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PDFDATA
     
The Budget and Economic Outlook:
Fiscal Years 2008 to 2017
  January 2007  


Cover Graphic




Notes

Unless otherwise indicated, all of the years referred to in describing the economic outlook are calendar years; other years referred to in this report are federal fiscal years (which run from October 1 to September 30).

Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.

Some of the figures in Chapter 2 use shaded vertical bars to indicate periods of recession as well as dashed vertical lines to separate actual from projected data. (A recession extends from the peak of a business cycle to its trough.)

Supplemental data for this analysis are available on this Web site under "Current Budget Projections," "Current Economic Projections," and "Historical Budget Data." In addition, backup data are available for Table 2-2, "Key Assumptions in CBO's Projection of Potential Output" (Spreadsheet), and Table D-1, "CBO's Year-by-Year Forecast and Projections for Calendar Years 2007 Through 2017" (Spreadsheet).

As of March 14, 2007, updated versions of Table 1-5, "Budgetary Effects of Selected Policy Alternatives Not Included in CBO's Baseline," and Table 4-10, "Effect of Extending Tax Provisions Scheduled to Expire Before 2017," are available under "Current Budget Projections" on the home page of this site. The updates primarily reflect estimates by the Joint Committee on Taxation that were not available at the time of this report's release.







                
Preface

This volume is one of a series of reports on the state of the budget and the economy that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issues each year. It satisfies the requirement of section 202(e) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 for CBO to submit to the Committees on the Budget periodic reports about fiscal policy and to furnish baseline projections of the federal budget. In accordance with CBO’s mandate to provide impartial analysis, the report makes no recommendations.

The baseline spending projections were prepared by the staff of CBO’s Budget Analysis Division under the supervision of Robert Sunshine, Peter Fontaine, Janet Airis, Thomas Bradley, Kim Cawley, Paul Cullinan, Jeffrey Holland, and Sarah Jennings. The revenue estimates were prepared by the staff of the Tax Analysis Division under the supervision of Thomas Woodward, Mark Booth, and David Weiner, with assistance from the Joint Committee on Taxation. (A detailed list of contributors to the revenue and spending projections appears in Appendix F.)

The economic outlook presented in Chapter 2 was prepared by the Macroeconomic Analysis Division under the direction of Robert Dennis, Kim Kowalewski, and John F. Peterson. Robert Arnold and Christopher Williams produced the economic forecast and projections. David Brauer, Ufuk Demiroglu, Richard Farmer (formerly of CBO), Naomi Griffin, Douglas Hamilton, Juann Hung, Kim Kowalewski, Mark Lasky, Angelo Mascaro, Ben Page, and Frank Russek contributed to the analysis. Andrew Gisselquist and Adam Weber provided research assistance.

An early version of CBO’s economic forecast was discussed at a meeting of the agency’s Panel of Economic Advisers. At that time, members of the panel were Martin Baily, Richard Berner, Dan Crippen, J. Bradford DeLong, Martin Feldstein, Robert J. Gordon, Robert E. Hall, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Ellen Hughes-Cromwick, Lawrence Katz, Allan H. Meltzer, Laurence H. Meyer,William D. Nordhaus, June E. O’Neill, Rudolph G. Penner, James Poterba, Robert Reischauer, Alice Rivlin, Nouriel Roubini, and Diane C. Swonk. Raj Chetty, Sherry Glied, Daniel Kessler, and David Zion attended the panel’s meeting as guests. Although CBO’s outside advisers provided considerable assistance, they are not responsible for the contents of this report.

Jeffrey Holland wrote the summary. Barry Blom, with assistance from Mark Booth and Eric Schatten, wrote Chapter 1 (David Newman compiled Box 1-1). John F. Peterson authored Chapter 2. Christina Hawley Anthony wrote Chapter 3, with assistance from Eric Rollins and Eric Schatten. Mark Booth authored Chapter 4, with assistance from Barbara Edwards, Pamela Greene, Andrew Langan, and Emily Schlect. Ann Futrell, with assistance from Mark Booth, wrote Appendix A. Luis Serna wrote Appendix B (Frank Russek wrote the box) and Appendix C. Andrew Gisselquist and Adam Weber compiled Appendix D, and Ann Futrell prepared Appendix E. Mark Hadley and Eric Schatten produced the glossary.

Christine Bogusz, Christian Howlett, Kate Kelly, Loretta Lettner, Leah Mazade, and John Skeen edited the report. Marion Curry, Denise JordanWilliams, and Linda Lewis Harris assisted in its preparation. Maureen Costantino designed the cover and prepared the report for publication. Lenny Skutnik printed the initial copies, Linda Schimmel handled the print distribution, and Annette Kalicki and Simone Thomas handled the electronic distribution via CBO’s Web site.

Peter R. Orszag
Director
January 2007




CONTENTS
 
  Summary

 
The Budget Outlook

A Review of 2006

The Concept Behind CBO’s Baseline Projections

CBO’s Baseline Projections for 2007 to 2017

The Long-Term Budget Outlook

Changes in CBO’s Baseline Since August 2006

Uncertainty and Budget Projections

The Outlook for Federal Debt

Trust Funds and the Budget

 
The Economic Outlook

The Rise in Interest Rates and the Decline in Housing

Construction

The Continued Strength in Business Fixed Investment and
Net Exports

The Slowdown in Consumer Spending

The Steady Growth in Government Purchases

The Easing of Core Inflation

The Outlook Through 2017

Projections of Income

Changes in the Outlook Since August 2006

How CBO’s Forecast Compares with Others

 
The Spending Outlook

Mandatory Spending

Discretionary Spending

 
The Revenue Outlook

Revenues by Source

CBO’s Current Revenue Projections in Detail

Changes in CBO’s Revenue Projections Since August 2006

The Effects of Expiring Tax Provisions

 
Changes in CBO's Baseline Since August 2006
 
How Changes in Economic Assumptions Can Affect Budget Projections
 
Budget Resolution Targets and Actual Outcomes
 
CBO’s Economic Projections for 2007 to 2017
 
Historical Budget Data
 
Contributors to the Revenue and Spending Projections
 
  Glossary

Tables
   
S-1.  CBO’s Baseline Budget Outlook
S-2.  CBO’s Economic Projections for Calendar Years 2007 to 2017
1-1.  Projected Deficits and Surpluses in CBO’s Baseline
1-2.  Average Annual Growth Rates of Revenues and Outlays
1-3.  CBO’s Baseline Budget Projections
1-4.  Changes in CBO’s Baseline Projections of the Deficit or Surplus Since August 2006
1-5.  The Budgetary Effects of Selected Policy Alternatives Not Included in CBO’s Baseline
1-6.  CBO’s Baseline Projections of Federal Debt
1.7. CBO’s Baseline Projections of Trust Fund Surpluses or Deficits
2.1. CBO’s Economic Projections for Calendar Years 2007 to 2017
2-2.  Key Assumptions in CBO’s Projection of Potential Output
2-3.  CBO’s Current and Previous Economic Projections for Calendar Years 2006 to 2016
2-4.  Comparison of Forecasts by CBO, the Administration, and the Blue Chip Consensus for Calendar Years 2007 to 2012
3-1.  CBO’s Baseline Spending Projections
3-2.  Average Annual Rates of Growth in Outlays Since 1995 and in CBO’s Baseline
3-3.  CBO’s Baseline Projections of Mandatory Spending
3-4.  Sources of Growth in Mandatory Spending
3-5.  CBO’s Baseline Projections of Offsetting Receipts
3-6.  Costs for Mandatory Programs That CBO’s Baseline Assumes Will Continue Beyond Their Current Expiration Dates
3-7.  Defense and Nondefense Discretionary Outlays, 1985 to 2007
3-8.  Growth in Discretionary Budget Authority, 2006 to 2007
3-9.  Nondefense Discretionary Funding for 2007
3-10.  CBO’s Projections of Discretionary Spending Under Selected Policy Alternatives
3-11.  CBO’s Baseline Projections of Federal Interest Outlays
4-1.  CBO’s Projections of Revenues, by Source
4-2.  CBO’s Projections of Individual Income Tax Receipts and the NIPA Tax Base
4-3.  Actual and Projected Capital Gains Realizations and Taxes
4-4.  CBO’s Projections of Social Insurance Tax Receipts and the Social Insurance Tax Base
4-5.  CBO’s Projections of Social Insurance Tax Receipts, by Source
4-6.  CBO’s Projections of Corporate Income Tax Receipts and Tax Bases
4-7.  CBO’s Projections of Excise Tax Receipts, by Category
4-8.  CBO’s Projections of Other Sources of Revenue
4-9.  Changes in CBO’s Projections of Revenues Since August 2006
4-10.  Effect of Extending Tax Provisions Scheduled to Expire Before 2017
A-1.  Changes in CBO’s Baseline Projections of the Deficit Since August 2006
A-2. Changes in CBO’s Baseline Projections of Discretionary Outlays Since August 2006
B-1.  Estimated Effects of Selected Economic Changes on CBO’s Baseline Budget Projections
C-1.  Comparison of Budget Resolution Targets and Actual Budget Totals, 2006
C-2.  Sources of Differences Between Budget Resolution Targets and Actual Budget Totals, 2006
C-3.  Sources of Differences Between Budget Resolution Targets and Actual Budget Totals, 1982 to 2006
D-1. CBO’s Year-by-Year Forecast and Projections for Calendar Years 2007 to 2017
D-2. CBO’s Year-by-Year Forecast and Projections for Fiscal Years 2007 to 2017
E-1.  Revenues, Outlays, Surpluses, Deficits, and Debt Held by the Public, 1962 to 2006 (Billions of dollars)
E-2.  Revenues, Outlays, Surpluses, Deficits, and Debt Held by the Public, 1962 to 2006 (Percentage of gross domestic product)
E-3. Revenues by Major Source, 1962 to 2006 (Billions of dollars)
E-4.  Revenues by Major Source, 1962 to 2006 (Percentage of gross domestic product)
E-5.  Outlays for Major Categories of Spending, 1962 to 2006 (Billions of dollars)
E-6.  Outlays for Major Categories of Spending, 1962 to 2006 (Percentage of gross domestic product)
E-7.  Discretionary Outlays, 1962 to 2006 (Billions of dollars)
E-8.  Discretionary Outlays, 1962 to 2006 (Percentage of gross domestic product)
E-8.  Discretionary Outlays, 1962 to 2006 (Percentage of gross domestic product)
E-9.  Outlays for Mandatory Spending, 1962 to 2006 (Billions of dollars)
E-10.  Outlays for Mandatory Spending, 1962 to 2006 (Percentage of gross domestic product)
E-11.  Surpluses, Deficits, Debt, and Related Series, 1962 to 2006
E-12.  Standardized-Budget Surplus or Deficit and Related Series, 1962 to 2006 (Billions of dollars)
E-13.  Standardized-Budget Surplus or Deficit and Related Series, 1962 to 2006 (Percentage of potential gross domestic product)
   
Figures
   
S-1.  Projected Growth of the U.S. Economy and Federal Spending for Major Mandatory Programs
S-2.  Total Revenues and Outlays as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1966 to 2017
1-1.  The Total Deficit or Surplus as a Percentage of GDP, 1966 to 2017
1-2.  Debt Held by the Public as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1940 to 2017
1-3.  The Population Age 65 or Older as a Percentage of the Population Ages 20 to 64
1-4.  Total Federal Spending for Medicare and Medicaid Under Different Assumptions About the Health Cost Growth Differential
1-5.  Uncertainty of CBO’s Projections of the Budget Deficit or Surplus Under Current Policies
1-6.  Debt Subject to Limit
1-7. Projected Social Security Trust Fund Surpluses
2-1.  Interest Rates
2-2.  Monetary and Financial Conditions Index and Real GDP
2-3.  Single-Family Housing Starts
2-4.  Real Prices of Houses
2-5.  Real Business Fixed Investment
2-6.  Corporate Profits
2-7.  Nominal U.S. Trade and Current-Account Balances
2-8.  Delinquency Rates at Commercial Banks
2-9.  Core PCE Inflation and Unit Labor Costs
2-10.  Core PCE Inflation, Including and Excluding Rent
2-11.  Real Potential Output, Potential Labor Force, and Potential Labor Force Productivity
2-12.  Actual and Potential Labor Force Participation
2-13. Labor Income
3-1.  Major Components of Spending, 1966 to 2017
3-2.  Caseload Growth in Social Security and Medicare, 1995 to 2017
4-1.  Total Revenues as a Share of Gross Domestic Product, 1966 to 2017
4-2.  Annual Growth of Federal Revenues and Gross Domestic Product, 1966 to 2017
4-3.  Revenues, by Source, as a Share of Gross Domestic Product, 1966 to 2017
4-4.  Capital Gains Realizations as a Share of Gross Domestic Product, Calendar Years 1990 to 2017
   
Boxes
   
1-1.  Funding for Activities in Iraq and the War on Terrorism
2-1.  The Yield Spread and the Risk of a Recession
3-1.  Categories of Federal Spending
3-2. Medicare’s Prescription Drug Benefit
4-1.  Tax Bases and Tax Liability
4-2.  The Growing Significance of the Alternative Minimum Tax in CBO’s Projections
4-3. Reduced Receipts and Refunds of Telephone Taxes
B-1.  The Potential Budgetary Impact of a Recession

 






                
 
Summary

If current laws and policies remained the same, the budget deficit would equal roughly 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) each fiscal year from 2007 to 2010, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects. Those deficits would be smaller than last year’s budgetary shortfall, which equaled 1.9 percent of GDP (see Summary Table 1). Under the assumptions that govern CBO's baseline projections, the budget would essentially be balanced in 2011 and then would show surpluses of about 1 percent of GDP each year through 2017 (the end of the current 10-year projection period).

Summary Table 1.


CBO's Baseline Budget Outlook


   
Total,
Total,
 
Actual
2008-
2008-
 
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2012
2017
                               
In Billions of Dollars
Total Revenues 2,407 2,542 2,720 2,809 2,901 3,167 3,404 3,550 3,717 3,896 4,084 4,284 15,001 34,531
Total Outlays 2,654 2,714 2,818 2,926 3,038 3,179 3,234 3,391 3,533 3,687 3,892 4,034 15,194 33,731
                               
Total Deficit (-) or Surplus -248 -172 -98 -116 -137 -12 170 159 185 208 192 249 -194 800
    On-budget -434 -357 -299 -332 -367 -258 -85 -101 -79 -57 -72 -10 -1,342 -1,662
     Off-budgeta 186 185 201 216 230 246 255 261 264 265 264 259 1,148 2,461
                               
Debt Held by the Public at the End of the Year 4,829 4,995 5,104 5,232 5,380 5,403 5,242 5,089 4,912 4,709 4,521 4,274
n.a.
n.a.
                               
As a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
Total Revenues 18.4 18.6 19.0 18.7 18.4 19.2 19.8 19.8 19.8 19.9 20.0 20.1 19.1 19.5
Total Outlays 20.3 19.9 19.7 19.5 19.3 19.3 18.8 18.9 18.8 18.8 19.1 18.9 19.3 19.1
                               
Total Deficit (-) or Surplus -1.9 -1.3 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.2 -0.2 0.5
                               
Debt Held by the Public                            
at the End of the Year 37.0 36.6 35.7 34.8 34.2 32.8 30.5 28.3 26.2 24.0 22.1 20.1
n.a.
n.a.
                               
Memorandum:                            
Gross Domestic Product                            
(Billions of dollars)
13,066
13,645
14,300
15,014
15,742
16,465
17,205
17,973
18,764
19,582
20,425
21,295
78,726
176,766

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

Off-budget surpluses comprise surpluses in the Social Security trust funds as well as the net cash flow of the Postal Service.


The favorable outlook suggested by those 10-year projections, however, does not indicate a substantial change in the nation's long-term budgetary challenges. The aging of the population and continuing increases in health care costs are expected to put considerable pressure on the budget in coming decades. Economic growth alone is unlikely to be sufficient to alleviate that pressure as Medicare, Medicaid, and (to a lesser extent) Social Security require ever greater resources under current law. Either a substantial reduction in the growth of spending, a significant increase in tax revenues relative to the size of the economy, or some combination of spending and revenue changes will be necessary to promote the nation's long-term fiscal stability.(1)

CBO's baseline budget projections for the next 10 years, moreover, are not a forecast of future outcomes; rather, they are a benchmark that lawmakers and others can use to assess the potential impact of future policy decisions. The deficits and surpluses in the current baseline are predicated on two key projections (which stem from long-standing procedures that were, until recently, specified in law).(2)

Policy choices that differed from the assumptions in the baseline would produce different budgetary outcomes. For example, if lawmakers continued to provide relief from the AMT (as they have done on a short-term basis for the past several years) and if the provisions of EGTRRA and JGTRRA that are scheduled to expire were instead extended, total revenues would be almost $3 trillion lower over the next 10 years than CBO now projects. Similarly, if discretionary spending (other than for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan) grew at the rate of nominal GDP over the next 10 years, total discretionary outlays during that period would be nearly $1.3 trillion higher than in the baseline. Combined, those policy changes—and associated debt-service costs—would produce a deficit of $328 billion (1.9 percent of GDP) in 2012 and a cumulative deficit over the 2008-2017 period of $4.2 trillion (2.4 percent of GDP).

Underlying CBO's baseline projections is a forecast that U.S. economic growth will slow in calendar year 2007 but pick up in 2008. Specifically, CBO anticipates that GDP will grow by 2.3 percent in real terms in 2007, a full percentage point less than the growth recorded last year. For 2008, CBO forecasts that GDP growth will rebound to 3.0 percent. Under the assumptions of the baseline, real GDP growth would continue at a similar rate in 2009 and 2010 and then slow to 2.7 percent in 2011 and 2012. For the rest of the projection period, average growth of real GDP is projected to decrease to 2.5 percent per year as increases in the size of the workforce continue to slow.

The Budget Outlook

CBO estimates that if today's laws and policies did not change, federal spending would total $2.7 trillion in 2007 and revenues would total $2.5 trillion, resulting in a budget deficit of $172 billion. The additional funding that is likely to be needed to finance military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would put that deficit in the vicinity of $200 billion. Even so, this year's shortfall would be smaller than the 2006 deficit of $248 billion.

Baseline Projections for the 2008-2017 Period

Under current laws and policies, the deficit would drop further in 2008, to $98 billion. That decrease results primarily from two factors. On the revenue side of the budget, receipts from the AMT are estimated to increase by about $60 billion next year because of the scheduled expiration of the relief provided through tax year 2006. (In addition, telephone-tax refunds, which totaled $13 billion in 2007, are projected to drop by $10 billion in 2008.) On the spending side of the budget, outlays for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and for relief and recovery from hurricane damage are about $14 billion lower in 2008 than in 2007 under the assumptions of the baseline.

The baseline deficit is projected to rise modestly over the following two years, 2009 and 2010, as outlays grow by about 3.8 percent annually and revenues increase by about 3.3 percent a year. That projected growth rate for revenues is lower than in recent years, mainly because corporate profits and capital gains realizations are expected to revert to levels that are more consistent with their historical relationship to GDP.

After 2010, spending related to the aging of the baby-boom generation will begin to raise the growth rate of total outlays. The baby boomers will start becoming eligible for Social Security retirement benefits in 2008, when the first members of that generation turn 62. As a result, the annual growth rate of Social Security spending is expected to increase from about 4.5 percent in 2008 to 6.5 percent by 2017.

In addition, because the cost of health care is likely to continue rising rapidly, spending for Medicare and Medicaid is projected to grow even faster—in the range of 7 percent to 8 percent annually. Total outlays for those two health care programs are projected to more than double by 2017, increasing by 124 percent, while nominal GDP is projected to grow only half as much, by 63 percent (see Summary Figure 1 ). Consequently, under the assumptions of CBO's baseline, spending for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security will together equal nearly 11 percent of GDP in 2017, compared with a little less than 9 percent this year.

Summary Figure 1.


Projected Growth of the U.S. Economy and Federal Spending for Major Mandatory Programs

(Cumulative nominal percentage growth from 2006 level)
Graph

Source: Congressional Budget Office.


Revenues are projected to increase sharply after 2010 given the assumption that various tax provisions expire
as scheduled. In the baseline, total revenues grow by 9.2 percent in 2011 and by 7.5 percent in 2012, thereby bringing the budget into surplus. Beyond 2012, revenues are projected to grow at about the same pace as outlays (by roughly 4.5 percent a year), keeping the budget in the black through 2017 under baseline assumptions.

Relative to the size of the economy, outlays are projected to range between 18.8 percent and 19.7 percent of GDP during the 2008-2017 period under the assumptions of CBO's baseline—lower than the 20.6 percent average of the past 40 years (see Summary Figure 2 ). Mandatory spending (funding determined by laws other than annual appropriation acts) is projected to grow by 5.9 percent a year over that period, which is faster than the economy as a whole. By contrast, discretionary appropriations are assumed simply to keep pace with inflation and, to a lesser extent, with the growth of wages. Thus, discretionary outlays are projected to increase by about 2.0 percent a year, on average, or less than half as fast as nominal GDP.

Summary Figure 2.


Total Revenues and Outlays as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product,
1966 to 2017

(Percent)
graph

Source: Congressional Budget Office.


CBO projects that revenues will average 18.7 percent of GDP from 2008 to 2010 (close to the 18.6 percent level expected for this year) before jumping sharply in 2011 and 2012 with the expiration of tax provisions originally enacted in EGTRRA and JGTRRA. After that, revenues are projected to continue growing faster than the overall economy for three reasons: the progressive structure of the tax code combined with increases in total real income, withdrawals of retirement savings as the population ages, and the fact that the AMT is not indexed for inflation. Under the assumptions of the baseline, CBO projects that revenues will equal 20.1 percent of GDP by 2017—a level reached only once since World War II.

Federal government debt that is held by the public (mainly in the form of Treasury securities sold directly
in the capital markets) is expected to equal almost 37 percent of GDP at the end of this year. Thereafter, the baseline's projections of smaller annual deficits and emerging surpluses diminish the government's need for additional borrowing, causing debt held by the public to shrink to 20 percent of GDP by 2017.

Changes in the Baseline Budget Outlook Since August

Although the long-term budgetary picture continues to be worrisome, the baseline outlook for the next 10 years has brightened in the five months since CBO issued its previous projections.(3) Budgetary outcomes have improved for each year from 2007 to 2016 (the period covered by the previous projections), from a reduction
of $114 billion in the deficit for 2007 to a swing of $285 billion in the bottom line for 2016 (from a deficit of $93 billion to a surplus of $192 billion). In all, those reductions represent a difference of about 1.2 percent of GDP over 10 years.

Those changes overstate the fundamental improvement in the underlying budget outlook, however. Roughly half of the total change stems from the baseline's treatment of previous supplemental appropriations for disaster relief and the irregular pattern of funding for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, more than half of the improved bottom line is unrelated to changes in the underlying budgetary and economic environment.

Much of the remaining change to the current baseline comes from lower projected spending for Medicare. Total outlays for that program over the 2007-2016 period are nearly 8 percent lower in this baseline than in CBO's August projections. That reduction is largely attributable to new estimates of per capita costs for all Medicare benefits, but it also reflects lower projections of the number of enrollees in the prescription drug benefit program. Those recent changes, however, do not significantly alter the upward trajectory of Medicare spending in the long term.

The Economic Outlook

The Federal Reserve's shift in monetary policy over the past two and a half years and the recent decline in housing construction are expected to restrain economic growth this year, but the economy is likely to post solid gains next year. CBO forecasts that GDP will grow by 2.3 percent in real terms in calendar year 2007 but by 3.0 percent in 2008 (see Summary Table 2).

Summary Table 2.


CBO's Economic Projections for Calendar Years 2007 to 2017

(Percentage change)
Estimated
 
Forecast
Projected Annual Average
   
2006
   
2007
 
2008
2009-2012
2013-2017
 
 
Nominal GDP
Billions of dollars
13,235
   
13,805
 
14,472
17,395
a
21,519
b
Percentage change
6.3
   
4.3
 
4.8
4.7
4.3
   
Real GDP 
3.3
   
2.3
 
3.0
2.9
2.5
   
GDP Price Index
2.9
   
1.9
 
1.8
1.8
1.8
   
PCE Price Indexc
2.8
   
1.7
 
1.9
2.0
2.0
Core PCE Price Indexd
2.3
   
2.1
 
1.9
2.0
2.0
   
Consumer Price Indexe
3.4
   
1.9
 
2.3
2.2
2.2
Core Consumer Price Indexf
2.6
   
2.6
 
2.3
2.2
2.2
   
Unemployment Rate (Percent)
4.6
   
4.7
 
4.9
5.0
5.0
   
Interest Rates (Percent)
   
Three-month Treasury bills
4.7
   
4.8
 
4.5
4.4
4.4
Ten-year Treasury notes
4.8
   
4.8
 
5.0
5.2
5.2

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor

Statistics; Federal Reserve Board.

Notes: GDP = gross domestic product.

Percentage changes are measured from one year to the next.

a. Level in 2012.

b. Level in 2017.

c. The personal consumption expenditure chained price index.

d. The personal consumption expenditure chained price index excluding prices for food and energy.

e. The consumer price index for all urban consumers.

f. The consumer price index for all urban consumers excluding prices for food and energy.


Gains in employment, which remained solid in 2006 despite a slowdown in economic growth during the second half of the year, are expected to lessen in 2007. That change may cause unemployment to edge up from the 4.6 percent rate recorded for 2006. As housing construction stabilizes, however, economic growth and employment should start to recover by the middle of 2007.

Last year, robust investment by businesses and solid growth in exports helped the U.S. economy absorb the decline in housing construction. Investment and exports are expected to continue to support the economy in 2007. For many years, businesses' capital stock (the plant, equipment, and software they use for production) grew more slowly than overall demand for U.S. goods and services; as a result, despite the recent growth of investment, the nation's capital stock is still low relative to the level of demand. Investment should therefore continue to increase, even if the growth of demand slows. Similarly, export growth is likely to remain strong because increases in demand for U.S. products overseas are durable enough to withstand a slight slowdown in U.S. demand for other countries' exports.

In the absence of any adverse price shocks to the economy, the core rate of inflation—which excludes prices for food and energy—is expected to ease slightly this year. Overall inflation (as measured by the year-to-year change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures) will fall from last year's rate of 2.8 percent to 1.7 percent in 2007 because of a large drop in prices for motor fuels near the end of last year. The core rate of inflation, however, is expected to decline less rapidly
during 2007.

CBO anticipates that the interest rate on three-month Treasury bills will drop slightly this year from the 4.9 percent rate seen at the end of 2006. Further declines are expected during 2008, when that rate will average 4.5 percent. CBO's forecast assumes that long-term interest rates will edge up as short-term interest rates decline. The rate on 10-year Treasury notes, for example, is forecast to rise from 4.8 percent this year to 5.0 percent in 2008.

Beyond the two-year horizon, CBO projects that economic growth (as measured by increases in real GDP) will average 2.7 percent a year from 2009 to 2017. As members of the baby-boom generation begin to retire, the growth of the labor force is expected to slow, pushing down the rate of real GDP growth during the second half of that period. Projected rates of inflation, unemployment, and growth of labor productivity average 2.0 percent, 5.0 percent, and 2.2 percent, respectively, after 2008. Interest rates are projected to average 4.4 percent for three-month Treasury bills and 5.2 percent for 10-year Treasury notes.



1. For a detailed discussion of the long-term pressures facing the federal budget, see Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook (December 2005), Updated Long-Term Projections for Social Security (June 2006), and The Outlook for Social Security (June 2004).

2. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, which established rules that govern the calculation of CBO's baseline, expired on September 30, 2006. Nevertheless, CBO continues to prepare baselines according to the methodology prescribed in that law.

3. Those projections were published in Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update (August 2006).



The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 to 2017 is available in its entirety in PDF format.