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Unless otherwise specified, all costs are expressed in current dollars. All dates, except those related with costs, refer to calendar years. Dates related with costs refer to fiscal years. |
Most of the MX missiles the Air Force plans to buy are earmarked for the test program, which establishes and monitors system capability and reliability over the system life. Thus, though the Congress halved the planned deployment of MX, the total system's size--and hence its cost--has not fallen in proportion. As requested by the House Budget Committee, this paper analyzes the basis for the planned test program--determined largely by statistical guidelines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff--and illustrates the risks and savings associated with a curtailed test program. This paper builds on an earlier study. In accordance with the Congressional Budget Office's mandate to provide objective analysis, the paper makes no recommendations.
Bonita J. Dombey of CBO's National Security Division prepared the study,
under the general supervision of Robert F. Hale and John D. Mayer, Jr.
William P. Myers of CBO's Budget Analysis Division provided detailed cost
analysis. Jeffrey A. Merkley of CBO assisted with statistical analysis;
Joel Slackman also provided assistance. Johanna Zacharias edited the manuscript.
Rudolph G. Penner
Director
February 1986
SUMMARY
SECTION I. WEAPONS SYSTEM TESTING
SECTION II. THE AIR FORCE'S MX TEST PROBLEM
SECTION III. OPTIONS TO REDUCE THE TEST PROGRAM
| TABLE 1. | COMPARISON OF TEST PROGRAMS FOR SIX BALLISTIC MISSILES |
| TABLE 2. | PROCUREMENT RATES UNDER CURRENT BASELINE AND OPTIONS |
| TABLE 3. | OPTIONS FOR MX TESTING |
| FIGURE 1. | MEETING JCS GUIDELINES FOR MISSILE TESTING (CLASSICAL STATISTICAL METHOD) |
| FIGURE 2. | PROBABILITY OF MEETING JCS GUIDELINES |
The MX, a highly accurate intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) carrying ten nuclear warheads, has long been a source of contention. Debate centers on the 195,000-pound missile's production, basing, and cost. These issues have been put to rest, at least temporarily, with fiscal year 1986 Congressional action specifying that no more than 50 MX missiles be deployed (in Minuteman silos) at any one time. Twelve MX missiles were authorized for fiscal year 1986, bringing the total number authorized thus far (including 20 research and development test missiles) to 74--enough to complete the deployment.
Though the planned deployment of MX has been numerically halved, from 100 to 50, the total purchase of missiles--and hence the system's cost-has not been cut by a proportionate amount. The reason for this disparity is that the program for testing the MX missile is not subject to change as the planned deployment decreases. Of the total 193 MX missiles that have been or will be bought (including Research and Development missiles), 143 are designated for testing. All 119 missiles still to be bought are earmarked for the test program. Specifically, the Congress provided that from 12 to 21 missiles be procured for this purpose in fiscal year 1987.
In this paper, the Congressional Budget Office examines the basis for that test program, which will consume about three-fourths of all MX missiles purchased. The study focuses on Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E), which constitutes the largest segment of the test program and is to proceed in two phases:
Analysis of Current Plans
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have established general guidelines for weapons systems included in the strategic nuclear war plan--also known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)--designed to ensure an acceptable level of testing. These guidelines form the foundation for the sizing of a ballistic missile test program. They specify annual testing to maintain the statistical level of confidence required in each service's estimate of weapon system reliability. However, the guidelines leave the statistical analysis and details of the test program to the individual services. The services often prefer to test to more strict criteria than specified by the JCS, especially in Phase II where the guidelines are less stringent.
The CBO analysis finds that the 24 missiles allocated by the Air Force for Phase I testing might not suffice to meet the statistical guidelines set out by the JCS and the Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC). Assessment based on the Air Force's assumptions and Classical statistical techniques indicates that at least 36 missiles would be needed. The Air Force rationale for using only 24 missiles for Phase I testing, however, rests on experience with land-based missiles and a judgment that, in light of constraints on the total test program, additional test missiles should be shifted to Phase II of the program.
The seven missiles per year allocated to Phase II slightly exceed numbers necessary to meet 3CS guidelines as interpreted by the Air Force: about six missiles per year would suffice. The Air Force wants more Phase II missiles, because it believes JCS guidelines for Phase II are not demanding enough, and also because the Air Force wants flexibility to meet diverse needs. Extra test missiles would be needed, for instance, if the MX remained in service longer than the 15 years currently planned--as has happened with past generations of U.S. land-based missiles--or if the MX at some point requires a major modification. Minuteman II missiles have been deployed for about 20 years, and although there are only 26 test missiles remaining, the Minuteman is likely to remain deployed through the end of this century.
Given the objectives of a ballistic missile test program, when Phases I and II are considered together, the MX test program seems modest in size. Phase I is actually too small as judged by Classical statistical techniques; the extra missiles in Phase II might be needed if the MX stays in the inventory for more than 15 years. The MX test program is also modest in size compared to test programs for other U.S. ballistic missiles.
Alternative Test Programs
Nonetheless, the test program will consume 74 percent of all MX missiles purchased, including those designated for R&D. In light of the small planned deployment of the MX, the Congress might consider options that provide less testing--hence less confidence in system performance--in order to hold down costs. The options examined here focus on Phase II of the Operational Test program, the portion that accounts for the bulk of operational test missiles.
Option I would reduce Phase II testing to about six missiles per year, thus reducing the remaining purchase of MX missiles by 12 from 119 to 107. This option would not meet the more stringent criteria for Phase II testing that the Air Force prefers. Nor would it provide as much of a hedge as do current plans against a possibly longer service life or other contingencies. If, for example, the history of the Minuteman missile were repeated and MX service life were extended, there would be even fewer test assets than under the current plan to accommodate an extension. This reduction in the test program would also eliminate flexibility for additional testing. The need for additional testing could arise as a result of unforeseen degradation of some components, requiring replacement or modification. Or it could arise from a need to test later improvements to the missile's capability to preserve its utility in the face of improved Soviet abilities.
This option would, however, meet JCS guidance standards. Moreover, depending on how it was implemented, the option could save from 0.8 to $1.8 billion. (See Summary Tables 1 and 2). Assuming a baseline program of 21 missiles per year, cutting the missiles from the end of the baseline buy would yield total savings of $1.8 billion.1 However, this method would not yield any savings over the five years 1987-1991, and would actually increase costs relative to the baseline in 1991 in order to end the program efficiently. On the other hand, proportional reductions in the program over the same period as in the baseline would mean purchase of 19 missiles per year, and would yield savings of about $0.6 billion over the next five years, with total savings of about $0.8 billion. Proportional reductions in the options would not affect deployment; nor would it slow the test program. However, this method would increase unit costs, owing to less efficient production rates, and thus lower the total savings.
Option II, testing three missiles per year, would not meet current JCS guidelines requiring that certain levels of degradation in reliability be detected within a year. It could, however, meet 3CS guidance every two years by following a practice, now standard for the Air Force, of pooling sample data from both years. This detection method increases risk, of course, but since the Strategic Air Command has not, over the years, experienced any sudden, drastic reductions in missile reliability, the added risk in detecting changes only every two or three years might be tolerable. Further, Option II offers even less flexibility than does Option I to accommodate such a possibility as an extended service life. Nor does it satisfy the more stringent reliability criteria the Air Force prefers.
In return for this added risk, Option II would eliminate 47 missiles from the test program and thus allow total savings of between $3.0 and $5.3 billion, again depending on how the option was implemented. Savings over the next five years, and total savings, would be higher if reductions occurred at the end of the baseline MX purchase. There would be no savings, however, in 1987 under this method. Proportional reductions to 12 missiles a year would provide savings of $0.6 billion in 1987, but total savings of only $3.0 billion due to unit cost increases.
Option in allows for minimal testing of the MX, purchasing only 36 missiles for both phases I and II of Operational Testing--72 fewer than are now planned. The Air Force could allocate these missiles to Phase I or Phase II, or both, depending on its judgment. For instance, if R«5cD testing now under way were considered successful and provided enough data to establish baseline parameters, then all missiles could be used for Phase II to monitor for losses in reliability. This would allow testing of about three missiles per year, and it would be similar in effect to Option II. Conversely, if the original plan for 24 missiles in Phase I were considered absolutely necessary, then there would only be 12 missiles available for Phase II. In this case, the Air Force might wish to forgo flight testing for degradation unless its annual Aging and Surveillance monitoring indicated potential deterioration. If they did, there would be a small reserve for flight testing of modifications. Training benefits from flight testing could probably be accomplished without actual launch of a real missile; all actions up to the actual launch could still be practiced, perhaps with the launch itself simulated.
Substantial risk is obviously inherent in this option. Military planners would be much less certain of the reliability of the system over time. Should a serious problem necessitating major changes develop with the MX, there would be few missiles available to test the changes. This could be of even greater concern, because the rest of U.S. land-based missiles--Minuteman II and III--are already old, and have few test missiles remaining.
Moreover, from a policy perspective, this option could reduce the deterrent value of the system if the Soviet Union perceived the system to be weakening. Because production of the missile would stop soon, there would also be less opportunity to expand deployment, should Soviet actions prompt an expanded U.S. response.
This option would, however, be consistent with a decision that the limited deployment of the MX does not warrant the expense of heavy testing, especially in light of constrained defense budgets and the slowing of other modernization programs. Arguably, the deterrent value of the MX system is already low, since its contribution to U.S. warheads capable of surviving an attack and retaliating is very small--in most cases, less than 1 percent. Further loss of deterrent capability because of minimal testing and the resulting uncertainty may be of belated importance. Moreover, having a system deployed for many years without testing is not without precedent: the Titan missile was deployed for more than 15 years without a flight test, and some Minuteman missiles may be in a similar situation before the end of the century.
Through radical reductions in the test program, this option would save from $6.9 to $7.9 billion. Savings would begin in 1989 if reductions occurred from the end of procurement, with $6.0 billion in savings through 1991, and $7.9 billion in total savings. If instead the annual number of purchases were reduced to 12, the five year savings would be $4.9 billion, including $0.6 billion in 1987, and total savings would be $6.9 billion.
This document is available in its entirety in PDF.
1. Since the Congress, in 1986, specified purchase of "from 12 to 21 missiles" for the test program in 1987, this baseline assumes continued annual procurement of 21 missiles per year through 1992.