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Alternatives for Boost-Phase
Missile Defense
  July 2004  


Cover Graphic


Notes

Numbers in the text and tables of this report may not add up to totals because of rounding.

Unless otherwise indicated, all dollar figures are in 2004 dollars.

The cover shows an intercontinental ballistic missile (a U.S. Minuteman III being test launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California) in the first seconds of the boost phase of its flight. (Photo by the U.S. Air Force)





                
Preface

A prominent part of the Bush Administration's strategy for national defense is developing and fielding defenses against ballistic missiles. To that end, the Department of Defense's Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is pursuing a layered defense composed of various systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at different points in their flight. For the past several years, work has primarily focused on intercepting long-range missiles during their midcourse phase (after their booster rockets have burned out but before their warheads have re-entered the atmosphere). MDA plans to field initial elements of a midcourse system this year. Recently, the agency also began an effort to develop interceptors capable of hitting intercontinental ballistic missiles during their boost phase (the first few minutes after launch, before their booster rockets burn out).

This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study--prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Senate Armed Services Committee--looks at technical, operational, and cost issues related to using a boost-phase intercept (BPI) system to defend the United States against intercontinental ballistic missiles. The study compares the strengths, weaknesses, and costs of five alternative designs for a BPI system--three surface-based and two space-based--that span a range of performance characteristics. In keeping with CBO's mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, this study makes no recommendations.

David Arthur and Robie Samanta Roy of CBO's National Security Division wrote the study under the general supervision of J. Michael Gilmore. Raymond Hall of CBO's Budget Analysis Division prepared the cost estimates and wrote Appendix A under the general supervision of Jo Ann Vines. Adrienne Ramsay and Robert Schingler helped review the manuscript for factual accuracy. Eric Wang, Barbara Edwards, David Moore, Elizabeth Robinson, and Christopher Williams provided thoughtful comments on early drafts of the study, as did Maile Smith of the Institute for Defense Analyses and Professor Daniel Hastings of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (The assistance of external participants implies no responsibility for the final product, which rests solely with CBO.)

Christian Spoor and Leah Mazade edited the study, and Christine Bogusz proofread it. Maureen Costantino produced the cover and graphics and prepared the study for publication. Lenny Skutnik printed the initial copies, and Annette Kalicki prepared the electronic versions for CBO's Web site.

Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Director
July 2004




CONTENTS


  Summary
1  Ballistic Missile Defenses and Threats

A Brief History of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defenses

Layered Defenses and Boost-Phase Intercept

Characteristics of ICBMs Important for BPI

Representative Threats for Comparing BPI Systems

2  Performance Needed for an Operationally Effective BPI System

Commit Time, Interceptor Speed, and Location

Sensors and Battle Management Components

Interceptors

3  Alternative Designs for BPI Systems

Assumptions About Sensors and Battle Management Components

Designs for Interceptors

Other Design Considerations for a BPI System

The BPI Options Examined in This Analysis

4  Comparison of BPI Options

Costs

Areas of the World Covered

Capability and Costs to Counter Solid-Fuel ICBMs

Reliance on Access to Foreign Basing

Vulnerability of the BPI System to Attack

Ability to Counter Increasing Numbers of ICBMs

Strategic Responsiveness

A  CBO's Estimates of the Costs of Alternative BPI Systems
B  Kinetic Kill Vehicles for Boost-Phase Interceptors
  Glossary of Abbreviations

Tables
   
S-1.  Funding for the Missile Defense Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense System Interceptors Program, 2004 to 2009
S-2.  Characteristics, Cost, and Effectiveness of Alternative Systems for Boost-Phase Intercept
1-1.  Implications of Intercepting Ballistic Missiles During Different Phases of Their Flight
1-2.  Funding for the Missile Defense Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense System Interceptors Program, 2004 to 2009
1-3.  Nations with Long-Range Ballistic Missiles
1-4.  Characteristics of North Korean and Iranian Ballistic Missiles and of Representative ICBMs
2-1.  Characteristics of Radar and Infrared Sensors
3-1.  Characteristics of Various Current or Proposed Kill Vehicles
3-2.  Potential Trade-Offs in Designing Surface-Based Boost-Phase Interceptors
3-3.  Comparison of CBO's Options for a Surface-Based BPI System
3-4.  Comparison of CBO's Options for a Space-Based BPI System
4-1.  Summary of Costs for Boost-Phase Intercept Systems
4-2.  Effects on CBO's Options of Targeting Solid-Fuel ICBMs
A-1.  Estimated Costs of Surface-Based BPI Systems
A-2.  Estimated Costs of Space-Based BPI Systems
A-3.  Estimated Costs of the First Production Units for Surface-Based BPI Systems
A-4.  Estimated Costs of the First Production Units for Space-Based BPI Systems
   
Figures
   
S-1.  Trajectory of a Notional ICBM
S-2.  Number of Surface-Based BPI Sites Needed for Full Coverage of Iran, by Commit Time and Interceptor Speed
S-3.  Characteristics of SBI System Needed for Full Coverage of North Korea and Iran Against a Single Liquid-Fuel ICBM
S-4.  Characteristics of SBI System Needed for Full Coverage of North Korea and Iran Against a Single Solid-Fuel ICBM
2-1.  Series of Events in a Boost-Phase Intercept
2-2.  Interceptor Reach Versus Commit Time for Interceptor Speeds Between 6 km/sec and 10 km/sec
2-3.  Time Needed for a BPI Sensor to Detect a Notional Liquid-Fuel ICBM
2-4.  Interceptor Reach Needed Against a Notional Solid-Fuel ICBM, by ICBM Trajectory
2-5.  Interceptor Reach Needed Against a Solid-Fuel ICBM Launched from Iran or North Korea
2-6.  Impact of Commit Time and Interceptor Speed on BPI Coverage of Iran from a Site in Iraq
2-7.  Coverage of Iran Possible from BPI Sites in Different Locations
2-8.  Number of Surface-Based BPI Sites Needed for Full Coverage of Iran, by Commit Time and Interceptor Speed
2-9.  Impact of Commit Time and Interceptor Speed on BPI Coverage of North Korea from a Site in the Sea of Japan
2-10.  Ground Track of a Satellite in a 45-Degree Inclined Low-Earth Orbit
2-11.  Number of SBIs Needed for Full Coverage of North Korea and Iran, by Commit Time and Interceptor Speed
3-1.  Effect of Interceptor Speed and Payload Mass on the Mass of a Surface-Based Interceptor
3-2.  Effect of Interceptor Speed and Payload Mass on the Mass of a Space-Based Interceptor
3-3.  Total Mass of SBI Constellation Needed to Counter Liquid-Fuel ICBMs, by Interceptor Speed
3-4.  Probability of a Successful Intercept, by Number of Shots Taken
4-1.  Location of Surface-Based BPI Sites Needed to Defend Against Liquid-Fuel ICBMs in CBO's Options
4-2.  Size of Surface-Based BPI Interceptors Relative to the Cargo Bay of a C-17 Aircraft
   
Box
   
4-1.  The Role of Uncertainty in CBO's Estimates of the Costs of Boost-Phase Intercept Systems
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