Skip Navigation

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has been a controversial program from its inception. Critics and supporters have argued over the goals of the program and its chances of success. Under the Administration's plans, SDI also promises to become increasingly expensive during a period when the total defense budget may be reduced. In fact, for 1992 the Congress provided the highest-ever funding on antimissile defenses and, for the first time, set a target date for deploying a defense against long-range ballistic missiles. The Congress will therefore continue to confront difficult choices: how much to spend on SDI research and, if budgets are to be held down, which of various alternative programs to pursue.

This memorandum seeks to inform the Congressional debate on SDI by summarizing the Administration's SDI proposal and presenting three alternative programs, which vary widely in their costs and the defense capability that would result. In keeping with the mandate of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to provide objective analysis, the memorandum makes no recommendations.

The memorandum was researched and written by Raymond Hall of CBO's Budget Analysis Division, under the direction of Michael Miller, and David Mosher of the National Security Division, under the direction of Robert Hale. Raymond Hall organized the study and prepared all the cost estimates. David Mosher helped devise and analyze the options. Janice Johnson prepared the final draft for production.
 
 

INTRODUCTION

The Reagan Administration repeatedly made it clear that one of the basic goals of its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was to protect the people of the United States from a large-scale nuclear attack. President Bush initially supported the Reagan Administration's goals for a system of strategic defenses. In the light of the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, however, President Bush recommended in his State of the Union address on January 29, 1991, that the SDI program be refocused, with emphasis on a revised policy objective: namely, protection against limited strikes. The resulting refocused SDI program is named Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).

In the 1992 defense authorization bill, the Congress indicated it would support a less ambitious plan, but did not spell out all the details. That plan calls for deployment of 100 ground-based interceptors at Grand Forks, North Dakota, by 1996, or as soon as it is technologically feasible. The authorization bill also calls upon the Administration to try renegotiating the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with a view toward deploying a larger system of limited ground-based defenses.

The President's 1993 budget is expected to present a new Administration plan that would be consistent with the Congressional directive. This memorandum summarizes the Administration's SDI proposal that was presented to the Congress in February 1991 and analyzes three alternative programs, which vary widely hi their costs and defense capabilities. The first alternative is consistent with the 1992 defense authorization bill (including deployment by 1996), while the remaining two are more limited alternatives that the Congress might consider under severely constrained budgets.

This document is available in its entirety in PDF.