Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding this hearing. Uzbekistan is indeed a country of strategic significance as well as an important ally in our struggle with international terrorism. Frankly, it is sad and disturbing that developments in that country oblige us to concentrate so much attention on whether we should certify Uzbekistan to continue receiving U.S. assistance. Uzbekistan has been an OSCE participating State since 1992. In fact, that same year President Karimov signed the original Helsinki Final Act unreservedly accepting all OSCE commitments.

After September 11, the U.S. Government proclaimed that deficits of democracy in developing countries constituted a national security threat, because they breed discontent that can ultimately take violent anti-American form. In that light, Uzbekistan is a special problem. For reasons of history, geography and culture, it is precisely in Uzbekistan that Islam has sunk the deepest roots.

While most Muslims in Uzbekistan pursue their faith peacefully, Islamic terrorist groups have been targeting the secular government for years. In 1999, there were explosions in Tashkent. In 1999 and 2000, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan staged incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. For the last several years, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, an anti-Western, anti-Semitic organization that hopes to reestablish the Caliphate, has been spreading in Uzbekistan and Central Asia. It’s little consolation that such an organization, which is structured around secret cells, claims to employ only peaceful methods.

In response, the government has placed excessive and oppressive limitations on religious freedom for all groups, whether Muslim or Christian, and these government actions have moved it towards meeting the threshold under the International Religious Freedom Act of a "Country of Particular Concern." From the mid 1990s on, authorities in the most devout regions of the country have closed hundreds of mosques and arrested their leaders, thereby creating a serious shortfall of facilities for the large and faithful Muslim population. If individuals at mosques are involved in actual criminal activity, the individuals should be punished. But by closing independent mosques that refuse to receive government appointed imams or accept government-approved Friday sermons, entire communities are penalized, and the government only gives further credence to the very movement it is trying to combat, while preventing the exercise of a fundamental freedom.

Given these circumstances, Uzbek officials claim democratization in their country must take place slowly and in accordance with Uzbek traditions. Many independent analysts, on the other hand, hold the Uzbek Government responsible for the deteriorating security situation, by stubbornly refusing to liberalize its political system. Indeed, in many respects there is less political freedom in Uzbekistan today than there was in the late 1980s. The country has earned its reputation as a police state.

Thinking about Uzbekistan reminds me of debates we have had in this city for the last few decades about Washington’s relations with repressive governments. Throughout the Cold War, we maintained cozy ties with states that violated human rights because they were anti-communist. Today we find ourselves in the same position with countries that are with us against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Yet all this time, critics have argued that by allying ourselves with such rulers instead of with their discontented people, we risk not only our reputation but also generating resentment against ourselves.

Finding a balance between security and liberalization would be problematic enough without worrying about terrorism. But that threat is precisely what makes understanding the situation in Uzbekistan so urgent. I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ perspectives on these issues and trends in that country.