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CONTENTS
Winter 2001, Vol. LIV, No. 1


President’s Forum    

Tomorrow’s conflicts will present complex requirements, and many things will be required to fulfill them. We need to pursue with great vigor the concept of network-centric operations and warfare, and a set of initiatives that would be quite disruptive to an enemy. The rebalanced fleet of the future will require these kinds of characteristics.


The Asia-Pacific Region

Strategic Traditions for the Asia-Pacific Region    
Stephen Peter Rosen

Tradition has both positive and negative implications. It may be valuable lessons learned, lessons paid for with blood, but tradition may also be habits of the last war that make it difficult to see and react to change. There is good reason to think that future conditions in the Asia-Pacific region will not be consistent with what the strategic traditions of the U.S. military tell us we can expect.


Strategic Trends
 
Asia at a Crossroads

Paul Dibb

There are positive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy. But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. The United States needs to develop more coherence and predictability in its Asia-Pacific security strategy, and it should listen more carefully to its allies and friends there.


The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia
  

James E. Auer and Robyn Lim

East Asia is the one part of the world where great-power war remains thinkable. That is because it is the only region where the Cold War left a residue of unresolved great-power strategic tensions. The United States must engage itself, and maintain a balance of power, in the western Pacific. To do so, it still needs large resources of maritime power, and nuclear weapons.


Network-centric Warfare 
What’s the Point?
Edward A. Smith, Jr.

What is network-centric warfare? What does it bring to us? Why is it so critical to America’s future military power that we must give up other capabilities to buy it? A warfare-centered working concept of network-centric operations is needed. The measure of success will be the effect that networking enables us to have on would-be enemies in peace and in war.


Military Experimentation

Time to Get Serious

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

The Pentagon cannot afford to “think rich,” and it cannot afford to proceed with a modernization program oriented to meeting only today’s challenges. Yet the Pentagon may be doing precisely that. It must determine the mix of systems required to operate effectively against future threats; experimentation provides an indispensable means for answering questions about those threats.


Transformation and the Navy’s Tough Choices Ahead

What Are the Options for Policy Makers? 
 
Ronald O’Rourke

Analyses have pointed to a “coming train wreck” between defense program goals and available resources; the fact is that the collision is already upon us. Fundamental transformation, its advocates argue, is a response that would produce, for a given amount of resources, a force more effective against future threats than would implementing today’s collection of programs.


The Confederate Naval Buildup

Could More Have Been Accomplished?

David G. Surdam

The North came perilously close to forfeiting, at least temporarily, its ultimately decisive naval advantage. Given extraordinary foresight, skill, and more than a little luck, Confederate leaders might have produced a navy strong enough to gain superiority on the American waters. Their failure to do so can be traced to a set of fundamental decisions.

Set and Drift

Naval Force in the New Century
Joseph A. Gattuso, Jr., and Lori Tanner

Leadership and Strategy
Carnes Lord

In My View

Review Essay

The GI Generation and the Vietnam War--
American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War,
by David Kaiser
reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel H. R. McMaster, U.S. Army

Book Reviews    

A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning, by Stephen A. Cambone,
reviewed by Charles Neimeyer    

Technological Change and the Future of Warfare, by Michael O’Hanlon,
reviewed by James R. FitzSimonds    

The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War,
edited by Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal,
reviewed by Erik Dahl    

The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and
Dealerting of Nuclear Weapons,
edited by Harold A. Feiveson,
reviewed by Hank Chiles    

The Second Nuclear Age, by Colin S. Gray,
reviewed by George H. Quester    

Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and
the Second Nuclear Age,
by Paul Bracken,
reviewed by Philip L. Ritcheson    

China’s Military Faces the Future, edited by James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh,
reviewed by Jianxiang Bi    

Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia: Geostrategic Goals,
Policies and Prospects,
by Duk-ki Kim,
reviewed by Robert Marabito    

MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing of
an American Hero,
by Stanley Weintraub,
reviewed by Donald Chisholm    

The Political Influence of Naval Force in History, by James Cable,
reviewed by Jan van Tol    

Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, by Nicholas Lambert,
reviewed by James Goldrick    

Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence in the
Age of Nelson,
by Steven E. Maffeo,
reviewed by Michael Riggle