

PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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OCTOBER 8, 2004
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Serial No. 108-149
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Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international_relations

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

96-360PDF

WASHINGTON : 2004

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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FRIDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the Africa Subcommittee, "Peacekeeping in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities," will come to order. And I apologize that our Members were a little late this morning, but we were over on the Senate side meeting with Chairman Lugar this morning to work out some differences in the Sudan Peace Act legislation authored by Mr. Tancredo and by Mr. Payne.

In terms of the subject matter today, Africa is the world's most war-plagued continent. Armed conflict, often sparked by small rebel groups capable of destabilizing weak governments, undermines much of what the United States policy aims to achieve in Africa, including promoting economic development, combating infectious diseases, and conserving natural resources.

Security is an essential foundation for Africa's development. With the development of terrorist sanctuaries in Africa, we have an increasing stake in the continent's peace and in its stability. The number of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa has increased substantially. The budget for U.N. peacekeeping is now \$3.9 billion, with \$2.9 billion of that spent on peacekeeping missions within Africa, three-quarters of the budget.

The U.N. peacekeeping mandates for these operations have increased in complexity, becoming more comprehensive, including holding elections, protecting civilians, and building government institutions. These are tall tasks, so the record of these operations is mixed. Namibia and Mozambique were good successes. Somalia and Rwanda were dramatic failures. The mission in Sierra Leone was falling apart until British troops took aggressive action against a rag-tag rebel force.

There is much room for improvement in U.N. peacekeeping operations, which have been plagued with many shortcomings. There are currently seven U.N. peacekeeping operations underway in Africa, including the Democratic Republic of Congo. I have recently returned from a visit there, and it is the world's largest and has recently been expanded, and then there is Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire.

Several additional peacekeeping operations are possible. A U.N. authorized African Union (AU) monitoring force of several thousand is scheduled for deployment to the Darfur region of Sudan to deter genocidal killing by government-backed militia.

This hearing will examine key peacekeeping issues. How the success of U.N. peacekeeping operations is judged will be one of those questions. How can the peace they may create be sustained? I am concerned about Sierra Leone, where the U.N. peacekeeping operation is winding down. Has enough been done in Sierra Leone? When should a peacekeeping operation be deemed a failure and shuttered? Western Sahara, I believe, falls into that category. Can quality troops be recruited, is another question. And is there a role for private military contractors in attempting to bring stability in Africa? I think there is. Many parts of Africa are in crisis, and we need to stretch our thinking.

Lastly, how is the Bush Administration's Global Peace Operation Initiative—a multi-national effort designed to train 75,000 foreign troops, many for service in Africa—how is that operation progressing? This initiative is promising. We need to do more to help Africans keep the peace, which it appears they are increasingly inclined to do.

I will now turn to the Ranking Member, Mr. Don Payne from New Jersey, for his opening statement.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this very important and timely hearing on the challenges and opportunities of peacekeeping in Africa.

Africa on a whole is a more peaceful place today than it was 20 years ago. Africa has gone through struggles, first in its decolonization struggle to become independent states through the 1950s and the 1960s. However, as that was moving forward the cold war began, and Africa was a pawn in the cold war which once again retarded the progress that we would have normally seen with emerging new democracies. But the 1990s saw the spread of democracy as the cold war ended, the iron curtain came down, and we saw democracy spread across the continent of Africa, once dominated by military dictators and authoritarian leaders. Nigeria held its second multi-party election last year, and despite reported irregularities, the elections were largely peaceful.

Of course, one cannot ignore the instability that is brewing in the Niger delta and other parts of the country. However, Nigeria, under military rule for practically all of its independence, now has President Obasanjo who is attempting to keep democracy alive.

The world also witnessed the end of White minority rule and subsequent democratic elections in South Africa and Namibia. The ghastly civil war in Sierra Leone has finally come to an end, and prospects for a just and passing peace in Angola appear to be promising. Prospects for peace in Burundi are also promising, with South Africa taking the lead in trying to have an African solution to that African problem despite some serious challenges ahead.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) seem to be heading in the right direction, although there are very, very difficult problems with that very complicated country, and we have to be careful that we don't start sliding down toward increasing unrest, which

may keep the future in doubt. But I believe that the DRC is moving in the right direction.

Rwanda has had multi-party elections, along with Kenya. Their President Moi, after many years, decided to retire from government. There was an election in Ghana where President Rawlings, who was thinking about amending the constitution and running again, also decided to step down, as we saw in Zambia where Chiluba was considering amending the constitution and running again.

Ethiopia and Eritrea have continued to have a cease-fire, although tensions continue because of the border commission decision on Badme. But we all watched while in Liberia last year 14 years of unrest culminated in all-out war and the dictator, Charles Taylor, finally fled the country. ECOWAS stepped in by sending troops well before the U.N. was prepared to deploy.

Many times, emergency situations like the Liberian example beg the question: As African regional organizations step up to the plate to solve African problems, particularly peacekeeping, what is the role of the international community and, particularly, the United States?

I certainly support the concept of African solutions to African problems; however, I feel that the United States has a responsibility to assist in building the capacity of the regional structures as well as to help their ill-equipped organizations in terms of resources, material, and personnel.

As we look ahead to the increase in force size and expanded mandate of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur, we must understand the needs and ensure that we provide what is necessary. We cannot set the AU up for failure. This is one of the questions that I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Are there any other opening statements by the Members? Congresswoman Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you and our Ranking Member for your leadership on Africa and the issues of peace and development for the continent, and for holding this very important hearing today.

As we discuss Africa's challenges and successes in peacekeeping, I am hopeful that African Governments and the African Union will continue to grow and build Africa's peacekeeping capacity. However, the United States must and should and probably will continue to play a pivotal role—I hope an enhanced role—in supporting the United Nations and the African Union in building and maintaining peace throughout the continent.

The United States, of course, must support democracy in Africa, and it has been our goal and really our obligation to support emergent democracies and the capacity for regional development organizations like the African Union to support those democracies. Today, we support seven U.N. missions in Africa, and I personally believe we should be supporting more missions in northern Uganda and Darfur, not to mention expanding missions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire.

Africans need support in training peacekeepers in coordination with the United Nations, also in terms of just helping to strengthen the capacity of Africans to protect Africans.

Some argue that we should contract out the job of peacekeeping, and I must respectfully disagree with our Chairman on that point in terms of the use of military, private military companies. You know, I guess I am an ardent and have become more of an ardent opponent of this, because I think we must avoid future Abu Ghraib and Mark Thatcher plots and all crimes against humanity.

Who do private companies answer to? How do private companies handle sensitive African issues like child soldiers or the protection of internally-displaced people? How do these companies work with the African Governments that they are hired to protect? And how does our own Government—and I think we have seen this very recently—how do we ensure compliance with international standards of human rights?

So I don't believe we should outsource the important responsibility of defending democracy and securing the peace in Africa. As a leader of the free world, the United States must be a true broker for peace and democracy and security throughout the world. Our work with the United Nations, the various U.N. missions, and our partners in Africa must be a priority of our foreign policy because without peace on the ground, Africa's dream of a free and prosperous Africa will become a very distant aspiration.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our discussion today.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, we are going to go to our first witness. But private military corporations are increasingly involved in peacekeeping all over Africa in terms of providing logistics. And, I mean, it would be an interesting change in policy if we were to pull all of those units out.

But in any event, let us go to Mr. James Swigert. He is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs at the Department of State. Mr. Swigert was chief Balkans adviser to the Deputy Secretary during the negotiations of the 1999 Kosovo accords. He has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe, and was at the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade in the early 1990s during the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. He has received multiple Department of State Superior Honor Awards and the Presidential Meritorious Service Award. It is an honor to have you with us today. And, Mr. Swigert, if you would like to condense your testimony to 5 minutes, that would be great, because we have your written copy.

STATEMENT OF JAMES W. SWIGERT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SWIGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Payne, distinguished Members of the Committee. I welcome this opportunity to appear before you to discuss challenges of peacekeeping in Africa. And, with your permission, I request that my written statement be entered into the record.

This is a timely hearing, Mr. Chairman. As the Committee is well aware, there has been, literally, an explosion in the growth of

peacekeeping in Africa in this past year. Since October 2003, we have seen three new peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burundi, and the Security Council just last week authorized a major expansion of the mission in Congo, the MONUC mission. The African continent, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, now hosts 7 of the 16 U.N. peacekeeping operations, including the two largest ones, MONUC in Congo, and UNMIL in Liberia. Security Council resolutions currently authorize over 37,000 U.N. peacekeepers in Africa, and that is out of 54,000 worldwide.

Over the near term, increased demand for U.N. peacekeepers in Africa we judge as likely, even as some missions like UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone are drawing down.

As you know, planning has begun for a new mission in Sudan, contingent on a north-south peace agreement, and the U.N. is actively supporting the planning for expansion of the African Union monitoring mission in Darfur.

Given the priority that the United States puts on bringing an end to the horrific violence in Darfur and securing completion of a north-south peace agreement, we have encouraged and we are actively supporting these U.N. efforts. The U.N. needs to be ready to help the people of Sudan with peacekeepers once the conditions are right.

The U.N. itself sees challenges ahead in Africa and across the board concerning peacekeeping. U.N. Secretary General Annan has warned that the number and scope of U.N. peace operations are approaching what may be their highest levels ever, improving prospects of conflict resolution to be sure, but stretching thin the capacities of the system.

There are clearly lessons to be learned from past operations, but I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that success depends most of all in adapting each mission to individual circumstances. Each operation is unique. The task of UNMEE on the static Ethiopian-Eritrean border bears little resemblance to the multi-dimensional tasks of UNMIL in Liberia, for example.

As you know, the United States pays the largest share of the costs of U.N. peacekeeping—currently 27.1 percent—and as the number and scope of operations goes up, that means costs are going up for the U.S. taxpayers. I can assure you that we, at the State Department and in the International Organization Bureau, take seriously our responsibilities to ensure good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. We approve U.N. peacekeeping operations only when we judge them to be absolutely necessary in United States interests, right-sized, with a viable exit strategy, and only after extensive consultation with the Congress.

In accordance with the American Servicemen's Protection Act, we also scrutinize missions to ensure that American soldiers in U.N. peace operations are protected from possible assertions of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court.

Through the U.S. inter-agency process, we examine U.N. reports on peacekeeping, taking them for what they are: recommendations; and the eventual resolutions voted by the Security Council often differ significantly from U.N. Secretariat recommendations. To take the most recent case of MONUC, the Secretariat had recommended expansion of the mission from 10,800 to 23,900 troops in its exten-

sion into vast new areas in the Congo. We eventually voted in favor of an expansion of the force to 16,700, reinforcing it in problematic zones, but declined to accept that MONUC deploy into provinces where it was not already present.

We regularly review ongoing U.N. peacekeeping operations to ensure they are right-sized. Recent examples of downsizing in Africa as a result of such reviews include operations in Ethiopia and Sierra Leone. And I note your interest, Mr. Chairman, in Western Sahara and the operation there, and we are urging that the Security Council request the Secretary General to review the mission in Western Sahara.

Peacekeeping has changed dramatically over the past two decades, and the patrolling of a static cease-fire line which was once the norm is now the exception. U.N. peacekeepers are regularly charged with the responsibility of protecting not only themselves but, in many cases, innocent civilians in their areas of operation. There is a tendency, once a U.N. mission is on the ground, to expect more from it, sometimes more from it than it can do. We need to be realistic about U.N. peacekeeping. We want the U.N. to succeed, not to fail, and we are therefore careful not to ask more of the U.N. than it can reasonably do.

As we review proposals for new missions and extensions of existing ones, we strive to ensure that missions which are often being sent to operate in dangerous places are properly trained, equipped, and staffed to succeed.

The high end of the spectrum of peace operations includes the most challenging tasks, and for the forces engaged, peace enforcement can prove much the same as warfare. Such tasks we feel are not well-suited for the U.N. Rather, coalitions of willing and able forces with the militarily strong staying in the lead, are better instruments. A good recent example, which I believe, Congressman Payne, you referred to, was the intervention by the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) in the seriously destabilized Liberia in mid-2003. ECOWAS became the vanguard for the U.N. force established several months later. And it is important as we work on these peacekeeping issues that we work very closely with regional organizations like ECOWAS, like the African Union. They have repeatedly stepped in with the encouragement and the support of the United States and others in the international community.

ECOWAS did so, not just in Liberia, but in Cote d'Ivoire in 2002, the AU did so in Burundi in 2003, and most recently the AU has gone to the Darfur region of Sudan with troops to protect AU cease-fire monitors, and is in the process of vastly expanding this critical mission. The willingness of African States to step up to the challenge has been exemplary.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. has strongly supported the Secretary General's efforts to reform U.N. peacekeeping operations. As a result of the Brahimi report of a few years ago, the U.N. has implemented reforms and more is being done. But U.N. reform is only part of the answer to meet the peacekeeping challenges.

Another important part is to work with our African partners and with other donors to improve the capabilities of African armed forces for peacekeeping. There are a number of U.S. programs un-

derway. I am sure the Committee is well aware of the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) programs. You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative. At Sea Island, the President discussed this issue with his G-8 colleagues, and they committed to an action plan to enhance global peacekeeping, with an emphasis on Africa and building up African capabilities.

In fact, as we meet today in this important hearing, my colleagues at the State Department are meeting with their colleagues from the G-8, from the African Union, and from the European Union to discuss how we can better coordinate our respective efforts in Africa with an initial focus on civilian policing and strengthening the headquarter staffs of the ECOWAS and the African Union.

While all of the efforts of African regional organizations, the U.N., and outside donors are critical in meeting the challenges of peacekeeping in Africa, Mr. Chairman, the most important element for success and conflict resolution is one that is perhaps the hardest to judge and the most difficult to foster, and that is the political commitment of the protagonist to the peace process that they are engaged in. Success of U.N. peacekeeping in particular depends on the readiness of the parties involved to commit to peace and to make the political compromises inherent to any peace process. That indeed is a key challenge to all of us.

And with that I will conclude, and I would be delighted to try to address any questions that you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Swigert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES W. SWIGERT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Challenges of Peacekeeping in Africa. There has been an explosion in the growth of UN peacekeeping in Africa. Since October 2003, three new peacekeeping missions, in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire and Burundi, have been created, and a major expansion of MONUC in Congo was authorized just last week. The African continent now hosts seven of the UN's sixteen peacekeeping missions, including the two largest ones, MONUC in Congo, and UNMIL in Liberia. UNSC resolutions currently authorize over 37,000 blue helmeted troops in Africa, out of a total of 54,000 worldwide.

Each UN mission is unique and operates in different circumstances. Specific circumstances compelled the last year's rapid growth African peacekeeping—three new peacekeeping missions in Africa were authorized in FY 2004 alone. We see this for what it was, a growth spurt, but do not see it as a basis for predicting the rhythm of creating new peacekeeping missions in Africa. There is one likely new UN peacekeeping Mission on the horizon, for Sudan, whose creation we will welcome once circumstances are right. The need for a Sudan mission, contingent on a North-South peace agreement, has long been recognized, and indeed, a call for such a mission has long been on the table in negotiations between the government of Sudan and the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement.

UN peacekeeping missions are each unique, just as the political difficulties that led the Security Council to create each mission are unique. The task of UNMEE on the static Ethiopian-Eritrean border bears little resemblance to the multidimensional responsibilities of UNMIL in Liberia, for example. Each of these missions is separately deliberated and authorized, and each is composed of components from a large number of troop contributing countries. After Congressional Notification and consultation, we approve UN peacekeeping missions only when we judge them to be necessary, right-sized, and only if they have a viable exit strategy. In accordance with the American Servicemen's Protection Act, we also scrutinize missions care-

fully to ensure that American soldiers in UN peacekeeping are protected from assertions of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court. We seek to reduce the size of missions, as is currently being accomplished in UNMEE, and as we anticipate will occur soon in MINURSO and UNFICYP. We also press to shut down missions which have completed their tasks, as we did last fall with UNIKOM, and as we expect will be the case for UNMISSET in 2005.

The UN Secretariat, and notably the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), recognizes the necessity of crafting each mission to fit the specific circumstances of the countries concerned. When there is a widely-perceived need for the creation of a new peacekeeping mission—or the expansion of the mandate of an existing one—DPKO undertakes a serious study, usually with input from its own experts and other interested parties. It drafts a report which the Secretary General submits to the Security Council. The report contains recommendations as to the precise mandate and size of the mission. Often the Council asks the Secretariat to include recommendations as to a possible downsizing, as in the most recent renewal of the mandate for MINURSO. It is up to the Security Council to vote a resolution creating or changing a peacekeeping mission.

Security Council members, and in particular the United States, take responsibilities with respect to UN peacekeeping, to their legislatures, and to the taxpayers, very seriously. It is a challenge to keep UN peacekeeping operations under constant review. Circumstances sometimes require forces to be built up, and sometimes permit them to be reduced or closed. In the U.S. interagency process, we examine and critique the reports of the SYG on peacekeeping very seriously, taking them for what they are—recommendations. In many cases the eventual resolution voted by the Security Council will differ significantly from the SYG recommendations. To take the most recent instance, the SYG recommended the expansion of MONUC in Congo from 10,800 troops to 23,900, and its extension into vast new areas in the Congo. After consultation with Congress, we eventually voted in favor of an expansion of the force to 16,700, reinforcing it in problematic zones, but declining to accept that it deploy into provinces where it was not already present.

There is a tendency, once a UN mission is on the ground, to expect more and more from it. We want the UN to succeed, not to fail, and we are therefore careful not to ask more of the UN than it can reasonably do. As we review proposals for new missions and extensions of existing ones, we strive to ensure that UN missions, which are being sent to operate in dangerous places, are properly trained, equipped and staffed to do what we ask of them.

The notion of what a UN peacekeeping mission can be capable of doing has undergone a thorough transformation since 1989. The patrolling of a static ceasefire line is now the exception rather than the norm. Haunted as the Council is by the specter of the Rwandan genocide, UN peacekeepers are regularly charged with the responsibility of protecting themselves and innocent civilians in their areas of operations. Neither does anyone again want to see groups of UN peacekeepers taken hostage and humiliated by rebel thugs, as happened in Sierra Leone in 2000. It is a constant challenge for UN peacekeeping forces to maintain an attitude of neutrality and to avoid entanglement in the local politics of the area in which they are deployed, even as they stand ready to act to protect themselves and, where feasible and where so provided in their mandate, to protect innocent civilians. We agree with the August 2000 Brahimi report that emphasized that UN peacekeeping capabilities must match its needs. As a general matter, peace enforcement is a job ill-suited to the United Nations, given the inherent difficulties of managing a multinational, multi-lingual force. Our view is that peace enforcement is at the high end of the spectrum of peace operations. The high end of the spectrum includes the most militarily challenging tasks, and for the forces engaging in those tasks peace enforcement can prove much the same as warfare. For such tasks, we feel that coalitions of willing and able forces, with a militarily strong state in the lead, are best suited to the task. A good recent example was the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in a seriously destabilized Liberia in mid-2003, which became the vanguard for a UN force several months later.

Since the early 1990's, Multinational Forces of the ECOWAS, and later of the African Union, have repeatedly stepped in, with the encouragement and support of the international community, to take on peacekeeping duties where the need was most urgent. ECOWAS did so in Liberia in 1993 and again in 2003, ECOWAS in Cote d'Ivoire in 2002, the AU did so in Burundi in 2003, and most recently the AU in the troubled Darfur region of Sudan. While the experience has not been without errors and a number of abuses by some peacekeepers, notably in Liberia in the 1990's, the willingness of African states to take part in peacekeeping has been exemplary. African states are no newcomers to UN peacekeeping. Ghana, for example, has contributed troops to UN peacekeeping since the 1960's and is today one of the world's

largest participants in UN peacekeeping, with 3,185 troops and civilian police deployed with UN peacekeeping missions worldwide. Other large African contributors of troops and civilian police include Nigeria (3,577), Ethiopia (3,445), South Africa (2,448), Kenya (1,824), Morocco (1,541), and Senegal (1,540). Twenty-four other African states contribute a further 3,718 troops and civilian police worldwide.

The U.S. supports regional peacekeeping initiatives in Africa, where willing troop contributors have been able to make personnel available for peacekeeping tasks in a very short timeframe, as in Liberia in 2003. In a number of cases, the United States has been able to provide material assistance to ECOWAS and to the African Union to undertake such tasks. Over the last two years, the United States, through peacekeeping operations (PKO, not CIPA) funds, has assisted ECOWAS in deploying to Liberia faster than any UN force ever could, in helping ECOWAS to give a developing peace process some breathing space in Cote d'Ivoire, and in helping the African Union continue to play the peacekeeping role they had taken on in war-torn Burundi and the Darfur region of Sudan. In these most recent examples, the AU and ECOWAS have done an outstanding job as peacekeepers. Moreover, in the case of Liberia, the fact that ECOWAS, and later UN peacekeepers, were available, eliminated calls for U.S. troops to be sent in. In the cases of Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire last year, the U.S. peacekeeping operations funds were largely used to pay a contractor to get needed supplies to ECOWAS troops when and where they needed it.

The following initiatives are the frameworks within which the USG currently seeks to strengthen the peacekeeping capacities of African states:

The Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), the successor to the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), administered by the Africa Bureau in the State Department, provides training for peacekeeping operations to military units from selected African countries. Since 1996, over 12,000 African troops from 10 African nations have received training through the program. In 2004 ACOTA's U.S. trainers will train 9 battalions, while African militaries will use ACOTA equipment and methods to train many more units. The ACOTA program equips and trains deployable military units and their training organizations in order to provide a self-sustaining capability, in association with the ongoing peace operations training. ACOTA continues the partnership by committing to sustainment training, mentoring, and multinational command exercises in the out years following initial training. In Africa, it has been agreed that ACOTA will be the core program and the model for the proposed Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).

Africa Regional Peacekeeping. This State initiative equips, trains, and provides logistic support for troops from selected African countries that are involved in peacekeeping operations. The main recipients in recent years have been Nigerian, Senegalese, and Ghanaian units serving in Sierra Leone and Liberia and units of the Guinean army along the border with Liberia; funding has also gone to support African peacekeeping efforts in the Congo, Burundi, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire and on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border. The Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Centre in Accra, a recipient of U.S. and other international support, has the potential to be an increasing significant locus for regional peacekeeping Training.

Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program. This program, managed by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, aims to assist selected foreign countries in developing their institutional capacities to field more efficient and well-led peacekeeping units. EIPC is a "train-the-trainer" program. It focuses on providing military trainers from assisted countries with the skills and tools to qualitatively improve the capabilities level of their respective militaries to engage in global peacekeeping. Since its inception in 1997, EIPC has assisted 30 countries worldwide, including Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia.

Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI). At Sea Island, G-8 members committed to an action plan to enhance global peacekeeping capabilities, with an emphasis on Africa. G-8 members have been meeting in Washington to better coordinate their respective efforts in Africa, with an initial focus on civilian policing and strengthening the Headquarters staffs of ECOWAS and the African Union.

Knowing when the international community has done enough and can withdraw will always be a difficult decision. We are always re-examining peacekeeping missions with a view to right-sizing. A few cases in point:

MINURSO, in the Western Sahara, faces a political stalemate between the protagonists that has not changed in years, despite prolonged efforts by the Secretary General's Special Envoy, former Secretary of State James Baker. We have requested that the Secretary General examine a possible down-sizing of MINURSO's operations.

UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, one of the poorest countries on earth, will have to scale down even though it has become a prime actor in the local economy.

UNMEE, between Eritrea and Ethiopia, poses the question of what to do when one of the parties to the conflict blocks the mission from carrying out its prime task, in this case border demarcation; we supported the Secretary General in downsizing the operation unless and until the parties agree to allow UNMEE to implement the mission.

In Cyprus, where UNFICYP has been in existence some forty years, we will support the Secretary General's recommendation, in view of Cyprus' admission into the EU, of a 30% reduction in UNFICYP's personnel.

The most important element that points to likely success of an international intervention in favor of a peace process is also one of the most difficult to judge: the political commitment of the protagonists to the peace process they are engaged in. One size most definitely does not fit all in finding the swiftest or most lasting end to an international conflict.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, let me begin with a question, Mr. Swigert, about the current situation with the African Union peacekeepers in Darfur. I know that we have private military corporations on the ground there that have done the logistics and helped set up the camp for approximately 300 of what we hope will be 3,500 African Union forces that come into Darfur. Our units there have had some experience, as well, training the Nigerians to go into Sierra Leone, and, of course, we have also used private military corporations in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire to do that type of logistics work.

But I wanted to ask about the mandate for the African Union forces that are going into Darfur. I wanted to ask how many forces you think ultimately can be deployed? When might their numbers expand? What U.S. support is being lent to the mission?

Tony Blair yesterday made a commitment, as we know, for 1,500 United Kingdom troops to be part of a plan to help train up to 20,000 African troops to act as peacekeepers. He said, "I want Africa to be the top priority for the EU's new rapidly deployable battle groups. . . ." And so clearly there is a great deal of focus right now worldwide on this issue. And so if you could begin giving us some details on those questions.

Mr. SWIGERT. Thank you for that question. I think the African Union mission to Darfur is critical. The Security Council, when it passed the second resolution on the situation in Darfur, sought to encourage support for the AU mission. And if I could, Mr. Chairman, first address what is on the ground and then turn to your question about plans for expansion.

On the ground right now are essentially four monitoring missions, not peacekeeping missions but monitoring missions. As you point out, private contractors are indeed playing a critical role.

The first mission, the AU monitoring mission, is monitoring the cease-fire in Darfur. It consists of a total of about 400 representatives of the AU, including monitors and forces to protect the monitors, and it is on the ground and we have already seen the results of its work. It has been very critical in informing the Security Council deliberations, and our representatives on the ground believe that it is important to put outside eyes on the situation to deter violence. And, therefore, the African Union is working toward expanding that presence rapidly.

The other three monitoring groups relate to the north-south situation. There is a joint monitoring commission for the Nuba Mountains, and two small groups of civilian protection and monitoring teams are also active in the south. And in at least one of these

cases, private contractors are providing the monitoring. And this has been very helpful.

In the current situation, of course, what we would like to see, Mr. Chairman, is a peace agreement, a peace agreement finalized on the north-south. We would like to see the violence halted and peace in Darfur, and that, we believe, would enable us to move toward a formal peacekeeping mission.

As for the expansion in Darfur: The plans of the African Union are to move in, move up the numbers to 3,500. United States military planners, together with U.N. military planners, have been working with the African Union on this in Kenya—no, I believe in Addis Ababa, excuse me. And the African Union is developing a budget. The United States has pledged \$20 million, I believe, Canada is pledging assistance as well. We expect the European Union, as well, to provide some substantial support. So it is our priority right now to assist the African Union to move that forward.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. One last question. The U.S. Government trains African military units for peacekeeping missions through what we call the ACOTA program, and obviously we are going to be expanding the numbers trained. So I would like to ask you, How effective are the U.S.-trained units, in your opinion, compared to other units? Are they better able to engage in peacekeeping operations, for example? If you were to compare the Pakistani or Indian peacekeeping units to these United States-trained units, how would you rank their proficiency?

Mr. SWIGERT. Well, it is hard to make comparisons between various units. And the ones you mentioned, the Pakistanis are generally regarded as well-trained units, but it really depends on the unit and each situation. Our experience with the ACOTA program, however, I would say, has been quite positive, and we have seen a difference in those forces that have not benefited from U.S. training and those that have.

So our overall assessment is that it is making a difference. And I think if you look at the track record of African forces, peacekeepers, and their engagement in Liberia and you compare some of the problems that existed in the first ECOWAS or ECOMOG engagement in Liberia with the ECOWAS-led group that then became the vanguard of the U.N. peacekeeping force there now, I think you will see that United States training made a considerable difference.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I want to go out of order, if it is okay with Mr. Payne, at this time. And the reason I say that, Mr. Payne, is because Amo Houghton, the Vice Chairman of this Committee, is going to be retiring after many years of commitment—not just to this institution, Congress—but to the continent of Africa. And he has been a very strong ally to the work that Don Payne and I have tried to do in a bipartisan way on this Committee, and we have also, from time to time, come to rely upon his assistance on the Ways and Means Committee for some of our interests and agenda. So we are very appreciative. And, Amo, we would like to go to you for any statement or any questions that you might want to ask. But we also wanted to recognize your service in the interest of humanitarian interests in Africa.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Well, thank you very much. I am going to miss this place. I am going to mostly miss the people here. You have

done a wonderful job of directing this Subcommittee. I asked for a special waiver to come on this group—I was on the Ways and Means Committee and couldn't get on it, naturally—because I so believe in Africa and the things that are going on here. Another thing is that you have been—and I think you will agree with me, Don, on this—absolutely bipartisan. We have been thinking of ourselves as citizens rather than members of a party, citizens trying to help Africa rather than help ourselves, and that has been a hallmark of what you have done here.

Could I just ask one question? This has to do with picking up on some of the specifics. The worry I have with the United Nations or other troops coming in as peacekeeping functions, is that they come in as peacekeepers and, therefore, do not show the spine or the muscle that is necessary to get order and to get some sort of structure in the country. You see this all over the world. Wonderful people, great loyalty as far as their nations, but the mandate they get is not sufficient to the task at hand. And I would like to ask you whether I am right there.

Mr. SWIGERT. Well, you raise a very important question, and that has been one of the challenges I think the U.N. has been grappling with. It is our view in the Administration that the U.N. is not well-suited to carry out robust peace enforcement missions, which resemble warfare in many instances. There are a variety of reasons. Imagine, for instance, the composition of any U.N. peacekeeping force involves a number of people from a variety of countries. Their training is not adequate for that sort of task. But nonetheless, they often find themselves in situations where it is not necessarily an act of conflict between two sides, but you have thugs, you have lawless elements in a society, and the U.N. is put in a position where either it stands by the side or somehow does something to effect a positive change in the situation. I refer to Mr. Brahimi's report. He did a very critical report on U.N. peacekeeping reform, and he recognized that there needs to be something done in such situations so that there are no more Sierra Leones.

We have tried in our voice and vote in the Security Council to make sure that the mandate in each situation matches the challenges. And, for example, in the Congo, we have strengthened the mandate for the operations of the U.N. peacekeepers in eastern Congo in Ituri and Bukavu, where we have seen a number of lawless groups. And it is a challenge, Mr. Congressman, to ensure the right response. I would be remiss, I think, if I said that there are no more problems. But I do think that since we adjusted the mandate, strengthened their ability to react, and, importantly, changed the composition of some of the troops to get better troops in there that were more willing to stand up to the situation, that part of the Congo has improved.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Chairman, could I follow this up with just one other? I don't really worry about the United Nations because I think their instinct is right. The thing I am worried about is the will of the individual countries and the message they send to their troops before they join the United Nations force.

Mr. SWIGERT. Well, there are some, I think, traditionally peacekeeping contributing nations have seen the task as one of patrolling a cease-fire line, and therefore there may have been some peo-

ple that saw this as less of a challenge and, therefore, did not have that commitment. I think as the situation has evolved, more and more forces understand that they have to have that commitment, and I think the training has improved so that forces are moving in with a better understanding of how to protect themselves so there can be no more Sierra Leone-like situations, and how, when their mandate calls for it, they can protect innocent civilians at risk.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Congressman Houghton.

We will go to Congressman Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I, too, will take a point of personal privilege to echo what you said about Amo Houghton. He certainly will be missed on the Committee, not only on the Committee here but in the Congress in general. I think he has done an outstanding job with his interest and compassion for doing the right thing here for the continent of Africa, but also his humanitarian record in general. And so we certainly wish you and your lovely wife, Priscilla, Godspeed, and I hope you will continue to be involved. I know you have a foundation in Zimbabwe, and I hope that the schools that you have been building and working with teacher training for the last 25, 30 years will continue, and I know it will. So it has really been a pleasure to work with you.

Let me ask in regard to the whole peacekeeping situation, and your mentioning this new training, at one point under the Clinton Administration there was this rapid response initiative where training was going on by the United States military with African troops. Perhaps you could give me a little more insight on the Global Peace Operations Initiative. What basically is that? And then I will get back to the rapid response sort of question after that, once you tell me what that is.

Mr. SWIGERT. Well, the global peacekeeping, or the Global Peace Operations Initiative, Congressman Payne, is an initiative the President launched—he discussed with his colleagues at Sea Island. It is an effort to try to increase the numbers and capabilities of peacekeepers worldwide and to concert international resources and training with a focus first on Africa, because, as we are discussing today, the greatest and most immediate challenges that we are confronting are in Africa.

Africans have shown a very admirable willingness to step up. They want to be involved in solutions and helping to resolve some of these longstanding conflicts, but they often lack resources and adequate training. The ACOTA initiative, which you referred to, has been a U.S. initiative. It has been limited in its impact. As I mentioned earlier, I think the impact has been positive. Our effort now is to get together in a coordinated fashion with others, and in fact today this meeting is taking place at the State Department. It will be sort of an umbrella group, and we are exchanging information on which programs other countries are carrying out. We are hearing from the Africans themselves as to their needs, and our hope is to bring some additional resources to bear in the very near future.

Mr. PAYNE. Do you think that then the sort of a rapid response kind of Green Beret unit could come out of this sort of training, so

that the chapter 7 sort of initiatives that are needed in some instances—for example, when U.N. troops went into Sierra Leone, about 20 or 30 went up to one of the diamond mines, and they were very quickly outmanned by a much larger number of people. They were disarmed and actually sent back to town. One, they were, you know, not prepared. And, secondly, the size was not adequate. We also saw in Liberia—with a disarmament program and demobilization rehabilitation program—where the combatants were so anxious to get into the program and give up their weapons, and sign up and get the stipend, that it almost created a very unsafe situation because of the inability or the lack of the estimates of how many would show up. I think they were anticipating 700 or 800, and several thousand people came in and they were sort of—I mean, it was a good thing, but they were not prepared. So I just wonder if you could maybe respond to those.

Mr. SWIGERT. Well, I think the original idea in the Clinton Administration of the African crisis response force has evolved over time, and although there has been consideration of developing an idea of rapid response capacity, nothing really has come of that. I think you are right, Mr. Congressman, that as you look at the needs in Africa and what they are, the growth in the gap that exists has been forces that are trained and able to deal with more dangerous situations, what we might call chapter 7 situations versus chapter 6, which are more than traditional patrolling of the line between separated forces. And, clearly, as we work in partnership with our African Union friends and the other regional organizations of Africa and with other donors, the question of which training, what kind of training will evolve. But I can tell you that our objective here is, at the end of the day, to have forces that are able to more adequately deal with the real problems in Africa and not to recreate some idealistic view of what peacekeeping forces should do. So we are going to work together with Africans on this.

Mr. PAYNE. My last question: Several weeks ago I went to Iraq and Jordan. After we spent a couple days in Iraq, we went up to Germany to speak with the military command at the hospital where our troops go on their way home. We got into a discussion about peacekeeping in Africa, and there was an interest in attempting to give, to develop the capacity, perhaps through the AU, for logistics such as transporting. Transport capacity, for example, of C-130-type planes that the African Union would have as a part of its peacekeeping component, that they would be trained in, and be able to take their own troops rather than having to wait to see if France would do it or whether the Brits or whether the United States. Have you heard of any further discussion about that logistical kind of air force capacity being discussed?

Mr. SWIGERT. I am not aware of that being discussed, Congressman Payne. I know that the question of logistics and transport are very key issues, and they are areas in which private contractors often have come to bear in carrying out a vital role in ensuring that the peacekeepers can get to where they need to go in a timely fashion. It is critical with ECOWAS and their deployment to Liberia, and it is a gap. But I am not aware where that discussion may stand.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. We will go to Mr. Tancredo of Colorado, and then Ms. Lee of California.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to follow up, actually, on the question of logistical support specifically of Darfur: The AU commitment has expanded, the mandate has expanded, at least from the standpoint the Government of Sudan has allowed for an expanded mandate. Now we have to get the Security Council to go along with it. But that would be only the first step. And the next step is to make sure that the logistical support is there to get the folks in place. What is the status? Do you think that that can happen in a timely fashion? Are we ready to do that?

Mr. SWIGERT. That is a critical question, Mr. Congressman. We are working on that every day. We are in detailed discussions with the African Union on developing a budget and are working with them to help work the timeline to make sure that their forces can get in place and missions can be expanded as rapidly as possible. I am confident that we are going to be able to do that. It will be essential that additional resources from other countries come to bear. But the money that is available right now is, in my understanding, sufficient to get this started.

Mr. TANCREDO. Do you have any idea, by the way, when we can anticipate some action of the Security Council to expand the mandate?

Mr. SWIGERT. On the mandate—and I have approached this from the point of view of the International Organizations Bureau, so I am not deeply engaged in the peace process as my colleagues in the African Bureau are. But my understanding is that the mandate will go forward as the African Union has agreed to it. Right now the Sudanese have indicated in general terms that they accept the expansion of the mission, and the goal at this point is to get African Union monitors, and the forces that would protect them, on the ground as soon as possible.

Mr. TANCREDO. So you don't think we need to actually take the step, that the Security Council doesn't need to actually formally act to expand?

Mr. SWIGERT. I believe that the action that the Security Council is taking place to date in terms of endorsing the mission, calling on others in the international community to step up to provide assistance for this mission, the U.N. assistance in the planning for the mission. I think that that is sufficient to get them into place on the ground, and obviously a lot still has to be done, but I don't see any necessity of additional Security Council action.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. Let me ask you about the criteria for disengagement: Is it established with every mission, or is there an overall plan that we adhere to when a peacekeeping force goes into a country? How do we know when it is time to take them out, either because we have failed or because the mission has been accomplished? Is there a formal way of doing that?

Mr. SWIGERT. Well, that is one of the most difficult questions to determine, when a mission should be disbanded, and we obviously look at the criteria. When missions are approved, we approve them, as I indicated, with a clear exit strategy in mind. In some cases that may be elections, in some cases it may be demobilization and disarmament of former combatants. It depends on each individual

case. So we look into whether those objectives and that exit strategy had been fulfilled, and then we are 1 of 15 members of the Security Council. We are obviously one voice, and a very important voice as the major contributor, and we work with others on the Council as well as the country involved, regional partners, and the U.N. Secretariat to ensure that missions, when they have completed these tasks, are drawn down and disbanded.

When conditions have changed so that you can no longer carry out the tasks, we look at each case individually. In the case of Western Sahara, where there has not been the referendum, we have discussed this on the Council and we have called on the Secretary General in the last resolution, which extended its mandate asking the Secretary General to give us recommendations on possible reductions.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me say with regard to—I just want to go back for a moment to the issue of private military companies. I am quite aware that their mandate and their scope of work, quite frankly, is more logistical support, but I also know and I have heard many discuss moving beyond logistical support to provide for direct peacekeeping in terms of a change of their mission. And, I don't know, at some point we may want to look at requesting a hearing with regard to the role of military companies and peacekeeping operations, because certainly we know many, many instances where the employees have really, quite frankly, turned into mercenaries. So I would just hate to see this sort of bubble up again at this point. So let me—

Mr. ROYCE. Well, if I could interject for just a second, Congresswoman.

Ms. LEE. Sure.

Mr. ROYCE. We are going to have Mr. Doug Brooks on the second panel. That is what he is here to testify on, and so you will be able to direct those questions to him and maybe address some of those issues on our second panel.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much.

Let me ask about northern Uganda at this point in terms of the escalating war there. Many of us are very concerned about the situation in northern Uganda, and at this point I don't believe that the United Nations has stepped up to attempt to stop, for instance, the real creation of these child soldiers by the Lord's Resistance Army, and I am not sure if the United States has and whether or not you agree that we should encourage President Museveni, the United Nations, and the African Union to really begin to develop a way to stop this very tragic and growing war in northern Uganda.

Could you kind of respond to that and let us know the status of our involvement there and what you see as our role and responsibilities?

Mr. SWIGERT. Well, Congresswoman Lee, my writ at the State Department is peacekeeping. And, as you point out, there is not a peacekeeping operation underway, so I am afraid I could not address that more specifically than to note that I know the Security Council has had a number of discussions about the situation in

northern Uganda. They have requested briefings from the Secretariat. The U.N. Secretariat is watching this closely.

And I would be delighted to take that question back to my colleagues at the State Department and provide you a response.

Ms. LEE. I would appreciate that. Peacekeeping is so important in the prevention of the conflicts, even though northern Uganda now is really—it is a mess. And I am just curious why, if you know why that has not been a request of the United Nations or of the United States at this point, what the issues are that have prevented the U.N. from asking for a peacekeeping force there?

Mr. SWIGERT. I am afraid I am not familiar with the details of that issue. But as I said, I would be delighted to take the question and get you a formal response.

Ms. LEE. Okay. Thank you very much. And, again, I will talk to our colleagues about it. I look forward to the response because I would like to hear an official response from our Government on that.

Mr. SWIGERT. Certainly.

[The information referred to follows:]

RESPONSE RECEIVED IN WRITING FROM JAMES W. SWIGERT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Question:

Peacekeeping is so important in the prevention of the conflicts, even though northern Uganda now is really—it is a mess. And I am just curious why, if you know why that has not been a request of the United Nations or of the United States at this point, what the issues are that have prevented the U.N. from asking for a peacekeeping force there?

Response:

Sadly, the war in northern Uganda is still quite active. Without a peace agreement, the issue of deploying regional or international peacekeepers has not arisen in any serious way. Certainly the Government of Uganda has not requested peacekeepers and is unlikely to do so. In essence, there is not yet any peace to keep. Both the Ugandan government and the international community have, however, responded vigorously to the humanitarian crisis. And the United States has made a major contribution to this multi-faceted response. First, the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) has begun to do a better job in military operations against the LRA, and in protecting civilians. These efforts are complemented by a generous amnesty program for ex-LRA combatants. Second, the United Nations has led a massive program of humanitarian assistance, including World Food Program (WFP) relief for over 1.6 million internally displaced people. The United States is overwhelmingly the largest donor to WFP's Uganda operations and provides significant bilateral humanitarian assistance. Security for WFP operations is provided by the UPDF and an extensive in-country UN security program. Finally, the United States supports reconciliation between the people of northern Uganda and the rest of the country, and diplomatic and political efforts to bring the war to a quick and permanent end.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a second?

Mr. ROYCE. The gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. PAYNE. Just on the northern Uganda situation: As you know, the problem is Sudan, the Lord's Resistance Army is headquartered in Sudan. The Sudanese Government allows them to stay there, allows them coverage, has given them weapons, has given them food, has given them support. So, once again, you have a prior government in Sudan which is creating situations throughout. Only re-

cently did the Government of Sudan give permission for the Ugandan forces to go into their territory, but it is vast and so forth.

The second thing, though, which is occurring is that the International Criminal Court has taken that situation up, and there may be an indictment from the International Criminal Court, which of course then puts it in another arena. It doesn't stop it, but it then indicts him as a war criminal and therefore could evoke some other kind of action.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. We are going to go to—I think the time has expired. So we are going to go to Mr. Flake of Arizona and then Mr. Meeks of New York.

Mr. FLAKE. Just a brief question: With the conflict in the Congo, are there still the existence of foreign troops there not under the U.N. umbrella? For a period of time there were troops from Zimbabwe and others related to diamond concessions or other things. Is that still a problem there?

Mr. SWIGERT. The problem that existed in the past was of enormous dimensions, Congressman Flake. And that problem, to my knowledge, is gone. There are occasional reports of support from across the border, for example in Rwanda, of certain units inside eastern Congo where there have been clashes. But I am not aware of any foreign troops that are sited in eastern Congo. If you would permit, I might ask my colleagues from the Africa Bureau to just confirm that. Well, I can get confirmation from others here as well. The issue of eastern Congo has been critical.

And back to the comment that Congressman Houghton made before, one of the things that we have done—in addition to change the mandate to deal with the question of thuggery and bands of armed people—has been to increase the number of forces in the eastern Congo. And that is what we did in the Security Council last week. We examined the Secretary General's recommendation very carefully. We concluded that it was not necessary, at this time, to make expanded commitments of U.N. forces to other parts of the Congo. But in the east, where the problems have been most significant and where stability was most under stress, we agreed to increase the forces there.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all let me also just compliment my colleagues, Tom Tancredo and Don Payne, for the great work that you all did in passing H.R. 5061 yesterday. I think it was fantastic, and it goes toward trying to stop atrocities that are taking place in Darfur. I thank you and congratulate both of you.

Let me ask, I think it is something similar to a question that Barbara was asking but just on a broader scale. It just seems to me all the time that we are reacting to crises, being reactive as opposed to proactive. So, therefore, peacekeeping has come to be like individual peacekeeping troops swooping in like Superman or something to stop problems from happening.

I am wondering whether or not we do any kind of planning, or is there anything afoot where we can maybe be proactive with peacekeeping, where we can maybe see that there is mediation, that we can do something of that nature before we have atrocities

taking place, before we have loss of lives, before we have the kind of genocide that is currently taking place in Darfur?

Secondly is whether or not you think that there are any such situations existing on the continent now where we may be able to be proactive and get involved in before there are any outbreaks of violence?

Mr. SWIGERT. Well, you raise a very important question and an important point, Congressman Meeks. Obviously, we don't want to go to peacekeeping operations if there is a possibility to avoid that and to prevent conflict. From where I sit in the International Organizations Bureau at the State Department, I see a variety of efforts underway by the Administration to work in Africa intensively, to ensure that there is progress and development. The MCA, the Millennium Challenge Account that Congress has funded, puts forth a tremendous amount of resources.

The way to avoid problems, really, is through working on fundamentals; fundamentals of development of democracy, and ensuring that there is good governance. In Africa, as you know, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has put a focus on that. And I think our efforts are to try to work with African nations to ensure that there is movement in that direction.

Now, when there are simmering conflicts, which is a different, more short-term challenge, I know that through diplomacy we are quite active to try to diffuse these. From where I sit, I see the U.N. with its resources also working the problems.

In some cases, short of a peacekeeping operation, you will have a U.N. special political mission in a country where you have U.N. personnel who can work to help mediate and diffuse conflicts. But it is a very complex issue you raise which requires both short-term and long-term approaches.

Mr. MEEKS. I know I am one who had been advocating with the AU to step up to do more peacekeeping—and the question is: For a long-term basis, how much do you think to get the AU up to strength with the proper equipment, with the proper technology? What would you think so that they can—because I again understand that there is more focus for one or two reasons on the conflict. Both are good, to either help a neighbor or to just stop genocide. I have heard that the Senate has estimated over a long-term basis—"long-term" being, I guess, 5 to 10 years—it is estimated from \$75- to \$150 million may be what is needed to help strengthen and help them be successful.

But how much money do you think that we need to put behind them to help make them more successful?

Mr. SWIGERT. Well, I wouldn't be in a position to put a figure on it, Congressman Meeks. I am not that familiar with the scope of the programs that the AU has in place right now. The ones that I have seen active is the AU in Burundi, as I mentioned before, which are basically South African forces. And the AU is now stepping up in Darfur.

I think the key is that these operations need to be successful operations. And I would say the most pressing priority right now is Darfur, and that is what we are working on.

Looking at it as more of a mid- to long-term issue, building up capacity and training for the next crisis, not for the current one,

is what we tried to do today through the President's Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) in the meeting of the State Department, where AU, European Union, G-8 representatives are sitting down with our Government's representatives to get a good fix on what everybody is doing right now, hear from the AU about needs, and then move to translating this discussion into actual programs.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Swigert, we thank you.

We ran a little over on our first panel. We have a rather exceptional circumstance. We are going to ask our second panel if each of you will present in 3 minutes. The reason I say that is this is the last day of Congress and we have rolled all the votes. So once the votes come at 11:15, there is going to be an endless series of these votes, so we will not be able to come back. We will have to adjourn at that time.

So we have little time. We would like for each of you to make your presentation. We would like to have each of the Members of our Subcommittee have an opportunity to ask questions.

So we will now go to the second panel.

Let me introduce them. With us is Vivian Lowery Derryck. She is Senior Vice President and Director of Public-Private Partnerships at the Academy for Educational Development. Before joining the Academy for Educational Development, Ms. Derryck served as the Assistant Administrator for Africa at USAID. She is the recipient of numerous awards, including the Guggenheim Humanitarian Award and the Martin Luther King Service Award.

It is nice to see her before our Subcommittee again. Welcome, Vivian.

We also have Ms. Victoria Holt, a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, where she co-directs the Future of Peace Operations project. She has worked at the State Department as Senior Policy Advisor and was a senior staffer on the House Armed Services Committee. Ms. Holt recently co-authored a study of Peacekeeping Reforms at the United Nations.

Welcome, Ms. Holt.

We have Mr. Doug Brooks. He is the President of the International Peace Operations Association. He has written extensively on the regulation and utilization of private military services and is currently an Adjunct Professor at American University. Welcome, Mr. Brooks.

We will begin with Ms. Derryck.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VIVIAN LOWERY DERRYCK,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, ACADEMY FOR
EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Ms. DERRYCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. I will ask you to push the button there in front of you.

Ms. DERRYCK. I thank you, Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Payne and Committee Members.

I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you, and I, too, would like to take a moment to thank Congressman Houghton for being just a remarkable friend of Africa and a good citizen of the world and a great role model. We appreciate it in the community.

And I also wanted to congratulate Congressman Royce and Congressman Payne on many of the awards that you are getting now for your fine service and commitment to Africa.

I am speaking in my personal capacity, and not representing the Academy for Educational Development, the NGO for which I work. My written testimony is submitted for the record, and I am going to skip even some of the things I was going to say in oral testimony to get to two issues that I think are particularly important.

The first is the importance of peace-building and peacekeeping. I think that that really has to be the new focus and the new challenge in terms of peacekeeping. In post-conflict African countries we see weakened institutions, tattered economies, and for years these countries haven't had experience with, or reinforcement of, democratic values. These countries need prolonged periods of nurturing and a chance to learn or to relearn democratic values.

And to do this, they need an institution or a transition point. I propose The Trusteeship Council. The Trusteeship Council's initial function was to monitor the progress toward independence of mandated and non-self-governing territories after World War II. That function was over by the early 1990s. The Council still stands, but the Council has really no continuing mandate. I suggest that the Council be resurrected to deal with the issue of failed states. In my testimony, I cite what the charter says about the mission of The Trusteeship Council, and it really does comport with attention to failed states.

Now, let me turn to another point that I was going to make on the United States role in peacekeeping in Africa. Briefly, I think that we should be fully engaged in peacekeeping in four African countries. In Burundi, we need to provide technical assistance and help to monitor elections, if elections do take place as scheduled by the end of this month. In DRC, we should stay the course, we should support further troop expansion, and we really must—DRC is not going to have a successful transition without dealing more robustly with the situation in the east. And MONUC needs to re-address the institution in the east, rethinking its position if necessary.

In Liberia, we need to maintain the momentum and really learn from the lessons there: From the deficits in the preparedness of some African troops; from the better showing of U.S.- and U.K.-trained troops who came to Liberia from Sierra Leone and UNAMSIL; and from the centrality of Nigeria to ECOWAS and subregional responses.

But in my remaining minute I want to talk about Sudan. The United States needs to respond robustly in Darfur as part of an international peace protection force. I propose five steps:

First, the United States needs to help mobilize the 3,500 troops endorsed by the Security Council. The African Union has now agreed to send three battalions. However, if past experience is any guide, these troops are going to suffer from lack of uniforms, weapons, lift capacity, et cetera. They definitely will need to be trained for interoperability. The United States should offer immediate financial assistance of 75 million to support the materiel and transportation needs of the 3,500 troops as well as 200 million for long-term peacekeeping.

However, U.S. funding should be contingent upon the expansion of the mandate to protect civilians. Currently, the mandate covers only the protection of the monitors, while civilians continue to suffer.

Secondly 3,500 troops is a totally inadequate number for the protection force, so the U.S. should push for a force of 10,000.

Third, the United States should commit two battalions to train with the AU force and join them in a protection force, operating jointly for a short specified period of time to jump-start the process. Two U.S. battalions with superior equipment, et cetera, could powerfully strengthen the protection force.

Fourth, the U.S. should encourage NATO and the EU to contribute similar logistical troop support in Darfur.

Fifth, the United States needs to go the next step after declaring genocide and become involved in resolving this crisis diplomatically. Shuttle diplomacy by former President Carter, former President George Herbert Walker Bush, or well-known Americans such as Andy Young, would maintain international pressure on the Khartoum Government and probably yield to rapid results.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Derryck.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Derryck follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VIVIAN LOWERY DERRYCK, SENIOR VICE
PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

It is essential to have some place . . . in which reason, or law, can be brought to bear on conflicts, either for preventing them, or for ending them in accordance with certain generally accepted rules. We must not despair if these rules are often violated or, more frequently, ignored, or even if the Super-Powers sometimes fail to make use of the machinery altogether. The great thing is that it should be there. And when the abyss really yawns before them I believe that this time . . . it is to the United Nations that nations will turn."¹

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important topic of peacekeeping in Africa. The views that I will express are my own and are in no way to be associated with the Academy for Educational Development, the NGO for which I work.

I am delighted that the Sub-Committee is sponsoring this hearing for three reasons. First, attention to African peacekeeping is in the US national interest. After 9/11, the correlation between conflict overseas and US national security has become clear. Conflict undermines US security. Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from more long-term conflict than any other region, so it is in our national interest to deal with its conflicts and support strong nation-states on the continent that subscribe to the rule of law, invest in their own citizens and develop transparent financial architectures.

This hearing is also appropriate because Africa hosts more than twice the peacekeeping missions of any other region and consumes approximately half of the UN peacekeeping budget.

Third, an examination of peacekeeping in Africa is warranted given the sheer number of nations, actors, and populations involved. Key players in African peacekeeping include: the UN; regional organizations such as the African Union and the European Union; other groupings, notably the G-8; individual nations, e.g. the US, UK, Netherlands, Nigeria and Rwanda; and non-state actors ranging from private armies to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Each actor has a huge stake in peacekeeping successes, but efforts are often plagued by lack of coordination, broken promises, unmet financial pledges and posturing for national audiences.

Three components are fundamental to peacekeeping: preventive action to keep conflicts from boiling over in the first instance; actual peacekeeping which involves the use of military force to establish and maintain peace; and peacebuilding, the efforts to rebuild institutions of governance and viable economic systems, as well as

¹ Gladwyn Jebb, UN founder from the UK, as quoted by Ingvar Carlsson, "The UN at 50: A Time to Reform," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1995, p. 4.

to re-establish the rule of law and respect for human rights. In these remarks, I will focus on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, outline key challenges and propose specific US government actions.

PEACEKEEPING

There is universal acknowledgement that long-term global security is based on a worldwide network of stable nation-states; that, from time to time, securing that stable system requires peacekeeping; and that the international community is the ultimate arbitrator and last guarantor of peace and stability. The United Nations is recognized as the international community's guarantor of the peace and is mandated to act to secure it, especially in Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The UN holds primacy of place in African peacekeeping. With 13 ongoing peacekeeping missions and 12 peacebuilding operations in post-conflict nations, the UN dominates peacekeeping worldwide. Over the years, the UN has developed a rational, but complex system to deal with conflicts; the world body has the mechanisms, track record and legitimacy to lead international efforts. But the system is hampered by bureaucratic inefficiencies, cumbersome financial systems in which it is painfully slow and excruciatingly difficult to raise resources, and member states' reluctance to give robust authority for peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeepers today confront at least five challenges: training; interoperability; sustained readiness; transportation and logistics obstacles; and funding. After the mission is set and troops are solicited, myriad challenges inevitably arise. Some troops lack uniforms and boots. Many lack weapons. Different countries train troops differently. The training among various national forces may be uneven, raising the question of interoperability. Once the training and interoperability issues are resolved, mission planners worry about how to sustain troop readiness. Deployment issues of transporting the peacekeepers to the site and logistics concerns are commonplace. Of course, funding is the base consideration from initial solicitation through end-of-mission.

The report of the panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the Brahimi Report, reflected a high-level attempt to strengthen international peacekeeping as the panel examined missions, responsibilities and procedures from the Secretary General and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations that he convened. The report covered the Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with its Integrated Mission Task Forces, and the Department of Public Affairs. If the Brahimi Report's recommendations for clear strategies, stronger and precise mandates, integrated mission planning, and integration of civil society strengthening strategies into peacebuilding are enacted, there will be a much stronger peacekeeping capability in the United Nations.

Two new developments may also help strengthen peacekeeping in Africa, the African Union and the proposed Global Peace Operations Initiative. The African Union (AU), the new, proactive regional organization of the continent, has focused on conflict resolution as a key priority and the proposed Global Peace Operations Initiative spearheaded by the US would help develop a long-term African peacekeeping operational capability.

The AU, inaugurated in 2002, came into being with new institutions, a determination to find African solutions to African problems and an avowed commitment to accountability. New institutions include an African Parliament, a Peace and Security Council, a peer review mechanism, and NEPAD, an ambitious program of long-term multi-sectoral development. The UN, the G-8, and OECD have all embraced NEPAD as "the basis on which to build future relations with Africa and the general framework around which the international community including the United Nations system (A/RES/57/2) should concentrate its efforts for African development."²

Earlier this year, at the G-8 Summit, Africa was once more on the agenda. When a group of African leaders met with G-8 leaders at Sea Island, they formulated a new initiative to address African inability to respond to peacekeeping demands on the continent and the need to develop an African capacity to do so. AU and G-8 officials found common cause. With a US financial commitment of \$660 million over the next five years, the Global Peace Operations Initiative will create, train and equip a stand-by force of 70,000 by 2010. The initiative is part of an African Action Plan to "provide technical and financial assistance so that by 2010, African countries, and regional and sub-regional organizations are able to engage more effec-

²(A G8 Action Plan, Annex, Page 8.)

tively to prevent and resolve violent conflicts on the continent and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter.”³

This is a welcome development as the initiative proposes to deal with many of key challenges hampering Africans’ ability to deal aggressively with the continent’s conflicts. GPOI’s emphasis on training and joint exercises will reduce the interoperability issues. Basing portions of the initiative in Italy will reduce logistical issues. It is laudable that at the early stages, planners are holding serious discussions about ways to maintain readiness and newly acquired skills. One hopes that GPOI remains an Administration priority and the request is made for robust funding for FY06.

III. PEACEBUILDING

The peacebuilding component of peacekeeping in Africa presents the greatest long-term challenge. In some post-conflict African countries, weak institutions and years without the reinforcement of democratic values have left feeble nations as failed states. Women have suffered acutely and disproportionately. It takes time to rebuild institutions and trust among former combatants with sharply differing views. The skills sets required for peace-building vary sharply from the skills required of peacekeepers. Unfortunately, the peacebuilding component of peacekeeping operations usually is not programmed to continue for the many years required to rebuild a war-ravaged state. These countries need a prolonged period of nurturing and the incubation of democratic values. The Trusteeship Council is well placed to meet those needs. When peacebuilding will takes many years or conditions are too rough to accommodate peace-building, bring in the Trusteeship Council.

The Trusteeship Council’s initial function was to monitor the progress toward independence of mandated and non-self-governing territories after World War II. However, the Trusteeship Council had served its function by the early 1990s. The Chamber still stands, but the Council has no continuing mandate. In 1995, it was suggested that the Council focus on the environment. I suggest that the Council be resurrected to deal with the issue of failed states. The Charter, in Chapter XII, Article 75, describes the basic duties of the Trusteeship Council: “[to] further international peace and security; promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development toward self-government or independence; to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and to ensure equal treatment in social, economic and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals . . .”

The Trusteeship Council’s mandate embodies the essence of peacebuilding—strengthening democratic institutions, re-building economies, promoting human rights. The Trusteeship Council could incubate failed states until such time as they were ready to hold elections and resume functioning as sovereign entities.

In July and August, 2003, when Liberia was floundering, the question of trusteeship was quietly raised. Liberia, with UN, ECOWAS, AU and US support, seems to have turned the corner and is managing the initial peacebuilding phase adequately. However, Somalia would be a prime candidate. Virtually without a national government since 1990, trusteeship could guide the development of new institutions of government, help build a viable market economy, safeguard the rights of vulnerable women and children, and support the re-establishment of a national army and constabulary forces.

One concern about this recommendation is timing. The peacebuilding phase in many African peacekeeping operations needs to be strengthened immediately. With all of its remarkable progress, I still worry about Sierra Leone when the UN force leaves next year.

Large organizations like the UN are slow to move—Security Council reform has been discussed for ten years with no definitive action. We need immediate action to transfer peacebuilding activities from UN peacekeeping missions to long-term programs. If it will take years to re-activate the Trusteeship Council, planners might consider reconfiguring the current Ad Hoc ECOSOC and Security Council Working Groups on Countries Emerging from Conflict into a permanent body to deal with this issue.

US ROLE IN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

Clearly, the US has a major role to play in African peacekeeping. Currently, we are reluctant to send troops to more troubled situations, citing our commitments in

³G-8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations.

Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, I believe that we should engage fully in peacekeeping in four African countries: Burundi; DRC; Liberia; and Sudan. In all four, US financial and material support can make the difference between success and failure.

Burundi. We should continue to shine a spotlight on Burundi. Burundi has been in conflict since 1992 with a constant UN presence for more than a decade. Legislative elections are scheduled to be held by the end of this month. US inquiries, as well as the presence of US election monitors would be a major boost to UN workers. The US should also underscore its appreciation for South African contributions to the peace process in Burundi. From the involvement of Nelson Mandela to the presence of a battalion of peacekeepers, South Africa has been an active participant in the Burundi peace process.

DRC. Stay the course in MONUC. Peacekeeping operations in DRC are vital for security and stability in central Africa. The DRC boasts 50 percent of Africa's forests and potentially enough hydro-electric power to fuel the whole continent. Bordering nine countries, strife and conflict in DRC inevitably reverberate to nine other nations. Similarly, a non-violent transition and successful elections in 2005 will send a positive signal to those same neighbors and reinforce the AU and NEPAD. But DRC will not have a successful election without dealing with the situation in the East. MONUC must address the continued instability in the East, rethinking its mission as necessary.

Liberia. Maintain momentum in Liberia. AU pro-activity, ECOWAS and UN peacekeepers, with US support, have produced an African success in Liberia. Behind-the-scenes US support was important, but I wish that it had been more robust. Nevertheless, US officials involved in peacekeeping learned a great deal from the Liberia experience. In debriefings, deficits in the preparedness of some African troops were revealed. US and UK-trained African troops who came to Liberia from Sierra Leone demonstrated the importance of good training and experience on the ground. The centrality of Nigeria to the ECOWAS and sub-regional response was highlighted.

Sudan. The US should respond robustly in Darfur as an integral part of an international protection force. Sudan is the acid test of the international community's mechanisms of genocide prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping. The international community's robust engagement in Sudan is a win-win-win. For the UN, action in Sudan offers an opportunity to get momentum behind the reforms the Brahini Report recommends so persuasively. For the AU, Sudan presents a chance to strengthen new mechanisms and institutions, and to test the ability to of the new mechanisms to respond to conflict under the banner of the African Union. For the US, Sudan brings the opportunity to demonstrate a commitment beyond rhetoric to staunch genocide where we see it. Sudan presents us with the opportunity to live our values.

The government of Sudan has committed genocide, as Secretary Powell courageously stated in his Senate testimony on September 9, 2004, to the US Senate. However, the naming of the atrocities in Darfur as genocide does not in and of itself constitute sufficient action for the US in this situation. The acts of brutality continue and the international community is failing to act. The fighting began in February, 2003. Twenty months later, at least 50,000 Sudanese are dead; 1,400,000 are IDPs and with 10,000 added to the IDP rolls every week.

The International Genocide Convention calls for signatories "to undertake to prevent and to punish" genocide. Genocide is defined as attempt to annihilate a group of people, "to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." That practice is happening in Sudan each and every day.

The UN Security Council has authorized, under Chapter VI, a protection force of 3,500 to protect 300 African Union monitors in Darfur. That authorization raised three big issues. First, there is authorization, but no discussion of the funding for the mission. UN sources estimate that the monitoring operation currently envisioned will cost about \$1 million per day. At this point, no funders are on the horizon. The second issue is the Sudanese government's ability to veto protective force contingents that it does not approve of. The third issue is timing. It takes a minimum of 90 days to get any peacekeeping activity organized and mobilized under UN auspices. That's too long a wait for action in Sudan.

Having courageously denounced actions in Sudan as genocide, the US is morally obligated to act immediately. We can shape world opinion, harness resources and support the African Union.

Five steps would advance a robust response to the Darfur situation. First, the US should help mobilize the 3,500 troops endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1564. The African Union has now agreed to send three battalions; however, if past experience is any guide, these troops may suffer from a lack of uniforms, weapons,

and lift capacity. The troops will definitely need to train for interoperability. The U.S. should offer immediate financial assistance of \$75 million to support the material and transportation needs of the 3,500 troops, as well as \$200 million for longterm peacekeeping. However, US funding should be contingent on expansion of the mandate to protect civilians. Currently, the mandate covers only the protection of the monitors, while civilians continue to suffer.

Second, 3,500 troops is a totally inadequate number for the protection force. By some estimates, a successful operation will need 50 times the troop strength currently authorized. To date, only Nigeria, Rwanda, and Tanzania have offered forces. The US should push for a force of 10,000. If we have a force of 15,000 in Liberia—which is less than the size of Darfur—surely 10,000 troops is not too many for Darfur, which is as big as Texas or France.

Third, the US should commit two battalions to train with the AU force and to join them in a protection force—operating jointly for a short, specified period of time to jump-start the process. Two US battalions with superior equipment, night vision goggles and radar detection equipment would add exponential strength to the protection force. If the Sudanese government objects to US involvement, we should seek Chapter VII rather than Chapter VI Security Council authorization.

Fourth, the US should encourage NATO and the EU to contribute similar logistical and troop support in Darfur. The Netherlands at one point indicated an interest in offering material support and other EU nations have explored the possibility of involvement.

Fifth, many nations around the world applauded the courage and strength of Secretary Powell and President Bush in declaring genocide in Darfur. Now President Bush, Secretary Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice need to go the next step and become actively involved in resolving this crisis diplomatically. Shuttle diplomacy by former President Carter, former President George Herbert Walker Bush or well-known Americans such as Andy Young would maintain international pressure on the Khartoum government and probably yield rapid results.

All five activities must be undertaken with sensitivity to the legitimate sovereignty concerns of the Khartoum government and awareness of the fragile cease-fire and SPLA-government peace process on-going in the south. Aware that the civil war has killed more than two million Sudanese, all involved are committed to not derailing the peace talks between the Khartoum government and the SPLA. African conflict specialists and negotiators are aware of the sensitivities and stakes of the peace talks and kudos to them for negotiating with the Sudanese government to raise the level of the protection force to 3,500.

Government sensitivities and rebel suspicions underscore the sensitivities and delicacy of peacebuilding. A key task of the protection force leadership will be the public relations campaign—hopefully under the direction of the UN Dept of Public Affairs—to get residents of Darfur and citizenry of Sudan to understand why peacekeepers are present and to address the sensitive issues of race, ethnicity, language, religion, rights to arable land rights and economic expectations and sort through the relationships between Arabic-speaking, black, Muslims and Arab nomads who are also Muslims.

In addition to active engagement in the four specific peacekeeping operating discussed above, the US could support African peace keeping through three other specific actions. First, we could strongly support the key findings of the Brahimi Commission. Secondly, we could robustly fund the Global Peace Operations Initiative. Finally, we could be pro-active in our specific support to UN peacekeeping operations in New York. New York particularly needs to build its prevention capabilities. UN/New York has no single office to coordinate preventive diplomacy activities. The US should agree to fund a modest team comprised of one person from each region, augmented by five US specialists. The team would have dual reporting so that if its findings were stymied by the UN bureaucracy, it would have another outlet through which to share its findings.

In conclusion, peacekeeping in Africa embodies the very heart of the UN. It highlights challenges of funding, relationships to regional organizations and distinctions between and among types of mandates—authorizations versus full mandates. The key challenge is to expand and strengthen peacebuilding capabilities. Peacebuilding goes beyond the mandate of traditional peacekeeping. One way to address this need would be through re-activation of the Trusteeship Council with a modified mission of restoring and rebuilding post-conflict states.

Peacekeeping in Africa reflects the triumphs and failing of individuals and states. Yet, we're looking at positive developments in five African peacekeeping operations. Gladwyn Jebb's optimism was well founded. "The great thing is that it (peacekeeping machinery) should be there. And when the abyss really yawns before them I believe that this time . . . it is to the United Nations that nations will turn."

Mr. ROYCE. Now we go to Ms. Holt.

**STATEMENT OF VICTORIA K. HOLT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER**

Ms. HOLT. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Congressman Payne, and Members of the Committee.

I, too, would just like to say a word of appreciation for Congressman Houghton's work over the years, as an outside observer. It has been appreciated.

I will be quick. I will hit four main challenges, as the Committee requested. I will briefly touch on some lessons learned from the U.N.'s own experience in asking tough questions itself by how it could do better in peacekeeping. Then I will highlight a few areas where I think our U.S. policy could be strengthened, particularly in the areas of this Committee's oversight.

We clearly already know the first major challenge. We have seen peacekeeping go up dramatically in the last year and a half. It is almost unprecedented, with 80 percent of these U.N. troops in Africa; 16 U.N. operations with 60,000 troops worldwide; and a mission in Sudan not yet counted into that total. And all the missions that have been authorized are not fully staffed.

But I also want to point out these aren't just more missions, they are also hybrid operations; they are complex, and they have got multidimensional aspects on the ground.

One of the things the U.N. is smarter about is trying to integrate both security and what we have been hearing about already, which is peace-building—and we can talk about that today. But what the peacekeepers are being asked to do is more complex than what they have been asked to do in the past.

We also have been seeing more hybrid operations. As pointed out earlier, it is presently smarter to send in forces that are prepared to deal with a more combat-like environment. These forces may be from the West, or they may be from ECOWAS or from the African Union. But we also have to figure out how transitions work between those forces and what becomes U.N. peacekeeping operations. Frequently, traditional peacekeepers expect to do more of an observer mission.

Second, the Africans are leading: They have demonstrated political will and they are committed to building up an African Union and an ECOWAS capacity, including a stand-by force by 2010 with five regional brigades, with the goal of having them able to deploy on the ground quickly. This is fabulous, but the problem continues to be that many troops within Africa frequently are not self-sustainable, they lack logistical and transport support, and sometimes even basic equipment, food and medical supplies, as we saw in Burundi.

The African Union, ECOWAS and other regional groups also face major gaps in their headquarters support as well as their own ability to plan, organize, manage, deploy and keep a mission going in the field.

Third, while international capacity has increased dramatically, I fear that this capacity may not be able to keep up with the pace at which it is being asked to deploy and manage peace operations today. And that is where I think the lessons learned about past op-

erations will make a difference. We have seen a dramatic shift to developing states being the lead peacekeepers currently.

Of all the countries contributing over 1,000 forces each to U.N. peace operations, they are all developing states; the top five being Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Ghana. The United States contributes under 1 percent of the U.N.'s peacekeepers today. And the vast majority of U.S. forces within U.N. peace operations are civilian police.

Finally, the bottom line will always be political will. As we have seen in Sudan, capacity is only part of the question. We can come back to Sudan, but there is a fundamental difference between an observer mission, which the AU mission is currently able to lead in Sudan, and having civilian protection on the ground.

Mr. Chairman, I think I am closing out on my time, so I will just quickly point out the importance of talking about U.N. reforms another time. Your Committee oversees both the Contributions to the International Peacekeeping Account, which funds our share of the U.N. peacekeeping budget and which only has half of what it needs for the coming years, as well as the Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations account, which is the only pool of money that the U.S. has to support deployments like that of ECOWAS. It is \$104 million and could easily be doubled, and well used. I would also say I support the Global Peace Operations Initiative and other reforms at the U.N.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Holt.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Holt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICTORIA K. HOLT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

Chairman Royce, Congressman Payne, and Members of the Committee, it is an honor to be invited to testify before you today. Thank you for the opportunity to address the challenges of African peacekeeping, and to consider how United States policy can best support the success of current and future operations.

This topic is especially important and timely. The growth in African peacekeeping is unprecedented. The US has supported Security Council approval of four new or expanded African missions in the last year including Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burundi. In June, President Bush announced the \$660 million *Global Peace Operations Initiative* (GPOI), to help train and support African nations (and others) for peace operations. The US recently recognized genocide in Darfur, Sudan and called for global action, ten years after the Rwandan genocide where the world failed to act. African nations and organizations are moving forward to lead peace operations. Today, the State Department is hosting G-8 partners and representatives from African organizations to review the G-8's *Africa Action Plan*, which aims to strengthen capacity for peace operations in Africa. Yet for all this good will there are big obstacles to overcome. Missions still need skilled troops, observers and civilian police; GPOI has not been approved by Congress; the horrific crisis in Sudan continues; African organizations are not capable of conducting operations without support; and the G-8 goals are still to be achieved.

Meeting the challenges of peace operations depends on US leadership. This Committee's role is pivotal, especially in its oversight of the key US tools for peace operations: funding for UN operations, for training African forces, and for support to regional peacekeeping efforts. I will suggest ways that US policy could better support more effective and successful conduct of peace operations in Africa by looking at the questions posed by the Committee for this hearing:

- What are the challenges today for successful peace operations in Africa?
- What lessons have been learned over the last 15 years of peace operations?
- What US policy options address these questions, including GPOI, and are US goals being met?

CHALLENGES

First, demand for challenging peace operations is up. The number of operations and peacekeepers¹ in Africa has grown dramatically in the last five years, a response to opportunities for peace. Today the UN leads 16 peace operations, seven in Africa: Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and the Western Sahara. These African missions account for over 80 percent of *all* UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide.² Of the seven missions in Africa, six began after 1999, supported by roughly 49,000 UN peacekeepers. More troops will be needed for a potential mission in Sudan. As a result, costs are increasing with the demand for deployments. Of the projected UN peacekeeping costs for 2004–2005, approximately 70 percent are associated with missions in Africa. In addition to the increase in missions and mission personnel, many of these operations are complex, multidimensional, and operating with Chapter VII authority.

Many recent African operations are hybrids, where multiple organizations have played a lead role in the peacekeeping mission in concert with the UN. In Liberia, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed troops in the summer of 2003, assisted by the US, and then transitioned the mission to the UN in October 2003. In Burundi, the African Union (AU) led a peacekeeping force with a deployment of 2,870 peacekeepers primarily from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique before the UN took over in June 2004. The European Union authorized a French-led force to eastern DRC in the summer of 2003 to secure the Ituri region for three months, giving time for a more robust and expanded UN force to take its place in the fall. And in Sudan today, the African Union leads an observer force, with the United Nations planning a potential peacekeeping mission there.

Second, there is an increased African commitment to peacekeeping, but African groups face major organizational and resource challenges. Within the AU and ECOWAS, political will and ambitious leadership are fueling efforts for both organizations to take on peace operations, ranging from mediation and early warning to peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention. In Africa, some leaders see peace operations as a means of putting out a fire in a neighbor's house, both a moral instinct and recognition that such fires can devastate a region.³ Others cite a responsibility to prevent future genocides on the continent. Alongside the rhetoric are real advances.

- The African Union, in addition to launching its first peacekeeping operation in Burundi and its second mission now in Darfur, aims to develop five regional brigades that will comprise an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010.
- The Economic Community of West African States, which has led numerous peacekeeping operations in West Africa, is developing its regional standby force, and is moving to increase its headquarters planning and management staff.
- Other African organizations traditionally focused on development and economics are moving toward peace and security issues, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).⁴ The development of an East African Standby Brigade for the African Standby Force concept was announced in September 2004.⁵

Key challenges face these organizations in their efforts to deploy peacekeepers. Most forces are not self-sustainable, many lack sufficient logistical and transport support, and some even need basic equipment, food and medical supplies.⁶ The African Union, ECOWAS and other regional groups also face gaps in their headquarters and leadership capacity to organize, manage, deploy and fund peace operations. Outside partners are offering some support to African organizations and nations in funding, training and deployment support for peace operations. The United States,

¹Peacekeepers include troops, military observers and civilian police. These numbers do not include additional civilian staff required in the field or in headquarters for peace operations.

²Numbers as of August 2004, when 48,864 of the 60,731 UN peacekeepers were deployed in Africa alone. As of early October 2004, the United Nations had authorized an increase in the DRC mission numbers by another 5,900 troops.

³Reflects comments by Ambassador Raph Uwechue, ECOWAS official, Stimson Center Roundtable, January 2004.

⁴Other actors in the region include: Economic Community of Central African States, East African Community, Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States and the Arab-Maghreb Union.

⁵OCHA, "East Africa: Eleven nations to provide troops to AU Standby Force," IRIN News, 14 September 2004.

⁶Some troops were deployed to Burundi and reportedly not provided with sufficient food or medical supplies.

Great Britain and France have modest, on-going bilateral military training programs focused on selected countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The G-8 countries created an *Africa Action Plan* in 2002 to advance African peacekeeping efforts with financial and programmatic support.

Third, increased international capacity for peace operations may fail to keep pace with the need. Efforts to increase African capacity for peace operations and conflict resolution raise the question of whether these initiatives are aimed at building greater overall capacities to deal with conflict; or are intended to reduce the direct involvement of developed states in Africa. It is a fair question, given the overall reduction in developed states' participation in UN-led peace operations in Africa. 100 nations contribute forces to UN peacekeeping, but contributions from developed nations have declined since the 1990s. Today the top 16 nations, those contributing more than 1,000 personnel each to UN operations, are all from developing states—led by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Ghana.⁷

Many developed states with highly skilled armed services are stretched by their increased military commitments, such as in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet major powers have recently intervened in African conflicts, primarily to help stabilize immediate crises, such as the British deployment to Sierra Leone (2000), the French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire (2002), the French-led EU mission in the DRC (2003), and the American support to the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (2003). The Stand-by High Readiness Brigade, composed of 16 nations (mostly developed and European) played a pivotal role in setting up the UN mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (2000) and helping transition from ECOWAS to UN missions.

When developing nations provide personnel for peacekeeping missions, they frequently require outside material and financial support from the UN and bilateral partners, such as transportation, logistics, equipment, and planning and organizational support. The challenge for the AU and regional organizations is transitioning their forces to a higher level of self-sustainability and establishing their own management and planning staffs, logistics capacity, and financial strength to organize and conduct missions.

Fourth, political will determines action in hard cases—such as Sudan. UN capacity to organize a rapid and effective response to a genocidal conflict may be improved with better advance planning, logistical support, on-call and skilled personnel, mission leadership and clarity within the UN system. But member states ultimately must be willing to act—to authorize the use of force and deploy military units and skilled personnel rapidly by the UN, a regional organization or a multinational force. UN missions also need members to support clear, robust rules of engagement; offer leadership; and provide timely support. An effective response requires the Security Council to authorize UN action (or that of an operation led by a lead nation or regional organization), and to provide a clear mandate that is impartial but not neutral, with strategic guidance from the Secretary-General to the missions' leaders on how to deal with dramatic changes on the ground. These requirements are a political call, and not easily met even in the face of dramatic atrocities.

LESSONS LEARNED AND THE BRAHIMI REPORT

In 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan tasked an expert *Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* with considering the UN failures in meeting peacekeeping challenges of the 1990s.⁸ Capacity shortfalls have sometimes dogged UN missions—countries have sent personnel without proper equipment, shoes, or even rudimentary skills. UN headquarters support for operations was hindered by insufficient resources when it needed skilled personnel, planning capacity, and clear guidance. The UN had failed to act against the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the 1995 Srebrenica massacre.⁹ Named for its dynamic chair, UN Under Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi, the Panel presented its findings in August 2000. I will review

⁷ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 August 2004.

⁸ Panelists included Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), Mr. J. Brian Atwood (United States), Mr. Colin Granderson (Trinidad and Tobago), Dame Ann Hercus (New Zealand), Mr. Richard Monk (United Kingdom), General Klaus Naumann (Germany), Professor Hisako Shimura (Japan), Ambassador Vladimir Shustov (Russian Federation), General Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe), Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland).

⁹ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/55, entitled "The fall of Srebrenica,"* A/54/549, 15 November 1999; and UN Security Council, *Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, enclosing the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257,* 15 December 1999.

some of the lessons learned from this effort, based on findings from our Stimson Center study of its implementation.¹⁰

Three broad principles of the Report remain salient four years later. *First*, war fighting is the job of nations and coalitions, not the UN—but peacekeepers should be prepared to deal with armed groups or bandits and not get pushed around during the conduct of their mission. The UN may need to provide troops with more robust rules of engagement and specialized support to implement peace after intrastate conflicts. *Second*, peacekeeping and peacebuilding must go together from the beginning of operations. Security is provided temporarily by peacekeepers, which enables peacebuilding to work; peacebuilders help develop the institutions and environment that sustain security and enables peacekeepers to return home. *Third*, fundamentals still matter as the underpinning of UN peace operations, the support from UN, its member states, and collaboration among them all affect capacity and success.

More specifically, meeting the challenge of peace operations requires closing gaps between goals and reality. The UN has moved to close the gap between what the Council mandates and what peacekeepers can do in the field; to improve its headquarters support for planning and supporting missions; to increase skilled mission leadership; and finally, to develop systems for more effective and rapid deployments. A few central areas parallel the challenge for African capacity today:

Skilled management of operations is central. The UN learned it needed more capacity to manage, organize and support the operations it deployed, including professional staff at UN headquarters, better leadership of missions, civilians who could deploy rapidly to the field and an improved planning capacity. Mission leaders, for example, are now brought together in advance of going to the field, to review their mandates and meet with their colleagues before deploying to the field.

Rapid and effective deployments require advance planning and support. The UN now aims to deploy a traditional peacekeeping operation within 30 days and a complex operation within 90 days of a Security Council resolution. To prevent equipment-related delays that plagued so many missions, the UN provides some funding to the Secretary General to support advance planning. The UN now has Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), which arrange contracts and supplies in advance of deployments, coordinated through the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy.

Quality personnel matter. Skilled personnel are still the backbone of peacekeeping. UN capacity depends on the quantity and quality of troops, police and civilian personnel provided by member states. For complex operations, the skills and coherence of the force are critical, and the UN would benefit from nations collaborating in training and equipping brigade-sized forces that could deploy rapidly and be listed in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), a voluntary listing by member states of the resources they could provide to an operation. UNSAS helps to organize and deploy operations more effectively. Still missing are sufficient numbers of logistical support and other enabling units. The supply problem has plagued many missions, delaying deployment of military personnel for the DRC and of qualified police for Liberia. Over 75 percent of the police recruits for the UN mission in Liberia, for example, failed the test for basic qualifications.¹¹

US POLICY OPTIONS

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States' only major peacekeeping role in Africa has been in Somalia. Today, US personnel serve in two African UN peacekeeping missions: 85 in Liberia (nearly all civilian police) and six observers in Ethiopia/Eritrea. US policymakers have been reluctant to lead peace operations or provide sizeable US military forces for peace operations. In an environment where U.S. military participation in or leadership of peace operations in Africa is minimal, the natural question is what else can the U.S. do to help other actors respond?

First, the US needs to increase support of its existing efforts. Within the State Department budget, two accounts are critical.

- The *Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations account*, requested at \$104 million for fiscal year 2005 (FY05), is under funded and could easily be doubled to meet

¹⁰William Durch, Victoria Holt, Caroline Earle, and Moira Shanahan. The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations (The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC), November 2003 at www.stimson.org/fopo.

¹¹Interview, UN DPKO, October 2003.

the current demand. This account is the central source for support to regional efforts and organizations, to run US training of African forces (African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, with \$15 million annually), and to assist African missions (e.g., support for Ethiopia contingents to deploy to Burundi, planning support to ECOWAS, etc.)

- The *Contributions for International Peacekeeping Account* (CIPA), requested at \$650 million for fiscal year 2005, provides the US share (27%) of contributions for UN peace operations. This request is roughly half of what is required for the coming year. Further, this account is frequently without any specific funding to support initiatives that invest in capacity-building and longer-term reform efforts, which then limits the US ability to promote such reforms at the United Nations or within specific missions.

Second, the US should support capacity-building at the AU, ECOWAS and other regional and sub-regional groups for peace operations, as well as increase US bilateral training and logistical support for such operations.

- *Support for GPOI*. This draft initiative would greatly expand US foreign military train and equip efforts, including constabulary training for peace and stability operations. In concert with other G8 countries, this US investment could increase the ability of African nations to field more capable peacekeepers.¹² In lieu of supporting standing brigades, the Initiative focuses on training (with G8 partners) 75,000 troops over five years for peace enforcement and constabulary roles, a goal of 10 African battalions. Equipment, transport and logistical support are also central in addressing the shortage of capable personnel for such operations and could involve \$660 million over five years. This Initiative would dramatically increase the small US resources now dedicated to training African militaries and assisting regional groups in Africa.¹³ The program must be integrated with AU and ECOWAS efforts as well as the UN.

Third, the US should increase its efforts to improve UN capacities for peace operations.

- *Support more rapid and effective deployments*. The stocks at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy should be expanded to sustain deployment of more than one major peace operations each year.¹⁴ Given the UN's lack of enabling units, logistical support and transport for its missions, for which it depends on member states—the United States and other G8 nations should work to match their air and sealift capacity, key transportation and logistical support, to help deploy and sustain peacekeepers and civilian specialists in crisis areas. Better participation in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System would help match contributors' capabilities during the planning stage for more effective deployments.¹⁵
- *Increase international pool of skilled civilian police, rule of law experts and peace-building capacities*. The need for qualified and skilled civilian police (CivPol), and rule of law experts (judges, corrections, penal and human rights) outpaces their availability for operations in Africa. The UN is shorthanded at headquarters, as fewer than 30 staff tries to recruit and manage nearly 6,000 CivPol in the field. African organizations have little to no capacity. Creating a certification process with EU, AU, and ECOWAS members to identify and standardize the characterization of qualifications and skill levels for those of

¹² Many questions remain about this initiative and its operational aspects, including what doctrine would be used, what equipment is provided, how countries are chosen, how standards are set, and what gaps are being closed, etc.

¹³ The primary funding source for direct US bilateral support to African military training is through the ACOTA program which is funded at \$15 million in FY04, with \$15 million requested from Congress for FY05. Additional support to ECOWAS is provided through the Africa Regional program (State Department budget); funding for this area was \$9 million in FY04 and is requested at \$45 million in FY05. The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program supports training to militaries including Africa, but less than \$2 million as requested for its FY05 budget.

¹⁴ The UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, is currently configured to support deployment of one new complex UN peacekeeping operation annually. Given the current pace of UN operations, this is not sufficient in 2004.

¹⁵ The UNSAS system is based on volunteer pledges by Members States to contribute specified resources within agreed response time for United Nations peacekeeping operations. When necessary, they are requested by the Secretary-General, and, if approved by the Member States, are deployed.

ferred by member states as CivPol (and rule of law experts) would help support more effective deployments in the field.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Brooks, I committed to the Members that they would have opportunities to question the witnesses. So if it is all right with you, and, without objection, I would like to go to Ms. Lee, if we could, because she had some specific questions that I would like to give her an opportunity to ask at this time.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Yes. I would just like to ask you to describe the role and the mission of the private military companies in terms of their logistical support and the types of vetting of the employees, and the specific use of former security branch offices from certain countries such as South Africa.

Mr. BROOKS. In 2 minutes or less. Essentially in Africa we are seeing private companies being used in the place of Western militaries, where I think in the past, Western military or European military would have been more involved in logistics and support operations for operations there. More often now, we see private companies doing it.

For the most part, what we are talking about—90 percent of it, maybe 95 percent of it—is actually logistics and support; demining operations, heavy airlift, helicopters, medical services, these sorts of things. That is really the core of what we are talking about.

On the other hand, some of these missions are quite dangerous. And as we know from the first Liberian mission, for example, the U.S. State Department supported that mission with ICI of Oregon, a helicopter company. The crews were taken hostage three times during that peacekeeping operation, and the first two times it was not a big deal. The third time the crews were tortured. They were allowed to arm themselves at that point. The Nigerian troops that were working with them loved it, and they did over 60 airfield seizures. It was Nigerians and ECOMOG troops supported by these helicopters. It was a very effective combination.

I think the reason we use the private sector so much is, frankly, we have no alternative. What we are doing with ACOTA is training African militaries to do peacekeeping better, but we just can't provide them with squadrons of helicopters with heavy air lift, which is extremely expensive to maintain and keep in operation. It just makes sense to use these items off the shelf.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We see no expanded role—only in terms of logistical support—not expanding to more security?

Mr. BROOKS. Well, in a sense, when you put private entities into combat zones, there is going to be some sort of a bleed or some sort of a gray area. I think in terms of what we looked at—we put a paper together for supporting MONUC in the Congo, which would have involved training Congolese to do border security and quick reaction and things like that, but it also included a quick-reaction police force which just made sense.

I mean, until the Congolese have their own capacities built up, you have to keep something in place. And the troops that were being proffered to that mission by the international community were simply not capable of doing that sort of quick reaction.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Mr. Payne?

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

I am going to ask you a quick question, and then of Ms. Derryck.

Is there a group called Executive Outcomes and Sandstrom, or something like that? Where are those from? Executive Outcomes is from Africa, sort of mercenaries, and Sandstrom out of Europe?

Mr. BROOKS. Executive Outcomes is out of South Africa. That closed in 1998. Sandline International was out of the U.K., it closed this year.

Mr. PAYNE. So those mercenaries are gone.

Mr. BROOKS. Those companies are gone.

Mr. PAYNE. All right, you won't say "mercenaries."

Ms. Derryck, this trusteeship—real quick—would the country have to agree there were some negative connotations of the trusteeships in the past, another—some other name it could be called. It was not development of the countries in many of the old trusteeships, but would the country have to say it was okay, would we impose on it, or what would you say?

Ms. DERRYCK. Thank you for the question, Congressman. The Trusteeship Council, under the charter, only deals with countries that are not sovereign nations. So it would take a change in the charter to have this happen. But there are other things that are being proposed for changes in the charter.

In the interim, because this issue is so important about what do you do with these new post-conflict countries that are coming on line—there are two committees within the U.N. system, one for the Security Council and one for ECOSOC, that could deal with post-conflict. They could be made permanent in the interim, but then ultimately go to the Trusteeship Council to give it this renewed mandate.

Mr. ROYCE. All right. Mr. Brooks, we will give you your 2 minutes to make your summation, if you would.

STATEMENT OF DOUG BROOKS, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION

Mr. BROOKS. 2 minutes?

Mr. ROYCE. We cut you another minute.

Mr. BROOKS. Okay.

Peace operations in Africa attempt to fulfill lofty mandates while operating with minimal funding and lacking essential equipment, training, and expertise needed to succeed. As well, most of the deployed troops come from most of the world's impoverished countries. Too often we see some Western governments resort to conscience-salving measures adequate only to ensuring something was done instead of ensuring what is needed is done.

There is a bright side, and it comes from Africa. The African Union has been far more keen to address humanitarian initiatives than its predecessor, the OAU. African States are willing to send their own soldiers to do peacekeeping on the continent, undeterred by lack of funds, equipment or training.

Fortunately, the West's reluctance to offer their own military resources has resulted in their largely being replaced by private-sector capabilities that provide remarkable value and that work quite well with the African militaries, providing logistics, expertise, the sorts of things needed to win the peace.

Nevertheless, we have to recognize—I think we have to recognize that the United Nations is not a poor man's NATO. This was brought up earlier today.

U.N. peace operations are made up of a hodgepodge of militaries, using different equipment, communications gear, and languages. Military coordination is the exception, not the rule, and mandate interpretation varies dramatically between different nationalities. In fact, we too often use the U.N. as a scapegoat for the West's own failure to effectively support peacekeeping mandates in Africa.

Even without on-ground Western military support, however, peace operations in Africa need not fail. There is much that can be done, and the private sector leads the way on this. The private sector has proven to be a willing and capable surrogate for the absent Western military capabilities in African peace operations. Reliance on the private sector has increased in the past decade, and so has confidence in the capabilities of these companies.

Effective military training and logistics for peacekeepers and low-cost aerial surveillance means that companies can make smaller peacekeeping deployments infinitely more effective, saving money and, ultimately, lives.

While the international community has too often been absent from critical and humanitarian missions, the private sector has always been willing to step up to the plate to provide critical services, even in some remarkably risky operations.

I think we have a couple of fine examples, recent examples of their capabilities. In Liberia, for example, we have the recent ECOWAS intervention. You had African troops that were trained by private companies that were transported to Monrovia by private companies, that their logistics or bases, everything was built and arranged by private companies. The core of troops, the people who actually did it, and the political will came from ECOWAS supported by the U.S. I think that is probably the wave of the future.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUG BROOKS, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE
OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION

First, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for hosting these hearings on such an important topic. Considering all the ongoing peace operations in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and elsewhere in Africa, these hearings are indeed timely. Africa is fortunate that this subcommittee remains one of Washington's most bipartisan. It is an honor to be here today.

INTRODUCTION

Peace operations in Africa attempt to fulfill lofty mandates while operating with minimal funding, and lacking the essential equipment, training, and expertise necessary to succeed. As well, most of the deployed troops come from the world's most impoverished countries.

The West, with the best-trained and equipped militaries, is not in the picture. Militaries in Western Europe are a shadow of their Cold War selves, and their few remaining capable units are deployed more often to the Balkans and Afghanistan and rarely to peace operations in Africa.

The U.S. military faces enormous demands from conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and elsewhere. Nor has the United States been interested in peacekeeping in Africa since the debacle in Somalia. Further, even if U.S. troops were engaged they would become prime terrorist targets, severely hampering their effectiveness.

Worse, too often some Western governments resort to conscience-salving measures adequate only to ensure 'something was done' instead of ensuring 'what is needed is done'.

There is a bright side: it comes from Africa. The African Union is far more keen to address humanitarian initiatives than its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. Better, African states are willing to send their own soldiers to do peace-keeping on their continent, undeterred by lack of funds, equipment or training.

Finally, the West's reluctance to proffer military resources has resulting in their largely being replaced by private sector capabilities that work quite well with African militaries providing the support, logistics and expertise needed to 'win peace.'

KEY PLAYERS

The United Nations

As the world's primary political and military instrument for making peace, the United Nations can be a painfully slow, politically moribund, frustratingly bureaucratic and an astonishingly incompetent organization. Having said that, it is not the bogeyman that it is so often made out to be. And while many question the UN's relevance every time there is a lack of consensus in the Security Council, it remains the prime forum for international cooperation. Nor has it been immune to reform, and Tori Holt and the Stimson Center have well documented some astonishing improvements over the past several years resulting from the 'Brahimi Report.'

We must recognize that the UN is not a 'poor man's NATO.' UN peace operations are made up of a hodge-podge of militaries using different equipment, communications gear, and languages. Military coordination is the exception, not the rule, and mandate interpretation varies dramatically between different nationalities. Yet, well-known UN peacekeeping failures more often have more to do with the West's reluctance to provide meaningful on ground support than other causes. Too often the UN is a scapegoat for our own failings.

In fact, the UN has several features that continue to make it the first option to launch international peace operations. First, it brings legitimacy. Second, it saves us money, spreading the cost of such missions among its members. And third, it brings some surprising capabilities and expertise to help with humanitarian services, peace making and state building. And there is simply no other international organization in the world capable of organizing humanitarian relief on a massive scale. In terms of peace operations, the UN's benefits far outweigh its faults and it remains a useful and largely effective organization.

African organizations

The African Union has already shown itself to be a real improvement over the OAU. Once decisions have been made observers have been impressed with how quickly the organization can move to implement them. In addition, its willingness to intervene in member states for humanitarian reasons means that it can be far more proactive in addressing humanitarian issues. It has shown an impressive pragmatism and a real interest in addressing the continent's many conflicts.

Other African organizations too have shown a willingness to address problems in their regions. The most prominent of these is ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States). ECOWAS has taken the lead in doing peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and elsewhere. They have also taken advantage of training programs provided by Western powers, training which has shown some very positive results in terms of effective peace operations.

What is clear is that African institutions are better able to take over crisis management than ever in the past. We can work with these willing organizations to help build a strong peacekeeping capability for Africa at minimal cost and huge long-term savings due to earlier and more comprehensive interdiction. Ideally, the West will still take an active role in ongoing peace operations, at least in terms of providing funding and support services. But even in a behind the scenes role the West can do much to ensure enduring training programs that will ensure Africa has a sufficient cadre of effective peacekeepers to call on.

This is to say that even without on ground Western military support, peace operations in Africa need not fail. There is much that can be done. The private sector leads the way.

The private sector.

The private sector has proven to be a willing and capable surrogate for absent Western military capabilities in African peace operations. Reliance on the private sector has increased over the past decade and so has confidence in the capabilities of private companies. While the international community and best military forces have too often been absent from critical humanitarian missions, the private sector

has *always* been willing to step up to the plate to provide critical services, even in some remarkably risky operations.

Some of the more ideologically driven analysts warn of a ‘new invasion of Africa’ by ‘modern mercenaries;’ they are wrong. They willfully ignore the stark differences between the infamous rogues of the 1960s and 1970s and the legal and ethical companies of today that do everything from demining, to water purification, to providing security for UN field headquarters and warehouses, to training African peacekeepers. They ignore that the industry operates only under legitimate international mandates, works for rational international regulation and willingly engages with policymakers, NGOs and humanitarian organizations. They misconstrue an industry that offers greater transparency and accountability than seen in peace operations of the past, while providing greater cost-effectiveness and a ‘force-multiplier’ capability that reduces the need for vast numbers of peacekeepers to carry out missions successfully.

IPOA recognizes both the need and value of the private sector to African peace operations. Since private companies are *already* providing critical services for peacekeepers and saving lives in every African peace operation it is important to ensure internationally recognized standards and codes. Some critics call for caution and delay in the utilization of the private sector, but caution in the face of humanitarian catastrophe is ruthless, and we have many legal and financial means already of ensuring professional and ethical behavior. IPOA members have agreed to abide by our own code of conduct (available online at <http://www.ipoaonline.org/code.htm>). They support national and international regulations and laws that would ensure the most responsible companies are the ones engaged in these operations while allowing the critical flexibility that makes the private sector faster, better and cheaper compared to past state efforts.

Two recent interventions point to the future of African peace operations:

Liberia 2003

In the Liberian intervention of 2003, ECOWAS took the lead in proffering troops and with U.S. financial support (and brief military support), initiated a surprisingly successful humanitarian intervention. While no mission is perfect, for one taking place in such a ravaged country as post-Taylor Liberia, the mission went well was handed over to the UN without major hitches. What was especially unique and relevant about this mission was that many of the West African troops used for the operation had been trained by private companies, were flown to Monrovia by private companies, and once in Liberia they were transported, based and supported logistically by private companies. It was a ‘hybrid’ public private operation that offers useful indications into how this concept can be built on in the future.

Darfur 2004

The Darfur intervention faces unique difficulties that have made it more challenging politically than militarily. Dissent within the UN Security Council ensured that meaningful resolutions were not going to pass, much less mandates for robust peace operations. Nevertheless, the African Union, strongly encouraged by a concerned U.S. Congress, has in fact become the lead player in sending observers and small numbers of soldiers to stem a worsening humanitarian disaster. While the Khartoum government has not been happy with the process, it has accepted African troops far more readily than it would have done with Western troops. In Darfur too, companies like Pacific Architect and Engineers (PAE) and Medical Support Solutions (MSS) have led the AU troops into Darfur, preparing bases and setting up logistics systems. The private sector is less deterred by international geopolitics and has been quicker to deploy to this humanitarian crisis.

WHAT WE HAVE TO DO TO ENHANCE AFRICAN PEACE OPERATIONS

1. Increase military training programs in Africa, specifically ACOTA.

African militaries can only do peace operations successfully if provided the training enhancements and basic equipment to be able to carry out their difficult missions. A relatively small amount of funding for programs like ACOTA (African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance) and OFR (Operation Focused Relief) go a long way to enhance Africa’s own peace operations capabilities, ensure improved military interoperability, and create a core peacekeeper capability that other troops can use as an anchor. Once trained, such troops can then be quickly and easily funded, mobilized, transported, based and logistically supported at minimal additional cost.

2. Work in support of international organizations, especially the African Union and Africa's Regional organizations to address conflicts.

Unless the West is going to take the lead with their own forces in a peace operation, as they did in East Timor and (eventually) Sierra Leone, Africa must be allowed to be the primary architects of these operations. Supporting African initiatives, providing advice, helping to support humanitarian operations, and especially providing operational planning expertise would be useful and welcomed. Once a mission is approved, support should be in the form of transportation, logistics, and aerial surveillance.

3. Security is 90% of the problem but 10% of the solution.

Security must be established before the UN, NGOs and others can deploy in the field to do effective relief and reconstruction programs—and it is wise to establish effective security even before political settlements are finalized. There are many remarkably capable organizations that are willing and capable of doing reconstruction and reconciliation, state-building and reconstructing essential humanitarian services but they are not going to deploy their field workers until enough security to provide for their safety can be assured. An effective peacekeeping/peace enforcement capability can deter spoilers from upsetting fragile political agreements and truces. They can deter crime and end the impunity that is so much of a problem in conflict/post conflict environments.

4. Recognize that peace operations will not last one to two years, but five to ten years.

Peace agreements in partially reconstructed states are prone to falling apart again. Local security must be trained from the beginning of a peace operation on a large scale so they can gradually take over security duties from international peacekeepers. Inexpensive technologies such as high-tech aerial surveillance can be utilized to monitor peace agreements and reduce the need for large numbers of peacekeepers that strain economic and social fabrics. But international staying power is critical to ensuring stability and long term success.

Special thanks to Thomas Cheplick for his help in drafting this document.

The International Peace Operations Association is an association of service companies that support international peace and stability operations around the world. The association was founded to institute industry-wide standards and a code of conduct, maintain sound professional and military practices, educate the public and policymakers on the industry's activities and potential, and ensure the humanitarian use of private peacekeeping services for the benefit of international peace and human security.

Mr. ROYCE. I wanted to ask a question of Ms. Holt before we wrap up, and it goes to the pros and cons of this.

I wanted to ask you, Ms. Holt, in your judgment, do you support an expanded role for private military corporations in these teams of peacekeeping missions?

Mr. BROOKS. Well—

Mr. ROYCE. Pros and cons; and I want to ask Ms. Holt the question.

Ms. HOLT. As Doug and others have pointed out here, private companies already have a fairly large role in peace operations and this includes the U.N. missions. In one area I would heartily support the greater support of potential private companies: Expanding the U.N.'s logistics base and its Strategic Deployment Stocks. These stocks are meant to be on hand in advance of an operation.

But the U.N. is prepared to do only one mission per year. And at the pace of four new peace operations per year, which we have seen now, we know the stocks have already been used up. So I would absolutely endorse that expanded use of private military companies to support deployments.

In general, I would think they can serve a very useful role. Where I think you need to draw a line is not having private compa-

nies substitute for member state contributions. At the end of the day, committing military forces—who may face casualties and fatality in the field—has to be a decision by the country, I think. The U.N. system is set up so that it does not deploy peacekeepers if member states aren't willing to do it.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Holt.

Mr. BROOKS. I would just add that already the U.N. uses private security for their headquarters in the field, for their convoys in the field, for their warehouses in the field. The line right now is that the U.N. will not use private companies to actually put them in the front line carrying out the mandate, but it is sort of a blurry line even today.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I thank our witnesses, and this hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT ON BUILDING PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY IN AFRICA—OCTOBER 8, 2004

Contact: Peter H. Gantz, *Peacekeeping Advocate*, (202) 828-0110

The humanitarian and human rights crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan has highlighted the need for greater peacekeeping capacity in Africa. The U.S. Congress said in July that “the atrocities in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide” and called on the members of the United Nations “to undertake measures to prevent the genocide.” But Darfur is merely the latest example of the challenge to the United States and the international community—not whether to intervene, but how, and with what capacity.

Refugees International has been concerned for many years that peacekeeping capacity is insufficient for success, especially in Africa. Recent examples of problematic missions include the following:

- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the UN mission (MONUC) has less than 20,000 troops tasked with establishing a secure environment in a country the size of Western Europe. While a more robust mandate, allowing MONUC to take on spoilers and protect civilians, has increased its overall effectiveness, peace is still extremely fragile. The DRC is too large for such a small force to have an impact throughout the country. The UN relies on former combatants to stay peaceful, while it conducts spot checks and establishes secure zones in different parts of the country.
- In Liberia, the deployment of UN peacekeepers went painfully slowly, and jeopardized the success of the mission and the substantial financial commitment to that mission made by the U.S. To its credit, the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) had originally maintained that an October 1, 2003 start date for UNMIL was not possible, but the Security Council overruled UN staff under pressure from the United States, which was seeking to avoid any obligation to deploy its own troops to stabilize the situation. As a result, with many fewer troops than needed to provide security in Liberia, the initial attempt to demobilize the numerous armed groups in December 2003 produced chaos. The UN was forced to contravene one of the key recommendations of the August 2000 Brahimi report on reforming UN peacekeeping operations by taking on the Liberia mission without the necessary resources in place to succeed from the outset.
- In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL troop strength has been reduced from 17,500 to around 5000 currently. In one sense, this is a testimony to its overall success in stabilizing the situation in Sierra Leone after a very rocky start. But with pockets of the country still very insecure, the downsizing may be premature. Creating peace means more than ending conflict; the transformation of societies emerging from conflict into ones that are healthy and can manage tensions in a peaceful way is a long-term process that requires matching commitment. Pulling troops prematurely from peacekeeping operations in countries that seem stable often leads to renewed conflict.

A large number of the troops that serve in UN peace operations in Africa, or in peace operations sponsored by African organizations such as the African Union or the Economic Community of West African States, come from African states. On the whole, these troops are poorly equipped and trained. African states are unable to properly support their troops with sufficient logistical support, such as transport and communications. African political leaders are usually unwilling to allow their

peacekeeping troops to engage in firefights with “peace spoilers,” consequently allowing what are essentially well-armed criminal gangs to rape and pillage without fear the peacekeepers will stop them.

Yet peacekeeping troops from some African countries are far better than they were ten years ago. A primary reason for this has been training and assistance programs sponsored by the United States and the European Union. U.S. programs such as the African Crisis Response Initiative, replaced by the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, have “trained the trainers,” helping some African countries to begin building more professional militaries. The U.S. and the EU have also funded peacekeeping training centers in Africa, and both have implemented rule of law and civilian police training programs.

In June 2004, at the summit in Sea Island, Georgia, the U.S. and other G-8 countries approved an initiative to enhance the world’s capacity to deal with post-conflict situations, especially in Africa. The goal is to improve global capacity for peace operations through three proposals: coordination and enhancement of training troops for peace operations; a constabulary police training center; and a deployment logistics support arrangement. The Bush Administration’s plan, called the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), is a positive development.

One goal of the plan is to train up to approximately 65,000 troops, mostly from African countries, to better perform peacekeeping activities. Peacekeeping operations succeed when they are led or complemented by well-equipped, well trained forces of sufficient size and with a mandate that allows for robust defense as well as counterattack.

Increasing the supply of well-trained soldiers for peacekeeping operations, however, is not enough to ensure success. Capacity to establish security for civilians and the rule of law is also essential.

Rule of law operations are critical to restoring basic public safety and maintaining law and order, which in turn allows other political and economic reconstruction efforts to go forward. To conduct rule of law operations, the UN relies upon civilian police, as well as judicial officials such as judges, prosecutors, and corrections staff, contributed individually from member states. A key problem is that in the immediate post-conflict environment, a special sort of police capacity is needed. Widespread looting and rioting, organized crime, and extremist activities such as terrorism require a response that falls between the overwhelming force doctrine of the military and the community policing techniques of ordinary police.

Constabulary police, found in European states such as France, Spain, and Italy, can fill this need in peace operations. Constabulary forces receive both police and military training, and can deploy as formed units with their own communications, logistical support, and command structures already in place. They are trained to deal with situations that might overwhelm ordinary police, but that are not a job for combat soldiers. Constabulary police are only found in certain countries, however, and the need for well-qualified professional constabulary police further limits the pool of available officers. For this reason, one component of GPOI calls for working with European allies to enhance constabulary police capacity, and this will be crucial to making peacekeeping operations in Africa more effective.

Peacekeeping in Africa also faces serious obstacles in the area of logistical support. The Administration has not yet detailed its plans to enhance capacity in this area, but the need is clear. Troops have deployed without appropriate clothing and gear for the climate, without weapons and/or ammunition, and without functioning transport. African countries cannot provide airlift capacity to get troops to the area of operation, and aerial support to monitor large spaces effectively. The U.S., the United Kingdom, and other countries use private contractors for many logistical support needs. African countries could benefit from this practice as well, but only with U.S. and EU financial support and only if a new international regulatory scheme is first created to ensure appropriate behavior and accountability on the part of the companies.

Unfortunately, Congress has thus far failed to support GPOI. The latest effort to do so, by the Senate Appropriations Committee in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, looks likely to fail due to the opposition of several key Senators and Representatives. This is an unfortunate development. GPOI could be, and should be, the cornerstone of U.S. efforts to build African peacekeeping capacity.

The peacekeeping capacity problem in Africa requires African-led solutions, backed by U.S. and EU support. The idea that Africa should solve Africa’s problems is not new, and African countries themselves want this. But if Africa is to take on more of the peacekeeping job in Africa, the U.S., the EU, and other industrialized powers need to greatly expand programs that provide logistical support, professional military and police training, and most of all money.

As part of the effort to better equip the AU to handle its own problems, Refugees International recommends that:

- Congress provide funds for President Bush's Global Peace Operations Initiative.
- Congress provide more money for UN peacekeeping. The UN has not been able to fully pay African states that have contributed troops for peacekeeping missions, partly because the U.S. does not pay its own bill to the UN. This leaves African countries less able to conduct peacekeeping missions, because they cannot afford to pay soldiers, buy equipment, or pay for training programs themselves.
- The Bush Administration and Congress support a transition to a more sensible funding apparatus for UN peace operations. Rather than ad hoc funding on a yearly basis, which creates uncertainty and inefficiency within the UN, the U.S. should support moving the peacekeeping support account budget for the UNDPKO headquarters into the regular budget of the UN.
- The Administration support multidimensional mandates for UN peace operations at the Security Council, regardless of whether such mandates increase the likely cost of the mission. Lessons learned during the past decade illustrate the need for peacekeeping mandates that address all dimensions of the conflict and its consequences. The Administration should request, and Congress should provide, full political, logistical, and monetary support for peacekeeping to ensure that success is achieved.
- The U.S. Congress lift the restrictions currently in place that require a waiver for in-kind support costing more than \$3 million, effectively prohibiting the Pentagon from providing timely logistical support to UN peace operations, including those in Africa.

RESPONSES FROM JAMES W. SWIGERT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

Question:

The Administration recently approved the expansion of the UN peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to 16,700 troops. The UN Secretary General had recommended 23,900 troops. What was U.S. thinking on this decision? How do you react to those who say that almost no number of troops will be sufficient given the vastness of the country and the apparent lack of political will to bring about greater stability?

Response:

The Secretary-General reported August 16, 2004, that MONUC's establishment created expectations that the Mission would enforce the peace throughout the country. These expectations were unfulfilled because MONUC lacked capacity to contribute to the peace process and the mandated tasks were not specific enough. The Secretary-General recommended specific tasks that MONUC would accomplish, as well as an increase of 13,100 military personnel. The United States shared the Secretary-General's concerns about the challenges that MONUC faced, and joined other Council members in adopting unanimously UNSCR 1565, which strengthens MONUC's capacity by authorizing an additional 5,900 troops. The Council felt this number of additional personnel was appropriate for MONUC's needs and priorities based on recommendations to improve effectiveness that the Secretary-General had made in his report. The Council also expressed its determination to keep MONUC's strength and structure under regular review. UNSCR 1565 reflects the Council's approval of a carefully targeted approach to peacekeeping, with a priority for the eastern DRC. The Transitional Government of the DRC and other parties in the region must also meet their responsibilities to maintain peace.

Question:

The UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea was established in 2000 to assist the demarcation of the border, which has yet to occur. How much longer can the UN Mission remain if progress is not being made? Are both sides fully cooperating with the UN Mission and UN representatives? What can be done to ensure cooperation?

Response:

UNMEE was established as a temporary measure to create conditions conducive to a permanent settlement of the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. With UNMEE's presence, the international community has been able to establish peace and stability in the border zone. UNMEE's military component is a vital factor of stability. Despite the political impasse on border demarcation, some positive developments recently occurred relating to UNMEE operations. Eritrea loosened restrictions on UNMEE's freedom of movement; ceased to make anti-UNMEE statements through public officials; and significantly decreased the number of detentions of locally recruited UN staff. Ethiopia offered to allow UNMEE to fly directly between Asmara and Addis Ababa.

On September 14, 2004, the Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 1560, extending UNMEE's mandate until March 15, 2005. The Council endorsed the Secretary General's recommendation to downsize UNMEE's configuration gradually, without undermining UNMEE's core monitoring function. Further reductions may be justified in 2005 depending on the situation on the ground.

In adopting UNSCR 1560, the Council urged Ethiopia to accept unequivocally the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's binding decision of April 13, 2002, and to take the necessary steps to enable the Commission to demarcate the border. The Council called on Eritrea to enter into dialogue with the Secretary General's Special Envoy. Still, Eritrea has insisted that dialogue is not possible before the completion of the demarcation process and has refused to engage with the Secretary-General's Special Envoy on the peace process.

Although the Secretary-General met with leaders of the parties in their respective capitals in July 2004, neither side offered any new ideas on advancing the peace process, but only restated their existing positions. The U.S. is following these issues closely and supports the efforts of Special Representative of the Secretary General. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs visited Eritrea as part of U.S. efforts to keep Eritrea engaged in the peace process with Ethiopia. We have worked with regional partners to stress that both sides have responsibility to implement the Algiers Agreement and the decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission.

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE VIVIAN LOWERY DERRYCK, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

Question:

In your testimony, you advocated resurrecting the UN Trusteeship Council and name Somalia as a prime candidate to be put under UN trusteeship. What would the role of the UN be in Somalia if the country were under UN trusteeship?

Response:

Somalia's new transitional government, named on October 10, 2004, has yet to assume power in the country almost a month later. Fighting has broken out in two break-away mini-states within Somalia and the international community is wary of providing much needed post-conflict aid until the security situation improves. Although Somalis have elected a transitional government, named Abdulahi Yusuf their transitional president, and President Yusuf, in turn, has named a prime minister, Professor Ali Mohammed Ghedi, the new government still resides in Nairobi.

Somalia has been without a central government since 1991. With almost 14 years without a functioning civil authority, even after the new transitional government returns to Mogadishu, Somalia is facing a long peacekeeping period and a longer peace-building stage. Both peacekeeping and peace-building are expensive and multi-year endeavors.

Re-activation of the Trusteeship Council can rationalize and reduce expenses of costly, long-term peace-building operations. Often, peace-building operations are curtailed before the country has fully regained governance and economic strength. Concerns are being expressed over UNAMSIL's planned departure from Sierra Leone in 2005 and similarly from Ethiopia and Eritrea through another UN peacekeeping operation, UNMEE.

Peace-building requires a multi-year commitment, a commitment that member states are often unwilling to make to the civil society-building and institutional strengthening programs required to forge democratic nation-states. UN peace-keeping at the *peace-building* stage is often fraught with a failure of political will and donor fatigue.

A robust Trusteeship Council could advocate forcefully for peace-building. If re-activated, the Trusteeship Council could incubate post-conflict countries moving toward democracy. If the UN Trusteeship Council were able to administer Somalia's transition from a failed state to a functioning, multi-party state, various organs and specialized agencies of the UN could be deployed. A re-activated Trusteeship Council could designate one of its members as the responsible party for Somalia, with full powers to request funded support from other UN agencies. In essence, the Council would oversee disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR). Special units of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) that focus on human rights and civil society strengthening could be deployed. UNDP programs could be put in place.

In the Somalia case, UN involvement would include peacekeeping as well as post conflict reconstruction and peace-building, so Trusteeship Council coordination with the Security Council would be essential. The Trusteeship Council could request that the Secretary General ensure that there is coordination with DPKO, especially with its Integrated Mission Task Forces, as well as with the Department of Public Affairs.

Question:

Would international civil servants be brought in to run government ministries until adequate numbers of trained Somalis are available?

Response:

Yes. The UN has years of experience and a vast data bank of experts in building institutions of government, re-establishing financial architectures and reinforcing values of full participation by all segments of a given population. Through the Trusteeship Council, the UN could have a ready reserve of accumulated peace-building expertise to be tapped when countries begin to move forward toward resumption of rule of law, citizen participation and democratic elections. The international experts' terms of reference and position descriptions would have, as a primary duty, counterpart relationships with Somalis, so that Somali expertise would be built throughout the trusteeship.

Question:

How would the trusteeship government be funded?

Response:

The Council's general and administrative expenses would be funded through a re-established line item in the UN's annual budget, while specific trusteeship mandates, e.g. Somalia, would be funded through voluntary contributions.

Question:

What happens if a local group violently resists establishment of a UN trusteeship?

Response:

The Trusteeship Council would work closely with the appropriate regional and sub-regional organizations to meet with local dissidents and explain the benefits and temporary nature of trusteeship. In the case of Africa, the Africa Union would be a close ally. The moral suasion of the AU and the UN system would deter such groups. If necessary, the AU and UN would coordinate peacekeepers to end the resistance.

Ultimately, one would hope that trusteeship would be viewed as a desired status, indicating that a failed state was making significant, measurable progress toward democratic governance.

Question:

Politically, how viable is the proposal?

Response:

In discussions with Africans, opinion has varied. In the past year, no one has categorically denounced the idea. Some political scientists and diplomats have approved the idea, saying that 40 years after independence, the taint of trusteeship is past. They note that Somalia is a threat to regional peace and a likely incubator of terrorism. Virtually all agree that Africa needs models of new ways to deal with long-term, systemic insecurity. It is worth noting that Liberians discussed requesting trusteeship when the humanitarian crisis was at its height in July/August of 2003.

Moreover, given the 2002 advent of the African Union, Africans might also view of the Trusteeship Council as a potential source of institutional strengthening for some organs of the AU. New institutions include a Peace and Security Council and

NEPAD, an ambitious program focused on long-term multi-sectoral development. Both organs could be strengthened by Trusteeship Council expertise and support. For instance, the AU's Peace and Security Council could liaise with the Trusteeship Council to develop a long-term African peacekeeping operational capability, while NEPAD could benefit by the Trusteeship Council's mandated emphasis on strengthening democratic institutions and economic development.

Question:

In countries emerging from civil wars, governments are often formed by giving positions to the major combatants. Does this make long-term peace and stability less likely?

Response:

All major combatants must be included in transitional governments. Excluding any major group is unwise. One of the most visible and transparent ways of demonstrating commitment to establishing a new regime is to include representatives of all the former major combatants, no matter how heinous their actions. The goal is to include representatives of all major factions so that they will claim ownership in the new governance system, believe that they can influence policy and participate unimpeded in economic reconstruction. All peace-building and nation-building efforts must stress shared commitment to abiding by established rule of law for future regime change.

Question:

Does this encourage future civil wars by rewarding those who take up arms?

Response:

If transitional governments are inclusive and transparent, rebel concerns will be addressed through the political process. Transitional governments need to be encouraged to maintain constant dialogue with dissidents so that they see alternatives to resorting to arms.

Transitional governments must have the commitment from donors and the Security Council that if dissatisfied rebels try to take up arms, UN forces will move swiftly to prevent actions that would compromise the transitional government.

Question:

Are there alternatives?

Response:

The best alternative is for the peace process to include all parties and provide those who feel that they were slighted a channel through which to address their frustrations. Currently, previously warring parties and major antagonists lack an institutional body in which they can have an open dialogue. The Trusteeship Council would be particularly useful as a gathering place for accumulating experience and providing a safe space in which transitional leaders could talk openly and safely to opposition figures.

Question:

Given the weak state of most African governments and the ease with which rebel groups seem to launch themselves, what are the prospects for making Africa a more stable continent?

Response:

The prospects for a stable continent are positive, given African advances in governance and donor awareness of the impact that strategically targeted official development assistance can have. On the African side, there is a growing political consensus on the need for peace and a growing consensus on the appropriateness of peer pressure for peace, good governance and democracy [e.g. NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)]. On the donor side, stability will be more likely if the US and other donor member states make major four major commitments. First, we must understand that peace-building takes a minimum of five years plus a gradual transition to democratic governance, then make a time commitment to stay the course and see the transition through. Second, transitional governments must include oppositions in discussions and day-to-day governance, as well as work with all parties to strengthen civil society so that rebel groups cannot gain popular support. Third, donors, particularly the U.S., must commit to large-scale investments in social infrastructure—in education, especially ICT, and health. Fourth, donors must promote indigenous economic development with incentives for the private sector.

Question:

Is progress being made?

Response:

Yes, progress is being made through a fortunate confluence of events. First, the African Union provides mechanisms for monitoring conflict and averting civil strife before it reaches crisis proportions. Second, African civil society and the private sector are united in their opposition to supporting rogue rebel groups. Third, at the same time, the donor community realizes that fighting terrorism means investing in building capabilities within developing country populations so that local citizens are capable of assessing ideas, making policy, and ably controlling their own affairs. The confluence of African accountability, civil society's new assertiveness and donor self-interest all bode for new opportunities to reduce the number of civil conflicts.

The most remarkable occurrence in recent months is the publication of the UN Economic Commission for Africa study on good governance in Africa. The study represents a phenomenal attempt to address the issues of governance as *African* populations articulate them. Based on consultations with 2000 African experts and the polling of 50,000 African households in 28 countries, citizens rated their countries in terms of participation, competition, corruption and adherence to the rule of law. The results demonstrate a continent wide populace that is sophisticated about the requisites of democracy and is not afraid to indicate areas in which governments are woefully weak.

The prospects for increased stability rate are soaring because an African home-grown demand for good governance is now irrefutably proven.

RESPONSES FROM DOUG BROOKS, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

Question:

In your testimony, you advocate that private military corporations take a more active role in peacekeeping operations. Do you foresee corporations potentially replacing traditional peacekeeping units, or just providing specialized skills such as logistics, transportation and surveillance? Do you foresee PMCs engaging in peace enforcement activities?

Response:

In a sense many peacekeeping units have already been replaced by PMCs, since many of the UN's security and logistics operations are already being handled privately. The specialized skills mentioned are important and generally underutilized. For example, providing peacekeepers with high tech aerial surveillance alone could do an astonishing amount to improve the quality and effectiveness of existing peace operations—with particular value in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo missions today. How do we know who is crossing borders, or where refugees and internally displaced persons are congregating, or who is attacking who without this capability? While the increased use of private companies has already been extremely beneficial to international peace operations, IPOA supports universal standards, codes of conduct and international legal frameworks to ensure that companies are held to strict standards while providing their critical services.

Contracting out a complete peacekeeping operation seems unlikely at this time, and perhaps unnecessary in light of the success of ACRI, ACOTA and Operation Focused Relief. African militaries that have participated in these programs have provided much-improved peacekeepers than in past operations. Whereas a few years ago the international community's reluctance to intervene in humanitarian emergencies created by conflicts combined with Africa's incapacity to provide professional soldiers meant there was a greater need for 'front line' private services, today we can provide effective intervention with retrained African troops supported by essential private sector capabilities.

Nevertheless, we should be clear that even in the provision of support services private firms will face serious risks and may be armed or require armed security. To accomplish their missions in support of ECOMOG and UN peacekeepers in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ICI of Oregon had no choice but to use armed helicopters. Their helicopters were able to go places and do missions that (armed) UN helicopters refused. Further, while the ultimate goal should be to train effective and professional security forces from the population of the country where the peace operation is taking place, it would not be outrageous to provide private sector police

training units, police quick-reaction units to support fledgling security forces, and to use 'mixed' units on actual operations until the local security forces can be fully trained.

Question:

How do other countries view private military corporations? European countries? South African?

Response:

The reaction has been mixed. Most countries recognize the staggering humanitarian need for effective peace operations but have been wary of embracing the private sector as the answer. Nevertheless, they would rather see the private sector utilized than their own military forces so long as this reality is not publicized. The United Kingdom has taken the most comprehensive look at the issue. The UK has been open to working with private companies and looking at what sort of regulatory frameworks could be used to ensure legal and ethical behavior.

The South African government has had the greatest difficulty with the issue of using private military companies. South African citizens tend to be the most skilled and experienced in conflict and post-conflict operations, and they are employed all over the world—including Iraq, Darfur, and the Democratic Republic of Congo—doing everything from logistics to demining to armed security.

The government's issue with the use of private military companies stems from the fact that many of its citizens once served in the apartheid-era security forces, meaning the current government was literally at war with many of them less than two decades ago. South Africa's much emulated Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) proved to be an extremely successful tool in separating true criminal acts from politically motivated ones, and the overwhelming majority of citizens who served in the apartheid-era security services have since been law abiding and productive South African citizens. And we should ask what is unethical about using someone with a history we might disagree with for extremely hazardous jobs such as lifting landmines, training local police forces or guarding UN convoys on peace operations.

It is not surprising that there is South African governmental suspicion and distrust towards those citizens working in peace and stabilization operations around the world. Governmental efforts to ban any such activity have been overly broad in design, poorly written and defined, and widely ignored by private companies, international organizations and the South African government itself. Such ineffective efforts have nevertheless created a nebulous 'legal gray area' that somehow allows South Africans to continue to provide useful services to peace and stability operations while hinting that they may be brought up on legal charges at some point in the future, which is hardly an ideal situation.

Question:

Would you agree that ideally peacekeeping forces would not have to rely on private military corporations?

Response:

I agree, but since the end of the Cold War we have seen a vast demobilization of the West's most capable military forces, combined with a disturbing reluctance to support humanitarian peace operations in 'non-strategic' conflicts. The private sector has always been willing to fill this vacuum, and the harsh reality is that ignoring such utility now would be a devastating blow to international peace efforts and would increase an already vast humanitarian suffering.

Question:

At least one press report has linked your organization, albeit tenuously, to the recent attempt to depose the government of Equatorial Guinea. Is this report accurate?

Response:

The reports have been far more entertaining than accurate. We have a press release on our web site addressing this issue (http://www.ipoaonline.org/news_detailhtml.asp?catID=4&docID=69). The reports refer to our dinner that we hosted in November 2003, a dinner that was open to all and was attended not only by IPOA members, but also by the press, academics, the humanitarian community, the State Department, NGOs, UN representatives and Hill staffers. If any coups were being plotted during that dinner, it would have been most astonishing indeed.

RESPONSES FROM VICTORIA K. HOLT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

Question:

How many of the key reforms recommended by the Brahimi report on UN peacekeeping have been made?

Response:

The United Nations has demonstrated clear progress in implementing a majority of the reforms recommended in 2000 by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, called the "Brahimi Report" after its chair, Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi. My colleagues and I analyzed the progress of the recommendations in the Report and published our results as a Stimson Center study, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations*, in December 2003. I'll review areas of progress, as well as areas where more work is needed.

We assessed progress in various ways. We developed scoring criteria in order to rate and sort the recommendations based on their level of implementation. Using a range of zero to five, with zero representing no implementation and five representing implementation above the expectations set by the original 2000 *Brahimi Report*, we calibrated the relative success of implementation. Of the 80 recommendations, we determined that roughly 70 percent of them were either partly implemented (e.g., partial funding, partial staffing or a reduced concept), implemented at the expected level, or implemented above the expected level. More than 25 percent of the total 80 recommendations were fully implemented at or above the expected level. [An attached chart from our study reflects our scoring of each recommendation.]

Assessing progress, however, also depends on looking at priority areas, and weighing the impact of the changes in differing ways. Implementing the Panel's recommendations has required action by many actors, both within the United Nations and by the member states. We found that the Secretary General and the UN Secretariat were surprisingly strong supporters of the reforms, and that in general, the UN system itself was receptive to the need to implement change. (Now, four years later, follow-up by member states is needed to further increase the capacity of the UN and its operations to meet the needs of today's expanded missions.)

Since the Report's publication in 2000, progress has been particularly strong in:

- More rapid and effective deployment of peace operations;
- Structural reforms within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations;
- Improved planning capacity for peace operations; and
- Shifting toward better linking of security and peacebuilding in peace operations.

Noteworthy developments include the adoption of clear deployment timelines, improved mission leadership, better availability and staffing strategies for qualified military personnel and civilian specialists, more integrated mission planning, and improved use of information and web technology. A few highlights include:

Peacekeeping Doctrine & Mandates. To address the gap between UN Security Council mandates and the UN's capacity to deploy effective peacekeeping operations, the Panel urged the UN Secretariat to tell the Council "what it needs to know not what it wants to hear." Before Council approval of a new mission, the Panel urged that peace agreements meet threshold conditions, that troop contributing countries be consulted in advance, and that Council resolutions promote clear unity of effort and command and control. Time will determine the level of UN discipline, but the UN Secretariat has been clearer with the Council about new and strengthened UN roles in Liberia, Burundi and the Congo in 2003 and 2004, and in refraining from a UN peacekeeping role in Afghanistan in 2001. Consultations between troop contributing countries, the Council and the Secretariat have helped all parties better plan and execute operations. The major challenge today, however, is supporting the huge surge in UN peace operations (16 peacekeeping missions, force levels over 60,000) with capable forces, personnel, equipment and political leadership.

Improved Mission Guidance and Leadership. The UN adopted Brahimi Report measures to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping mission leaders through better selection, training, guidance and recruitment. Rather than continue to pick leaders on an *ad hoc* basis and send them to the field with little guidance, the UN identified leadership qualities, improved a roster of mission candidates and has identi-

fied UN personnel for senior field positions. Mission leaders are assembled in advance of deployment, becoming familiar with their mandates and colleagues before going to the field, augmented by DPKO briefings for senior personnel. There is less evidence of improved Headquarters strategic guidance for missions in sticky situations, however, and leadership selection remains dependent on political considerations.

Rapid & Effective Deployment. Before the Brahimi Report, the UN lacked a definition of rapid and effective deployment, which hindered its ability to plan operations, organize equipment and troops, and manage public expectations. The UN adopted the Panel's recommended timelines as its goal: to deploy a traditional peacekeeping operation (positing 5,000 troops) within 30 days of a Security Council resolution and a complex operation (positing 10,000 troops) within 90 days. To prevent equipment-related delays that plagued so many missions—the UNTAES operation in Eastern Croatia (1996–1998) waited months to get recycled computers from Mozambique, already on their second round there—the UN far exceeded the Panel's proposal to create start-up kits for missions. Instead, the UN has created Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), a combination of on-hand equipment and readied contracts for likely requirements, to supply the establishment of each peacekeeping mission. The UN also refurbished the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, and centralized the SDS there. The current pace of UN operations has since stretched thin this area of success: The SDS was designed to accommodate one new peace operation per year, not the three operations that were approved in 2004.

UN capacity depends on the quantity and quality of troops, police and civilian personnel provided by member states. For complex operations, the skills and coherence of the force are critical. The Panel urged states to collaborate in training and equipping brigade-sized forces that could deploy rapidly and be listed in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), a voluntary listing by member states of the capacities they could provide to an operation. UNSAS is vital for the UN to organize and deploy operations more effectively. The DPKO received little initial support for the brigade-level concept. Members of the existing, European-led Stand-by High Readiness Brigade participate in UNSAS, however, and recent European Union and Africa Union initiatives in this area show promise. The revamped UNSAS includes clearer member state listings of capacities and a Rapid Deployment Level (RDL) for members to list units able to deploy rapidly, although only two states have signed so far. Still missing are sufficient numbers of logistical support and other enabling units.

Enhanced Headquarters Capacity to plan and support operations. The General Assembly funded 191 new posts for DPKO personnel. Restructuring of DPKO's military and police divisions and Military Adviser's Office reflect better the divisions of labor in the field. Recruitment of civilian field personnel has gone online with the Galaxy Project, where initial job listings garnered 20,000 applicants per month. DPKO is also setting up rosters of pre-vetted UN staff ready to be deployed as Rapid Deployment Teams. Efforts to implement recommended Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) across various sectors of the UN Headquarters have produced mixed result in mission planning, however.

WHAT STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE: A FEW HIGHLIGHTS

Where Panel recommendations have lagged, there are various causes: some are supported by the Secretariat, but deferred by member states or a UN body; some are not fully funded; others await the proper circumstances. Some measures were rejected by a UN body, opposed by member states, failed to win funding or lacked support from the Secretariat. One important area of partial progress relates to peacebuilding and security sector reform. Key areas requiring more progress and support include:

Deployable Units. Skilled personnel are still the backbone of peacekeeping. The Panel did not address the finite supply of skilled peacekeepers and the increased competition for those militaries willing to participate in UN peace operations. The supply problem has plagued many missions, delaying deployment of military personnel for the DRC and of qualified police for Liberia. While the UNSAS overhaul is important, enabling units are lacking and few states are listed at the Rapid Deployment Level. Also needed are skilled and deployable brigade-sized units, preferably trained together; only SHIRBRIG really provides this so far. Expansion of the UN-approved multinational International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan was hindered by states' reluctance to provide troops sufficient to deploy peacekeepers beyond Kabul, for example, despite the UN's repeated warning that insecurity in much of the country undermined the peacebuilding mission there.

Civilian police/Rule of Law Teams. The UN badly needs skilled civilian police (CivPol) and rule of law experts (e.g., penal, judicial, corrections). CivPol roles in peace operations have grown, but DPKO has a difficult time recruiting sufficient qualified personnel, a factor in meeting rapid deployment goals. Over 75 percent of the CivPol recruits for the UN mission in Liberia, for example, failed the test for basic qualifications.¹ On-call lists for CivPol and rule of law teams often work poorly or are non-existent. Two major Brahimi reforms seem to have too few takers: member states creating national pools of ready-to-deploy civilian police or regional police training programs. To support rule of law, the UN created an office of Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit within DPKO, but it has had only two staff positions.

UN capacity for management and strategic analysis. To help plan and conduct peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions and support UN offices, the Panel urged the creation of an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat to analyze in-house knowledge and outside information. Opposition emerged from developing nations who viewed it with suspicion. Efforts to link existing UN sources of information and analysis—from DPKO's Best Practices Unit to UN staff with field experience—may enable this capacity to grow more virtually.

Peacebuilding. Tools which are most likely to be in high demand for future operations included measures that support transitions to governance, such as rule of law teams, improved civilian police capacity, integration of electoral efforts and other means of assuring longer-term stability through peacebuilding. These measures are not just “nice to have” but critical to the success of even an aggressive, complex peacekeeping operation with peace enforcement duties. Successful peacebuilding, as noted, is a complex operation's exit strategy.

The Report identified ways to bolster peacebuilding, including fact-finding missions to areas of tension, use of which has increased without commensurate funding added to the Trust Fund for Preventive Action or for the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to backstop these and other political missions. Providing regular budget funding in lieu of voluntary contributions for DPA's oversubscribed Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) resulted in some funding for staff and travel, but the EAD still was turning away an average of 9–10 requests per year from member states for support of electoral processes. Within DPKO, quick impact projects (QIPs) have become routine for the first year budget of operations, as seen for Ethiopia/Eritrea, Afghanistan, and the DRC. The Panel's recommendation to integrate all parts of critical disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs for former fighters into the first phase of a mission budget overcame opposition and was included in the Liberia peacekeeping operation in October 2003, but it not clear if that will become regularized. Of the other peacebuilding areas recommended to receive small amounts of UN assessed budget support, most remained dependent on insufficient voluntary funding instead.

ASSESSING BRAHIMI'S IMPACT

Since the report's release, the UN has undertaken new peacebuilding missions (Afghanistan) and peacekeeping operations (Ivory Coast, Haiti, Burundi and Liberia), drawn down or ended some (Sierra Leone, Bosnia, East Timor) and expanded the DR Congo operation. The UN is also planning for a likely peace operation in Sudan. As a result of the on-going reforms, the United Nations can field peacekeeping operations more rapidly and effectively. Current UN peace operations have benefited from improved planning, recruiting, and support. At the same time, however, there has been a dramatic increase in missions. This has placed large demands on the UN system, on the UN Secretariat's management of missions, and on member states to provide personnel. The United Nations does not yet have the capacity it needs to provide an effective response to the demands placed on it.

One natural question post-Brahimi is whether the UN can now tackle a future Rwanda or Srebrenica? The answer is not clear. UN capacity to organize a rapid and effective response to a genocidal conflict on short notice is much improved, with some nations now listed at the RDL level in the UNSAS, with better logistical support in place, with a better planning process and greater clarity within the UN system about mission leadership. Yet an effective response also requires a UN that can galvanize member states who are willing to use force and to deploy military units and skilled personnel rapidly; provide clear rules of engagement; and supply competent leadership and effective command and control. An effective response also requires the Security Council to authorize action, and in doing so, write a clear mandate that is impartial but not neutral, with clear strategic guidance from the Secretary-General to the missions' leaders on how to deal with dramatic changes on the

¹Interview by author, UN DPKO, October 2003.

ground. These requirements may not yet be met, as we have seen in the case of the on-going conflict in Sudan.

Today, since the Brahimi Report, the United Nations is much better prepared for both traditional and complex peacekeeping operations. The challenge remains, however, to press forward with improvements to UN capacity, building the momentum needed to meet the good intentions of the international community with the capacity to deploy successful peace operations. This needed capacity will ultimately depend on the leadership of the UN's member states, such as the United States, to press for the rest of the reform agenda to be implemented.

Question:

In your testimony, you note that in the past, countries sent poorly trained and unequipped forces to UN peacekeeping operations. Is this still a problem?

Response:

While the situation has improved since the 1990s, some UN member states continue to offer the United Nations poorly trained and ill-equipped forces for peace operations. The United Nations faces a shortfall in its recruitment of military, police and civilian personnel who can deploy rapidly and effectively to meet the demand for the current peacekeeping missions authorized by the Security Council. Major gaps include recruitment of capable civilian police, constabulary forces and rule of law experts for UN peace operations. Skilled civilian police are needed, but often those offered to the UN do not meet the basic requirements—such as driving a vehicle or speaking the mission language. The UN also needs more readily available and skilled prosecutors, judges and corrections experts to support missions, as well as civilian personnel who can deploy on short notice.

As pointed out earlier, the UN is facing a dramatic increase in its requirements with 16 peace operations and more on the horizon, especially at a time when many Western militaries are deployed in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Overall, there is a shortage of skilled forces available to deploy for peace operations, whether with the UN or other multinational organizations or coalitions.

Many countries can not offer self-sufficient forces, and the UN must organize support from other nations or through its own supply centers to provide equipment, logistics and other enabling units. The UN needs additional member state participation at the highest levels of the UN Stand-by Arrangements System, especially nations will to provide key enabling and specialized units (e.g., transportation, medical, engineering, and signals) to better partner personnel and equipment for operations where fully-supplied and trained brigades are not available. As mentioned earlier, the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, and the Strategic Deployment Stocks have improved the UN ability to equip missions, but the pace of UN operations has since stretched thin this area of success. The United States and other countries should support expansion of the SDS and Brindisi to meet the current demands of peacekeeping. This could also include support to regionally-led peace operations, such as missions initiated by ECOWAS or the African Union.

