Rotating Globescreen-reader - skip some navigation set

ABOUT FMSO
PUBLICATIONS
BOOK REVIEWS
RESEARCH LINKS
NEW STUFF
CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
Foreign Military Studies Office
604 Lowe Drive
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2322
WARNING!
The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Red Thrust Star Logo

*RED THRUST STAR

April 1996

Red Thurst Star OPFOR Logo

STAFF

Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment....COL Terry L. Tucker
Editor-in-Chief.......................................................Mr. Allen E. Curtis
Associate Editor....................................................CPT Scott C.Janzen
Managing Editor..................................................SPC Jeffrey S. Booth


RED THRUST STAR is published for the U.S. Forces Command OPFOR Training Program by S-2, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA 92310-5031. The purpose of the RED THRUST STAR is to publish timely, authoritative information on OPFOR training to increase the knowledge and understanding of OPFOR training throughout the Armed Forces. Articles published reflect views of the authors and should not be interpreted as official opinion of the Department of the Army, or of any branch, command, or agency of the Army. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to RED THRUST STAR and to the author(s), except where copyright is indicated. Articles, photographs, and new items of interest on all facets of OPFOR training are solicited. Direct communication is authorized to : Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, ATTN: AFZJ-AC-RT, Fort Irwin, CA 92310-5031, tel. (619)380-5289, or DSN 470-5289, FAX: (619)380-5127. Subscriptions are available to battalion size or larger units, as well as to training and readiness staffs, from the same address. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. RED THRUST STAR is published quarterly.
This medium is approved for the official dissemination of OPFOR related material.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
DENNIS J. REIMER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official
JOEL B. HUDSON
Acting Administration Assistant to
the Secretary of the Army 02030
Distribution: Special

BULLETIN CONTENTS

  1. Greetings Comrades
    BY COL TERRY L. TUCKER
    COMMANDER, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

  2. The Battle of the Washboard
    BY LTC CHRISTOPHER L. BAGGOT
    COMMANDER, 1ST SQUADRON
    AND MAJ PETER R. MANSOOR
    S-3, 1ST SQUADRON,
    AND CPT STEVE MANDES
    COMPANY D, 1ST SQUADRON
    11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

  3. The Chechen War: Part I
    BY 2LT JAMES REED
    ASSISTANT REGIMENTAL S-2
    11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

  4. Threat Update: 2A45M "Sprut-B" Antitank Gun
    BY WO2 BRUCE DEJONG
    INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION SECTION
    11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

  5. OPFOR Augmentee Engineer Support at the
    National Training Center
    BY MAJ STEVEN D. HARMON
    REGIMENTAL ENGINEER
    11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

  6. Genforce Tactics, Part 1
    BY MR. CHARLES J. DICK
    CONFLICT STUDIES RESEARCH CENTER
    ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY SANDHURST
    CAMBERLEY, UNITED KINGDOM

  7. Red Thrust Points of Contact

Greetings Comrades

Well, comrades, this is the last issue of the bulletin that will be printed during my time in command of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, I've enjoyed serving as the National Training Center opposing forces "Commander, 60th Guards Motorized Rifle Division". It's been an illuminating two years, during which I've had the opportunity to learn a great deal from observing units train here In the desert. I'm also confident that the NTC OPFOR has done a great job during this period training rotational units, and I'm happy that we are able to pass on a few of the OPFOR's lessons learned in this bulletin.

Lieutenant Colonol Chris Baggott, 1st Squadron Commander, along with his S-3, Major Pete Mansoor (now the Regimental S-3), and his D Company Commander, Captain Steve Mandes, have another excellent article for this issue. They describe in depth an OPFOR mission to attack through the rough terrain of the NTC's "Washboard". I'm sure that you will appreciate this detailed look at OPFOR regimental planning and execution. Lieutenant Colonel Baggott just completed his last rotation before giving up command of the squadron in June. Thanks to him not only for a superb job commanding the OPFOR regiment every alternate rotation, but for sharing his knowledge with all of you.

I am sure that most of us have watched the television coverage of the pattern of the Russian Army's operations in Chechnya, and noted once again the difficulties that a highly-motivated enemy can pose to a modern, mechanized force. We may however have wondered how the situation in Chechnya
by COL Terry L. Tucker

COL Terry L. Tucker

COL Terry L. Tucker

came about, and in his article, Lieutenant Jim Reed of the regimental S-2 section provides the background to the current conflict. His article will continue in subsequent issues.

The threat update in this issue is once again by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Bruce DeJong of the regimental S-2s intelligence production section. He covers the 2A45M "Sprut-B" 125-mm antitank gun. The NTC OPFOR converted its mockup MT-12 antitank guns to 2A45Ms earlier this year. Although they do not have the full ATGM capability of the real weapon, they often provide a deadly surprise to rotational units. Chief DeJong is also departing the regiment this summer, and his expertise will be greatly missed.

Some of the most important helping hands that come to augment the NTC OPFOR each rotation are those of the engineers. Without them the OPFOR would be hard pressed to adequately prepare defensive positions, to emplace obstacles, and to conduct mobility operations in the attack. Major Steve Harmon, the regimental engineer, describes what engineer units coming to the NTC to augment the OPFOR need to know in order to properly prepare.

The U.S. Army is not the only army with an active opposing force program. Our allies in the British Army have developed two different opposing force models for various levels of training: a generic force, or "Genforce", fairly similar to our Heavy (Armor/Mechanized) OPFOR Model; and "Genforce II", which anticipates the demands of future war for British Army simulations and exercises. Mr. Charles Dick, head of the British Armys Conflict Studies Research Center at Sandhurst, is a frequent contributor to the bulletin. Also the author of the "Genforce II" tactics manual, he has offered to share a portion of the manual to show what the British Army will be training against as a futuristic adversary. I believe you will find this not only interesting as a training tool, but also an insightful analysis of the nature of future war, offering possible means of dealing with the challenges of a dramatically different military environment.

As I prepare to say farewell to the regiment, let me assure you that the past two years have been professionally rewarding and challenging, and that there aren't many jobs in the Army that are more enjoyable and fulfilling on a daily basis than commanding the NTC OPFOR. Allons!

The Battle of the Washboard

LTC CHRISTOPHER L. BAGGOTT
COMMANDER
1ST SQUADRON,
AND MAJ PETER R. MANSOOR
S-3, 1ST SQUADRON,
AND CPT STEVE MANDES
COMMANDER
COMPANY D, 1ST SQUADRON,
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

The Scenario

The United Nations resolutions and the resulting embargo, combined with the deployment of rapid deployment forces from the United States, did not bode well for the People's Republic of Krasnovia. Based on the experiences of the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, every day the Krasnovians waited they became weaker and the Americans stronger. Therefore, the Politburo committed two combined-arms armies to the offensive with adequate aviation assets, and granted authorization for the release of chemical munitions down to division commanders.

The decision resulted in spasms of frenzied planning and demands to the Central Front headquarters for more intelligence. The 11th Combined Arms Army (CAA) planned to attack with three motorized rifle divisions abreast and a tank division in reserve. It's main axis of advance was along Highways 15 and 40. The 60th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (GMRD) was assigned a zone of attack to the north of this and designated the supporting effort. Knowing the enemy would only be able to emplace a partially prepared defense, the 60th GMRD Commander elected to attack with three motorized rifle regiments (MRR) abreast and a tank regiment in the second echelon.

The 60th GMRD Commander decided to focus his main effort

The deployment of rapid deployment forces from the United States did not bode well for the Peoples Republic of Krasnovia.


(two MRRs) along an axis east and south of Fort Irwin Military City because the ground was more open and offered better opportunities for dispersion and speed in movement. He assigned the 125th Guards Tank Regiment (GTR)1 a large zone of attack and the role of supporting effort to protect the northern flank of the divisions main effort.

Upon receipt of his division order, the 125th GTR commander was crestfallen. His area of operations extended from Fort Irwin Military City north to the Granite Mountains, a width of twenty-five kilometers. The 125th GTR commander, in consultation with the 60th GMRD commander, attempted to clarify his mission and requested additional combat power. Although the 125th GTR was the divisions supporting effort, the MRD Commander grudgingly offered the use of a tank company of ten T-80s from the second-echelon tank regiment, and allocated one persistent chemical target, two remotely-delivered mine (RDM) targets, six non-persistent chemical strikes, and four sorties of Su-25/

An attack aviation battalion of Apache heilcopters was available to prevent any penetrations of the brigades rear boundary.


FROGFOOT ground attack aircraft.

The MRD commander stated that the sooner the enemy lost his forward area rearm/refuel point (FARP) and brigade support area (BSA), the fewer losses the MRD would sustain. The regimental commander returned to his staff to initiate planning. "This is not going to be easy," he mused.

METT-T Analysis

Mission: 125th Guards Tank Regiment attacks 230645***96 to penetrate enemy forces and seize key terrain vicinity NK 2023.2

Enemy: Front intelligence and Parumphian irregulars reported an entire U.S. Army heavy brigade preparing a defense in sector. The brigade's combat power consisted of one armor and one mechanized infantry task force with a battalion of 155-mm self-propelled (SP) howitzers in direct support and another battalion of 155-mm SP howitzers in a reinforcing role. An attack aviation battalion of Apache helicopters was available to prevent any penetrations of the brigades rear boundary.

Terrain: The area of operations was mountainous desert. The zone of attack was approximately twenty-five kilometers in width but offered only three avenues of approach (Figure 1). The Northern Corridor traversed through three narrow defiles before opening up into two battalion corridors (Echo and Drinkwater Valleys) but then constricted into a narrow defile (Alpine Valley) before reaching the objective area. The Central Corridor was open, allowing a regimental frontage across Barstow Road until it narrowed at Brown and Debnam Passes. To the west of the passes, the Central Corridor again opened up into a regimental avenue extending to the objective area. The southern avenue extended south of the pass complex and consisted of a rugged wadi complex, nicknamed the "Washboard", which offered tough going until the objective area was reached. The terrain favored the defense, especially if the defender adopted a reverse slope approach and dug-in his vehicles.

Troops: The 125th Guards Tank Regiment consisted of four motorized rifle battalions (MRB), Each MRB contained ten T-80 main battle tanks and 28 EMPs. In addition, the regiment had an antitank battalion consisting of twelve AT-5s and obtained an additional ten T-80s from the MRD. The regimental reconnaissance company consisted of a tracked platoon of four BMPs and a wheeled platoon of four BRDMs, along with ground surveillance radar and chemical and engineer reconnaissance vehicles. Two movement support detachments, two mobile obstacle detachments, and an air defense battery rounded out the combat support elements. The division commander offered use of an air-assault company with Mi-8/HIP helicopters and a

The key to Krasnovian decision-making is scientific substantiation, i.e., the correlation of forces and means at decisive places and times.


dismounted AT-4 platoon. Artillery in the regimental artillery group (RAG) consisted of three battalions of 2S19s and one battalion of the older 2S1s. The division artillery group (DAG) contained one battalion of BM-21 rocket launchers and two battalions of 2S5 guns. In essence the 125th GTR was a fighting organization built for speed and short, sharp, violent action with a minimal logistics tail.

Time: The regimental staff had several days to plan and wargame multiple courses of action (COA). The 125th GTR commander would choose his COA after intelligence later confirmed the most likely enemy COA. When this was established the regiment would have no more than twenty-four hours to conduct rehearsals, prepare for combat, make the necessary coordination to ensure adequate troop control, orchestrate the successful massing of fires and special munitions, and synchronize other combat multipliers.

Doctrine

The key to Krasnovian decision making is scientific sub-stantiation, i.e., the correlation of forces and means at decisive places and times. In following the norms established for correlation of forces in a particular type of operation, probability for success is increased. Although the norms required for a regimental attack against a defending enemy call for a zone of advance of no more than fifteen kilometers and an attack frontage of no more than eight kilometers, the 125th GTR had to contend with a zone extending up to twenty-five kilometers.

Instead of the minimal doctrinal force ratio of 3:1, the 125th GTR was attacking the enemy at 1:1

figure 1

Figure 1


figure 2

Figure 2

odds. Success, therefore, was incumbent upon isolation of the enemy at the point of penetration, the achievement of mass against the enemy there, and rapid penetration into the depths of the enemys defensive sector.

The Plan

The most likely enemy COA was a defense with two task forces abreast with the main effort in the north defending reverse passes. A reserve company team under brigade control, positioned center of sector, would move to areas threatened by penetration. The enemy would accept risk in the far northern portion of his sector. The 125th GTR staff wargamed and planned three courses of action, described below.

COA 1

This option called for a point of penetration through Brown Pass. An air assault company--Task Force (TF) Angel--would insert behind the pass at last light and infiltrate to attack the company/team defending the pass from the rear. Another infantry company (TF Destroyer) would move on trucks to a dismount point short of the enemy's counter-reconnaissance line, then infiltrate to join TF Angels attack on the company/team defending behind Brown Pass. The regiment would attack with a reinforced forward detachment (FD) to seize Brown Pass, complete the destruction of the defending company/team, and establish secure breach lanes for

The most likely enemy COA was a defense with two task forces abreast with the main effort in the north defending reverse passes.


the regimental main body. The regiment would follow with two MRBs in the main body and one MRB(-) as a second echelon, move through the pass, deploy into battle formation, and attack to seize the regimental final objective from the north. The condition to execute this course of action was enemy weakness behind Brown Pass. The staff defined weakness as fewer than three company teams arrayed in the area bordered by Brown Pass, Debnam Pass, the Matterhorn, and Crash Hill.

COA 2

This option called for a penetration through the difficult wadi complex in the southern portion of the Central Corridor. TF Angel would fly deep at last light and land on the southern edge of the zone. The company would then move on foot to establish a firing line to the east of Chinaman's Hat to block the movement of the enemy's brigade reserve to the south. TF Destroyer would infiltrate during limited visibility to place fires on the initial point of penetration vicinity Brigade Hill. A reinforced FD would seize the initial point of penetration vicinity Brigade Hill/Hill 899, destroy the defending enemy company/team, and establish breach lanes through the enemy's obstacle belt. The regiment would then commit its first echelon of two MRBs into the Washboard and assault the final objective from the south. The second echelon of one MRB(-) would follow and assume the main effort. In addition, an MRB-slzed divisional enveloping detachment would penetrate Echo Valley and attempt to strike into the flank of the enemy brigade. The condition to execute this course of action was enemy weakness in the Washboard. The staff defined weakness as fewer than three company teams arrayed in the area bordered by Brigade Hill, Hill 899, Three Sisters Cut, and Hill 910.

The positioning of enemy reserves was crucial in this COA since an enemy company/team positioned at the western mouth of Alpine Valley could bottle the regiment up in that narrow area.


COA 3

This COA was a planned deep envelopment of the brigade. TF Destroyer would secure Refrigerator Gap on the regiment's line of march, while TF Angel air assaulted to fix enemy forces behind Brown Pass. An MRB would attack through the Central Corridor to fix forces while the regiment rapidly maneuvered through the Northern Corridor to force the narrow defile in Alpine Valley and seize the final objective from the rear. The conditions to execute this course of action was enemy weakness in the Northern Corridor, coupled with the absence of enemy reserves located to the north or west of Crash Hill. The staff defined weakness as one mechanized company/team or less in the Northern Corridor. The positioning of enemy reserves was crucial in this COA since an enemy company/team positioned at the western mouth of Alpine Valley could bottle the regiment up in that narrow area.

The Reconnaissance Fight (Part I)

The decision to select a specific course of action is always based upon enemy actions or events. The success of the regiment, therefore, is predicated on the success of the reconnaissance battle. The division reconnaissance battalion entered zone at 211830***96. Dismounted reconnaissance teams were dropped off at pre-planned observation posts to watch enemy preparations. One BMP and two

figure 3

Figure 3

BRDMs were destroyed by M2s as mounted reconnaissance patrols penetrated the brigade sector throughout the night and continued to infiltrate into the division rear, looking for FARPs and command posts. The intelligence obtained confirmed the most likely enemy course of action (Figure 1). Four enemy company teams positioned in the northern portion of the Central Corridor in prepared defensive positions eliminated COA 1. An armor team located near the western mouth of Alpine Valley eliminated COA 3. Division reconnaissance confirmed fewer than three company teams in the southern portion of the Central Corridor, however, and one of these was in a counter-reconnaissance screen to the east of Barstow Road. The conditions were set to execute COA 2.

Infiltration

TF Angel arrived at its assigned landing zone at approximately 221555***96 on the southern boundary of the zone in the wadi complex. The helicopters touched down after the completion of SEAD (suppression of enemy air defense) missions fired by the 2S7 guns of the army artillery aroup (AAG). The air assault was observed and engaged by a Stinger team positioned on the flank, which resulted in the loss of one platoon of infantry and one AT-4. Fortunately, the enemy apparently lost contact with TF Angel as it infiltrated north through the Washboard. By 2300 hours, TF Angel had established a blocking position along a significant intervisibility line to the east of Chinaman's Hat, thereby helping to seal the northern flank of the regiment's attack zone.

TF Destroyer began its infiltration at 221810***96. The company worked over high ground into the eastern mouth of Hidden Valley (Figure 2). At 2000 hours a firefight erupted with M2s in the security zone. TF Destroyer engaged with RPGs, but lost two

The scouts went to ground and waited for first light to call in initial spot reports and adjust Phase I fires. Eyes deeper in zone were established looking at the boundary between the two task forces and the objective area.


platoons to direct fire. Until the Bradley fighting vehicles withdrew, TF Destroyer would go nowhere.

The Reconnaissance Fight (Part II)

The regimental reconnaissance company moved into the enemy sector 221830***96 under cover of darkness. The infantry activity in the brigade security zone heightened the level of alert among the forces performing counter-reconnaissance. At 2130 hours two BMPs and four chemical and engineer reconnaissance BRDMs were destroyed, but by 0210 the next morning regimental reconnaissance had penetrated the enemy sector and had redundant eyes on both Brown Pass and Hill 899. The scouts went to ground and waited for first light to call in initial spot reports and adjust Phase I fires. Eyes deeper in zone were established looking at the

Su-25 aircraft came on station and were directed to drop their cluster bombs on the northern task force behind the passes, with special emphasis on any repositioning forces. The point of penetration was isolated.


boundary between the two task forces and the objective area.

Contact

Phase I fires (fire support of the movement forward) from the DAG erupted across the division frontage at 0515 hours, focusing on enemy combat observation laser teams (COLT) and fire support assets. The company team in the security zone pulled and moved back across Barstow Road. This was observed by regimental reconnaissance and reported to the chief of reconnaissance at first light. The regimental commander reaffirmed his commitment to COA 2 as the chief of artillery adjusted his timetable accordingly. At 0645 hours a persistent chemical agent fired by the AAG impacted along the boundary of the two task forces to the west of the Matterhorn to hinder reinforcement from the north. As the enemy brigade reacted to the introduction of chemical munitions into their sector, 4th MRB (+), acting as a forward detachment, crossed the line of departure.

As 4th MRB transitioned into prebattle formation, the RAG initiated Phase II fires (fire preparation) with multiple high explosive strikes on known enemy positions across the enemy's forward edge. Smoke missions were fired north of this by mortars to obscure observation from the rest of the task force. At 0715 hours anon-persistent blood agent was fired by the DAG on both flanks of the southern task force to force the enemy into mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP). An RDM minefield fired by the DAG impacted in the battle position vicinity Hill 910 to hinder reinforcement to the south. Su-25 aircraft came on station and were directed to drop their cluster bombs on the northern task force behind the passes, with special emphasis on any repositioning forces. The point of penetration was isolated.

The Assault

At 0715 hours the chief of artillery began Phase III fires (fire support of the attack) by shifting fires directly on Brigade Hill and firing multiple volleys of submunition rounds using all tubes available in both the DAG and the RAG. Massive concussions rocked the area as hundreds of rounds impacted on the unfortunate company/team defending there. The 4th MRB commander divided his forces (Figure 2). Two motorized rifle companies (MRCs) and one platoon of AT-5s maneuvered into the face of the defending armor team. The other two MRC's pushed into Hidden Valley, destroyed the two M1A1 tanks guarding the western mouth, conducted an in-stride breach of a Volcano minefield at the exit of the valley, transitioned into battle formation, and rapidly assaulted Brigade Hill from the south as the chief of artillery shifted fires to the north and west. One of the two northern MRCs conducted an in-stride breach of a tilt-rod minefield barring the regiment's direct route to Brigade Hill. A movement support detachment immediately moved to reduce the obstacle for the regimental main body. By 0800 hours the FD had consolidated on Brigade Hill and began to push west to Hill 899. The enemy company/team defending the area was dead. The assault had lasted approximately thirty minutes. The Regiment Commits

Phase III fires continued as the RAG fired strikes on Hill 910. The northern company/team lost three M1Als in the RDM minefield in a vain attempt to reinforce their brethren to the south. Su-25 aircraft continued to attack the northern task force as the enveloping detachment entered the brigade sector through the Northern Corridor. The success of the FD prompted the regimental commander to order the first

Elements of the air defense battalion started bounding west to position themselves prior to the expected commitment of the enemys attack helicopters. The race was on.


echelon through the point of penetration and into the Washboard (Figure 3). F-16s attacked the regimental main body as the air defense battalion responded with SA-14 missiles and 2S6 fire. The first echelon maintained prebattle formation through breaches in the enemy's obstacles and entered the Washboard at 0830 hours. The 7th Antitank Battalion (ATB) moved to guard the northern flank of the regiment as a mobile obstacle detachment under its control emplaced a minefield south of Hill 910. The chief of artillery requested his last RDM from the DAG and it impacted at 0850 hours next to the contaminated area to the west of the Matterhorn, overwatched by TF Angel.

The southern enemy task force committed its remaining teams to a counterattack, but fires from 4th MRB and 7th ATB destroyed them before they could reach their

By 0800 hours the FD had consolidated on Brigade Hill and began to push west to Hill 899. The enemy company/team defending the area was dead. The assault had lasted approximately thirty minutes.


objective. At 0900 hours the second echelon entered the Washboard, thirty minutes behind the main body. As the regiment moved slowly through the Washboard, 1st MRB conducted a moving flank guard to the north by deploying Into battle formation and clearing the wadis with multiple forward patrols. This provided security for the regiment in ground that permitted forces to move unobserved. The RAG started moving along the axis of advance to occupy positions for Phase lV fires (fire accompaniment) by leap-frogging battalions while sustaining fires on known locations of the northern task force. Elements of the air defense battalion started bounding west to position themselves prior to the expected commitment of the enemy's attack helicopters. The race was on.

The Enemy Reacts

The task of the enveloping detachment in the north was to fix the enemy's northern task force to allow the regiment to move unhindered through the Washboard. To accomplish this mission with only one tank company was a tall order. The tank company commander decided to split his force, with each of his tank platoons forcing their way through a separate defile on the flank of the northern task force. Their presence deceived the enemy just long enough to prevent prompt reinforcement at the decisive point to the south. At 0945 hours the regimental commander instructed the chief of artillery to request another nonpersistent chemical strike on the northern task force as he slowed the regiment's advance to give the air defense assets time to get into position to support the final advance onto the objective.

As the regiment crested the final wadi in the Washboard, it came upon an amazing scene. Arrayed below it approximately 2000 meters to its front was the enemy's brigade support area(BSA).

Pockets of attack helicopters, both in the air and on the ground, dotted the landscape. The regiment moved quickly enough to overrun a few before they could lift off. Others moved south out of range of the T-80s, only to find themselves engaged by SA-14 teams moving forward along the south wall. 1st MRB positioned itself to engage enemy forces repositioning from the northern task force and finally linked-up with TF Angel, eighteen hours after its air assault mission began.

Mission Accomplished

While 1st MRB engaged a repositioning company/team north of Nelson Lake, 2nd MRB came into contact with another repositioning armor team to the west. Sabot petals and green tracers tore through the BSA that was located between the converging forces. Multiple RAG strikes reduced the BSA to a smoking ruin. 3rd and 4th MRBs moved to reinforce the main body. The regiment massed maximum combat power forward with four MRBs in battle formation poised to assault directly northwest. Slowly the MRB commanders inched their elements forward, testing the attack helicopters and the scattered enemy forces. RAG fires chased the enemy tank team as it positioned on the friendly side of it's threatened BSA. Weight of numbers prevailed, and a sudden rush from 4th MRB brought It to the edge of the BSA. Infantrymen from its BMPs dismounted to clear the area tent-by-tent. 3rd MRB enveloped the enemy armor team from the south and by 1130 hours had destroyed it. Enemy attack helicopters broke station. The regiment had seized its objective with over sixty percent of its combat power still intact.

Conclusions

This dramatic description of an actual battle at the National Training Center is designed to offer insights in the art and science of synchronizing assets to achieve

The 125th GTR focuses reconnaissance and surveillance assets throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield. The most important focus is to identify the laydown of the enemy's company/team battle positions.


success at the decisive time and place on the battlefield--at the point of penetration. The following paragraphs detail what the 125th Guards Tank Regiment believes are the essential prerequisites for a successful penetration of a defending enemy.

Reconnaissance

The 125th GTR focuses reconnaissance and surveillance assets throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield. The most important focus is to identify the laydown of the enemy's company/team battle positions. Without this information, the regiment cannot identify defensive weaknesses and therefore must guess as to which course of action will bring success. In this particular battle, the regiment understood early that the enemy's principal focus was to defend the reverse side of Brown and Debnam

Everyone in the 125th GTR understands that they are part of the reconnaissance effort and if reconnaissance fails (as it has in the past) you must reconstitute assets to fill the void--taking forces from the main body if necessary.


Passes with four company teams plus a brigade reserve. The task force in the south defended well forward with no combat elements in depth in the Washboard. This successful reconnaissance effort enabled the regimental commander to clearly visualize the battlefield and decide on a course of action. Everyone in the 125th GTR understands that they are part of the reconnaissance effort and if reconnaissance fails (as it has in the past) you must reconstitute assets to fill the void--taking forces from the main body if necessary.

Isolating the Point of Penetration

To penetrate a prepared defense, an attacking unit must mass its forces at a single point of penetration to overwhelm the enemy there. The German army in World War II called this area the schwerpunkt; more recently, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam would urge its units to "find the bastards, then pile on." Any way one puts it, you cannot penetrate a defending enemy at 1:1 odds without isolating the enemy company/team defending the point of penetration and "piling on with every asset and your disposal to ensure its destruction.

In this battle, the regimental commander used his special munitions (persistent chemical agents and RDM) and air assault forces to divide the battlefield in two. These assets sealed the flank and hindered the repositioning of enemy forces that could disrupt the regiments advance. Although unsuccessful, TF Destroyer deployed during limited visibility to reduce enemy obstacles and destroy enemy forces at the point of penetration. Massed artillery fires, accurately placed by reconnaissance elements with eyes on the target, pounded the point of penetration with multiple volleys. The enveloping detachment and close air support were used to fix forces away from the point of penetration. Smoke lines and nonpersistent chemical agents disrupted enemy command and control and further isolated the point of penetration. A reinforced MRB acting as a FD attacked with one objective in mind-to destroy the enemy at the point of penetration. The point should be clear by now. To be successful, the 125th GTR believes in focusing all of its energy and forces on the destruction of a single company/team at a time and place of its own choosing. Conversely, the Regiment must prevent the enemy from reinforcing its forces at the point of penetration by isolating the forces located there.

Planning and Rehearsals

The 125th GTR plans its operations deliberately and rehearses them thoroughly. The regiment will always have at least two courses of action and often as many as four. These COAs are enemy dependent--thus the importance of precise reconnaissance. Success for the regimental reconnaissance company means that they give the chief of reconnaissance a ninety-percent read on enemy strengths and locations. Armed with this information, the regimental staff can synchronize the regiments assets to take advantage of enemy weaknesses. The regimental commander can choose a COA early and it will be briefed and rehearsed at every level from regiment to vehicle crew.

Rehearsals are "battle drills" in the 125th GTR. We take them seriously for we believe that they are the most important part of the orders process. The details of how the 125th GTR conducts rehearsals will not be covered here, but one fact is important. 3 We begin every rehearsal by telling the assembled leaders, "This is a rehearsal, not a wargame." Unless the chief of operations is ruthless in enforcing this dictum, the plan will unravel and leaders will lose focus. General George S. Patton,

To be successful, the 125th GTR believes in focusing all of its energy and forces on the destruction of a single company/team at a time and place of its own choosing.


Jr. cautioned his officers not to take counsel of their fears. Once the regiment decides on a COA based on the best available intelligence, it implements the plan to the best of its ability without significant modification.

Penetrating to the Depth of the Enemy's Defense

Since the 125th GTR must attack defending enemy brigades at 1:1 odds, we often face the need to penetrate more than one company/team on the battlefield. Two and even three points of penetration are not uncommon if the enemy is arrayed in echelon. The regiment has developed techniques to force multiple points of penetration. These include shifting Phase III fires (artillery, close air support, and electronic warfare) onto subsequent points of penetration while the direct-fire battle is ongoing at the initial point

General George S. Patton, Jr. cautioned his officers not to take counsel of their fears. Once the regiment decides on a COA based on the best available intelligence, it implements the plan to the best of its ability without signficant modification.


of penetration, focusing TF Angel deeper in zone, using enveloping detachments against enemy elements arrayed in depth, and timing the movement of the regimental main body to enable it to gain its mass before hitting the second or subsequent point of penetration. Slowing the advance of the main body is especially important to allow air defense assets to work forward if the enemy forces contain significant attack helicopter assets. In short, the attacker must maintain his momentum, which does not always equate to maintaining a high rate of speed.

Battle Drills and Standard Operating Procedures

We will say little about these here except to state that they are the difference between winning and losing at the small unit level. The authors hope that this article will provoke some thought on the science and art of synchronizing combat power in a high intensity combat environment. The battles at the National Training Center continually remind us of the importance of training, the difficulty of the profession of arms (despite Clausewitzs assertion that "everything in war is simple"), and the deadly nature of the modern battlefield.

Endnotes:

1. An honorific title earned in the Great Patriotic War. The 125th GTR is configured as a standard motorized rifle regiment.

2.The month has been sanitized, from the date-time group to avoid identifying the NTC rotation described in the article.

3. See CPT Mandes's article on OPFOR rehearsals in PB30-96-1 (January 1996).

The Chechen War: Part I

BY 2LT JAMES REED
ASSISTANT REGIMENTAL S-2
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY
REGIMENT

In Part I of a three part series on the recent Chechen War, we'll conduct an historical overview leading to the start of the war. Part II will focus on the main Russian attack on the capital city of Grozny. Part III will explore Russian lessons learned.

Background

In 1991 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) disbanded, and in its place arose twelve independent nation states. The largest state was Russia, measuring over 6,000 miles from West to East. The other eleven independent states were: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. All twelve of the independent states grouped together is called the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The independent state of Russia calls itself the Russian Federation (RF), and includes many republics. Chechnya is one such republic. One of the southernmost republics within Russia, it is surrounded by Georgia to the west, Azerbaijan to the south, Dagestan to the east, and Russia to the north. In 1994 Chechnya attempted to break away politically and economically from Russia. The conflict that followed is now called the Chechen War.

Chechnya

The seeds of the Chechen War were planted as early as 1772. It was in this year that Peter I of Russia, during his Persian campaign, spent time in Chechnya. He encouraged economic and cultural exchange with Russia. However, as Russia began to wield

In 1994 Chechnya attempted to break away politically and economically from Russia.


stronger control, and as tribal ways were replaced by more modern Russian methods, a national Chechen liberation movement began to emerge. Then, during the long Caucasian War (1817-1864) military colonialization in the area increased. As the Chechen people were driven more into the mountains, the Russian-protected Cossacks were allowed to move into and settle the fertile Chechen lowlands. This only fueled hatred for Russia.

Several minor uprisings took place in the 1860s and 1870s; however, the Caucasian War brought Chechnya, and surrounding areas, positively under Russian control. They had finally become incorporated into Russia politically and economically.

The last two decades of the 1800s brought tremendous change to the republic. In 1893 oil was discovered near Grozny, and it was oil that truly ushered Chechnya into the industrial age.

Chechens participated heavily in WWII. The Germans came within miles of Grozny at one point, and thirty-six Chechens were awarded Russia's highest combat honor, The Hero of the Soviet Union.


Had it not been for this discovery, Chechnya might never have developed into anything more than a handful of small backwoods villages.

As commercial and industrial enterprises began to develop, more and more Russians poured into the region. Industrialization only created a new class structure; as the Russians became the working class and the Chechens became the peasant class.

After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, socialism quickly spread over all of Russias territories. What is important to note is that the Chechens have socialism and oil to thank for building Chechnya into a semi-modern Russian republic. It was during this "Soviet Period" (1917-1991) in Chechen history that the culture underwent a radical transformation. Illiteracy was completely eliminated, a writing system was created for the Chechen language, a political structure came into being, and artistic expression flourished.

All the socialist construction projects over the years have transformed Chechnya into a republic with large oil refineries, chemical factories, machine building plants, and canneries. Huge deposits of oil and natural gas have been found around the cities of Grozny, Malgobek, and Gudermes. Oil extraction and refining, machine building, chemical factories, metalworking, and four large power plants provided good jobs for those (mostly Russians) who took them. There were also two large universities in Grozny.

The republic is divided into fourteen counties, has five cities, and four small towns. The people are Muslim, primarily Sunni, with several Sufi clans in the mountain counties.

Chechens participated heavily in WWII. The Germans came within miles of Grozny at one point, and thirty-six Chechens were awarded Russia's highest combat honor, The Hero of the Soviet Union.

Tensions Build

Prior to the winter 1994 attack, political tensions were high in Chechnya. Since the breakup of the USSR many different factions had been attempting to gain control. By 1994 one man, Dzhokar Dudayev, had gained enough political and military support within the tiny republic to proclaim that Chechnya was now an independent nation state. Dudayev made this proclamation, and risked Russian persecution, knowing full well what he was doing. He knew two things for certain. First, he knew he had the support of the tiny Chechen military, and could count on them to be loyal. Second, he knew that Russia would have to send in troops if she wanted to stop him, and that doing so might very well

What made it so easy for Dudayev to maintain control during this period was that all of these groups had their own independent agendas and could find no way to unite.


set off an Islamic holy war throughout the Northern Caucasus against Russia.

Russia was not surprised by Dudayevs declaration of independence. She had watched from 1991 to 1994 as Chechnya slowly deteriorated politically and economically. By December of 1994 Dudayev had been in power for almost three years, and had been growing ever bolder in his push for Chechen independence. Russia, on the other hand, was covertly financing several opposition groups. These opposition groups which had been fighting politically and militarily against Dudayev in a slowly smoldering civil war included:

-Umar Avturkhanov's pro-Russian Chechnya Interim Council,

-Ruslan Khasbulatov's Peace Group,

-Ruslan Labazonovs armed faction,

-Besland Kantemirovs armed faction,

-and organized crime in Grozny.

What made it so easy for Dudayev to maintain control during this period was that all of these groups had their own independent agendas and could find no way to unite. Dudayev knew the Russians were financing and arming these groups and often attacked Moscow in public forum for doing so. He used the media during his tenure to condition the people into distrusting the Russians and to prepare them for

map 1

Map 1

the inevitable attack by Russian troops that would someday come.

The Russian View

From Russia's perspective Chechnya had been rapidly falling to pieces since the 1991 breakup of the USSR. She was concerned that the civil and political strife in the republic might either spill over into neighboring republics, or else somehow jeopardize the flow of outgoing oil from Chechnya. It is important to note how powerful a role oil played in this conflict. Had it not been for Chechnya's oil production, the tiny republic would probably have been spared the bloodbath caused by the Russian attack. Russia might have simply let Chechnya slip away into independence quietly.

Several other factors had to be taken into consideration by the Russians before they could make the decision to use military force against Chechnya. Russia believed that the situation of civil unrest and the declaration of independence made for the most serious case of lawlessness and mutiny within the Russian Federation. Dudayev was attempting to gain support from other republics and CIS states nearby, and Russia knew that if he

Chechnya was "ruled by generals, controlled by gangsters, patrolled by highly armed teenage psychopaths, awash with oil money, and undermined by Russians."


was successful, then this type of lawlessness, civil war, and anarchy could easily bring to life long-suppressed rage in the Islamic community against years of Soviet tyranny. Potentially, all of the Northern Caucasus could erupt, from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea.

Russia also knew that Dudayevs regime had plunged Chechnya into a political and economic black hole. He effectively banned the Chechen Parliament, allowed organized crime to thrive and go unchallenged, and let the unemployment rate skyrocket to over fifty percent. The situation had gotten so bad that in August, 1994, a journalist from the Grozny Daily Telegraph described the situation in the city as, "...being

Chechen and Neighboring Republics

Map 2

ruled by generals, controlled by gangsters, patrolled by highly armed teenage psychopaths, awash with oil money, and undermined by Russians."1

With everything being as bad as it was in Chechnya, still there were reasons for not using military force to restore order. First, given enough time, the opposition factions in the republic would see to the eventual downfall of Dudayev. Second, a Russian military move against Dudayev could ignite an Islamic holy war in neighboring republics. Lastly, even if it did not ignite a holy war, still, the Chechen mountain tribes could sustain a long and disciplined campaign of attrition against Russian occupation troops. These groups would clearly see Russian intervention as an attack not against Dudayev, but against their towns, homes, and families.

One more consideration is important to note. The Russians had recently implemented a new military doctrine to "protect near abroad". This new doctrine may have been the deciding factor.2

The Chechen War

29 July 1994: Russia issues a statement that, "...the situation in Chechnya is practically out of control. ..if violence is used against citizens of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Chechnya...it will be obliged to protect these citizens of Russia..."

3 August: Amid several Chechen reports of the buildup of Russian troops along the Russo-Chechen boarder, Russia issues an official statement denying any buildup.

7 August: Russia suspends all air flights to and from Russian airports and Grozny.

28 August: Dudayev announces that he has within his possession a copy of an official document signed by Yeltsin that authorizes the expenditure of 150 billion rubles to be used for subversion against Chechnya.

29 August: The Russian minister for nationalities and regional policy invites Chechen officials to Moscow, and claims that Russian troops will not be used in Chechnya.

5 September Chechen journalists interview a captured Russian officer, Sergey Terekhov, who claims he came to Chechnya to coordinate the work of opposition groups.

29 September: Umar Avturkhanov, leader of the pro-Russian Chechnya Interim Council, announces that anti-Dudayev forces have a large batch of Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters, and that they came from one of the states in the CIS.

30 September: Anti-Dudayev forces (opposition forces) attack the Grozny airport and call on Dudayev to surrender. Dudayev claims Russian troops were involved in the attack, and that unless Russia denies any responsibility for involvement Chechen terrorists will carry out attacks in Russian cities, including Moscow. He also calls on the Chechen people to defend Chechnya's Independence.

1 October: Pro-Dudayev forces begin reinforcing Grozny.

2 October: Umar Avturkhanov confirms his intention to storm Grozny.

3 October: Avturkhanov launches a ground and helicopter attack on the outskirts of Grozny.

9 October: Another helicopter attack near Grozny by Avturkhanov.

16 October: At a rally, Dudayev tells Chechens to unite under the banner of Islam.

19 October: Dudayev launches an offensive against opposition forces.

10 November: Dudayev announces that he will step down from power only if Russia will recognize Chechnya as an independent state.

21 November: opposition forces spokesman claims that Grozny will be taken by the end of November, and that the opposition forces are fully in control of the situation in Chechnya.

30 September: Anti-Dudayev forces (opposition forces) attack the Grozny airport and call on Dudayev to surrender. Dudayev claims Russian troops were involved in the attack.


23 November: Dudayev claims that twenty to twenty-five tanks entered Chechnya from Russia.

25/26 November: opposition forces attack Grozny with tanks and helicopters. Dudayev mobilizes the Chechen militia. He claims the attack has been defeated, and that 120 soldiers, including 58 Russian servicemen, have been captured. A Russian Army officer, Lt-Gen Potapov, claims there are no Russian servicemen taking part in actions in Chechnya.

28 November: Russian Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev, claims there have been no Russian servicemen in Chechnya.

29 November: Yeltsin announces that the Chechnya situation is now dangerously close to becoming a vital Russian interest. This is also the day that most believe Yeltsin gave the go-ahead for active Russian military intervention.

3 December: Russian television airs an interview with Russian

21 November: opposition forces spokesman claims that Grozny will be taken by the end of November, and that the opposition forces are fully in control of the situation in Chechnya.


prisoners of war (POW) in Chechnya. They are angry at Russia's denial of their existence.

4 December: Maj-Gen Polyakov, commander of the Kantemirov tank division, resigns in protest over his soldiers having been recruited for operations in Chechnya.

6 December: Amid the denial of Russian involvement, Russian government officials fly to Chechnya, hoping to secure the release of the POWs. They return with seven live and three dead servicemen.

8 December: All remaining POWs are released.

10 December: Russia's Defense Ministry closes off Chechnya's borders.

11 December: Russian armored columns enter Chechnya from three places; Ingushetia, North Osetia, and Daghestan. The two from Ingushetia and Daghestan are reportedly blocked by the Chechens.

Author's Note:In Part II we'll pick up the Russian attack into the heart of Chechnya.

Endnotes:

1. Central and Eastern Europe, Today and Tomorrow, 1995/96 (Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Center, 1995), p. 16-7.
2. Ibid., p. 16-12.

References:

1. Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Third Edition, Volume 29 (New York: Macmillan 1982), pp 79-85.
2. Dr. Mark A. Smith, "A Chronology of the Chechen Conflict", Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, United Kingdom, June 1995.
3. Central and Eastern Europe, Today and Tomorrow, 1995/96 (Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Center, 1995).

Threat Update: 2A45M "Sprut-B" Antitank Gun

BY CW2 BRUCE DEJONG
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
SECTION
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY
REGIMENT

Introduction

In early 1993, Russia introduced a new towed antitank gun. This weapon, designated the 2A45M, and nicknamed "Sprut-B" (Sprut is the Russian word for octopus), could replace the 100-mm T-12 and MT-12 antitank guns currently used in Russia and many other countries that have received military assistance from Russia.

The capability of the T-12/MT-12, which entered service in 1955, to penetrate modern western armor had been limited for some time. Therefore in the late 1980's, Russian leaders decided it was necessary to develop and field a more capable system.

"Sprut" is the Russian word for octopus.


To fulfill this requirement, the V.F. Petrov Design Bureau was tasked to layout an antitank gun that was effective, reliable, relatively inexpensive and capable of destroying modern armored combat vehicles. Cost was also a significant concern. As a result, the 2A45M, a 125-mm smoothbore antitank gun, was developed. The V.F. Petrov Design Bureau has also designed the 122-mm D-30 howitzer and many tank main guns.2

Carriage

The carriage design for the 2A45M is based on the 122mm D-30 towed howitzer carriage that has been in service with Russia and many other countries for over 30 years. A 125-mm smoothbore gun, used in Russian main battle tanks (MBTs) since the T-64, has replaced the 122-mm rifled-bore tube of the D-30. Other modifications include a thermal sleeve, a large "T" type muzzle brake, and a towing eye mounted underneath the gun barrel.3

In the deployment configuration, the weapon rests on three trails. These trails are normally staked to the ground to increase the stability while firing. The 2A45M also contains a sloped shield that protects the crew from small arms fire and shell fragments.

The 2A45M uses a hydraulic recoil brake, a control plunger type of counterrecoil, and a pneumatic recuperator. This system provides reliable braking and significantly reduces the Impact to the carriage after around is fired.

Armament

The Sprut-B has the capability to deliver extremely accurate

2A45M in firing position

2A45M in firing position.

Nomenclature Type Muzzle Velocity Round Weight
BM-17 APFSDS 1700 m/sec 20.7 kg
BK-10 HEAT 905 m/sec 29.6 kg
OF-36 HE 850 m/sec 32.5 kg
Figure 1. Rounds Carried and Employed with the 2A45M6.

aimed fire at a rate of six to eight rounds per minute. It probably has a sixty-round unit of fire, of which six are carried with the gun. Once in the firing or deployment configuration, the broad base offers large laying angles both in elevation (-6 to +25 degrees) and deflection (360 degrees).4

Ammunition

The 2A45M is also equipped with a safety device that prevents the round from firing if the breech is not completely closed. The breech is opened manually for the first round and then opens automatically through recoil energy. This process positions the firing pin and also ejects the spent shell casing.

The Sprut-B fires the same family of separate-loading type (projectile and cartridge) ammunition as the modern MBTs (See Figure 1). The APFSDS projectile is used to engage MBTs and has an effective range of 2100 meters. An HE-Frag projectile is used to engage enemy personnel and other general battlefield targets. A HEAT projectile will defeat first generation MBTs such as the M60 and M48 unless they are fitted with explosive reactive armor (ERA). Although it is not a primary role, the 2A45M is also capable of engaging targets with indirect fires. Maximum range in the indirect fire role is 12,200 meters. 5

The 2A45M system can also employ one of the 125-mm laser-guided antitank guided missiles (ATGM) that are fired from the latest MBTs. The 9K120 "Refleks", known in the West as the AT-11/SNIPER, is a laser beam-riding ATGM that is currently fired from the T-72/80/90 MBTs. This round enables the 2A45M to strike targets at distances up to 5,000 meters away. If these rounds are carried, the system will be fitted with special 9S53 type of gear that guides the AT-11/SNIPER to its target.7

Sights

The sights utilized by the Sprut-B consist of the daytime OP4M-48A optical sight for direct fire engagements and the 1PN53-1 image intensification sight for night engagements. The system also contains the 2TS33 iron sight and the PG-1M panoramic sight that are used together when firing on targets in the indirect fire mode and also as a backup in case the primary sites malfunction.

2A45M in towing position

2A45M in towing position.

2A45M in firing position showing breech and fire controls

2A45M in firing position showing breech and fire controls.

Prime Mover

The seven-member crew and combat equipment is transported from assembly areas to firing positions with the MT-LB tracked prime mover, or the Ural-4320 6x6 truck, which serves as the prime mover for the 2A45M. Maximum speed during highway movement is eighty kilometers per hour.

The prime mover transports the crew and ammunition as close to the firing position as possible. Once the gun is near its firing position, a small wheel on one of the trails is lowered and an auxiliary power unit (APU) propels the 2A45M into its designated firing position. Maximum speed during self-propulsion is ten kilometers per hour over dry dirt roads. This APU consists of a MeMZ-967A gas engine with a hydraulic drive. It is mounted under a special housing on the right side and can propel the system fifty kilometers before refueling is required. The driver's seat and systems for controlling the gun during self propulsion are installed on the left side of the frame.

Deployment

The 2A45M has a mechanical-over-hydraulic system for transferring the system from traveling to firing configuration and back. A hydraulic jack is used to raise the carriage so that the trail legs can be positioned. Hydraulic cylinders also elevate the gun for proper clearance and raise and lower the wheels. A hydraulic pump driven from the power unit or a manual pump can be used to change configurations. It requires 1.5 minutes to place into operation and two minutes to return it to traveling configuration. 8

Organization

The 2A45M is found at regimental level in the antitank battalion. The combat power of the battalion comes from an ATGM battery and an antitank gun battery. The 2A45M equips two antitankgun platoons subordinate to the battery. Antitank gun batteries containing 2A45M guns are also likely to be found with the divisional antitank battalion, and army or front level antitank regiments.9

NTC Replication

During Rotation 96-04 (January 1996), the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment upgraded its OPFOR antitank capability by introducing the 2A45M. These replaced the MT-12 on a one-for-one basis. The OPFOR regiment's antitank battalion now fields six 2A45M alongside their ATGM vehicles. They are currently fitted with the T-80 MILES laser transmitter. Current replication does not include the ATGM capability. The OPFOR has not altered its employment of the antitank reserve. However, once the full capabilities of the system are achieved, this system will offer the OPFOR commander the ability to engage heavy armored targets at a significantly increased range. For additional information on the NTC OPFOR's employment and mission of antitank subunits, see PB-30-94-4 (January 1995), PB-30-95-1 (April 1995), PB-30-95-2 (July 1995), PB-30-95-3 (October 1995).

Endnotes

1. Major Sergei Samoyluk, "Sprut protiv tankov [Sprut against Tanks]", Armeyskiy sbornik [Army Review] 3/1995, pp. 84-85 and rear cover.
2. Christopher Foss, editor, Jane's Armour and Artillery 1994-95 (London: Jane's, 1994), p. 596.
3. Ibid.
4. Samoylyuk, op. cit.
5. Ibid.
6. Foss, op. cit.
7. Samoylyuk, op. cit.
8. Ibid.
9. U.S. Army Combined Arms Command and Fort Leavemvorth Pamphlet 350-1, Heavy Opposing Force (OPFOR) Organization Guide, 24 September 1993, pp. 36-38.

OPFOR Augmentee Engineer
Support at the National Training
Center

BY MAJ STEVEN D. HARMON
REGIMENTAL ENGINEER
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY
REGIMENT

Every month, an engineer company from within the continental United States trains at the National Training Center (NTC) as the augmentee engineer company that supports the Opposing Force (OPFOR) at Fort Irwin, California. This is a unique opportunity of which Forces Command (FORSCOM) engineer units can take advantage. If your company is selected, the first thing you should do is to locate and read a copy of FORSCOM Regulation 350-50-1, Training at the National Training Center. The

Two months prior to your rotation, the company commander and the company supply sergeant should visit the NTC for a coordination visit.


regulation will provide you with basic information that is generic for all the augmentee units that train at the NTC. After you have read the regulation, contact the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) Regimental Engineer Section at DSN 470-5133/5135 or commercial (619) 380-5133/ 5135) to get specific information for engineer requirements.

Two months prior to your rotation, the company commander and the company supply sergeant should visit the NTC for a coordination visit. You need to allow two days on the ground with the regimental engineer section to complete all the coordination that needs to be done. The commander needs to bring a sleeping bag, Kevlar helmet, and load-bearing equipment (LBE), as he will be going down range to observe a battle and defensive preparations. The supply sergeant will spend the day in garrison preparing for the logistical support your company will need upon arrival. Everything from transportation motor pool (TMP) support, to signature cards, to barracks and motor pools can be taken care of

figure 1 OPFOR standard minefield

Figure 1. OPFOR Standard Minefield.

OPFOR Tank and BMP positions

Figure 2. OPFOR Tank and BMP Positions.

prior to your arrival during this visit.

Your advance party should arrive on Monday of the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) week (formerly preparation week) of the rotation. The main body should arrive on Wednesday or Thursday of RSOI week. This schedule allows enough time to draw two sets of desert camouflage uniforms, class IV, MILES, sign for the barracks and motor pool, and receive mandatory briefings and training. This also allows enough time to bring your equipment from the railhead at Yermo to Fort Irwin, approximately forty miles away. Yermo does not provide rail load tools, so you must bring your own.

While at the NTC you will be attached to the 11th ACR to provide general support. You will be further attached to the OPFOR regiment to provide direct support during the rotation. Any missions that relate to the rotation you will receive from the commander of the 58th Engineer Company who acts as the OPFOR regimental engineer. Your company represents elements of the OPFOR divisional engineer battalion. The

While at the NTC you will be attached to the 11th ACR to provide general support. You will be further attached to the OPFOR regiment to provide direct support during the rotation. Any missions that relate to the rotation you will receive from the commander of the 58th Engineer company who acts as the OPFOR engineer.


D-7s that you bring to the NTC replicate the BAT-2s and BTMs that the Regiment receives from the battalion's technical company. Your soldiers represent a slice of the battalion's sapper company. Due to technical requirements at the NTC, augmentee engineer companies can only be used on defensive missions. This is due to tracking, instrumentation and visual modification requirements.

With brigade operations now the norm at the NTC, you can depend on at least one defensive mission that you will be responsible for emplacing. Count on spending five days in the field; this includes recovery time. This allows you approximately nine days of training that you should plan for your company. With advance notice, we can coordinate training areas and ranges for you to use during your rotation. We need at least sixty days warning for you to take advantage of this opportunity.

All OPFOR minefields, except for some point obstacles, are surface-laid GMZ minefields. To replicate the GMZ, the OPFOR uses a M113 pulling a M105 trailer. Soldiers ride in the back of the trailer and hand mines to a soldier walking along on the ground. Every 7.5 paces the soldier places a mine on the ground. A single row anti-fratricide fence is built on the friendly side of the minefield. All GMZ minefields are three rows deep and 300 meters long (see Figure 1). 300 meters is our standard obstacle package for mineftelds and triple-strand wire obstacles. If your unit does not have M113s, 5-ton trucks can be used. Plan on bringing enough haul assets to carry your soldiers, 2500 M-2 1 training mines, 1700 rolls of concertina wire, and 2200 pickets.

POL support is limited. Bulk fuel (JP8) is all that we can provide. There is no diesel available on Fort Irwin. The class IX account is primarily designed for wheeled engineer companies. This does not mean that mechanized companies cannot train here. Upon arrival, $12,500 of class IX is available to you for 03 priorities. If you go over the $12,500 limit, the 11th ACR will continue to support you with class IX; however, your unit will be billed for the excess. There is no SSSC on Fort Irwin. When you arrive, you are Issued a push packet of necessities. Contact the Augmentee Support Section at DSN 470-4642 for exact items and quantities. Your vehicles are parked in a secure motorpool. There is enough room to erect a maintenance tent if you desire.

OPFOR tank and BMP survivability positions are very distinctive (see Figure 2). The width of the M551 Sheridan used to replicate the T-80 and BMP is only one D7 blade-width wide. The vast majority of our survivability positions are two-tier fighting positions. Exact depth is critical for hide positions. If the hide is too deep, blade time is wasted. Also, the firing platform must be to the exact depth. If it is too deep, the MILES belt will be below ground and not exposed when the vehicle comes up to fire. This is a violation of the NTC rules of engagement. If it is too shallow, and too much of the vehicle is exposed when it comes up to fire. Proofing the holes with the exact vehicle that will occupy that hole is very important.

Safety is key to any operation. Before you move out to the training

Soldiers should be trained in the hazards of unexploded ordnance. At one time or another, almost all of Fort Irwin has been used as a range for live fire. There is plenty of unexploded ordnance at the NTC. Certain areas of Fort Irwin have been declared no-dig or restricted dig areas.


area, you will receive a very detailed safety briefing from the 11th ACR regimental engineer. Before you come to the NTC, you must make sure that all drivers and all vehicle commanders have serviceable night-vision goggles. All vehicle crew members need to rehearse roll-over drills. If at all possible, bring global positioning systems (GPS) to the desert. GPS allows you to navigate on dark nights and meets the requirement that all

Coming to the NTC as an OPFOR augmentee engineer company is a tremendous opportunity. If you come and take advantage of what we have to offer, your company will be a better-trained unit when it leaves. Even though you may be here for only one rotation, augmentees are a permanent part of the 11th ACR.


obstacles be marked with a GPS system.

Soldiers should be trained in the hazards of unexploded ordnance. At one time or another, almost all of Fort Irwin has been used as a range for live fire. There is plenty of unexploded ordnance at the NTC. Certain areas of Fort Irwin have been declared no-dig or restricted dig areas. No-dig means exactly that. Restricted dig means that D-7 operators must be in fragmentation vests and Kevlars. There is also a requirement for an observer to be in the same uniform. No digging at night is allowed in these areas.

The weather at the NTC varies significantly thoughout the year. Even on warm spring or fall days where the temperature is in the 90's, nights will cool off to the 40's. Bring clothing accordingly. If at all possible, bring two water buffaloes. Water is essential. Even during cold months, soldiers will dehydrate if they do not continue to drink large quantities of water.

Coming to the NTC as an OPFOR augmentee engineer company is a tremendous opportunity. If you come and take advantage of what we have to offer, your company will be a better-trained unit when it leaves. Even though you may be here for only one rotation, augmentees are a permanent part of the 11th ACR. Augmentees are treated as if they belong to the 11th ACR. Our augmentee support section and regimental engineer section are experts at receiving augmentees and getting them to the field to train and support the OPFOR regiment. Over 1200 active duty, reserve and national guard engineer soldiers train each year at the NTC as augmentee engineers. If you would like to take advantage of this, contact the regimental engineer section at the telephone numbers listed above for more information.

Genforce Tactics II - Part I

BY MR. CHARLES J. DICK
CONFLICT STUDIES RESEARCH CENTER
ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY SANDHURST
CAMBERLEY, UNITED KINGDOM

Editor's Note: This article describes the British Army's counterpart of the U.S. Army's Opposing Force program, called "Genforce". The first version of the tactics used by Genforce Tactics I, was very similar to the tactical art of the former Soviet Union. Genforce Tactics II, as Mr. Dick describes below, is significantly different. Please note that this is the British Army's OPFOR for training; it is not intended for use in the U.S. Army. We publish it here in the Star to show you what our British allies have developed as a forward-looking opposing force model, for your professional edification.

Introduction

Genforce Tactics I

Genforce "Tactics I" described the Genforce approach to tactics in the nineteen eighties and early nineties. Essentially, this approach was a refined and updated version of that which had served Genforce well in World War II, but which took account of the lessons of subsequent local wars, particularly those In the Middle East in 1973 and 1982. However, Genforce theorists were increasingly aware that both their operational and tactical concepts needed considerable revision in the light of three developments. These were:

This study aims to describe in outline the changes that are being effected in Genforce tactics as the century turns. As yet, only the outline is clear, for Genforce is still pondering the implications of far-reaching change (and much of its thought is, naturally, confined to the realm of the classified). For this reason alone, it is somewhat less detailed and prescriptive than the previous pamphlet, which set out concepts that had been refined and elaborated over many years. Moreover, Genforce is at a transitional stage in its development. For at least three reasons, it can confidently be asserted that further, probably radical changes can be anticipated in the medium and even in the short term:

Genforce II, Operational Art and Tactics, was conceived and written by C.J. Dick, the Head of the Conflict Studies Research Center, RMA Sandhurst (with some help from the CSRC's air desk for the relevant air chapters). Any enquiries about Genforce's concepts and modus operandi should therefore be addressed to the CSRC. The author would also be grateful for any constructive criticism and suggestions for the improvement of these manuals.

The Changing Face of the Battlefield

Section 1 - The Revolution in Military Affairs

The Nature of the Revolution

General

A revolution in military affairs occurs when technological change has proceeded so far as to transform the nature of the battlefield. Such a development took place in the thirties, with the widespread fielding of tanks, motor transport, efficient and portable radios and airpower.

Another occurred with the application of nuclear and missile technology to the battlefield in the sixties and seventies. However, Genforce eventually decided that nuclear weapons were a dubious military asset: a weapon which destroys not only the enemy but the very medium in which it is used Is not so much a usable weapon as a contradiction; moreover, nuclear firepower destroys military art in general as actions using it cannot be rationally guided and controlled.

The eighties saw the start of a new revolution brought about principally by the microprocessor, but also by the introduction of new explosives such as fuel-air, and other technologies like satellite navigation systems and unmanned air vehicles. The effects of these developments on the areas of firepower, command and control, communications, intelligence and

The eighties saw the start of a new revolution brought about principally by the microprocessor.


computers (C4I), on mobility and thereby on the development of operational art and tactics are outlined below.

Perhaps the most important one, however, is to provide a viable alternative, in the Genforce view, to the use of battlefield nuclear firepower. When new conventional munitions are combined with new C4I, they possess the destructiveness of small nuclear weapons but without the latters collateral damage and escalatory dangers.

Moreover, the fragmented, nonlinear battlefield where friendly and enemy forces are intermingled does not lend itself to the use of such area weapons as nuclear or even chemical weapons (especially non-persistent). Consequently, NBC warfare is now being downplayed by Genforce, especially against an enemy who has matching capabilities in this area. Genforce does, however, continue to maintain stocks of NBC weapons and to train for their use (separately or together) should deterrence fail or should Genforce perceive their use to confer an advantage over the enemy.

Firepower

In terms of range, accuracy and lethality, modern weapons have improved enormously on those of World War II--often by an order of magnitude, especially in the last two characteristics. While the performance of direct fire weapons has been dramatically increased, the most important development has been the transformation of artillery and aircraft from area suppression weapons into systems capable of destroying point, hard targets through the use of precision munitions.

Of course, area targets can also be effectively attacked with such advanced conventional munitions (ACM) as fuel-air explosives (FAE) and cluster warheads. Together, precision and other ACMs make it possible reliably to destroy or suppress enemy groupings without imposing an impossible strain on the logistic system: afew rounds can now accomplish what hitherto required several hundred. Genforce estimates that the use of new munitions will reduce expenditure by five to fifteen times.

Mobility

The progressive armouring of infantry, artillery and air defence and an across the board improvement in cross-country mobility has increased the survivability, flexibility and combat capability of combined arms units and formations. Furthermore, the provision of satellite and other navigation aids on generous scales has ensured that movement will be better controlled than in the past and more uniformly purposeful, a development the significance of which for maneuver can hardly be exaggerated.

Of course, these improvements are marginal when compared with those in firepower. Of greater significance than the increased ability of armored and mechanized units to maneuver is the ability of commanders to maneuver fire laterally and in depth without havingphysically to shiftfire units. Long-range artillery and multiple rocket launchers (MRL), attack helicopters, tactical and operational missiles and tactical aviation greatly increase the zone in which commanders can influence the development of the battle by rapidly concentrating fire and strikes from dispersed systems. Genforce has calculated that 80-90% of the damage that will be inflicted on the enemy in the tactical zone will be caused by artillery and aviation.

The most profound development in mobility, raising it by more than an order of magnitude, has come in the field of air mobility. Thanks to the increased payload and range (and more accurate navigation) of transport aircraft, airborne troops have a greater radius of action than before and their secondary, armored mobility when landed gives them greater flexibility and combat power.

The provision of satellite and other navigation aids on generous scales has ensured that movement will be better controlled than in the past.


The widespread deployment of rotary wing aviation, including large helicopters capable of transporting infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) and artillery, gives commanders the ability to maneuver units and even formations rapidly over long distances, vertically by-passing both obstacles and enemy groupings. Of course, the ability to exploit the vertical dimension to the full will be dependent on securing air superiority.

Command, Control, Computers, Communications and Intelligence

The recent improvements in firepower and mobility would not have exercised a revolutionary effect had it not been for a simultaneous quantum leap in the efficiency of C4I. The information revolution has changed the nature of the battlefield in the fundamental ways.

Reconnaissance Fire and Strike Complexes
Contemporary air and space based surveillance and target acquisition systems are capable of providing information in real time throughout the enemy's tactical and even operational depth. Automated data processing

Genforce has calculated that 80-90% of the damage that will be inflicted on the enemy in the tactical zone will be by artillery and aviation.


(ADP) has enabled command posts to process the consequently vastly expanded volume of information into intelligence and targeting datawithin a usable time frame, and computer assisted decision making enables commanders to allocate priorities and initiate engagements in a matter of only a few minutes.

The marriage of precision and other ACM deep fire (tactical) and strike (operational) weapons with modern C4I has given birth to new and already dominant systems. These are reconnaissance-fire and reconnaissance-strike complexes (RFC and RSC) in which dedicated precision weapons are linked through a largely automated command and control/fusion centre with reconnaissance means (usually multi-sensor) which can accurately locate and report enemy groupings and weapons in real time.

Extending the Span of Control
At the same time as enabling accurate fire to be brought to bear throughout the enemy's tactical and operational depth, computerization and the proliferation of a variety of secure, long-range communications systems capable of passing unprecedented masses of data rapidly make it possible for headquarters to control a larger number of subordinate echelons in combat at a vastly increased tempo. This has enabled Genforce to remove two entire levels of command (one tactical and one operational), a military de-layering which not merely reduces military bureaucracy but also accelerates and improves reactions to changing situations (see Annexes A and C in Part II of this article).

Philosophy of Command and Control
Historically and instinctively, Genforce has always favored centralized C2 on the grounds that decentralization works against unity of effort and thereby against the generation of momentum. It recognized, however, that decision-making had to rest with the commander who possessed

Influence of the Revolution in Military Affairs on the Focus of Control in Maneuver Operations
A. Pre-Revolution Directive Control and Decentralized Battle Management
Formation or Unit Timely Access to Information Required for Decision Making Decision Making Focus Consequent on Information Flow
Army/Division Relatively limited.
  • Time delays for intelligence from air, RPV and satellite reconnaissance.
  • SIGINT gives partial picture.
  • Situation on line of contact
    often obscure and information flow
    subject to time delays and error.
Formation HQ cannot control battle in detail.

Issue of operational/tactical, directive, lessening danger of loss of unity of effort through stress on:
  • Commander's Intention
  • Designation of main effort. Formation continues to control significant firepower resources (Artillery and air).
Regiment/Battalion Limited knowledge of picture beyond line.

Up to date awareness of situation on line of contact (inclusive of dangers and opportunities). 		Decentralized battle management stress:
  • Tactical independence.
  • Responsibility of commander to use initiative to further senior commander's intent. Drawbacks:

  • Decentralization can lead to dispersal of effort.
  • Lower commander's lack timely access to firepower needed to react quickly to dangers or opportunities.
B. Post Revolution: Recentralization of Command and Control
Corps/Brigade Near real-time situation data:
  • Satallite, Air, RPV, recon- naissance.
  • SIGINT.
  • Data linked to battlefield surveillance means and combat elements, combined with SATNAV, gives clear view of current situation on line of contact.
  • Flexible, secure commun- ications.
Formation HQ can control battle in detail.
  • Commander can maneuver fire quickly in response to near real-time appreciation of operational/tactical situation (and fire is now more effective.
  • Commander can issue realistic orders to manuever elements to meet dangers/ opportunities.
  • Need for decentralized battle management reduced.
  • Unity of effort ensured.
Combined Arms Battalion Commander has wider picture than previously enjoyed by a regimental commander. Commander has up to date awareness of situation on line of contact (inclusive of dangers and opportunities). Commander's independence more circumscribed. He now exploits results of fire directed by formation HQ. Initiative still required as time constraints preclude detailed orders. Commander has sufficient organic resources to act without needing to wait for reinforcement of combat support.
Notes: a) Removal of a level of a command simplifies and speedsup command and control process.

b) Availability of airmobile troops at brigade and corps levels (including organic lift at corps) accelerates response to requirements for conduct of deep battle.

the relevant information on which decisions had to be based.

Counter-Developments

Naturally, these improvements have prompted dialectical responses. Thus, for instance, the threat of precision attack has been met by fitting tanks and other high value targets with countermeasures against guided and homing munitions (i.e., automatically triggered jamming systems and decoys and grenade launchers to intercept incoming warheads.) Counter-mobility has greatly extended in scope with the widespread use of remotely-delivered mines (RDM) laid by artillery, MBRLs or aircraft.

Enemy C4I and EW capabilities have prompted numerous responses. These include passive measures such as automatic encryption, burst transmission and frequency-hopping for radios, improved camouflage and the deployment of multi-sensor spoofing dummies and false electronic signals; and active measures such as air and ground launched anti-radiation missiles and radio and radar jamming.

Genforce believes that the outcome of future war will depend very largely on which side achieves an edge in the technological systems and counter-systems race. Its theorists are well aware of the fact that reliance on mere numbers will no longer suffice. Thanks to the latest revolution in military affairs, quality can and will negate quantity (assuming, of course, that the qualitative edge is more than marginal and that the will to victory is strong enough to accept casualties as the price).

The Future

The current revolution in military affairs has recently entered a fresh spiral as new technologies start to become militarily usable in combat systems. These will include, for instance: acoustic effect means (e.g. infrasonic weapons, acoustic generators, explosives generating acoustic energy); electromagnetic effect means (e.g. laser and radio-frequency weapons and electromagnetic suppression); radiation means (e.g. particle beam, ionizing and radiological weapons).

These, together with an acceleration of current trends (e.g. towards greater automation and robotizatlon, more powerful explosives, super-high-speed data processing) will produce yet more changes to the face of battle than those outlined below. Most radical of all, perhaps, they may transfer the main focus of combat into the air and space, relegating land (and sea) operations to the status of secondary (supporting) actions.

The Future Battlefield

The Informational Struggle

Technology has gone a longway towards enabling commanders to see through the fog of war and to react rapidly to what they see at the tactical and even the operational level. Genforce believes that the critical struggle in future war will be to keep the battlefield largely transparent to Its eyes while fogging the enemy's vision. The side that achieves an information advantage and maintains the shorter intelligence - decision - reaction cycle will achieve what is, in effect, a continuous temporal lead which will result in the more effective engagement of targets and more timely and purposeful execution of maneuver.

The principal targets of physical and electronic attack will thus become the enemy's eyes (mainly electronic in the form of radar and ELINT), his brain (i.e., headquarters and weapons control centers) and his nervous system (radio and satellite communications). At the same time, everything possible will be done to deceive the enemy as to Genforce's true locations, nature of deployment and intentions.

The Battlefield of the Past: A Point of Comparison

In World War II, there was usually a clearly identifiable front

Technology has gone a long way towards enabling commanders to see through the fog of war and to react rapidly to what they see at the tactical and even the operational level.


line. Along, and a few kilometers either side of, this line, there was an intense struggle for fire superiority between opposing direct fire weapons and artillery.

With the important, but rarely decisive, exception of airpower, fire could not be delivered effectively into the enemy depth as artillery lacked the range and target acquisition capability and operational and tactical missiles were things of the future. If the attacker won the struggle, he could take some ground and sometimes generate some tactical or even operational maneuver in the enemy's depth, thus shifting the focus of combat and increasing its dynamism.

The predominant form of combat was, however, close-range fighting, and an attacker had to grind the enemy down in an attritional battle, often of an exhausting nature, before he could penetrate the enemy's defense and accomplish his ruin by maneuver and pursuit. In other words, positional and maneuver forms of warfare were roughly balanced, with the advantage perhaps resting with the former where the two sides enjoyed comparable mobility (though when this balance did not exist and one side possessed a distinct mobility advantage, the latter tended to prevail). In local wars of the subsequent forty years (excluding unconventional warfare, of course) this approximate balance remained, though it tilted somewhat in the opposite direction thanks to increasing mechanization and the growing influence of airpower.

Effects of the Contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs

Although they have increased dramatically in effectiveness, direct-fire weapons and artillery fires on the line of contact have lost much of their relative importance. Future war will be dominated by long-range combat, so much so, indeed, that it will often become an independent form of battle.

This, according to Genforce, is the inevitable result of the synergy of developments outlined earlier:

The side that wins the information struggle and long-range electronic-fire superiority will be able to suppress or destroy maneuver elements with comparative ease, and the latter will be unable to respond effectively. A Genforce contention that bears repetition is that 80-90% of the losses inflicted in the tactical zone are expected to be caused by artillery and aviation.

Thus the main forces of today are not, as before, the bulk of the tank and mechanized formations of the enemy so much as his deep fire and strike (i.e., tactical and operational level) systems, his C4I, and his electronic attack capability.

As these are all located in the tactical and operational depth, so the military center of gravity of combat has shifted from the old front line into the depth. Each side, whether in attack or defence, will have to make every effort to take the battle into the enemy's rear.

Genforce view of the dynamic, fragmented battlefield

Figure 2. Genforce View of the Dynamic, Fragmented Battlefield

While Genforce sees fire and electronic systems (electronic countermeasures--ECM--are now considered the equal of fire in their destructive effect) as the principal means of accomplishing this, maneuver forces also play a vital part. Whether inserted by air or infiltrated on the ground, or by a combination of the two, tactical forward and raiding detachments and operational mobile groups are essential elements of the deep battle. The enemy now can, indeed must, be defeated simultaneously through his tactical and operational depth something that really was not possible in the past. This will, of course, be made very much easier if the enemy can be pre-empted in the delivery of effective initial strikes. Genforce puts the greatest possible stress on the importance of the initial advantage that pre-emption can confer.

The Eclipse of Positional Warfare and the Triumph of Maneuver

Three factors have combined to reduce the efficiency of positional defense. The spiralling cost of developing and deploying modern weaponry (in skilled personnel as well as other economic resources) has precluded the fielding of traditional, mass armies. This has reduced force densities on the battlefield and thus made continuous fronts, strongly held everywhere, a thing of the past. Moreover, no matter how well prepared in the engineering sense, no matter how dense or deep the defense, modern munitions make it possible to blast a way through (and furthermore, without the collateral damage associated with their nuclear predecessors). It is also possible vertically to bypass the defense with heliborne or airborne troops that enjoy armored secondary mobility, or to use such troops to destroy the cohesion of the defense through rear attacks.

Together these developments limit the possibilities of positional defense to favorable terrain (e.g. mountains and towns) or to the defense of key areas. Accordingly, Genforce sees the answer to most tactical and operational problems, whether in offence or defense, as lying in the application of maneuver of fire and of forces.

The Forms of Combat Action

It follows, from all that has been said, that the initiative will be continually contested in future war and it will likely change hands more frequently than in the past. Units and even formations may suffer a critical level of losses and lose combat effectiveness in unprecedently (save for the nuclear era) short periods of time. Tactical and also operational situations will thus be characterized by fluidity, uncertainty and rapid change.

In consequence of these factors and lowforce densities, the former clear distinction between forms of war will cease to exist. Both sides will have to be prepared for rapid transition from one to another, and even then the differences will be blurred. Two examples will clarify these points.

One side may have established what it regards as a solid defense on a line (perhaps as a pivot for offensive maneuver elsewhere). The enemy, through a combination of precision and ACM strikes and a sudden, surprise concentration of armored and air assault forces, may quickly smash through and force the defender into an unexpected combination of forced withdrawal under pressure, rapid and radical redeployments, and counterthrusts to restore the situation.

On the other hand, a putative attacker may be so depleted and disrupted bylong-range electronic-fire strikes during his attempt to close with the enemy that the onetime defender, perceiving a favorable change in the correlation of forces, may be able to go over to the attack himself to defeat the "attacker" in a meeting engagement: in the era of long-range battle, the attacker loses his traditional advantage of choosing where and when to initiate combat. In other words, in future war all operations will perforce comprise a mix of offensive and defensive actions, the proportions of each changing according to circumstances and often very suddenly.

The Meeting Battle and Engagement

With maneuver, surprise action, and rapid and kaleidoscopic change being the rule on the future battlefield, it is not surprising that Genforce theorists believe that the most typical form of combat action will be neither attack nor defense but the meeting battle and engagement (i.e., at the tactical and operational levels respectively). This is a clash between two sides when both are trying to accomplish their missions through offensive action.

Such combats will occur, for instance:

Implications

The Genforce vision of the next bafflefield, illustrated in Figure 2, is one of great dynamism, intensity and destructiveness. It is of a struggle which will not take place primarily along clearly identifiable lines, but which will spread out in great width and depth. The concept of a struggle to maintain or break a more or less stable front line must be replaced by one of combat flowing over huge areas.

Maneuver is seen to be the key to success, but maneuver must not be confused with mere movement. It must be purposeful and timely, and moving units and formations must contain sufficient firepower to fulfil the mission.


Formations and even units will no longer enjoy secure flanks or safe rear areas. Combat will be fragmented and non-linear.

This does not imply the random dispersal of units and formations, though. Rather, commanders who will not have sufficient forces to achieve viable force densities connected across wide frontages but still need to deliver fire In width and in depth (and be able to transition rapidly from one to the other) will have to maneuver to achieve concentrations and counter-concentrations. A fine balance will have to be found between concentration to apply decisive force, dispersal to reduce vulnerability and economy of force to insure adequately against attacks from flank or rear.

Maneuver is seen to be the key to success, but maneuver must not be confused with mere movement. It must be purposeful and timely, and moving units and formations must contain sufficient firepower to fulfil the mission. In other words, maneuver is latent firepower, seeking the right place and time for its application. On the other hand, less firepower is required than in attritional combat, for the aim of maneuver is as much psychological dislocation of the enemy as it is his physical destruction.

Actually, these two aims are not contradictory but complementary. A surprise application of prepared strength against unprepared weakness followed by rapid exploitation will enable one side to impose its will upon the other. The goal of combat in non-linear warfare will seldom be the seizure or retention of ground, but rather command of the area of operations which will be conferred upon the side that more successfully pursues the destruction of enemy forces, especially deep strike systems and their directing and supporting elements. In this way, land warfare is coming to resemble sea and air warfare. This vision of future war has driven Genforce Into a major restructuring of its forces to provide groupings tailored at every level to be able to operate flexibly and independently. This is dealt with in Section 3 and the Annexes which will appear in Part II of this article.

The Relationship Between Operational Art and Tactics Relationship Between Goals and Means

What differentiates tactics from operational art is the nature of the problems they face and the method of approaching a solution. In operational art, the point of departure is the goal and the missions arising from it. Necessary forces are fitted to these, creating groupings which will achieve the given aim. Thus there is no permanent force structure for operational groupings. In tactics, the start point is the available forces, and missions are determined and actions planned relative to them; that is, tactics consists of the specification of missions for available forces.

The Developing Relationship Between Operational Art and Tactics

Technological developments are changing the relationship between these two levels of war, lessening the dependence of the former on the latter.

This, in Genforces view, changes decisively the former relationship between the component parts of military art. Battle, conducted by tactical units and formations, ceases to be the only means of achieving victory. The operational commander has acquired considerable ability to inflict decisive defeat on the enemy with the resources he controls directly. Moreover, through the rapid maneuver and concentration of fire, he can exert a determining influence on the tactical battles of subordinates. There will thus be an increased dependence of tactics on operational art in future war.

It follows from this that superior tactical performance will not be able to compensate for lack of operational, let alone strategic foresight or deficiencies in concepts or planning. Furthermore, Genforce theorists believe that it is necessary to get the answers right the first time at these higher levels. Failure to do so will be so severely punished in technological war, which reaches through the entire depth of deployment, that subsequent recovery and rectification of errors and deficiencies will hardly be possible. Incorrect appreciations and decisions made even before the first missile of the war is launched will likely doom the perpetrator to inevitable defeat.

Editors Note:This article will continue in the next issue.

Red Thrust Points of Contact

(As of 31 May 96)
Please retain this list of points of contacts.

G-2: The NTC G-2 is responsible for the Red Thrust program, publishing the Red Thrust Star bulletin, and threat management at the NTC.

Mailing address:
COMMANDER NTC & FORT IRWIN
G-2/Dir of Intelligence
ATTN: AFZJ-I
P.O. Box 105059 Fort Irwin, CA 92310-5059

Telephone:
Commercial (619) 380-6502
DSN 470-6502
FAX (619) 380-5127

E-mail:
afzj-i@irwin-emhl.army.mil

S-2, 11th ACR: The regimental S-2 is able to answer questions about NTC OPFOR and its capabilities.

Mailing address:
COMMANDER 11th ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
ATTN: AFZJ-AC-S
P.O. Box 105068
Fort Irwin, CA 923 10-5068

Telephone:
Commercial (619) 380-4350
DSN 470-4350
FAX (619) 380-6482

E-mail:
afzj-ac-s@irwin-emhl.army.mil

NTC OPFOR Academy: The academy conducts the OPFOR Leader's and Soldier' Course, and can conduct mobile training teams for Forces Command units on request.

Mailing address:
COMMANDER 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
ATTN: AFZJ-AC-OA
P.O. Box 105068
Fort Irwin, CA 923 10-5068

Telephone (Academy OIC):
Commercial (619)380-4078/5502
DSN 470-4078
FAX: forward through S-2, 11th ACR