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SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI,  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: [REDACTED]

March  
THURSDAY, ~~MAY~~ 12, 2015

Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room HVC-205,  
Capitol Visitor Center, commencing at 10:12 a.m.

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Appearances:

For the SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI:

DANA CHIPMAN, CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

SHARON JACKSON, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL

SHERIA CLARKE, COUNSEL

MARK GRIDER, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL

KIM BETZ, MEMBER OUTREACH LIAISON

HEATHER SAWYER, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL

BRENT WOOLFORK, MINORITY SENIOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF

For the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

AUSTIN EVERS, SENIOR ADVISOR

Ms. Jackson. Let's go on the record.

This is a transcribed interview of [REDACTED], conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks of the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and matters related to it pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Agent [REDACTED], could you state your full name for the record, please.

Mr. [REDACTED].

Ms. Jackson. Okay. On behalf of the committee, we appreciate your willingness to come in and talk to us today. It's my understanding that you came in from overseas.

What time does your body tell you that it is?

Mr. [REDACTED]. Right now it's 9 1/2 hours ahead. So I think we're pushing almost dinnertime.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. All right. Well, we'll try and get you out before your body says it's your bedtime. Okay?

Mr. [REDACTED]. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. Again, I introduced myself earlier. But I am Sharon Jackson. I am one of the counsel on the majority staff.

And we're going to go around and have everyone introduce themselves so you at least, at one point, have a name that goes with a face. There will be no quiz at the end where you have to put names and faces together at the end.

But I'll start with my colleague to my right.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke.

Ms. Robinson. Kendal Robinson, detailee for minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Mr. Woolfork. Brent Woolfork with the majority staff.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman with the majority staff.

Mr. Grider. Mark Grider with majority staff.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. Evers. And I'm Austin Evers from the State Department.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Before we begin, I'd like to set out the ground rules that we're going to follow today. As in anything, as you're well aware, there are procedures and processes that are going to be followed.

The way that questioning occurs before a congressional committee is that a member from the majority, either a member of the committee, a Member of Congress on the majority staff or a member from the majority staff, will ask questions for up to 1 hour.

And then we over here will switch seats. You'll stay there. And then we'll turn it over to the minority staff for them to have a similar period, an hour, to ask questions for that time period. We will adhere to that 1-hour time period for each side. And, again, questions can only be asked by a Member of Congress who is on the committee or a member of the staff. And we'll rotate back and forth until each side has exhausted all of the questions that they have for you.

During your career as a law enforcement officer, you may have had to testify in a deposition or in a Federal court or even a state court. And this is a little different. We are not bound by the Rules of Evidence here. So we may ask your opinion on things. We may ask hearsay. And all of that is admissible in a transcribed interview before a congressional committee.

You or the counsel that you have brought with you today may raise an objection to a question, but only for one of privilege. That invocation of privilege is subject to review by the chairman of the committee, and he will then decide whether the question will be answered or not. Because, again, privilege, as like other things, do not necessarily exist in a committee.

So the minority staff and our staff are not permitted to raise objections to questions. So it's just you, your counsel, and the only one that will be entertained will be one for privilege.

This session is going to be -- we are in an unclassified setting. So if you believe a question that is posed to you calls for a classified answer, just say so, and we will either retract the question or reserve it until we go into a classified setting.

In preparing for yours, I don't believe that any of my questions will go into classified information based on the documents that I have reviewed and things like that. But, again, if you feel that it does, we will ask that you answer as best you can in an unclassified manner, but let us know that more details could be given in a classified setting, if you can.

Mr. [REDACTED]. [Nonverbal response.]

Ms. Jackson. You are welcome to confer with Mr. Evers at any time that you need. We understand he is here as the State Department's attorney, not as your personal attorney.

But he is here today for you. And so, should you wish to confer with him before giving an answer or about any procedural thing, we will give you that opportunity to do so.

So just let us know. We'll go off the record. You can step out. And we'll give you the time that you need to confer with him.

We will also take a break whenever it's convenient for you. Typically, we've taken a break at the end of the first hour, but while we switch seats for the minority to come in.

But if you need a break before then or at any time during this session, again, just let us know. We'll go off the record. We'll take a break. Usually, after the first 2 hours, we'll take maybe a 45-minute break for lunch and reconvene, if we need to, for another round.

We have waters out. We have coffee available, tea available. So if you need anything, again, just let us know. We're going to try and make you as comfortable as possible to get through this.

As you can see, we have an official reporter here taking down everything that is said so that we have a written record of this interview. So it will be important that you give all responses verbally. A lot of people nod and shake their head, but that's very difficult for the reporter to take down. So just like a court of law,

responses have to be out loud.

The other thing that's often difficult to do is to wait to begin your answer until the question is done and for me to wait until your answer is done until I ask the next question maybe in followup. We need to be cognizant that it's difficult for the reporter to take down when two people are talking at the same time and just dial it back a little bit, take a little bit slower pace.

As for the questions that we ask you today, it is important to us that you understand what we're trying to get at in a particular question. So if you miss part of it or you're unsure as to what we're asking, please ask us to restate it or rephrase it in some way. Sometimes it may be a compound question. We can break it down.

But we want to make sure that you understand the questions that we're asking to give us the best answer that you can in that. So please don't hesitate, if you're confused about anything, to just ask us to rephrase or restate it.

We also want a clear understanding of what you know from your time in Benghazi, Libya. So we're going to ask you to give us your best recollection. We understand that several years have passed since you were there, you've done a few things in the interim, and everything is not going to be crystal clear.

But we are going to ask you to give us your best recollection possible so that we can gather -- I mean, we weren't there. You were there. And so we need you to tell us about what was happening in Benghazi at the time you were there.

If you just don't remember a particular event, please tell us. We understand it's human nature that memories fade over time. But to the extent that you can give us something or give us information about someone else who was there, someone else who might have information on that point, let us know who that person might be so that we may be able to explore that avenue.

Mr. [REDACTED]. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Do you understand that you have an obligation to answer questions from Congress truthfully?

Mr. [REDACTED]. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And do you understand that that also applies to this committee?

Mr. [REDACTED]. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. As a Federal law enforcement agent, I'm sure you're aware, but I need to ask you: Do you know that a witness who provides false testimony could be subject to a prosecution for perjury or making a false statement?

Mr. [REDACTED]. 1001. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Yes. Okay.

Is there any reason, as you sit here today, that you would not be able to answer the questions truthfully that are going to be posed to you?

Mr. [REDACTED]. No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. That's the end of the process for me.

Does the minority have anything that they would like to add?



Ms. Sawyer. We don't.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. I would show that the clock reads now about 10:12, 12 after 10:00. So we're going to begin with the first hour of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Agent [REDACTED], how long have you been a Federal law enforcement agent with the Department of State?

A I've been with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security since [REDACTED] 2001.

Q And did you have any prior military law enforcement or State Department experience prior to becoming a Diplomatic Security agent?

A Yes. I was in the Army Reserves as a 96 Bravo, which is an intelligence analyst. And I also served for the [REDACTED] District Attorney's Office as an intelligence analyst in [REDACTED] prior to becoming an agent.

Q Was that criminal intelligence?

A The military obviously was --

Q Right.

A But the [REDACTED] DA's Office was criminal in nature.

Q Okay. And when did you do that?

A That was in 1998 until I was actually hired by DS.

Q Okay. And starting in [REDACTED] 2001 until present, can you give us a summary of your various assignments within Diplomatic Security.

A Okay. Well, I became an agent, like I said, in 2001. I graduated from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in the [REDACTED] 2002. I was assigned to the [REDACTED] field office.

After [REDACTED], I served as the assistant regional security officer in [REDACTED]. From [REDACTED], I became the RSO in [REDACTED] for 1 year. After [REDACTED], I served in [REDACTED] as an assistant regional security office.

After [REDACTED], I served as the RSO in [REDACTED]. From [REDACTED], I went back to FLETC, as I mentioned earlier, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. I was the agency rep for FLETC for 3 years.

And currently I serve as the regional security officer in [REDACTED], which is in the northern provinces.

Q And how long have you been in [REDACTED]?

A July 23, 2014. I know the date well.

Q And how long will you be there?

A July 23, 2015.

Q Okay. In early 2012, you went to Benghazi, Libya. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And when were you in Benghazi?

A I was there from first week of January -- exact date I cannot recall -- till about February -- I think it was just before Valentine's Day, 13th or 14th.

Q And how is it -- and that was considered a temporary duty assignment?

A Correct. In our vernacular, TDY.

Q Right. Those letters, capital T, capital D, capital Y?

A Correct.

Q Yes.

And how is it that you either volunteered or got recruited for the Benghazi assignment?

A It's typical in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to put out an email to the agents requesting volunteers to serve in certain areas of the world. Benghazi just happened to be one of them. And, therefore, I put my name -- submitted my name.

Q Okay. Were you at FLETC at the time?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Had you done any other TDYs in your career prior to Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Can you summarize those for us.

A Yes. I have served six TDYs in Afghanistan, four TDYs in Iraq. I've also been TDY as RSO in Sana'a, Yemen.

Q You seem to like to go to the hot spots around the world. Do you choose in a way to have the challenge of a high-threat post?

A In order to respond to that, I would just say, when duty calls, I'm more of one of volunteering to go to those areas.

Q Okay. Did you have high-threat tactical training prior to any of your TDYs in a high-threat post?

A Yes.

Q When did you undertake that high-threat tactical course?

A The high-threat course has been in place -- I want to say it was put together in 2002, but actually implemented in 2003. I was one of the first class that actually went through the course.

I have taken that course twice. Recently I took a high-threat executive course, which is more for a manager or higher level. So, as far as high threat goes, I've taken that course three times in different versions.

Q Was the executive course taken after your tour of duty in Benghazi, Libya?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And had you taken the high-threat course twice before going to Benghazi, Libya?

A Yes.

Q Okay. You took it for the first time in 2003. Is that correct?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. And then when did you take it again?

A It was just -- I would say it was 2004 or 2005. It might be the wintertime. As I stated earlier, I was RSO [REDACTED], and that began in the fall of 2005.

Q So sometime before you went to [REDACTED]?

A Definitely. Yes.

Q Okay. Had the course changed or evolved over time?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And how so?

A Well, the course was a 12-week course, if I recall the first one. And by the time I took the second one, I think it was down to 10 weeks.

A lot of that has to do with having enough training calendar days in order to get through all the training, and I also believe it has something to do with lessons learned of what was important and what may not have been important in some of the training. It was an evolution.

Q Uh-huh.

Now, you said that your assignment at FLETC for 3 years was to be the agency representative to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q What does that actually entail? Are you an instructor? Do you put together courses? Do you advise others on what the State Department needs? All of the above?

A As the DS representative at FLETC, I'm in charge of three agents and one PSC, or contractor. And our job there is to implement the DS agents into that curriculum, which is, at FLETC, a basic agent course. It's a requirement within Diplomatic Security to have that course in order to then go on to follow-on training in becoming an agent.

My job is to represent Diplomatic Security to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center executives, lobby, perhaps, on behalf of them, depending on training that we require for our agents, as well

as be the representative to the students actually in the training whenever there are disciplinary or other things that happen at FLETC.

Also, as the DS representative, I'm mentoring the agents who are actually instructors that actually participate in the class, and I took it upon myself to actually become an instructor if I had chosen to actually take classes as well.

And the reason behind that is I didn't want to manage people with something I didn't already know how they should be actually implementing the policy of FLETC. So I took it upon myself to take that training as well.

Q So there's actual training to become an instructor?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And have you actually taught any courses?

A I have not taught any FLETC courses, but I've taught Diplomatic Security courses.

Q Okay. And what were some of the courses that you've taught?

A Over the recent scare of shutdown for DHS, when I was back at FLETC, there was a shutdown where we had to actually take our students off of their property.

So I took it upon myself to instruct our agents how to do route analysis with motorcades, how to do advances. And then the other courses were basically physical activities, push-ups, sit-ups, running, things like that.

Q Okay. Are there special requirements when you undertake motorcades or movements in high-threat areas versus other more stable

areas?

A This question is separate from FLETC or are you talking about just DS?

Q Just DS.

A In regards to motorcade operations in a high-threat environment for diplomatic security, there are different procedures as opposed to what you would do CONUS or secure stateside.

Q And what are some of those differences?

A Those differences would include the type of vehicles, perhaps, the type of special equipment that we have in the vehicles, and may include different tactics in how you drive, depending on the environment.

Q Would it also include the number of vehicles, the number of agents, who were along?

A I want to say no.

Q Okay. All right. Going back to your tour of duty in Benghazi, Libya -- and I believe you said you were there from early January through just about the middle of February. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Who were the State Department foreign service officers in Benghazi when you were there?

A When I arrived, I believe the name is [REDACTED], who was the IMO/management officer and collateral duties. And the principal officer at the time was [REDACTED] or [REDACTED].

Q And did those two individuals remain constant during the

entire time that you were there or did one or both of those individuals rotate out?

A Both of those individuals rotated out.

Q Okay. And was that shortly after you arrived, in the middle of your tour, or at the end of your tour, if you recall?

A I recall it was near the end of the tour.

Q Okay. And who were they replaced by?

A Mr. [REDACTED], who did IMO. I do not recall the gentleman's name. If you had a photo, maybe I could say that's him.

And the other gentleman was -- I believe it was [REDACTED]. I do recall the gentleman that replaced Mr. [REDACTED] came from The Hague -- or at least that's what I can remember off the top of my head.

Q Was his first name perhaps [REDACTED]?

A The IMO person?

Q Yes.

A That sounds familiar.

Q Like [REDACTED] or something like that?

A It may.

Q Okay.

A I think that may be it.

Q All right. Were there other employees in Benghazi -- other State Department employees in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there an individual known to you as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?



A The name [REDACTED] is familiar. I'm familiar with the name.

Q Okay. [REDACTED]?

A [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

But for this question, Mr. [REDACTED] was an advisor/consultant to the public -- the PO.

Q And that means "principal officer"?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And that would have been Mr. [REDACTED], who was then replaced by Mr. [REDACTED]?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was Mr. [REDACTED] like a full-time employee in Benghazi? I mean, did he show up every morning, stay all day, go home at the end of the day, or was it more of an ad hoc arrangement, from your perspective?

A I'd rather leave that to the classified setting.

Q Okay. It's your assertion that that information would be classified?

Mr. Evers. I don't think that's what he's saying. We spoke about this off the record prior to the beginning of the interview.

Ms. Jackson. Uh-huh.

Mr. Evers. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. Evers. -- so we can address it.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Other than Mr. [REDACTED], were there other persons?

A There was what I would call a local hire or a locally engaged staff -- the acronym LES -- female. And I cannot give you what her first name is.

Q And what was her role?

A She was more secretarial. She did some secretarial work primarily for the principal officer.

Q Okay. But this person was a Libyan national?

A Yes.

Q Okay. When you arrived in Benghazi, how many other DS agents were there?

A There were two DS agents in Benghazi upon my arrival.

Q Okay. And who were they?

A [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

Q Okay. Were there any other DS personnel in Benghazi when

you arrived?

A I just remember those two.

Q Okay. Now, you've described that you went through high-threat tactical training prior to going to Benghazi.

Was that a requirement for anyone who went to Benghazi?

A I don't recall if there was a requirement or not. You know, verbatim, I don't remember what the email said as far as for volunteers and whether there were stipulations. But, as I stated earlier, I was high-threat-qualified.

Q To your knowledge, were the other two agents high-threat-trained?

A I don't know. I don't recall.

Q All right. And did the other two agents remain in Benghazi during the entire time that you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So Agent [REDACTED] and Agent [REDACTED] were in Benghazi through the first part of February?

A I believe Mr. [REDACTED] left maybe a week before myself and Mr. [REDACTED]. So I believe Mr. [REDACTED] did a 30-day. We were all going to do 30-day TDYs, and myself and Mr. [REDACTED] decided that we would stay longer because of the turnover with the new agents coming in.

Q Okay. During the first 30 days that you were there -- so, essentially, the month of January -- were the three of you joined by or augmented by any other agents?

A No.

Q So during the time there, it was -- during the month of January, it was just the three of you?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were there any other [REDACTED] present in Benghazi, Libya, outside of the three of you? And I'm just looking for a yes or no answer.

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were they physically present on the compound where you and the other agents were staying?

A No.

Q Were they close by?

Mr. Evers. If you can say in that context.

Mr. [REDACTED]. I'm just going to refrain from answering that question.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. Evers. And to be clear, you mean in this setting?

Mr. [REDACTED]. Correct. I'm sorry. Yeah.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have any Department of Defense support?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you have any support from any other western countries or other entities that had a presence in Benghazi, Libya, such as the U.N. or European countries, other countries that were friendly to the United States?

A We had relationships with the Brits that were in Benghazi,

but there was no direct support of either's mission. But we did communicate with one another.

Q Okay. So there were no formal memorandums of agreement or understanding regarding mutual support for security purposes?

A Correct.

Q Okay. You've described previously that you underwent the high-threat tactical course. It is our understanding that there is something called FACT training within the State Department.

Do you know what I'm talking about when I say FACT training?

A Yes.

Q And does "FACT" stand for "Foreign Affairs Counterterrorism Training"?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. And could you describe just generally what that would be. What is FACT training, to your understanding?

A I've never instructed the course. I've participated in it. And, in summary, FACT training is just a portion of training that the Department of State Diplomatic Security provides to personnel who are going overseas.

They may or may not be Department of State employees. They could be DHS. They could be DOJ. And it's a training course to bring to light their surroundings of what they may experience in whatever country they're going to.

Q Sort of put them on a heightened state of alert when they're going into a high-threat country?

A The FACT training does have the input for people attending it. It talks about surveillance. It gives them a crash-bang course with vehicles to feel what it's like to drive a vehicle and push out. So yes.

Q Okay. What's a crash-bang course?

A It's a -- it's where you actually move a vehicle with another vehicle and they help you with tactics on how to do that in case you're ever cornered.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, was there a requirement that the foreign service officers who were serving in Benghazi -- was there a requirement that they undergo FACT training prior to going there?

A I do not know.

Q Okay. Was there any specific equipment or other type of training that you had to undergo prior to going to Benghazi? Were you required for any language training or any other type of security training or were you provided any special equipment prior to going to Benghazi?

A I can only speak for myself. I wasn't asked to do any other additional training or given any other equipment prior to taking on this mission.

Q Were you given a list of things that you should take with you?

A I recall there was a list. It was more geared toward, you know, "The weather is going to be cold. Make sure you have long johns" or that kind of thing, but nothing specific in regards to just security.

Q No.

Do you recall? Did you take, like, your own body armor and other things like that?

A I did not.

Q You did not.

Was that available for you once you got there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there a sufficient amount of personal protection equipment available in Benghazi when you got there?

A There was sufficient amount of protective equipment for the personnel on the ground in Benghazi.

Q Okay. Was there a sufficient number of weapons for the personnel who were on the ground in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q It appeared you might have hesitated a little bit.

Is there anything -- did you -- would you have preferred to have more or different weaponry in Benghazi?

A No. I had what was -- what I needed in order to do my job.

Q And what was that?

A I had a pistol. I had rifles. I had ammunition, smoke, vehicles -- armored vehicles.

Q Is there something called an [REDACTED] or an [REDACTED]?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What is that?

A For Diplomatic Security, that's a machine gun -- a heavy

machine gun.

Q Okay. Had you been trained on one of those?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And when had you received that training?

A During high-threat training.

Q Okay. So anyone who was high-threat-trained would have been trained on that?

A Anyone who -- any DS agent who was in my class for high threat would have received that training.

Q Okay. Do you know if that training had been dropped in subsequent years?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Was there any machine guns available in Benghazi to you or the other agents?

A Yes.

Q Okay. On your compound?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Prior to going to Benghazi, were you given any intelligence reports or briefing papers regarding the security situation in Benghazi?

A I was put on an email distro prior to my arrival in order to try to ascertain what I would be going into. Granted, it was during the holidays. So a lot of people took time off. But I was definitely put on the distro regarding information regarding Benghazi.

Q Okay. And you were going in to be, essentially, the agent



in charge or the lead supervisory agent in Benghazi. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Who were you replacing?

A My understanding, that I was replacing -- actually, I don't remember the gentleman's name who I would be replacing.

[Bell ringing.]

Mr. [REDACTED]. Time's up.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q That is wishful thinking on your part. The buzzers and the bells that you hear mean something. I have no idea what. But they signal Members of Congress that they are either to be someplace or not to be someplace.

But it certainly, we assure you, does not mean we have to evacuate the building for any reason, and it, unfortunately for you, does not mean that time is up.

A That's okay. No problem.

If you don't mind restating the question just because it threw me off.

Q Yes. And we have gotten used to them. So yes.

I believe I asked who you replaced. Who was the supervisor --

A Okay.

Q -- before you?

A I don't recall the gentleman's name who was in charge at Benghazi. But the last person there that I recall prior to Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED] arrival was a gentleman by the name of [REDACTED]

██████. I don't know if he was in charge or he was just another agent that was there when they made the transition.

Q Okay. Did you have conversations either over the telephone or by email with him prior to your arrival in Benghazi?

A As I stated earlier, I was put on a distro, and I may have had some interaction with him. I just don't remember.

Q Okay. Outside of emails on that distribution list, do you recall getting anything specifically from him?

A I don't recall specifically, but I'm sure there was probably a correspondence between us.

Q Okay. Any other agents who either were in Benghazi at the time or had been in Benghazi before? Did you sort of reach out for any sort of informal intel about what it was like over there with anyone that you knew had already been there?

A I cannot give a definitive answer because it's been so long. And I'm still in contact with these people. So I couldn't say yes or no because I still have a relationship with them and I speak with them often. So I don't remember if it was prior to Benghazi, while I was in Dubai, or just prior arriving in Benghazi.

Q Okay. And who are some of those people that you've communicated with regarding your experience in Benghazi?

A I know of one person that I -- that I believe served in Benghazi prior to my arrival. His name is ██████████.

Q Okay. Let me just take a step back.

Did you ever do a TDY in Tripoli?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you consider it?

A I would have considered -- knowing me, that if they offered, I probably would have done it.

Q Okay. Prior to going to Benghazi, had you read any intelligence reports either authored by the State Department or any other government agency?

A I don't remember reading any intelligence reports.

Q Okay. Once you were there, did you have access to intelligence reports?

A On the ground in Benghazi?

Q Yes.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did you read them?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And were those daily reports? Weekly reports? Bimonthly reports?

A I remember going through a daily report that we call a situational report, also known as a SITREP. I remember reading something like that. But there were other intelligence reports there.

Q Okay. Was the SITREP something that you or the other agents prepared and sent to Diplomatic Security headquarters?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what kind of information would you include in those reports?

A Situational reports are, like we were just discussing, put out daily. They're not all-encompassing of what happens the 24 hours prior. But what it does do is provide some insight to what we've done for that period.

It may include movements, any incidences that may have occurred during that timeframe, and possibly a status report on security upgrades.

Q Okay. And did you personally prepare those reports or did you delegate that to one of the other agents while you were there?

A It was a collaborative effort. But I, for the most part, delegated it to one of the ARSOs -- Mr. [REDACTED] or Mr. [REDACTED] -- to actually draft it. We would discuss it to ensure its accuracy at least for that time period and then we'd submit it.

Q Okay. And then, as you said, you did these daily?

A We tried to. DS likes to be informed of what's going on. Depending on the circumstance of that day, whether we were out for long movements, we tried to get one out every day. And, if not, we got one out that following morning.

Q Okay. And to whom were these reports directed? I mean, was there a regular list of people or did you just send it to one place and then that place forwarded it to the relevant persons?

A From what I recall, our situational reports were passed through [REDACTED], who was at DS headquarters at the desk -- or what we call "the desk."

If there were other people on that distro, I just don't remember.

But I remember vividly that we would go through him. I did a lot of communication with him.

Q He was sort of your lifeline --

A Yes.

Q -- in a manner of speaking?

And he was -- was he the Libya desk officer?

A I don't know if he was the Libya -- I don't know.

Q Okay. He certainly had Benghazi. He certainly had the Benghazi Mission in his portfolio, as they would say?

A Yes.

Q Do you know if he had other countries or other places?

A I do not recall.

Q Okay. Okay. Going back to these SITREPs that were sent in and you said that you delegated the responsibility for drafting them to the other agents who were there, would you personally review them before they got sent off or did the other agents -- were they authorized to just send them off without your review?

A The other agents had the authorization to send in SITREPs. I made it a point to instruct them that, if they were going to do one, to make sure they discuss it with me so -- although I didn't have to read it just before they sent it. As long as we had some kind of discussion prior to being sent, they had the authority to do that.

Q Okay. All right. So you and the other two agents were in charge of the security at the compound. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you had a principal officer and an IMO management officer that you supported. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And there were these other two individuals that we talked about. But for movements in and around Benghazi, did you provide security for all four of those individuals or just the principal officer and the management officer?

A It was my job to provide security for the PO and the IMO if they were outside of the compound.

Q Okay. And the other -- I'm assuming the locally employed staff, she was sort of -- she did not live on compound, did she?

A No.

Q Okay. So she came and went every day?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you were not responsible for providing security for her. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q The other individual we talked about, he came and went from the compound on his own volition?

A I had no responsibility for that individual's comings and goings.

Q Okay. Describe for us, if you will, how you and the other agents would undertake a movement with the principal officer.

A I requested that the principal officer give us at least 24 hours' heads-up when they wanted to move so that we can plan for the

movement.

Depending on where he wanted to go, if it was within the city, then I'd be able to put something together, advise the agents, and try to get some intelligence about the location that we'd be going to.

We would put in a two-car motorcade and put the principal officer in the vehicle with myself and another agent and go to a venue.

Q Okay. Who would be in the second vehicle?

A Depending on what was going on, we would have the other agent in the other vehicle. And, if not, a local national might be driving it, carrying perhaps the Secretary or somebody else that the PO maybe wanted to go along with. But that's how -- that's how we did it.

Q Okay. Was there a requirement that one agent remain back at the compound?

A There was a requirement to ensure that anybody under Chief of Mission had security. So there were times when the principal officer wanted to go somewhere and I needed all the agents and I had the IMO come with us.

Q So that you had everyone together?

A We had a complete package.

Q Okay. And who was left behind to guard the compound when all of the agents had to --

A Well, we had our local security guards that we hired, as well as the 17th Feb militia, which I would consider like a quick reaction force.

Q QRF?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Whereas the other ones were your local guard force, or LGF?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was the LGF armed?

A No.

Q Okay. Was the QRF armed?

A Yes. Yes.

Q Yes.

Okay. What type of communication systems did you have in Benghazi?

A We had a landline. We had radios. And we also had satellite phones.

Q Okay. Did you have computer systems?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what kind of computer systems did you have?

A We had unclass and, I believe, classified laptops.

Q Okay. Did you have any issues with your radios working satisfactorily in the Benghazi area?

A I don't recall having any issues with my comms --

Q Okay.

A -- regarding radios.

Q Okay. Any other type of communication problems in Benghazi?

A I think we had problems with -- I think we had problems with



Internet, and that might have to do with the power source within Benghazi or something like that. But nothing that really sticks out.

Q We've seen an email address of [REDACTED]. Do you recall that email address?

A I don't.

Q Okay. It's not something that you recall creating?

A I definitely -- I don't believe I created any email addresses.

Q Okay.

A But it doesn't ring a bell.

Q Okay. Would you describe for us the physical layout of the compound that you were at in Benghazi, Libya.

A That is a big question. So I'm going to do my best to answer fully.

Upon my arrival in Benghazi, there were three separate villas or compounds that were connected by bricks in walls where we actually broke down the walls where we could either pass a vehicle or persons through. Each compound was fairly big, even in domestic here, United States sizes for a home, very elaborate and large.

All of them had perimeter fencing of sort. As I stated earlier, only because they were all side by side did we break down the walls in the middle so that we could actually travel from one to the other freely.

I know we called them Villa A, B and C, but I can't recall which one was which. So in my head, I'm going from left to right. It was

a very large villa, very elaborate, that, by the time when I was leaving Benghazi, the decision had been made to actually give it back to the owner, that we didn't need it.

Q Was that Villa A?

A I -- I don't remember.

Q Okay. Was it at one end or was it --

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A It was at one end.

Q Okay.

A Then the middle compound had multiple buildings, for lack of a better term, one where we had our RSO TOC, and the other one was a cafeteria area that we used.

And then the last villa, which we used for the principal officer, another very large compound that had, also, two other -- had two buildings, one, the villa in which myself and the other agents and the principal officer and the IMO lived in, as well as a villa that the 17th Feb -- or QRF resided in.

Q Was that a smaller structure in the corner of the property where the QRF resided?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Sort of like a guest house or something for the property?

A It was a nice guest house, if I had it here in the U.S.

Q And just to be clear, the middle villa that you said had

several buildings, could you go through those again. Because I'm not sure if there were two or three buildings on that property or more.

A The best of my knowledge -- I'm trying to scribble here on my paper so I can have a frame of reference -- we had one building that, as I stated earlier, was the TOC --

Q Okay. And that's --

A -- for the RSO.

Q Tactical operation center?

A Yes.

Q All right. And is that where you kept communications equipment, such as your computers, your satellite phones, radios, and things like that?

A Yes.

Mr. Evers. If you'll just flip the page in the event you want to share the drawing.

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mr. [REDACTED]. Oh. I understand.

So we had the RSO office. There were other offices within that building to include the PO's office. So that's one building. It also -- it also had a restroom in there.

And then the building across from it, as I stated earlier, was what I considered a cafeteria, but it was actually a home that we used as a cafeteria. And that --

---

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did it have bedrooms in it, when you say you considered it

a home, but you used it as a cafeteria?

A It did have -- it had bedrooms in there --

Q Okay.

A -- as well as a chow hall open area where we ate.

And then I don't recall any other large structures in that middle compound. I recall the access control areas, gates where we put vehicles. But that's what I remember.

Q Okay. And at the time that you were there, all of you resided in one villa. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And it was one -- the villa that you retained, that was on the other end of the property, not the middle villa?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And why was it? Was there any security implications of all residing in one villa?

A Yes. I wanted -- I wanted to ensure that, if there was an emergency, that all Chief of Mission personnel would be in one place where we could either harden up -- that's a term that we use -- to -- basically, if we were being attacked, we could all be together and not be sporadically placed throughout the three very large compounds that we were responsible for.

And it also allowed us -- if need be, instead of taking a defensive position, would be to actually become offensive and break out of that building to get to vehicles or whatever we needed, you know, depending on the emergency.

Q Uh-huh.

And did you keep vehicles close to that villa where you were residing in the evening hours?

A In the early part of our -- of my time in Benghazi, I was reviewing what we call REACT procedures. And it was -- it was a test of where should we put the vehicles. But by the time we left, we had drills that involved putting the vehicles next to or close to the building.

Q Okay. And what's a REACT procedure? And that's R-E-A-C-T. Correct?

A Yeah. REACT -- I don't know each acronym. But it was more of a "this is how we respond during a crisis," whether it was an attack on the compound, natural disaster, where do we go if the duck-and-cover or an alarm goes off. And so we -- we -- we practice that.

Q Okay. Now, you said that, when you arrived, they were giving up one of the villas, the largest of the villas, I believe you've described it. Is that correct?

A When I arrived, we had all three active compounds and were using all three of them. By the time I left, the decision was made by the principal officer, in conjunction with RSO and the IMOs, that that villa was just -- it wasn't worth the cost and we didn't need it.

When I left Benghazi, I believe that the lease or something was already taken care of from a contractual standpoint, which is not my purview, but it was still there.

Q So you were still in the process of moving equipment and

other things out of it into the others or had that been completed?

A I can only speak of RSO stuff. Regarding security stuff, I had no -- I had nothing in that -- that last building that I needed to conduct my job.

Q Were there any cameras or barriers or other things like that in that building that needed to be moved over to the remaining villas?

A There was lighting and some of those things that the management officer actually took under their purview to take care of because I was dealing with daily security activities. So I left it to that person.

Q Okay. But that was being done?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Of the two remaining villas that was going to be the compound, were there -- did those two villas meet the security requirements of the State Department?

Tell you what. Let me back up and ask this question.

Are there physical security requirements for overseas posts in the State Department?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And was it your understanding that the Benghazi compound had to meet those requirements?

A No and then yes.

Q Okay. Could you explain your answer.

A Upon arrival, Mission Benghazi wasn't a consulate. It was -- I don't know how to describe it. It was a facility implementing

diplomacy on behalf of Tripoli and perhaps the Main State, but it wasn't a consulate or an embassy. It wasn't an official mission, was my understanding. So that's where I said no.

And I say yes because it was later brought to my attention that the mission was recognized, that they would be staying longer, so that it was very -- it wasn't -- it wasn't determined how long that place was going to be there.

And, at that point, when it was decided by someone in Washington or headquarters that it would stay longer, then it became more of an official, "Okay. We're going to be here for a long duration."

So that's where I said no and yes.

Q Okay. And what was that duration, if you recall?

A I don't recall what -- what the -- how long that would have been. So I don't recall.

Q Okay. Did you have any role in deciding what physical security upgrade should be implemented once the decision was made to remain in Benghazi for this longer period of time?

A I'd like to just clarify.

My active participation of putting in physical security upgrades in Benghazi started from the first day I was there. It didn't matter whether it was an official or unofficial post.

As a security expert, I recognized that there were things that needed to happen, and I started that process of listing them and forwarding that to Diplomatic Security headquarters. And that was for the first, I would say, 2 weeks I was there.

Q Had any of your predecessors also undertaken that exercise?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And so did you essentially inherit some products that had already been written or sent to DS headquarters?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And would those physical security upgrades have been sent through [REDACTED]?

A Yes.

Q Okay. If you could, would you walk us through what you saw as the physical security shortcomings and what you were recommending be implemented to make the compound more secure.

A I asked for -- it was -- I asked for things such as Jersey barriers, and that was to provide a little bit more standoff from our access control areas in one part of the compound.

Q And what's a Jersey barrier?

A The concrete metal barriers you see on our highways here in the U.S. It helps control traffic flow and things of that nature.

Q So nobody can just zoom in?

A Correct.

Q They at least have to go through a maze to get in?

A Yes.

Q It slows them down a bit?

A [Nonverbal response.]

Q Okay.

A So Jersey barriers. I asked for drop-arm barriers.



Q That's just the arm that goes up and down to -- it won't stop a car, but it might slow them down a bit?

A Well, the drop-arms that I put together -- or wanted were actually metal, almost like a telephone pole, with drop-arm barriers.

Q Okay.

A So it's not just like a parking lot you would find in a mall. This was pretty substantial.

I asked for lighting. We had some lighting issues. Some things I were able -- I was able to -- actually, just a matter of turning the lights around.

We had lights lighting up our villas, and I immediately told them, "Let's turn those lights around, face them out," in case someone's watching us or surveilling us, that they would not necessarily get to see all of our comings and goings.

So we talked about Jersey barriers, drop-arms, lighting. Sandbags was another one for fighting positions in case there was an emergency.

Q And what would sandbags do for you?

A Sandbags is just a rudimentary military frame of reference to actually put in a fighting position, somewhere where you could dive behind in case you were being shot at or incoming and direct fire and things of that nature.

I thought, by having some of those sporadically put throughout the compound -- because you never determine when an emergency is going to happen -- that you could actually go behind at least some sandbags

if there was, you know, an issue.

And, to be honest, I remember submitting something -- a list of things, but I can't recall all of them. I just don't recall.

Q Okay. And were any of those upgrades implemented during the 6 or so weeks that you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were some still outstanding?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you know why some were still outstanding?

A Yes. It's my understanding -- I mean, I was asking for things that were not just readily available in Benghazi. And it wasn't I could go to the drop-arm store. There wasn't one. So they would have to be locally procured and then put together. But during my time in Benghazi, I made it a point for those 30-plus days to implement those things as best I could.

Q Okay. Did you consider these to be the bare-minimum safeguards that were needed for this compound?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you have a longer wish list of other things?

[Bell ringing.]

Mr. [REDACTED]. One more.

Ms. Jackson. Uh-huh.

Mr. [REDACTED]. I'm sorry. Make it easier for her.

Ms. Jackson. Yeah.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay.

A In an ideal situation, you could never have enough security. From my standpoint as a security professional, I would have asked for, you know, concrete walls and concertina wire and more setback.

But to make the on-the-ground decisions, I asked for what I thought would enable me or future agents coming in to replace me to have a safer environment, and those that I mentioned earlier were part of that.

Q Were you aware of any conversations back at DS headquarters or within Main State that there was an issue over funding for these security upgrades?

A I'm not aware of the conversations that happened back in Washington. I don't know.

Q So no emails between you and [REDACTED] that you recall regarding "We can't get you this because we can't figure out who is going to pay for it"? Anything like that?

A Yeah. I took your previous question as -- and when I said no, I was thinking more upper management.

But, yes, I did have conversations with [REDACTED] regarding funding for security upgrades. He would pass me information. I would pass it to him.

But I know he wasn't making those decisions. It was people above him. And so that's why my previous answer was I don't know what that conversation was.

Q Okay. So you don't know how high up in the --

A Correct.

Q -- in the Department of State these decisions were being made, but you were aware that there were funding issues?

A I was aware that there was funding discussions, whether pro or con, but I don't know who was making those discussions -- or decisions.

Q Okay. Did the holdup of funding impact your receiving any of the physical security upgrades, if you recall?

A I don't recall. And, again, I'll just reiterate. Me asking for these things does not impact the daily mission I still have to conduct, regardless if I get them. So I was moving forward.

I made the professional decisions for them. But, regardless, I still had to do the missions and get people in and out and protected. So I just -- you know, I -- I guess that other -- that's it.

Q Okay. Let me take a step back and ask you: Do you know or do you have an estimate of how large the compound was first when it was A, B, and C, or the three, and then when it was reduced to two?

A I'm horrible with volume of property. I'd be guessing. And I -- honestly, I -- I'd rather not give a guess. But I'll just say significantly large compounds.

Q Okay. Would you say that each individual compound was larger than a football field?

A I'm looking up because I'm trying to put each compound in my head. If I were to just be a satellite and look down on all three compounds and use the perimeter walls as that landmark, I would say

three football fields would be close.

Q Okay. What was the condition of the perimeter walls?

A They were not up to my standard. And my standard would have been, you know, a concrete block. They were porous. You could see through them. And, at some points at some of the perimeter walls, you could actually -- you know, you could push them over.

Q Okay. So that would allow a weapon to be pointed in through those points of access?

A Potentially.

Q Okay. Was that a concern to you when you were there?

A I made it a point to -- for the walls that I'm actually thinking about -- try to cover up that area where people could actually look in and see us. And that was where -- where we were living. And I'm not sure if that's Villa A or C. It's on the end. Because I was worried that people out in the street could see if we were just walking around or we were getting in vehicles or not.

Q Okay. Now, you've stated that it was you and two other agents while you were there.

Was that the number of agents that were allotted for Benghazi?

A Upon arrival in Benghazi, we had three agents. And I didn't know any better whether that was more or less of what we were supposed to have.

But during my time in Benghazi, I remember learning that there was a document that was put out by the Under Secretary that there would be five agents slotted for Benghazi.

Q Okay. And when you say "the Under Secretary," which of the six Under Secretaries would have authored that memo?

A I believe it was Under Secretary Kennedy.

Q So the Under Secretary for Management?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Sharon, just to correct, you in the question said he authored the memo. I don't think there's any evidence that he actually authored the memo. So just to be clean on the record.

Ms. Clarke. You said "put out."

Ms. Jackson. I said "put out." So --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q At any point while you were there did you get up to five agents?

A Yes.

Q And when was that?

A We reached five agents at the very tail end of my tour in Benghazi, and it was only because it was the agents replacing myself and Mr. [REDACTED].

Q So there was just some overlap? Before you left, the new -- the replacement agents came in?

A Correct. So just to make sure I'm clear, there was three of us on the ground at the time, myself, Agent [REDACTED], and Agent [REDACTED]. And we were being replaced by Agent [REDACTED], and I want to say [REDACTED]. And those two agents were coming in to replace us. So, for

a brief moment, we actually had five agents on the ground.

Q Okay. That brief moment, was that a matter of days or a week, if you recall?

A It was not a week, and it may have been as limited to 3 to 5 days. And it was a timing issue. Mr. [REDACTED] was leaving on his first 30 days, and myself and Mr. [REDACTED] voluntarily extended.

Q Okay. I see that my time is now up for the first hour. So we're going to go off the record, take a break, and then resume in a few minutes. Okay?

A Thank you.

[Recess.]

RPTR ZAMORA

EDTR WILTSIE

[11:37 p.m.]

[REDACTED] Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2  
were marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q During the break, it was decided that the minority's questions were going to be somewhat limited. So they have offered that the majority committee staff continue with the questioning until we have finished our questioning and then they will ask any follow-up questions that they have. So we're going to continue with the minority questions, Agent [REDACTED].

A Okay.

Q When we broke, we were talking about the number of agents that were there when you arrived and then the number that were there when you left.

And during the break, I've also asked you to review two documents that you have before you as Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 2. I'd like to turn your attention first to Exhibit No. 1.

And can you describe what -- this, say, three-page document at the top is marked as "Unclassified//SBU." At the top, it also says "U.S. Special Mission Benghazi Regional Security Office." And it also says "Diplomatic Security Turn Over Notes."

Can you describe for us what this three-page document is.

A This document is a description of what has happened in



Benghazi, gives a little bit of a background as well as describes the mission in Benghazi and provides -- or it hopefully provides the reader a synopsis of what to expect for he or she taking over as either ARSO or RSO.

Q And did you prepare or receive this document when you were in Benghazi?

A Did I prepare this one or did I prepare one like it? It is a custom for DS agents to have turnover notes each time new agents come onto the compound and take over.

So this one here looks like one that I put together -- or may have put together. I can't be sure. But this is what it is. It's just a turnover note.

Q Okay. Does Exhibit 1 describe Benghazi as you experienced it when you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And, if I am correct, if you did not prepare this one, you prepared a similar document?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. All right. Now let's turn to Exhibit 2 before you, which is a five-page document. At the top, it is marked "Sensitive But Unclassified," and it is entitled "Benghazi: Security Environment & Threat Assessment."

Have you seen this document before, Agent [REDACTED]?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And under what circumstances did you see this

document before?

A In the matter of preparation. I was with counsel, and we just kind of went over possible documents that have my name on it or are perhaps derived from me. And so I remember looking at this one.

Q Was this a document that was prepared when you were in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you prepare it?

A I worked in collaboration with the other ARSOs. And, as you can tell, on page -- the last page, even the final sentence -- I remember writing that because I was in the midst of turning over to another RSO.

Q So the very last paragraph where it says, "Questions should be directed to RSO" -- something redacted -- "As of Feb. 5, please contact RSO" -- redacted -- "via the Benghazi RSO TOC at" -- and a telephone number redacted -- is that the time when you initially were going to leave Benghazi?

A The reason for the February 5 date on this document was I was trying to make a transition with the new agent and hand over the reins, have them actually be in charge, yet, I would still be there as an adviser in case he or she needed help.

Q So your replacement, [REDACTED], was going to be there as of February 5?

A He was there as of February 5. And I was still on the ground in Benghazi, but I wanted people to understand that, if they were going

to refer to this document, that I would no longer be there, you know, within days of this document.

Q Okay. But you and the other two agents who were in Benghazi were responsible for authoring this document, Exhibit No. 2?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And were you requested to prepare this document?

A Yes.

Q And what do you recall about that request?

A Like the other document, this is something that agents do prior to handing over a post or something like Mission Benghazi.

I remember speaking with ██████ regarding this threat assessment in that I had been taking notes throughout my time on the ground in Benghazi and had my agents -- actually, Agent ██████, primarily -- looking at the previous threat assessment that was done prior to our arrival and augmenting it with different things that happened during our timeframe there.

So in speaking with Mr. ██████, I helped Agent ██████ put this together, and I was waiting for Mr. ██████ to get back to me because he wanted an ITA, an intelligence threat assessment, done from Washington from their perspective as well so that it would be an all-encompassing threat assessment.

Q So would it be accurate to describe Exhibit 2 as your portion of that overall encompassing document?

A This is my unclassified portion of this document. Yes.

Q Okay. So are you saying that there's a classified portion

of this document, also?

A There may be classified documents regarding threat assessment that would obviously not be included in this.

Q Okay. Do you know for a fact that there was a classified companion to this document?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. When you arrived in Benghazi, did you receive a similar-type document?

A I believe there was one on file, but I do not recall the date of it and how accurate it was, whether it was a month before my arrival or previous. But there was a document there.

Q But in your training and experience as a Diplomatic Security agent, a security environment and threat assessment is a regular and routine document that is prepared and handed over to the subsequent RSO?

A In my training -- I can only speak of myself -- that's how I conduct business. And, therefore, yes, for me, if I'm coming into an environment, I would expect one, as should the next agent taking over from me. And, hence, this document was produced.

Q Okay. And is that the same for Exhibit No. 1, the turnover notes? You, as an RSO, would expect to receive turnover notes and you, as a person, would prepare turnover notes for your successor?

A The answer is yes. As you refer to Exhibit 1, I don't know if I actually drafted this one or not. It just doesn't ring a bell to me. I don't see anything in there that says it came directly from

me, but I could be wrong.

Q Okay. But do you recall receiving turnover notes when you arrived in Benghazi?

A I -- yes.

Q Okay. And when you turned over to Agent [REDACTED], did you have turnover notes to provide to him when he arrived?

A When Agent [REDACTED] arrived -- because we had a lengthy turnover -- I don't recall actually handing him a turnover note because I voluntarily decided to extend to assist him. But, as we discussed earlier, it is customary to pass it over. So --

Q Okay. Now I want to direct your attention to Document 2, Exhibit 2, and the last page.

In the second full paragraph on that page, the second sentence says, "Numerous Islamic extremists, including dozens with experience fighting coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, are in the area and have ready access to arms."

Do you see that sentence?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And do you recall that you or Agent [REDACTED] or someone decided to include that sentence in this report?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Can you tell us some background about deciding to include this sentence in this report.

A Although the sentence itself is not classified, I think putting that sentence in there derived from classified information.

And so, therefore, putting it in there was a highlight to the reader that these type of people are in this, I would say, AOR, area of operations -- region -- responsibility. Sorry.

Q AOR --

A AOR, area of responsibility.

Q All right.

A So this is just to highlight to the reader that, "Listen, this is a very dangerous area, and there's all kinds of players here in Libya."

Q Okay. Did that particular threat increase or decrease in the time that you were in Benghazi?

A I don't know that it increased or decreased. I couldn't go either way on that. But just the fact that it was there is enough for someone like myself or a DS agent.

Q And then in the -- what would be the third-to-the-last paragraph of this page, I quote from the report, "There are reports of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) smuggling weapons and explosives out of Libya to neighboring countries. AQIM and other transnational terrorist groups could try to take advantage of a deteriorating security environment in Benghazi or a post-Qadhafi power vacuum in Tripoli."

Do you recall the reasons why this particular paragraph was included?

A I believe this paragraph was also included based on our intelligence and perhaps some classified information. And without

being able to put classified material in this, again, this paragraph and sentences provide the reader with a perspective that we're in a dangerous place.

Q And did this document go to anyone other than your successor DS agents? Did it go to DS headquarters? Did it go to ITA? If you know, was it disseminated beyond your successor DS agents in Benghazi?

[Bell ringing.]

A This document --

Mr. ██████. Can you type during this?

This document was forwarded to and would have been sent to ██████. And, as I stated earlier -- I mentioned the acronym ITA. I don't know for a fact that it was sent to them, but I would think that Mr. ██████ would have done that.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. And what does "ITA" stand for?

A "Intelligence threat assessment." It would go to our threat assessment folks within the Diplomatic Security Service.

Q Okay. And without going into the content of what you might have sent, did you or the other agents supplement this document with any classified reporting to ITA?

A We did not put any supplements, as far as this document is concerned. If an agent were to be coming out to Benghazi and they wanted to see this document, it would likely -- as long as it was a classified area, they would have this document and also have a threat assessment provided with it, but it wasn't necessarily something I

produced.

Q I think I may need a little further elaboration on that. Who would have produced -- would the other document be a supplement to this or what would this other document be?

Mr. Evers. If you know.

Mr. [REDACTED]. Just to be clear, this document is put together by myself --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And by "this document," you mean Exhibit 2.

A I'm sorry. Yes. Exhibit 2.

This document was produced by myself and the agents on the ground. We would have given that to Mr. [REDACTED], who, like I said, would likely push it forward. To whom exactly I do not know.

And in response to my -- my answer of the last question is that a person coming to Benghazi would've had access to read this one, which is the -- Exhibit 2, and then they may have been provided, if they requested, an intelligence threat assessment of Benghazi from a classified perspective.

Q Okay. Did you have access to similar-type documents prior to coming to Benghazi?

A I had access to it. But, again, I was not in Washington. I was in Georgia at the time. So I was not able to look at any classified -- I don't recall reading any classified material about Benghazi prior to my arrival.

Q Okay. Did you have to be physically located in Washington



to have access to that classified information?

A For my circumstances at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, we had no classified material access. We didn't have classified safes or computers enabled to read classified material.

Q Okay. What about if -- for those agents who came out of field offices? Would they have had -- because you were in the New York field office at one time.

When you were in the New York field office, did you have access to classified information?

A When I was in New York, I did have access to classified information.

Q Okay. Do you know if all the field offices have access to classified information?

A I do not know.

Q Okay. You and another agent extended until about February 2012, as I understand it. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there a particular event or reason why you felt the need to stay in Benghazi in February of 2012?

A Yes.

Q And what was that reason?

A The anniversary of 17 February was coming up.

Q Okay. And why was that important in Libya?

A Well, in Libya, as we discussed, the QRF, or quick reaction force, was also known as 17th Feb. The significance of that date, is

my understanding, had everything to do with the overthrow of Qadhafi, which actually stemmed and began in Benghazi or Eastern Libya.

Q Okay. So just to ensure that I'm understanding correctly, the revolution that overthrew the Qadhafi regime began on or about February 17?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And the revolution started in Benghazi?

A That's my interpretation.

Q Okay. And did that pose a security risk then for you and the other agents in protecting U.S. government personnel?

A Yes.

Q And what were those security concerns that you had?

A Like any anniversary of a terrorist attack, which I'm sure everyone in this room is familiar with, like 9/11, in law enforcement overseas, we have experienced, unfortunately, incidents that happen on significant dates.

So it's not out of the realm when the 17th Feb date was coming up in 2012 that there may be protests or may be some action against expatriates or just amongst the Libyans themselves. So I wanted to be prepared for that.

Q Okay. And did the Libyans have ready access to weapons, explosives, and other types of items that could do harm to people?

A Are you asking if all Libyans --

Q In your estimation, were -- well, let me take a step back. In certain countries like England, guns are generally prohibited.

In other countries, guns are more prolific.

Where did Libya, and especially -- specifically the Benghazi area, fall on that continuum of virtually no weapons to everyone has a weapon?

Does that help?

A Yes. Thank you for providing some context.

Q Uh-huh.

A For Benghazi, weapons on persons within that greater area was normal. We would hear gunfire routinely, not necessarily towards us, but celebratory gunfire and things of that nature. So yes.

Q Okay. Were you able to make any distinction between the type of gunfire you heard, if you, based on your training and experience, could distinguish between handgun fire versus AK-47 fire versus more advanced weapons?

Again, on the continuum of weaponry, were you able to tell what type of weapons or did you know from your personal observations of what type of weapons were prolific in and around the Benghazi area?

A For the record, I'm no weapons expert. But with my experience, I could tell if it was a pistol or perhaps a machine gun going off, or it wasn't uncommon to hear anti-aircraft guns go off.

Q And what do you mean by "anti-aircraft guns"?

A "Anti-aircraft guns" are high-caliber weapons that are made to shoot down aircraft.

Q Are they often called RPGs or is that something different?

A That is something different, ma'am.

Q Okay.

A RPG is a rocket-propelled grenade similar -- it probably makes a similar noise like a mortar. But an AAA, anti-aircraft artillery, piece is much larger and usually it's pointing towards the sky, looking for a target.

Q Okay. Is that sometimes known as a MANPAD?

A No.

Q Okay.

A And, again, for the record, I am no weapons expert.

Q And by my questions, obviously, neither am I in this respect. I'm just trying to figure out where everything fits on the continuum.

Based on your visual observations and in conjunction with the type of firing that you heard, do you have an opinion as to the most prolific type of weapon that was used by people in and around Benghazi?

A I would say the AK-47 would be a weapon that -- again, I'm no weapons expert, but I would say that's the noise that would be most prevalent in that area.

Q Okay. And I believe you said you would hear gunfire daily.

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there a particular time of the day that you would hear gunfire more often than other times of the day?

A To give a definitive answer would be speculation.

Q Okay. Would gunfire occur throughout the nighttime, through the overnight hours?

A There would be what I would consider celebratory gunfire on some evenings. So I would hear that.

Q Okay. Were you able to distinguish between celebratory gunfire and other types of gunfire?

A No.

Q Okay. But you observed that AK-47s and similar-type weapons would be fired during celebrations?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were there any security incidents that occurred while you were in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Could you -- and I know you may not be able to give us precise dates. But if you could say early on, in the middle, at the end, to the best of your ability, would you describe for us those security incidents that occurred.

A I recall one incident where we had to use the alarm -- the duck-and-cover alarm and it was reported -- I do not recall if it was over the radio or if it was just by voice -- that somebody had jumped the wall.

Q And what did that turn out to be?

A It turned out to be a local hire who decided not to walk around the perimeter and access the compound the proper way, and this person decided to just jump the wall.

Q Okay. How did the duck-and-cover go?

A The duck-and-cover went very loudly, and we reacted in the

manner that we were trained in.

Q Okay. So everyone reacted appropriately?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What about any other security incident?

A I don't want to mix them together. We had one jumping the wall. I don't recall the other one, exact details.

And, again, for the record, I've served in many high-threat places. And security incidents are, unfortunately, part of my job, and I don't want to mix the two.

Q Okay. Sure.

Do you recall any security incidents involving checkpoints when you were out on movement?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Would you tell us what you can recall.

A In Benghazi, in order to get to the airport, you had to drive through impromptu checkpoints. And some of them we knew they were there and some were just -- sometimes they just showed up on the road.

Two of my agents were moving to the airport late at night. I was actually still on the compound when they called me and told me that they were being held at gunpoint.

Q Okay. And what, if anything, did you do?

A In that situation, me personally, there's not much I can do physically. But I made contact with 17th Feb QRF folks who, in turn, sent out a vehicle to their known location, since they had the language ability, and they were also able to get in touch via mobile phones with

folks who could then maybe diffuse the situation.

Q And did the situation get diffused?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And how did it resolve itself?

A I don't recall the particulars of how it was resolved, but it was resolved.

Q Okay. Do you recall any incident in which there was a stop at a checkpoint in which the Libyan nationals were inquiring as to whether Envoy Stevens was in the car?

A No. That does not ring a bell at all.

Q Okay. Were there protests or demonstrations that occurred in and around Benghazi when you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And were they routine or sporadic?

A Protests in Benghazi were -- I'll use the term "commonality." It was known to happen. We were aware of it.

Q Okay. Would you have advance notice when they were going to be?

A We may receive information from either the ex-pats in the area, like I mentioned earlier, the British, or even our locally engaged staff who may have heard something.

Q Okay. And was there a common area where the protests would occur?

A A lot of the protests occurred down near the water area and at government buildings, which was on the coast of Benghazi.

Three years later, to give you a definitive location, it's just too -- it's not there. I'm sorry.

Q Was there an area called Freedom Square?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Is this the area that you were talking about where the government buildings were?

A I don't remember if -- the government buildings there at Freedom Square. But now that you mention the name Freedom Square, that's a very relevant name and a known location for protests.

Q Okay. And when you say that protests were fairly common -- I'm sort of paraphrasing here -- would that mean daily or weekly or twice a week? Could you give us a little more definition to that answer, if you can.

A Protests in Benghazi occurred. And to say definitively whether it would be daily or weekly, it would not be accurate. But it was prevalent.

Q Okay. Was there a particular time of the day that protests would occur? Mornings? Noon? Early evening? Nighttime?

A There was no definitive time. I don't recall there being anything significant to sunrise or sunset or --

Q Okay. Do you recall any protests occurring after dark?

A I believe there were protests that occurred after dark. But to give you a timeframe, whether it was the beginning, middle or end of my time in Benghazi, I don't know.

Q Okay. Are there any other security incidents that you



recall occurring while you were in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Okay. Were there any other threats to U.S. government personnel generally or to the political officer specifically while you were there?

A No.

Q Any threats to the compound, that you're aware of, while you were there?

A I'm taking time to -- because I want to answer accurately. I will say this: Being in Benghazi as the senior RSO, I felt there were threats every day in Benghazi. Whether they were directed toward me, my agents, the PO or the IMO, I don't know.

Q Okay. So you were on personal high alert every day?

A Yes.

Q Okay. I want to take a few minutes and switch to the local guard force and the QRF and ask you some questions about them. Okay?

A Yes.

Q Did you have a local guard force when you arrived?

A Yes.

Q And would you describe that local guard force -- the number, their duties and responsibilities -- and just give us a description of who they were and what they did.

A I don't recall the number of personnel that were on the local guard force. However, the local guards were Libyans who provided, like I said, access control.

They would help with people visiting the compound, help to search them. They assisted with escorting people to locations within the compound. So perhaps, if somebody comes in the compound, they would walk them to the PO's office or my office.

They were also my -- or what I would consider my early warning system. Having them out on the compound -- because I could not be everywhere, nor could the agents -- they were able to provide us an insight if something occurred.

And they were issued -- what do you call it? They were issued like clickers, you know. So if there was an emergency, they could hit the button that would sound the alarm.

And that's what those guards -- they were not well educated. They weren't -- well, I'd like to retract that, if I could. I don't know if they were educated or not, but --

Q Okay. Did you have issues with their performance?

A I didn't have issues with their performance.

Q While you were there, was their contract terminated?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you know why it was terminated?

A I don't know the whole reason why it was terminated.

Q Okay. Do you know part of the reason why it was terminated?

A Yes.

Q And what was that?

A During my time there, it came to the forefront that the local guard force contract was also coexistent with the food contract.

Somehow prior to my arrival that all was put in place. It was all one.

Q Is that typical, in your experience, of other places you've been as the RSO?

A No. Other places as RSO, the local guard force contract is an RSO contract.

Q Separate and distinct from everything else?

A Yes.

Q Okay. But this one was combined?

A I'd like to make one caveat.

You were mentioning whether or not the LGF is just one contract for the RSO. We have other contracts like surveillance detection units and things of that nature. But for this description of Benghazi, there was this combination for whatever reason.

Q Okay. And that existed prior to your getting there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And was there problems then with the overall life services contract?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what were those problems?

A I don't know all the reasons for the issues with the food contract, but it was based off the principal officer and the IMO no longer wanted to continue to contract with the food portion. They weren't happy with it. Obviously, that had implications on my program because they were tied together.

Q Okay. Did you have any concerns or issues with the local

guard force not showing up to work?

A I heard from the 17th Feb QRF that they, by de facto, would help me manage the local guards. And to that end, they would let me know, "Hey, somebody showed up late today," at which point I could, you know, give some disciplinary action or let the person go.

Q Okay. So, at some point, the life services contract was being terminated while you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What security issues did that pose for you if you were losing your local guard force?

A Well, the fear was that the person who held the food contract and the local guard force contract would be jaded and that person -- I don't recall the name or the company -- would then just take everything off the compound and walk away.

Q Okay. And what security risk did that pose for you, as the head security guy at the compound?

A Well, that would have taken away one of our -- what we consider concentric rings of security. And that would have taken away one of those rings.

Q And how many concentric rings of security do you normally have at an overseas post?

Mr. Evers. If you can say.

Mr. [REDACTED]. I can say, on consulates and embassies, usually, we have several layers. But to go in detail on what those layers are would be more of a classified setting.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Well, you've described three layers to us today. If I may summarize, you've got your local guard force, your quick response force, and the Diplomatic Security agents.

Are those three of the rings that you would expect at an overseas post?

A No.

Q No? Okay.

Can you correct me in how I've missummarized that.

A Your summary for Benghazi is accurate. But you stated is this the three concentric rings for an overseas post. In general, would not be applicable.

Q So Benghazi was treated differently from a security perspective than other overseas posts?

A I don't know if it was treated differently. But I can tell you what was on the ground at the time when I was there.

Q Okay. And are those three that I've described what was on the ground at the time?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other security assets on the ground at the time?

Mr. Evers. If you can say.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q It's just a yes or no.

A I'll defer it to a classified area.

Mr. Evers. If you can say in a setting yes or no whether there were additional security measures --

Ms. Jackson. Without saying what they were.

Mr. Evers. -- you can say.

Mr. [REDACTED]. Yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. Okay. But any further elaboration would be in a classified setting?

A Yes. And I'm not trying to be difficult.

Q No.

A I just wanted to be accurate.

Q That's why I asked it as a yes-or-no question, so that we didn't have to go any further.

Do you recall whether there was any type of interim local guard force contract between the termination of the life services contract and the letting of a new contract?

A I don't believe there was an interim. I believe what occurred -- and this is right near the end of my time in Benghazi -- was that the IMO and PO -- principal officer -- worked with the gentleman who owned that contract to just try to parcel off the food portion, maintain the security portion, all the while, perhaps -- all the while, we were going to look for another contract so that this wouldn't happen again.

Q Okay. And is that what was in place when you left Benghazi in February of 2012?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were you aware of any objections or issues to doing it that way?

A No.

Q Okay. As an RSO at an overseas post, do you generally have responsibility for vetting of the local guard force?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what's entailed in vetting the local guard force?

A In my experience at the posts that I've mentioned at the opening of this meeting, for local guard force, we would run a background check on each individual in whichever country they were from.

For example, if someone is from the Philippines, we would run a check through the RSO and the Philippines to ensure that that person did not have any derogatory information that would negate them from being employed with us, whether it was when I was in Dubai or Dhahran or somewhere else.

In Benghazi, I arrived and adopted the local guard force program. They were already on the ground and implemented.

Q Okay. Do you know, was there any vetting of the local guard force in Benghazi?

A I do not know whether or not they were vetted prior to my arrival or after.

Q Okay. Does the RSO generally keep records of any vetting

that is done?

A If there was vetting completed on an individual who was on a local guard force contract with an RSO at an embassy or consulate, there should be a record of it.

Q Did you come across any such records when you were in Benghazi?

A I don't recall seeing records on the local guard force contract.

Q Okay. Did you acquire any new members of the local guard force while you were there?

A I don't remember hiring or firing anybody during my timeframe.

Q Okay. You stated under the vetting that you would check for any type of criminal records.

Are there other checks in other areas, such as foreign counterintelligence, financial, other indicia of stability within the community, that you would normally check to vet a local guard?

A Yes.

Q Okay. I've named a few.

Are those areas that you would normally check?

A Those are areas we would normally check. And I would think that, depending on the post, whether it was a high-threat post or one in someplace like Moscow, there is a little more involved.

So different embassies and different consulates, depending on the access of that particular local guard, whatever their posting is,



whether it would be a perimeter outside post or an internal post, there might be additional vetting done, depending on their particular job.

Q Okay. So is vetting, in your opinion, more important when you're at a high-threat post or a post that might have higher foreign counterintelligence implications?

A I think it's fair to say that vetting, in general, is a good thing to have regarding the local guard force.

Q Okay. Now turning to the Feb 17 militia that was your quick response force --

Mr. Evers. Can we take a break?

Ms. Jackson. Yes. We can go off the record and take a break. Let's take about a 10-minute break.

[Recess.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Agent ██████, when we broke for just a few minutes, we were talking about the February 17th militia being employed as -- or being there as the quick response force.

Were they actually employed?

A Yes.

Q Okay. They were paid in some way by the Benghazi Mission?

A Yes.

Q Did you know how they were paid?

A It was a stipend.

Q Okay. Were they paid in cash by mission personnel or were they, you know, electronic funds transferred to a bank account, if such

existed in Benghazi?

A I don't recall how they were paid. I just know that there was a stipend involved.

Q Okay. Was there any -- and what was the general nature of the duties and responsibilities of the Feb 17 militia?

A 17th Feb was there to assist my office in providing security to Chief of Mission personnel in Benghazi.

Q Okay. And I believe you described that there was a smaller residence on one of the end compounds that they resided in. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And so they would be there 24/7?

A They -- obviously, depending on the numbers, they would come in and out. But they had access to that part of the compound 24/7.

Q Did you have an understanding of how many would be there at any given time?

A We didn't have a definitive number. But on my time, during those 30-plus days, it would fluctuate. But it would normally be around three.

Q Okay. At any time did you ask for additional protection by Feb 17?

A I did not ask 17th Feb for additional protection from them. I did ask them at one point for a vehicle outside of the perimeter, a marked vehicle. And so I believe they actually went to, like, the local police.

Q Okay. Did you ask that to be a permanent addition or did you need it for a specific purpose?

A It wasn't a permanent position. I just remember asking for it near the end. I don't recall why I did. I just remember asking for it.

Q Did the approaching anniversary of the revolution play any part in your request?

A No. I think it had -- requesting that was actually because of where the street was. It was on the street that was less traveled by, and I wanted to have at least some kind of presence there, in my line of work, as a deterrent. If somebody saw a police car, maybe they would be like, "Okay. Let's go somewhere else to rob a house" or whatever.

Q Okay. And I believe you said earlier -- but correct me if I misremembered this -- you used the Feb 17 personnel to help you make movements for the political officer, the IMO, when they needed to be out and about in Benghazi. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And they would either travel in the second vehicle or work to give you information regarding the site you were going to or both?

A I would use them to provide advance work. So if I knew I was going somewhere, I'd ask them about the place. Maybe they could go out there the day before.

And then we would ask maybe one of them to come with us, since

they knew the area better than anyone and had better language skills.

Q And I think I forgot to ask this earlier.

But what were the types of meetings that the principal officer was having in and around Benghazi?

A I don't recall a specific meeting and what was said at those meetings. But he had -- you know, a principal officer may have one or two meetings a day.

Q Were they generally with government officials?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And would there be meetings on compound?

A Yes.

Q But you would generally have one or two movements off compound every day or workdays?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall a time towards the end of your tenure in Benghazi that there was a dispute with Feb 17 as to whether they were going to support off-compound moves?

A I don't recall that.

Q Okay. Do you recall whether any members of the Feb 17 Brigade that were assigned to the compound quit due to lack of pay?

A I don't remember anyone quitting during my time of quitting.

Q Okay. It has been a few years.

[REDACTED] Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Let me hand you what I am marking as Exhibit No. 3, which is at the top an email from Agent [REDACTED] dated Saturday, January 28, 2012, at 5:02 a.m. And the subject matter is "Benghazi RSO SITREP for 28 January 2012." And the document is marked "Unclassified."

If you would, take a moment and look through this document, and then I'll ask you if you recall it and ask you a few more questions about that.

A Okay.

Okay. I've read it.

Q Okay. All right. And Agent [REDACTED] was one of the Diplomatic Security agents assigned when you were there. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Is this what you described earlier as a situation report, or SITREP?

A This looks to be a SITREP from Benghazi.

Q And this is something that you would have collaborated with or assisted in writing during your tenure there. Is that correct?

A As I stated earlier, my agents were given the authority to submit a SITREP. I only ask them that we -- I be included on it if there was anything major, and they had the authority to send out the SITREP.

Q Okay. I see on the "Cc" line that it says "Benghazi RSO."

Is that how they would have cc'd you?

Mr. Evers. If you remember.

Mr. [REDACTED]. I don't recall. I remember we talked earlier about this. I just don't remember this email address.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay.

A I don't see my name in here yet on this document.

Q Right.

So your other state.gov account is not listed in the "Cc" line or the "To" line. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. I see two email addresses in the "Cc" line that is [REDACTED]@gmail.com and [REDACTED]@gmail.com.

Do you recall those email addresses?

A It's been a long time. I have no doubt that this is a legitimate document for hearings on Benghazi. But, honestly, I don't remember this.

Q Okay. And you may not remember this. But if I could direct your attention to the paragraph this is entitled "Security/Environment" and the second bullet point that says -- I quote -- "Two TNC assets assigned to aid in protecting the U.S. Mission compound have permanently left their positions."

Do you have a recollection of that occurring?

A I don't remember that -- the fact that two of them left. But, as you read more in that same paragraph, if you don't mind me saying the next sentence, "Information gathered from the TNC commander indicates their departure was due to dissatisfaction with their

stipend, their lack of payment by the new GoL, and the need to find work in the local economy," this rings a bell. That sentence rings a bell --

Q Okay.

A -- for me.

Q That you may have lost people due to low pay or lack of pay?

A Not that I've lost people. I just remember there was dissatisfaction with the stipend. I don't remember actually, like, guys saying, "We're out of here."

Q Okay.

A I don't remember.

Q And then the next bullet point, which would be the third bullet point under this section, says -- and I quote -- "Roving TNC patrols around the perimeter of the compound have terminated. Information gathered from the TNC commander indicates that their departure was due to the same reasons listed above."

Do you recall that, having, hopefully, refreshed?

A It has refreshed my memory. And this coincides with the previous question regarding a uniform presence. And that's -- this roving patrol was that uniform presence that I discussed earlier. And this makes sense to me. It's kind of coming back to me.

Q Okay. And then, again, this was January 28, 2012, towards the end of your stay in Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And when it talks about TNC assets in this section,

is that the same thing as the Feb 17th Brigade?

A 17th Feb derived from my -- I believe it's Transnational -- I forgot what the TNC stood for.

Q How about -- does it sound familiar to be the Transitional National Council?

A That does sound familiar.

So yes. Yes to the fact that 17th Feb and TNC may be interchanged in terminology.

Q Okay. So when you or Agent [REDACTED] writes about TNC assets, you're referring to the Feb 17th Brigade employees at -- or contractors at the compound?

A On this document, it appears that's what he has done.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, was there any vetting of these QRF guards?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. You did none?

A I did none while I was there. I don't recall ever vetting them.

Q And you don't recall having any other agents conduct any vetting of the guards?

A No.

Q Okay. Do you recall coming across any files that individuals prior to you conducted any vetting of the TNC assets on Feb 17th guards?

A No.



Q Okay. Do you know how the Feb 17 guards were selected? Did you ever learn that while you were there?

A No.

Q Okay. Just generally, why is vetting important?

A Are we talking in the context of guards? Are we talking QRF? Or are we talking about a security clearance here in Congress?

Q Let's talk about vetting of the local guard force and the QRF forces at an overseas post.

A Vetting is part of the hiring process. And, I mean, that's just something that takes place.

Q Okay. Did Benghazi have tripwires?

A I am looking up and to the left because I want to make sure --

Q No. You were looking into the far recesses of your mind, going through a few cobwebs.

Mr. Evers. Do you know what she means?

Mr. [REDACTED]. I know what tripwires are. For me -- tripwires, for me, as an RSO in Benghazi, are right at the area of classified information. But a tripwire, in general, is an event that may occur to cause myself or somebody else to then react to that event.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. Do you recall whether Benghazi had written tripwires?

A I don't recall whether they did or did not.

Q Okay. When a wire is tripped, what, if any, action or reaction is generally required?

A It depends on the tripped wire.

Q So different wires have different consequences if they're tripped?

A I wouldn't use the word "consequences." I would say have different reactions.

Q Okay. And, generally, that's spelled out in a document?

A Yes.

Q Have you seen written tripwires at other posts you've been at?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And would the reactions also be spelled out?

A Yes.

Q Did those reactions generally require a specific action or that a meeting be called to discuss the security situation?

Mr. Evers. Are you asking about -- sorry.

Ms. Jackson. Generally.

Mr. Evers. Generally. So not just Benghazi.

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mr. [REDACTED]. The answer is yes -- yes, that tripwires may cause an action and/or ask for a meeting to occur.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Sharon, you might be close.

Ms. Jackson. I have, like, two or three more questions.

Ms. Sawyer. Great.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q All right. Last area.

Do you recall whether Benghazi had an evacuation plan?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall whether it was rewritten or reworked while you were there?

A Yes.

Q Did you have any involvement in that?

A Yes.

Q And what, if any, involvement did you have in that?

A I worked in collaboration with the two agents on the ground on the evacuation plan, to update it and ensure -- or -- to the best of my ability that it would be a document that we could rely upon in case of an emergency.

Q Do you recall why you felt it needed to be updated?

A I don't recall why. But for me personally, it's something in that type of environment that I would rely upon. And, therefore, I would have taken the initiative to do that.

Q Okay. If I said that it was updated because the prior version relied on DOD access for evacuation, does that trigger any recollection for you?

A No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. I think that's all the questions I have. And why don't we go off the record for a moment.

[Recess.]

Ms. Jackson. Let's go back on the record.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Yes. My final question that I always ask is -- Agent [REDACTED], thank you very much for coming today. Thank you very much for being sleep-deprived as you came here today with the time change that you've undergone. We appreciate your cooperation with this committee.

And before I conclude, I do always ask, as we've taken breaks and as you sit here now, is there any question that has been asked or answer that you gave that you think needs further elaboration, clarification, or retraction? Just to give you a final opportunity to elaborate or clarify anything that we've discussed today.

A We had a question and answer regarding ITA and a classified -- potentially a classified product that would be at headquarters.

I have no knowledge if there was one or there is one or one was produced. I mentioned that -- you know, in passing, I mentioned that, but I don't even know if there was one.

Q So as you sit here today, that, if one was produced, you don't recall it being shared with you?

A Correct.

Q Okay. All right. Anything else? Any other -- we covered a lot of territory here today --

A No, ma'am.

Q -- for things that happened several years ago. So -- but, again, thank you very much. And thank you for your service.

A You're welcome.

Ms. Jackson. And we'll go off the record now and switch places.

[Recess.]

RPTR HUMISTON

EDTR HUMKE

[1:00 p.m.]

Ms. Robinson. We can go back on the record. Thank you.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. ROBINSON:

Q Hi. I'm, just a reminder, Kendal Robinson, detailed to the minority staff, and I'm going to -- here with some of my colleagues and we just have a couple more questions for you. It's 1 o'clock right now.

And before I turn it over to my colleagues, I just wanted to ask a couple questions about the exhibits that were provided earlier.

[REDACTED] Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. ROBINSON:

Q We can first look at Exhibit Number 3. We had read several sentences from this exhibit earlier, and I just wanted to circle back on one of the sentences that we hadn't discussed, which is in the second bullet under the Security/Environment page, and it's going to be the last two sentences in that section where it says, no hostility was reported between the two TNC assets who left and the U.S. Mission. The relationship within the TNC assets remains positive.

And as you discussed earlier, the TNC was a reference to the 17th of February. Is that correct?

A Yes. And I'd just like to point out, you mentioned the

word, the relationship within. That's not what my document says.

Q Right. The relationship with TNC assets remains positive.

A Okay.

Q My mistake. So, in your understanding from while you were there, did you feel that this is a true statement for how you perceived relationships between the 17th of February and the mission?

A Correct.

Q And were you aware of any issues while you were there or complaints about the 17th of February and how they were performing their functions with the mission?

A No.

Q Okay. Thank you for following up on that.

And I wanted to also look at Exhibit 1, if you wouldn't mind. Looking at the second page, I wanted to look at the last two -- well, the last sentence of the first paragraph where it's talking about -- the sentence is the -- about the QRF, they are truly a great asset to the mission and are also extremely professional.

Was that the experience that you had with working with the QRF?

A Yes.

Q And, again, since we talked about the QRF earlier, would you remind us who the QRF were?

A The QRF were what we called the 17th Feb Brigade.

Q Okay. Thank you for refreshing us on that.

So when you were there and when you left, from your understanding, the relationship that the U.S. Mission had with 17th of February was

a positive one and a professional one?

A Yes.

Q Would you have any other, you know -- would you characterize -- have any other characterizations for the 17th of February and working with them?

A I think overall for the 30 plus days I was there, I walked away with that same assumption, that they were professional in nature and that we had no derogatory issues with them.

Q And that when you requested assistance or -- that they were responsive to any requests that were made of them as far as you were aware?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And then I just wanted to note that on the first page, I don't know if you can talk to this or not, but there's the last sentence of the first paragraph that states, although Benghazi is no longer the headquarters of the NTC, it is still a great asset in the transition of Libya as a democracy.

Can you speak to that at all about the importance of having a presence in Benghazi?

A Unfortunately, I cannot.

Q Okay. That is certainly understandable.

Ms. Robinson. Was there anything else that you wanted to cover?

Ms. Sawyer. On those two?

---

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Just returning briefly to Exhibit 3, that same



Security/Environment paragraph that we were just talking about.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q You see that final bullet, it says, ROS -- RSO staff is taking steps to fill in security gaps left by the departing TNC assets.

Do you recall what steps you guys were taking at the time?

A Honestly, I do not recall what steps were being taken. And if I recall earlier testimony, I don't even remember that two people actually departed, so my apologies.

Q So is it fair to -- No. That's perfectly fine. I think that's it.

Ms. Robinson. So I'm going to --

Ms. Sawyer. Unless you --

Ms. Robinson. No. I'm sorry. I just had one --

Ms. Sawyer. Go ahead.

BY MS. ROBINSON:

Q No. I just wanted to ask you, we also mentioned about protests earlier, and I was just curious, in your experience while you were there, did you ever see protests turn violent?

A Did I -- I did not personally see protests turn violent.

Q Did you hear about protests turning violent?

A Yes.

Q How many times do you recall hearing that protests turned violent?

A I recall one offhand, and that came from the Brits, who advised us that they were on a venue that ended up turning violent,

and they advised us of that.

Q And do you recall any more detail about that event and how it -- in what way it turned violent, you know, what was the outcome of the violence or the event?

A I don't recall.

Ms. Robinson. Okay. I'll turn it over.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q Mr. [REDACTED], I just want to actually follow up in the same vein regarding security staff, in particular the local guard force. And I'm going to enter as Exhibit Number 4 a Weekly Update of Topics in Benghazi.

[REDACTED] Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q And I'll give you a few moments to take a look at that document.

A Thank you.

Okay. I've looked at it.

Q Thank you. Now, this document is dated January 29, 2012. And could you remind us again when you left Benghazi?

A I left Benghazi, I believe, February 12, 13. I don't know a specific date.

Q And so this would have been towards the end of your deployment to Benghazi, correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Now, I wanted to point you to particular sections within this document. The first one is on the top -- or close to the top of page 2.

A Okay.

Q And it's a section entitled Life Services/Guard Contract. And earlier in the last few hours, you discussed the local guard force contract and mentioned that an interim contract, you believe, had been put in place regarding local guard force. Is that right?

A That's incorrect.

Q Okay. Please correct me.

A The question was was there an interim contract put in place, and my response was that we were in the -- during my time, we were in a position of trying to parcel off the food contract. So I don't know if that would necessarily be considered an interim contract or they were just filling it, but it was still being maintained. And behind the scenes, unbeknownst to that contractor, we were like, okay, we can't do this again. Let's see -- go for another contractor.

Q Now, the first part of that section reads, quote, "received termination of LSC packet from AQM effective January 31, 2012."

Again, could you tell us what LSC stands for?

A I don't know. And just for the record, this is not one of my documents.

Q Okay.

A This was put together by -- these -- if you see these documents in the future, usually these are put together by the IMO in

conjunction with the PO, and it's an overall perspective of post.

So specifically "received termination", that's not something that I recall coming through my office.

Q Okay. Now, in terms of these documents, would you have seen these documents before they were distributed?

A When you say, "these documents," you're talking about just the exhibit as a whole?

Q That's correct. These Weekly Updates.

A I would have access to them. Obviously, I could not recall each one that went out.

Q Okay.

A But the one in front of me looks to be one from Benghazi.

Q Okay. Now, I wanted to actually move backwards to the bottom of page 1 and just ask you if you are familiar with the Security Upgrades section. And I ask this because over the last few hours, you had discussed some requests that you had made initially when you arrived, and they included sandbags, drop arms as well as jersey barriers. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And, again, what happened to that request that you made when you arrived in Benghazi?

A I did not make that request upon arriving in Benghazi. It actually took me some time to survey the compounds, the task at hand. So I would say within a couple of weeks, definitely within 2 weeks, I'm sure, that I probably came up with these security upgrades.

Q Okay. Now, I want to point out in that section that's called Security Upgrades, the update says that 100 percent of jersey barriers have been delivered and continue to list approved security upgrades such as additional lighting, which is -- I think is one of the other items that you requested.

Now, based on the requests that you made, did you feel that the Department was taking steps to provide those upgrades?

A Yes.

Q In particular, there was a question earlier about any delays regarding these upgrades. Again, those were related to funding. Is that right?

A I don't know if it was related to funding. As I stated earlier, those requests were put in through DS headquarters and [REDACTED]. What happened after that and the discussion of whether or not to be funded or not funded, I don't know.

Q In terms of the document, it says in the third bullet, quote, "received information from RSO that multiple security upgrades have been approved and funded from the action memo that was submitted. Below is the list of approved security upgrades. Benghazi will work with Tripoli on determining how many could be done via EFT and how many would need to be done out of local cash," end quote.

Do you recall, then, that these were the upgrades that you had requested?

A These upgrades listed on this document are a part of the requests I made for security upgrades, so if these are inclusive, these

are part of it.

Q Okay. Mr. [REDACTED], you had mentioned earlier regarding the local guard force contract that you had not been involved in the vetting process for the guards that were there at that time. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Now, did you have any specific complaints about the local guard force while you were there?

A I did not have specific complaints about the local guard force while I was there.

Q Okay. Now, you said earlier that you had left Benghazi on or around February 12, correct?

A Yes.

Q Now, today we had talked about various issues ranging from the local guard force, the Quick Reaction Force as well as various physical security upgrades that you had requested. Once you left Benghazi in February of 2012, did you have any firsthand knowledge about the work of the Special Mission Benghazi after that time?

A I'm pausing because I want to make sure it's certain that I can definitively say that those things were discussed later on. In the interests of being accurate, I'm going to say no, I don't remember discussing those security upgrades and what happened to them after I departed.

Q Okay. And then in terms of the eventual investigation, which was the Benghazi Accountability Review Board, were you aware the Accountability Review Board --

A Yes.

Q -- was convened? Did you think that you had any information that would have been relevant for the ARB?

A No. I -- honestly, I would -- if they wanted to call me, they knew where I was, who I was and the fact that I participated in Benghazi, but they chose not to.

Q Okay. Were you ever asked or ordered to not provide information to the ARB?

A No.

Q Were you ever asked or ordered to conceal or destroy information from the ARB?

A No.

Q Have you had the opportunity to read or review the ARB's final report or its -- including its recommendations and findings?

A I have reviewed a document about the ARB, and I believe it to be unclassified. I don't remember anything else other than that.

Q Okay. And so you don't -- do not recall the recommendations or the findings of the --

A Correct.

Q Okay.

A I don't recall that.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Mr. [REDACTED], just before we leave the exhibits, I just wanted to direct your attention to the one we haven't yet discussed, which is Exhibit 2, that you had talked about a little earlier. By my count,

and it might not be fully accurate, I saw on the first page in that first paragraph a reference to weapons. It says, quote, "the proliferation of weapons and explosives presents additional hazards." On the second page, I also saw in the second paragraph another reference to easy access to weapons.

It says, as a result of the, quote, "17 Feb uprising, a large segment of the population is now armed but not trained in weapons handling and safety." And then again, which you have discussed about earlier with my colleague, on that last page, a reference to in that second sentence that you had already discussed, quote, "ready access to arms," end quote, by numerous Islamic extremists. So on my count, there was at least three references to problems with easy access to weapons and access to weapons in Benghazi.

Now, it's also our understanding as a committee that the United States had a program -- I don't want to in this setting get into the details of that program -- for identifying, collecting, and destroying weapons in Benghazi. Were you involved in that program at all?

A No.

Q Were you aware of it in any way?

A No.

Q My colleague had asked you a little earlier -- and I'm still on Exhibit 2. I had a couple other questions about it --

A Sure.

Q -- about protests. You talked both with the majority and my colleague on the minority about protests in Benghazi. If you take



a look at the second page, the last paragraph, and there's a reference to in the first sentence just says, one of the -- and I'm quoting here, quote, "one of the constant demonstrations turned violent on January 21 when protesters stormed TNC headquarters in Benghazi," end quote.

Was that the protest, when you -- you discussed a little earlier, to the best of your recollection, was that the same protest that turned violent that you had heard about from the British?

A It may have been the one.

Q Okay. And the reference to constant demonstrations, I think you talked a fair amount, the fact of a demonstration or a protest in Benghazi was a fairly routine event?

A Yes.

Q And obviously among the potential security problems that posed as reflected in this memo is the fact that a protest could potentially turn violent?

A Yes.

Q So the notion of a protest in Benghazi turning violent, would not be a ridiculous notion that should be discussed out of hand by any of your successors?

A A protest in Benghazi turning violent is possible, but I can only account for the time that I was there on the ground.

Q And so it was certainly something that did occur during your time on the ground?

A Yes.

Q And then on the last page, again, just to ask you, one of

the things that is noted in the Look Ahead, that second paragraph, short paragraph, it says, to date there have been no anti-U.S. demonstrations in Benghazi or specific threats against U.S. interests.

What is the significance of that fact from a security perspective?

A From an RSO perspective, the burning of American flags or something directed towards U.S. would have raised perhaps, if it's possible to raise, the threat level about movements within Benghazi. So the significance of this, putting this in there, if there were anti-U.S. demonstrations at Benghazi, then I may have taken the steps to not do movements or things of that nature.

Q So despite some of the things that you mentioned -- that are mentioned, I don't recall whether you said you actually authored this, but you said you were familiar with it, that are mentioned throughout the memo, issues about access to weapons, the existence of numerous Islamic extremists that are noted here, what's also noted is that at least during your time in Benghazi, there were no, quote, "specific threats against U.S. interests." Is that true and accurate?

A Yes.

Q I promise you this is my last question based on this exhibit.

A Which exhibit are we talking about again, Exhibit 2?

Q Just something that I noticed -- yes. Still exhibit 2, that I noticed that I was curious about. And you may or may not be able to help us out a little bit. It's on page 1, 2, 3, 4 under Venue Security, and it talks about Freedom Square, which did come up a little earlier, and the third sentence there, and I'll just quote, it says,

one, quote, "exhibit in the square is comprised of spent munitions used by regime forces against the local population," end quote.

The reference there to regime forces, is that a reference to General Qadhafi's regime?

A Yes.

Q And what was your understanding either based on that exhibit or otherwise as to what had occurred as between the regime and the local population and force being used against them?

A Honestly, I couldn't talk about what happened to them. I wasn't there at the time. The significance of mentioning this, munitions on the ground is obviously an alert to agents who -- agents or Chief of Mission personnel going to this area that those things are available. So it's just pointing that out, but to comment on what was used from the regime, I wasn't there, I don't know.

Q So the hope was that they were actually spent munitions, but I think your caution was that there should be a check to make sure that they were not live munitions as well?

A If an agent were to take the principal officer there for a meeting, you know, we didn't have necessarily EOD dogs or things of that nature, but this would obviously be a red flag for us just as making it a point to show them that this is there, that it's present.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q Agent ██████, I'm just going to run through a series of allegations that have been made publicly. You understand that the committee's investigating some of these allegations, so I nor the

minority members necessarily adhere to any of these allegations. But I'm just going to run through these allegations and just ask you whether or not you have any evidence to support any of them.

So I'll just kind of go through this hopefully pretty quickly.

A Okay.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton attempted to block military action on the night of the attacks. One congressman speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down, end quote, and this resulted in the Defense Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi."

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to, quote, "stand down" on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington Post fact checker evaluated this claim and gave it, quote, "four Pinocchios," end quote, its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in the spring of 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries. A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was not collecting and shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and that they found, quote, "no support for this allegation," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed from departing to annex to assist the special mission compound. There have been a number of allegations about the causes and the appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered to, quote, "stand down," that instead there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do you have any evidence that there was, quote, "a bad or improper" reason behind the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the annex to assist the special mission compound?

A No.

Q Concern has been raised by one individual that in the course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board, damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or, quote, "scrubbed" damaging documents from materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or, quote, "scrubbed" damaging documents from the materials that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and non-partisanship," end quote.

Do you have any evidence that the CIA deputy director Mike Morell gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made a, quote, "intentional misrepresentation" when she spoke on the Sunday

talk shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander In Chief," end quote, on the night of the attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegations that the President was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander In Chief" or, quote, "missing in action" on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel at MC Tripoli on the night of the attacks, who were considering flying on the second plane to Benghazi, were ordered by their superiors to, quote, "stand down," meaning to cease all operations. Military officials have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to, quote, "remain in place" to Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their current location. The Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services Committee found that, quote, "there was no stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House Armed Services Committee that, quote, "there was no stand-down order"



issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It's been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets on the night of the attacks that would have saved lives. However, former Republican Congressman Howard Buck McKeon, the former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "given where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened and how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's conclusion?

A No.

Q And do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have saved lives, but that Pentagon leadership essentially decided not to deploy?

A No.

Mr. Woolfork. Thank you very much. Thank you, Agent [REDACTED].

Mr. [REDACTED]. You're welcome.

Ms. Sawyer. Did you guys have any additional?

Ms. Jackson. No. We're good.

Ms. Sawyer. Then we can go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

## Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

I have read the foregoing \_\_\_\_ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

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Witness Name

---

Date

*Errata Sheet*

**Select Committee on Benghazi**

The witness reviewed the accompanying transcript, certified its accuracy, and declined to provide corrections to the transcript.