Rep. Markey has frequently queried BP for more information on the exact size of the spill and on their refusal to engage with outside scientists. Independent scientists have examined video, satellite photos and other aspects of the spill and determined that it may be much bigger than estimated. Today at a briefing Rep. Markey held in his Energy and Environment Subcommittee, independent scientists from Purdue University and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution said that the estimate of a 5,000 barrel per day leak was an underestimation of the flow. The scientists said with more data, they could better calculate the flow of oil from the sea floor.
“This is 4th grade math. We know the numerator here–the couple thousand barrels a day BP is siphoning out of the sunken pipe. But we still don't know the denominator,” said Rep. Markey. “BP is capturing a fraction of the oil, but they don't know what that fraction is.”
Last night, BP agreed and said they would release the feed. It is now streaming on globalwarming.house.gov/spillcam from the ocean floor, 5000 feet below the surface:
Note: If you can not see the feed, it is currently overloaded and will be back soon.
This week, the House continues oversight actions with several hearings:
Energy and Commerce Committee
Sizing up the BP Oil Spill: Science and Engineering Measuring Methods
The Subcommittee on Energy and Environment will hold a briefing on the science and engineering measuring methods being used to calculate how big the oil spill is and its impact.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010, at 2:00 PM EST
Witnesses:
Steve Wereley, Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering, Purdue University
Richard Camilli, Associate Scientist, Applied Ocean Physics and Engineering, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Michael Freilich, Director of the Earth Science Division, NASA
Frank Muller-Karger, Professor of Biological Oceanography and Remote Sensing, University of South Florida
Deepwater Horizon
The Committee will hold a hearing to examine the circumstances surrounding the ongoing spill of crude oil from the Deepwater Horizon, including potential environmental effects, ongoing response actions, long-term cleanup challenges, and potential natural resource damages.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010, 10:00 AM EST
Witnesses:
PANEL I
Mr. Lamar McKay, President, BP p.l.c.
Mr. Steven Newman, President and CEO, Transocean Ltd.
PANEL II
Ms. Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Dr. Jane Lubchenco, Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and NOAA Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Director, Minerals Management Service
RADM Brian Salerno, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, U.S. Coast Guard
Accompanied by RDML Peter V. Neffenger, Deputy National Incident Commander for the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response, U.S. Coast Guard
PANEL III
Ms. Sylvia Earle, Ph.D., Explorer-in-Residence, National Geographic Society, Washington, DC
Mr. Larry Schweiger, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Wildlife Federation, Reston, Virginia
Mr. Pete Gerica, Gerica Seafood, New Orleans, LA
Ms. Carys L. Mitchelmore, Ph.D., Associate Professor, University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, Chesapeake Biological Laboratory, Solomons, Maryland
Ms. Nancy E. Kinner, Ph.D., Co-Director, Coastal Response Research Center, University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire
In addition, today the Natural Resources Committee announced they will hold a seven-part oversight hearing series to investigate the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion and examine the future of America’s offshore oil and gas policy:
Rahall will kick off the series with two Full Committee oversight hearings on May 26 and May 27, followed by five Subcommittee hearings to look at many issues related to the incident in more detail – from MMS’ enforcement of safety regulations to the impacts the spill is having on the huge range of natural resources in the Gulf.
Full Committee Oversight Hearing on “Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Strategy and Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Rig Explosion”
Wednesday, May 26, 2010, at 10:00 a.m.
Full Committee Oversight Hearing on “Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Strategy and Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Rig Explosion”
Thursday, May 27, 2010, at 10:00 a.m.
Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife Oversight Hearing on “Our Natural Resources at Risk: The Short and Long Term Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill”
Thursday, June 10, 2010, at 10:00 a.m.
Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife Oversight Hearing on “Ocean Science and Data Limits in a Time of Crisis: Do NOAA and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) have the Resources to Respond?”
Tuesday, June 15, 2010, at 10:00 a.m.
Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources Oversight Hearing on “The Deepwater Horizon Incident: Proposals to Split Up the Minerals Management Service”
Thursday, June 17, 2010, at 10:00 a.m.
Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife Oversight Hearing on “State Planning for Offshore Energy Development: Standards for Preparedness”
Thursday, June 24, 2010, at 10:00 a.m.
Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources Oversight Hearing on “The Deepwater Horizon Incident: Was the Minerals Management Service Doing its Job”
Tuesday, June 29, 2010, at 10:00 a.m.
Chairman Waxman opened saying, “the more I learn about this accident, the more concerned I become”:
We are here today to begin the process of understanding what went wrong and what we need to do to prevent future catastrophes.
The investigation is at its early stages, but already we have learned some key facts.
BP, one of the world's largest oil companies, assured Congress and the public that it could operate safely in deep water and that a major oil spill was next to impossible. We now know those assurances were wrong.
Halliburton, one of the world's largest oil services companies, says that it had secured the well through a procedure called “cementing” and that the well had passed a key pressure test. But we now know this is an incomplete account. The well did pass positive pressure tests, but there is evidence that it may not have passed crucial negative pressure tests. According to a senior BP official, significant pressure discrepancies were observed in at least two of these tests, which were conducted just hours before the explosion.
Transocean, one of the world's largest operators of drilling rigs, says it has no reason to believe that the rig's failsafe device, called a blowout preventer, was not fully operational. But we have learned from Cameron, the manufacturer of the blowout preventer, that the device had a leak in a crucial hydraulic system and a defectively configured ram.
And we know there are major questions about the effectiveness of BP's response to the spill. The company said it could manage a spill of 250,000 barrels per day. Yet, it is struggling to cope with this blowout, which is releasing only 5,000 to 25,000 barrels per day.
The more I learn about this accident, the more concerned I become. This catastrophe appears to have been caused by a calamitous series of equipment and operational failures. If the largest oil and oil services companies in the world had been more careful, 11 lives might have been saved and our coastlines protected.
It is dangerous to drill for oil a mile below the ocean's surface. An accident can wreak environmental havoc that destroys livelihoods and imperils fish and wildlife. The oil companies make billions of dollars from taking these risks, but they don't bear the full costs when something goes drastically wrong.
Chairman Stupak discussed the issues related to the blowout preventer (which was the “fail safe system” designed to cut off the flow of oil and gas to the rig and prevent oil from spilling) in his opening statement:
Chairman Stupak explained that the committee investigation found that the blowout preventer had multiple problems–it had an apparent significant leak in a key hydraulic system, was modified in unexpected ways, was not powerful enough to do what it was supposed to do (cut through joints in the drill pipe), and that the “deadman switch” (which is supposed to activate the blowout preventer when all else fails), among several possible problems, had a dead battery. The Washington Post illustrates the issues:
Chairman Ed Markey asked the oil executives at the hearing about their response plans and ongoing activities to mitigate the spill saying, “you know, last week you tried to plug the leaks with a huge dome, which failed when it froze up. Now we’re reading about a smaller top hat dome. If that fails, the solution looks increasingly desperate, to plug the leak with a junk shot of golf balls and old tires and knotted ropes, soaking up some of the oil with hair and nylons…top hats, golf balls, tires, hair, nylons–these are not the response actions of companies who are prepared for the worst-case scenario accident and capable of carrying out that response plan.”:
Rep. Bruce Braley questioned Mr. Lamar McKay, Chairman and President of BP America, about a recent NPR report on BP’s efforts to “compel Deepwater Horizon crewmembers to sign forms the day after the accident, stating they suffered no injuries from the incident or the evacuation”:
Braley: They also interviewed on NPR one of your, one of the Deepwater crewmembers, a Christopher Choy, who did sign the Transocean form. He says that he was angry, because he wasn’t able to talk to his physician or attorney. And let me tell you what his experience was.
He saw multiple explosions and flames coming out of the derrick. He saw men pile into one lifeboat while two others burned. He saw his friends and co-workers with burning flesh and broken bones. He lived through this disaster and saw those things that I hope you and I never have to experience in our life.
Can you tell us why he was asked to sign a statement that he had no first-hand or personal knowledge regarding the incident after experiencing that?
The ATSDR's mission, as stated on their website, is “to serve the public by using the best science, taking responsive public health actions, and providing trusted health information to prevent harmful exposures and disease related to toxic substances.” ATSDR is a sister agency of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Top officials at ATSDR have denied involvement despite evidence to the contrary. In interviews with Subcommittee staff and during testimony before the Subcommittee at the April 1st hearing, Dr. Howard Frumkin, the Director of ATSDR, said he did not really focus on the formaldehyde issue until July 2007, when a congressional hearing drew his attention to it. Yet, documentation provided to the Subcommittee after the Subcommittee's April 1st hearing reveals that Dr. Frumkin had at least 13 separate meetings on the formaldehyde issue between January 2007 and July 2007.
In February 2007, ATSDR produced a health consultation for FEMA on formaldehyde levels in 96 new unoccupied travel trailers provided by FEMA to survivors of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The report was marred by scientific flaws and omissions, according to the Subcommittee Staff Report. Many of these issues were first flagged by Dr. Christopher De Rosa, then the Director of the Division of Toxicology and Environmental Medicine, when he first saw the report three weeks after it had been sent to FEMA.
Although the report was prepared by De Rosa's staff, he was unaware of the report because his staff was asked by FEMA to keep the report “confidential” and his staff was tasked directly by the Office of the Director of ATSDR on the formaldehyde issue. Ds. Frumkin and his deputy, Dr. Tom Sinks, have consistently maintained that their involvement in the formaldehyde health consultation was extremely limited, although they were only two of five ATSDR employees who ever saw the report before it was released to FEMA.
The Subcommittee staff report provides details on how Drs. Frumkin and Sinks, took concerted efforts to mask or ignore their own involvement in the formaldehyde study and instead attempted to push the blame for their fumbling of this critical public health document down the line to others, particularly Dr. De Rosa and his staff. Dr. Frumkin removed Dr. De Rosa from his position as Director of the Division of Toxicology and Environmental Medicine in October 2007. Dr. De Rosa had successfully held that position for 16 years and the Subcommittee believes his removal was in retaliation for his persistent attempts to push the agency's leadership to take more substantive actions to protect the public's health from potential environmental hazards.
In numerous instances both Dr. Frumkin and Dr. Sinks, claimed that De Rosa's staff “took it upon themselves to engage” in the formaldehyde work for FEMA. In fact, Dr. Sinks personally authorized the agency's involvement in this work, and he acknowledged to Subcommittee staff during interviews that he had directly stated to agency staff that ATSDR should be “engaged” with FEMA on this issue. Drs. Frumkin and Sinks used this false assertion about De Rosa — just one of many — to help justify their “unsatisfactory” performance evaluation of Dr. De Rosa in a memo to a senior CDC official in Oct. 2007.
Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Brad Miller stated:
Howard Frumkin and Tom Sinks were every federal employee's nightmare of a boss. Their failures left thousands of people exposed to toxic levels of formaldehyde, and then they tried to push the blame down the ladder. Federal employees deserve better than that, and so does the public.
In 2006, when the Gulf Coast was still reeling from the federal government's incompetence and congressional inaction, House Democrats dispatched a delegation to the Gulf Coast to assess the devastation from Katrina and Rita. That trip was a first step in an unwavering partnership House Democrats have established with the Gulf Coast, informing the legislation that eventually became law under Democratic leadership in the 110th Congress. Last week, House Majority Whip Clyburn led Speaker Pelosi, Leader Hoyer, Vice-Chair Larson and other House Democrats on their third Congressional Delegation to the Gulf Coast. On their four-day trip, the delegation visited several sites in New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and coastal Mississippi to determine where the region stands on the issues of health care, housing, education, infrastructure, criminal justice and insurance reform.
FY 2008 Supplemental
Provides $5.8 billion for much-needed efforts to strengthen New Orleans levees in FY 2009, and includes $73 million for Louisiana housing vouchers, for permanent supportive housing vouchers targeted to the extremely low-income, disabled and elderly left homeless as a result of Hurricane Katrina.
FY 2007 Supplemental
Provides $6.4 billion for Gulf Coast Recovery; the Democratic-led Congress added $3 billion to meet specific urgent needs of the Gulf Coast.
Katrina Housing Tax Relief Act
Strengthens tax incentives for building affordable rental housing in hurricane-affected areas of the Gulf Coast, and expands access to low-income financing for homeowners in the region.
Extending Access to Emergency Education Aid
Extends access to education emergency federal funding to pay teachers’ salaries and operate schools for local school districts in areas impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
RENEWAAL Act
Provides $30 million to help public schools that were impacted by the hurricanes recruit and retain K-12 teachers and administrators, and $30 million to help higher education institutions in the Gulf Coast recruit and retain faculty and students.
Extension of FEMA Utility Subsidy Program
Extends for one more year FEMA’s authority to reimburse local governments for the cost of paying the utility bills of essential local government employees still working and living in temporary housing.
Water Resources Development Act
Authorizes approximately $1.9 billion for the Corps of Engineers projects to restore the Louisiana Coastal Area and help prevent future hurricane damage.
Gulf Coast Housing Recovery Act
Speeds the rebuilding of homes and affordable rental units, including by freeing up $1.2 billion for the Louisiana Road Home program; helps preserve the supply of affordable rental housing; helps families by extending the Disaster Voucher Program through January 1, 2008.
RECOVER Act
Includes numerous provisions to overhaul the Small Business Administration’s disaster assistance program in response to SBA’s disastrous performance after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
Disadvantaged Business Disaster Eligibility Act
Ensures that, for each small business that participates in the SBA 8(a) minority entrepreneur program and was affected by Hurricanes Katrina or Rita, the period in which it can participate in the 8(a) program is extended by 18 months.
Accountability in Contracting Act
In response to the massive waste, fraud and abuse in Katrina-related contracts, requires federal agencies to minimize the use of “no-bid” contracts and promote the use of cost-effective fixed-price contracts.
Federal Housing Finance Reform/Affordable Housing Fund
Creates a non-taxpayer financed Affordable Housing Fund, which during the first five years will go towards the construction of affordable housing in areas still recovering from Hurricane Katrina.
Chairman Waxman: “One contracting official told us: ‘I just don't trust the guy. … I couldn't take anything he said credibly.’ He told us that AEY was the single worst company he dealt with in Iraq, saying: ‘that was my lemon I had to make lemonade out of.’ In testimony to be delivered today, the witness from the Defense Contract Management Agency continues to assert that ‘AEY had a history of satisfactory performance.’ That's simply ridiculous. Rating AEY's performance as ‘excellent’ and ’satisfactory’ is an insult to the taxpayer.”
Chairman Henry Waxman questions the witnesses:
Chairman Waxman: “The same inspector also wrote this to Mr. Diveroli, the head of AEY: ‘Some people got a little wound up when they saw the daily receiving report. They remembered the 10,000 helmets you sold them earlier this year and the junk AK’s we still have in the warehouse. Several scenarios were being planned for you, none of them pleasant.’ Another official wrote, ‘Bottom line, the helmets are damaged goods and we don’t want them.’ General Phillips does this sound like satisfactory performace to you?”
Rep. Elijah Cummings (MD-07) questions the witnesses:
Rep. Cummings: “What struck me with the number of times AEY failed to perform and then came up with outlandsih excuses for why it didn’t fulfill the contract… Diveroli said the German government was interfering in the delivery of these Italian-made pistols, he said that the transport planes couldn’t fly because of bad weather, he even said that there was a fiery plane crash that destroyed the documents necessary to secure an export license needed to ship the goods. But that wasn’t all! Mr. Diveroli said at one point he failed to deliver the weapons because a hurricane hit Miami, Florida where AEY was based. He told a contracting officer that they had no water and ‘his life was terrible.’ As it turns out, this wasn’t true. In an interview with the Committee staff, this is what your contracting officer told us: ‘We could tell there was no hurricane in Miami, it wasn’t like we didn’t have the internet in the Green Zone.’”
Rep. Stephen Lynch (MA-09) questions the witnesses:
Rep. Lynch: “I hear and I read that the contracts have been cancelled, terminated. Now I was in Iraq at the Taji weapons depot a few weeks ago and I asked a commanding general there about the AEY contract. He said ‘yeah, they’re shipping into us.’ So myself and Mr. Platts from Pennsylvania actually asked the general to give us some detail and went around and started opening up some crates. They were all AEY contacts, it looks like they’re still performing in this contract, and that doesn’t jive with the testimony and documents I have before me. So can you tell me, is AEY still performing on some contracts in Iraq?” Jeffrey Parsons, Executive Director, Army Contracting Command: “Sir, I am not aware, and I will have to get back to you on whether they are still performing…” Rep. Lynch: “That’s not good enough…”
In July the Oversight Committee held a hearing, “FEMA's Response to Reports of Toxic Trailers.” The Committee heard testimony from residents occupying FEMA trailers, experts who are familiar with the health impact of formaldehyde, and from FEMA Administrator Paulison.
James Harris, Jr., travel trailer occupant starting in April, 2006, gave opening testimony:
James Harris, Jr.:
“We noticed a pungent, and overpowering odor that permeated through the whole FEMA travel trailer…Our eyes burned and watered as we tried to inhabit the trailer facility. We were told by the person who gave us the keys to the trailer initially, that if we opened the doors and windows of the trailer and allowed the trailer to air out for a couple of hours, that all the odors and the burning sensations of our eyes would pass and not come back. Over a period of time and to this day, we have found that this remedy did not remove the strong odors that we now know to be formaldehyde.”
Subcommittee Investigates FEMA's Toxic Trailers Did the CDC Fail to Protect Public Health?
(Washington, DC) The House Committee on Science and Technology's Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight today examined how and why the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a sister agency of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), failed to protect the public's health after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
The agency failed to translate scientific findings and facts into appropriate public health actions which would have resulted in properly informing and warning tens of thousands of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita survivors living in FEMA-provided trailers and mobile homes of the potential health risks they faced. Instead of pushing to have the residents removed immediately, the agency did virtually nothing.
The hearing examined the direct involvement of the Director and Deputy Director of ATSDR in reviewing, vetting and approving the release of the agency's February 2007 Health Consultation on formaldehyde which was scientifically unsound and quickly dismissed by the agency's chief toxicologist after it had been forwarded to FEMA. Dr. Christopher De Rosa, ATSDR's chief toxicologist and then-Director of the Division of Toxicology and Environmental Medicine, immediately drafted a swift, sharp letter to FEMA pointing out many of the scientific faults with the report and said to release it as it was would be “perhaps misleading.”
“In almost every respect ATSDR failed to fulfill its mission to protect the public from exposure to formaldehyde at levels known to cause ill-health effects,” said Subcommittee Chairman Brad Miller (D-NC). “The agency's handling of this issue and their inability to correct it was the result of a collapse of senior management and leadership.”
The bottom line is that ATSDR failed to issue a scientifically sound report nor to act to correct the record when it was brought to their attention that the report was significantly flawed. And the result of that failure and the passivity of the agency to correct those issues was that thousands of Americans stuck in trailers since the storms of 2005 were left in harm's way for a year longer than necessary.
“The people in these trailers include the most vulnerable among us–children, the elderly, the handicapped. Many of these are people who were really stuck in the trailers twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Children and babies breath faster than adults and are less able to process formaldehyde so it builds up in their bodies faster than in adults,” added full Committee Chairman Bart Gordon (D-TN). “These are the same populations that you might expect to be most sensitive to formaldehyde–lower levels of exposure triggering stronger health reactions. These are the very segments of the public that we most expect the government to act to protect.”
ATSDR's failures were not purely theoretical. They had real-world consequences for tens of thousands of Americans who had survived Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and were living in FEMA-provided trailers. The Health Consultation on FEMA trailers was released to FEMA on February 1, 2007. In February of 2007, the CDC's position was that formaldehyde levels in trailers would be “below levels of concern” so long as the doors and windows were left open to air out the trailers. Further, the report was utterly silent on long-term risks associated with continuous exposure to formaldehyde.
“Think back to when you were a child and sick. The safest place to be was at home in bed. But here we have a situation where the government has provided families with homes that are making children sick,” said Chairman Miller. “Where do those children go to be safe? Who do their families turn to for help?”
The following witnesses testified before the Subcommittee today: Dr. Heidi Sinclair, Assistant Professor of Pediatrics, Louisiana State University, Medical Director, Baton Rouge Children’s Health Program; Mrs. Lindsay Huckabee, Resident of FEMA-provided mobile home in Kiln, Mississippi from October 2005-to-present, along with her husband and five children; Ms. Becky Gillette, Formaldehyde Campaign Director, Sierra Club Gulf Coast Environmental Restoration Task Force; Dr. Christopher DeRosa, Former Director, Division of Toxicology and Environment Medicine, ATSDR; Dr. Meryl Karol, Professor Emerita, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Environmental & Occupational Health; Dr. Howard Frumkin, Director, ATSDR and National Center for Environmental Health, (NCEH); Dr. Tom Sinks, Deputy Director, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and National Center for Environmental Health, (NCEH); Vice Admiral (ret.) Harvey E. Johnson, Jr., Deputy Administrator, FEMA.
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005. Less than one month later on September 24, 2005 Hurricane Rita struck the Gulf Coast. These hurricanes left tens of thousands of individuals and families homeless. In response, FEMA provided more than 140,000 mobile homes and travel trailers known as temporary housing units, to individuals and families across the Gulf Coast, but the potential threat of exposure to high levels of formaldehyde from this housing was soon recognized by at least some federal agencies. High levels of formaldehyde in the manufactured homes industry was no secret. Several health studies in the 1980s documented adverse health effects from individuals living in travel trailers and mobile homes. By October 2005, concerned about the health consequences of formaldehyde exposures to FEMA workers, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) began testing for formaldehyde in FEMA temporary housing staging areas and discovered high levels of formaldehyde. But no agencies conducted testing on the actual trailers families and individuals would be living in for extended periods of time.
NEW ORLEANS (AP) — The Federal Emergency Management Agency said Thursday it will step up efforts to move Gulf Coast hurricane victims out of more than 35,000 trailers because tests indicate some of the temporary homes contain high levels of formaldehyde.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said fumes from 519 tested trailer and mobile homes in Louisiana and Mississippi were — on average — about five times what people are exposed to in most modern homes.
FEMA Administrator R. David Paulison and CDC Director Dr. Julie Gerberding said at a news conference they hope to get people out of the trailers before the warm summer months, when heat and a lack of ventilation in the trailers could make formaldehyde accumulations worse.
“The real issue is not what it will cost but how fast we can move people out,” Paulison said.
Chairman Henry Waxman of the Oversight Committee wrote letters to FEMA Administrator R. David Paulison and three manufacturers of FEMA travel trailers demanding explanations for the high levels of formaldehyde in FEMA trailers and additional information about FEMA's handling of the toxic trailers.
Mr. R. David Paulison
Administrator
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Department of Homeland Security
500 C Street, SW
Washington, DC 20472
Dear Mr. Paulison:
I am writing in regard to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's ongoing investigation into dangerous levels of formaldehyde in travel trailers provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to victims of the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
First, I am concerned that FEMA has still not provided all responsive documents to the Committee. There is a striking absence of documents that would clarify how the agency's approach to the formaldehyde hazard was developed and approved. In particular, FEMA has not produced documents which clarify how the chain of command functioned above the level of Patrick Preston, a trial attorney in the Office of General Counsel.
In order to resolve this matter, I request that you produce all remaining documents and personally certify that FEMA has provided all documents. Additionally, I request that Patrick Preston be made available for a transcribed interview no later than Friday, February 29, 2007. Please ensure that FEMA produces every document responsive to its requests up to the date of the subpoena, July 16, 2007, including every responsive document relevant to your role as FEMA Administrator.
Finally, I understand FEMA has decided to reimburse individuals who purchased a travel trailer through the General Services Administration. Please provide the Committee with information that explains FEMA's decision to reimburse these individuals as well as how FEMA intends to make taxpayers whole for any defective products that may have been purchased with taxpayer funds. I also understand that the Federal Occupational Health (FOH) has been conducting an employee monitoring project with regard to the presence of formaldehyde in FEMA trailers. Please provide the results of this monitoring project.
Please provide the documents and information requested in this letter by Friday, March 7, 2008.
The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform is the principal oversight committee in the House of Representatives and has broad oversight jurisdiction as set forth in House Rule X.
If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Erik Jones with the Committee staff at (202) 225-4407.
Chairman Waxman:
“Another FEMA official wrote, the office of general counsel has advised ‘We do not do testing, because it would imply FEMA’s ownership of this issue.’ Early in the process, due to the perseverance of a pregnant mother with a four month old child, FEMA did test one occupied trailer. The results showed that their trailer had formaldehyde levels 75 times higher than the maximum workplace exposure levels recommended by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. The mother evacuated the trailer. FEMA then stopped testing other trailers.”
Paul Stewart, a travel trailer occupant from December 2005 to March 2006, gave testimony:
Paul Stewart:
“One morning I found our pet cockatiel was very lethargic, unable to move, he was regurgitating, unable to keep his balance. I immediately called a veterinarian who told us to get him out of the camper immediately… The veterinarian told us that the camper was probably making him sick. He said there are many chemicals inside the camper, especially a new one. He said that formaldehyde was the likely cause. He said if we don’t get the bird out of there, the bird will probably die. He explained to us that birds, much like children, breathe much more rapidly than adults, and they take in much more of the toxins that are inside the camper, and that he’s going to show symptoms before we do, but that we should also get out.”
First: The Political, Diplomatic, and Cultural Spheres
1. Supporting the Republic of Iraq in defending its democratic system against internal and external threats.
Third: The Security Sphere
1. Providing security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters, or airspace.
2. Supporting the Republic of Iraq in its efforts to combat all terrorist groups, at the forefront of which is Al-Qaeda, Saddamists, and all other outlaw groups regardless of affiliation, and destroy their logistical networks and their sources of finance, and defeat and uproot them from Iraq. This support will be provided consistent with mechanisms and arrangements to be established in the bilateral cooperation agreements mentioned herein.
3. Supporting the Republic of Iraq in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces to enable them to protect Iraq and all its peoples, and completing the building of its administrative systems, in accordance with the request of the Iraqi government.
Full Committee Chairman Tom Lantos invited the State Department to appear at this hearing, but they declined, instead giving only a classified briefing.
Subcommittee Chairman Bill Delahunt gives opening remarks:
Chairman Delahunt: “Secretary Gates appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Wednesday and seemed to minimize the declaration of principles as nothing more than a press release. He testified that the Administration is not seeking to make, and in fact he pledged that it would not make, security commitments to defend Iraq. All that is being negotiated, he said, is a standard Status of Forces agreement that governs the conduct of U.S. forces in another country. Now on its face, this would appear to be a major reversal of the Administration’s position. So it’s all the more important now to remove any confusion, and explore the apparent contradictions between the declaration of principles signed by our President, George W. Bush, and the testimony of Secretary Gates.”
Rep. Rosa DeLauro (CT-03), who has introduced legislation on the matter, gives testimony:
Rep. DeLauro: “In November, we note that President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki agreed to a declaration of principles for a long term U.S.-Iraq relationship to be finalized by July 31st. I too am concerned about the security commitments and assurances our nation plans on providing, according to this declaration. As has been described as well, when you take a look at ‘defending Iraq’s democratic system against internal and external threats.’ What are these undefined threats? Would we be obliged to preemptively strike Sunni fighters beyond Iraq’s borders? Or even strike homegrown armed factions Maliki’s own government deems to be a threat?”
Douglas Macgregor, Ph.D, Retired U.S. Army Colonel, and Senior Fellow at the Straus Military Reform Project, gives testimony:
Macgregor: “I think any elected official contemplating the commitment of US forces to the security of a government like Iraq’s, a government that already confronts powerful armed opposition inside its own borders, should recognize the potential damage that the government’s reliance on US military power would cause to its legitimacy.”
Oona A. Hathaway, Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School, gives opening testimony:
Hathaway: “So there’s a central principle that I want to establish that is the foundation of my remarks today. And that is, the President cannot make an international agreement that exceeds his own Constitutional authority without the agreement of Congress. That’s the bottom line… what is not permissable, however, as has already been said, is to include in that status of forces agreement, SOFA agreement, a guarantee to come to the defense of another country. What I believe is also not acceptable would be to include in that status of forces agreement immunity for private military contractors…”
Michael J. Glennon, Professor of International Law at The Fletcher School of Tufts University:
Glennon: “I don’t want to impute any illicit intention to the Administration, but I would simply observe that the Administration has an understandable incentive to overstate the scope of the commitment in its communications with the Iraqis, and to understate the scope of its commitment in its communications with the Congress. It is essential that the Congress not be led to believe that there is no security commitment, when there is one. It is also essential that the Iraqis not be led to believe that there is a security commitment if there is not one. When it comes to the role of the United States in Iraq’s future security, Congress and Iraq must be on the same page. If they are not, the consequences could be catastrophic…”
Extended transcript:
Glennon: “It is possible that the Administration may now be moving away from the broad construction of the declaration of principles of the sort that I have just outlined. But it seems to me that it would be, at this point, premature to jump to any such conclusion. First, I’ve read the entire transcript of his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. This comment was not included in his prepared statement, it was made in answer to questions from Senators Kennedy and Levin and if you read the commentary surrounding his response to Senator Levin I believe it’s fair to say that it’s not clear to what extent this position was carefully thought through. And as the Chairman emphasized in his opening statement it’s important to note the President, after all, did sign the Declaration of Principles, which seems on its face to be inconsistent with the statement made two days ago by the Secretary of Defense. Leading to the conclusion that is all the more important for Congress to get to the bottom of this, to get the facts straight and to insist upon clarity. I don’t want to impute any illicit intention to the Administration, but I would simply observe that the Administration has an understandable incentive to overstate the scope of the commitment in its communications with the Iraqis, and to understate the scope of its commitment in its communications with the Congress. It is essential that the Congress not be led to believe that there is no security commitment, when there is one. It is also essential that the Iraqis not be led to believe that there is a security commitment if there is not one. When it comes to the role of the United States in Iraq’s future security, Congress and Iraq must be on the same page. If they are not, the consequences could be catastrophic…”
Speaker Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid sent the following letter to President Bush yesterday requesting an immediate 60-day moratorium on the demolition of public housing developments in New Orleans.
The text of the letter follows:
December 14, 2007
The Honorable George W. Bush
President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing to request an immediate 60-day moratorium on the demolition of New Orleans' public housing developments: C.J. Peete, St. Bernard, Lafitte, and B.W. Cooper. The Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), currently under the control of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), is demolishing these homes under executive authority. Although a temporary restraining order has delayed the demolition of these units to next week or possibly longer, we believe that additional time is needed in order to resolve several outstanding issues surrounding the City's affordable housing needs, including the need for a comprehensive plan for replacement of any demolished public housing units.
We believe that New Orleans' recovery requires a viable plan for its affordable housing needs. We are committed to working with you and the Department to execute such a plan for replacing affordable housing currently scheduled for demolition. The entire New Orleans metropolitan region is in dire need of the kind of affordable housing that will allow citizens to return and grow the workforce. The Department's premature push for complete demolition impedes this goal. Given the poor condition of New Orleans' rental housing stock, the rising levels of homelessness in the City, and the sound construction of some of these developments, these housing resources should not be demolished without a viable full replacement plan in place.
As you know, the area is still recovering from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the Federal levee breaks, which destroyed 67 percent of the housing stock in Orleans Parish and almost 100 percent in neighboring St. Bernard Parish. Much of this housing has yet to be rebuilt. The shortage of housing has pushed rents in the City, and surrounding metropolitan area, well above their normal levels, with rents rising 45 percent since the storm.
The lack of available and affordable housing is being felt acutely across the City and region. According to a January 2007 study by UNITY of New Orleans, since January of 2005, the number of homeless in the City has more than doubled to almost 12,000 individuals. Many of these homeless residents are living under Interstate 10 or in Duncan Plaza, next to New Orleans City Hall. Experts at the Brookings Institution cite a net 9,000 unit decrease in affordable housing for the City of New Orleans. According to an August study by the Louisiana Family Recovery Corps, 50 percent of families wanting to return to the City earn less than $20,000 a year. It is clear that affordable housing, including public housing, is essential for these families.
Given the City's housing needs and the current availability of these affordable housing resources, we are extremely disappointed by the Department's insistence on moving ahead with this demolition despite insufficient resources to make up the clear loss of affordable housing. For the Federal government to reduce affordable housing units at a time when the City is desperate for this very type of housing is a misuse of taxpayer funds and runs counter to the mission of the Department, not to mention the core values that we share. Additionally, HANO has not completed a promised survey of displaced residents and has indicated that this important document now will not be ready until late January at the earliest. HANO has also not provided meaningful opportunity for residents to collect their belongings. The additional sixty days would allow for the resolution of these and other essential issues, including the completion of a comprehensive plan for HANO redevelopment of all affordable units, and replacement of any units proposed for demolition.
As many in the country prepare to spend the holiday season at home with their families, we urge you to consider these New Orleans families and their homes. We strongly urge you to halt the demolition of these units.