White House had better options on Bergdahl
With the recovery of Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl last week, feelings about whether a disproportionate exchange of prisoners was right or wrong are divided between the principles that our military “leaves no man behind” and America “does not negotiate with terrorists.”
In Bergdahl’s case, the United States could have secured his release and avoided any negotiation with the Taliban along with the transfer of five high-value detainees from Guantanamo Bay, who are sure to pick up where they left off within the Taliban hierarchy.
The prisoner exchange was the favored approach by the White House and the Department of State, superseding all other options under consideration, regardless of their viability. In fact, left on the table were several options under pursuit by the Department of Defense that presented significant strategic advantages and far less risk.
Every day Bergdahl was in the custody of the Haqqani network — which is aligned with the Taliban and Pakistani security establishment — presented a threat to U.S. service personnel. The propaganda value alone of his captivity, regardless of the circumstances leading to his capture, always motivated recovery efforts and was no less significant than the fact that he was an American in enemy hands. One way or another, the Haqqani network would benefit from Bergdahl’s captivity, even if that meant using him in very distinct ways for propaganda purposes ahead of the U.S. drawdown and eventual withdrawal.
Given the importance of Bergdahl’s recovery, I wrote to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel twice in February of this year to alert him to disorganization within the Defense Department around recovery options that, with the right attention, would avoid negotiation with the Taliban and instead rely on regional allies. Secretary Hagel agreed and appointed a Defense Department coordinator. Soon, efforts within the Defense Department and coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and all other government elements began improving.
A month later, I wrote to the president to call his attention to these efforts and urge the discontinuation of any interest in negotiating with the Taliban and agreeing to a prisoner exchange. A response was provided that stated “should we be in a position to talk directly with the Taliban, we would actively pursue Sgt. Bergdahl’s return through that channel.” And, of course, that is exactly what they did.
Not unexpectedly, controversy has erupted. A December 2013 “proof of life” video did indicate deteriorating health for someone in captivity for five years, but even individuals who first analyzed the video said there was no way to assess Bergdahl’s specific health condition. Further, they too knew that “proof of life” videos only show what the other side wants seen. For all the alarm with Bergdahl’s health, a Taliban video of Bergdahl’s handoff, which caught the U.S. government by surprise, showed him in good condition, walking upright to the helicopter that flew him away.
In the weeks and months ahead, only Bergdahl can answer questions about his captivity while the Obama administration will continue trying to justify why it skirted the law by not notifying Congress and why it believes there was a need to act immediately, the way it did, and not months or years ago.
Unfortunately for the Obama administration, the State Department-led swap was billed as the only game in town — overshadowing options within the Department of Defense that began to come together well after the prisoner swap received executive-level approval. For the Defense Department, there is a lesson learned, too, and this experience alone should motivate a change in process and systems.
Asked if the Taliban would be inspired to kidnap others, a commander laughed and responded as anyone would expect, saying “definitely.” The Taliban and other adversaries view the prisoner swap as an invitation to take more Americans into captivity. That fear alone should have prompted the president and the State Department to change course and put the Defense Department in the lead with orders to exhaust the numerous lines of effort already under pursuit that — without firing a shot — stood the same chance to put Bergdahl back in U.S. hands.
It is wrong to think the choice made by the Obama administration was the only one. It was not. With the right leadership and good decision-making, the United States could have upheld the commitment not to negotiate with terrorist and ensure that no man is left is behind. .
