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SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: [REDACTED]

Tuesday, February 10, 2015

Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room HVC-205,
Capitol Visitor Center, commencing at 10:34 a.m.

Present: Representatives Westmoreland and Brooks.

Appearances:

For the SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI:

CHRIS DONESA, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR

DANA CHIPMAN, CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

SHARON JACKSON, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL

CARLTON DAVIS, INVESTIGATOR

SARA BARRINEAU, INVESTIGATOR

SHERIA CLARKE, COUNSEL

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR/GENERAL COUNSEL

HEATHER SAWYER, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL

PETER KENNY, MINORITY SENIOR COUNSEL

KENDAL ROBINSON, MINORITY DETAILEE

For the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

CATHERINE DUVAL, SENIOR ADVISOR

AUSTIN EVERS, SENIOR ADVISOR

Ms. Jackson. Good morning, everyone. This is a transcribed interview of [REDACTED] conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. The interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters, pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Mr. [REDACTED] would you give us your full name, please?

Mr. [REDACTED]

Ms. Jackson. We appreciate your appearance here today at this interview. Again, my name is Sharon Jackson. I am one of the lawyers with the majority staff. We have done introductions, but I'm going to do them again so that the court reporter who is here can get everything down.

Obviously, Mr. [REDACTED] you are here with two agency counsel this morning. To your immediate left, we will start there and go around the room.

Mr. Evers. My name is Austin Evers. I work with the State Department.

Ms. Duval. Kate Duval, State Department.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer, chief counsel for the minority.

Ms. Robinson. Kendal Robinson, staff for minority.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm Susanne Sachsman Grooms. I'm the staff director on the minority side.

Mr. Westmoreland. I'm Lynn Westmoreland from Georgia.

Mrs. Brooks. Susan Brooks from Indiana.

Ms. Barrineau. I'm Sara Barrineau with the majority staff.

Mr. Davis. I am Carlton Davis. I work for Mr. Gowdy.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman, chief counsel on the majority side.

Mr. Donesa. I'm Chris Donesa. I'm the deputy staff director for the majority.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke, counsel on the majority side.

Ms. Jackson. And our court reporter today is?

The Reporter. [REDACTED].

Ms. Jackson. [REDACTED] welcome, and thank you very much.

Before we begin, I would like to go over the ground rules and explain how this interview will proceed today. The way the questioning proceeds in a congressional investigation is that a member of the majority -- that will be me -- will ask questions for up to an hour. And then a member of the minority staff will ask questions for the next hour if they so choose. And we will adhere to this 1-hour back-and-forth until each side has asked all of the questions that they want.

At the end of each hour, we will take a break, reconfigure our chairs so whoever is asking you questions sits across from you. And we will, obviously, take any breaks that you need for water, coffee, the facilities, anything like that.

Probably after the end of the first 2 hours, we will take a break

for lunch. And then reconvene a short time after that. There's plenty of facilities, cafeterias, and other places here. So we will probably take about a 45-minute break for lunch and then reconvene this afternoon if we have questions that go beyond an hour each.

Unlike a testimony or a deposition that you might be familiar with in your career as a Federal law enforcement officer, the committee format is not bound by the rules of evidence. So you may raise objections or your counsel may raise objections for privilege, but that is subject to the review by the chairman of the committee.

If those objections cannot be resolved during this interview, we can ask that you return. And then we will deal with the objections and then have you come back for any answer based on those questions down the road.

Members and staff of the committee are not permitted to raise objections when the other side is asking questions. So any objections would be from you or the agency counsel that you have there.

This has really not been an issue we have encountered in the past, but I just wanted to make sure everyone is clear on the process today.

This session is also unclassified. So if any question that is asked of you calls for what you know is a classified answer, please let us know and we can reserve that question until, you know, we can decide whether we want to move into a more -- an appropriate setting for that question. Okay?

You are welcome to confer with counsel at any time during this interview. But if something needs to be clarified, if you didn't hear

all of the question, or, as I have been known to do, talk a little fast and you didn't catch it all, please just ask me to rephrase or repeat the question first because we want to make sure that you understand the questions that are being asked.

I'm sure these are instructions that any number of prosecutors have given you over the years about answering questions. If you need to discuss anything with a counsel that is here today, we will go off the record, stop the clock. We will allow you to consult privately with them and then reconvene in this room.

Again, we will take a break whenever it is convenient for you. It could be after every hour or after the 2 hours, whatever you prefer. If you need anything, water, we have bottles of water here. We have coffee and tea available. Just let us know, and we will go off the record, stop the clock, and get you whatever you need, and then we will proceed. We would like this to be as easy and comfortable as possible for you, given the setting. We understand that.

As you can see, we have an official reporter taking down everything you say today. There will be another reporter that comes in after the first hour, and they will switch off back and forth.

As you likely know, it is important that you answer audibly to questions. So no nodding of the head.

Mr. [REDACTED] Okay.

Ms. Jackson. No shaking of the head. And the other thing, for the reporter's sake -- so that we don't drive her crazy today -- is that it's very important that we not talk over each other. So I will

make sure that I don't start my next question until you have finished your answer. And if you would wait until I finish my question before you give an answer, that will make our court reporter very happy. And that's what we are here for today. And it also allows us to get a very clear record of what is happening today.

We want you to answer the questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible, so we will take our time. Again, ask that anything be repeated or clarified if you are not sure what we are asking or you need a little more guidance and direction. So just let us know because we will be happy to repeat or clarify anything that we are asking.

If you don't honestly know the answer to something, please, just let us know. But we want you to give us your best recollection of events. We understand some of these events we are going to inquire about are almost 4 years ago. A lot has happened in your life since then. A lot, you know, you have had other assignments, other experiences, but we do want you to give us the best and most full recollection that you can of the events when you were in Benghazi in 2011.

But, again, if you don't know the answer to a question, just, please, just say so. Do you understand that you are required to answer questions from Congress truthfully?

Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay, and you also understand that this applies to questions that are posed by staff members of Congress, such as myself

and the other lawyers here?

Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And as you are well aware, having been a Federal agent, you know that knowingly providing false material testimony could subject you to criminal prosecutions for perjury or making false statements as a witness. Do you understand that?

Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay, is there any reason that you know of as you sit here today that you would be unable to provide truthful testimony to this committee?

Mr. [REDACTED] No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. That's the end of my preamble. Does the minority have anything that they would like to say or add to that?

Ms. Sawyer. No. I would just note, we do obviously abide by courtesy to our colleagues as they do to us. Sometimes we do ask for clarification if we find a question. We certainly will be respectful of that. But to the extent we just want to make sure that for our Members, as for the full committee, we have a very accurate, complete record, but we will, obviously, do so with great courtesy and not in a way that interferes with the witness' ability to, you know, appear before the committee and give full testimony. And I just wanted to say, we thank you very much for appearing and appearing voluntarily before the committee. So thank you for arranging that in your schedule.

Ms. Jackson. The clock now reads 10:40, so we are going to begin

with the first hour of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Mr. [REDACTED] you were a Diplomatic Security agent for how many years?

A Twenty years.

Q Twenty years. When did you join the Diplomatic Security Service?

A 1991.

Q Okay, did you have any prior military or law enforcement background before you joined DS?

A I had prior law enforcement. I was a Supreme Court officer for 7 years. And 6 of the 7 years, I was assigned to the Chief Justice, security for the Chief Justice. I had Military Police experience in the Reserves. I retired with 20-plus years Reserve duty.

Q Thank you. Can you give us a summary of your various assignments you had as a Diplomatic Security agent? We don't need a great deal of detail --

A Sure.

Q -- but if you could just give us an overview of your career with DS.

A Sure. Normally after you finish training, you go to the field office. So I went to the [REDACTED] field office; was there for 3 years; supported a lot of protective details; and had one TDY to Algeria to support the Embassy there. Finished that assignment; went

to the Secretary's detail; was on part of the protective detail for Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright. And then I left there; went overseas; assigned to the Embassy in [REDACTED] for a year. And then, after that, went to [REDACTED] was part of the security team in [REDACTED] for 2 years.

Q May I ask, when you were you in [REDACTED]?

A 1997 to 1998.

Q Okay, and then, after [REDACTED] -- I believe was after [REDACTED]?

A Yes.

Q Okay, what did you do after [REDACTED]?

A Came back to the Secretary's protective detail as a shift leader and did that for 4 years. And then I had another domestic assignment in Antiterrorism Assistance Office, basically training foreign police. And then I left that and went to [REDACTED] was the security officer in [REDACTED].

Q Was that known as the RSO?

A Well, I report -- I was the RSO in [REDACTED] but there was another RSO in [REDACTED] that was my boss, but I was the RSO in [REDACTED].

Q These buzzers that we have signify that something is going on with Congress and the House of Representatives. It is not a security thing that we need to evacuate or anything like that. We have gotten a little used to them, but for someone -- when I was new here, it was like, okay, what are we supposed to do now? But the buzzers just signify that something is going on in either the House or the Senate. Okay.

And then what happened next in your career?

A When I came back from [REDACTED], I went to the Dignitary Protection Unit in Washington, and we protect foreign dignitaries that visit the U.S. So I did that for almost 3 years. The people, maybe the Queen of Jordan, I protected her; the First Lady from Qatar; various foreign ministers; Tony Blair; Dalai Lama; a lot of different dignitaries in different --

Q In what time period were with you the Dignitary Protection detail?

A I retired in 2011. So it was probably 2008 to 2011.

Q Okay. So that was your last assignment with DS?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And when you were part of that, is that when you went to Benghazi?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Were you recruited or volunteered for the Benghazi assignment?

A Nobody volunteered. We were all selected. Actually, I had tickets to go [REDACTED] on vacation, but my boss told me --

Q You were volunteered?

A You would be the best person to go on this assignment with your experience, and, you know, when we go to headquarters with your name, I know that they are not going to question it.

Q And who was your boss at the time?

A [REDACTED].

Q [REDACTED]

A Correct.

Q Was he head of Dignitary Protection?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And when were you approached about going to Benghazi?

A Probably about a week before I actually left the States.

Q Okay. So would that have been in early March of 2011?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And what were you told about the assignment?

A I understood it to be two facets. One was Mr. Stevens was going to go there and try to gather a lot of information on what was actually happening on the ground. And the other facet was, he was going to make contact with the government or subsets of government that were in place at the time.

Q Was this the transitional government in Libya?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And how long was this assignment to be? What were you told initially was going to be the length of the assignment?

A Sixty days.

Q Sixty days. Okay, and were you involved in the planning of the expedition to Libya?

A Some of the planning. Some of the planning I wasn't. For example, we needed vehicles. So I wasn't involved in obtaining vehicles, armored vehicles. I wasn't involved in like getting a ship

for us to go into Benghazi, you know. A lot of those issues took a lot of time. That's why, you know, we -- I was on a 60-day TDY, but I think I spent less than 45 days in Benghazi because -- I know I did. I spent 30-some days in Benghazi because it took time for us to get there.

Q And why did it take you some time to get there?

A When I left Washington, I went to Rome. And in Rome, I was met by the Envoy, Chris Stevens. And we were there a little bit over 2 weeks, and we were trying to work out even at that point how we were going to go into Benghazi. That wasn't -- everything wasn't nailed down, you know. We didn't have a ship at that point and still working on trying to get vehicles, and the team members were in Malta. So we went to Benghazi, and they went to Malta to prepare.

Q Okay. Was the equipment going to Malta, or was it with you in Rome?

A We had no equipment in Rome. It was going to go to Malta.

Q Okay, were you -- you said that you weren't involved in the acquisition of vehicles or renting or leasing the ferry, but were you involved in what the scope of the security should be for the Envoy?

A I was part of that. I mean, the numbers were pretty much determined, I think, by my supervisor, but I was comfortable with what was determined as far as the team makeup.

Q Okay, and what was the team makeup?

A You had the Envoy, Mr. Stevens, and then he had an aide, a staff person that was going to handle a lot of the logistics on the

ground.

Q Was that Mr. [REDACTED]

A That was.

Q [REDACTED]

A Correct, [REDACTED]

Q [REDACTED]

A And he spoke Arabic. So that was very useful to have him as part of the team. And then there were eight agents, including myself.

Q Okay, were there any other U.S. personnel that traveled or was transitioning into Libya at the same time? Were there any USAID workers or other U.S. Government personnel going with you?

A No. They came later.

Q They came later?

A Right.

Q Okay. So you went to Rome first and met with the Envoy. Is that correct?

A Right.

Q Were you expecting to go to Libya right away and -- or were you expecting to stay in Rome for a period of time?

A [REDACTED]

So we never could actually get a good handle on when we might be going. You know, I expected to go a lot sooner than what we did, you know, 2 weeks later. But --

Q Okay, and was the security situation in Libya a factor in

why you couldn't go into Libya right away?

A I don't think that was so much a factor. I think it was just trying to plan everything to get everything together that we needed to go.

Q When you say get everything together, are you talking the vehicles and communication equipment and weapons and the like, or are you talking about something else?

A No. Everything as far as the weapons, the vehicles. We knew we had to take spare parts for the vehicles because we wouldn't be able to get anything over there. Communication equipment. Just everything that we thought we were going to need on the ground.

Q Okay. Do you recall when you actually went into Libya?

A I will have to refer to my notes.

Q Okay.

A We were going to leave on the 10th of April, but the ship had a problem. There was a mechanical problem. So we ended up leaving the next day. We left on 11 April -- 11 April. I'm sorry. We left on 4 April. We were going to leave on the 3rd of April, but that's when the ship had the mechanical problem so we left the following day. We arrived on 5 April at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

Q And how did you, when you say you were on a ship, what kind of a ship was it? Was it a military ship or another type of ship?

A It was a Greek freighter that was leased.

Q I bet those accommodations were luxurious?

A Pretty sparse, but we needed a ship large enough to where

we could drive the vehicles off. That was the main reason for getting a freighter because we had to be able to drive the armored vehicles off. We knew we couldn't unload it like at a port where equipment was there to unload it. That wasn't available.

Q Okay. And how many vehicles did you take with you?

A Four armored vehicles.

Q And what other type of specialized equipment did you have or take with you?

A As I remember, we had like two satellite phones, and we had some laptops that were -- a couple of laptops that we used to send messages back. I think -- I believe there were two.

Q Two.

A And then the weapons with the vehicle parts and the ammo, and we had body armor, that type of thing.

Q MREs?

A There might have been a couple of cases. There wasn't a lot. We took a few MREs.

Q Anything else that you recall from the equipment?

A Well, maps, and binoculars, and --

Q When you work overseas, do you use a different type of weapon than if you are domestically located -- or let me -- and let me ask it a different way. For this particular expedition, did you take any specialized weaponry with you?

A I can speak at the time. I have been out of Diplomatic Security for almost 4 years. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q And is that what you took with you over there?

A That's what we took.

Q Okay. And every agent was equipped with an M4?

A Correct. We might have -- I think we had a shotgun or two, and then we had our sidearms, our issued sidearms.

Q Let me ask you, did you know Envoy Chris Stevens before you went on this expedition to Libya?

A No.

Q Had not met him before?

A Well, I met him on Saturday, right before we departed to go to Rome. So we had -- there was a meeting in the office, and I had met him then. But that was the first time.

Q Okay. How about any other members of your team, the other seven agents? Had any of them ever worked with Envoy Stevens before or had met him?

A I don't recall that anybody had met Mr. Stevens before. I knew two of the agents from working protective details for me in Washington, but most of the others I didn't know.

Q Okay. Let me ask this. And we may have covered this, but I want to cover it indepth. Did you have any say in who was being selected as the other members of the team, or were you all volunteered in the same way you were volunteered?

A I think it was pretty much people were selected because of their skill sets. You know, they spent -- they spent time to make sure they had the right team makeup. And, for example, my shift leader [REDACTED] [REDACTED] he had -- I would estimate he had been on Diplomatic Security for 8 years. He had some advanced training on a mobile training team where they -- it's a tactical team that the State Department has. He was on that team, and they trained for like 9 months.

Q Is that known as the MSD?

A MSD.

Q Okay.

A And anybody else on the team either had prior military experience, which I think all but two had prior military experience, and they had all gone through the State Department's high-threat training.

Q Okay.

A As I recall.

Q Okay. And you had too?

A Yes.

Q To your knowledge, was that a requirement that everyone have this high-threat tactical course prior to going?

A I think that was a requirement as far as the boss' thought when they were trying to put the team together, you know, that they wanted people to have that experience.

Q Can you tell us a little bit about that training that you went through? When did you go through it? How many weeks was it? An

overview of what you do in that course?

A I think the course, as best I can recall, was around 8 weeks of training. Since then, it is very different lengths, been shortened and then lengthened. But I went to it prior to going to [REDACTED] so I had gone to it probably 2 years before this assignment -- well, no, sorry -- 3 years before this assignment, I had gone through the training.

And you fire a lot of different weapons, a lot of heavy weapons. You do a lot of team tactics. There is a lot of movements with a team trying to clear a building. You do a lot of evacuation drills. You do map reading, and a lot of communications, different -- you use different types of communication equipment, have different intel briefings.

Q Okay, and it's your understanding that all eight of you had been through the high-threat tactical course?

A Correct.

Q Okay. You talked a little bit before about there was sort of a cross-section of skills that the various team members had. What were some other specialized skills that various members brought with them for -- to be part of this team?

A The shift leader, he had been in Iraq also. So he brought with, you know, some experience being in a pretty restrictive environment and making movements with the team in a high-threat environment.

Several of the members that had been in the military. I know for

sure one or two of them were in a special unit, Special Forces Army unit. And then there were -- one of the team members I know was an officer in the Army, either a captain or a major. I think a captain at the time. Since then, he has been promoted. I think there was one member that didn't have the military experience, but I had worked with him in Washington. So I was pretty confident of his skills.

Q All right. Were there any other United States Government security personnel going in with you -- either from CIA or DOD -- or were there other U.S. Government security personnel on the ground?

Mr. Evers. And I'm just going to caution the witness as you did at the beginning. If this requires a classified answer, you should say so.

Mr. [REDACTED] Nobody flew in -- nobody went in on the boat with us.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay, let me ask this --

A Other than the 10 on the team, including Mr. Stevens.

Q The eight agents, Mr. Stevens, and Mr. [REDACTED]

A Right.

Q Okay. When you arrived, were there other U.S. Government personnel in Libya?

Mr. Evers. Same caution.

Mr. [REDACTED] I don't know. I mean, I would imagine there were, but I didn't meet them.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. That was going to be my followup question.

Did you have any dealings with any other U.S. Government personnel once you were in Libya?

Mr. Evers. Same caution.

Mr. [REDACTED] Yeah. I'm kind of reluctant to answer that question as far as later on.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Ms. Duval. In an unclass setting.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Ms. Duval. I think he is happy to answer the questions about this in a classified setting. He just doesn't want to kick up chalk on the lawn.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay, that's fine. We have heard something described as a FAST team, which is a military asset. So you are saying a FAST team did not go in with you at the time?

A Correct.

Q Okay. When you arrived in Libya -- well, let me ask this just to make sure we are clear. You went straight into Benghazi from Malta?

A Yes.

Q Okay. The Greek cargo ferry left from Malta and transported straight to Benghazi. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q No other -- didn't go to Tripoli, didn't go to any other port before then?

A Correct, and that took about 24 hours. That was 24 hours.

Q Was it smooth sailing?

A It was smooth. Seemed like a lot more than 24 hours, but it was just a 24-hour trip.

Q Did you have a bunk?

A We did.

Q You didn't have to double up in the bunks or anything like that?

A No. So we doubled up in the rooms because, you know --

Q When you got to Libya?

A No, on the boat.

Q Oh, on the boat. Okay. When you arrived in Libya, were there other, for lack of a better term, Western countries or Western interests present, such as the United Kingdom, any European countries, the U.N.? Were there any other Western countries or Western presence that you coordinated with once you arrived?

A Correct. We coordinated with our colleagues from the U.K. Turkish, there was a Turkish representative there; Egyptian representative. I don't know if they were considered ambassadors, but they were senior people from those governments that were located there.

Q And already in Libya at the time you arrived?

A Correct. And Italian.

Q Okay. What about any representatives from the United Nations?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. I would anticipate that you were monitoring the security system or situation in Benghazi before you went in. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. What was your understanding about the security situation in Benghazi in particular?

Mr. Evers. And, again, [REDACTED] if you have to, if you learned the information from classified sources and can't speak to it here, you can save it for another occasion.

Mr. [REDACTED] Okay. I will just speak very general terms that we looked a lot at what Qadhafi's forces were doing. At that point, you know, the lines were going back and forth a little bit. And that was our major concern was, would we come close to being overrun by maybe Qadhafi's forces because the war was still going on?

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q At the time you went in, Benghazi was not under direct attack from Qadhafi forces. Is that correct?

A Right.

Q You wouldn't have gone in if they were?

A Right.

Q Okay, and there was a lot of this that was in open-source reporting at the time. Do you remember how far away those forces were?

A No, I don't remember exactly how far away they were. I mean, I just, you know, everybody felt comfortable at the time that they were far enough away.

Q Okay. All right. Did that change during the time that you were there?

A It did. His forces moved back and forth.

Mr. Evers. Again, same caution on classified information,

Mr. [REDACTED] But I think some of it was kind of open, though. I mean, the press were there. The press were reporting on --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q CNN gets it before anybody else, don't they?

A Right. And --

Q Yeah.

A You know, there were a lot of different press there.

Q Uh-huh.

A And they were reporting on those forces.

Q Let me back up for just a moment and talk about prior to going into Libya, did anyone talk to you about what was the reason why the U.S. Government wanted to go into Libya? What was the policy that was being promoted by sending the Envoy in?

A The best I can recall is what I had mentioned earlier, basically two reasons, that Mr. Stevens was on a fact-finding, you know, to see what happening on the ground in Benghazi and also to link up with the council that was in place, the government that was in place at the time in Libya.

Q And that would have been that transitional government that was seeking to get a foothold in Libya?

A Correct.

Q Okay. What was your -- you and the other agents and the Envoy's -- status going to be when you went into Libya? I understand when you go to an embassy or a consulate, you will have diplomatic status. Were you going to -- to your knowledge, were you going to be covered by the same diplomatic status when you went in there?

A Correct. We had our diplomatic passports, and I actually -- I think when we arrived, they -- somebody did look at our passports in the harbor there from the council.

Q Okay, so as far as you were -- as far as what you knew is, you had the same status as if you were going to be the RSO at an embassy anywhere?

Mr. Evers. Do you -- if you know the status of the RSO versus what your status was.

Mr. [REDACTED] I'm not sure on exact status.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. You talked about the two reasons that you were told as to why the U.S. Government wanted to go into Libya, fact finding as to what exactly what was happening in country and to link up with the transitional government. Was that told to you by superiors or the Envoy or others or a combination of people if you could identify who you had conversations with about the purpose and the policy?

A I truly don't recollect who might have told me that. I mean, I had, obviously, different communications with people at headquarters and with my bosses. And I'm sure my boss probably did,

but I can't recall when he might have, or --

Q Yeah. Did you have a free exchange of daily conversations with the Envoy, you know, both before going into Libya and then while you were there?

A We did. He was very open, and we spoke about different things that were of concern to everyone with security. And, you know, he was very -- very much willing to make adjustments in order for us to be secure, you know.

Q So he was very cooperative with suggestions about the necessary security for him to make movements once you were in Libya?

A Correct. Right.

Q Very amenable to that?

A Right.

Q Has that always been your experience?

A No, that's not always been my experience.

Q Okay. Were you aware of to whom the Envoy was reporting back, either, you know, your status when you were in Rome before you were -- before you went to Malta to go to Benghazi and then once you were in Benghazi, but basically what was his chain of command or who was he reporting back to?

A Well, the Embassy in Tripoli had been evacuated, so part -- they had like -- and I don't remember what the actual office was that they called it, but they actually had a staff back here in Washington, and that was part of his coordination was back through that staff and I think the Ambassador was still in place. So he -- it was

a -- I think they had like a task force, and he reported -- that was part of who he reported back to.

Q To your recollection, did he have any direct conversations with the Secretary, the Deputy Secretaries, any of the Under Secretaries?

A I don't know. I don't know that he did. I can't recall.

Q Okay. When you were, to your knowledge, was he reporting to anyone on the national security staff or in the White House?

A I don't recall that he was. I will backtrack just a little bit. There was a Feltman -- I think he was assistant secretary. He did report to Assistant Secretary Feltman.

Q Would that be Jeffrey Feltman?

A Yes.

Q Okay, and do you recall that he was the Assistant Secretary over Near East Affairs?

A Correct.

Q And that would be the geographical area that would have included Libya?

A Right.

Q Okay. Prior to your going into Libya, did you have some sort of operations plan? Did you have any type of written plan or authorization to go in? Or did you and the team put together an ops plan?

A We -- it wasn't in writing, but you know, we tried to put a plan together as best we could. We didn't even know where we were

going to set up once we arrived. Once we arrived, we looked at a couple locations. But prior to going there, it was somewhat fluid because it was just the unknown.

Q Okay. And was staying on the ferry an option?

A It was an option for a period of time.

Q And do you recall what that period of time was?

A We arrived on the 5th, and the ship was still there on the 10th. It might have left on the -- it left sometime after the 10th, but not more than 1 or 2 days later.

Q And that was the original plan, that it was just going to be there for a few days?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And so, once you arrived in Libya, you ended up staying at the Tibesti Hotel, am I correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay, and that's T-i-b-e-s-t-i, Tibesti Hotel. You said you looked at a couple of different places. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Do you recall the various types? Were they other hotels? Were there villas? Were there private residences? What type of places did you look at?

A We went to see where the British were at, and they were kind of at a guest conference type center. It wasn't really big, but it was moderate sized, maybe two or three stories, had a compound. It was down along the water, so we ruled that place out.

Q And why was that?

A We didn't think it was quite as secure. There were a lot of entrances into -- as best I can recall, it was walled, but there were still a lot of entrances into it. And then coming up from the water, there was no wall, so --

Q So it was beachfront?

A It was beachfront.

Q Okay.

A And we went to one other hotel where there were some other journalists were staying. I don't recall the name of it, but it was a little bit smaller. It was right up against the highway. So we decided -- and it was a little bit closer to where the U.K. facility was, but we decided that wasn't really a good place for us. And then we went to the Tibesti and looked at that. At the time, there were some advantages for us to be there.

Q And what were those advantages?

A There was a little bit of setback from the highway. We had an area there where we could secure our vehicles, and keep an eye on them. That hotel, I don't remember exactly how many floors it was, but it was probably at least 18 floors, so we were -- we weren't at the top, but we were near the top, and we had a pretty good view of part of the city from up there.

There were a lot of journalists there that would make it easier for -- and others staying there that would make it easier for Mr. Stevens to communicate with these people without us having to make

unnecessary movements all the time. And there was a little bit of security at that hotel, very minimal. There was a presence.

Q Was there any type of law enforcement presence within Benghazi at the time? I mean, was there a chief of police? Was there a federal police? Was there a national guard or the equivalent of that in Benghazi at the time?

A There wasn't a formalized police -- I mean, there was probably somebody that called himself a police chief. And then you had the military somewhat of a military presence, you know, that really wasn't focused on anything to do with our security. They had, you know, they were trying to fight the war. Then you had February 17, a militia that assisted us a little bit.

Q Tell me about your understanding of what February 17th was all about.

A It is just a militia that offered to assist us. I didn't have a lot of dealings. I had a few dealings with them, but everybody over there, we were somewhat suspect of because we couldn't vet anyone. So we were self-sufficient for the most part.

Q Okay. And what type of vetting would you normally expect to do?

A Well, I mean, if I was at an embassy, we would have had local employees on the security staff that would be able to check police records. There were no records there. We couldn't pull up records that Qadhafi's government might have had. We would have sent them out to a neighborhood and had them check to see acquaintances, whose

acquaintances were these people that we were going to work with. We would have interviewed them, obviously, too. But we couldn't do any of that in that location.

Q Okay. Based on your understanding of February 17, were they employees of the militia? Were they just a group of kindred spirits? Were they organized in any type of structure? I guess, how did you know who to talk to and what was your assessment of how they were structured and their capabilities?

A Well, they came to us through Mr. Stevens, through the Council. So that's how, you know, that we were -- that we had contacted them. You know, we didn't initially have a relationship with them. It came from the Council.

Q Okay. So the Transitional Council recommended that you deal with Feb 17?

A As best I can recollect.

Q Okay, and approximately how many meetings would you have had with their leadership?

Mr. Evers. Excuse me, which leadership?

Ms. Jackson. Feb 17 leadership.

Mr. [REDACTED] Less than -- less than a handful of meetings.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And did they offer to provide any security services to you?

A They offered, and we prodded them for more security as time went on.

Q And what type of security did they offer? What kind of

security did you ask them for, did they agree to? We will start there.

A Well, they were very undisciplined. You know, people over there, a lot of them were not familiar with weapons, you know, because they weren't allowed to have weapons during Qadhafi's rule. So we never could really count on them for much because they just didn't have training. They were undisciplined. We just tried to see if we could get them to post at a couple of locations around the hotel at the entrance and in the parking lot, and to be around at night also in the parking lot.

Q And did they show up with regularity?

A For the most part. There were times when there were holes that they didn't fill because of just being an undisciplined force. And I will just mention, the military at that time, whatever small amount of military there was, they had similar problems because nobody wanted to be assigned to a discipline-type activity. They just wanted to go out in the desert and fight and come back in the town and hangout with their friends. There was a definite lack of discipline everywhere.

Q Okay. Tell us a little bit about what the Envoy did on a day-to-day basis once he was in -- during your time when he was in Libya from when you arrived on the 5th, until you departed 30-some days later.

A Well, he wanted to talk to people and he talked to everyone. He would talk to the men downstairs that serve coffee to us, or he would talk to the cleaning people. He would talk to the reporters. He would talk to the hotel manager. He would talk to anyone that wanted to talk

to him.

Q As head of his security team, did that make you crazy?

A Well, I mean, I was --

Mr. Evers. I'm going to object to the question.

Ms. Jackson. Did that pose challenges for you as head of his security?

Mr. Evers. Withdrawn. Withdrawn.

Mr. [REDACTED] Not for the most part. I mean, we weren't out walking around in the street trying to pick people off the to speak to. These people were at the hotel, and he would just speak to them, sometimes sit down and talk to them.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. And would he have meetings then with members of the Transitional Council, the transitional government?

A Yes. Probably half the time, they would come over and meet in our building. And about the other half of the time, we would go down and meet in their building.

Q What kind of challenges did you have to go out into Benghazi to escort the Envoy to these meetings?

A Well, luckily, their facility wasn't really far. It was -- I would -- within a mile and a half of where we were. So just try to break it up to where we went and set a pattern of what we were doing and wouldn't want to stay too long -- and we didn't -- in the meetings. The Envoy was always open to suggestions how we might do things.

Q And how many would travel with him when you would go to the meetings?

A Well, we would send two advance agents to the site ahead of time. And maybe initially, before we would go there, we would check it out a day or two ahead of time. And maybe more than two would go, you know. We would send a few more just to look at it. And then so that would be one vehicle that would go. And then we would usually travel with two vehicles: The Envoy in my vehicle with the driver, and then sometimes [REDACTED] would go, the aide, and then we had a security follow vehicle with four agents. And we would leave one agent back at the command post so we had comms with Washington.

Q And by "comms," you mean communications?

A Correct.

Q So it took all of you to escort the Envoy to make movements during this time period?

A Correct.

Q And you thought that was sufficient, a sufficient number?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Did the Envoy have any type of like personal GPS tracking device or, in my world, a panic button or anything like that? I don't know what you might have a name for it or call them.

A I can't talk about that in this setting.

Q Okay.

A I -- maybe you would like to know a little bit more about how we were set up in the hotel.

Q Let me ask you, how were you set up in the hotel?

A On the floor, we had -- there were suites down at the end and going into the suites were glass doors. So we could basically secure the glass doors and we could secure the exits from that suite area. So we operated out of the suite area. And Mr. Stevens had one of the suites there. His aide had another room. And then I had a room. And then we had the command post there. And then we had one or two empty rooms within the suite area. And then the agents were right outside the suite area, down the hall, on the other side of the partition.

Q Did you take up the whole hall?

A No. There were some other rooms down at the end that sometimes people occupied.

Q Okay. And was that okay with you?

A That was the best I thought we could do at the time.

Q Okay.

A I mean, we were able at least to keep everybody on the floor. And when they needed to react, we had everyone there.

Q And the Envoy was sort of clustered or closed in at the one end?

A Right, and we would pretty much -- the guys would stay in that suite area most of the time unless they were sleeping or getting ready to make a movement.

Q So everyone had their own room?

A Correct.

Q Okay. You said you took a couple of satellite phones with you and some personal laptops. Did you have both secure and unsecure communications or did you -- I'm not asking what the communications were, just the equipment that you took with you.

Mr. Evers. I will give you the same caution as earlier, if you can talk about this in this setting.

Mr. [REDACTED] I don't know that I can actually talk about that in this setting.

I did have a lot of comms with my boss, and it was nonsecure. But we were able to talk around things that we needed to. And I had usually two calls a day back to Washington to like people in Diplomatic Security. We would speak -- and that included weekends. You know, I would call them at home, and we would talk on the weekends.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have to file any type of daily report? We have seen SITREPs and SPOTREPs, and other things like that. Were you sending written reports as well as having these telephone calls with your boss?

A No, I wasn't sending in any written reports.

Q Okay. Do you know if anyone else was on your team, or the Envoy?

A Mr. Stevens, he had a laptop that he pretty much reported constantly on. So that was part of the issue was, you know, he had a device that he used almost all the time.

Q So, of the laptops that you brought with you, one was pretty much dedicated to him?

A Correct.

Q Okay, and so he was on that -- he was a user, a power user, as we might call them, of that laptop?

A Right. I'm sure, you know, he would every time he met with somebody, he would report back that, you know, what he had found out. And --

Q And I'm anticipating that he was using email?

A Yes.

Q Was that laptop an unclassified laptop -- if you know?

A I don't know. I don't recall.

Q Okay. If it were a classified laptop, would you have had to secure it in a different manner than an unclassified laptop?

A Well, I mean, we secured our equipment because we always left an agent back at the command post, and every time we left, we secured our equipment.

Q Okay. So it was --

A And that would have been a requirement if we had classified, that we would have to secure it.

Q Okay. Did you -- I think you said you had two satellite phones with you. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q What other means of communication did you have amongst the team?

A We had our radio, so we had -- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] So we had good communication with our command post when we moved around the city.

Q Okay. Did you use any other forms of communication? Did you have cellphones over there, text messaging? Maybe not you. Maybe some of the younger members of the team. But, to your knowledge, were there other methods of communication? Not that I'm casting any aspersions on your technological ability, but --

A As I recall, I don't think anything worked over there as far as the cellphones. I don't recall that we were able to use those.

Q Okay. Did the team members use email to talk to one another or send emails back to your DS headquarters?

A There were people that had to send different messages back maybe to account for their time or special reporting that -- administrative mostly reporting that they had to do. They would have done it that way. A lot of communication was, though, through the sat, through the satellite phones.

Q Did you have any trouble communicating through email with main State?

A There were times when we didn't have good communication. Maybe that satellite phone needed an adjustment, or we were just at a bad time, where it wasn't -- might be down for a little while. And then we would try to use the other satellite phone.

Q Any other workarounds that you had to improvise with while you were over there?

A Nothing comes to mind right now.

Q Did anyone -- were the laptops that you have referred to, they were State Department laptops -- if you know?

A I really don't know.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, did anybody bring their personal laptop or an iPad? I don't know if iPads were -- 4 years ago?

A Probably. Probably, but whether -- I don't -- I never saw anybody trying to transmit out of there with a personal laptop.

Q Okay. Did you use any of the laptops?

A I didn't. I didn't.

Q You didn't?

A I mean, I used the laptop that we had that was furnished but not very often.

Q Okay.

A Very infrequently.

Q Okay. What type of communication -- what type of information would you be sending over the laptop?

A I think, as best I can recall, there was just Emergency Action Committee. We had a meeting near the end of our time. And we were discussing in that message some possible threats that were happening in the area or things that had occurred that we were trying to get a handle on what actually had happened -- some explosion.

RPTR HUMISTONEDTR HOFSTAD

[11:32 a.m.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. Can you describe those for us, please?

A Sure.

One evening, I think it was around 6 p.m., in the distance, over by the shore, over towards where the British were, we saw an explosion. And there was, like, a little fire after that.

And then we had heard that there was an explosion near the transnational council, near their building also. I'm not saying those happened at the same time. Could have been different days.

And then there was an explosion over where the British were.

Q And would you say that all of these occurred, like, within days of each other? Within a week's time?

A I think within days of one another.

Q Okay. So, in the span of 3 days, you had these 3 incidents?

A Three or 4 days, in about that time period.

Q And so an Emergency Action Committee meeting was convened?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

A Right. We do that in the embassies also, --

Q Right.

A -- which was not uncommon if you're in a -- like, when I was in [REDACTED] we had many of those.

Q Okay. In this particular case, did it involve everyone?

A It might not have involved all the agents. I know there were other agents there besides myself, but I can't recollect if everybody was involved.

Q Was anyone from main State on a phone call with that, or were you just meeting internally?

A We met internally to discuss it.

Q Okay. And then was there a report of that meeting made either orally or in writing and sent to main State?

A There was a report sent to main State.

Q Do you recall whether it was oral or in writing or both?

A It was in writing.

Q In writing?

A In writing, yeah.

Q Okay.

A It was titled "EAC."

Q Okay. Tell us about that internal meeting that you had.

Mr. Evers. And I'll just caution, if it was a classified discussion, you can save it for later. But if you can describe it here, feel free.

Mr. [REDACTED] I don't think it was classified. I mean, it basically described those three events that I described to you and trying to vet what actually happened.

Because we had the feeling that people really wanted us there. The Libyan people, you know, for the most part, you know, they were

behind Americans being there, because we were providing air support. And the Council was behind us being there, and February 17 was behind us being there.

So a lot of times, when we got information, we weren't sure that the information we were getting was correct. Like, for example, the first instance I mentioned to you where there was an explosion down by the water that we could see from our hotel, I called the committee there and asked about it, and they told me -- I called them, like, 5 minutes after it happened, and they told me what had happened, which was a complete fabrication. There's no way they knew what happened that quickly, but they wanted to please us and to try to, you know, put us at ease that everything was okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So what did they tell you happened?

A They said there was a boy that was down near one of the fishing shacks where they kept explosives for fishing, which they did -- they'd throw dynamite in the water to fish -- and that he was playing with matches and that he blew up the shed.

Q Uh-huh. As head of the security detail for the Envoy, did that cause you concern, that you could not get a straight answer out of the Council?

A It did, but I've been accustomed to not getting straight answers from different governments in different locations I've been in.

Q And teenage children?

A Unfortunately, it's not uncommon where we don't get the correct reporting from people where we're located. And that happened in [REDACTED] that happened in [REDACTED]. It happened during my career.

Q So it's my understanding, when an EAC is convened, they can either be routinely had or they can be -- one can be convened in response to a series of security incidents. And, as you've described it, is it correct to say that this one was convened in response to these security incidents that occurred?

A Correct. It was convened because of these incidents that involved explosives.

Q Was there a discussion of your team leaving Libya?

A There was a discussion of our team leaving Libya more than once, but mostly it had to deal with how the Qadhafi forces were moving. You know, sometimes they would get momentum and they were able to push forward a little bit, so then we would always, you know, keep an eye on that.

Q Okay. And approximately how many times during the 30-some days you were there did you discuss evacuating Libya?

A Probably no more than three. Maybe two.

Q Did they occur within a short timeframe, or was it every week?

A I think it was more focused later on than when we first -- even when we first arrived. Maybe it was three incidents. Because even when we first arrived, we weren't sure how we were going -- the first night we were there, we spent it on the ship. We

went out and looked at some sites earlier in the day, but we didn't actually move to any of those sites. As best I can remember, we stayed on the ship.

Q Okay.

A And then even when we did move initially to the hotel, we kept somebody back on the ship to have communication.

Q So one of the agents always resided on the ship while it was still in port?

A As best I can remember, that's what we did.

Q And was that for --

A Maybe not at the end, maybe not at the last day or two that the ship was there.

Q And was that to expedite an evacuation if needed?

A Correct.

Q So these Emergency Action Committees that were convened that you had were, I believe you said, primarily in response to the military action getting closer to Benghazi?

A Well, I only recall that we had one EAC, one formal EAC, and that was actually in response to those three incidents with explosives.

Q Okay.

A And, you know, we would just kind of discuss less formally some of these other activities.

Q Did you ever recommend to the Envoy that you leave Libya?

A No.

Q Did you ever request additional security personnel or security equipment in response to either the military action or these three incidents?

A No, I didn't. It's kind of hard to get the right number on the ground. You know, you don't want to have too many; you know, then your profile raises. Plus, we didn't have but four vehicles, so we didn't want to have more people there than we had capacity to evacuate. So those all played a part in, you know, the numbers.

Q Did there ever come a time when you packed up from the Tibesti Hotel and got ready to move back to the ferry?

A I think there was one time when we did pack up and we were getting ready to move. And I think, if I recall, it had to do with Qadhafi forces moving.

Q Okay. All right.

Ms. Jackson. I see that we are coming within about 40 seconds of my first hour being up, so I'm going to take this as an opportunity to stop my questioning. Thank you.

Would you care for, like, a 5-minute break as we reconfigure and --

Mr. [REDACTED] Sure.

Ms. Jackson. -- perhaps get you some water, coffee, or whatever you might need?

Mr. [REDACTED] Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. All right.

Mr. [REDACTED] Thank you.

Mr. Davis. We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.

Starting back.

And just for the record, I'm Susan Brooks from Indiana with just some follow-on questions to Sharon's questions.

When you initially received this assignment, did you have an option to opt out of it?

Mr. [REDACTED] I guess I could have told my supervisor I didn't want to go. Sure. DS isn't that formalized where, you know, we don't have good communications amongst ourselves, so, sure.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Did anybody else besides [REDACTED] and the Envoy -- well, did anybody else besides [REDACTED] have language skills, communication skills to communicate with the folks in Benghazi?

Mr. [REDACTED] No. [REDACTED] and the Envoy were both very fluent, but that's all.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. So no one else on the detail did.

Mr. [REDACTED] Right.

Mrs. Brooks. You talked about that you had diplomatic passports that were checked when you arrived. When you deal with a transitional government like you were dealing with this government, what type of status do you have, or did you have?

Mr. [REDACTED] You know, I just don't recall. I mean, to the team, it really wasn't that important to us.

Mrs. Brooks. Have you gone into other countries on other assignments with transitional governments similar to this --

Mr. [REDACTED] No.

Mrs. Brooks. -- situation? So this was your first time really going into a country where there was a true transitional government you were dealing with.

Mr. [REDACTED] Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Have you ever gone into any other countries in your career where you didn't have any formal written plan or you didn't really know what you were going into? As it seems you've indicated you went in without any formal written ops plan. You didn't know what you were going into exactly, how you were going to set up and how it was going to work. Have you done that in any other country?

Mr. [REDACTED] I traveled a lot with the Secretary of State, and, normally, you know, you send advance agents out, and they have time to do written plans, but there's times when there isn't enough time to actually write something down, so you just don't. You brief people, and you go off the briefings.

Mrs. Brooks. And maybe I just should clarify. Beyond even a written plan, it seems that it was very unclear to you what was going to happen when you landed. You didn't know where you were going to be staying, you didn't really have a game plan. Is that correct?

Mr. [REDACTED] Right. We were basically going to take one day at a time.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Have you done that before in your career, in any other location like that?

Mr. [REDACTED] To a certain extent, you know, maybe when I was in [REDACTED] or [REDACTED], we would have an assignment to go somewhere and, you know, we would send somebody out or people out ahead of time and take a look and make adjustments as they developed.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. But, in this case, you were the people being sent out ahead of time; is that --

Mr. [REDACTED] Right.

Mrs. Brooks. -- right?

Mr. [REDACTED] Right.

Mrs. Brooks. There hadn't been anybody that had been there before you to think about -- or to advise you on the status of Benghazi.

Mr. [REDACTED] Mr. Stevens, he had contacts with a number of people that were on the ground there from -- I had mentioned earlier -- Egypt, Italy --

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Mr. [REDACTED] -- a couple others that he -- the Cana- -- or not the Canadians -- the British, you know, that he had gotten information from what was happening on the ground.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

And on the February 17th, you mentioned they offered to assist, and then through further questioning you talked about they were recommended to you by the transitional government.

What did February 17th offer to do? What was it that you believed

they were going to provide you?

Mr. [REDACTED] Well, just some security, some extra security around the hotel.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Mr. [REDACTED] You know, that if they would give us good security around the hotel, that's the best we could ask for --

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Mr. [REDACTED] -- from them.

Mrs. Brooks. So you didn't ask them to do any advance work before you and the Envoy traveled outside of the hotel. It was really just for security around the hotel.

Mr. [REDACTED] Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Mr. [REDACTED] There was one time we used a vehicle, and I can't remember who provided it, and the -- if I recollect it, we were going to meet a military general, and that person led us to where he was at.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Mr. [REDACTED] But other than that, all our other moves were independent, we did it ourselves.

Mrs. Brooks. How did you communicate with them?

Mr. [REDACTED] Well, we had [REDACTED] We would use him.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

When the Envoy and [REDACTED] would communicate with people, whether it's February 17th or whether it was, you know, the people in the hotel and all the various folks you talked about, did the Envoy share with

you what they were saying?

Mr. [REDACTED] Not usually. You know -- and, normally, I didn't interject. If he was sitting somewhere, you know, I really didn't want to get involved with what he was discussing, because I needed to watch what was going on around. So, no, mostly not.

Mrs. Brooks. On the team, what was your specific assignment?

Mr. [REDACTED] I was the team leader or the agent in charge. And the unit I was out of, Dignitary Protection, that's what we did. We were mid-level supervisors that lead protective details.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And so it was really protective detail of Chris Stevens.

Mr. [REDACTED] Correct.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

That's actually all the follow-on I have. Thank you.

Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you.

I'm the only attorney not in the room, so I'm not going to be as organized as they are.

When you all got to the hotel -- and I'm assuming that that was something you all located after you got to Benghazi. Is that correct?

Mr. [REDACTED] Correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. And how far was that away from the ship?

Mr. [REDACTED] Probably a mile and a half. We could see the ship. We actually had a good view of the ship from where we were at.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did you have any type -- did you all name your location anything, like a temporary facility or any other type name

that you would have called where you were at?

Mr. [REDACTED] Well, when we were on the radio, we had call signs. You know, everybody had a call sign. And I'm sure we had a call sign for the command post, but I just -- I don't recollect what it was.

Mr. Westmoreland. And you mentioned that you all were trying to keep up with the Qadhafi troop movement. And did you all feel like that the rebels gave you any type of protection, or were you all watching -- I'm assuming the 17th February was part of the rebel group. Is that correct?

Mr. [REDACTED] That's correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. And so were you all watching what they were doing, too?

Mr. [REDACTED] Well, we were watching what everyone was doing, but we had limited resources. Like, we weren't going to actually go out and try to monitor events that were taking place. Basically, we had enough people to secure the Envoy, but we didn't have assets to go out and do that type of thing. We did go out and do some surveys for our evacuation, but we didn't actually go out to look at any events, except in one instance.

Mr. Westmoreland. So the weaponry that you all -- or equipment you took in was adequate for the number of people you had at the location you had. But I'm assuming, at some point, if there was a new facility that the Ambassador was going to move into, then that would have been looked at as to what it would take to adequately make sure that they could defend that position.

Mr. Evers. If you know.

Mr. [REDACTED] Standard practice for the State Department is to examine that. Sure. But I wasn't there at that point. But --

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes.

Mr. [REDACTED] -- I just know from my experience that that would be looked at.

Mr. Westmoreland. The other thing -- I know that there are some agencies in the government that provide certain intelligence to the State Department -- the DOD, CIA, and others -- as far as maybe locating bad guys. Did you ever take advantage of any service like that while you were in Benghazi to let you know where some of these known bad guys may have been?

Mr. Evers. If you can answer in this setting.

Mr. [REDACTED] I don't think I can answer in this setting.

Mr. Westmoreland. That's all I've got.

Mrs. Brooks. I have one follow-on to Congressman Westmoreland's question.

You just mentioned that you didn't go out and check out incidents happening beyond what your purview was, you said, except for one instance. What was that?

Mr. [REDACTED] John McCain made a visit to Benghazi, so --

Mrs. Brooks. During the time you were there?

Mr. [REDACTED] During my time. So we went to three locations that he wanted to see, and that was outside the scope of what we were doing for Mr. Stevens. You know, these were specific things that Senator

McCain wanted to look at.

Mrs. Brooks. And did Mr. Stevens go with Senator McCain?

Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And are you able to share where Senator McCain went --

Mr. [REDACTED] Sure.

Mrs. Brooks. -- in this setting?

Mr. [REDACTED] Sure.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Mr. [REDACTED] I mean, the press were there, too, so --

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Okay. Where did --

Mr. [REDACTED] He went to that Freedom Square --

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Mr. [REDACTED] -- which was a big rally point for the rebels and everybody that was involved. And as the day would grow, so would that venue, with a lot of people and that type of thing.

Mrs. Brooks. All right.

Mr. [REDACTED] I'll just mention that that was a problematic venue. The way around that was we went -- as soon as Senator McCain arrived in the morning, we took him there, when there were a lot less people.

Mrs. Brooks. Uh-huh.

Mr. [REDACTED] Much.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Mr. [REDACTED] The numbers were much lower at that point.

And he also checked out a military base, if you want to call it

a military base. At some point it was a military base. But there were a few troops there, and he looked at them. And they had a couple empty buildings, for the most part.

And then we went to a hospital where some aid workers had been shelled.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Mr. [REDACTED] They weren't shelled at the hospital, but they were taken there from Misrata.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Did he have any interaction with February 17th that day?

Mr. [REDACTED] I can't speak to whether he did or not. I don't recall.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Okay. I don't have anything further.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Kenny. The time is 12:05.

And, Mr. [REDACTED] just on behalf of the select committee minority staff, I want to thank you again for being here and thank you for your service to our country in the Diplomatic Corps.

I just want to take a moment to reintroduce myself. My name is Peter Kenny. I'm with the minority staff. I'm joined here by my colleagues, as well. This is Heather Sawyer, who's our chief counsel.

We understand that appearing before Congress can be a daunting experience, so we want to assure you that we'll work with you to make

this process, along with our Republican counterparts, just as simple and as straightforward as possible.

And, just again, thank you for being here.

Mr. [REDACTED] Thank you.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KENNY:

Q There was a discussion in the last hour about your arrival and the circumstances of your arrival into Benghazi aboard the Greek container ship. Do you recall that discussion?

A Yes.

Q Okay. I'd like to just maybe take a little step back here, and we'll go ahead and introduce Exhibit 1.

[REDACTED] Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q This is a copy of an article entitled "Mission to a Revolution." It's authored by Diplomatic Security Special Agent [REDACTED]. It appeared in the December of 2011 issue of the State Department magazine called "State." And this is an article -- it describes the efforts of various Diplomatic Security agents in Benghazi to support then-Special Envoy Chris Stevens' mission to Libya in 2011.

I'd just like to first ask, you're familiar with this article?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you've read this article before?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

So I'm going to refer to, just to give you a bit of a roadmap here, refer to a bit of the passages here. So I'm going to do my best to steer you. I understand and apologize in advance, the font is a little small, so I'm going to do my best to guide you to where I'm referring to.

So I'd first like to ask you -- and this is on page 20, and it's in the sixth paragraph down. There's reference to this phrase, "expeditionary diplomacy." And you see it again towards the end of the article, so I think it appears in this article at least two times.

And I'll just give you a moment.

A Okay.

Q I'd just like to begin our discussion by asking you what this phrase means to you, what the phrase "expeditionary diplomacy" means to you.

A Oh.

Mr. Evers. Of course, if it means anything to you.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q If it -- and I guess we could lead into, also, just the role that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security plays, you know, either presently or in the past during your time, in supporting this concept, this term.

A Just a security function is what we're doing, you know, for the Envoy, for him to conduct diplomacy.

Q Okay. So this term doesn't have any specific or particular

meaning to you outside of what you ordinarily would do in a protective function; is that right?

A No. I mean, I've never -- other than in this article, I've not seen that in my career, where something was mentioned with that word.

Q Okay. That's very helpful. Thank you.

And, again, you mentioned in the last hour your role. I believe the title you were given was agent in charge, [REDACTED]

And I was just wondering if maybe you could flesh out a little bit more what that meant. You mentioned that that had a specific meaning in the protective-detail world, and maybe you could just help us understand what that meant in this particular mission.

A Okay.

As the agent in charge, I would have direct communication with the Envoy and, you know, discuss security matters with him. That's not to say that, you know, since this group was together for a period of time, that other people on the team didn't talk to the Envoy, which, you know, everyone did, but that was my responsibility, to bring to his attention any issues that I saw and also to lead the team.

Now, I had a shift leader, and he was involved in a lot of the tactics. You know, he would work with the agents on how we were going to make a movement, and then we would review it. He would bring the plan to me, and we would review what he wanted to do. And, you know, we would adjust it or go with the plan that he brought forward.

Q So it sounds like there was some sort of division of labor on the team, and people brought different skills to the table. Is that --

A Yes.

Q -- fair to say? Okay.

Is it also fair to say, then, that you were the principal security advisor to the Special Envoy?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

We had a brief discussion in the last hour about your understanding of the purpose of the mission. And I was hoping we could walk through the article, touching on a few of those items and just ask a few questions. And I'll help direct you to where we are.

So, on page 20, the first page with text in the article -- and so this is three paragraphs in, and I'll go ahead and read. This paragraph reads, quote, "The team's mission was to establish a U.S. diplomatic outpost in Benghazi, the cradle of the revolution and a stronghold of the forces that were pressing to end the Qadhafi regime after the dictator's 41 years in power," close quote.

This article refers to Benghazi as the "cradle of the revolution." I would just like to understand your sense of what the importance of Benghazi was to the anti-Qadhafi uprising.

A It was definitely the cradle of the revolution. And, you know, the people would rally. In the evenings, they would have a procession on the main street, which was where we were located, down

to the Freedom Square on a daily basis.

Q Okay. Did you have any other sense of the importance of just the city of Benghazi, what it meant to Libya more generally?

A Just a very general sense, you know, that it was important. That's all.

Q Okay.

At the time of your mission, there seemed to be some concerns that Qadhafi posed a grave threat to his own people. If we flip forward here to page 23, and three paragraphs in on the left-most column, the second sentence begins, quote, "Only 2 weeks before the team arrived, a threatened massacre of Benghazi's 750,000 residents was thwarted by NATO-led Operation Odyssey Dawn, the decisive air bombardment that routed Qadhafi's forces," close quote.

As you know, the United States, along with the United Kingdom, France, and some other partners, participated in the joint NATO mission.

Mr. [REDACTED], you were on the ground at that time. Did you get a sense of how the people in Benghazi felt about Qadhafi? Were they afraid that his forces might be turned against them, his own people?

A You know, I didn't speak Arabic, so I didn't have a lot of interaction with the people. You know, it was secondhand through the Envoy or through [REDACTED].

Q Okay. But secondhand you would hear these sorts of things, that the residents of Benghazi were concerned about their safety --

A Sure.

Q -- due to Qadhafi?

A Sure.

Q Okay. That's helpful.

So, to the extent that you know, did Chris Stevens, Special Envoy Stevens, did he personally share with you his concern that the residents of Benghazi were somehow placed in grave peril due to Qadhafi and his forces?

A I don't recollect that we had that conversation.

Q Okay.

Flipping back now to page 20 -- and I appreciate your patience here. So, in the fourth paragraph on the right-most column -- and this is again continuing to describe the purpose of the mission as it evolved over time. But the sentence reads, quote, "They also facilitated the delivery of nonlethal military assistance to the TNC for the protection of civilians and civilian-populated areas," close quote.

Just to the extent that you have an awareness of this or you have knowledge of this, do you know what "nonlethal assistance," what that means, what that meant here?

A Well, I mean, I know what that means. If you were going to give people ballistic vests, that would be a -- that would fit that category, or food.

Q Okay.

A Or vehicles or something.

Q Okay. But you have no specific awareness of what assistance was provided, what nonlethal assistance was provided?

A No. No. Oh, no.

Q Okay.

Again, we're still on page 20 here. About four paragraphs in on the left-most column, there's a quote from Special Envoy Stevens that I'd like to read into the record. It reads, quote, "My mandate was to go out and meet as many members of the leadership as I could in the Transitional National Council," close quote.

And if you scroll farther down the page into the right-most column, the second paragraph down, the sentence begins, "Special Envoy Stevens and Political Officer █████ spent their days and nights building up the U.S. Government's first on-the-ground contacts with the Transitional National Council, as well as with members of the emerging civil society and newly freed news media," close quote.

I know there was a discussion in the last hour that Special Envoy Stevens had met with, in your opinion, many people.

A That's true. I mean, this paragraph's true, sure. He met with --

Q Okay.

A -- you know, people in education. He met with a lot of different people. He met with people that had come back to Libya after being outside of Libya because of Qadhafi. You know, a lot of young people came back to try to help the cause.

Q Okay. Was he able --

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Was he able, to your knowledge, to meet with many members of the opposition leadership specifically?

A He did. He did.

Q Okay. And you know that because you were responsible for his security and may have --

A Right. Right.

Q Okay.

Can you just characterize for us generally how busy this period was, in terms of the numbers of meetings that the Special Envoy was having?

A Normally we didn't have more than two or three meetings outside of the venue, but he could hold numerous meetings, you know, almost all day, in the venue.

Q Okay.

A So it was a busy time. No day went by where he wasn't meeting with somebody.

Q Okay. Did it seem, in your opinion, that he was able, then, to meet the mandate as he laid out here, just to meet with as many people as possible?

A Sure.

Q Did you get the sense in your dealings with the Special Envoy that he had strong feelings about this particular mission?

A Sure.

Q Did he ever share those feelings with you?

A I don't recall him sharing that with me, but you could see,

with his actions, how dedicated he was to the mission and how much he cared about the Libyan people.

Q Okay.

Now returning to the article, four paragraphs down on the right-hand column, the article further describes that another part of the U.S. mission was to launch, quote, "the U.S. Government's cooperative program with the Council to collect dangerous weapons, such as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles," close quote.

Was this a program that you were aware of during your time in Benghazi?

A That's not a program I was aware of.

Q Okay.

And when it says here "shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles," would you interpret that to mean MANPADS?

Mr. Evers. If you know.

Mr. [REDACTED] I don't know.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay.

As a trained Federal law enforcement officer, did you see any value to having some sort of a collection program like that to collect weapons that may have been flowing --

Mr. Evers. Do you mean in general in Benghazi, even though he wasn't part of it?

Mr. Kenny. Yes.

Mr. [REDACTED] I wasn't aware of any operations to that point taking

place. So it would all be just speculation on my part.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. No, that's helpful.

There have been allegations that, in addition to a program such as this that collected weapons, the United States was also engaged in the unlawful transfer of weapons to other countries, including Syria. Did you see any evidence of this happening during your time --

A No.

Q -- in Benghazi? Okay.

Again, I apologize for flipping around here, but on page 20, left-hand column, fourth paragraph down -- or fifth paragraph down, the article states, quote, "Stevens said the Libyans were genuinely grateful to the United States for supporting their aspirations for freedom, as demonstrated by the greeting the team received. The Libyans had hoisted British, French, Qatari, and American flags at Freedom Square, the vast open area in front of the Benghazi courthouse," close quote.

A That's true.

Q Is that something you witnessed, as well, or were aware of?

A Correct. Right. They had a procession that would come by the hotel on a daily basis, because we were along a main avenue, and it was down the street from Freedom Square. So, in the procession, people would have those flags when they came by.

Q To include American flags?

A Right.

And we would never go down to the square when the people were down there gathering. We only went down, like, a couple times, just to prepare for John McCain's visit, during earlier hours when there weren't as many people down there. Because these processions also had a lot of weapons with them in the procession.

Q Did you interpret that this procession that carried the American flag, that it was meant to at least show some support for American support --

A Sure.

Q -- of them? Okay.

At the end of the article, which is page 23, the author -- who is, again, DS Special Agent [REDACTED] -- states that the team was very proud based on the role and the mission in Benghazi. And I'd just like to ask if, you know, you shared this sense of pride and accomplishment in your work there.

A I think we were all proud that, you know, we had been selected to be part of that mission and, you know, we had protected him during our time there.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q If you could pardon my intrusion, I just wanted to ask a quick question. I think Peter had finished up with his questions on the article. But I noticed, as he was walking you through it, that there's a picture, I think about the fourth page in -- fifth page in. There's a nice picture --

A Oh, sure.

Q -- on this page.

A Uh-huh.

Q And up in the right-hand corner, it says, "Rebel fighters and residents of Benghazi celebrate in the city's main square." Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q You've talked to us a little bit about something you call "Freedom Square." Is that Freedom Square or what you understood to be Freedom Square?

A What I understood to be.

Q And this picture, I have no idea when it was taken, but it shows a gentleman with a young boy on his shoulders waving a flag, and there's a number of people in the background.

And you just moments ago spoke about parades and processions that would occur in that square. Would that be the kind of crowd that you would sometimes see in Freedom Square?

A I never saw a crowd this large in Freedom Square because we wouldn't go to Freedom Square when there was a large amount of people there. But I would see this amount of people in the procession that was going to Freedom Square.

Q And so you guys, as part of your role and job of assessing the ongoing security environment, you would certainly assess something like when you saw groups and crowds amassing, and you would react, I guess is the right word, accordingly and advise the Ambassador on that?

A The Envoy?

Q Yes. I'm sorry.

A We --

Q My apologies.

A I mean, we would look closely at each day when they came by, because it was a concern, because they did have weapons and they were, for the most part, an undisciplined group. It wasn't like a military unit that was making a procession; it was a hodgepodge of freedom fighters and just residents.

Q So is it fair to say -- you talked a little bit about the one time you did go with the Envoy and Senator McCain to Freedom Square. Is it fair to say that, given your druthers as a security professional, you would have avoided going to Freedom Square?

A Sure.

Q But you understood the request to go there to be the request of Senator McCain?

A Correct.

Q And you were willing to do everything in your power to make sure he was safe in doing that?

A I felt safe that we could go there early and accomplish it. And Mr. Stevens felt so also. We wouldn't have went in the afternoon, but we felt safe we could make that happen for Senator McCain.

Q And you felt -- and I think you've said this a little bit -- that the Special Envoy was certainly flexible and took your recommendations on security?

A Yes.

Q And did you feel he had an awareness of the security situation in Benghazi at the time?

A Yes and no. I mean, it's a big city, and there's a lot happening. It's a tough environment to get your arms around. You know, even as many people as he spoke to, that wasn't easy. And it's hard to vet what people tell you, also.

Q Right. And was he sensitive to the security challenges that were posed in that environment?

A Sure.

Q You know, before I leave you and return to Peter, I just wanted to very briefly talk with you a little bit about another document we're going to mark as an exhibit. But before I do so, I'd just like to very briefly share this with the counsel from State.

It is part of a production that was made to us. It does not bear a classification marking. In fact, it says, "No classification marked." But just so that you can take a look and see if there's anything that immediately flags your attention, I'd appreciate it.

Mr. Evers. Thank you.

I'm fine proceeding with this.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay.

We're going to mark this Deposition Exhibit 2.

[█████████ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. ██████████ Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And I'm going to let you take a quick look at it, and then I'll ask you a couple questions and then turn it back over to Peter.

Have you had a --

A Okay.

Q -- chance to take a quick look?

A Sure.

Q Had you ever seen that --

A Yes.

Q -- exhibit before? Can you explain to me what it is?

A These temporary duty assignments, in order for the agents sometimes to get credit for it in their evaluations -- it was very generous of the Special Envoy to write this, but he was trying to give everyone credit for that assignment, in hopes that it would help them.

Q And the subject line, I'm just going to read it for you. It says, "Subject: Kudos for DS Protective Detail -- U.S. Rep Office Benghazi." And up at the top, it bears a date, Wednesday, June 1, 2011.

So was that near the end of your time in Benghazi?

A I'd already left Benghazi by that time.

Q And it mentions you very particularly in that first paragraph. And I'm just going to go ahead and read the paragraph, if you'll bear with me.

A Sure.

Q It says, "As the first DS Protective Detail team in Benghazi prepares to rotate back to Washington, I wanted to tell you about the outstanding work these eight agents did on this historic mission. Very

ably led by Agent in Charge [REDACTED], the team successfully 'created the environment that enabled diplomacy' in uniquely challenging circumstances."

So it specifically mentions you as very ably leading. And I know sometimes it's hard to talk about oneself, and you seem to be certainly very humble. But, clearly, the Ambassador believed you did an incredible job in what he described as uniquely challenging circumstances.

Did you feel the same way, that you were able to do a job that enabled to create an environment where the diplomatic mission could be carried out?

A I felt that the entire team did, and not to speak of myself but to speak of my office, the dignitary protection office. Diplomatic Security could have sent a tactical team in, but they wanted a team that would enhance Mr. Stevens' ability to have diplomacy, and sometimes that's not as readily available if you have a large tactical team around you.

So the people that were assigned and the experience with my office, that's why we were selected, rather than having a more qualified -- because they are more qualified -- a tactical team in order to fight. If you were going to go there to fight, you would have more of a tactical team, more mobile support team.

Q And just to translate that into layman's terms for someone like myself, when you talk about a tactical team, you mean a team or individuals who have a visible, outward kind of military presence? Is

that --

A More. More so. I mean, our team had that to a certain extent, but a tactical team would have more of a presence like that, more of a -- most of the team wore body armor, but on a tactical team everybody's going to wear body armor and helmets, and we didn't wear helmets on an everyday basis.

Q And you feel that your team was selected very strategically in order to help accomplish the diplomatic mission? That you weren't a tactical team, as you said, but that you were --

A I was told by my supervisor that they wanted a team billed out of our office rather than -- dignitary protection, rather than an other-type team.

Q And Ambassador Stevens was obviously quite pleased with how you all were able to then create a safe environment for him to conduct diplomacy. Did you feel the same, that you were able to do that, that you had the resources you needed?

A It's tough to say. I mean, we were restricted by a lot of factors -- vehicles, support on the ground. But I felt we had adequate support there and nearby.

Q Okay.

And down a little further in this letter, he talks about some of the specific things. And I'm just going to direct you to the fourth paragraph. He says, "In the succeeding weeks, the team has not only provided highly professional protection for me and my staff as we attended meetings in a city none of us knew well; they have also taken

on a number of other roles that have enhanced our overall security and effectiveness as a mission."

And then he goes into a few of the highlights, and I'd just like to review some of those with you. He notes as number one, "Established excellent working relations with host-country and foreign mission security officers, resulting in exchange of information on security developments as well as cooperation to counter potential threats."

So I think you spoke a little bit about that earlier and that he, in particular, the Special Envoy, really did try to speak to anyone that he could. So did you kind of share his sense that you guys had been able to create an environment that allowed him to do that?

A Yes.

Q And then, in terms of the second one -- and you talked, in particular, a little bit in more detail about this with regard to Senator McCain's visit, certainly. But it says, "Conducted thorough site surveys for all of our meeting locations."

So, obviously, the Ambassador was quite pleased with that, but did you feel that you all were able to do that in order to allow him and, I guess, Mr. [REDACTED] to get out and meet with the folks they needed to meet with?

A Sure. We did.

Q Okay.

And he mentions a number of other things. I won't go through them for you, but if you could just take a look at them for me. And if there's any in particular that you felt, you know, we should know about that

are noteworthy from your perspective, having been there as the agent in charge, if you could let us know, that would be great.

He specifically mentions this last one, actually, that you "smoothly handled all the security arrangements for codel McCain, the first codel to visit Libya since the revolution began in February."

So we've talked a bit about that, but obviously he was quite pleased with what you guys had done to make that trip possible.

A There was a lot of coverage at the time of his trip. So, you know, I think Mr. Stevens was happy with what had transpired.

Q And did you get a sense from -- I don't know how close in contact you were to Senator McCain himself, but did you get a sense from him as to whether he was pleased with the trip?

A He thanked the Envoy and he thanked the team when he left, so I thought he was pleased.

Q And did you get any sense about his feeling about the U.S. mission there? Was he happy that the U.S. was there supporting the revolution?

A I don't know.

Q Okay.

A I can't speculate how he felt.

Q Fair enough.

Ms. Sawyer. I don't think I had more on this.

RPTR YORK

EDTR SECKMAN

[12:35 p.m.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I think before moving on, I just wanted to ask a few followup questions based on our last hour.

We had a discussion of the communications capabilities back with Washington during your tour in Benghazi, and I just wanted to follow up and ask who it was within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security that you were communicating with as the agent in charge of this mission?

A I communicated back to my boss that was in charge of the Dignitary Protection Office, [REDACTED], and also his boss that was in charge of all of the protection for Diplomatic Security, [REDACTED], and that was on a daily basis.

Q And when you referred to having calls perhaps twice a day with Diplomatic Security, it would be primarily those two individuals?

A It was those two individuals, yeah.

Q Okay. That's helpful.

There was also a brief discussion about written operational plans, and I had in my notes that you'd mentioned that there were times when there was simply no time to write those things down so you would brief people. And I just wanted to establish that you did in fact brief people in the case of Benghazi in the absence of these written plans.

A Sure. We -- I mean, when the -- a lot of it was the agents briefing me. You know, they would go out and do an advance, and they

would come back, and the shift leader and myself, we would talk about what we were going to do then.

Now, that's just in the past I've worked a lot of security details, especially for the Secretary of State, where almost everything is written and it's reviewed. I've always felt -- and it's my own personal experience -- that I would rather make sure that people have a better understanding of what's happening and we talk about it a little bit more than looking at documents all the time. Plus, we didn't have the equipment there to type up a lot of documents.

Q Okay.

A Nor did we want to have that type of paperwork laying around.

Q And were you able to discuss these things freely with your team? Were the communications good?

A Sure.

Q Okay. Okay. So I think we'd like to move on at this point while we still have a few minutes and fast forward.

I believe you may have mentioned earlier, but we'll just ask again, what time -- or when did you leave the State Department?

A June 3, 2011.

Q Okay. So, fast forward, just and have a discussion about the Accountability Review Board, when did you become aware or first become aware that there was an Accountability Review Board that would be convened in response to the Benghazi attacks?

A I don't remember the date, but probably when it was announced in the press. I mean, I try to stay current with the news,

so I'm sure I saw it.

Q And did you have an understanding to what the purpose of this ARB was, what they were --

A Sure.

Q -- to investigate?

A I mean, we learn about that even when we're new agents in training that, you know, what an Accountability Review Board is.

Q Okay. And what was your understanding?

A That to look and see if there's better practices that can be established to enhance security.

Q Okay. And did you understand that the ARB would be interested in talking to people that would help them better understand what potential best practices there may be?

A Sure.

Q Okay. And what gave you that impression?

A That's what ARBs do. They talk to people to --

Q Sure. Did you feel that you had information that would have been particularly useful for the ARB?

A I understood that they were focused on the attack at the facility, and I didn't have any knowledge of that.

Q Okay. So you didn't provide any information to the ARB?

A No. No.

Q Okay. And just to be clear, you didn't provide that information because you thought that, given the time when you served in Libya, you didn't have information that related directly to the

circumstances of the attack. Is that accurate?

Mr. Evers. I'm sorry. I don't know if you asked the question whether he was still at the Department when the ARB was stood up.

Mr. Kenny. I think he established it.

Mr. Evers. Okay.

Mr. [REDACTED] I had left.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q June of 2011.

A Yeah, I had left. Yeah. I don't know how to answer that. I wasn't there at -- during that time period. So --

Q Sure. But you didn't feel the need to reach out to the ARB, for instance, to provide information?

A I always thought if they wanted to talk to me, they'd call me.

Q That's fair.

Were you ever asked or ordered not to provide information to the ARB?

A No. I had no -- I had no interaction at all with the ARB, no.

Q Okay. Were you ever asked or ordered to conceal or destroy information from the ARB?

A No.

Q Were you ever asked to participate in a document review session related to the attacks?

A No.

Q Have you had the opportunity to read the ARB's final report --

A No.

Q -- that came out in December?

A No.

Q No. Okay. Are you generally familiar with some of the recommendations that it made?

A I don't recall them at the moment, you know.

Q Okay. That's -- okay. Well, maybe we can just take a quick opportunity to ask you, since you mentioned that you thought they'd reach out, if you'd be willing to share what you would consider to be best practices. So I don't know if there's anything you would like to share with us that you think the Department should consider or explore in order to improve Diplomatic Security.

Mr. Evers. In connection with the attacks in Benghazi?

Mr. Kenny. In connection with security at diplomatic posts abroad.

Mr. Evers. Any post?

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah, I would say limited, really, to your time in Benghazi. That's, you know, the -- Congress in general is very interested in doing that. This committee is -- you know, our mandate is to kind of just explore the before, during, and after of Benghazi. So, really, anything that you think would help our Members. They're very interested in just making sure that lessons learned carry forward. So what you might have in relation to that.

Mr. [REDACTED] I hadn't really thought that through. So I'm a little reluctant to make any kind of recommendations, and I'm a mid-level manager also. I'm not upper-level management that would be involved with that type of response.

Ms. Sawyer. Well, obviously, based on the commendation that you received, you are a fine mid-level manager, as you described it.

So I think what we'd like to do at this point -- we have just a -- probably a few more questions, but we would like to certainly figure out how much more you guys have, the majority --

Mr. Davis. We have an hour.

Ms. Sawyer. You have another hour. So should we break and allow you guys some time for lunch, come back. They can proceed. We just have, I think, a few more questions that we'll wrap at the end with and then -- does that make sense? Okay.

Mr. Kenny. We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Davis. Go back on the record.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So I want to backtrack a little bit to the first hour of questioning that Sharon had for you and just go over some things again.

So you stated that you understood the Benghazi mission to be a 60-day TDY. Is that right?

A Sixty days for the agents, yes.

Q For the agents.

And you were in Benghazi for not more than 45 days?

A Right.

Q Okay. So were you told up front that it would definitely be 60 days, or it had the possibility of being 60 days?

A Just a possibility. I mean, it was unclear. It could have been 3 days, you know. We were -- when we arrived there, we didn't know how long we were going to stay. If conditions, you know, were -- got bad, we were going to leave.

Q So, to the extent you can remember, what would have been the contributing factors that would have led to your early dismissal out of Benghazi?

A Well, obviously, if we would have had threats directed at us or even threats that were directed at Benghazi from Qadhafi's people; you know, if they would have -- if the forces would have been moving further east than they were, then we would have -- we would have left.

Q So you were stationed in Rome for a period of how long before you ultimately went to Benghazi?

A A little bit over 2 weeks.

Q And you were there with the Special Envoy?

A Yes.

Q And the rest of your team was in Valletta?

A Yes. They didn't all arrive exactly the same time, but that's where they all ended up. I think there were a few that got there a little bit earlier and then the -- more people came in.

Q So when did you find out that you would be going to Benghazi? Who told you that you would be going to Benghazi, as opposed to being

stationed in Rome? You got the signal to go in.

A Mr. Stevens, you know. You know, because we would meet daily. I mean, we -- we spent a lot of time together in Rome.

Q Okay. So it was Envoy Stevens who said that you were going to go, and you had checked with your boss, [REDACTED]?

A Right. I had talked daily with him too.

Q Okay. Did you have any indication from Mr. [REDACTED] that you were about ready to go into Benghazi before Envoy Stevens told you?

A I don't remember the timeline with -- if it came ahead of time from [REDACTED] or if it was Mr. Stevens.

Q Okay. And was there a precipitating event that allowed your entrance into Benghazi? Was the security situation better than it had been during your 2 weeks in Rome?

A I don't know if that was so much of the delay or it was just getting the resources in place. The -- I don't know -- you know, the resources in place was an issue all along because we had to get armored vehicles to Malta. They had -- they didn't always have an idea that, Hey, we're going to get a Greek freighter and we're going to go in there. All these things developed.

Q And the Greek freighter came about during your 2 weeks in Rome?

A I'm not sure.

Q Okay. Who would -- who was in charge of --

A That was all being done back in Washington.

Q Okay.

A You know, that --

Q So it wasn't you and it wasn't Mr. [REDACTED] or any members of your team?

A No. Definitely not. No.

Q Okay.

Mr. Davis. So I'm going to introduce a document, document 3.

[REDACTED] Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Give you a minute to read it.

A So, on April 8, we were in Malta getting ready to go.

Q I think you said earlier --

A Oh, I'm sorry. No, I'm sorry. We're not.

Q Yeah. Earlier you said it was April 5.

A Right. We were in -- we were in Benghazi at that point.

Q Right.

A I'm sorry. Yeah.

Q So you can take a minute to read it if you want. I don't know if that's a document you are familiar with.

Mr. Kenny. Do you mind just describing the document for the record?

Mr. Davis. Sure. This is dated April 8, 2011. It's from [REDACTED], Shift Leader Benghazi, to [REDACTED] Director DS/DP. Subject: Decision point. It's a page and a quarter?

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Is this something you've seen before?

A You know, I don't remember if I saw this before. I can't -- I can't say for certain that I saw this.

Q Okay. So I'm going to flip to page 2, and it seems as though there are two options here, and I'll just read them out loud.

Option 1: The team continues to operate until the morning of April 11 and departs with the Aegean Pearl. This will give the appearance of a planned departure, allowing for the extrication of all personnel and property in an orderly fashion. Information gained from the party can then be used for the establishment of a, quote-unquote, "U.S. Mission to Benghazi."

Option 2: Team remains in place for 30 days, and on or about 20 days, the USG seeks options for removal/replacement of personnel. This method is only feasible during best-case scenario. As the last 2 days have demonstrated, the ground situation is fluid and dangerous with no room for error. After the 11th, the untimely removal of personnel may come at a high cost to the USG.

So this document was written from [REDACTED], who was on your detail. Correct?

A Okay. You know, I -- let me recant.

I think I do remember when I saw this, and, you know, he showed it to me. And I said, If this is what you're comfortable with sending, go ahead and send it.

Q Okay. So was it always the plan for a member of your detail to send something like this to Mr. [REDACTED] a few days into the --

A No. I mean, that wasn't the plan. You know, he felt it necessary to do that.

Q Okay. And you approved that he would send that up?

A I didn't stop him from -- I didn't approve of this document, but I didn't stop him from sending the document.

Q So you said Mr. ██████ felt like he needed to send this up to Mr. ██████ for a decision point, option 1, option 2. Do you know if Mr. ██████ took any action after receiving this document?

A I'm sure we had conversations between him and I. That's all I can say. I don't know what happened in Washington.

Mr. Evers. I'm sorry, Carlton. Can you just clarify what type of action you're talking about? I mean, I'm sure folks in Benghazi took lots of actions after April 8, 2011.

Mr. Davis. I was actually referring to Mr. ██████. If Mr. ██████ took any action upon receiving --

Mr. Evers. Sure. I'm sorry. And I'm sure folks took a lot of actions in D.C. as well. Are you regarding these two options or -- I'm sorry. I'm --

Mr. Davis. Regarding these two options. Sure. Sure.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Whether Mr. ██████ selected option 1 or whether he selected option 2 after receiving this document. Are you familiar with that?

A Well, we stayed. So --

Q Would he have been the individual that would have made the decision to stay after this memo, or would there have been another

individual who would have --

A I'm sure there were a lot more people involved back in Washington than just [REDACTED]. He didn't make the decision on his own.

Q Okay. And who -- to the best of your knowledge, who would those other individuals have been?

A I'm sure his boss, [REDACTED], who I spoke with on a daily basis was involved, but I'm not -- I can't speak to who else was involved.

Q Okay. So, going back to page 1 of this document, there's some details here about possible evacuation procedures. Paragraph 2 talks about the Aegean Pearl ship. Paragraph 3 talks about the Benghazi airport. Paragraph 4 talks about the overland route to Egypt. Paragraph 5 talks about an emergency extraction.

When you first went into Benghazi, did you have any type of evacuation plan if any of the tripwires were crossed?

Ms. Duval. Is that connected to this memo? I want to make that sure he understands whether you're asking a question about this document that he doesn't have a clear recollection of having seen or whether you're asking a question about his recollection of what he actually did in Benghazi. Just trying to make sure we have a clean transcript that accurately reflects his recollection.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q When you first went to Benghazi, are you aware of any evacuation plans that were in place in the event any tripwires were

crossed?

A Well, I mean, obviously, we had -- the ship was there. So we would just evacuate on the ship.

Q Okay. So this paragraph, paragraph 2 in this particular document, talks about how the team in Benghazi has available until April 11 a means of egress, the Aegean Pearl, a Greek registered ferry, is docked at Benghazi Harbor. Due to a contract modification, this craft will remain in place until 10:00 a.m. local time. This craft allows for the team to exit via sea with all team members, personnel, and government equipment.

So the plan was that if an evacuation needed to occur, you would have evacuated on the ship?

A Right.

Q Okay. And after April 11, do you know if the ship actually left on April 11 or whether or not it was extended further?

A Well, we extended it to April 11 because it wasn't originally supposed to stay until that long, but I don't have it in my notes exactly when the ship left.

Q Okay.

A I can't recall.

Q Was there -- prior to coming to Benghazi, was there ever any talk of evacuating via air or via land, or was it just via the ship?

A Well, initially, it was just via the ship. I don't -- we had communications with military assets on a daily basis. So we could have evacuated via military assets.

Q And these military assets, is that AFRICOM, or were you in contact with other individuals?

A There was a ship that -- a Navy ship that was out in the sea, and we had comms with them. And it just so happened that there was a DS agent that was on Reserve Duty as a major that was our contact on that ship, and we had daily contact with him.

Q And he would liaison with the ship, and that was your communications with the ship?

A Right. Initially, when he went on Active Duty, it didn't have anything to do with us. You know, he just happened to be on that ship, and I knew this -- this individual. So it was -- you know, we felt comfortable that we could obviously count on them.

Q Okay. You mentioned at the end of the first hour with Sharon that there was one time where you packed up the hotel and you were ready to move back to the ferry due to where Qadhafi's forces were. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And did you pack up the hotel and move back to the ferry? Where in that process -- how far along did you get?

A I know we packed everything up and we put it in the vehicles. I just don't recall if we moved everything to the ship. I seem to remember that -- seem to think that we might have actually taken the equipment to the ship.

Q And if you took the equipment to the ship -- or even if you didn't and you simply packed up the vehicles -- why didn't you evacuate?

Why did you remain in Benghazi?

A We reexamined the issues, and at that time, we weren't worried about what was happening in Benghazi. We were worried about the forces coming forward. So they must have stopped.

Q So was that you and your agents reexamining? Or was that somebody else reexamining and telling you to stay?

A No. We weren't directed to stay. I mean, it was a combination, you know, of discussing with Mr. Stevens and getting the information of where Qadhafi's forces were. I don't -- I can't say who made that decision, but I was comfortable with staying.

Q How long would it have taken you -- or how long did it take you to pack up the hotel and move everything into the vehicles on the ship?

A Oh, I think we did that like in a couple hours.

Q In a couple hours?

A Yeah.

Q So what would have changed between the couple hours where you packed up the hotel to pack the cars and move everything onto the ship to when you get to the ship and you decided not to evacuate?

Mr. Evers. I'm sorry. Just to be clear about what he said previously, I'm not sure he said he did go to the ship.

Mr. Davis. Correct.

Mr. Evers. And the other thing is, if you remember.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So what information did you get between the time where you

decided to pack up the hotel, you packed up the hotel, you packed the cars, and you may or may not have gone to the ship, within that couple of hours' span, what new information did you get to reevaluate and decide to stay?

Ms. Duval. If that's how it happened. I mean --

Mr. [REDACTED] I can't recall. Like, that's 4 years ago. I just don't have a recollection of what the -- what happened as far as, you know, did we get more information that Qadhafi's forces were stopped. That's more than likely, but I don't -- I don't have that recollection.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So Qadhafi's forces were your main concern, the location of where those forces were?

A Correct.

Q And were you getting realtime updates on where those forces were?

A We were getting updates. Yes.

Q Okay. So it's possible that within the 2 hours somebody from the government would have called you and said the forces are in a different location than where they were an hour or two prior?

A You know, I don't recollect that.

Q Okay. Now, the reason you packed up the hotel, was that because a tripwire had been crossed?

A I mean, that was -- all along that was a major concern of Qadhafi's forces.

Q Did you have any tripwires that were written down when you

went into Benghazi?

A No.

Mr. Davis. Let me pass out another document for you. Document 4.

[REDACTED] Exhibit No. 4
Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q There's a brief second page?

A Oh, I saw it.

Q Oh, you saw it. Okay.

Is this a document that you've seen before?

A I don't believe so.

Q Okay. Just to describe, [REDACTED] this is an email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] Wednesday, May 4, 2011. It's forwarding an email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] with the subject: Stevens Tripwires. The cc on that second email is from [REDACTED]. The date is Friday, April 11, is the original email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED].

Ms. Jackson. Friday, April 8.

Mr. Davis. I'm sorry. Friday, April 8, 2011.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So this is not something you've seen before, this email?

A I don't recollect it.

Q Do any of these tripwires, one through seven, looking at this now, do any of those ring a bell?

A Well, sure. I mean, obviously, if we were going to -- if we were receiving artillery in Benghazi, if there was troop movement towards us, if we were being targeted.

Q You say sure, but was anything actually written down went you into Benghazi in terms of tripwires?

A I don't recall having tripwires with me that were written down.

Q Okay. If there were any formal tripwires, would you have known, being the agent in charge of the DS force?

Ms. Duval. He doesn't recall.

Mr. Davis. I asked if there were, if he would have been aware of them.

Mr. [REDACTED] That's hard to answer. I mean, they could have -- this [REDACTED], he worked back in Washington. So we could have had a conversation -- you know, my boss could have had a conversation with me, but I just don't recall.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Mr. Davis. Okay. Is there any --

Mr. [REDACTED] And I mean a conversation while I was on the ground.

Mr. Davis. Okay. Is it unusual for you to go into a country and not have any written tripwires?

Mr. Evers. And he said he didn't remember if he had them or not.

Mr. Davis. Well, I'm asking if it's unusual if he would not -- if he would have them written down.

Mr. [REDACTED] Well, I mean, this is the only instance where I went

into a country that was -- had -- was in a war zone. So I don't have other experience to say --

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Well, you served in [REDACTED] as an RSO [REDACTED]. Correct?

A Right.

Q And did you have written tripwires there?

A We had tripwires, sure.

Q But you don't recall having any written tripwires when you went in Benghazi?

A Right.

Q Reading the email here from [REDACTED], it says, [REDACTED], here they are: One to five were top-down driven; i.e., what we came up with here. Six and seven came from the team.

Are you the team that he's talking about here, you and your agents?

A Right.

Mr. Evers. I'm sorry, [REDACTED]. Do you know? Do you know whether he's referring to --

Mr. [REDACTED] Well, we had concerns about, you know, obviously, shortages there and if there was a credible threat. So --

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Do you ever recall talking with other members of your team about creating certain tripwires or about what tripwires might be?

A I remember talking about these issues. We -- not saying, Hey, these are tripwires; if this happens, we're going to leave. But, you know, there were -- at one point, there was a fuel shortage, you

know, where the stations had shut down for a while, but then we got past that. They opened back up. And we had reserve fuel anyhow that we stored. But these were concerns all along.

Q So it says one to five were top-down driven. What does that mean to you, top-down driven?

Mr. Evers. If you know.

Mr. [REDACTED] I don't know. I mean --

Mr. Davis. Well, I'm asking you what it means to you, whether or not you know what it is in this context.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Carlton, are you asking him what an email not written by him that did not copy him --

Mr. Davis. Susanne, I'm asking what "top-down driven" means, Susanne. It's a simple question.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. The term "top-down driven" in any context?

Mr. Davis. The term "top-down driven."

Mr. Evers. If it means something to you.

Mr. [REDACTED] It doesn't mean anything -- anything to me.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So, out of those seven tripwires, when you packed up the hotel that one day to go back to the ship, was it for any of these seven reasons that you're aware of?

A What I recall is it had to do with movement by Qadhafi's forces, and none of the other issues were a part of the decision at the time.

Q So would that be No. 1 in this list, or would that be

something separate from this list?

A It would be movement of his forces. I don't remember the city, though, that -- you know.

Q Okay. So, in your other experiences as an RSO around the world, if a tripwire was crossed, was that a -- did that usually mean that that was a trigger for you to undertake certain action? Is that what a tripwire is?

A Well, I mean, you would have an EAC and you would just discuss ways to provide better security. You know, a lot of times you go to the host government and get other assets.

Q Going back to the evacuation for a second, I know we've been discussing about that a lot, you mentioned the evacuation plan when you went into Benghazi was to leave on the ferry. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q And once the ferry left, was there an evacuation plan for how you would leave Benghazi at that point?

A Well, I mean, we had a couple options. You know, we had vehicles. So we could drive east to Egypt. You know, so that was definitely option there. Or we could drive part way to Egypt and get picked up by military assets.

Q And how long was the drive to Egypt, if you can recall?

A It was over 10 hours if you were to drive. You know, we never drove it, but I know that the drive was over 10 hours. Different terrain and everything. It's wasn't an easy trip.

Q Okay. So, correct me if I'm wrong, but it sounds as though

you're saying when you first went to Benghazi, the evaluation plan was to leave on the ship. Correct?

And then if the ship had left, you had the two --

Mr. Evers. Do you want to respond to the question verbally, just for the transcriptionist?

Mr. [REDACTED] Oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead. I'm --

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So when you first went into Benghazi, the evacuation plan was to leave on the ship. Correct?

A Correct.

Q And then if the ship had departed, you had two other options, one of which was to drive over land to Egypt, and the other one was to drive east and be picked up by military assets. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Can we go off the record just for a second.

Mr. Davis. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Davis. Go back on the record.

So we noticed you pulling some notes out of your pocket throughout the course of the interview.

Mr. [REDACTED] Correct.

Mr. Davis. I guess in an effort to help refresh your memory. Are those notes that you took while you were in Benghazi?

Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

Mr. Evers. Do you want to ask for them?

Mr. Davis. Well, we can ask for them. We can do it -- we can do it on the record, or we can do it off the record.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q But that's something you're willing to share with us?

A Sure.

Q Those notes?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

A I kept a log during my career, and basically, I know what I was doing each day. It's not in detail, but at least I can say, you know, I worked on this detail, I was in this city and -- or whatever, or if there was a major accident, I -- a lot of times I made a note of that.

Q Okay.

Mr. Evers. Carlton, do you mind if I ask a couple questions about it too.

You took them for your personal use?

Mr. [REDACTED]. Yes. And there's a couple things on there like private. I mean, not real private, but like exercise for 15 minutes or something like that.

Ms. Jackson. And you would be embarrassed about that?

Mr. [REDACTED]. No. But there's things on there that aren't pertinent to you're --

Ms. Duval. And we talked about it out in the hallway, and you'll

keep these confidential and use them for whatever probative value they may have.

Mr. Davis. Yes, and I am going to speak for Susanne and say that Susanne and the minority will do the same.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Yes. I know that he notes his mother's birthday.

Ms. Duval. See. He's a good guy.

Ms. Jackson. Do you want to mark it as an exhibit?

Mr. Davis. No, because we're not going to discuss off of it.

Ms. Jackson. Do you want it marked in any way as part of the record?

Mr. Evers. The transcript will reflect that we handed it over.

Ms. Jackson. Yeah. Yeah. Okay.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Is it common in the State Department when you go to war zones or other areas that you receive some type of additional compensation on top of your salary?

A Yes.

Q And what is that referred to normally?

A Danger pay.

Q And when you went to Benghazi, were you told that you would be receiving any danger pay?

A I think at the time we didn't get danger pay because it -- sometimes the danger pay lags some. You know what I mean? It can be a war zone. It can be -- but sometimes it's not declared. You

know, nobody's there right now. So it's not declared a -- best I can understand, it's not declared a danger pay location.

An example is when I went to [REDACTED], it wasn't a danger pay. A little bit later, a year or two later, I think it was like a year later, then it became a danger pay post, and the conditions didn't get any worse a year later than they were when I was there, but the system kind of caught up. Sometimes the system, from what I see, isn't caught up all the time.

Q So when you first went to Benghazi, was that considered a danger pay post?

A I don't think it was. I don't remember getting extra pay for going to Benghazi.

Q Okay. Did you ever receive any extra pay for going to Benghazi?

A I don't -- I think all that I received was just my per diem.

Q Did anybody from within the State Department speak with you about your time in Benghazi or the situation surrounding your time in Benghazi after the compound was attacked on September 11, 2012?

A No.

Q So nobody from the Department reached out to you for your story?

A No.

Q Did you speak with anybody? Were you debriefed by anybody regarding your time in Benghazi?

A At -- are you speaking about a couple years later -- or a

year and half later, when the compound was -- after it was attacked, was I debriefed?

Q That's right.

A No.

Q No. Okay. What about when you came back from Benghazi initially in May of 2011?

A Not too much conversation in my office about it. You know, nobody asked me to prepare a report.

Q That's not something Mr. [REDACTED] or anybody in the office asked you to do?

A Right.

Q And you retired how long afterwards?

A Month later.

Q Month later. Okay.

So your experience in Benghazi was not formally -- was not shared in a formal setting either written or orally with anybody else?

A The --

Mr. Evers. Is that what you meant to say?

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q You weren't debriefed by anybody within the Department when you came back?

A I spoke to my supervisor, but basically informally. You know, I didn't write a report on what had happened.

Q Do you know if your supervisor took any notes during this meeting?

A I don't know.

Q And your supervisor at this time was who?

A [REDACTED]

Q Okay.

A I will mention that I was called to the Director's Office, [REDACTED], maybe a week or two later. And he basically thanked me for, you know, having gone into Benghazi, but there wasn't a -- from what I can recall, there weren't any detailed questions.

Q And aside from thanking you for going into Benghazi, did Mr. [REDACTED] ask you to elaborate on your experience there?

A No.

Q And, again, a year and a half later after the attack you spoke with nobody at the Department about your time there?

A I might have spoken to some colleagues that followed after me or just some colleagues that I know from the Department, but it wasn't anybody in leadership. It -- just lower-level people that were at the Department.

Q You testified earlier you did not speak to the Accountability Review Board --

A Correct.

Q -- is that correct?

A Right.

Q Did you speak with anybody on the Independent Panel of Best Practices?

A No.

Q And you've never spoken to anybody at Congress before?

A No.

Q About this -- about Benghazi.

A Correct. Yeah, I didn't speak to anyone in Congress about Benghazi.

Q When was the first time that you recall hearing Congress was looking into what happened at Benghazi?

A I don't -- I don't recall.

Q Okay. Did anybody from the Department -- let me rephrase. Have you ever searched for any documents or emails regarding your time in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Okay. Has anybody ever asked you to look for any documents or emails about your time in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Did anybody ever make you sign any type of a nondisclosure agreement about your time in Benghazi?

A No.

Q When did you first learn that this committee wanted to speak with you?

A Last week.

Q Were you told last week that the committee first asked to speak with you as early as last November?

Mr. Evers. That's --

Ms. Sawyer. You know, Carlton, I think I'm going to have to

object. I was in meetings that you were not present in. So I'm not saying that you're misrepresenting what occurred in those meetings, but in those meetings, that was not the clarification of the letter. If you want to ask if a letter was sent on that date, that's fine.

Ms. Jackson. It was December.

Mr. Davis. I'm sorry. November. December -- December. I'm sorry. December 4. I'm sorry.

Ms. Duval. And then there were clarifications later about who the committee wanted to speak to when.

Mr. Davis. Well, Chairman Gowdy's letter asked to speak with him as early as December 4. So, to the extent any clarifications -- it's December. I'm sorry. December 4. Thank you.

Mr. Davis. So you first learned last week that the committee wanted to speak with you, is my understanding.

Mr. Evers. And, [REDACTED] is that quite right? Nudge.

Mr. [REDACTED] I think that's right. Did -- I mean, you contacted me. I thought it was last week.

Mr. Evers. If that's what you remember.

Mr. [REDACTED] I never received that email from -- that you had given me later because of the wrong address.

Ms. Duval. Right. Okay.

Mr. Evers. That's right.

Mr. [REDACTED] There was an email that Assistant Secretary Ken Starr's office --

Ms. Duval. Greg Starr.

Mr. [REDACTED] Greg Starr, came out of his office. I didn't get it. He had the wrong email address.

Ms. Duval. Because he's no longer a current employee. So it was hard for us to track him down. There were some hurdles in trying to get in touch with him on behalf of the committee.

Mr. Davis. Do you know what date that email was sent?

Mr. [REDACTED] I should have looked, but I didn't. I wasn't paying attention to that, but I ended up getting a copy then. Austin had given me a copy then of that -- of that letter, and it -- he -- Assistant Secretary Starr basically said, Don't compare notes with other people that -- and give your truthful testimony. That's what the letter was about.

Mr. Davis. Okay. We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Kenny. Go back on the record. Time is 2:25.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I'd like to take a moment to just return to our conversation we were having the last hour. Refer you back to Exhibit 3.

A Okay.

Q This is the email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] in DS/DP, and I'd like to ask you -- understanding and acknowledging that you told us during the last hour that you don't recall seeing this document, aren't familiar with the contents of this document, there was a discussion about some of the methods of extraction that the document discussed. I know that we keyed in on one sentence in particular, in

the second paragraph, which states that this is the only method of extraction that is currently in place for personnel in Benghazi. And in that paragraph, based on the context, appears to refer to the Greek ferry that was available to April 11.

What I would like to ask you about is there is -- five photographs in at the bottom of the page -- another statement that, at least on the face, appears to somewhat at least be somehow inconsistent with that statement, in the beginning, reads, Emergency extraction, the current operational plan for extraction of personnel using military assets would require that the majority of equipment be abandoned in Benghazi.

And so putting this document aside and, again, without touching on classified information, feel free to tell us if we're approaching the line there because we certainly don't want to cross it and don't want you to cross it either, but at least based on this document to us, you know, looking at the date, and this is April 8, it appears that there was some sort of emergency extraction plan in play, whether it's military assets or otherwise. Is that your recollection?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And just to clarify even further, then, on the next page there are two options that are laid out. We discussed those in some length in the last hour, and the second option, the last sentence reads, After the 11th, the untimely removal of personnel may come at a high cost to the USG.

Now, do you know, based on this document, what they're referring

to when they say that there's a high cost to the U.S. Government?

A No, I don't. I didn't write this document. I didn't -- as I mentioned earlier, I didn't stop him from sending it, but these are not my thoughts.

Q Sure. I completely understand.

The reason I asked is because elsewhere in the document, they talk about these fully armored vehicles that appear to be pretty expensive assets. Is that correct? They refer to their value here as around \$100,000.

A Correct.

Q Okay. And do you recall the military evacuation plan, would that have also provided for the removal of that equipment, or would that equipment had -- would have been abandoned?

A It would have been abandoned.

Q Okay. So it's possible, then, when he refers to a high cost to the U.S. Government, he could be referring to the equipment that would be left behind or an emergency evacuation to --

A I don't -- I can't speculate on --

Q That's --

A I will mention, though, that those vehicles were provided to us by AID. So it wasn't so much of an issue with me. They aren't my vehicles.

Q That's very helpful. Thank you.

Turning now just real briefly to Exhibit 4, this is the email -- at the top of the email is from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]. This is the May

4, 2011, email. We had some discussion in the last hour, and I was wondering -- I think I just want the record to be as clear as possible with respect to the tripwires, and you had mentioned that at the time, you weren't aware of whether there were any tripwires in place when you arrived in the country, but at some point in time, your understanding was that there were written tripwires that were developed. Is that a fair characterization?

A Well, I don't recall, you know, when written tripwires were in place, but, you know, we had concerns. You know, maybe we -- these were concerns that we had. You know, and I didn't have a document in my pocket that said, Hey, we're -- if we get overrun by Qadhafi's troops, then, hey, that's a tripwire. We better leave.

You know, that was taken for granted. If, you know, there was some activity in Benghazi directed at us, we're going to take that into consideration. Other attacks on our colleagues. You know, all that was -- we were looking at all that on a daily basis.

Q So --

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Sorry. And so is it fair to say you had a list in your head of tripwires?

A Right. I had a list in my head, but I didn't classify them as tripwires. They classified them as things that we monitor all the time.

Q And so the list in your head of things that would cause concern to have a discussion about whether to evacuate or take other

emergency precautions, that was something that you considered on a daily basis?

A Sure.

Q Did you discuss that with your counterparts in Benghazi?

A I mean, I would ask them questions, find out about this or that, but maybe -- I don't think I discussed it with them on a daily basis, no.

Mr. Evers. Do you want to clarify what counterparts or who "them" are?

Mr. [REDACTED] Do you mean the other agents?

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Yeah. The other agents or the Envoy.

A No. We didn't discuss those issues on a daily basis.

Q If any of those issues in your head had occurred, would you have discussed them?

A Sure. We discussed when events happened.

Q And what would you have done if any of the issues that you had in your head as potential concerns happened? What would have been the next step?

A Well, I mean, we reported back to Washington. And as I mentioned earlier, I reported to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. And we would have -- I would have discussed it with the Envoy and with the team, and we would have come to some decision.

Q And what do you mean by "some decision"? Do you mean a decision about whether to take action or not to take action, or whether

to evacuate or not to evacuate or --

A Well, it wasn't always like, Hey, I'm going to look at this because I'm ready to leave. We're going to look at this and maybe we avoid that area where that incident happens, or maybe we change our profile a little bit, you know. I wasn't looking to evacuate every other day.

And if I could, can I go back to the past hour of something that -- and as I thought -- because I haven't thought about these things for 4 years, but it was brought up that when we did that evacuation back to the ship, when that -- we had some data come in, and we evacuated back to the ship, and we had gathered our supplies and packed the vehicles and went back.

RPTR MCCONNELL

EDTR HOFSTAD

[2:33 p.m.]

Mr. [REDACTED] I recall now that, after that happened, I was somewhat embarrassed that we had done that.

I was out of the command post when the information came in. And after we looked at the information, we kind of realized that there wasn't enough for us to go back to the ship. I had let one of my -- you know, the shift leader, he kind of looked at it different than I did, when I had time to reflect back on it, along with Mr. Stevens.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Did you have any sense of the Special Envoy's views towards tripwires in Benghazi?

A Not specifically. I mean, obviously, he was concerned about security like we were, you know. But --

Q Is it fair to say that he paid close attention or as close attention as he could given his position to security in Benghazi?

A Sure. Sure. I mean, he was able to speak to people that we couldn't speak to because he had the language skills. So he was always concerned about security.

Q Okay. Did he ever express to you any desire to stay in Benghazi regardless of if security deteriorated?

A I don't recall that.

Q Uh-huh.

A I can recall that he never expressed a desire to leave.

Q All right.

Okay. One other just quick cleanup matter here. So there was a question in this internal email, in the Exhibit 4. Referring to specific tripwires one through five, quote, "One through five were top-down driven, i.e., what we came up with here," close quote.

And just so we have a complete understanding of this document, [REDACTED] you described as your boss. Where does he sit in Diplomatic Security?

A I was in the Foreign Service. I was an FS-2, which is a GS-14 approximate. So he would be an approximate, in the GS system, a GS-15.

Q Okay.

And [REDACTED], who was he?

A He was down at headquarters, and he was on the desk, a desk officer for Diplomatic Security. And that was his region.

Q Okay. So he was a desk officer.

A But he was -- he was a DS agent. But he was on the desk for DS.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Could I just ask you a quick question about the incident that you clarified for us?

You described yourself as being, I think you said, somewhat embarrassed by the decision to have packed up and headed to the ship and that you felt you assessed it on the ground a little differently,

looking back, than your team leader would.

So, with regard to that, were those decisions being made, like, right there on the ground by the folks who had firsthand access to the security situation?

A I don't recall exactly, but the best I can recollect is -- we weren't -- there was no decision in Washington that came and said, "Hey, you guys need to leave." That was on the ground.

Q And was there a decision that came down from Washington -- you said there was nothing from Washington that said, "You guys need to leave." In response to that, when you guys went to the ship, was there any message back from Washington that you needed to stay?

A I don't -- I don't recall. I mean, once we got back to the ship and we had more time to look at what had happened, then it was reevaluated by Mr. Stevens and myself.

Q And did you two reach an agreement on how to then move forward? You said you reevaluated it by you and the Special --

A Right.

Q -- Envoy. Did you two reach agreement amongst yourselves?

A To come back?

Q Yeah. Whatever decision you made. I presume you came back, because it seems like you stayed.

A Right. We made that decision to come back.

See, when the information came in, I wasn't in the command post. So I came in a little bit late, and they were down the road, as far

as like, hey, we really need to get out of here. So if they felt that and they had the information, I'm not going to sit down, okay, let's have a meeting here for 15 minutes. We just did it. You know, we moved.

Q All right.

So, understanding that security on the ground might be fluid, your team certainly had the flexibility to adjust and respond appropriately?

A Right. We were never given any direction that we couldn't make decisions on our own with the change in conditions that were taking place in Benghazi.

Q So whether or not those change in conditions were actually written down somewhere, did you feel in any way constrained to make your best judgment on the ground as to how you should respond to security incidents?

A No, I didn't feel constrained.

Q Were you guys ever -- you said that you personally felt somewhat embarrassed. Were you ever criticized by anyone else for the decision to, at that point in time, go with your team leader's assessment and pack up and go to the ship?

A No. And Mr. Stevens, he wasn't upset or anything that we had done that. I just think that we realized that maybe we shouldn't have done it. But there were no reprimands or anything like that.

Q All right.

So would it be fair to say that you feel like your team acted in the moment as best it could, and then when you had the opportunity to

reflect back and have the conversation, you were able to have that conversation freely without any pressure?

A Sure. And then, as we reflected back, I looked at it as, you know, it wasn't a bad thing; we just did a drill here to get out of here so we know we can get out of here quick if we have to.

Q Okay.

A At the time, we didn't think it was a drill. But, in reflecting back, it was like, okay, we are able to get out of here very quickly.

Q Uh-huh.

Mr. Kenny. So did the information turn out to be inaccurate? Is that --

Mr. [REDACTED] I don't know that it was inaccurate.

Ms. Duval. What information?

Mr. Kenny. The information that you received that caused you to reevaluate --

Mr. [REDACTED] I don't remember, you know, what -- all I know is there was troop movement, and maybe it wasn't as forward as initially thought.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay.

Was it the case that some of the information or sometimes information you received would later turn out to be inaccurate?

A I don't recall that. It could have been.

Q As a general matter, you don't recall?

A I don't, no.

Q Okay.

I think what we would like to do at this point is turn to a series of questions and ask you about a number of allegations that have been publicly made and asserted as facts since the attacks occurred 2 1/2 years ago.

You may have heard some of these allegations on television or read about them in the press. While anybody can speculate about what might have happened before, during, and after the attacks, there is really a limited universe of people who actually have firsthand factual knowledge of what really happened, and we need to explore fully with you whether you are one of those people.

And please understand that, given your position, you may not have been in a position to directly observe certain facts related to all of these allegations. And we are not asking you to speculate. It is just, in our role as fact-finders, we want to ask you whether you have any evidence -- that's any evidence at all -- to support these allegations.

Your answers will help provide a complete factual record and reduce any confusion or misinformation that may be in the public domain as a result of certain statements.

So the first allegation relates to whether Secretary Clinton intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down, and this resulted in the Defense Department not sending

more assets to help in Benghazi.

Mr. [REDACTED], do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A I have no idea --

Q Okay. That's fine.

A -- because I wasn't at the Department anymore.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Understood. But do you have any evidence that that occurred?

Mr. [REDACTED] No. No.

Mr. Kenny. Okay.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. There is just going to be a series of these.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton issued any order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Okay.

We'll move now to the next allegation, and this relates to the Secretary's personal involvement in security decisions related to Libya.

Some have alleged that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security to the post in Benghazi. The Washington Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four

Pinocchios, its highest award for these claims.

And, Mr. [REDACTED], do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A I have no knowledge of that.

Q So you have no evidence.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day security resources in Benghazi?

A I have no evidence of that.

Q Okay.

We'll turn to the next allegation, and this relates to Secretary Clinton's role in the March 2011 run-up to U.S. military operations in Libya, then called Operation Odyssey Dawn, which was pursuant to a United Nations Security Council resolution, as well as the follow-on mission led by NATO called Operation Unified Protector.

Recently, the Washington Times has raised an allegation that, quote, "U.S. intelligence did not support the story that Mrs. Clinton used to sell the war in Libya, namely that there was an imminent danger of genocide to be carried out by the Qadhafi regime," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or fabricated intelligence in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in the spring of 2011?

A I have no idea.

Q So you have no evidence?

A I have no knowledge of it.

Q Okay.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton intentionally exaggerated the risk that Muammar Qadhafi, the longtime Libyan dictator, presented to his own people so that she could justify military intervention in Libya?

A I have no knowledge of that.

Q Okay.

We'll turn to the next allegation, which relates to speculation about the illegal transfer of weapons from Libya to Syria.

Some have questioned whether the U.S. mission in Benghazi was transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to any other countries, including Turkey. A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was not collecting and shipping arms from Libya to Syria," close quote, and that, quote, "eyewitness testimony and thousands of pages of CIA's cables and emails that the committee reviewed provide no support for this allegation," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A I have no knowledge of any of that.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria or any other country?

A No knowledge of that.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. personnel in Benghazi were involved in the unlawful transfer of weapons to Syria, to Turkey, or to any other country?

A I have no knowledge of that.

Q Okay.

I appreciate your indulgence here as we turn to the next allegation, which relates to reports that a team of CIA security personnel were temporarily delayed from departing the Annex to the State Department personnel Special Mission Compound.

The House Intelligence Committee found, or issued a bipartisan report concluding that, quote, "the evidence from eyewitness testimony, ISR's video footage, closed-circuit television recorders, and other recordings and other sources provides no support for the allegation that there was any stand-down order. Rather, there were mere tactical disagreements about the speed with which the team should depart prior to securing additional security assets," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order?

A I have no knowledge. I wasn't on the ground.

Q Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House Intelligence Committee's finding that, quote, "there were mere tactical disagreements about the speed with which the team should depart prior to securing additional assets," close quote?

A No knowledge. I wasn't there.

Q Okay.

Still, some have speculated that, quote, "there might have been a good reason to delay. There might have been the safety of these very men that were standing there. It might have been a bad reason. There might have been something political," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that there was a political reason for the temporary delay of the CIA's security personnel who departed the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A I have no knowledge. I wasn't there.

Q Okay.

And putting aside whether after the fact you personally agree with the decision to delay temporarily or whether you thought or might think it is the right idea or right decision, do you have any evidence that there was a, quote, "bad" or improper reason behind the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A Again, no knowledge. I wasn't on the ground.

Q Okay.

The next allegation relates to the State Department's cooperation with the Accountability Review Board.

According to a September 15, 2014, article entitled "Benghazi Bombshell: Clinton State Department Official Reveals Details of Alleged Document Review" that appeared on the Web site The Daily Signal, quote, "Hillary Clinton confidants were part of an operation to separate damaging documents before they were turned over to the

Accountability Review Board," close quote.

The article further reports that former State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Ray Maxwell, quote, "couldn't help but wonder if the ARB, perhaps unknowingly, had received from his bureau a scrubbed set of documents with the most damaging material missing," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that Hillary Clinton confidants, such as Cheryl Mills or Jake Sullivan, which are both named in the article, were part of an operation to remove or scrub damaging documents before they were turned over to the ARB?

A I have no knowledge. I wasn't there.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No knowledge. I wasn't there.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No knowledge. I wasn't there.

Q Okay.

And then we will again ask these questions for documents provided to Congress.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were provided to Congress?

A No knowledge that any documents were altered.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided to Congress?

A No knowledge of that.

Q Okay.

We'll turn now to the next allegation, which refers to a set of talking points that the intelligence community prepared at the request of Congress on the role of then-CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell. It has been alleged that, quote, "every single change that Michael Morell made was calculated to cast the administration in a more favorable light," close quote.

There are allegations that Mr. Morell lied in his testimony before Congress when he said that he and the CIA had, quote, "faithfully performed our duties in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and nonpartisanship," close quote.

The question for you is, do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell gave false or misleading testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence?

A I have no knowledge of what has gone on at the CIA.

Q Okay.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A I have no knowledge of what is happening with the CIA.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone else in the CIA altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No knowledge of what's happening at the CIA.

Q Okay.

We'll turn to the next allegation. It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk shows?

A I have no knowledge about that. I wasn't there.

Q Okay.

We'll turn to the next allegation. It has been alleged the President of the United States was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote, on the night of the attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the President was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote, on the night of the attacks?

A I have no knowledge of that.

Q Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the President was, quote, "missing in action," close quote, on the night of the attacks?

A I have no knowledge.

Q Okay.

We'll turn to the next allegation, which relates to a team of four military personnel at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services Committee found that, quote, "there was no stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join in the fight in Benghazi," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that the House Armed Services Committee's conclusion that there was no stand-down order is accurate?

A I have no knowledge of that.

Q The first rescue team was sent from Tripoli to Benghazi within 45 minutes of receiving notice of the initial attack at the State Department facility in Benghazi. Some have questioned, however, whether a second team of four military personnel should have also been sent.

Some have alleged that those four military personnel were ordered to stand down. Military officials have stated that those four individuals were ordered to, quote, "remain in place," close quote, in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance there.

Do you have any evidence that military officials who told Congress that the individuals were ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance were incorrect or misrepresenting the facts?

A I have no knowledge of that DOD activity.

Q Okay.

Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon in fact ordered the four military personnel in Tripoli to stand down rather than remain in place to provide security and medical assistance in Tripoli on the

night of the attacks?

A I have no knowledge on the DOD activity.

Q Okay.

The last allegation relates to the military's deployment of assets on the night of the attack. Former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, had conducted a review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened and how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did," close quote.

Do you have any evidence whatsoever to contradict Congressman McKeon's conclusion?

A I have no knowledge of where our assets were that night.

Q Some have stated, quote, "We didn't run to the sound of guns," close quote, or that, quote, "our military didn't try to engage in that fight," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that the U.S. military did not try to engage in the fight?

A I have no knowledge of those DOD activities.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have saved lives but the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to deploy?

A I have no knowledge of DOD activity.

Q Okay.

Mr. Kenny. Thank you. That concludes our hour. We will go off the record.

Ms. Jackson. We have no further questions.

Thank you, Mr. [REDACTED]

Mr. [REDACTED] Oh, you're welcome.

Ms. Jackson. We appreciate it.

[Whereupon, at 2:54 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

I have read the foregoing ____ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

Witness Name

Date

Errata Sheet

Select Committee on Benghazi

The witness did not respond to multiple contacts from the State Department requesting corrections to the accompanying transcript.