S. Rept. 104-13 - LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT OF 1995104th Congress (1995-1996)
Committee Report
| Report Type: | Senate Report |
|---|---|
| Accompanies: | S.4 |
| Committees: |
Reports for S.4
S. Rept. 104-13 - 104th Congress (1995-1996)
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Senate Report 104-13 - LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT OF 1995
[Senate Report 104-13]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
104th Congress 1st SENATE Report
Session
104-13
_______________________________________________________________________
Calendar No. 26
LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT OF 1995
__________
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
TO ACCOMPANY
S. 4
TO GRANT THE POWER TO THE PRESIDENT TO REDUCE BUDGET AUTHORITY
March 7 (legislative day, March 6), 1995.--Ordered to be printed
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware,
Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN GLENN, Ohio BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
SAM NUNN, Georgia
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
Franklin G. Polk, Staff Director
and Chief Counsel
Joan Woodward, Professional Staff
Member
Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff
Director
Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
I. Purpose of the Measure...........................................1
II. Background and Need..............................................1
III. Difference With State Item Veto..................................2
IV. Past Efforts to Enact Enhanced Rescission........................4
V. Legislative History..............................................4
VI. Committee Action and Tabulation of Votes.........................6
VII. Committee Amendments.............................................6
VIII.
Section-By-Section Analysis......................................6
IX. Cost and Budgetary Considerations................................9
X. Regulatory Impact Evaluation....................................10
XI. Additional and Minority Views...................................11
XII. Changes in Existing Law.........................................14
(iii)
Calendar No. 26
104th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 104-13
_______________________________________________________________________
LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT OF 1995
_______
March 7 (legislative day, March 6), 1995.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Roth, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. 4]
The Committee on Governmental Affairs, to which was
referred the bill S. 4, to grant the power to the President to
reduce budget authority, having considered the same, reports
thereon without amendment and without recommendation.
I. Purpose of the Measure
The purpose of S. 4, as ordered reported, is to strengthen
the President's ability to rescind budget authority. Under the
reported bill, presidential recommendations to rescind funds
will take effect unless disapproved by Congress during a
designated review period.
II. Background and Need
This bill responds to the overly restrictive effect of the
Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Congress passed the statute in
response to a series of executive actions in the early 1970s
that terminated or severely reduced funds that Congress had
appropriated for federal programs. The Impoundment Control Act
established two procedures to guide executive officials. If the
President wanted to delay the expenditure of budget authority
he could submit deferral messages. Either House of Congress
could disapprove deferrals at any time.\1\ If the President
wanted to terminate budget authority he would have to submit a
rescission message. Under the procedure established for
rescissions, the funds would be released for expenditure unless
the President obtained the approval of both Houses of Congress
within 45 days of continuous session.
\1\ As a result of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the one-
House legislative veto over deferrals was unconstitutional. A federal
appellate court later held that the one-House veto in the Impoundment
Control Act was inseverable from the deferral authority. Because of
that ruling, Presidents could no longer propose deferrals for policy
reasons (disagreeing with the purpose of a program). Future deferrals
would have to be limited to routine administrative actions. City of New
Haven, Conn. v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Congress
enacted the principle of the 1987 ruling into law. 101 Stat. 785, sec.
206 (1987).
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The statutory procedures for rescission are too stringent
to achieve significant savings. From 1974 to the present time,
Presidents recommended $72.8 billion in rescissions and
Congress agreed to only $22.9 billion. On its own initiative,
acting through the regular legislative process, Congress
rescinded a total of $70 billion.
The purpose of S. 4 is to reverse the burden by adopting a
procedure called ``enhanced rescission.'' Instead of the
President having to obtain the approval of both Houses within a
specified number of days, Congress would have to disapprove a
presidential proposal to rescind funds. The President could
then veto the disapproval bill, forcing each House to muster a
two-thirds majority to override the veto.
The purpose of enhanced rescission is to confront the
serious problem of pork-barrel spending. Each year wasteful and
parochial projects--unlikely to pass on their own merits--are
tucked into omnibus bills. Often these projects are not germane
to the bill. They may be nothing more than extraneous and
indefensible riders that hope to make it to safety in the
company of a larger bill. They are added routinely as part of
the price for getting a bill out of committee or passing it on
the floor. Without item-veto power (the state variety) or its
functional equivalent (enhanced rescission), Presidents must
either sign the entire bill or veto it. S. 4 gives the
President a tool to cancel these projects. It will force
Congress to address, through the rescission process, the
specific merits of these projects. Only if Congress, during
this second review, votes to disapprove the President's
rescission package and votes successfully to override an
expected veto will those projects become law.
III. Difference With State Item Veto
Although debates on S. 4 and other rescission reforms
typically speak of ``line item vetoes'' and giving the
President the same tool that 43 Governors now have, the
procedures at the state and federal levels are fundamentally
different. Governors exercise item-veto authority when a bill
is before them. After striking out certain items the balance of
the bill becomes law. S. 4 gives the President no such
authority. If S. 4 is enacted, the President's power regarding
disposal of a bill would be unchanged. The President could
either sign the entire bill or veto the entire bill. There
would be no authority to veto particular items in the bill.
S. 4 applies to the process after a bill becomes law. For
example, if the President signs an appropriations bill into
law, he would then be able only to recommend the rescission of
budget authority. Those recommendations would take effect
unless Congress disapproved them in a bill or joint resolution
that must be presented to the President. The President could
veto the bill or joint resolution of disapproval, requiring a
two-thirds majority in each House for an override of the
presidential veto.
For several reasons, the rescission process is more
suitable for the Federal Government. First, appropriations
bills are itemized at the state level but not at the federal
level. Governors can wield item-veto authority because the
bills presented to them are highly itemized. It is not unusual
for state appropriations bills to descend to items as small as
$2,000. Thus, at the time that bills are in front of governors,
they can selectively veto the parts that they disapprove and
sign the remainder of the bill into law.
The federal budgeting process is different in its
essentials. Appropriations bills consist primarily of large
lump-sum accounts: $4.6 billion for ``Aircraft Procurement,
Navy''; $3.3 billion in the Department of Energy for ``Energy
Supply, Research and Development Activities''; $3.0 billion in
the Department of Health and Human Services for ``Health
Resources and Services'' (under the Health Resources and
Services Administration); $2.6 billion for the ``Operating
Expenses'' of the Coast Guard, and so forth. Occasionally these
lump sums are subdivided to earmark funds for specific
projects, but most of the details are placed in conference
reports, agency justification materials and other nonstatutory
sources. Presidents could not effectively use item-veto
authority for the simple reason that appropriations bills do
not contain items.
Second, Congress and the executive agencies are in broad
agreement that lump-sum funding is an effective way to manage
the Federal Government. Because of lump-sum appropriations,
federal agencies are able to shift funds within large
appropriations accounts and therefore adjust to changing
conditions during the course of a fiscal year. By making these
shifts inside the account, the overall dollar figure for the
activity is not violated and therefore there is no need to seek
remedial legislation from Congress. Fund-shifting takes place
under established reprogramming procedures, with agencies
notifying designated committees of the shifts and in some cases
seeking the advance approval of those committees.
For example, the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1995 contains the
``Construction, General'' account for the Corps of Engineers. A
lump sum of $983,668,000 is provided, including 34 earmarks
ranging from $67,500 for a project in Rhode Island to a $20
million project in Kentucky. These statutory earmarks total
$130,126,500. The conference report, listing 210 projects in 40
states, explains in great detail how the entire $983.6 million
is to be allocated. The Corps of Engineers may depart from the
specific amounts listed in the conference report by following
reprogramming procedures. This flexibility is important for the
agency and for Congress in its oversight capacity.
It is possible, although not desirable, to apply the state
budgeting system to the Federal Government and give Presidents
the kind of line-item veto presently available to governors. To
maximize item-veto authority for the President, the details in
conference reports, agency justification materials, and other
nonstatutory sources could be transferred to appropriations
bills. Presidents would then have the range of choice available
to governors. However, placing items in appropriations bills
would produce an undesirable rigidity to agency operations and
legislative procedures. If Congress placed items in
appropriations bills, agencies would have to implement the bill
precisely as defined by the individual items. In cases where
the specific amounts detailed in the appropriations statutes
proved to be insufficient as the fiscal year progressed,
agencies could not spend above the specified level. Doing so
would violate the law. Agencies and departments would have to
come back to Congress and request supplemental funds for some
items and rescissions for others, or request a transfer of
funds between accounts. Neither Congress nor the agencies want
this inflexibility and added workload for the regular
legislative process.
IV. Past Efforts To Enact Enhanced Rescission
On several occasions in recent years, the Senate has
considered and voted on bills to provide the President with
enhanced rescission. On November 9, 1989, Senator Coats'
amendment to provide for enhanced rescission was rejected on a
vote of 40 to 51 to waive the Budget Act. On June 6, 1990,
Senator McCain's enhanced rescission amendment was rejected on
a vote of 43 to 50 to waive the Budget Act. Two years later, on
February 27, 1992, another enhanced rescission amendment by
Senator McCain was unsuccessful on a vote of 44 to 54 to waive
the Budget Act. In that same year, on September 17, 1992, an
enhanced rescission amendment by Senators McCain and Coats was
rejected on a vote of 40 to 56 to waive the Budget Act. The
next year, another vote occurred. On March 10, 1993, the Senate
voted on an enhanced rescission amendment, sponsored by Senator
McCain, to S. 460. The vote to waive the Budget Act failed on a
vote of 45 to 52.
V. Legislative History
S. 4 was introduced by Senator Dole on January 4, 1995, for
Senators McCain, Coats, Kyl, Helms, Murkowski, Ashcroft, Bond,
Grams, and Gramm. The bill was referred jointly to the
Committees on the Budget and Governmental Affairs, with
instructions that if one committee reports, the other committee
would have thirty days to report or be discharged.
The Senate Committee on the Budget held a markup on
February 14, 1995, and reported S. 4, as amended, without
recommendation on a rollcall vote of 12 to 10. The Budget
Committee adopted two amendments. Senator Domenici's amendment,
to provide that enhanced rescission authority will cease
(sunset) in 2002, was approved by voice vote. Senator Conrad's
amendment, to provide that whenever funds are rescinded the
discretionary caps will be lowered to ensure that rescinded
funds are allocated to deficit reduction (``lock-box''), was
approved by voice vote.
A joint hearing was held on January 12, 1995 by the House
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs to explore the merits of
enhanced rescission. The first panel heard testimony from
Senators John McCain and Dan Coats and from Representatives
Gerald Solomon, Jack Quinn, Mark Neumann, and Michael Castle.
Also testifying at these hearings were Governor William Weld of
Massachusetts; Dr. Alice Rivlin, Director of the Office of
Management and Budget; Dr. Robert D. Reischauer, Director of
the Congressional Budget Office; Judge Gilbert S. Merritt,
Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit and Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Judicial Conference; Joseph Winkelmann of
Citizens Against Government Waste; David Keating of the
National Taxpayers Union; and Dr. Norman Ornstein of the
American Enterprise Institute.
In testifying for the Clinton administration, Dr. Rivlin
expressed support for the strongest possible version of
presidential authority to cut spending. She noted in her
statement that President Clinton has repeatedly favored
enactment of item veto legislation. During the 1992 campaign he
supported a tool ``to eliminate pork-barrel projects and cut
government waste.'' That support was repeated in the February
17, 1993 document, ``A Vision of Change for America,'' and in
speeches and letters during the last Congress. In a letter to
the congressional leadership early this year, he wrote:
The line item veto authority will help us cut
unnecessary spending and reduce the budget deficit. It
is a powerful tool for fighting special interests, who
too often are able to win approval of wasteful projects
through manipulation of the congressional process, and
bury them in massive bills where they are protected
from Presidential vetoes. It will increase the
accountability of government. I want a strong version
of the line item veto, one that enables the President
to take direct steps to curb wasteful spending. This is
clearly an area where both parties can come together in
the national interest, and I look forward to working
with the Congress to quickly enact this measure.
Dr. Rivlin emphasized that the President's letter indicated
support for ``the strongest version of the line-item veto, one
which ensures that he can cut unnecessary spending, reduce the
budget deficit, and fight attempts by special interests to fund
wasteful projects at taxpayers' expense. The Administration
believes that the line-item veto must be broad in scope and
become effective as soon as possible.'' She also noted that S.
4 and H.R. 2 (passed by the House on February 6, 1995) ``give
the President the most new authority, providing that
Presidential proposals stand unless both Houses pass a bill to
overturn them and the bill is enacted.'' Bills such as S. 14
(expedited rescission), she said, ``provide less new
authority.''
Dr. Robert D. Reischauer, Director of the Congressional
Budget Office, noted in his testimony that the procedure in S.
4 (enhanced rescission) ``provide the President with greater
potential power than a constitutionally approved item veto.''
He explained that a constitutional amendment would limit the
President to approving or vetoing dollar amounts only to the
extent that they appear in appropriations bills. However, the
dollar figures in appropriations bills are usually large lump-
sum amounts, not itemized details. The President could not
reach within those dollar amounts. With enhanced rescission,
the President is able to reach within appropriation accounts
and select specific amounts. Because of this authority, the
President can propose rescissions for all or part of an
appropriated amount. To that extent, Dr. Reischauer said,
enhanced rescission ``is equivalent to some of the strongest
item veto powers possessed by state governors. Such `reduction
veto' authority is possessed by chief executives in only 11
states.''
VI. Committee Action and Tabulation of Votes
The Committee on Governmental Affairs held an additional
hearing on February 23, 1995. Testimony was heard from Senator
Bill Bradley, Representative Peter Blute, Louis Fisher of the
Congressional Research Service, and Allen Schick of the George
Mason University. Issues explored during the hearings included
the extension of rescission authority to tax expenditures and
the definition of targeted tax benefits; comparisons between S.
4, S. 14, and the House-passed enhanced rescission bill, H.R.
2; exempting the judiciary from the President's exercise of
rescission authority; the question of whether S. 4 and S. 14
could reach entitlements such as social security; and the
balance between the executive and legislative branches,
including the issue of how much legislative power may be
delegated to the President.
On March 2, 1995, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
held a markup on S. 4. Senator Glenn moved that the Committee
report S. 4 with recommendation. Senator Stevens then moved to
amend the Glenn motion, to report S. 4 from the Committee
without recommendation. A vote then occurred on the Stevens
amendment to the Glenn motion. The Stevens amendment prevailed
with roll call vote of 9 to 6. The following Senators were
recorded as voting AYE: Roth, Stevens, Cohen (by proxy),
Thompson, Cochran, Grassley, McCain (by proxy), Smith, and
Lieberman. The following Senators were recorded as voting NO:
Glenn, Nunn, Levin, Pryor, Akaka and Dorgan. A voice vote then
occurred on the Glenn motion as amended by Senator Stevens to
report S. 4 from the Governmental Affairs Committee without
recommendation.
VII. Committee Amendments
No amendments were adopted to S. 4 in the March 2, 1995,
markup of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.
VIII. Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1 provides the short title of the ``Legislative
Line Item Veto Act of 1995'' for S. 4.
Section 2 enhances the President's spending control by
amending the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to add at the end
thereof the following new title: ``Title XI--Legislative Line
Item Veto Rescission Authority.'' Section 2 consists of two
parts: Part A, defining the legislative line item veto
rescission authority, and Part B, providing for congressional
consideration of legislative line item veto rescissions.
Part A--Legislative Line Item Veto Rescission Authority.--
Part A grants the President enhanced rescission authority and
establishes conditions for its use. Notwithstanding the
provisions of Part B of Title X and subject to the provisions
of Part B of the new title, Title XI, the President may rescind
``all or part'' of any budget authority if the President
determines that the rescissions (1) would help balance the
Federal budget, reduce the Federal budget deficit, or reduce
the public debt, (2) will not impair any essential Governmental
functions, and (3) will not harm the national interest. In
satisfying these conditions, the President must notify the
Congress of proposed rescissions in one of two occasions: (1)
by means of a special message not later than twenty calendar
days (not including Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays) after the
date of enactment of a regular or supplemental appropriations
Act or a joint resolution making continuing appropriations
providing such budget authority, or (2) notifies the Congress
of proposed rescissions by special message accompanying the
submission of the President's budget to Congress provided that
such rescissions have not been proposed previously for the
fiscal year. The President shall submit a separate rescission
message for each appropriations bill defined above.
The President's proposed rescission becomes effective
unless disapproved by Congress. Any amount of budget authority
rescinded under Title XI as set forth in a President's special
message shall be deemed canceled unless during a congressional
review period a rescission disapproval bill is enacted into
law.
The congressional review period consists of twenty calendar
days of session, during which Congress must complete action on
the rescission disapproval bill, with that bill presented to
the President for signature or veto. If Congress passes a
rescission disapproval bill, the President has an additional
ten days (not including Sundays) to exercise his authority to
sign or veto the bill. If the President vetoes the rescission
disapproval bill, an additional five calendar days of session
is available for Congress to consider an override of the veto.
If a President's special message is transmitted under this
section during any Congress and the last session of such
Congress adjourns sine die before the expiration of the period
described above (twenty days for congressional consideration of
a rescission disapproval bill, ten days for presidential
review, and five days for a congressional override), the
rescission shall not take effect. The message shall be deemed
to have been retransmitted on the first day of the succeeding
Congress and the review period, with respect to the message,
shall run beginning after such first day.
For example, if Congress considers an override at the end
of the second session and adjourns sine die before the
expiration of the five days set aside for that consideration,
at the start of the next Congress the entire period of thirty-
five days begins anew. On the other hand, if Congress
considered an override at the end of the first session and
adjourned before the expiration of the five-day period, the
calculation is different. Whatever time Congress consumed would
be deleted from the period of thirty-five days. If Congress
used thirty-three of the thirty-five days, when the second
session began Congress would have two days remaining to
consider the override.
Section 1102 of Title XI defines the term ``rescission
disapproval bill'' to mean a bill or joint resolution that only
disapproves a rescission of budget authority, in whole,
proposed to be rescinded in a President's special message.
Section 1103 of Title XI provides for a ``lock-box'' to
ensure deficit reduction. If Congress fails to disapprove a
President's rescission within the period provided for
legislative review, the President shall, on the day after the
period has expired, reduce the discretionary spending limits
under section 601 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 for
the budget year and any outyear affected by the rescissions to
reflect the amount of the rescission. If Congress fails to
disapprove a President's rescission within the period provided
for legislative review, the chairs of the House and Senate
Committees on the Budget shall, on the day after the period has
expired, revise levels under section 311(a) and adjust the
committee allocations under section 602(a) to reflect the
amount of the rescissions. If Congress fails to disapprove a
rescission of direct spending within the period provided for
legislative review, the President shall, on the day after the
period has expired, adjust the balances for the budget year and
each outyear under section 252(b) of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 to reflect the amount of
the rescission.
Part B--Congressional Consideration of Legislative Line
Item Veto Rescissions.--Part B establishes the procedures to be
followed by Congress when acting on a rescission disapproval
bill. Whenever the President rescinds any budget authority
under Title XI, the President shall transmit to both Houses of
Congress a special message specifying (1) the amount of budget
authority rescinded; (2) any account, department, or
establishment of the Government to which such budget authority
is available for obligation, and the specific project or
governmental functions involved; (3) the reasons and
justifications for the determination to rescind budget
authority pursuant to section 1101(a)(1); (4) to the maximum
extent practicable, the estimated fiscal, economic, and
budgetary effect of the rescission; and (5) all facts,
circumstances, and considerations relating to or bearing upon
the rescission and the decision to effect the rescission, and
to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated effect of the
rescission upon the objects, purposes, and programs for which
the budget authority is provided.
Section 1112 provides for the transmission of special
messages and their publication in the Federal Register. Each
special message under Title XI shall be transmitted to the
House of Representatives and the Senate on the same day, and
shall be delivered to the Clerk of the House of Representatives
if the House is not in session, and to the Secretary of the
Senate if the Senate is not in session. Each special message so
transmitted shall be referred to the appropriate committees of
each chamber and printed as a document of each House. Any
special message transmitted under Title XI shall be printed in
the first issue of the Federal Register published after such
transmittal.
Section 1113 explains the procedures in the Senate. Any
rescission disapproval bill introduced with respect to a
special message shall be referred to the appropriate committees
of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Senate debate
on any rescission disapproval bill and debatable motions and
appeals shall be limited to not more than ten hours. The time
shall be equally divided between, and controlled by, the
majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.
Senate debate on any debatable motion or appeal shall be
limited to one hour, to be equally divided between, and
controlled by, the mover and the manager of the bill, except
that in the event the manager of the bill is in favor of any
such motion or appeal. The time in opposition shall be
controlled by the minority leader or his designee. Such
leaders, or either of them, may, from the time under their
control on the passage of the bill, allot additional time to
any Senator during the consideration of any debatable motion or
appeal. A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. A
motion to recommit (except a motion to recommit with
instructions to report back within a specified number of days,
not to exceed one, not counting any day on which the Senate is
not in session) is not in order.
Provisions are established for points of order. It shall
not be in order in the Senate or the House of Representatives
to consider any rescission disapproval bill that relates to any
matter other than the rescission of budget authority
transmitted in the President's special message. It shall not be
in order in either chamber to consider any amendment to a
rescission disapproval bill. The above two provisions on points
of order may be waived or suspended in the Senate only by a
vote of three-fifths of the members duly chosen and sworn.
Section 1114 establishes a sunset for the President's
rescission authority under Title XI, which shall cease to be
effective on September 30, 2002.
IX. Cost and Budgetary Considerations
The following estimate of costs of this measure has been
provided by the Congressional Budget Office:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, March 2, 1995.
Hon. William V. Roth, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
reviewed S. 4, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 1995, as
ordered reported without recommendation by the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs on March 2, 1995.
S. 4 would grant the President the authority to rescind all
or part of any budget authority. To exercise this authority,
the President must transmit a special message to both houses of
Congress specifying each amount rescinded from appropriations
within a particular bill that has just been enacted.
Furthermore, the message must include the governmental
functions involved, the reasons for the veto, and--to the
extent practicable--the estimated fiscal, economic, and
budgetary effect of the action. This message must be
transmitted within 20 calendar days (excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays) of enactment of the legislation
containing the rescinded appropriations. All budget authority
rescinded would be cancelled unless Congress, within 20 working
days, passes a rescission disapproval bill to restore the
appropriations. Those disapproval bills would themselves to
subject to veto, with the usual two-thirds vote in each house
required to override. In addition, if Congress does not
disapprove the President's message, the President shall reduce
the discretionary spending caps for all affected years to
reflect the rescissions. The provisions of this bill would be
effective through September 30, 2002.
The budgetary impact of this bill is uncertain, because it
would depend on the manner in which the line item veto is used
by the President and the success of the Congress in overriding
vetoes; however, potential savings or costs are likely to be
relatively small. Discretionary spending currently accounts for
only one-third of total outlays and is already tightly
controlled. While the bill, as reported, also allows the
President to rescind an appropriation for a mandatory program,
such a rescission would have no effect on the underlying laws
that govern the operations and determine the costs of the
program.
By itself, this bill would not affect direct spending or
receipts. Therefore, there would be no pay-as-you-go scoring
under section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985.
Enactment of this legislation would not directly affect the
budgets of state and local governments. However, the exercise
of line item veto authority could affect federal grants to
states, federal contributions toward shared programs or
projects, and the demand for state and local programs to
compensate for increases or reductions in federal programs.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contract on this issue
is Jeffrey Holland.
Sincerely,
James L. Blum
(For June E. O'Neil, Director).
X. Regulatory Impact Evaluation
In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee makes the following
evaluation of the regulatory impact which would be incurred in
carrying out S. 4. The bill is not a regulatory measure in the
sense of imposing Government-established standards of
significant economic responsibilities on private individuals
and businesses.
No personal information would be collected in administering
the program. Therefore, there would be no impact on personal
privacy.
Little, if any, additional paperwork would result from the
enactment of S. 4, as ordered reported. Paperwork is now
generated by presidential compliance with the Impoundment
Control Act. Additional paperwork beyond the current level
would be modest.
XI. ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
----------
S. 4, ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS GLENN, NUNN, LEVIN, PRYOR, AKAKA
The enactment of S. 4 would result in a massive shift of
power to the Executive Branch from the Legislative. When Dr.
Robert D. Reischauer, Director of the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) testified on January 12, 1995, at a joint hearing
between our Committee and the House Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight, he said S. 4 would ``provide the
President with greater power than a constitutionally approved
item veto.''
Clearly, S. 4's impact on the fundamental balance of powers
laid out in the Constitution should be carefully considered.
Clearly, it should be the subject of thoughtful recommendations
to the full Senate.
However, on March 2, 1995, the Governmental Affairs
Committee, against objections from our side, voted to report S.
4 without recommendation because there were not enough votes in
Committee to favorably report the bill. In addition, amendments
to correct technical problems in the bill--which would have had
bipartisan support--were ruled out under a ``no-amendment-in-
committee'' strategy.
While S. 4 is called a line-item veto bill, S. 4's
rescission authority does not require the president to pick a
specific budget item or line item. S. 4 provides that ``the
President may rescind all or part of any budget authority.'' S.
4's enhanced rescission authority allows the President to reach
into dollar amounts, not just lump sum items. Such ``reduction
authority'' has been given to Governors in less than a dozen
States.
S. 4 would allow Presidential proposals to become law
unless the Congress passes a ``rescission disapproval bill''
within 20 days. S. 4 contains no requirement for Committees to
report the disapproval bill. The motion to proceed to this bill
is fully debatable--potential filibuster--as are conference
motions on any disapproval bills.
If a ``disapproval bill'' managed to reach the President's
desk, he presumably would veto it. In that event, S. 4 is a
prescription for gridlock if you have a President from one
party, and one body of Congress from the other. Under these
circumstances, a President would only need \1/3\rd of either
body to rescind spending determined by a majority of the
Congress.
S. 4 proposes to fundamentally change the balance of powers
between the Executive and Legislative Branches; and alters the
budget process. At present, both the President and the Congress
have opportunities to affect budget priorities. The President
formulates a budget and the Congress amends this budget. The
President can veto a budget reconciliation bill. When the
Congress passes appropriations bills based on the budget, the
President has a choice of signing or vetoing them.
S. 4 would add additional steps. After going through the
regular budget process, the President could propose an enhanced
rescission. Then, Congress could pass a rescission disapproval
bill within twenty days, which the President could then veto.
After all these steps, spending items adopted by a majority
vote in the Congress could only be reinstated by 67 votes in
the Senate and 290 votes in the House.
In his January 12th testimony before our Committee, Dr.
Reischauer, Director of CBO, testified about the experience of
the sates with line-item veto. He said:
Evidence from the states suggests that the item veto
has not been used to hold down state spending or
deficits, but rather has been used by states governors
to pursue their own priorities. * * * For example, a
study in the use of the item veto in Wisconsin over a
12-year period found that governors were likely to use
the authority to pursue their own policies or political
goals but not to reduce spending. Similarly, a
comprehensive survey of state legislative budget
officers found that governors were likely to use the
item veto for partisan purposes, but unlikely to use
the veto as an instrument of fiscal restraint.
S. 4 proposes to change the way a bill becomes a law and we
ask the question: ``For what purpose?''
The Committee report reads: ``The purpose of enhanced
rescissions is to confront the serious problem of pork-barrel
spending. Each year wasteful and parochial projects--unlikely
to pass on their own merits--are tucked into omnibus bills.''
An amendment was offered at our mark-up that would have
limited S. 4's enhanced rescission authority to items that have
not been previously authorized. It was offered on the grounds
that if there is to be a significant transfer of the
Legislature's spending authority to the Executive, it should be
transferred as a penalty for legislative abuse. In other words,
the Committee had an opportunity to limit S. 4's purpose
directly to the serious problem of pork-barrel spending. This
amendment was withdrawn after the Chairman stated that he would
report S. 4 out without amendment and, further, he had the
votes to defeat any amendment to S. 4.
The Minority staff on the Governmental Affairs Committee
expressed interest, prior to mark-up, in working with the
Majority staff of the Committee to develop technical
amendments--to be offered at mark-up--to at least make S. 4
workable. The Minority had met with the Majority staff on this
issue. One amendment to correct the problems of filibustering
the appointment of conferees on a disapproval bill had already
been drafted. However, the Majority staff then indicted that
the Chairman had decided not to have any amendments adopted at
mark-up. We have to ask the question: ``Why go through the
charade of a Committee mark-up?''
Another problem we had wanted to correct was the issue of
budget authority. S. 4 does not define ``budget authority.''
Budget authority is defined in the Budget Act as both
appropriations and entitlement spending. We had testimony
before this Committee on February 23, 1995 that, as currently
drafted, a President could line-item veto a Social Security
cost-of-living adjustment. As currently drafted, S. 4 threatens
other appropriated entitlement and non-appropriated entitlement
spending. We had wanted to work with the Majority staff to
rectify this problem before the bill was sent to the Senate
floor.
There were other issues which Members on our side of the
aisle would have liked to address at the Committee mark-up,
but--for the reasons outlined above--we did not.
In closing, we would like to include an excerpt from the
Committee's mark-up transcript:
Senator Glenn. ``Mr. Chairman, if I might ask, you
announced a no-amendment policy, as I understood your
opening statement. Are we to assume that no matter what
the merits of the amendments are, that on the
Republican side they will be voted down, regardless of
whether there is merit to them or not?''
Chairman Roth. ``That's correct.''
David Pryor.
John Glenn.
Sam Nunn.
Daniel K. Akaka.
Carl Levin.
XII. Changes in Existing Law
This bill represents a new title, Title XI, to be added at
the end of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974.