

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL FLYNN

Tuesday, September 29, 2015

Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room HVC-302,
Capitol Visitor Center, commencing at 9:05 a.m.

Present: Representatives Westmoreland, Roby, Schiff, and

Duckworth.

Appearances:

For the SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI:

CHRIS DONESA, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR

DANA CHIPMAN, CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

MAC TOLAR, SENIOR COUNSEL

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For the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

BRENT EVITT

Mr. Tolar. All right. Let's go on the record. This is the transcribed interview of Lieutenant General Michael Flynn conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, in September 2012, and related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

General Flynn, would you please state your full name for the record.

General Flynn. Michael Thomas Flynn.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you, sir. On behalf of Chairman Gowdy and this committee, we appreciate your time and willingness to come in and talk with us today. My name, again, is Mac Tolar, and I am an attorney with the committee's majority staff. At this time, I'm going to ask everyone in the room to go around and introduce themselves for the record.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman with the committee staff.

Ms. Adams. I'm Sara Adams with the majority staff.

Ms. Rauch. And Laura Rauch with the minority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Ms. Cohen. Linda Cohen, minority.

Mr. Evitt. Brent Evitt, deputy general counsel, DIA.

Mr. Donesa. I'm Chris Donesa with the committee staff.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you all. At this time, I want to go through

[REDACTED]

a few procedural issues, sir, before we get started.

Generally, the way the questioning proceeds, is that a member from the majority will ask questions for an hour. At that time, the minority staff will have an opportunity to ask questions for an hour. We will go back and forth until we have concluded all our questions.

We will rotate -- let's see, questions may only be asked by a member of the committee or a designated staff member. In terms of -- unlike depositions or testimony in Federal court, a transcribed interview by the committee is not bound by the rules of evidence. You or your counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject to review by the committee chairman. If the objection cannot be resolved in the interview, you can be required to return for a deposition or hearing. That said, members and staff of the committee are not permitted to raise objections when the other side is asking questions.

As you can see, Catalina is transcribing verbatim everything that we say here today. As such, we would ask you to please give verbal responses such as yes and no to all questions. Please avoid nodding your head or saying "huh-uh," or otherwise she is going to give me a dirty look and make me call you out on that.

You are welcome to confer with your counsel at any time throughout the interview. Just let us know and we will be happy to go off the record and stop the clock and provide you with an opportunity to do so.

We will also take breaks whenever it is convenient. This can be every hour after questioning, after a couple of rounds, or whenever

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

you prefer, just let us know.

General Flynn. Okay. Can I ask one question?

Mr. Tolar. Sure, yeah.

General Flynn. So in terms of counsel, Brenton represents DIA.

Mr. Tolar. Okay.

General Flynn. Not me. So I don't have a counsel here today. I understand he's representing DIA just as a -- I guess as a courtesy.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you for clarifying that for the record, sir.

General Flynn. Okay.

Mr. Tolar. I would ask you to answer all questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible. We will take our time and repeat or clarify any questions, if necessary.

If you don't understand a question, I would just ask you to please let us know. If you honestly do not know the answer, that's okay. Just please don't guess. Give us your best recollection or indicate who you think might be better poised to answer that question.

Sir, do you understand that you have an obligation to answer questions from Congress truthfully?

General Flynn. I do.

Mr. Tolar. Do you understand this obligation extends to congressional staff in an interview such as this one today?

General Flynn. Yes.

Mr. Tolar. Do you understand that a witness who knowingly provides false testimony could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false statements?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

General Flynn. Yes.

Mr. Tolar. Is there any reason why you are unable to provide truthful answers today?

General Flynn. None.

Mr. Tolar. This interview will be conducted at the TS/SCI level. That is the end of my preamble.

Do you all have anything to add?

Ms. Sawyer. Not at this point. We'd just thank you for being here today and look forward to hearing your testimony.

General Flynn. Okay. All right.

Mr. Tolar. I've got 9:06 in the a.m. Let's start the questioning, please.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, first off, I want you to talk to me a little bit about your background in both the intelligence community as it relates to military operations, just kind of walk us through how you got to where you are today?

A Okay. I have 30 -- just slightly over 33 years in the Army. I have 16 years at a place called Fort Bragg, North Carolina, so in an organization like 82nd Airborne Division, 18th Airborne Corps, Joint Special Operations Command. I have served overseas in the 25th Infantry Division.

I have multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, almost 5 years in Iraq and Afghanistan. I have had tours as a trainer at the Joint

[REDACTED]

Readiness Training Center, twice at the Army's intelligence center, once as a young officer, and then I went back later on as the commander for the Intelligence Training Brigade there. And most recently, I have had assignments as the senior intelligence officer for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, senior intelligence officer or assistant director of National Intelligence for Partner Engagement over in the DNI side, so at the national level, and then as the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, so -- and that was the sort of the culmination of my career was the -- was my final assignment as the Director of DIA.

And you know, just accumulated, you know, a range of training experiences, educational experiences, had the opportunity to get three master's degrees that the government supported me on, and just other, you know, awards and decorations that go with a typical long career like that, so --

Q What was your billet immediately prior to taking over as Director of DIA?

A Yeah. It was the assistant director of National Intelligence for Partner Engagement was the title.

Q Talk more about what that is and what that entailed?

A Yeah. So I was responsible for international military and domestic engagement, which one of the big roles was I ran the information sharing board for the National Intelligence Community, which is a really important, you know, component where we decide how we are going to share intelligence with other nations and with inside of our own intelligence community, and with inside of government.

[REDACTED]

It was -- gave me -- it gave me a perspective of certainly the international community, and probably even greater perspective of our domestic law enforcement community, including the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice. I worked very closely, for example, with the FBI in that role.

Q In that role, can you talk a little bit more about the IC community in terms of our operations overseas, how that interface occurred?

A Sure.

Q Did you implement any changes? What did you -- did you see challenges and --

A Yeah.

Q -- are there challenges that still exist today, et cetera?

A Sure. One of the biggest challenges is information and intelligence sharing. It still exists today. It's a cumbersome process, sometimes for the right reasons, sometimes just because we are -- we have a, you know, an enormous bureaucracy and a whole range of, you know, interagency processes that get through.

So how it -- how it generally works is there are policies that you put in place or that are already in place, and you execute those policies to the best of your ability.

In times of crises, which seem to be, you know, damn near every week, if not, certainly every month, you are always having to have a crisis response meeting, and make decisions about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

And you are in a fairly daily contact with your counterparts in the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and also, all of the other sort of big intel agencies, you know, that we have in the U.S. Government.

So a pretty robust position. I was actually assigned to it as the first ADNI partner engagement, so assistant director of national intelligence. Jim Clapper, the current Director of National Intelligence, created the position and asked me to fill into it and then kind of -- and basically define it.

Q Okay. You had -- am I correct, and you had a couple of tours at DIA early in your career?

A Yeah. I mean, I -- you know, if you consider my job, my assignment at CENTCOM where I was the J2 at Central Command, you know, as a military officer, you are really assigned to a joint billet in support of the commander, but your intelligence support comes from DIA. And, in fact, the year that I was at CENTCOM was the year that the Department made the very significant change to align all of DIA, the civilian structure underneath -- underneath the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department decided to do that, and then basically align them with the J2.

My second time working directly for DIA was as the J2 on the joint staff, senior intelligence officer to the chairman. That billet is actually not a joint staff billet. That billet is a deputy director to the DIA with an assignment to the joint staff. Not a lot of people

[REDACTED]

know that.

Q How long was that tour?

A That tour -- CENTCOM was a year, and the joint staff was 1 year.

Ms. Sawyer. Mac, just for a moment, I just wanted to make sure we had an opportunity to introduce to the witness Congresswoman Duckworth from Illinois.

General Flynn. Hi, how are you?

Ms. Sawyer. Who is here as also a veteran of the Armed Forces.

General Flynn. Good. Super.

Ms. Duckworth. Thank you for being here, General.

General Flynn. Yeah, thanks. Thank you.

Mr. Chipman. General Flynn --

General Flynn. Thank you for your service.

Mr. Chipman. -- during your time at CENTCOM, was this when CENTCOM was also actively managing theaters of operation in both Iraq and Afghanistan?

General Flynn. Absolutely. Oh, yeah, yeah. And also, at that time, CENTCOM still retained six countries in East Africa, so that was -- that was also during the period of time when we transitioned from some of the countries at CENTCOM, essentially, had in its AOR to Africa Command, and that was a big deal, too. So yeah, I mean, we had significant operations -- significant combat operations still ongoing in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

Mr. Chipman. And by AOR, you meant CENTCOM's area of

[REDACTED]

responsibility?

General Flynn. Yeah, yeah, sorry.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, prior to joining DIA in 2012 as a Director, talk a little bit about your background as it relates to intelligence collection, analyst reporting with regard to Libya. What kind of association or work did you do in Libya or about Libya?

A Sure. I would just say that, first of all, you know, the very front side of your question, I mean, I have extensive experience training, you know, doing the job of an analyst, the collection management component of intelligence operations, running -- running not only, you know, very tactical level efforts, intelligence efforts, you know, intelligence, counterintelligence, physical security, special security operations, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, but all the way up to the national level, you know, building out architectures for combat zones as well as for entire theaters of operations. So I have had my hands in or have done some of that quite a bit.

In terms of Libya, I think that the majority of my time directly related to Libya really started when I was in Iraq, because many of the individuals who we were after or we captured or killed were from Libya. Many of the senior leaders of Al Qaeda were from Libya,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

So a lot of experience studying the situation in Libya as it related to how it affected and impacted our operations in Iraq. Many of the leaders, as I said, not only at the Al Qaeda level but -- and I am talking about the senior Al Qaeda command and control, but also, many of the individuals who were leading Al Qaeda in Iraq were from Libya, and Libya was a transit point for foreign fighters coming in at that time, you know, and this is 2004 to roughly probably 2010, you know, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but you know, paid a lot of attention to Libya because of what it represented in terms of the fight that we were having inside of Iraq.

Mr. Tolar. Just spending -- go ahead.

Mr. Chipman. Just one question I will try to get the context here.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Chipman. And so this time when you talk about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] with Al Qaeda operatives in Libya, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

And then I went from there to CENTCOM, and then from CENTCOM to the joint staff. So my -- you know, so I never broke contact with -- because I -- you know, Iraq was still the main effort at that time for the Nation, and so I never really broke contact from the time

[REDACTED]

I was at JSOC till I actually ended up going become to Afghanistan in 2009.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Have you ever been to Libya?

A I have not.

Q When did you report in as Director of DIA?

A It was -- I think it was 24 July 2012. I think that was the date. July 2012.

Q If you will, once you came aboard as Director, kind of walk me through your daily routine?

A Yeah, my daily routine was probably, you know, it started at about 5:00 in the morning, and it would typically -- you know, it would typically end at about 1900, you know, 2000, but you know, I had, you know, in my home, which is part of the problem, you know, you end up with, you know, communications systems at your home. I lived over on Fort McNair, and so you are never out of touch. And you are just never -- in that job, you are never out of touch.

Q Talk to me a little bit about in terms of what kind of products you reviewed on a daily basis. Was there a morning briefing for you? Was there a morning read book?

A Yeah.

Q Were you looking at --

A Yeah, every day, for the most part, I was pretty religious about reading the Presidential Daily Brief. I was one of the few that had the privilege of having access to that, and so I -- as you know,

[REDACTED]

if I was -- if I was here in D.C., and sometimes I actually did get pieces of it overseas or other times when I traveled, it was harder, but I would typically, you know, after my morning normal routine of some PT, you know, I would go out for a run, I would come in, and I would read the PDB, and that usually would take me about 30 to 45 minutes, maybe sometimes an hour, depending on the substance that was in that book.

That was my -- that was my typical start of the morning before I would drive in to different meetings and updates and things like that.

Q When did you leave DIA?

A I left DIA 4 August 2014.

Q There have been several congressional inquiries regarding the events surrounding the attacks in Benghazi. Am I correct in saying that you've never testified before Congress in any of these inquiries?

A You are correct.

Q Were you even asked?

A No.

Q Do you find that peculiar?

A Very peculiar.

Q Why do you say that?

A Well, because I just think that as the head of one of the intelligence agencies, I just found it stunning that -- you know, and I was prepared to do that, but just, you know, was never asked.

Q Okay.

A And you know, I -- people go, well, why didn't you say

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

something? Well, I mean, you know, I was in multiple conversations with our leadership, but nobody ever said, hey, we want you to come over, and nobody from -- nobody from the Hill ever said, you know, let's -- what does DIA think?

Q Sure.

A At least not to me.

Q Yes, sir. Talk to me briefly about the mission at DIA, a little bit how DIA fits into the intel community.

A Yeah.

Q Those kind of things.

A So two roles. One, I am the -- the DIA has its own responsibility to run itself as an agency, so the Director is responsible for [REDACTED]. Things like the defense attache system around the world is under DIA. Our real mission is to provide really strategic indications and warnings for conflict and any particular threats to our country around the world 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

We have a range of capabilities. Probably the most important capability that we have is we are one of three -- but we are one of two of the largest all-source intelligence agencies, not only in the United States, but in the world. So that is the DIA side.

The other -- another hat that I wore was I was the chairman of the military intelligence board, which set standards, policies, procedures for all of military intelligence. So essentially, I am the senior military intelligence officer for the Department of Defense in

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

that role and ran a -- you know, a very, I thought, good process with all of the other senior intelligence leaders within the Department on a fairly routine basis to just make sure that, you know, resources were argued for appropriately, we understood the direction that each service was going, and also, daily, sometimes -- sometimes daily, definitely weekly interaction from DIA through the joint staff to the combatant commands.

So we have 11 -- 11 four-star commands around the world. You know, a couple of them are functional commands like Korea, but then I include that in the 11 as a sort of a combatant command level, but those 11 four-stars are also part of that sort of daily, you know, interaction, frankly, and it is either -- that interaction, you know, there is the formal processes and the meetings and the routine and the battle rhythm that we have, but there is also just the constant communications with VTCs, and of course, email, Tandberg sessions based on crises that are going on around the world. And just, you know, I mean, these last few years, I think as everybody has seen, is probably some of the most complex times we have faced.

Mr. Chipman. Sir, you talked about an all-source intelligence agency, and I think you meant that the CIA and the DIA are the two all-source intelligence agencies within the intelligence community?

General Flynn. Yeah. And that -- yes. So there is a third one, and that is the State Department. The State Department has a small, we would call it an all-source intel agency, and they are actually -- you know, my read of them and using them and communicating with them and

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

being briefed by them over the years, and they are actually pretty effective, good professional people over there, but they are small, very small, and they are focused on, really, the State Department; whereas the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, you know, have large all-source intelligence analysis capabilities, and I like to say that they are -- they should be competitive with one another, because, frankly, our views will be different, will be different, and the defense side, because of the -- because of the scale of the Defense Department and the role of the defense intelligence beyond DIA, it's much larger actually.

Mr. Chipman. Okay. And by all-source intelligence, what does that mean?

General Flynn. All-source intelligence means you look and you bring in every form of information that is possible to support the intelligence assessments that you would craft for your decision makers. So that would mean things like [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], open source, multiple open sources of information, you know, that you have that is called MASINT, which is measurements and signatures intelligence, you know. You have all the space-based stuff, so there is an enormous amount of intelligence that is brought together, and the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency have those roles and responsibilities for the U.S. Government. One is CIA is national, and DIA would be defense.

Mr. Chipman. Thank you.

[REDACTED]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Would you talk about DIA's mission versus military intelligence mission? Is there overlap there? How much coordination is done, et cetera?

A Yeah. There's a lot of overlap, and you know, sitting here today in looking at it, and there is probably, at times, too much, but the coordination, I think, is really -- I think the coordination is actually pretty effective.

Now, the best coordination is not necessarily at the leader level. The best coordination actually happens at the analytic level because analysts just have a knack for developing their own networks inside of the sort of the, you know, the subtext to, you know, leaders getting together in a room and going, okay, is this what we want. The analysts down at the engine deck, or the engine plate level, they actually have a very effective network and they communicate very well, so that happens more than daily. That happens on almost a constant basis, particularly those who are paying close attention to, you know, their particular areas of the world.

Q Talk to me a little bit about what section in DIA or group or organization handles Libya specifically.

A Yeah. So in DIA, it would be -- today would be the MARC, which is the Middle East Africa Regional Center. Middle East Africa Regional Center. And you know, at the time that we are really talking about, we had not gotten to that organizational construct yet. We still had just what I would just call DI, defense intelligence element

[REDACTED]

of our all-source component, and we had a sort of a North Africa desk, if you will, that handled North Africa and handled specific things like AQIM, you know, and the various other AQ networks.

Q With the rise of the Arab Spring and the Libyan revolution, did you find that North Africa desk bumping up in resources and personnel and things of that nature, or did you stay the course?

A Well, I tell you, no, we went through a radical basically reorganization, and -- because what I saw in my time in combat and my time in places like Central Command, places like the joint staff, I found the structure of defense intelligence very cumbersome, and not focused on providing really good connections between national and the warfighter. So I wanted to focus more on the warfighter, and you know, and figured if we did that, we would provide better assessments for the, you know, for the decision makers that we had, everybody from the chairman to the Secretary to the DNI.

And so we went through a bit of a restructuring and created what I just mentioned a little bit earlier was this Middle East Africa Regional Center, and that basically -- that particular one, because there is five of them, that particular one overlapped three combatant commands because, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] So this overlapping of the commands I always saw presented problems, especially when I was at Central Command and at the joint staff.

So what we were trying to do was create sort of umbrellas over

[REDACTED]

those where they overlapped to try to make sure that we were more seamless in what we were doing to share, talk about, assess intelligence.

Q Did you utilize a Red Team concept for Libya?

A No, I don't -- I wouldn't say we did. I wouldn't say we did. Our counterterrorism task force inside of DIA, I thought, had a really good -- we called it JITFCT at the time, now it's called DCTC. JITFCT was basically the Joint Interagency Task Force for Counterterrorism. Now it's national -- now it's DCTC, which is Defense Combating Terrorism Center, so we just adjusted the name, did some other things with them, but I thought they had a very, very good read on the situation in North Africa and the situation in Libya.

Q You talked about the challenges that the ground forces have getting intel potentially. Do your DIA analysts have access to operational traffic, operational information?

A Yes.

Q Did it exist prior to the attack?

A You know, I don't know. I mean, you know, if you were to say operational traffic, if they had -- you know, I mean, if there were military forces on the ground, they likely had -- they likely had access to some of that reporting. They likely had access to some of that reporting, and that would help them in their overall determination of assessments that they were going to make.

I mean, one of the things that we're very concerned about, you know, and still are, is the return of GTMO detainees, as an example,

to the battlefield, and we were tracking a number of them that were in various parts of that part of the world, and always trying to figure out whether or not they were going to return to the battlefield, and in some cases, they did.

Q Prior to the attack, do you have an appreciation as to how often combatant commanders would request products from DIA?

A I would say they would get them daily. Oh, yeah. Combatant commanders would get a DIA product daily.

Q Was that just a product you all generated on a regular basis or was that a specific request from the combatant commanders?

A Probably a combination. I would say a combination. I mean, you know, they would have -- they would have something specifically that they would ask for, and, you know, and then the machine -- the DIA system would prepare it for them, you know, a specific question maybe on an individual for a particular weapon system or whatever, or a particular area of their area of responsibility that they wanted specific information, so that would be prepared as a special product. But every day, they -- they likely saw something that was created by the Defense Intelligence Agency, you know, system that we had.

Q Was there a single specific daily product that DIA produced that was disseminated throughout the ranks or was it a multitude of things?

A It is a multitude, but specifically, we do something called the Defense Intelligence Digest, an acronym is the DID; and then the

[REDACTED]

other one is the chairman's briefing, so the daily chairman's briefing, and I've always called it the most widely read intelligence product in the world, and DIA produces that, and that --

[REDACTED]

And I have seen -- I have used them,

[REDACTED]

So I mean, so that -- those two products, the DID, other, you know, specialty products and the chairman's briefing, those are daily.

Q Sir, at this time, I just wanted, for the record, recognize that Congressman Westmoreland has joined us, as well as Congressman Schiff.

A Good. Okay.

Q Talking about -- we move on from combatant commanders. Would the OSD or DNI or NSC or any of those organizations typically request products from DIA?

A Yes, they would. They would see them. I mean, you know, I don't know exactly what they -- what their sort of daily, you know, briefing books or whatever. You know, I do know that the USDI and the DNI both have access to the PDB, but in terms of what they -- what they read on a daily basis, would they request products from us? Absolutely, yeah.

Q Same goes for the Department of State?

A Department of State, absolutely.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q Prior to the attack, did you ever have any discussions with anyone at the Department of State about Libya specifically?

A No, none that I can remember.

Q And in terms of the products, I assume the President's administration would also receive something?

A Oh, yeah. I mean, you know, again, the Presidential Daily Briefing is supposed to be an accumulation of the products prepared by the whole of the U.S. intelligence community, and if it's a specific product like a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], and that might be -- that might, you know, get raised to the level of the President of the United States. But mostly the products were -- normally, they were all-source products, and those all-source products means that they are prepared by the entirety of the intel community.

And again, back to what I talked about earlier, CIA and DIA were the two all-source agencies. And in those all-source products, if there is a -- if there is a difference like, you know, if there is some other -- if somebody has a difference of opinion, so if DIA did not agree with CIA, that either can be told by the briefer to the President or it's stated right in the product itself.

Q So the product, especially the PDB will have counter arguments?

A I should, it should. Yeah, any counter argument should be

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

presented. If it's not, it's irresponsible.

Q Prior to the attacks in Libya, did you ever have any discussions with Michael Vick or anyone else from the administration about Libya?

A Michael Vickers?

Q Vickers, excuse me.

A Yeah, yeah, yeah. No. No.

Q When you came aboard at DIA, did you have a feeling that DIA was being utilized properly based on their expertise and abilities?

A Well, I thought it was -- I felt like DIA needed a shot of energy and a refocus on our warfighting commands. That is what I really believed. That is where I came from, and frankly, my conversation with -- my one conversation with Secretary Panetta early on, before I even took over, you know, we talked about that.

So you know, my emphasis was going to be to bring a, you know, some energy into it, retool it and focus on our warfighting commands because the problem that I saw, certainly, and I think in the collective sense, I saw the environment that we were operating within growing more complex, particularly on the, you know, the Islamic radical -- the growth of radical Islam in terms of just number of organizations that, you know, frankly, had doubled over the time before I even took over.

In addition to what other countries were doing, what the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and all the different aspects of what we were involved in, I felt that there was this too -- for the DIA, I felt it was too much of a Washington focus, and I saw that.


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I mean, I saw that in my own, you know, my own processes, my own assignment history that I had, certainly the previous, you know, probably 8 years.

Q You touched on, a few minutes ago, about the differences between CIA and DIA. Kind of flesh that out a little bit more in terms of how they go about their collection methods, or not their sources of methods, per se, but how they do their approach to that kind of focus.

A Yeah, DIA and CIA, you know, for the most part, you know, are supposed to have access to, for the most part, because there is always some other sensitive, you know, intelligence sources that are out there that are just going to be kept so sensitive, but for the most part, DIA and CIA analysts have access to essentially what each other has seen.



But for the most part, I would say, you know, 90 to 95 percent of their -- of the information and the views are certainly shared

[REDACTED]

amongst each other, and that is why I think, you know, like I like to say sometimes, I think that between the CIA and the DIA, you know, if I were in a senior leadership position, I would want to know what are -- you know, do we agree, do we disagree, you know, why do we disagree if we do because the presentation of opposing views, what I call competitive intelligence, is critical.

Q Do you typically coordinate collections efforts?

A Yes. One of the hats that I wore as the head of Defense Intelligence Agency was I was the -- essentially, the collection manager for the Defense Department, so we set broad, broad priorities, you know, down at the -- down at the warfighter level they would set very tactical, some operational priorities, but yeah. So we would -- and then that would be based on, you know,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED], so yeah.

Q Did you have regular meetings or phone conversations with the Director at CIA?

A Not really. Periodically, you know, we set the national HUMINT board together, and a phone call here and there based on what was happening. If something was going on, you know, in the world, you know, we would likely communicate, but some of it, you know, as long

[REDACTED]

as my, you know, sort of the key deputies for me were my head of defense analysis, and as long as they were talking to their colleagues over at the Agency, over at CIA, you know, I was confident that there was a good line of communications opened up.

Q In 2012, did you ever have a conversation with either Mr. Morell or General Petraeus about Libya?

A No, not at all.

Q I want to talk a little bit about military capabilities. Talk to me about -- do you all monitor military asset locations around the world at DIA or you just rely on a document from DOD itself?

A I mean, define military assets.

Q Well, I mean, locations of military organizations, units?

A Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. I got you. I got you. So the defense attache systems belongs to DIA, okay, and I think there were -- I think it's 142 countries. So defense attaches in a country, you know, are supposed to have knowledge of where, you know, Department of Defense assets are in that particular country. They typically do. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q As Director of DIA, did you have an appreciation of what kind of quick response forces were readily available for hotspots around the world --

A Sure.

Q -- if we had personnel there?

A I am very aware of what crisis response elements we have,

[REDACTED]

call them CREs and other, you know, where we have, you know, assets generally postured or based for quick reaction to, you know, to emergencies, sure.

Q Do you recall what CREs were available in September of 2012?

A Well, there is always supposed to be one available to every combatant command, so a CRE should be available to every combatant command. You know, I don't know, because of the -- because we were tapping into some of those crisis response elements just because of need in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, but every geographic, so every geographic combatant command, so AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, specific command, would have a crisis response element, usually part of their special operations forces.

Q Were you tracking the military response on September 11 as well?

A I was not. I was not. I was -- I know that I was asking about it, but I was not tracking it specifically as to, you know, what was happening. I think for me, it was just to -- you know, it was to get informed about what was going on because it was as much about -- you know, it was as much about what was happening in Libya because it was -- it just didn't sound really that things were going, you know, all that well with Benghazi, but there were other things happening.

And, of course, one of our -- one of our number 1 things

really is always about safety of our people, probably number 1. In fact, it is the number 1 priority, and accountability, so do we have -- you know, do we have accountability of everybody? Are they in a place where they are relatively safe? And then you can go from there.

Q Okay. Subsequent to the attack, whether it was weeks and months or whatnot, did you ever have an opportunity to go back and review the military response in terms of the timeline, et cetera?

A Yeah. I have looked at it. I have looked at everything on that, yeah.

Q Did -- do you have any concerns about what you saw in terms of how we responded? For example, do you have concerns about potential delays in the VOCO or delays in the vocal order, delays in the in-hour establishment or delays in the air response, do you have any concerns about something like that, what you saw?

A Yeah. So let me give you a little bit of experience first.

So I understand rapid deployment very, very well, and I understand posturing forces for rapid deployment in times of emergency, so I have a lot of experience here.

My principal concern, kind of in hindsight, and really even at the time, because it was like, you know, it was -- we -- when it all began, you didn't know how long it was going to go on, so -- so you know, you are -- you know, you are, frankly, it's other people's responsibilities to deploy and to decide to deploy forces, but certainly, in hindsight, nobody really knew how long this thing was

going to last.

So I mean, you do everything you can to protect, you know, lives of American citizens around the world. I mean, that is the nature of why we have these rapid response forces, especially in the case of a United States Ambassador's life who is at risk, you know, and then subsequently he was murdered.

Q In addition to the crisis response elements that were launched, do you believe that other elements should have been launched or mobilized?

A I believe that we could have used a lot more imagination, yeah.

Q Could you flesh that out for me?

[REDACTED]

. But you know, in addition to other capabilities that may have been postured, you know, and the time-distance factors were, I know, extensive, but you know, you do everything you can to, you know,

[REDACTED]

to protect American citizens abroad.

I mean, one of the things -- one of reasons why we do things like we do, even though the calvary may not show up in time, is so the next time we put people's lives in a difficult place, they know that somebody is going to actually come for them.

Q Did we do everything we could?

A I don't -- I don't personally believe we did.

Q What else do you think should have been done?

A That is my --

Q I mean, you talked about using more imagination, but can you give me specifics about what you think we should have done?

A I mean, I don't know. I would say anything from, you know, putting aircraft up in the air, getting, you know, posture -- you know, literally committing more forces, even into Tripoli, I mean, just to show that we were not going to stand for the murder of an Ambassador. I mean, even after it all sort of -- even after the dust settled, which I think was like, I don't know, 5 or 6 o'clock the next morning their time, you know.

Mr. Westmoreland. Sir, I'm Lynn Westmoreland, and thank you for your service. I was just at Suda Bay in Crete.

General Flynn. Right.

Mr. Westmoreland. That is probably a less than an hour's flight to Benghazi.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.


Mr. Westmoreland. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Mr. Westmoreland. You know, I don't know if that is right or not. I think -- I don't know if Suda Bay is part of EUCOM or AFRICOM because I know that Egypt --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- is part --

General Flynn. Central Command.


Mr. Westmoreland. Yes.

General Flynn. Egypt is Central Command.


Mr. Westmoreland. Yes, Central Command. And so I don't know -- I can't remember which one it is, but I just -- I didn't know if -- or I guess my question is, who would have known those assets were there.

General Flynn. Well, I think that the operational leadership in certainly our combatant commands should know where all friendly assets are all the time, and those are -- those should be judged -- those should be available at the various operation centers, so --

Mr. Westmoreland.



General Flynn. I personally, Congressman, I personally don't think that this was an intelligence issue. I think that this is an operational -- what you are getting at is this is an operational decision, and number 1, is to understand where all of your capabilities are in a time of crisis, you know; and the second part of that is -- that understanding is knowing what are their abilities and capabilities to be able to be employed if they had to be employed, how far could they



[REDACTED]

fly? Do you need refueling capabilities? Do you need forward basing? You know, are you going to have to make decisions that maybe a combatant commander is not authorized to make. Maybe only it's the President of the United States because you are going to violate somebody's sovereign -- you know, sovereign borders.

So that is a -- those are operational decisions and operational understanding, and I think, you know, as you guys go through this, you know, those are questions to ask. The intelligence piece of this from what we knew prior, you know, from really January, I think, because that is kind of where I -- I went back and looked at the January timeframe, 2012, up to the attack itself, and then even subsequent and even past, you know, post the attack, what did we know. And I thought we know -- I know we knew quite a bit about the threat. You know, the risk decisions and the operational decisions about where things are postured, whether they are able to respond, those are -- that's a different part. It's not the intelligence community or --

Mr. Westmoreland. No.

General Flynn. -- DIA, you know.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

General Flynn. Sure. Sure. I mean, that is -- those are the kinds of things that we have to learn from this. I mean, you know, what decisions were made. You got to -- I'm not sure what the posture -- I don't remember what the posture of like the Eastern Mediterranean fleet was. They may have been in the Red Sea, they may have been in the Eastern Myt, you know, it's still tyranny of distance in especially North Africa is significant, but not knowing the -- not knowing how long this thing was going to last, I think, is -- has to be part of it.

Even if it was going -- even if you knew it was going to end at 5 o'clock in the morning, you know, sort of local time, you know, what assets are you moving to the sound of the gun, so to speak, in order to secure a site where we knew we had casualties already, to include a U.S. Ambassador.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes.

General Flynn. So, I mean, again, those are sort of operational decisions that, you know, I was not in that conversation. I would have certainly given my two cents were I in that conversation.

Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, in the earlier stages of the Arab Spring, were you aware

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

if we had any assets on a heightened alert status?

A [REDACTED]


Q People are --

A People are more alert.

Q I am talking more specifically about back in 2010 timeframe, back in there -- 2011, excuse me. Had we ramped up or increased our alert status as the Arab Spring took flight, so to speak? Were you aware; do you know?

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Q Do you have appreciation for what kind of key issues the policymakers were concerned about regarding Libya?

A I think that, you know, the results of ousting Qadhafi, you know, what was it turning into. And you know, I mean, it was, from our assessment, I believe we saw it turning into essentially a failed state. I mean, we saw -- our assessments were that the various associated movements of Al Qaeda, essentially, were gaining a pretty strong foothold. They were involved in -- you know, they were moving, I thought, you know, one assessment I saw about movement of weapons that were stolen out of the arsenals of the Qadhafi regime, they were being used and sent, you know, all over Africa, and certainly into the Middle East.

Q Sir, in the past, you talked about the politicalization of

the intelligence community. Explain what you mean by that?

A Yeah. What I mean is that, you know, you've got to be -- if you are in the intelligence community --

Ms. Sawyer. Just to clarify. He may have testified about that today. I didn't hear him say it earlier, so just the context of where he made these comments.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, in the past, outside of this, have you ever commented on the politicalization of --

A Yes.

Q -- the intelligence community?

A Yeah, I talked about it in the context of we have to be careful that we don't politicize the intelligence that goes into leaders and --

Ms. Sawyer. I think I was asking more are these press statements, are these statements to Congress, are they congressional briefings, are they hearings? I am just trying to get a sense of the context, who he said that --

General Flynn. Yeah, I think I said that -- and I have to remember, but I think I was in the front of HASC maybe one time saying that.

Mr. Tolar. I want to say I read it in one of his interviews or something.

General Flynn. It may have been a --

Mr. Tolar. I don't recall the specific --

General Flynn. It may have been a press statement, recent press statement.

Ms. Sawyer. An interview that this committee had?

Mr. Tolar. No, no, no, no, somewhere online. I was searching the Internet, so somewhere online I found a comment where he -- that he said this.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay.

General Flynn. But the idea is -- and this can happen down at the tactical level, you know, if a intelligence officer, you know, he or she is the type of intelligence officer that, you know, puts their finger on their tongue and looks at which way the wind is blowing, you know, what does the commander want to hear, that is an ineffective intelligence officer as far as I am concerned.

So at the tactical level, it's very dangerous because you're talking about, you know, lives on the line, and I've seen -- I've seen intelligence officers at that level that do that, and good commanders get rid of them. At the -- you know, at the level that we're talking about here, the sort of the national level, I think we have to be careful that we don't have senior intelligence leaders or the decision makers looking for intelligence that supports a policy.

That is my belief. And I think that that is -- that is something that we always have to be cautious of, and frankly, if you are in the leadership role, if you are the decision maker and you have somebody who you can't trust to come in and give you the -- you know, the absolute

what we know, brass tacks, you know, ugly picture, because typically intelligence is not necessarily going to give you the, you know, the light. It's going to give you the dark.

You know, you have to -- you have to look for other people. You have to figure out how you're going to work with somebody like that because they may not always necessarily be in line with what you're trying to do politically. That's very dangerous for this country, because when I -- what I do believe is that the intelligence system that we have is actually, like the rule of law, is actually a strategic advantage for this country.

As long as it's focused properly and prioritized properly and adhered to, listened to, they don't have the use it, but they at least got to understand that they're getting those -- is this the whole picture, is there anything else that I'm not hearing, and I think the leadership has to -- has to understand that and use it that way. And you know, instead of -- because I have seen people go into different meetings and just -- and you're like -- that is why if I'm in there, I've always been somebody that's like, Hey, you know, before we leave, you know, you need to know this.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, do you believe that the politicalization may have impacted or affected the IC's prioritization of assets and collections in Libya?

A I don't know. I don't know.

Q I've got a couple of minutes left. Real quick, talk to me

briefly about DIA's role in PDB itself. What kind of input do you all provide to the PDB?

A Quite a bit actually daily. We have people that work on PDB staff during my time, the chief of staff or the PDB team was from DIA, so quite a bit.

Q The chief of staff of the PDB team is from DIA?

A At that time.

Q Okay.

A At that time, yeah. I mean, those are joint billets.

Q And who gives final approval at DIA for DIA's CHOP on the PDB?

A Well, our head of analysis, or our head of analysis would be involved in that process, but usually, the PDB team, and there's a head, there's a leader for the PDB team that makes decisions. And the way that Director Clapper has organized it, the Deputy Director for national intelligence -- I forget the exact. There's another title part of it, is the individual who gives the final CHOP, and at the end of the day, it's the DNI that's really responsible, but you know, because it's a daily grind, he turns it over to one of his deputies, and that deputy the DNI level is responsible for that.

Mr. Chipman. Congressman, anything further in our first hour? And just to clarify, the NIPF that Mac Tolar mentioned was the National Intelligence Priorities Framework?

General Flynn. Right, right. Yeah, National Intelligence Priorities Framework; that is right.

Mr. Tolar. Okay. I'm going to transition into a whole another category, so I'm going to stop here at -- I've got 10:05. Sir, let's take a break.

Mr. Kenny. Are we off the record?

Mr. Tolar. Off the record. I'm sorry, yeah.

[Recess.]

[10:15 a.m.]

Mr. Tolar. I've got 10:15 a.m.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, I want to talk about a little something different here. I want to talk a little bit about Libya, kind of the lay of the land prior to 9/11.

A

Q As the Libyan revolution came to an end, with the capture of Tripoli and the death of Qadhafi, was DIA tasked to provide any kind of post-revolution analysis such as consequences of removing a dictator, things of that nature? And you talked about the power vacuum and --

A

Q Who's "we"?

A DIA.

Q Okay.

A You know, the outflow of weapons from Libya, because I remember that -- seeing that specific --

Q Talk about that specifically just for a minute, please.

A Well, just the -- you know, there was real concern about the number of weapons that were remaining in Libya post-Qadhafi and what was going to happen to them.

Q Briefly talk about the consequences of a failed state and what that means when you've got a power vacuum.

A It gets filled immediately by typically by bad actors. In this case it got filled by al-Qaida for sure, specifically al-Qaida in the Maghreb, Ansar al Sunnah I think was the other group -- or al Ansar was the other group in the eastern part of Libya. I mean, it just gets filled, the vacuum gets filled, and it got filled.

Q Was it your impression that Libya, especially eastern Libya, became a haven for training camps?

A Yeah. We knew that to be the case for -- I knew that to be the case since at least, at least 2005 from my time in Iraq.

Q Did it concern you all that the use of radical Islamists and how they were being vetted in terms of the revolution, in terms of their being used to overthrow Qadhafi?

A Um --

Q Let me ask that a better way.


A I don't know.

Q Was the use of radical Islamists within the vetted revolutionaries and their role in the post revolution, did you talk about that or measure that?

A Yeah. I think there was some -- there was some assessments

done about the -- there were assessments done about the type of people that we were looking at to basically fill the void of not having a, you know, Qadhafi regime in power anymore, so --

Q Did you have any concerns about the type of people who were --



A

Q I want to talk to you a little about the intervention that the U.S. did. Were you aware or did you participate in any discussions within the IC regarding U.S. intervention into Libya during the

revolution?

A No. I mean -- you know, I mean, I think formal ones, no, no. Informal ones, probably a number of them, but definitely not in any formal discussions.

Q Do you know why the U.S. decided to intervene in Libya in the revolution?

A I have no idea. Can't sit here and tell you why, other than to remove Qadhafi.

Q Did you ever discuss U.S. intervention with the NSC, with Congress, with the administration writ large?

A I never did.

Q Okay. Do you have an appreciation of who in the executive branch supported intervention versus those who did not?

A I can't sit here and tell you that I know specifically.

Q



[REDACTED]

Q Sure. Prior to the attacks in Benghazi, [REDACTED]

A I was not.

Q Were you aware that the SMC, or the TMF, existed in Benghazi?

A What does the acronym stand for?

Q The consulate.

A Oh, yeah.

Q The Special Mission Compound or the --

A Yeah. The fact that we had a consulate, a presence in Benghazi, yes.

Q So you knew about the consulate, [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED]

Q Yes, sir.

A I mean, it's not surprising. I mean, it's just --

[REDACTED]

A large, irregular black redaction covers the central portion of the page, obscuring all text and graphics. The redaction consists of several thick, black horizontal bars of varying lengths, some overlapping, forming a dense, solid black area. The only visible text is the page number '50' in the top right corner.

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
[REDACTED]

[Flynn Exhibit No. 1
was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[Flynn Exhibit No. 2
was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q



Have you seen that before, sir?

A Yes. Yep, I sure have.

Q Who would typically receive this report?

A Frankly, anybody -- anybody in the Intelligence Community, anybody that uses intelligence, up to and including the President of the United States.

Q Would this report ever be challenged by any other IC -- is

[REDACTED]

it unusual for a report like this to be challenged in terms of its veracity by other members of the IC community?

A Not unusual. I think that this was a good report, though.

Q Explain the characterization of this report as high confidence?

A Yeah. So the confidence levels, and I think it's probably explained, it should be explained on some of these papers here, but the confidence levels, you know, high, medium, low confidence, the high confidence report means that we have multiple sources that their truthfulness, their veracity is high, and so the judgment by the analysts putting this together is that they're confident that what they're saying is pretty close to the truth.

Q [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED]

Q You're welcome to read this report if you'd like, but what I want to do is just get your appreciation or your sense of what the significance of this report is.

A Yeah. I mean, I think what you're talking about is in -- you know, if you go through, like, some of the subparagraphs, the bulletized things, which I'm just, you know, looking at, you know,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

where you talk about all of the -- what this report shows is the analysts that put it together took an accumulation, a quantity of reporting, and this is what all source reporting is about.

They took a quantity of reporting, you know, around the timeframe that talks about different things, you know, you -- you know, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

So, I mean, there's factual statements in here, and then there's probably some, you know, supposition in some of what the analysts when they make their conclusion, like the bold paragraph at the top, but this is one that I would say is based on more fact than assumption.

Q [REDACTED] Do you recall?

A I don't recall.

Q That's okay.

A Yeah.

Q Let's move on.

A I don't recall.

Q That's okay.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, now I want to show you another document, please, and this document is dated June 18th. It was produced by the joint staff, J2. I guess that was a billet you previously held?

A Yep. Sure was. Yep. This is a chairman's briefing.

[REDACTED]

Q Yes, sir.

A So this is when I mentioned the chairman's briefing earlier, it's a DIA product.

Q Sir, Ms. Roby has just joined the committee, the interview.

[REDACTED]

A No. Actually, this report would be produced with DIA. DIA produces this report.

Q Okay.

A Now, the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], because the J2 is the senior intelligence officer for the chairman, you know, who's the principal military advisor to the President. So you know, I always put a lot of -- I mean, the way [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], you know, with the various bullets and things like that, and then the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], because sometimes with no time, [REDACTED]

Q Sure.

[REDACTED]. I think you've alluded to this in the past, but just talk about what that means --

A Yeah.

Q -- the significance of that.

A So, I mean -- and I agree with it. I mean, [REDACTED]

Q Talking about that, let's --

Mr. Kenny. Sorry, Mac. Just to be clear, this exhibit 3 you refer to, this is a single slide of a briefing? Is that correct?

Mr. Tolar. Yes. I don't --

General Flynn. No. Well, what they are, this is a -- this the format, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], but what they try to do on the slide is give you the full context.

So essentially that's a briefing on one slide. And those were really difficult to do, and there are some great people that pull these things together, but that -- I've seen [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. So the slide is a briefing in and of itself?

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Is it typical of what would go into the daily chairman's briefing?

A Yeah. That is the -- yeah, this is an example of a daily chairman's briefing slide. And that's a really -- that's actually a very good slide. Now, you're -- you know, they're in color and everything else.

Q Yes, sir.

A Yeah, that's -- that's a good slide.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q All right. Sir, now if you'd look at exhibit No. 4, which you should have to your left,

A Yeah.

Q Talk about the significance of that?

A So this is a -- this is a very good slide and good information, because this is exactly what DIA is responsible for, which is warning. Okay?

[REDACTED]

And you can see in all cases, so I look down this, in all cases

[REDACTED]

So, these are good slides. I mean, these are -- that's an entire briefing in and of itself about the terrorist efforts inside of Libya.

Q All right. I got one more for you, sir.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 5

was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q This dated September 7th, and this is a report entitled,

[REDACTED] Again, it's a DIA product.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you familiar with this product, sir?

A Yes, I am, actually.

Q If you notice right there in the second sentence,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q Given the Arab Spring, you know, coupled with the Libyan revolution, is it safe to say that the Intelligence Community was flooded with intelligence reports such as the four we just looked at?

A Yeah. I mean, I think that what I remember looking back at, like I said earlier on, when I kind of said take me back to January, so this is September, so take me back to January, and I wanted to see every single report that we had ever put together that had anything to do with Libya.

Q Are you aware --

Ms. Sawyer. Can I just clarify on that? When you made that request, when was that request made?

General Flynn. I think it was after Benghazi happened.

Ms. Sawyer. It wasn't before Benghazi?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

General Flynn. No, no. I mean, we were paying attention to things, you know, the reporting, but afterwards, it was to basically kind of look forensically back to see what did we miss, you know, did we not report something. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. That's a lesson, you know, did we -- can we learn a lesson from this [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] And I look at this, that's why I said earlier to whatever the question was on operational activities, you know, I felt like strategic warning was there. I mean, this slide doesn't get any better. That's some of the best strategic warning you can get?

Mr. Tolar. So for the record, which slide are you looking at, exhibit number?

General Flynn. That's deposition exhibit No. 4.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you.

General Flynn. [REDACTED]. I mean, that's a pretty good slide. That is a slide that DIA does and is supposed to do. And [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], you know, you name it.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Again, we've just talked about several reports here that appear to show a trending [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q Do you believe there was enough actionable intelligence available prior to the attacks to either warrant ramping up security at the consulate in Benghazi or even withdrawing U.S. personnel from Libya?

A Yes.

Q Talk more about that.

A Well, I mean, I think that some of the attacks not only on our own facility, but also on other foreign partners who were in that area, and if I'm not mistaken and I -- you know, don't hold me to this, but I think one of the countries actually left the area, left their consulate, but there was a sufficient number of you a talks and activities and knowledge that warranted at least a consideration to increase security, if not just depart the area.

[REDACTED]

Q Did you have an appreciation for how much security was at the consulate at the time of the attack?

A I did not.

Q Knowing what you know now about what was there, do you have a comment about what was there, whether or not it was adequate?

A I would just say that obviously it was --

Ms. Sawyer. Mac, I'm not sure we've ever established what he does know now and what it's based on. I mean, I'm just not sure how he answers that question --

General Flynn. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. -- knowing what he knows now about the security.

Mr. Tolar. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. I just want to be fair to you and fair to the record.

General Flynn. Well, I mean, I -- yeah. No, I agree. I agree. I mean, I'd be --

Ms. Sawyer. I mean, I just --

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Tolar. Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. Just to be fair to the record.

General Flynn. Yeah. Yeah, yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. I don't know what he knows now.

Mr. Tolar. Understood.

General Flynn. Given the fact that, you know, that they were able to overwhelm with combat power the consulate, you know, shows that we weren't prepared to level that -- the threat presented, and I think

that that's obvious. The threaten ended up presenting themselves in a much more robust way, and we were not prepared for that. That's obvious.

I mean, with mortars and other capabilities that they used, you know, we obviously didn't prepare ourselves to stop that level of an attack. That's a tragedy.

Ms. Sawyer. Do you know how it was postured --

Mr. Tolar. Well, now, please.

Ms. Sawyer. Mac, we spoke --

Mr. Tolar. Right.

Ms. Sawyer. -- before this hour began about the fact that we had both been advised --

Mr. Tolar. Right.

Ms. Sawyer. -- by the witness, understandably, that he has a 12 o'clock --

Mr. Tolar. Sure.

Ms. Sawyer. -- stop time.

Mr. Tolar. You're going to get equal time.

Ms. Sawyer. And I asked you guys to work with us in a way that was flexible --

Mr. Tolar. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. -- that allowed us all to get our questions in.

Mr. Tolar. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. I can ask him these questions later or we can just get the foundation here that brackets kind of how he knew what he knew.

Mr. Tolar. Go ahead. Go.

Ms. Sawyer. I'm happy to wait.

Mr. Tolar. Go.

Ms. Sawyer. So you're withdrawing your objection to my --

Mr. Tolar. Yes.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So did you -- were you involved ever before 9/11/2012 in assessing the exact security assets --

A No.

Q -- environment in Benghazi?

A Nope.

Q In Tripoli?

A No, other than assessing -- I mean, if involvement is assessing DIA's involvement to assess the intelligence, you know, to assess the environment, that's -- if that's being involved, yeah, we were involved in assessing the environment. I mean, you -- that's what all these things are.

Q Right. But you had just indicated to me you had not reviewed those prior to --

A Yeah. The tactical -- the tactical array of security forces in Benghazi or Tripoli, I was not involved in any of that.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. Thank you.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Given all you knew -- all that we knew about Libya at the time, how would you rank that country in terms of being one of the most

[REDACTED]

dangerous places to have U.S. personnel? [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I mean, you had a whole range of -- and the other part was we were also tracking GTMO detainees, trying to figure out whether or not they were returning to the battlefield.

So, you know, in terms of increasing it, I mean, I thought we had -- from DIA's perspective, I thought we had sufficient analytic focus and our counterterrorism teams networking with the other parts of the military, I thought did a very good job of assessing the situation.

Q You previously talked about a strategic warning and others, I mean, IC had talked about a strategic warning. Explain briefly what a strategic warning is.

A Okay. I mean, the best example is this thing right here, is this slide right here. I mean, strategic --

Q Which slide, sir?

A That's exhibit 4.

[REDACTED]

Q Okay.

A

So we -- this is not a non-standard kind of a product. This is a very standard type of product that will come out on everything that -- all the different threats that we face around the world.

Q Did you previously predict that the Russian encroachment into Crimea would occur, and notify the administration accordingly?

Mr. Kenny. When?

Mr. Tolar. See what he says and then --

Mr. Kenny. Well, but this is --

Mr. Tolar. We'll ask why or when he did it.

Mr. Kenny. I mean, respectfully, I mean, this is the Select Committee on Benghazi. You're asking whether or not the general provided strategic warning regarding a completely wholly different matter.

Mr. Tolar. There's a reason for it, Peter. I promise. It's relevant. It's to show a pattern here.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Go ahead. Did you do that, sir?

[REDACTED]

A Well, I think that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

So I would say that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q Okay. I want to talk a little about it about the attack --

A And I believe that I've also -- I believe that I testified that to the HPSCI.

Mr. Kenny. So, Mac, can I hold you to that, then? Are you going to tie that back to --

Mr. Tolar. No. I'm going to --

Mr. Kenny. Okay.

Mr. Tolar. Well, not now, so, no.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q I want to talk about the attack now, sir. Where were you on the take of the attack, September 11, 2012?

A I was at actually in Fort Huachuca, Arizona, at a senior leader intelligence conference for that day, and returned the very next day, and I was given a presentation out at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

I was back about -- you know, I was in communications the whole time, but left prior to the attack, if I remember my timeline right, and returned the very next day and immediately went in to work, so it

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

would have been the 12th. So I left -- if I remember right, it was like a Tuesday, right? So I left on a Tuesday, I think I was back on Wednesday.

Q Yes, sir. What was your first course of action once you were notified of the attack?

A Basically to make sure that we had accountability and then to get, you know, an assessment of the situation not only there, but I wanted to know where else were -- where were embassies and consulates where we had U.S., you know, personnel, where else was there pressure.

[REDACTED]

Q Were you given any specific tasks?

A No. No. I mean, I think I told our folks to make sure that they -- you know, to basically -- my typical thing is let me know if they need any help, if they need additional resources, you know, make sure that I gave them guidance to make sure they were in touch with the right people, you know, AFRICOM, joint staff, CIA, you know, et cetera, just to make sure that everybody's talking to each other.

Q Was there anybody outside of DIA you were in regular

[REDACTED]

communication with?

A Not -- I mean, not necessarily. I mean, the joint staff probably, probably AFRICOM at the time.

Q Subsequent to the attack, did you participate in any meetings regarding the attack?

A After?

Q Yes, sir.

A Yeah, yeah. After I went to our --

Q And just for perspective, I'm talking about in the coming -- in the subsequent days.

A Oh. Yeah. I was involved in a couple of ETCs with the White House for the next couple of days. They were running -- if I remember right, they were running, I think, three a day for a couple of days after.

Q Did you ever attend any deputy committee meetings?

A I did not, no. Wasn't asked to attend any of those.

Q Does DIA ever have a presence at a deputy committee meeting?


A Yeah, they do sometimes, and it would be in the -- usually,

like,



Q What's USDI?

A USDI is the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.



Q Okay. Did DIA conduct any post-Benghazi analytic or line review of either the assessment produced by DIA or produced by the IC, things of that nature?

A Yeah. I mean, I think we produced -- we actually went back and we produced a very thorough timeline of everything, you know, from the reporting back as far as, you know, let's just say January, and then I think we -- if I remember right, there was a very detailed timeline literally hour by hour, minute by minute of what we knew and what happened and that all the different pieces and parts of it.

Q Do you recall when that document was produced?

A I don't. I don't, but I'm certain it was produced, maybe a couple of days later, maybe a week later, I don't know, but it was produced.

Q

Q Prior to September 11th, 2012, during your tours with DIA, so to speak, were you ever involved in any other high profile attacks that occurred against U.S. interests?

A Oh, God, yeah. I mean, in Afghanistan and Iraq, significant attacks. We --

Q What I'm trying to get at here, sir, is if DIA engaged any differently during those than they did in the Benghazi attack.

A Oh, no, no. I think the response that -- in these crises moments, I think the response mechanisms are relatively the same. I

mean, you know, you can light a fire under people sometimes for different things, but I think that the people, the analysts and the leaders that were running those analytic teams that were responsible for those areas, I think they did what they were asked to do and they did it in a professional way.

Q Subsequent to the attack, as the IC community and others were doing their post-attack analysis, was DI engaged in that or do you feel like they might have been excluded from some of those discussions?

A I certainly was not engaged. I mean, nobody asked me for what I thought. Personally as an agency head, I -- you know, nobody came and said, you know, what do you think?

Q So I understand you've said -- previously said that with regard to the inquiries conducted by the various congressional agencies -- or committees.

A Right.

Q But I'm talking about the IC community itself?

A Yeah, no, not really. I mean, we had conversations about everything, but I think it was still -- you know, for those couple of days, you know, let's just say 12, 13, 14, whatever, nobody -- I mean, you know, I will say, I guess, just thinking about it, because I don't want to beat around the bush here, I mean, what our assessment was, I stood by our assessment.

Q And what your assessment?

A Our assessment was that this was an attack by a terrorist

[REDACTED]

organization networked, part of al-Qaida. You know, it was an al-Qaida-based, you know -- I mean, because of the abundance of intelligence that we had and I think the assessment that we made, I think, the next day, the 12th, that is a pretty good assessment.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q That's what I want to talk to you about right now, sir. You're looking at exhibit No. 6, dated September 12, 2012, and it's a joint product produced by DIA and CIA.

A Uh-huh.

Q It's entitled, "Middle East and North Africa Situation Report". Is that the product you were talking about?

A Yeah. I mean, this looks like it. I mean, we actually produced our own as well.

Q Yes, sir. We'll talk --

A The DIA produced our own too, but, yeah. I mean, this looks like it.

[REDACTED]

and then I know the one that DIA created, which basically tied it to the terrorist organizations that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

were -- we knew were there.

Q Sir, in terms of this report, it was done in conjunction with CIA. Is that typical to produce --

A Yeah.

Q -- joint reports?

A Yeah. I think -- I think it is. It's -- you know, CIA would typically pull it together, but this is probably -- you know, this is likely one that would get into the PDB, because this is a -- this looks like a -- sort of a first report, because you can't time on it. It's 7:00 o'clock eastern daylight time, so, you know, the situation was still really unfolding in Benghazi.

Q When you produce a joint report, does either agency have trumps about what the final language will be?

A If they do, that trump is -- should be at the DNI level, should be at the DNI level. Or if there's a difference of opinion, somehow -- difference of a judgment, that has to be stated. That should be stated in here.

Q Okay.

A It should be stated in here, yeah.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Thinking about that, I want you to turn to exhibit No. 7, which you were just handed. This is dated September 13th, it's a DIA report entitled [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] defense intelligence daily, or this looks like it's a response to a request for information on the perpetrators and motivations behind the Benghazi attack on 11 September and an outlook on future threats, so what you know, again kind of back to warning.

Q Is this document typically disseminated throughout the IC?

A Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. This is available to anybody that has the right, you know, clearances that you see at the top of this thing.

Q Would anybody outside of DIA vet or proof or CHOP this prior to DIA's issuance thereof?

A No. This would be a DIA -- this would be our belief, this would be DIA's assessment of, you know, possible terrorist involvement and motivations behind the U.S. consulate attack in Benghazi, as the title says.

Q And is this, as far as you know, the first report issued by DIA subsequent to the attack about the attacks?

A I think it might be. I don't know. You know, I don't know.

Q Given --

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A It seems to me that we might have produced something on the 12th, you know. We likely had chairman's briefings, chairman's slides that were produced on the 12th, certainly the 13th, and then of course this is on the 13th, so.

Q This reports uses the term in the first sentence there of -- or the first large paragraph, moderate confidence.

A Uh-huh.

Q We previously talked about high confidence. Would moderate confidence indicate it's better than 50 percent, or can you equate --

A I mean, I wouldn't put a percentage on it. I would just say that moderate confidence is a pretty good level of confidence, it's a good -- you know, it's better than low, you know, not quite as high, but -- but based on what we knew, and I think the evidence that the analysts lay out here in this report, you know, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

--

Q Yes, sir.

A -- where they're headquartered and -- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

--

Q Sure.

A So, I mean, I think that there's an abundance of intelligence that -- and previous reporting that led the assessment

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

and the -- led to the conclusion.

Q And is it fair to say that the previous IC reports that talked about those who might engage and did in fact engage, this report's consistent with those in terms of whether it be an [REDACTED], things of that nature?

A I think it's consistent, right.

Q [REDACTED]

A Okay. Not the escalation of a peaceful protest. Yeah. I mean, I am not quite clear on your question you're asking me --

Q Okay. Let me --

A -- but I think what I would just say is that, you know, one is the 12th, an immediate report right after, you know, kind of get what's the assessment of the two -- like we talked about, the two largest all source agencies that we have with a lot of capability, and then this is a DIA assessment the next day.

So, the evolution of the intelligence as it was coming in and people really taking a hard look at this thing, I think there was a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

real belief that this, in fact, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I believe that's kind of what this tells me. I didn't read the whole --

Q Yes, sir.

A -- this exhibit 7. I believe that's sort of what it says.

Q And I know we're moving quickly here, sir, and if you need me to slow down, you let me know and I'm happy to do it. But I'd like to talk to you about exhibit No. 8 now to your left.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q It's the Defense Intelligence Note as opposed to report, and it's entitled, [REDACTED]


A Yeah.

Q So what's the significance of this report moving back up to the high confidence level in terms of the veracity of it?


A Yeah. So this basically says that we believe, based on the evidence, and probably the evidence in this case is an accumulation of all source intelligence and then it looks like some [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



So I think that, you know, this -- you know, the spontaneity and the video, which we always have known to be, you know, radioactive with this crowd whenever there's any kind of video or something that goes -- that happens to a Koran or something like that,



[REDACTED]

Q Sure. All right, sir, we're going to take it another direction real quick. I want to talk to you a little about what's affectionately known as the talking points.

A Yeah.

Q Was DIA ever tasked to provide any talking points to either senior military leadership and/or Congress after the Benghazi attacks?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Are you aware of the unclassified HPSCI talking points that were produced or prepared by CIA?

A Now I am.

Q Okay. At the time, did DIA provide any language to the HPSCI talking points?

A Not that I'm aware of, not -- I mean, they -- you know, they could have provided it through some of our analysts or certainly through our reporting, but, you know, the reporting's pretty clear to what we believed, so.

Q Did you personally edit --

A I did not.

Q -- or CHOP --

A No, I did not. I did not see any talking points nor was I asked for my, you know, expert judgment.

Q When the final talking points were released, did DIA provide any kind of opinion about the final product after it was on the open

[REDACTED]

market per se?

A No. I mean, nothing formal. I mean, I certainly -- when I saw them and saw what -- how they were -- how the situation was presented, I was, you know, I think as surprised as anybody.

Q Going back to what you said earlier, you said it sounds like it's possible that some of your analysts down the food chain might have participated in --

A Yeah.

Q Okay.

A Yeah. I mean, they might have. They might have -- you know, they -- I mean, the intelligence, the documents that you've been handing me, they're, you know, at least post Benghazi, post the attack are pretty clear about what DIA believed.

Mr. Tolar. Okay. Let's go off the record real quick.

[Recess.]

Mr. Kenny. We will go back on the record.

General Flynn, I just want to take this moment to thank you again for appearing before the Select Committee, take a moment to reintroduce myself. My name's Peter Kenny. I'm counsel with the Select Committee.

We've proceeded in a slightly unusual manner in that we deferred an initial hour to our Republican counterparts in order that they could ask some of the questions of you that they had intended to ask of you today. We'd like to use our full hour now to ask some follow-up questions, some clarifying questions based on some of the statements

[REDACTED]

you made in the last two rounds.

And at this point, we are joined by a member of the Select Committee, Congressman Adam Schiff is also the ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. And at this point I'd like to turn it over to the congressman.

General Flynn. Okay.

Mr. Schiff. General, thank you for being here and thanks for your many years of service to the country. Greatly appreciate it.

General Flynn. Thanks.

Mr. Schiff. I want to ask you primarily about intelligence, but -- on the attack on Benghazi, but I want to begin more generally by asking about your responsibilities at the time.

In the period leading up to the attack on Benghazi, you were the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In that position, did you have responsibility over operational decisions in how to respond to the attacks in Benghazi? Were you part of the chain of command in terms of deciding what assets could be mobilized and where they were located and how they'd be utilized?

General Flynn. No.

Mr. Schiff. So apart from the general observations you made earlier, you weren't really a participant in the discussions about what resources were available, how quickly they could get there, what utilization they might have? That was not really part of your responsibilities at DIA?

General Flynn. That's right. That's not part of my

[REDACTED]

responsibilities at DIA, to be part of that sort of decisionmaking process. That was not a responsibility I had. Certainly could have offered it.

Mr. Schiff. But you weren't tasked to?

General Flynn. No.

Mr. Schiff. Your primary responsibility at the time was really in overseeing the intelligence workforce for the DOD all over the world?

General Flynn. Right.

Mr. Schiff. And as you're aware, there were problems not only in Benghazi, but there were problems in many capitals --

General Flynn. Oh, yeah.

Mr. Schiff. -- throughout the --

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Schiff. -- Muslim world at the time?

General Flynn. Yep.

Mr. Schiff. At that time, about how many protests were going on around the world?

General Schiff. Well, so this is, you know, the September 11th and then the next few days. The number that sticks in my head, and I think I got this from one of the VTCs that the White House was having, was that there were 93 embassies or consulates in some sort of array of, you know, a threat or concern; I mean, not that there were protesters, although there were protesters at other places around the world.

Yemen was one that I definitely remember outside the U.S. Embassy

[REDACTED]

in Sana'a. So the number that sticks in my head is about 93, and that's embassies and consulates. So a pretty significant, pretty significant number.

Mr. Schiff. Which means that, you know, the resources that you had at DIA to keep track of all of those dangers to DOD personnel and non-DOD personnel had a lot of work on their hands?

[REDACTED]

Mr. Schiff. And, you know, while the violence turned deadly in Benghazi, it had the potential to turn deadly in multiple capitals around the world at that time?

General Flynn. Yeah, I believe it did. Yeah, you're right.

Mr. Schiff. What did you think of the DIA workforce?

General Flynn. At that time?

Mr. Schiff. Yeah.

General Flynn. Professional, exceptional, experienced, because of the amount of years of combat that DIA employees, civilians, you know, primarily, certainly our military workforce had had already up till that point. So most of our -- or a large portion of our civilian analysts actually had a lot of combat experience, particularly those involved in counterterrorism.

Mr. Schiff. And you mentioned they were professionals. I take it you didn't see evidence that they were trying to politicize their work product --

[REDACTED]

General Flynn. No.

Mr. Schiff. -- or --

General Flynn. No.

Mr. Schiff. -- feed you conclusions that you wanted to hear?

General Flynn. No. No. None at all.

Mr. Schiff. Now, I know we're all aware there's an IG investigation now of intelligence work product in the CENTCOM.

General Flynn. Right.

Mr. Schiff. Did you have any indication -- and I don't know what period the whistleblowers may be referring to and whether it extended into your tenure. Did you have any indication during your tenure that --

General Flynn. None.

Mr. Schiff. -- your analysts --

General Flynn. None.

Mr. Schiff. -- were politicizing intelligence in any way?

General Flynn. No. The analysts, I don't think that's the -- from what I understand, what this IG is -- I've only seen really in the media, that it's not the analysts politicizing, it's the leadership. That's a big difference.

Mr. Schiff. And did you have any indication of that by the leadership going on while you were there?

General Flynn. No, no. Did not. I always thought that the assessments that I saw coming out of all the elements of Central Command, all of their components was pretty good; didn't see

[REDACTED]

any indications that there was anything, any differences, that there were -- you know, like I said earlier, I don't know if you were in here, if there was differences, the responsibility is to make sure that those differences are shared within the community.

Mr. Schiff. Let me ask you about some of the Defense Intelligence Agency work product at the time. I think some of the committee staff has gone through a piece of it with you, one exhibit, No. 6, which was from September 12. Let me ask you about another Defense Intelligence work product of the same date. And if we could have this -- I don't know what exhibit. We'll mark this as exhibit 9.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 9

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Schiff. This is a Defense Intelligence Report of September 12, 2012, entitled, "Libya: Terrorists Likely Involved in Attack on U.S. Consulate in Benghazi". Do you have a copy of that?

General Flynn. I don't. I do not have a copy.


Mr. Schiff. Okay. We'll get you a copy. We're getting you a copy now.

General Flynn. Thank you.

[REDACTED]

[11:30 a.m.]

Mr. Schiff. Just looking at the first bullet point on that report, it provides



General Flynn. I'm not sure. I'm not following you. Where are you looking at?

Mr. Schiff. The very first bullet point on the front page where it says --

General Flynn. "DIA assesses with moderate confidence"?

Mr. Schiff. Well, actually I'm going to get to that, but even above the source summary statement.

General Flynn. Okay.

Mr. Schiff. Look at literally where the first bullet is.

General Flynn. Where you're saying "On 11 September."

Mr. Schiff. Exactly. 11 September --

General Flynn.



[REDACTED]

Mr. Schiff. So initially, at least in this report --

General Flynn. So that's a piece -- so as you read these, that's a piece of evidence, in addition to -- usually like the bullets that you see in these type of reports, you know, you see the -- sort of the conclusionary statements up front, and then those are -- it's just evidence that they add, you know, like you can see that one on 11 September, the next one that comes up is on 12 September, and 12 September, so it's just -- it's evidence that's an accumulation at this time, 12 September, which would have been, you know, the day after, and more than likely this was -- this was prepared, you know, I guess is not early morning but probably later that afternoon as more information was coming in.

Mr. Schiff. And that -- the bold paragraph on the cover, is that essentially the summary of the report.

General Flynn. Yeah, that's the summary of the whole -- of all the evidence that's presented, you know, in the report itself, yes.

Mr. Schiff. Well, if you look at the bold section of the summary of the report.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

General Flynn. Yeah. And I think if you go back and look at all of the reporting, the accumulation of the reporting up till that point, that it was very clear that there were threats to Western -- certainly western, and definitely, I think, U.S. interests leading up to that. The way I read that sentence is that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

General Flynn. Yeah. I mean, I think the whole of the assessment, the whole of the judgment is that we are confident that

[REDACTED]

Mr. Schiff. Exactly. And I don't think there's any dispute that terrorists were eager to have the opportunity to attack us.

General Flynn. Al Qaeda-associated terrorists.

Mr. Schiff. Al Qaeda-associated terrorists.

General Flynn. Yeah, yeah.

Mr. Schiff. The big bone of contention, though, has been whether there was a protest, whether there was a belief of a protest, or whether that was made up for some political purpose, but this DIA work product --


General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Schiff. -- that the analysts you believe were very professional, believed initially that there was a protest.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. Isn't that right?

General Flynn. There was a protest. I mean, I think there was -- I think there was an indication that there was activity certainly in some -- you know, however you want to define it at the -- at the consulate, you know. I mean, you have to understand that none of these things happened as an individual thing. This is an accumulation of threats that we saw building up over a long period of time, and, in fact,



So I think the -- I think the real challenge is that, you know, protest or not, you know, that this was an associated -- this was associated -- the protests and the attack itself was associated with an Al Qaeda-associated terrorist organization who we had been watching for a long time who had been up to no good, and I think that's the real bone of contention, honestly, Congressman. I mean, I just think it is.

Like I have said, you know, in uniform and out of uniform, had -- had the National Security Advisor gone on national television and just said we don't know or it could be a combination of things, we just -- we don't have enough, you know, evidence yet to know exactly what's going on, we wouldn't be having this conversation.

Mr. Schiff. Well, General, I think the Ambassador did say that we're continuing to get intelligence on this and -- but you know, I know our committee, because we asked for talking points.

General Flynn. Right.

Mr. Schiff. And the American people were eager to know what's happened, what do we know about this.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Schiff. And --

General Flynn. You know, knowing what I know about the talking points now, if I had ever seen those talking points, if they were -- if somebody had floated them by me and asked me for my judgment, I would not have given that judgment based on what those talking points say, and I didn't see those talking points so --

Mr. Schiff. I understand that.

General Flynn. I would have not said -- I would have not confirmed that -- they could have still said, okay, well, we appreciate your judgment, Flynn, but we are going to go with these talking points, okay, that's your judgment. But I -- you know, I wasn't given a shot at looking at them.

Mr. Schiff. And General, I'm sure that we would all had our own separate input into what the talking points were --

General Flynn. But I'm a head of an intelligence agency, and this is a really -- you know, this is an interesting -- it's an interesting dynamic, I think, is what I learned from it. I mean, I learned a lot from this. I'd have probably been far more vocal. I mean, I learned to be -- I learned to be from this, you know, I probably had a responsibility to say more, especially after hearing what I was hearing.

So it's a lesson learned for me, but I -- knowing what I know about the talking points that Susan Rice used on five Sunday talk shows, I would have never said I agree with those.

Mr. Schiff. Well, you would agree, wouldn't you, General, that the DIA analysis --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- that I just referred to --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- expresses the view that there was a protest, and you, I think, have just said yourself --

General Flynn. Sure.

Mr. Schiff. -- did think there was a protest going.

General Flynn. I think that that's true, but again, the accumulation of everything --

Mr. Schiff. General, if you'll let me finish.

General Flynn. Yeah, yeah.

Mr. Schiff. So when Ambassador Rice talked about the possibility of a protest or what appeared to have begun as a protest, that was consistent with the DIA's analysis, the analysis of your agency, was it not.

General Flynn. But I think that that's only -- you know, if you're breaking the whole judgment down into percentages, I'd say that's about 25 percent of the truth.

Mr. Schiff. Okay.

General Flynn. And that's a subjective 25 percent because there's other parts of that judgment that aren't part of what you just said. I mean, you can say there's a protest, you can say that there was prior planning, that you can say that there was potential Al Qaeda leadership that was looking at attacking Western and U.S. interests. I mean, why not add all that into the whole talking point and just, you know, say it -- say it like that and say we don't know.

I mean, that's what I would have rather -- you know, again, hindsight and knowing what I, you know, saw eventually, just saying we don't know would have been a far better answer.

Mr. Schiff. General, I appreciate that opinion. I'm not sure

[REDACTED]

that anyone would have been satisfied with the administration saying, After an attack that left Americans dead, that we don't know what happened.

General Flynn. Yeah, but that's -- but see, that's a different issue. You go on a Sunday talk show and you say that, why not just have -- I mean, just say we don't know but as we get additional information, we're going to get the word out, you know, as to what happened because we lost a U.S. Ambassador.

So again, this gets back to the issue that I have with, you know, being -- be careful what pieces of intelligence you use for what it is that you're trying to -- the point that you're trying to get across.

Mr. Schiff. General, let me go back to the analysis, if I could. In addition to the September 12 intelligence report that we just went through --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- I'd like to direct your attention to exhibit 7, which was produced the following day also by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. In this report, just looking at the first paragraph,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] "

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. The next sentence reads, "[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] "

So the following day, on September 13th, it was DIA's continuing assessment that there was a protest that was essentially --

General Flynn. That presented a target of opportunity.

Mr. Schiff. Gave an opportunity.

General Flynn. Sure, sure.

Mr. Schiff. You are reading this as well?

General Flynn. Yeah. I mean, that judgment right there on that 13 September report, that's a good talking point. That could have been a talking point that they could have easily put onto the -- to these talking points that are really driving this whole, you know, issue.

Mr. Schiff. Well, with respect, General, I think the main controversy around Ambassador Rice's comments was the fact she mentioned a protest, and that's consistent with the DIA analysis.

General Flynn. But I understand, and I don't have the talking points in front of me, but, you know, not tying it to Al Qaeda or the -- because of the threat that Al Qaeda presented, I mean, you know, even at that time, I think that the -- almost the nearly doubling of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Al Qaeda -- of Islamic radical terrorist groups by our own State Department that designates them, I think at that time had nearly doubled.

So I mean, that's the issue. I mean, let's face it, that's the real issue. Not associating this attack with Al Qaeda or an Al Qaeda-associated group, that's really where I think, personally, I think where the -- you know, everybody gets upset and just thinks that we're trying to brush this off as this was just a -- an attack based on a video.

Mr. Schiff. [REDACTED]

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Schiff. The citing of this press report --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- by DIA --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- without any contradiction of the press report, does that indicate to you that, in the view of the analysts, they gave weight to this press report, is that why it would have been included here?

General Flynn. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mr. Schiff. But if they -- if they were in disagreement with this open source, they would likely have expressed their view that they think the press was wrong, would they not?

General Flynn. Yeah, or they wouldn't use it, yeah. Or they wouldn't use the report. I mean, there's lot of -- you know, there's a lot of speculation in the press.

Mr. Schiff. So the reason they did include it was they thought there was likely some merit to it?

General Flynn.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

General Flynn. I don't. I mean, I don't know that's the case today.

Mr. Schiff. If that's not the case and if the opposite conclusion were more in line with intelligence community thinking, is that perhaps one of the reasons why it would not be wise to get out on -- in the week following the attacks and express conviction about who is responsible?

General Flynn. Yeah. Well, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

So I think what they're highlighting here is, you know, looking at the different groups that may or may not have been involved, you know, they're just making the statement that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


Mr. Schiff. If you turn to the third page.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. And the section marked, "CIA and national Counterterrorism Center Assessments," in the second paragraph of that section --

General Flynn. And here's the guy right here,

Mr. Schiff.



[REDACTED]

Mr. Schiff. Have you followed the intelligence that say who is responsible the attacks in Benghazi up to the present? Are you familiar with the current intelligence on who is responsible?

General Flynn. On who is responsible for what now?

Mr. Schiff. For the attacks in Benghazi on that day.

General Flynn. I mean, I would say that sitting here today, I don't know. I mean, I don't know. I mean, I, you know, followed the reporting, you know, until I got out, obviously, but --

Mr. Schiff. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mr. Schiff. And how long was it after the attacks that you left DIA?

General Flynn. Oh, God, I was only like a few -- I was only not even 2 months into the job, so it was almost 2 years.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mr. Schiff. So you left 2 years after the attacks?

General Flynn. Roughly. I mean, you know, 22 months.

Mr. Schiff. And in those 2 years before you left, did DIA reach definitive conclusions about all those that were responsible for the attacks?

General Flynn.

[REDACTED]

Mr. Schiff. General, let me direct your attention to -- I guess

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


we have to mark this as a new exhibit as well. I'm looking at a September 17th, 2012, DIA work product. We'll mark this as exhibit 10. Let me get you a copy of this.

General Flynn. Thank you.

Mr. Schiff.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Mr. Schiff. Okay.

General Flynn. What is interesting about this is this is really the first time I've really, I think, seen this one. Certainly -- or it's been some time. You know, when you look at the line between 10 and 11 September, this -- the spike in whatever this is, I guess, is this a Twitter? Is that what this represents?

Mr. Schiff. The social media highlights?

General Flynn. Yeah, so elements of social media.

Mr. Schiff. Yeah.


General Flynn. It shows you that there's a spike there. You know, that -- this is a good lesson learned is that, you know, that spike indicates something.

Mr. Schiff. Yeah.

General Flynn. You see that little tiny spike, you know, the scale of the paper takes away from the -- from what it is, but that's, you know, zero is at the bottom, but then it goes up to 50,000, so you know, you're looking at maybe 20,000 maybe, 20,000 in different words that were being used. I mean, that's very, very telling, and then, of course, all the other spikes that you see along the path here. That's the -- the lesson learned here is that we got to pay really close attention to social media.

Mr. Schiff. Yeah.

General Flynn.



Mr. Schiff. Thank you, General. If you look at the assessment

[REDACTED]

that accompanies this timeline at the top left, it provides [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] e."

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. So that indicates, once again, that at this point in the timeline, it was the DIA assessment that there were no indications that terrorists had a preplanned attack for that day, but rather, took advantage of those protests?

General Flynn. Yeah. I think that -- the way I would sort of synthesize that statement that you just read from that -- from this assessment is that we don't know. We still don't have enough information, and we just flat don't know. That's what I get out of that, so I would -- as a guy who's looked at a lot of these things, I would look at this and I would pay more attention to -- you know, to the graphic and what are we learning from this type of collection. And the actual assessment itself, I would say to whoever would brief me on something like this, I would say, okay, so the bottom line is we still don't really know what happened, but we do know certain things.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

We do know that it was -- that there was threats prior, we do know that there are Al Qaeda associated groups operating in the area, we do know that there were attacks against not only the consulate, but other places in and around the area, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], so we know that all the things that lead us to believe that there's a real potential security problem there are all there.

So this just says we just don't know enough about whether or not the protest was the impetus or what, you know, what happened. So the answer -- you know, my long answer to this assessment is we just don't -- still don't know enough, and that would have been -- that might have been the right answer.

Mr. Schiff. And there were, you know, the professional work product of your people, and you stand by them, right?

General Flynn. Yeah, I sure do. I sure do. I mean, you know, the pieces of paper that I have in front of me that you guys have given me as exhibits, I think, is very consistent, tells a very consistent story, and I think it's -- and I think that -- but like I said, I think that I'm surprised that we're not -- that we have not arrested or detained or captured, you know, others, that are -- that were part of this.

Mr. Schiff. Well, General, thank you again.

General Flynn. Yeah, thanks a lot, Congressman. Thanks for your service, too, appreciate it.

EXAMINATION

[REDACTED]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Thank you, Lieutenant General, we appreciate it. I had a couple of questions. My colleague, Peter Kenny has a few questions.

A Okay.

Q And then hopefully we'll be able to turn it back to our colleagues.

A Okay.

Q And then we may have a few questions at the very end.

You know, early in the first hour with my colleagues, you were asked if you had ever testified before Congress. Later, I think there was a broader statement from my colleague that you had not been asked by Congress about the attacks.

A Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think that I have spoken about it. I mean, I would have to go look at transcripts maybe, but I was never specifically asked to come in to testify about Benghazi. This is really the first time, other than when I was initially called by Counsel Chipman to come in to -- to, can you answer a few questions? That's the first time that anybody ever formally asked me anything about Benghazi, and that was only a few months ago.

Q And by saying that, you personally were not asked.

A Right.

Q Is that meant to represent that the Defense Intelligence Agency was not asked to participate in this prior --

A No, I think that that's fair. You know, analysts in my organization might have been asked, you know, I mean, these

assessments, so they might have -- there might have been some discussion. But I think, really, what it -- what this whole thing revolves around are these talking points, you know, and I have been asked to look at talking points in the past on other issues.

These, these I was not asked to review, was not asked for what I -- what I feel is an expert assessment, expert judgment.

Q So I'm going to show you what we're marking as -- I'm going to give you both of these at once, exhibit 11 and exhibit 12 for identification purposes.

A Okay.

[Flynn Exhibits Nos. 11 and 12
Were marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q We're getting it together.

A It's okay.

Q So the first document, exhibit 11, is a letter -- on the letterhead of the Committee on Armed Services. It's my understanding this is now available on a publicly available Web site. It's dated October -- gov.gov, dated October 18, 2012. It's addressed to you, I understand, and I'm not meaning to say that that means you saw it at the time, but it is addressed to you, is it not?

A Yeah. Yes, it is.

Q And in that first paragraph, it indicates that one of our predecessor committees investigating the Benghazi attacks -- and I just would point you to that second sentence. "I greatly appreciate,

however, the DIA's cooperation with the committee's efforts, particularly the briefing to committee staff this morning, as well as the other briefings and assistance you have provided."

Do you have a sense of what that -- does this come as a shock to you that DIA did brief HASC?

A No, no. I mean, this is not unusual. We had people over on the Hill just about every day talking about, you know, every issue on the planet, so not at all. I mean, so with these, I just did a quick cursory of these, and no, I mean, this is -- this is, you know, within -- within line of what DIA gets asked to do on a daily basis.

Q So any indication that certainly DIA had not been asked or DIA had not provided information when asked would have been an inference on your part?

A What do you mean?

Q I mean, you had indicated to us that you had -- you believed you had never been reached out to. Well, here, obviously, is a letter addressed to you.

A Right, right, but this is after -- yeah, this is after -- this is October 18th, okay.

Q Right. And it is clearly about the investigation of Benghazi.

A Sure, sure.

Q So --

A About, but I'm -- my point is on the sort of immediate aftermath, the first few days, you know, really the rest of that week

and then leading to the real big question, you know, or the issue in question is the talking points.

Q So you believe that with regard to everything else, you all -- other than the talking points and what happened, about the talking points and how the administration talked about the attacks, DIA did fully cooperate with Congress and answered all questions?

A I think we did. I mean, we usually did. You know, I wouldn't say that I would know for certain, you know, 100 percent, but I think if we're asked, we generally were pretty good about responding, especially on formal stuff like we did here, so yeah.

Q And this seems -- I mean, I also gave you the response.

A And like he says here, "I am hopeful that in the 5 weeks since September 11th, you have examined the actions taken by your command in the lead-up to the Benghazi attack. Therefore, I respectfully request you address these questions verbally or in writing," so yeah, so -- and we did.

Q So the request was to address everything you all had done prior to 9/11/2012, and you believe that you fully answered those questions?

A I think so. I mean, you know, we probably, you know, hindsight, probably could have given more detail. I mean, you know, you see all the things that I think this committee has been provided, you know, this particular binder, and there's probably more than that, you know.

Q Yes. Those were binders that were actually given to this

committee by the House Armed Service Committee, so it was information --

A Yeah.

Q -- probably provided by your organization --

A Sure. I put it together, so I had DIA put it together because I wanted to review everything, I want to learn lessons, I want to see what, you know, what did we do right, what did we do wrong, how could we, you know, do something different in the past from one perspective. I also wanted to know what happened, and what, you know, sort of what did we know, when did we know it, and what was provided.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that the information you --

A So there's probably -- there's probably more than that. There's probably a lot more than that, just because it's the nature of intelligence and the various reports that are going to come back and forth, so --

Q And with regard to your answer, I think, which is exhibit 12?

A Yeah.

Q There's a signature line. It says Michael T. Flynn.

A Yeah.

Q You know, there's been allegations in the course of the investigation that that means that someone personally reviewed and actually signed a document. We, I think --

A Signed what document?

Q Your letter, the letter that --

A Exhibit 12?

Q Yes.

A Yeah, I signed that.

Q Did you personally review it at the time?

A This letter?

Q Uh-huh.

A I imagine I did.

Q Okay. So you believe that was a complete answer to the letter that had been sent to you all on October 18 and 19?

A Yeah, I think at the time, I think based on the question that was asked, I think at the time, yeah, it was a complete answer to the chairman's question, yeah, I do. I mean, you know -- I mean, now -- now, there's more and more stuff out there, but I think at the time, yeah, I do.

Yeah, like he says in his -- in his request, the number 1 part of his statement, it says, "Excluding formal DIA analytic products, did you or anyone at DIA formally or informally," and he goes on to different things. So excluding the DIA analytic products, which were many.

Q Right.

A So that's really what I'm talking about.

Q Right.

A So we're answering what -- you know, this.

Q Additional questions, in addition to the formal --

A We're answering this without adding all the other DIA analytic products.

Q Do you have any reason to believe they didn't have that -- those products?

A It wasn't asked for. You didn't ask for it.

Q In these letters. Do you have any reason to believe --

A He says right there, "Excluding formal DIA analytic products, did you or anyone at DIA formally or informally," you know, need.

Q Do you believe this was the only communication with DIA, they never asked for the products otherwise?

A I don't know. I don't know. I mean, I don't know. I know that we provide daily -- you know, we have people going over to the Hill --

Q Sure.

A -- I mean, just about every day for some reason, so you know, I don't know. I don't know.

Q So you don't really know what materials were provided to the House Armed Services Committee?

A I would say that every single thing that was prepared on -- from DIA's perspective, you know, the likelihood of providing all of that, we dropped a lot -- in fact, we dropped all of our -- I forget the name of the system that we have that communicates, this electronic system that communicates with the Hill, but those are dropped on the electronic system just about every day. In fact, every

day.

Q So those would have been provided to the Hill, both contemporaneously with their production, as well as --

A Sure.

Q -- in any review of specific --

A To those that had access and those that had the right clearances, yeah, sure. Sure.

Q So the, before --

A Like these types of -- these other exhibits that you've -- you know, that you provided to me. All that -- those kinds of things get dropped on the -- you know, I forget the name of the electronic system that we share stuff, but it exists.

Q Right. So the standing committee with jurisdiction over the Department of Defense, certainly have access to these products, both in real-time as they're being produced?

A Sure, sure, absolutely.

Q And they would have had them also if there had been a compilation of specifically intelligence products --

A Sure.

Q -- related to Benghazi, they would have had that?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay.

A No doubt.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Thank you, sir.

[REDACTED]

A Yes.

Q We touched on, in the previous rounds, the concept or the system you referred to as the DAT system?

A Defense attache, yeah.

Q And the DAT is the -- as we understand it, is a senior defense official also in countries that you --

A Usually, usually, yeah, yeah. Not all the time. Not all the time. Usually.

Q And was there a defense attache in Tripoli, to your understanding?

A Yeah, I believe there was, actually, and I think his name is in this letter here. [REDACTED].

Q Okay. And do you know about when that office was created within Embassy Tripoli?

A I don't know. I don't know. I mean, you know, it may be -- it could go, you know, way back. I don't know.

Q Okay. And would the DAT, would that be staffed from DIA resources?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So that's a DIA --

A Defense attache is a -- yeah, it's a -- you know, depending on the priority, depending on the size of the -- you know, depending on the size of the mission itself, the physical size of the mission, because some of it depends on literally is there enough room for people, so Libya would probably be a smaller team of people.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q Okay.

A But again, it could be anywhere from, you know, a couple, two, three to, you know, a couple of dozen.

Q


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Q So at this point, I will mark exhibit 13.

A Okay.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 13

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And I'll just describe this for the record. This is a portion of a now declassified transcript of an interview conducted jointly by the House Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

A Uh-huh.

Q This interview is conducted of the defense attache Embassy Tripoli?

A Right.

Q The interview is dated January 31st, 2014, and the declassified transcript was publicly available on the Armed Services Committee Web site.

A Right.

Q So I know we're in a classified setting. We've opted to use, for our purposes here, a declassified transcript, so I'll do my best to help aid our discussion.

A Uh-huh.

Q




A Okay. Okay.

Q Okay. So just for the purposes of the record, I'll begin reading at the top of page 83. There's a question posed to defense attache.

"Question: In your estimation, with all the dynamics at play, was the security environment getting more tenuous or degrading, if you will?

"Answer:



[REDACTED]

"And you went straight from elections into Ramadan, which is kind of the quiet period traditionally in a Muslim country, so there was a bit of a lull, I feel, during that period. So it wasn't easy by any stretch of the imagination or obvious to read these tea leaves, but there was a sense that both the Libyan government and military officials and in the international community, I think there were a series of periodic episodes in Benghazi.

[REDACTED]

And I'm going to jump ahead to the bottom of page 82, but you are more than welcome to read the full portion. But at the bottom of 82, the question begins: "And do you have any sense or any recollection -- again, they declared that the IC produced hundreds of analytic reports in the months preceding the attacks talking about the fact that terrorists and affiliated groups had the capability and intent to strike U.S. and Western facilities and personnel in Libya.

"Again, in the months or weeks preceding the attack, did you sense

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

a particular threat or a threat trajectory?

"A particular threat?" Response.

"Question: Not a specific danger, but was the situation getting worse in Libya?

"Answer: The general sense that I had, if my memory serves me correct, was at the point you just characterized, there was definitely a general sense in the east that security was becoming -- was in greater, greater threat, it was becoming more tenuous over time. With that being said, Tripoli wasn't necessarily the case. That seemed to be, okay, this is a post-revolution, the government doesn't necessarily have a monopoly on force. There are security concerns, yes, but I would draw a distinction between the concerns we had with the east in Tripoli. I'm not sure if that clarifies this." Close quote.

A Uh-huh.

Q [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Now, what you feel is you do feel differently, because when you're in an area like that where, you know, the threats to -- I mean, the threats to our embassy in Tripoli -- now this is -- this is after the Benghazi stuff, but the fact that -- I mean, what I read from that right there, from that transcript is that, you know, that he -- he had -- he was comfortable with what he was able to read and that the threats in the east were -- were increasing.

Q Okay. And it may or may not be in this portion.

A From his recollection.

Q Sure. And it may not be clear here, but this defense attache, as we interviewed, did tell us that he did personally travel to Benghazi at least once.

A Good, good.

Q But his characterization here that it wasn't, quote, "glaringly obvious that things were going south extremely in a precipitous manner," do you disagree with the defense attache's assessment that to him, his belief was that the situation wasn't, to use his language again, not glaringly obvious that things were going south extremely in a precipitous manner?

A Yeah, I --

[REDACTED]

Mr. Chipman. Excuse me, you're talking about Tripoli or Benghazi?

General Flynn. Yeah, yeah.

Ms. Adams. This seems to say only Tripoli, and says the east is different, so that's unclear.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Kenny. You know, his statement there, he doesn't specify which, but he does, in that sentence, reference Benghazi, so then he makes the differentiation and --

Ms. Adams. He's established --

General Flynn. But he talks about that --

Mr. Kenny. Read the full exchange. The question is asked, security in Libya, and he's referring to both --

General Flynn. Yeah, I mean, he basically says that the security --

Mr. Kenny. -- locations, and he's referring --

General Flynn. I mean, he basically says the security in Libya, particularly the east, is going in the wrong direction. That's the gist of that -- that part of that transcript. So I don't disagree. I don't disagree.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q He also describes a bit of a lull that occurred, and again, this may be --

A Yeah, but you got to -- what period of time? I mean, you know, and what is a lull. You know, no attacks?

Q

A Yeah.

Q Do you recall when the election occurred?

A I don't off the top of my head.

Q Okay. Does July 2012 sound about right?

A I don't remember off the top of my head when the elections occurred.

Q Okay. My understanding is they occurred around July 7th, 2012.

A Right.

Q

A

A I'm not sure what you're asking me.

Q You said you were unclear as to which time period he's referring to. He makes a reference to the Libyan election, so presumably, he's referring to post-election.

A Yeah. So he's probably -- yeah, so if he's referring to at the election period, then yeah, sure. And that's -- if I -- you know, looking back, I mean, those -- at that time, I mean, I wasn't personally, I didn't think the thing was going to go in the right direction just because we knew what the threats were, but --

Q Uh-huh.

A But I -- you know, what he -- what he said sounds reasonable to me.

Q Sure.

A I mean, again, the gist that I get out of that, this particular exhibit is that the situation -- the security situation in Libya was not good.

Q Correct, yeah. I think that's a fair assessment.

A Yeah.

Q I don't think anybody disputes that. There were probably reports --

A And at the east was probably worse.

Q And there have been several reports that have documented that.

A Yeah.

Q And I think to return to a discussion you had in an earlier hour, because you did make reference specifically to Tripoli and security in Tripoli here, the defense attache does seem to appreciate that there is a difference between that was occurring in Tripoli and Benghazi.

[REDACTED]

A Yeah. I mean, you know, you have to look at the last couple of years, but there has been -- there's been some significant attacks in Tripoli. This was after Benghazi, but --

Q Uh-huh. But here it specifically says I would draw a distinction between the two, so the defense attache -

A Sure.

Q -- perceived a difference between the two.

A Sure.


Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And in that regard, do you think what he told the House Armed Services Committee was accurate?

A

[REDACTED]



Q Great. Thank you. We want to be respectful of your time.

A Great. Thank you. Thanks for that.

Q So that's all we have for right now. We may have some questions after our colleagues conclude, but we will certainly try as well, and be respectful of your time then.

A Yeah, great, great. Thank you, everybody, that's good. I'll just hold on to these until you guys are done.

Mr. Chipman. That's fine.

General Flynn. You know, and this can be on the record while you guys are transitioning.

Ms. Sawyer. We are off the record, and then we will go back on so she is able to get it clearly. Let's go off the record for a sec.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Tolar. Let's go back on the record, please. Heather, do you want to clean anything up with that last comment?

Ms. Sawyer. Oh, I just thought if he -- I certainly think if the witness -- we did not mean to cut you off in any way.

General Flynn. Yeah, so. I'll just answer based on at the end

[REDACTED]

of the last set of questions.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q So they certainly would be one of the important data points --

A Yeah.

Q -- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Ms. Sawyer. Great. Thank you.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q All right. So let's drive on. I'm going to move very quickly here --

A Okay.

Q -- in order to get you out of here, but if I'm moving too fast, please tell me to slow down.

A Okay.

[REDACTED]

[12:31 p.m.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q So the first thing, looking back at exhibit No. 9, which was introduced to you a few minutes ago, just for the record, sir, will you note in that first line what level of confidence this report is?

A Yeah. DIA assesses with moderate confidence.

Q Thank you, sir.

A Yeah.

Q All right. Now, sir, during your 33-year career in the military, were you ever involved in either the planning and/or participation of a military operation in response to a crisis?

A Yes, many times.

Q Did you do so at the company grade level?

A I did it at every single level.

Q Including the flag officer level?

A Yes. Multiple times.

Q Sir, do you believe that you have the requisite expertise to provide an informed opinion as to whether or not a given military operational response is appropriate?

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 14

Was marked for identification.]

Q I want to show you -- go back to the talking points just for a minute and talk to you real quick. I'm going to give you an

[REDACTED]

exhibit, please, sir, and it's exhibit No. 14, and this is an email dated September 14th, 2012.

And, sir, we'll give you a little context, because I want to talk about something specific, but basically this is an email from a gentleman named Ben Rhodes. Does that name sound familiar to you?

A Yes, it does.

Q Okay. And he prepared some talking points for Ms. Rice prior to the Sunday shows. And I want you to look specifically at the four goals that he laid out for the talking points and would you review those very quickly, and I want you to pay particular attention to goal number two.

A Okay.

Q You read it, sir?

A I did.

Q Given the fact that Mr. Rhodes was at the time the Deputy NSA for Strategic Communications, does it give you pause that such a senior official in the Intelligence Community would engage so blatantly in the shaping of policy discussions?

A Yeah. I mean, I read that as basically telling me what I needed to say.

Q In your mind, does that constitute --

A That's what I read that second bullet as.

Q And in your mind, does that constitute the politicization of intelligence?

A Well, if you're looking for intelligence that supports that

[REDACTED]

goal, I would -- and you cherry picked the intelligence to support that goal, yeah.

Q But does that meet -- and previously you've talked about your concerns over that.

A Yeah, yeah.

Q Does that meet with what you talked about in the past?

A Yeah, because the role that he's in, that Ben Rhodes is in, he's a national security advisor, you know, in role, he's a deputy, but he's still a national security advisor, so he definitely you know, has access to every bit of intelligence that we have.


Q Okay.

A And, you know, I mean, to state a goal that shapes what it is that we're looking for, I think, is not a good thing.

Q Moving on, sir, did you -- the DIA support the FBI investigation on Benghazi in any way that you're aware of?

A I don't know. I don't know. You know, I mean, we have had -- DIA and FBI have a very close working relationship, had one certainly, so if they needed any support, we gave it to them.

Q I want to talk to you



A



[REDACTED]

Q Are you aware of any efforts by the U.S. Government in Libya to provide any weapons directly or indirectly to any opposition to Qadhafi's forces?

A I am not.

Q Are you aware of any efforts by the U.S. Government in Libya to provide any weapons directly or indirectly to any Libyan rebels or militia?

A I am not.

Q Are you aware of any efforts by the U.S. Government in Libya to provide any weapons directly or indirectly to any opposition to Syrian forces?

A Yeah. I'm not. I'm not.

Q Are you aware of any efforts by U.S. Government in Libya to provide any weapons directly or indirectly to any Syrian rebels or militias?

A None.

Q All right. And you indicated previously -- or let me -- for the record, were you interviewed by the ARB?

A I was not.

Q Thank you.

Do you happen to know how many attackers have been identified to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

date that you're aware of, attackers on Benghazi?

A [REDACTED]

Q Sir, it's been said that context is everything when it comes to analysis. Do you agree with that statement?

A Yeah, I do. I do.

Q Senior administration officials have stated it makes no difference why the attacks in Benghazi occurred. However, is it fair to say that knowing not only the perpetrators of the attack, but more

[REDACTED]

importantly the motivations behind the attack are critical to the analysis -- to the analysts in the IC?

A Yeah. That's you know, absolutely a part of analysis. Hell, we train analysts to think like that --

Q What --

A -- and to analyze, you know, a range of pieces of information to get to those kinds of judgments.

Q Who all might benefit from knowing who the perpetrators were and why they did it?

A I mean, not only are -- I mean, from the top down, you know, our entire -- certainly our national leadership, our counterterrorism forces, that are trying to get after these guys, our partners that we work with in either the region or elsewhere around the world, other intelligence services, a lot of people.

Q Could this information potentially mitigate future threats and/or attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities abroad?

A Yep. Absolutely. Absolutely. Yeah.

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q General Flynn, you mentioned that

A

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q

[REDACTED]


Q Okay. And you had mentioned earlier that you had a DAT -- that we had a DAT in Tripoli?

A Yes.

Q

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Q There was an extensive back-and-forth conversation you had with Congressman Schiff before he left in the last hour, and it appeared that he was very much focused on the fact that there was protests or demonstration language --

A Right.

Q -- throughout in the exhibits that you were shown.

A Right.

Q And that I sensed your personal professional frustration

that it was not the presence of that language, but the absence of other language that you found --

A Yeah. Absolutely.

Q -- a problem?

A And that's cherry picking. I mean, let's face it. I mean, so if I say that an al-Qaida-associated terrorist group, you know, had intended to attack western and U.S. interests, you know, leading up to the Benghazi attack and we knew certain leaders, and they spontaneously took the opportunity because of a video, and you only say -- you only say the result of the -- or the reason for the attack was a spontaneous, you know, video, you're leaving out the other half, the other two-thirds of the evidence.

Q Okay. So it's the omissions, not the --

A Yeah. It's absolutely.

Q -- inclusion of the protest?

A Yeah. I mean, I got that there's a protest, but absolutely. There was protests going on in Cairo. There was a protest outside of our Embassy in Sana'a that I'm very aware of. We were concerned that that was going to be attacked.

Q And so your same concern by the comments by Ambassador Rice related to the --

A Yeah.

Q -- she included the one point about a video --

A Yeah.

Q -- or a protest, but didn't include the remainder of the

[REDACTED]

language that you thought would have shaped this more effectively?

A Right.

Ms. Sawyer. And, Dana --

General Flynn. Right.

Ms. Sawyer. -- could we just clarify?

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q What is that language specifically that she should have included?

A I think that she should have said up front, we don't have all the information yet. We know that there was elements of a terrorist organization associated with al-Qaida that were part of this, we know that we are -- you know, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] So we know these things.

There was definitely a video that we know from previous, you know, things that have occurred with, you know, the exposure of a Koran in a different way, I mean, some of the things that we had already seen, had she had said those kinds of things and, you know, at the end of the day, we just don't know yet, we don't have you all the information, we're going to be examining this and we'll continue to stay on this until we actually bring to -- you know, to bear the people that actually perpetrated this, the American public would have been just happy.

Q So can I just boil that down to, my understanding is that --

A I just said that in about 30 seconds. She could have put that out in 30-second increments five times on a Sunday talk show on the -- you know, on that Sunday, but she didn't.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q So it was the failure to use the word "terrorists"?

A The failure to assure -- well, the failure to really take all the pieces of the puzzle that we knew at that time up until that day, up until the day she walked onto the -- you know, into those studios, to take all the pieces that we knew and put together as accurate a puzzle as she could, you know, given sensitivities of intelligence, but this was a big deal.

And a lot of this stuff, you know -- I mean, national security advisor, she can -- and the President, they can declassify whatever they want to bring confidence to the American people.

I mean, that -- to me, I was surprised, one -- you know, I was not given an opportunity to look at those talking points or to give my 2-cents on them; and two, I was surprised when she went on the Sunday talk shows and said what she said, because I was, like, wow, that's not the whole story.

Q Again, just to try to clarify and boil it down, it was the failure to specifically mention that there were potential involvement of individuals associated with al-Qaida --

A Yeah.

Q -- associated with --

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q And there was then an inspired -- an al-Qaida-inspired attack?

A Because we knew, because we had previous evidence that showed that this -- that there were -- I mean, you know, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q And when you mentioned sensitivities of the Intelligence Community --

A Yeah.

Q -- what -- what -- you said --

A Well, I mean, I'm just saying, you know --

Q -- you said given the sensitivities of the Intelligence Community.

A She would have to judge, she and whoever was going to prepare her would have to judge exactly what, you know -- you know, if she used a name, for example, if she used an individual's name that we knew was one of the potential people there, how did we know that.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q Yeah.

[REDACTED], it

sounds like you would say --

A Yeah, but, I mean, you know --

Q -- was a legitimate concern --

A -- the things that I just rattled off a few -- you know, a minute or so ago, none of that's classified, none of it.

Q Do you think it was her decision to make at the time --

A I don't know.

Q -- as to whether that was classified or not? Would it have been appropriate for Ambassador Rice to decide whether that information --

A Yes, yes, and here's why: because she's the national security advisor for the United States of America and she was going to be the one going on television. So, I mean --

Q She wasn't the national security advisor at the time. Is that not correct?

A Well, she was the -- what was her role?

Q She was the Ambassador to the United Nations.

A Yeah, that's right, the UN ambassador. I'm sorry. UN ambassador. So, I mean, she -- I'm sorry. So she's got to make the judgment about what she's going to say. If she doesn't believe what

[REDACTED]

she's going to say, then she's the wrong person to put out in front of the television.

Q Should she have overruled determinations of the Intelligence Community about --

A She could have.

Q -- what was sensitive information and what was --

A Well, she could have.

Q -- in the public domain?

A Yeah, she could have. I mean, she could have, yes, certainly. Absolutely. She could have. If she didn't -- you know, if -- if she's going as a -- you know, I mean, does she have a mind of her own, is what you're asking me?

Q I'm not asking you that. I actually asked a particular question, which was, is it in her purview and is it something you would advocate for to overrule the assessment of the Intelligence Community as to what information --

A Yeah. She wouldn't overrule the assessment of the Intelligence Community, because --

Q Can I just finish my question --

A Yeah. I'm sorry.

Q -- because I do want --

A Yeah.

Q -- you to answer my question fully. So --

A Yeah. Yeah.

Q Do you think it would be appropriate and in her authority,

but more, actually, appropriate for her to overrule a determination that the Intelligence Community had made about what particular information was sensitive from their perspective? Do you understand my question?

A Not really. I mean, I think that if she was handed a set of talking points without, you know, as somebody, in fact, as the Congressman asked me, the context or somebody asked me about the context, if she didn't have the context of the whole situation and she was handed a set of talking points, then I question her judgment, because if she doesn't have that context, she's taking a very dangerous course of action to go on national television on behalf of the President, because that's the only reason she's going on there, she's not going on behalf of herself, and she's going to make some statements about, you know, the murder of an Ambassador and three other Americans and the wounding of a few others, I mean, without having that context, the background and seeing as much of the puzzle as possible --

Q Sure.

A -- I mean, I would have thought for a couple of days, I mean, knowing how -- how we prepare people, that I would have prepared a lot more and had some context instead of just being handed a piece of paper and saying, "Okay. Here you go. Employ these."

Q And then just to be clear, so your concern with what she said was not that what she actually said was inaccurate, it was an error of omission of sorts?

A Yeah. I mean, I think so. I think that's probably more

correct. I think that's more correct.

Q And you would have wanted her or whoever was --

A Yeah. I wish --

Q -- speaking to --

A Honestly, I wish I had seen those talking points. I wish I had seen those talking points and had an opportunity to weigh in on what I think they should have -- how it should have been caveated. That's what I do believe that -- you know, I would not have agreed with the talking points that she employed, as an agency director, as an Intelligence Agency director.

Q And, again, you weren't involved in the actual crafting of the talking points for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Is that accurate?

A No. I mean, I didn't -- I mean, sometimes -- like, I had talking points sent to me on Snowden as an example, but not -- this one wasn't one that I was given the opportunity to make a cut on, you know, to give my 2-cents on, huh-uh.

Q So if there's was back and forth on particular issues about including or omitting the term "al-Qaida," you would not have known about those conversations?

A



Q Right.

A Even though the idea that they used the protest to take advantage of it.

Q Understood. But with regard to the specific crafting of talking points for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, you would not have been aware of any --

A Now, for those, you know, because you're asking something different than those that were prepared for Susan Rice.

Q Oh. Okay. With regard to ones for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, were you involved in that process?

A Yeah. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I mean, if I was, you know, maybe I was. I don't know. I don't recall that, though.

Q Okay.

A I mean, I couldn't tell you off the top of my head if I saw something that was going to go to the HPSCI. I don't know. I don't remember that. But I definitely would know if I was given a shot at looking at the ones that Susan Rice employed, you know, immediately after the whole thing, you know, happened. So those I was not given an opportunity to look at.

Q Thank you, Dana.

A Okay.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Real quick. Just one other thing, sir, real quick. Were you aware --

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

[Large redacted area]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

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Q

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
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, is there anything else that you think is important for this committee to know about the attacks on Benghazi that you'd like to share with us before you leave today?

A Yeah. No. I mean, just, you know, looking at it from the time that it occurred till now, you know, sadly the situation's gotten worse, far worse. It's much worse today than it was then. So you can imagine how bad it was then where they had the ability to attack a U.S. Consulate, you know, kill a U.S. Ambassador and other -- and other Americans and are apparently still getting away with it, and the situation's far worse today, you know. I mean, there was a time when in 2009, 2010 where we were looking at, you know, 150 foreign fighters coming into Iraq, now we're talking about 1,500 a month.

So what we know for certain with, you know, great facts, and a lot of them, is that eastern Libya has been a hot bed of extremism supporting al-Qaida with variations, with different group names, different leaders for a long time in this fight we've been in. And so to have had ourselves postured the way we were in terms of security

and doing the kinds of things that I know that were going on, you know, it's sad that we didn't make better decisions.

And I will tell you, I mean, as a -- as, you know -- I'm a guy that's put together a lot of pieces of a lot of puzzles, and the pieces of this puzzle to me are very clear, you know, when you lay out all the evidence prior to 9/11, prior to that date, you know, that this happened, and the evidence was clear that there was direct threats to U.S. interests, and the primary U.S. interest was a consulate out there that was attacked, actually.

So decisions aside of what the Ambassador did or what more force protection was put there, I just look at this whole thing as it's just such a calamity of errors, and then, frankly, it's like I have said, you know, and this is really for -- Heather, for you as well, you know, we wouldn't be here talking about this had Susan Rice employed talking points properly. And given the entire context of what occurred, and then, frankly, saying, you know, we just don't know enough right now. That was only, what, 5 days, 6 days after. I mean, my God, you know.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Do you think that in her appearance, she failed to say this assessment is initial, there's an investigation ongoing --

A I don't know.

Q -- and we need to wait?

A Yeah. I don't know. I don't know. I don't -- I don't know that. I don't remember that specific, but only providing a portion of what we knew, is -- is kind of the way I felt. Boy, it's

like, wow, she just gave a -- she just gave an assessment that's not accurate.

Q And do you think in the talking points that were given to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to speak to -- to communicate with the public about what had happened in Benghazi --

A Yeah.

Q Those were given to HPSCI on September 15th.

A Okay.

Mr. Chipman. Excuse me. Can I make sure the record reflects, were those talking points actually provided to the committee on the 14th of September?

Ms. Sawyer. The 15th of September.

Mr. Chipman. 15th? The Saturday?

Ms. Sawyer. Yes.

Mr. Chipman. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Yes.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Do you think that --

A So I -- you know, I wasn't provided those.

Q The ones that were --

A And I don't -- I can't sit here and tell you that I ever saw those.

Q Would you have expected them to --

A I mean, now -- now, after the fact, I probably have seen them.

Q Would you have had the same expectation that you had for any talking points for Ambassador Rice, to the extent there were being talking points created for Congress to communicate with the public, would you have the same expectation that it would tell the full picture, that it would mention al-Qaida and affiliates, associations with al-Qaida?

A Yeah. I mean, I think so. I'm not quite sure I understand what you're asking, but I think that the broader context of -- and it doesn't require that much more, but the broader context is that this was not a bunch of hoodlums hanging outside of the consulate that night, and a video came out and they got upset and they attacked. That was sort of the message that came across, and that -- and we know that's not the case. We knew it then.

Q So regardless --

A We knew it then.

Q -- of who was communicating, the talking points that were being created for them --

A Yeah.

Q -- should have mentioned --

A I believe so.

Q -- the belief that al-Qaida was involved?

A Yeah. I think that there should have been more context probably provided in those talking points, sure. Certainly, you know, that al-Qaida was a -- you know, we believed that al-Qaida was responsible for this thing. Yeah. I think that would have been very

fair. And that would have helped her and, frankly, others who are -- you know, want to pick their battles. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. Were you guys finished? I think Peter had a couple.

Mr. Tolar. No, no.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Sir, I appreciate the flexibility with your schedule to accommodate our questions today. Just one housekeeping matter. I want to refer back to a response you gave in an earlier hour just to help us with the timeline of the night of the attacks, or the day of the attacks here in D.C. You'd indicated that -- were you in Washington, D.C., when you first learned of the attacks? Was that correct?

A I was in Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Q So you learned of the attacks when you were at Fort Huachuca?

A Right.

Q Is that right? Okay. And to the extent that the committee may have -- or let me ask it this way. Would there be a situation center that would track your movements?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And would that provide us with a general sense of your whereabouts, your movements --

A Oh, yeah.

Q -- at the accurate point in time?

A Yeah. Yeah. You can look at my -- you can look at my

[REDACTED]

calendar, you know. It probably shows, you know, when I departed, when I took off or when I -- when I, you know, returned from --

Q Okay. Do you recall when you landed at Fort Huachuca?

A Yeah. I think -- well, out there? I don't know off the top of my head.

Q Early evening?

A I know I was back the next day, you know, probably midafternoon or so, because I remember I went in and I went right into our CT center.

Q Sure. But your departure, would that have been midafternoon --

A Probably.

Q -- early evening?

A Yeah, probably, yeah, because I know I had some meetings that day. I think I had a meeting that day with, like, the -- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], that day, if I remember right, because I -- you know, I was still sort of in my early days of the directorship and so I was doing various meetings with different people to, you know, introduce myself and get a sense of what they were doing, so -- but, yeah, yeah.

Mr. Kenny. I think we're all set. Oh, sorry.

Ms. Sawyer. We've got --

Mr. Tolar. No. Go ahead.

BY MR. KENNY:

[REDACTED]

Q So, sir, just at this point, we do have one final matter. And I'll just preface by saying this: our the select committee is the eighth congressional investigation into the Benghazi attacks. On the minority side, this is our attempt to help ensure that it is the last, and we've been asking every witness a series of public allegations that have been made over the course of the last few years since the attacks. It's our understanding even though that some of these questions have been answered by other investigations, our colleagues in the majority continue to pursue these allegations, and that's why we are continuing to ask about them.

Anyone can speculate about the Benghazi attacks, plenty of people have, but only a limited universe of people really have the firsthand knowledge, actual knowledge of what happened either before, during, or after the attacks. So, again, what I'm asking for here is not so much opinion, but just whether you have firsthand knowledge of some of the matters I'm going to ask you about. If you don't, we'll just simply move on to the next allegation. And there's about a dozens of these, so please bear with me.

A Okay.

Q It's been alleged that the Secretary of -- that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally blocked military action on the attacks. One Congressman has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down," close quote, and this resulted in the Defense Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington Post fact checker evaluated the claim and gave it four Pinocchios, its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in spring of 2011?

[REDACTED]

A None that I can remember, no.

Q

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A Well, the way you asked the question, I question the judgment.

Q Okay. And can --

A So --

Q -- you elaborate?

A So -- because you used the word "bad." I mean, so, yeah, there was bad judgment.

Q So which judgment specifically are you --

A Probably at every level.

Q Okay. And are you referring to some -- a person in particular?

A I may not know specific evidence, but that's not the question that you asked me.

Q Okay. Well, actually I asked if you had any evidence that there was a bad or improper decision, reason behind the --

A Yeah. The evidence is -- yeah. The evidence is a dead Ambassador and three dead -- other dead Americans and others wounded. I mean, that's the evidence. So there was judgment calls at the ground all the way up to the highest level. I question the bad judgment. So

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

that's -- my evidence is the -- is the dead Americans and the wounded Americans and the fact that we had to leave a country. So, yeah, I question -- based on the evidence that I know, I question the bad judgment.

Q Right. So just to clarify, you're referring to the consequences of some of these decisions, the tragedy that unfolded, not any specific evidence that there was a bad or improper reason. Is that correct?

A There was bad judgment. That's obvious. It was bad judgment multiple, multiple levels of the government, starting with the guys on the ground, and that's the hardest place to be, but on up. I just question the judgment, yeah. So based on your question and the evidence that we know, there was obviously bad judgment.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And just to clarify, when you reference the evidence that we know, the evidence you're talking about is the consequences, what unfolded, not actual evidence that you had in your possession at the time?

A Yeah. Like, I don't know why they made a particular decision at the [REDACTED] or the consulate or at AFRICOM or back here in the White House, but it's pretty clear that the judgment was lacking, and clearly the decisiveness was lacking.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

[REDACTED]

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A I don't. I was never -- no. And I have had no interaction with the ARB at all.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department --

A Which is an amazing statement in and of itself --

Q Okay.

A -- when you think about it.

Q Well, perhaps we could explore that a little further.

A Well, why would the ARB not come and talk to the director of one of the largest intelligence agencies in the country about -- when everybody's questioning the intelligence? Why would the ARB not do that? That's what you ought to ask the ARB. I mean, honestly, I was surprised that they did not come and talk to me.

Q All right. Do you have an awareness of the individuals who they did interview?

A I'm not. No.

Q Okay.

A I mean, I'm sure I could go get a list of them, of who they interviewed, but, no.

Q And there was a representative from the Intelligence

Community, or a person who represented the intel side of the House on the ARB. Is that your understanding as well?

A I don't know. I don't know what the -- I don't know what the makeup of the ARB was.

Q All right.

A I know who the guy in charge and the -- and sort of his deputy.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No. No.

Q And then let me ask these questions also for documents that were provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that were provided to Congress?

A No. No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and nonpartisanship," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the Benghazi talking points?

[REDACTED]

A I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A Yeah. I don't know.

Q It's been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made a, quote, "intentional misrepresentation," close quote, when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk shows?

A Yeah. I think the key word there is "intentionally," and I would not be -- you know, I would not want to understand what was in her head, but she clearly employed talking points that were -- where there was omissions that probably could have clarified quite a bit of this mess that we're in right now, why we're sitting here today, and I believe that. I believed it the day that I watched her do that, and I just couldn't believe it, couldn't believe it.

Q It's been alleged that the President of the United States was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote, on the night of attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that the President was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote, or, quote, "missing in action," close quote, on the night of the attacks?

A No. No.

[REDACTED]

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel advanced to Tripoli on the night of the attacks were considering flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors to stand down, meaning cease all operations. Military officials have stated those four individuals were instead ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security medical assistance in their current location. A republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services Committee found that, quote, "there was no stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House Armed Services Committee that, quote, "there was no stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi," close quote?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "given where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened and how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's conclusion?

A I think that -- I mean, I don't have any evidence, but my

judgment is that we didn't do everything we could. I mean, I just think we lacked imagination that night.

Q And you had mentioned earlier, I think tying back to --

A I mean -- I mean, I would have used --

Q

I mean, use your imagination.

Q Sure. And, again --

A I just think that people get -- you know, in a crisis, which I've been in a lot of them, I think that people tend to get -- they stiffen up. So, yeah, I just think that we failed to use our imagination. I don't have any evidence about what you're asking me, but I just think that not every single tool -- you know, we tend -- sometimes we use a hammer to just hammer. You can do it -- you can use it for other things too.

Q But, again, on the night of the attacks, you were not in any operational role --

A No.

Q -- regarding this?

And, finally, do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have saved lives but the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

to employ?

A Yeah. I don't know that. I don't know that.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So just a quick question. We've talked a fair amount today about the talking points and Susan Rice's appearance. You indicated right now that you actually saw her on the shows that Sunday. Is that accurate?

A I did, yeah. Yeah.

Q And I think you said you couldn't believe it, what she had said?

A I couldn't. I could not believe it.

Q And even now you feel pretty strongly about that?

A I do, because I was surprised that she -- you know, I mean, I felt bad for her, because I think that she was put into a position where she really didn't know, and that's a problem in and of itself, but that's a different issue. But I think that she was put in a position to employ some talking points that weren't totally accurate.

Q And feeling that strongly about it even at the time --

A Yeah.

Q -- did you take any steps to address it, to correct the record, to bring it up with your partners in the interagency? Anything that --

A Yeah. I let it be known. I -- you know, it was -- it was -- you know, I let it be known.

Q Did you raise the issue --

A I mean, I didn't write -- I mean, it was done, it was a done deal and we were -- now it's recovering.

Q Did you raise the issue with anyone in CIA?

A No. I raised it at the -- you know, I raised it in conversation that I had with leadership in the Intel Community.

Q And do you remember any of the people that you contemporaneously raised it with?

A You know, it might have been -- might have been Director Clapper, you know. I mean, I just know that it was like, wow, what -- you know, she just -- she just, you know, really employed some things that were not totally -- they weren't -- they weren't a lie, they just weren't the whole -- you know, it wasn't a good contextual set of talking points that had they been employed properly, had there been a little bit more stated, then I think we wouldn't be here today. Yeah. I really -- I really believe that.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. I think from our perspective, that's all we have for you. We do really appreciate --

General Flynn. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. -- all your time in coming in. By the clock up there that isn't working, it's really only noon --

General Flynn. Yeah, I know it, I know it.

Ms. Sawyer. -- so we didn't keep you past noon, but we do appreciate you --

General Flynn. 1:15.

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. I understand that clock is not correct, but thank you and thank you for pushing back your departure time.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Tolar. And, sir, also on behalf of Chairman Gowdy and the other members of the committee, we want to thank you for your time involved here and coming in here today.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Tolar. Also appreciate your service to this country and your family's sacrifice during your service. It's really important that we recognize that. And thank you again.

General Flynn. Thank you.

Mr. Tolar. We're off the record.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

[REDACTED]

Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

I have read the foregoing ____ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

Witness Name

Date

[REDACTED]

Errata Sheet

Select Committee on Benghazi

Department of Defense counsel on behalf of the witness reviewed the accompanying transcript, certified its accuracy, and declined to provide corrections to the transcript.