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As the Congress considers the defense budget: for fiscal year 1982, the size and cost of the naval shipbuilding program will be one of the most important issues. Of particular significance will be decisions concerning surface combatant warships. This report, prepared at the request of the House Committee on Armed Services, devotes primary attention to "battle group" surface combatants (that is, destroyers and cruisers capable of operating with the Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups).
Looking ahead to the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Navy faces a substantial drop in the surface combatant force level as ships currently in the fleet reach retirement age. Because of the long lead time required to design and build new warships, decisions made in the current budget deliberations can define and constrain the characteristics of ships delivered to the fleet in the 1990s. In accordance with CBO's mandate to provide objective and nonpartisan analysis, the report offers no recommendations.
This report was prepared by Peter T. Tarpgaard of the National Security
and International Affairs Division of the Congressional Budget Office,
under the general supervision of David S.C. Chu and Robert F. Hale. Edward
A. Swoboda and Michael A. Miller of CBO's Budget Analysis Division provided
valuable assistance in preparing the cost estimates. The author gratefully
acknowledges the helpful comments and assistance of Robert Faherty, Damian
Kulash, Nancy Swope, and Dov Zakheim of the CBO staff, and of Professor
Ernst G. Frankel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dr. Lawrence
Korb of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, and
Dr. Reuven Leopold of the Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Group. (The assistance
of external reviewers implies no responsibility for the final product,,
which rests solely with the Congressional Budget Office.) Francis Pierce
edited the manuscript; Jean Haggis prepared it for publication.
Alice M. Rivlin
Director
April 1981
SUMMARY
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER II. U.S. SURFACE COMBATANTS: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1990s
CHAPTER III. ROLE OF THE SURFACE COMBATANT IN NAVAL WARFARE: RENAISSANCE THROUGH TECHNOLOGY
CHAPTER IV. U.S. SURFACE COMBATANTS: PROGRAMS FOR THE 1990s
APPENDIX A. CURRENT U.S. SURFACE COMBATANTS
APPENDIX B. CURRENT ANTI-AIR WARFARE UPGRADE PROGRAMS FOR SURFACE COMBATANTS
APPENDIX C. SURFACE COMBATANT TRADE-OFF ISSUES
APPENDIX D. DERIVATION OF DDGY DISPLACEMENT AND COST ESTIMATES
GLOSSARY
| TABLES | |
| 1. | BREAKDOWN OF THE NAVY'S SURFACE COMBATANT FORCE LEVEL OBJECTIVE |
| 2. | COMPARISON OF HELICOPTER AND V/STOL CAPABILITIES |
| 3. | CHARACTERISTICS OF ALTERNATIVE SHIP TYPES |
| 4. | ILLUSTRATIVE $33 BILLION 10-YEAR PROGRAMS FOR SURFACE COMBATANT WARSHIP CONSTRUCTION, FISCAL YEARS 1986-1995 |
| 5. | MISSION SUPPORT IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM OPTIONS IN THE YEAR 2000 |
| D-1. | DERIVATION OF DDGY DISPLACEMENT AND COST USING DDGX AS BASELINE |
| D-2. | DERIVATION OF DDGY DISPLACEMENT AND COST USING FFG-7 AS BASELINE |
| FIGURES | |
| 1. | U.S. NAVAL FORCE LEVEL TRENDS: TOTAL OPERATING FORCES AND SURFACE COMBATANTS, 1967-1980 |
| 2. | NAVAL SHIPBUILDING AUTHORIZATIONS, 1962-1980 |
| 3. | PROJECTED FORCE LEVELS FOR BATTLE GROUP SURFACE COMBATANTS |
| 4. | PROJECTED FORCE LEVELS FOR FRIGATES |
| 5. | FOUR ALTERNATIVE SHIP TYPES |
| 6. | BATTLE GROUP SURFACE COMBATANT FORCE LEVELS AND STRUCTURES IN THE YEAR 2000: FOUR EQUAL-COST ALTERNATIVES |
| C-1. | GROWTH TRENDS FOR U.S. SURFACE COMBATANTS |
The decade of the 1970s brought new challenges and uncertainties to the U.S. Navy. Accustomed since World War II to unequivocal dominance at sea, the Navy struggled in the 1970s with the pressures brought about by rapidly advancing technology, the block obsolescence of large numbers of World War II ships, and a vigorous challenge at sea from a Soviet navy growing in strength and confidence.
This struggle has continued into the 1980s. It is nowhere more evident than in that category of warships known as surface combatants--cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. Surface combatants are used in a variety of naval missions, including escorting aircraft carriers as part of a carrier battle group. During a major war, carrier battle groups are intended to be the Navy's primary instrument for gaining control of the seas and for attacking the enemy base structure and forces from the sea. Frontal assaults against Soviet homeland bases would almost certainly encounter stiff resistance from Soviet naval and air forces. Battle groups might also be required to confront additional, although probably less formidable, threats distributed widely over the world's oceans.
Additional tasks undertaken by surface combatants include their employment in surface action groups and as escorts for amphibious forces, underway replenishment groups, and convoys. Surface action groups are naval strike groups that do not contain an aircraft carrier. They are used today in the Middle East and the Carribbean, and could provide forces responsive to other crises in the Third World. Amphibious forces invade land areas from the sea. Underway replenishment groups replenish fuel, ammunition, and stores for warships at sea and are essential for sustained naval operations away from home waters. Merchant ship convoys will almost certainly require vigorous protection against enemy interdiction, as they have in past wars. All of these functions will require surface combatants beyond those needed for carrier battle groups.
Looking ahead to the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Navy faces a substantial drop in the surface combatant force level as the ships delivered in the late 1950s and early 1960s reach retirement age. At the same time, the challenge posed by the forces of potential adversaries has continued to grow.
In addressing this challenge, several related questions must be considered:
These questions are the focus of this paper.
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