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This study was prepared by Marvin M. Smith of the National Security Division, under the supervision of Robert F. Hale and Neil M. Singer. Michael J. McCord of CBO's Budget Analysis Division provided valuable technical support. The author is grateful for helpful reviews of earlier drafts by David Grissmer of the Rand Corporation. The paper was edited by Sherry Snyder, and the manuscript was typed and prepared for publication by G. William Darr. Questions regarding this analysis may be addressed to Marvin M. Smith.
 
 

Selected reserve personnel are on active duty only part-time during peacetime but would provide a large portion of U.S. military capability in a major war. The Administration is planning to increase the role played by selected reserve forces in U.S. military posture. To accommodate this increased reliance on reservists, the number of personnel in six selected reserve components--Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve--is projected to grow from an estimated 1,134,600 at the end of 1986 to 1,263,000 by 1991. Some people have questioned whether the current package of incentive programs will support the recruiting and retention necessary to achieve the planned growth.

Using the best available data, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the various reserve components should be able to increase the size of their forces with the recruiting and retention incentive programs in place as of fiscal year 1985, assuming that pay rates are adjusted to keep pace with inflation. According to CBO estimates, the Army Reserve could experience a shortfall in 1987 of as many as 14,000 recruits without prior military service (17 percent of the projected Army Reserve recruiting goal in that year). This shortfall, however, could be made up by higher retention, improved recruiting performance (such as occurred in 1986) or heavier reliance on personnel with prior service, as has been done in some past years.

Some trends in the characteristics of reserve personnel, however, could cause problems. Over the next few years, the average reservist will have more years of military service. This greater seniority will add to costs and may also make it more difficult to recall reserves to active duty in time of war, since these senior reservists could have greater responsibilities in civilian life. Senior reservists may also have less experience in dealing with the latest military equipment. The reserve components are also recruiting substantial portions of personnel with prior military service, which provides the advantage of immediate experience but can also reduce promotion opportunities and so harm future retention.

CBO's analysis of these trends reflects the incentive programs for reserve recruiting and retention that the Congress has enacted since 1978, except for the Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 1984 (known as the "New GI Bill"). The New GI Bill, a major new benefit for the reserves, first became available, on a test basis, in July 1985. Because it is so new, CBO analyzed the effects of the New GI Bill separately from the other incentive programs, and found that the bill will probably have a positive but modest effect on recruiting and retaining reserve personnel.

CBO's estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty. The analytic tools available to project reserve personnel trends are crude. CBO made several assumptions about the variables that could affect these trends, but changes in these assumptions could alter the projections. Policy changes may also alter the results. For example, if the Congress does not authorize all the increases in numbers of reserves requested by the Administration, the reserve components would find themselves better able to meet their diminished personnel goals.

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