This page lists the most recent publications related to fluctuations in gasoline prices. It includes publications issued since 2000. http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/gasprices.html Thu, 02 Dec 2010 10:14:52 -0500 GAO http://www.gao.gov/images/title_object.jpg http://www.gao.gov/ Feed provided by GAO. Click to visit. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-446 In December 2007, the Congress expanded the renewable fuel standard (RFS), which requires rising use of ethanol and other biofuels, from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons in 2022. To meet the RFS, the Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Energy (DOE) are developing advanced biofuels that use cellulosic feedstocks, such as corn stover and switchgrass. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the RFS. This report examines, among other things, (1) the effects of increased biofuels production on U.S. agriculture, environment, and greenhouse gas emissions; (2) federal support for domestic biofuels production; and (3) key challenges in meeting the RFS. GAO extensively reviewed scientific studies, interviewed experts and agency officials, and visited five DOE and USDA laboratories. To meet the RFS, domestic biofuels production must increase significantly, with uncertain effects for agriculture and the environment. For agriculture, many experts said that biofuels production has contributed to crop price increases as well as increases in prices of livestock and poultry feed and, to a lesser extent, food. They believe that this trend may continue as the RFS expands. For the environment, many experts believe that increased biofuels production could impair water quality--by increasing fertilizer runoff and soil erosion--and also reduce water availability, degrade air and soil quality, and adversely affect wildlife habitat; however, the extent of these effects is uncertain and could be mitigated by such factors as improved crop yields, feedstock selection, use of conservation techniques, and improvements in biorefinery processing. Except for lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, EPA is currently not required by statute to assess environmental effects to determine what biofuels are eligible for inclusion in the RFS. Many researchers told GAO there is general agreement on the approach for measuring the direct effects of biofuels production on lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions but disagreement about how to estimate the indirect effects on global land use change, which EPA is required to assess in determining RFS compliance. In particular, researchers disagree about what nonagricultural lands will be converted to sustain world food production to replace land used to grow biofuels crops. The Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC), a 45-cent per gallon federal tax credit, was established to support the domestic ethanol industry. Unless crude oil prices rise significantly, the VEETC is not expected to stimulate ethanol consumption beyond the level the RFS specifies this year. The VEETC also may no longer be needed to stimulate conventional corn ethanol production because the domestic industry has matured, its processing is well understood, and its capacity is already near the effective RFS limit of 15 billion gallons per year for conventional ethanol. A separate $1.01 tax credit is available for producing advanced cellulosic biofuels. The nation faces several key challenges in expanding biofuels production to achieve the RFS's 36-billion-gallon requirement in 2022. For example, farmers face risks in transitioning to cellulosic biofuels production and are uncertain whether growing switchgrass will eventually be profitable. USDA's new Biomass Crop Assistance Program may help mitigate these risks by providing payments to farmers through multi-year contracts. In addition, U.S. ethanol use is approaching the so-called blend wall--the amount of ethanol that most U.S. vehicles can use, given EPA's 10 percent limit on the ethanol content in gasoline. Research has been initiated on the long-term effects of using 15 percent or 20 percent ethanol blends, but expanding the use of 85 percent ethanol blends will require substantial new investment because ethanol is too corrosive for the petroleum distribution infrastructure and most vehicles. Alternatively, further R&D on biorefinery processing technologies might lead to price-competitive biofuels that are compatible with the existing petroleum distribution and storage infrastructure and the current fleet of U.S. vehicles. Tue, 25 Aug 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-700 In 2008, GAO reported that, with the exception of the period following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, refinery outages in the United States did not show discernible trends in reduced production capacity, frequency, and location from 2002 through 2007. Some outages are planned to perform routine maintenance or upgrades, while unplanned outages occur as a result of equipment failure or other unforeseen problems. GAO was asked to (1) evaluate the effect of refinery outages on wholesale gasoline prices and (2) identify gaps in federal data needed for this and similar analyses. GAO selected refinery outages from 2002 through September 2008 that were at least among the largest 60 percent in terms of lost production capacity in their market region and lasted at least 3 days. GAO developed an econometric model and tested a variety of assumptions using public and private data. While some unplanned refinery outages, such as those caused by accidents or weather, have had large price effects, GAO found that in general, refinery outages were associated with small increases in gasoline prices. Large price increases occurred when there were large outages; for example, in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. However, we found that such large price increases were rare, and on average, outages were associated with small price increases. For example, GAO found that planned outages generally did not influence prices significantly--likely reflecting refiners' build-up in inventories to meet demand needs prior to shutting down--while for unplanned outages, average price effects ranged from less than one cent to several cents-per-gallon. Key factors influenced the size of price increases associated with unplanned outages. One such factor was whether the gasoline was branded--gasoline sold at retail under a specific refiner's trademark--or unbranded--gasoline sold at retail by independent sellers. Our analysis showed that during an unplanned outage, branded wholesale gasoline prices had smaller price increases than unbranded, suggesting that refiners give preference to their own branded customers during outages, while unbranded dealers must seek out supplies in a more constrained market. Another factor that affected the size of price increases associated with outages was the type of gasoline being sold. Some special blends of gasoline developed to reduce emissions of air pollutants exhibited larger average price increases than more widely used and available conventional gasoline, suggesting that these special gasoline blends may have more constrained supply options in the event of an outage. Existing federal data contain gaps that have limited GAO's and Department of Transportation's (DOT) analyses of petroleum markets and related issues. For example: (1) Data linking refiners to the markets they serve were inadequate for GAO to fully evaluate the price effects of unplanned outages on individual cities, limiting the analysis to broader average effects. (2) Pipeline flow and petroleum product storage data were inadequate for DOT to fully address a January 2009 Congressionally mandated study to identify potential pipeline infrastructure constraints, and limited GAO's ability to identify re-supply options for cities experiencing outage disruptions. Federal agencies generally have continued to update their data collection surveys to meet their respective needs and emerging changes in the energy sector. However, in some cases the individual agency efforts have resulted in the collection of information that does not necessarily meet the data needs of other agencies or analysts who monitor petroleum product markets. Thu, 30 Jul 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-659 In 2008, GAO reported that 1,088 oil industry mergers occurred between 2000 and 2007. Given the potential for price effects, GAO recommended that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the agency with the authority to maintain petroleum industry competition, undertake more regular retrospective reviews of past petroleum industry mergers, and FTC said it would consider this recommendation. GAO was asked to conduct such a review of its own to determine how mergers and market concentration--a measure of the number and market shares of firms in a market--affected wholesale gasoline prices since 2000. GAO examined the effects of mergers and market concentration using an economic model that ruled out the effects of many other factors. GAO consulted with a number of experts and used both public and private data in developing the model. GAO tested the model under a variety of assumptions to address some of its limitations. GAO also interviewed petroleum market participants. GAO examined seven mergers that occurred since 2000--ranging in value and geography and for which there was available gasoline pricing data-and found three that were associated with statistically significant increases or decreases in wholesale gasoline prices. Specifically, GAO found that the mergers of Valero Energy with Ultramar Diamond Shamrock and Valero Energy with Premcor, which both involved the acquisition of refineries, were associated with estimated average price increases of about 1 cent per gallon each. In addition, GAO found that the merger of Phillips Petroleum with Conoco, which primarily involved the acquisition of oil exploration and production assets, was associated with an estimated average decrease in wholesale gasoline prices across cities affected by the merger of nearly 2 cents per gallon. This analysis provides an indicator of the impact that petroleum industry mergers can have on wholesale gasoline prices. Additional analysis would be needed to explain the price effects that GAO estimated. GAO used two separate measures of market concentration, one which measured the number of sellers at wholesale gasoline terminals and another which measured the market share of refiners supplying gasoline to those sellers, and found that less concentrated markets were statistically significantly associated with lower gasoline prices. For example, for wholesale terminals with more sellers--i.e., terminals that were less concentrated--GAO estimated that prices were about 8 cents per gallon lower at terminals with 14 sellers than at terminals that had only 9 sellers. This result is consistent with the idea that markets with more sellers are likely to be more competitive, resulting in lower prices. Using the second measure of concentration, GAO similarly found a statistically significant association between prices and the level of refinery concentration, with less concentrated groups of refineries associated with lower prices. Fri, 12 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-493 The U.S. transportation sector relies almost exclusively on oil; as a result, it causes about a third of the nation's greenhouse gas emissions. Advanced technology vehicles powered by alternative fuels, such as electricity and ethanol, are one way to reduce oil consumption. The federal government set a goal for federal agencies to use plug-in hybrid electric vehicles--vehicles that run on both gasoline and batteries charged by connecting a plug into an electric power source--as they become available at a reasonable cost. This goal is on top of other requirements agencies must meet for conserving energy. In response to a request, GAO examined the (1) potential benefits of plug-ins, (2) factors affecting the availability of plug-ins, and (3) challenges to incorporating plug-ins into the federal fleet. GAO reviewed literature on plug-ins, federal legislation, and agency policies and interviewed federal officials, experts, and industry stakeholders, including auto and battery manufacturers. Increasing the use of plug-ins could result in environmental and other benefits, but realizing these benefits depends on several factors. Because plug-ins are powered at least in part by electricity, they could significantly reduce oil consumption and associated greenhouse gas emissions. For plug-ins to realize their full potential, electricity would need to be generated from lower-emission fuels such as nuclear and renewable energy rather than the fossil fuels--coal and natural gas--used most often to generate electricity today. However, new nuclear plants and renewable energy sources can be controversial and expensive. In addition, research suggests that for plug-ins to be cost-effective relative to gasoline vehicles the price of batteries must come down significantly and gasoline prices must be high relative to electricity. Auto manufacturers plan to introduce a range of plug-in models over the next 6 years, but several factors could delay widespread availability and affect the extent to which consumers are willing to purchase plug-ins. For example, limited battery manufacturing, relatively low gasoline prices, and declining vehicle sales could delay availability and discourage consumers. Other factors may emerge over the longer term if the use of plug-ins increases, including managing the impact on the electrical grid (the network linking the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity) and increasing consumer access to public charging infrastructure needed to charge the vehicles. The federal government has supported plug-in-related research and initiated new programs to encourage manufacturing. Experts also identified options for providing additional federal support. To incorporate plug-ins into the federal fleet, agencies will face challenges related to cost, availability, planning, and federal requirements. Plug-ins are expected to have high upfront costs when they are first introduced. However, they could become comparable to gasoline vehicles over the life of ownership if certain factors change, such as a decrease in the cost of batteries and an increase in gasoline prices. Agencies vary in the extent to which they use life-cycle costing when evaluating which vehicle to purchase. Agencies also may find that plug-ins are not available to them, especially when the vehicles are initially introduced because the number available to the government may be limited. In addition, agencies have not made plans to incorporate plug-ins due to uncertainties about vehicle cost, performance, and infrastructure needs. Finally, agencies must meet a number of requirements covering energy use and vehicle acquisition--such as acquiring alternative fuel vehicles and reducing facility energy and petroleum consumption--but these sometimes conflict with one another. For example, plugging vehicles into federal facilities could reduce petroleum consumption but increase facility energy use. The federal government has not yet provided information to agencies on how to set priorities for these requirements or leverage different types of vehicles to do so. Without such information, agencies face challenges in making decisions about acquiring plug-ins that will meet the requirements, as well as maximize plug-ins' potential benefits and minimize costs. Tue, 09 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-695T The possibility of storing refined petroleum products as part of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) has been contemplated since the SPR was created in 1975. The SPR, which currently holds about 700 million barrels of crude oil, was created to help insulate the U.S. economy from oil supply disruptions. However, the SPR does not contain refined products such as gasoline, diesel fuel, or jet fuel. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to increase the SPR's capacity from 727 million barrels to 1 billion barrels, which it plans to do by 2018. With the possibility of including refined products as part of the expansion of the SPR, this testimony discusses (1) some of the arguments for and against including refined products in the SPR and (2) lessons learned from the management of the existing crude oil SPR that may be applicable to refined products. To address these issues, GAO relied on its 2006 report on the SPR (GAO-06-872), 2007 report on the globalization of petroleum products (GAO-08-14), and two 2008 testimonies on the cost-effectiveness of filling the SPR (GAO-08-512T and GAO-08-726T). GAO also reviewed prior DOE and International Energy Agency studies on refined product reserves. Since the SPR, the largest emergency crude oil reserve in the world, was created in 1975 a number of arguments have been made for and against including refined petroleum products. Some of the arguments for including refined products in the SPR are: (1) the United States' increased reliance on imports and resulting exposure to supply disruptions or unexpected increases in demand elsewhere in the world, (2) possible reduced refinery capacity during weather related supply disruptions, (3) time needed for petroleum product imports to reach all regions of the United States in case of an emergency, and (4) port capacity bottlenecks in the United States, which limit the amount of petroleum products that can be imported quickly during emergencies. For example, the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the concentration of refineries on the Gulf Coast and resulting damage to pipelines left the United States to rely on imports of refined product from Europe. Consequently, regions experienced a shortage of gasoline and prices rose. Conversely, some of the arguments against including refined products in the SPR are: (1) the surplus of refined products in Europe, (2) the high storage costs of refined products, (3) the use of a variety of different type of blends of refined products--"boutique" fuels--in the United States, and (4) policy alternatives that may diminish reliance on oil. For example, Europe has a surplus of gasoline products because of a shift to diesel engines, which experts say will continue for the foreseeable future. Europe's surplus of gasoline is available to the United States in emergencies and provided deliveries following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. The following three lessons learned from the management of the existing SPR may have some applicability in dealing with refined products. (1) Select a cost-effective mix of products. In 2006, GAO recommended that DOE include at least 10 percent heavy crude oil in the SPR. If DOE bought 100 million barrels of heavy crude oil during its expansion of the SPR it could save over $1 billion in nominal terms, assuming a price differential of $12 between the price of light and heavy crude, the average differential from 2003 through 2007. Similarly, if directed to include refined products as part of the SPR, DOE will need to determine the most cost-effective mix of products. (2) Consider using a dollar-cost-averaging acquisition approach. Also in 2006, GAO recommended that DOE consider acquiring a steady dollar value--rather than a steady volume--of oil over time when filling the SPR. This would allow DOE to acquire more oil when prices are low and less when prices are high. GAO expects that a dollar-cost-averaging acquisition method would also provide benefits when acquiring refined products. (3) Maximize cost-effective storage options. According to DOE, below ground salt formations offer the lowest cost approach for storing crude oil for long periods of time--$3.50 per barrel in capital cost versus $15 to $18 per barrel for above ground storage tanks. Similarly, DOE will need to explore the most cost-effective storage options for refined products. Tue, 12 May 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-247T The current economic downturn has brought significant financial stress to the auto manufacturing industry. Recent deteriorating financial, real estate, and labor markets have reduced consumer confidence and available credit, and automobile purchases have declined. While auto manufacturers broadly have experienced declining sales in 2008 as the economy has worsened, sales of the "Big 3" (General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford) have also declined relative to those of some other auto manufacturers in recent years because higher gasoline prices have particularly hurt sales of sport utility vehicles. In addition to causing potential job losses at auto manufacturers, failure of the domestic auto industry would likely adversely affect other sectors. Officials from the Big 3 have requested, and Congress is considering, immediate federal financial assistance. This testimony discusses principles that can serve as a framework for considering the desirability, nature, scope, and conditions of federal financial assistance. Should Congress decide to provide financial assistance, we also discuss how these principles could be applied in these circumstances. The testimony is based on GAO's extensive body of work on previous federal rescue efforts that dates back to the 1970s. From our previous work on federal financial assistance to large firms and municipalities, we have identified three fundamental principles that can serve as a framework for considering future assistance. These principles are (1) identifying and defining the problem, (2) determining the national interests and setting clear goals and objectives that address the problem, and (3) protecting the government's interests. First, problems confronting the industry must be clearly defined--separating out those that require an immediate response from those structural challenges that will take more time to resolve. Second, Congress should determine whether the national interest will be best served through a legislative solution, or whether market forces and established legal procedures, such as bankruptcy, should be allowed to take their course. Should Congress decide that federal financial assistance is warranted, it is important that Congress establish clear objectives and goals for this assistance. Third, given the significant financial risk the federal government may assume, the structure Congress sets up to administer any assistance should provide for appropriate mechanisms, such as concessions by all parties, controls over management, compensation for risk, and a strong independent board, to protect taxpayers from excessive or unnecessary risks. These principles could help the Congress in deciding whether to offer financial assistance to the domestic auto manufacturers. If Congress determines that a legislative solution is in the national interest, a two-pronged approach could be appropriate in these circumstances. Specifically, Congress could 1) authorize immediate, but temporary, financial assistance to the auto manufacturing industry and 2) concurrently establish a board to approve, disburse, and oversee the use of these initial funds and provide any additional federal funds and continued oversight. This board could also oversee any structural reforms of the companies. Among other responsibilities, Congress could give the board authority to establish and implement eligibility criteria for potential borrowers and to implement procedures and controls in order to protect the government's interests. Fri, 05 Dec 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-242T The current economic downturn has brought significant financial stress to the auto manufacturing industry. Recent deteriorating financial, real estate, and labor markets have reduced consumer confidence and available credit, and automobile purchases have declined. While auto manufacturers broadly have experienced declining sales in 2008 as the economy has worsened, sales of the "Big 3" (General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford) have also declined relative to those of some other auto manufacturers in recent years because higher gasoline prices have particularly hurt sales of sport utility vehicles. In addition to causing potential job losses at auto manufacturers, failure of the domestic auto industry would likely adversely affect other sectors. Officials from the Big 3 have requested, and Congress is considering, immediate federal financial assistance. This testimony discusses principles that can serve as a framework for considering the desirability, nature, scope, and conditions of federal financial assistance. Should Congress decide to provide financial assistance, we also discuss how these principles could be applied in these circumstances. The testimony is based on GAO's extensive body of work on previous federal rescue efforts that dates back to the 1970s. From our previous work on federal financial assistance to large firms and municipalities, we have identified three fundamental principles that can serve as a framework for considering future assistance. These principles are (1) identifying and defining the problem, (2) determining the national interests and setting clear goals and objectives that address the problem, and (3) protecting the government's interests. First, problems confronting the industry must be clearly defined--separating out those that require an immediate response from those structural challenges that will take more time to resolve. Second, Congress should determine whether the national interest will be best served through a legislative solution, or whether market forces and established legal procedures, such as bankruptcy, should be allowed to take their course. Should Congress decide that federal financial assistance is warranted, it is important that Congress establish clear objectives and goals for this assistance. Third, given the significant financial risk the federal government may assume, the structure Congress sets up to administer any assistance should provide for appropriate mechanisms, such as concessions by all parties, controls over management, compensation for risk, and a strong independent board, to protect taxpayers from excessive or unnecessary risks. These principles could help the Congress in deciding whether to offer financial assistance to the domestic auto manufacturers. If Congress determines that a legislative solution is in the national interest, a two-pronged approach could be appropriate in these circumstances. Specifically, Congress could 1) authorize immediate, but temporary, financial assistance to the auto manufacturing industry and 2) concurrently establish a board to approve, disburse, and oversee the use of these initial funds and provide any additional federal funds and continued oversight. This board could also oversee any structural reforms of the companies. Among other responsibilities, Congress could give the board authority to establish and implement eligibility criteria for potential borrowers and to implement procedures and controls in order to protect the government's interests. Thu, 04 Dec 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-153R Gasoline prices are volatile and have increased greatly over the last several years, before dropping again recently. The national average of regular grade retail gasoline prices increased from about $2.24 the week of January 2, 2006, to a peak of $4.11 the week of July 14, 2008, an increase of almost 84 percent, before dropping to about $2.40 the week of November 3, 2008. High fuel prices have focused attention on conservation. Congress previously used a national speed limit as an approach to conserve fuel when, in 1974, it provided for a national 55 mile per hour (mph) speed limit to reduce gasoline consumption in response to the 1973 Arab oil embargo. The law prohibited federal funding of certain highway projects in any state with a maximum speed limit in excess of 55 mph. In 1987, Congress allowed states to raise the maximum speed limit to 65 mph on rural interstate routes. In 1995, the 55 mph speed limit was repealed. Since then, states have been free to set speed limits without the loss of federal highway funds. Congress expressed interest in obtaining information on using a national speed limit to reduce fuel consumption. In response to the request, we reviewed existing literature and consulted knowledgeable stakeholders on the following: (1) What is the relationship between speed and the fuel economy of vehicles? (2) How might reducing the speed limit affect fuel use? For a vehicle traveling at high speed, reducing its speed increases fuel economy. In general, at speeds over approximately 35 to 45 mph, if a vehicle reduces its speed by 5 mph, its fuel economy can increase by about 5 to 10 percent, because air resistance, or drag, increases exponentially as a vehicle goes faster. Conversely, air resistance diminishes more rapidly as a vehicle slows down, thus increasing its fuel economy. According to existing literature and knowledgeable stakeholders, there is no single speed that optimizes fuel economy for all vehicles. Optimal speed for fuel economy for individual vehicles ranges widely, but is generally between 30 and 60 mph, depending on a vehicle's characteristics. However, a vehicle's fuel economy also depends on other factors besides air resistance. Factors that enhance fuel economy include engine efficiency enhancements (e.g., fuel injection), electronic and computer controls, more efficient transmissions, and hybrid technology. However, other factors decrease fuel economy. In general, over the last 2 decades, fuel economy gains resulting from advances in automotive technologies have largely been offset by increases in vehicle weight, performance, and accessory loads. Specifically, vehicles are heavier than in the past, because they are larger and include more technologies. Further, increased accessory loads, such as air conditioning and electronics, have also reduced fuel economy. According to EPA, from 1987 through 2004, on a fleetwide basis, technology innovation was utilized exclusively to support market-driven attributes other than fuel economy, such as performance. Beginning in 2005, however, according to EPA's analysis of fuel economy trends, technology has been used to increase both performance and fuel economy, while keeping vehicle weight relatively constant. Lowering speed limits can potentially reduce total fuel consumption. According to literature we reviewed examining the impact of the national speed limit enacted in 1974, the estimated fuel savings resulting from the 55 mph national speed limit ranged from 0.2 to 3 percent of annual gasoline consumption. According to DOE's 2008 estimate, a national speed limit of 55 mph could yield possible savings of 175,000 to 275,000 barrels of oil per day. This range is consistent with estimates of the impact of the past national speed limit. According to the Energy Information Administration, total U.S. consumption of petroleum for 2007 was about 21 million barrels of oil per day. However, other factors, including drivers' compliance with a reduced speed limit, would affect the actual impact of a lower speed limit on the amount of fuel savings. Reducing the speed limit does not necessarily mean that drivers will comply. Moreover, a national speed limit would not affect many of the miles driven in the United States, such as those in urban areas, where most vehicles are already traveling at lower speeds due to lower speed limits or congestion. Other external conditions also affect fuel economy, such as road conditions, including whether a road is steep or flat, and weather conditions, including wind speed and direction. Finally, other aspects of driver behavior may also affect fuel consumption. The speed limit is only one tool among many for potentially conserving fuel. Certain realities, such as congestion on our nation's roads, how people drive and maintain their vehicles, and emerging technologies, are other potential considerations as the nation looks for options to conserve fuel. Fri, 07 Nov 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-87 In recent years, global demand for petroleum products such as gasoline and diesel fuel has grown more quickly than the capacity to produce them, creating a tight market. U.S. refiners have been running near capacity, particularly during peak summer demand. In such conditions, unexpected refinery outages can result in price increases that adversely affect consumers. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the trends in U.S. refinery outages over the last 5 years, in terms of reduced production capacity, frequency, and geographic location, and (2) the federal requirements for reporting outages at U.S. refineries. To evaluate these objectives, GAO obtained and analyzed Energy Information Administration (EIA) and commercial data, and obtained and analyzed federal legislation and policies, and interviewed federal agency, academic, and industry trade group officials. With the exception of impacts beginning in 2005 related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO's analyses of commercial data on unplanned and planned refinery outages across the United States generally do not show discernible trends in reduced production capacity or in the frequency and location of outages from 2002 through 2007. GAO's analyses of commercial data from 2002 through 2007 indicate that the hurricanes resulted in two patterns of outages for refiners, depending on whether they were directly affected, specifically: (1) certain refiners that were forced to shut down due to the hurricanes opted to upgrade equipment and perform what maintenance they could during their unplanned outages, thus extending the length of time until the next round of planned outages for maintenance at these refineries; and (2) sometimes refiners not directly effected by the hurricanes deferred planned outages to continue to supply the market, thus partially increasing the need for planned outages in subsequent years as these refiners rescheduled their deferred outages. GAO's regional analyses showed few apparent trends, but some variation in reduced production capacity due to outages across regions, with the Gulf Coast region refineries experiencing a slightly higher rate of outages and related reductions in capacity than refineries in other regions, in part as a result of recurrent extreme weather events. At present, there are no federal requirements for refiners to report planned or unplanned refinery outages, and available data may not allow EIA to adequately ascertain the effects of some outages on prices of petroleum products. EIA collects data on a monthly refinery survey and has used this data to estimate outages. However, GAO found estimating outages using this method has a number of limitations. Among other things, it does not identify whether the outage was planned or unplanned, and it is important to make this distinction because unplanned outages are likely to have a different impact on gasoline prices than planned outages. EIA is independently exploring whether to collect data directly on planned and unplanned outages from refiners, but has not established a time frame to determine if it will collect such data. In addition, in response to the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, EIA is preparing to enhance its monitoring of planned outages. EIA officials told GAO they plan to primarily rely on commercial data to perform the mandated semi-annual analyses. However, even if EIA collects or acquires reliable data on refinery outages, the agency lacks other data--such as data on special fuel blends--that could be important for the Department of Energy in meeting its obligations to conduct periodic analyses of the potential impacts of refinery outages on prices of petroleum products. While a full cost/benefit analysis of the merits of collecting additional data was outside the scope of this review, EIA has the authority and expertise to determine and suggest what other information for inclusion on the monthly refiner survey could be helpful in adequately evaluating the potential effects of both planned and unplanned outages on prices of petroleum products. Tue, 07 Oct 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1114 The volume, but not the energy content, of hydrocarbon fuels, such as gasoline and diesel, varies in response to changes in temperature. Thus, because of expansion, the energy content per gallon of 90 degree fuel is less than that of 60 degree fuel. States and localities adopt and enforce weights and measures regulations, often using the model regulatory standards published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Although technology now exists to compensate for the effects of temperature on gas volume, the costs of doing so at the retail level have become the subject of much debate among weights and measures officials, consumer groups, and representatives of the petroleum and fuel marketing industries. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the views of U.S. stakeholders on the costs to implement automatic temperature compensation, (2) the views of U.S. stakeholders on who would bear these costs, and (3) the reasons some state and national governments have adopted or rejected automatic temperature compensation. To do this work, GAO reviewed NIST and other documents and congressional testimony; interviewed stakeholders from 3 federal agencies, 17 states, and 15 groups representing a variety of interests, including consumers, truck drivers, and the oil and gas industry; and interviewed officials in 5 other nations. Various stakeholders and officials provided technical and other comments, which were incorporated in the report as appropriate The costs to implement automatic temperature compensation are unclear. Most stakeholders said that implementing automatic temperature compensation for retail sales would involve the cost to purchase, install, and inspect new equipment on pumps, as well as costs to educate consumers about the change. Some stakeholders said the costs to adopt automatic temperature compensation ranged from $1,300 to $3,000 per pump, but none had estimated the total costs nationwide, in part because complete data are not available. Estimates of the cost to inspect the new equipment varied. Officials in a small number of states said inspection times would increase by 20 to 50 percent, while officials in three other states said the costs would not be significant. No stakeholders had developed estimates of the costs to educate consumers. Stakeholders differ on whether retailers, consumers, or both would ultimately bear the costs of implementing automatic temperature compensation at the retail level. Some stakeholders, including state officials and industry representatives, said that the costs would be passed on to consumers through higher prices for fuel or other goods sold at retail stations. Others, such as consumer groups, said that retailers and consumers would share the costs and benefits. That is, some retailers could use funds they receive from major oil companies for remodeling to pay for the equipment. These stakeholders also said the benefits include consistent energy content for consumers and improved inventory management for retailers. Stakeholder views were largely based on professional judgment and general economic theory rather than on studies or other data, and most stakeholders said that a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis would provide policymakers with important information. Governments that have adopted or permitted automatic temperature compensation for retail fuel sales cited improved measurement accuracy and greater equity between retailers and consumers as reasons for making the change; those that have prohibited it largely cited concerns that the costs would outweigh the benefits. Hawaii adopted temperature compensation more than 26 years ago because it provided purchasing equity for the industry and consumers. In 2008, Belgium mandated temperature compensation to help ensure more consistent energy content for consumers. Canadian officials cited improved measurement equity and accuracy as reasons for allowing retailers to sell temperature-compensated fuel in the early 1990s. In the United States, officials from eight states that have laws or regulations that prohibit automatic temperature compensation said the decision should be based on an analysis of the costs and benefits, with some expressing concern that the costs would outweigh the benefits. None of the governments that have adopted automatic temperature compensation have studied its impact. Thu, 25 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400