

**FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2000-2001: SECURITY OF UNITED STATES
MISSIONS ABROAD**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE ON
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000-2001: SECURITY OF UNITED STATES MISSIONS ABROAD

FRIDAY, MARCH 12, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SMITH. The Committee will come to order. This is the fourth and last in a series of hearings on legislation to authorize the foreign relations programs and activities of the United States for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. Today the Subcommittee will consider the security of the U.S. missions abroad and of the people who serve in these missions.

In August 1998 the world was shaken by the terrorist bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Among the results of those despicable acts was the appointment of Accountability Review Boards for each incident. Both of these boards were chaired by Admiral William Crowe, who is our lead witness today. Thank you and we do welcome you to this Subcommittee.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Among the Boards' findings was "the collective failure of the U.S. Government over the past decade to provide adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions to terrorist attacks in most countries around the world."

The Boards made 24 specific recommendations on a wide range of security-related issues. The recommendation that concerns us most today was that "the Department of State should work within the Administration and with Congress to obtain sufficient funding for capital building programs and for security operations and personnel over the coming decade, estimated at \$1.4 billion per year for the next 10 years, while ensuring that this funding should not come at the expense of other critical foreign affairs programs and operations. A failure to do so"—and, again, I quote the Crowe report—"will jeopardize the security of U.S. personnel abroad and inhibit America's ability to protect and promote its interests around the world."

In fiscal year 1999, the Administration did propose an emergency supplemental appropriation for worldwide security upgrades in the

amount of approximately \$1.4 billion, the same amount recommended in the Crowe report. This amount was about equally divided between capital improvements—principally the reconstruction and/or relocation of the two embassies that had been destroyed—and other security enhancements, including technology, personnel and training. In the Administration's fiscal year 2000 budget request, however, the amount requested for security enhancements drops dramatically to about \$300 million.

This is almost an 80 percent cut. The amount left after the cut is almost exclusively for the recurring salaries and expenses of the new people hired with the fiscal year 1999 money. Looking at capital improvements—the reconstruction and relocation of embassies and other U.S. missions—the drop is even more precipitous, from \$627 million to \$36 million. That is a 94 percent reduction from the current fiscal year. Indeed, the request for the next year does not fund any new embassy construction at all, because the \$36 million is only for planning and site acquisition. But this is not because the Administration disagrees with the Crowe report's finding that we need to spend billions more to reconstruct and/or relocate our embassies. The Administration still wants the money, or at least \$3 billion of it, but it proposes to spend the whole \$3 billion in the so-called "out years" beginning in fiscal year 2001.

In other words, the Administration embassy security budget essentially skips fiscal year 2000. If we were to represent the proposed spending as a graph, it would look like two mountains with a trough in the middle; it starts off high at \$627 million, then dips down to near zero, then goes back up to \$300 million, then \$450 million, \$600 million, \$750 million, and finally \$900 million. And any graph that looks like this raises an obvious question: What is so special about fiscal year 2000? What makes this the only year in which we should spend practically nothing to make our embassies safer? I look forward to hearing the Administration's answer, but the only one that occurs to me is that requesting serious money for embassies this year would have forced the Administration to make hard choices. They would have had either to recommend another emergency appropriation which would have had the effect of reducing the budget surplus, or to decide on cuts elsewhere in the Federal budget. So it looks as though the Administration decided to punt.

Daniel Geisler, the president of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) seems to agree and states very clearly and I quote: "The Clinton Administration and the 106th Congress should correct this failure by committing a sustained adequately funded program to reduce the risks we run." He points out that "we have grave doubt that this failure will be corrected."

Our doubts are heightened by the Administration's grossly inadequate request for funds to build safer embassies. The fiscal year 2000 budget request does not have a single penny for construction funds, even though the State Department has proposed that OMB request \$1.4 billion for worldwide security, and he goes on to say, "It is too little too late" in talking about how the out year money has been requested, but we need it right now.

One problem for putting off necessary spending until the out years is that the process tends to repeat itself. In fact, it gets even

easier as time goes on. The spending imperatives in other areas of the budget are likely to look just as important next year as they do this year, and the memory of the bombings will be less vivid. So it will be easy to revise the budget again, to decide that no great harm will be done by putting off the security measures for one more year. Like the cartoon character Wimpy, the Office of Management and Budget fully intends to pay Tuesday for a hamburger today, but it is always next Tuesday that the bill will come due. And so it goes—until the next tragedy.

Unfortunately, this prediction is not hypothetical or speculative. One of the most chilling of the Crowe report's findings is that the problems that gave rise to the bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were the very problems identified in the 1985 report of the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security chaired by Admiral Bobby Ray Inman. The Inman report was produced as a result of an earlier series of attacks on Americans abroad, including the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. And yet the Crowe report found that "adequate funds were never provided to implement the Inman recommendations."

I will never forget, one of my constituents, Paul Innocenzi, was one of the Marines who was killed in that attack, and the memorial services held for many years on his behalf, looking at his widow and his family and the great loss endured with regard to something that could have been prevented. And now we get another wake-up call with the two bombings at our embassies, and it seems that we are doing too little.

It is up to Congress to ensure that this does not happen again. So what we need to know from our witnesses is how much it will really take to make all our overseas missions as safe as they possibly can be, and how much of this can be accomplished in fiscal year 2000 if money is made available.

I am informed that Secretary Albright has testified that she asked the Office of Management and Budget for the \$1.4 billion in fiscal year 2000. I hope our State Department witnesses today will tell us whether this amount was for all security enhancements, including the \$300 million already in the Administration's request for recurring costs and site acquisition, or whether the \$1.4 billion was an additional amount just for the construction of safer embassies. I also hope that they will give us the best estimates they can of how much of this amount could really be spent in the first year if it were to be authorized and appropriated, and of what it would buy. And I would like our other witnesses to give their own estimates of these needs and capabilities.

I know I speak for my colleagues on the Subcommittee when I say that once we know these answers, we will do our best to secure an authorization and an appropriation for the necessary amounts. We cannot afford to lose more American lives, or the lives of other innocent people, to complacency or budget gimmickry.

I would like to ask my good friend and distinguished Ranking Member from Georgia if she has any opening comments.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Yes, I want to join you in extending appreciation to our panelists today. They are here to help us work out one of the most serious issues we face in our diplomatic process, one that affects what we do, how we do it, and where.

Of those who put their lives on the line for our country, those who perform our diplomatic work are often among the least appreciated. Perhaps this is because what they do is often hard to explain or difficult to calculate in nice neat tables graphed against resources expended. Or maybe for some people, it is because they don't use things that blow up or burn things down. If we are serious about being a force for making things better in the world, these are just the kinds of people whom we should be strongly supporting. Instead we allow ourselves to be taken in by big guns, high speeds and "gee-wizardry" and all the toys that boys use to make war and to kill boys and girls.

Certainly I am not an uncritical admirer of the State Department. Sometimes I am tempted to agree with George Will's remark that the Department is like tundra: Anything you do makes it better. I am particularly struck, especially during our recent hearings, with how little of the competent work of the worker bees manages to get reflected in what we hear from the 7th floor.

This is particularly true about the proposals we have received on diplomatic security in the Department's budget submission.

When the tragic bombings took place in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam last August, some of us hoped that some of this awful loss would be partly redeemed by a serious focus on getting rid of the security problems that help create those tragedies and will create other tragedies if they are not fixed. We were prepared to support a realistic well thought-out plan to remedy problems identified by Rear Admiral Inman almost 15 years ago and still found uncorrected by Admiral Crowe's panel earlier this year. We are especially concerned about the pressing problem of the physical security of our embassy buildings, most of which, according to the Department, are over 40 years old.

Instead of giving us a program to move promptly on these problems, however, the Department's budget called for no spending on embassy construction and only \$36 million of spending for embassy site purchase and design in fiscal year 2000. The only other funding for embassy construction was included in a \$3 billion advance appropriation request for 2001 to 2005. These funds were far less than the \$14 billion that Admiral Crowe's report called for. They were so backloaded that 60 percent of the expenses would occur in the last two fiscal years, and they were supposed to come out of the Department's current services budget.

Under this program, something like one-fourth of the Department's funding in fiscal year 2005 would be devoted to security costs, even if the advance appropriation got approved, which it most likely will not. This wasn't a real proposal to deal with the problems that put at risk the lives of our overseas staff, their families, and people who live near our embassy buildings. This was an attempt to look like dealing with the problems while actually doing nothing. I call it "the flimflam plan." As they should have expected, everybody who has tried to sell this flimflam plan on both sides of the Capitol has been told it won't fly.

Last week Under Secretary for Management Bonnie Cohen refused to defend it anymore. She said that the Administration was going back into a huddle and would be bringing out a new plan that would make more sense. But she never made a commitment

to get it for the authorization process, and this week we received the Department's draft of the authorization bill for fiscal year 2000 and it was just the same old flimflam plan once again, and I understand we are likely to get more of that today.

I don't blame any of our witnesses, including Assistant Secretary Carpenter. These decisions are clearly made at a higher pay grade. But I want the message taken back that I will not support the flimflam plan, and if necessary I will work to defeat it. I also want it understood that we, and even more, our country's overseas staff are entitled to see the improved plan that the Administration is supposedly putting together.

We are also entitled to believable assurances that the Department will reform any of its functions such as the Office of Foreign Building Operations that have been in the past obstacles to getting the job done. It is scandalous that the FBO is sitting on tens of millions of dollars already appropriated and unspent while the Department is asking for billions more.

I also want it understood that we are entitled to correct and honest information about this issue. *The Washington Post* this morning said that officials at the State Department are defending the refusal to ask for construction funding in fiscal year 2000 because the Department has not yet acquired sites or commissioned architects to design the facilities. If that is true, I would like to know why not. Even more importantly, I believe this information to be false. In Uganda, for example, we purchased the new embassy site when Johnnie Carson was ambassador there, and that was two ambassadors ago. It is the only weed patch in Kampala that gets 24-hour guard service. I am informed that the Department has made considerable progress with designs for the new embassy as well. Because Kampala has been closed half the time since the bombings in August, due to security concerns, I imagine the Department can find it quite easily.

Now, if the Department is going to defend its budget by putting out incorrect information, we are not going to have the trust we need to work on this important issue. To clear this up, I would like to receive within 1 week a status report on all embassy site purchase and design activities worldwide. I am not asking for classified information, just an update. And I will keep asking until I get this report, although I don't expect to have to ask more than what I have done today.

In making the plans for improving our diplomatic security and in carrying them out, we need to make sure that the people who have to live with the results have a seat and a voice in making them happen. It is for this reason that I am particularly happy to have the opportunity to hear today from President Dan Geisler of the AFSA, the professional association and bargaining agent for our overseas American staff. I expect to see AFSA fully represented in the Department's planning process, as well as among other things, to make sure that our embassy buildings are constructed with accessibility and functionality as well as security in mind.

If we allow our fears to drive us into making our overseas presence look like a fortress on hills in the suburbs, we lose. And if we let our fears drive us away from places we ought to be, we lose.

In thinking about these things, the excellent reports by Rear Admiral Inman and Admiral Crowe deserve full attention, but I wish to express my serious concerns about one of their implications. I believe we have benefited greatly, and at minimal cost, by our effort to maintain widespread diplomatic representation. The United States and its citizens have worldwide interests and worldwide responsibilities as well as worldwide opportunities. Having people on the ground worldwide is the best way to deal with them.

For this reason, I am concerned that efforts at regionalizing our embassies would produce small savings in the overall budget context at extremely high costs, especially in our contact with the developing world where we are just now paying some attention to people we and our European allies have ignored and exploited for centuries. Let's not break the bridges that we have built to save on the cost of cement to repair them.

We have a chance to do some serious thinking about how we want to have our country represented overseas. We owe it to our citizens and to those who represent us to take advantage of this opportunity.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for that excellent statement. Mr. Delahunt, do you have any opening comments?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I just want to comment on an observation that you made in your opening statement, and that was that Secretary Albright testified or indicated that she requested \$1.4 billion for fiscal year 2000 this year.

I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if we have the right witnesses before us today. I wonder if we should at some point in time request testimony from OMB and understand how this process works. If in fact Secretary Albright made that request, given the priority that the State Department purportedly gave to this particular concern, why wasn't that request respected by the Office of Management and Budget?

I think, you know, listening and reading the testimony of Admiral Crowe, listening to your opening remarks, the issue is becoming more clear to me at a very early stage. The problem would apparently be not with the State Department, but with OMB. And I think we have to send the message maybe elsewhere. Particularly, you know, given recent testimony—I think it was before a Senate committee by the Director of the CIA—where he stated we can anticipate terrorist attacks coming. I mean, we have been warned by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency that there is a considerable risk. I dare say this should be a top priority for the Administration in this Congress, and with that I conclude.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to extend my personal welcome to our two distinguished panelists. I have always been a great admirer of Admiral Crowe, certainly one of our national treasures and leaders, in my opinion, for advocating so strongly the importance of our strategic and economic interests in the Asian Pacific region when he was Admiral of CINCPAC in the State of Hawaii, and I would like to thank him for his work and what has happened.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a new issue. The only fact is that the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania have now been reemphasized. The fact is for the past 10 years as we have been sitting as Members of this Subcommittee, it isn't so much the construction aspects of our embassies, it is the security measures taken. I don't care where you put the embassy, they will get to you, whether it be in an urban area or whatever. They have these weapons called mortars, you can shoot something over a building and you are dead.

I notice from your statement, Mr. Chairman, there has been a decrease by 80 percent on security enhancements as far as embassies are concerned, if I am correct in reading the report from the State Department. That means that we have some real problems here. We can build the most beautiful and the most elegant facility, Mr. Chairman, but if the security aspects are not taken into consideration, all is for naught.

I am very, very concerned about this. We commit \$1.4 billion for building a building, but without security considerations, that building is worthless as far as I am concerned.

I don't know what went into this, but from my understanding, Mr. Chairman, for the 10 years that I have been sitting as a Member of this Subcommittee, we have actually increased our budgeting for security considerations of these embassies. And if it be Nairobi or in Tanzania, the issue that we are now confronted with, Mr. Chairman, is the question of terrorism. They can hit you anywhere they want. It could be in Africa, it could be in any embassy that you never hear of, in Madagascar or anyplace else.

So committing all of this money, I don't think that this is the center core of the issue, Mr. Chairman. Where are we with our security considerations, whoever is in charge of security as far as our embassies are concerned, that is the person that I would like to talk to. These are the people that I would very much be interested, Mr. Chairman, to find out exactly if they are truly experts, if they really do take into consideration how these embassies are constructed, what distance, how it affects our personnel.

You know, some of our embassies are separated from where the personnel live. Most of our ambassadors don't live in the compounds where our embassies are located. They live in some real Beverly hills area, I will tell you that, for the most part. We have a \$90 million embassy in Bangkok, and with a mortar, a terrorist could probably take care of every one of these embassies if they knew how to use mortars. So where do the security aspects come into play? This is the heart and soul of our problem.

This is not a new issue. It just so happens that 300 people were killed. These two embassies in Africa, the least expected, according to what I would consider as a priority in the measures taken in our embassies throughout the world. These terrorists can attack anywhere they want and that is our problem. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. You will have that opportunity to hear from those witnesses. David Carpenter will be testifying, and so those questions that you have ought to be directed to him.

Just so we are absolutely clear, the cut is from a baseline or in anticipation of \$1.4 billion each year, as recommended by Admiral Crowe's commission and from last year's supplemental appropriation. I don't want to have anyone misreading what that cut is. My

point in my opening statement was to go from a very large front-loaded amount of money but no sustainability in year 2. It drops off, like over a cliff. Mr. Tancredo, any comments?

Mr. TANCREDO. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. I would like to now introduce our very distinguished witnesses. We are delighted to have Admiral William Crowe, Jr., who is the Chairman of the State Department's Accountability Review Boards. He is a senior adviser to Global Options, an international crisis management firm in Washington. Previously, as we all know, he was the U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland—and served with great distinction in that posting—the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1985 to 1989.

A native of Oklahoma, Admiral Crowe graduated from the U.S. Naval academy in 1946. His early naval career was in submarines and he served as the Assistant Naval Attache to President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1954 to 1955. Later, as a Rear Admiral, he commanded U.S. Naval forces in the Persian Gulf.

In 1980 Admiral Crowe was named the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in southern Europe, the NATO Command responsible for Italy, Turkey and Greece, as well as the Mediterranean area. Subsequently, he commanded the U.S. Pacific Command before President Reagan named him the 11th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1985.

After retirement from the military in 1989, Admiral Crowe was a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and university professor of geopolitics at the University of Oklahoma. His book, "The Line of Fire," was published by Simon and Shuster in 1993.

He served on the board of directors of Merrill Lynch, Texaco, General Dynamics, Norfolk Southern, and Pfizer Pharmaceuticals.

Admiral Crowe holds a master's degree in education from Stanford University and a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University. He is the Shapiro Visiting Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University and serves as a trustee of Princeton University.

Admiral Crowe is married and has 3 children.

Daniel Geisler has been a member of the U.S. Foreign Service since 1985 and is President of AFSA. He served as AFSA's Vice President for the State Department prior to his election as President. Previously Dan was Deputy Director of the Office of Economic Policy in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, where he was responsible for developing policy and programs for Asia Pacific economic cooperation. His Foreign Service assignments for the State Department included tours in Malaysia, Jamaica, and Zaire. Domestically he has served in the Bureau of European Affairs as officer in charge of economic affairs for Germany, Austria, and Switzerland and as staff assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs.

Dan was a member of the core team of the Strategic Management Initiative and worked in the office of the U.S. Trade Representative on the North America Free Trade Agreement.

He holds superior and meritorious honor awards from the State Department. Prior to joining the Foreign Service, Dan was an engineer at the Environmental Protection Agency where he was awarded the group's silver medal for negotiations with the auto industry, and a Peace Corps volunteer in Togo, West Africa.

He holds a master's degree in civil engineering from Carnegie Mellon University, a bachelor of science in mathematics from St. Vincent College, and has done graduate work in both mathematics and economics.

Dan is married and has two sons.

I would like to ask Admiral Crowe if you would proceed and thank you for being here.

**STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., CHAIRMAN,
ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD**

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear here and discuss the recent study which I chaired to examine the explosions in both Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.

Mr. Chairman, I know you are pressed for time so I will submit my statement. I would like to go through some of the high points, though.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, your statement will be part of the record.

Admiral CROWE. Throughout the proceedings, the Boards were most disturbed regarding two interconnected issues. The first of these was the inadequacy of the resources to provide security against terrorist attacks, and the second was the relatively low priority accorded security concerns throughout the U.S. Government by the Department of State, other agencies in general, and on the part of many employees, both in Washington and in the field.

Saving lives and adequately addressing our security vulnerabilities on a sustained basis must be given a higher priority by all those involved. In the Navy we would say security is an all-hands proposition; otherwise, we are not going to be able to prevent a tragedy such as this in the future.

The Board found that Intelligence provided no immediate tactical warning of the August 7 attacks. We understand the difficulty of monitoring terrorist networks and concluded that vulnerable missions could not rely upon such warnings. I mean tactical warnings, which really speak to specifics. We found, however, that both policy and Intelligence officials have relied heavily on warning intelligence to measure threats, whereas experience has shown that transnational terrorists often strike without warning at vulnerable targets in areas where expectations of terrorist attacks against the United States are low. We found that the security systems and procedures at both posts at the time of the bombings were in general accord with Department policy. However, you have to keep in mind that on the composite threat list, Nairobi was listed as medium threat, and Dar es Salaam as low threat.

Once you have that feeling, of course, they have the systems they expected and thought they were well prepared. However, those systems and the procedures followed under the Department's direction did not speak to large vehicular bomb attacks or to transnational

or international terrorism or the dire consequences that would result from them.

One of your Members mentioned that there is nothing new here. That is not exactly true. These two features are very new. We are not talking about mortar attacks, we are not talking about suitcase bombs, we are not talking about fire or arson. We are talking about two threats that really are recent, and one is the presence of large bombs that will kill a great many people in one ignition, and the terrorism that does not recognize boundaries, that operates over those freely, is highly sophisticated and extremely well funded.

Both embassies were located immediately adjacent to public streets and were especially vulnerable to large vehicular bombs. The Boards found that too many of our overseas missions are similarly situated. Unless these vulnerabilities are addressed on a sustained and realistic basis, the lives and safety of U.S. Government employees and the public, both Americans and otherwise in those countries, and the public in many of our facilities abroad will continue to be at risk for further attacks.

In our investigations of the bombings, the Boards were struck, as you noted, by the similarity of our recommendations with those drawn by the Inman Commission over 14 years ago. I find very troubling, the failure of the U.S. Government to take the necessary steps to prevent such tragedies in the interim. The renewed appearance of large bomb attacks against U.S. embassies and the emergence of sophisticated and global terrorist networks aimed at U.S. interests abroad have dramatically changed the threat environment.

In addition, terrorists may in the future—and we haven't discussed this very much—use new methods of attack of even greater destructive capacity and possibly including biological or chemical weapons.

I would say unequivocally that old assumptions are no longer valid. Today many U.S. Government employees from many agencies work in our embassies overseas. They work and live in harm's way, just as the military people do. We must acknowledge that and remind our citizenry of this reality of life overseas for official Americans.

In turn, the Nation must make greater efforts to provide for their safety. I would never suggest that service abroad can be made completely safe. It cannot. But we can reduce some of the risk to the survival and security of our personnel. Even if they are going to continue attacks on our embassies and other buildings and missions, we can make the environment such that they can't kill as many, that the rate of survivability can be much greater.

Of course, this will require greater effort in terms of national commitment, resources, and procedures than in the past. Without that kind of commitment, nothing is going to change.

I should make a particular comment on funding. If we are to have comprehensive and long-term strategy for protecting our embassies overseas, it will be necessary to have some kind of sustained funding plan, and I think you referred to this, Mr. Chairman, in your own remarks.

We also need a long-term capital plan, a building program which is discrete and separate from the regular State Department budget.

That plan should be based on a comprehensive assessment of the requirements to meet the new range of terrorist threats, and our study recommended such.

We also recommended budget appropriations of \$1.4 billion per year sustained over a 10-year period over and above the normal State Department budget. Now, I am not contending that we were really equipped to analyze as an accountant some of these figures, but this was our best estimate, and we think that it is in the neighborhood if it is not exactly correct. We also think very strongly from what we are hearing now about the Administration's current year funding and the next 5 years, we think it is inadequate.

We understand there will never be enough money to do all that should be done. We will have to live with partial solutions, and probably for quite some time. In turn, a high level of threat and vulnerability will continue for quite some time.

As we work up the physical security of our missions, we should also consider—and I didn't say that we recommended doing this—we said that you should consider reducing the size and number of our embassies through the use of modern technology and by moving, in some cases, to regional posts in less threatened and vulnerable countries. We, of course, would prefer not to do that. I am a veteran of the Pentagon, and when our budget goes down, we don't want to eliminate divisions, ships or aircraft, but we have to do it. And if we do not have sufficient funding, then we should consider these things. It would be very preferable for the U.S. Congress to appropriate sufficient monies to make our embassies safe and to keep all of the embassies and missions that we currently have.

All employees serving overseas should assign a higher priority to security—and the Boards were very adamant about this—and adjust their life styles to make workplaces and residences safer. In overseas missions there is a tendency for people to continue doing their work in a certain way, traditional missions, not changing their life which they are very satisfied with, and then let someone else provide for their safety. Those days are gone. This attitude must be changed.

Security priorities will have to be adjusted to make embassies tougher, to make those systems and their procedures more appropriate, and to improve the overall odds of survival. This process will succeed only if it starts at the top and goes to the very foot of the hierarchy.

We cannot allow for terrorists to force us to retreat from defending our interests abroad. Making our people safe and deterring and frustrating terrorist attacks sends, I would say, the stronger signal of U.S. determination and capability.

And please note that in Nairobi 4,000 people were wounded and 200 people killed, and the 200 I am referring to were Kenyan nationals, and the great bulk of the 4,000 were citizens of the host country. The host country doesn't like to see our embassies attacked and does not like to see those attacks impact them. The host country has an interest in and, I can assure you, wants American embassies to be safe. And if you want to send a signal of American achievement and American determination to those countries, the best thing, the number one priority we could do is to make our embassies safe. Successful overseas terrorist attacks kill our people,

diminish confidence in our power, and bring tragedy to our friends in host countries. And I saw that in both Nairobi and Tanzania.

When choosing embassy sites, safety and security concerns should guide our considerations more than whether a location is convenient or historic or of symbolic importance. Most host countries want our embassies to be safe. If they don't, we probably shouldn't be there.

There is every likelihood there will be further large bomb and other kinds of attacks. We must face these facts and do more to provide security or we will continue to see our people killed, our embassies blown away, and the reputation of the United States overseas eroded.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Crowe appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Crowe, thank you for not only your testimony but, more importantly, for the great work that you have done on behalf of Foreign Service officers and embassy personnel. The importance of protecting the host countries and their citizens who can be killed as they walk by an embassy can never be overlooked or understated.

Admiral CROWE. I think that is terribly important.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Geisler.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL F. GEISLER, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

Mr. GEISLER. I have submitted a written statement that I would like to put in the record.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, it will be made part of the record.

Mr. GEISLER. I know it is traditional, Mr. Chairman, to thank you and the Members of the Committee to testify, and I want to assure you that in this case my thanks are more than a matter of protocol. The rank and file, the worker bees that Congresswoman McKinney referred to in her statement, don't often get a chance to testify before Congress and it means an awful lot to us.

I would also like to publicly thank Admiral Crowe. After an extremely distinguished career of public service, he has been working very energetically on behalf of embassy security. Admiral Crowe, on behalf of the Foreign Service, I really appreciate it.

In the aftermath of the tragic bombings of our missions in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the AFSA sent to the House International Relations Committee a list of our concerns about embassy security. That list was pretty much the same list that Admiral Crowe noted when he came out with his report in January. Our core message was then, and remains now, that we must commit to protecting our people from terrorism but we should not shrink back and cower with terrorists.

Over the years our leaders have focused on embassy security after a tragedy. We saw it in the seventies after Khartoum. We saw it in the eighties after Beirut. And we see it again today in the wake of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. However, as the memory of each loss fades, attention wanes. Commitment declines. Funding is diverted until a new tragedy ensues. We have to break this cycle. Admiral Crowe showed that the East Africa losses resulted from a

collective failure over the past decade. The Clinton Administration and the 106th Congress should correct this failure by committing to a sustained, adequately funded program to reduce the risks we run.

Mr. Chairman, we have grave doubts, as you said in your opening statement, that this cycle of interest and neglect will be broken. Our doubts were heightened by the Administration's grossly inadequate request for funds to build safer embassies. As this Subcommittee is well aware, that request does not have a single penny for embassy construction in fiscal year 2000. Its \$3 billion advance appropriation, even if it ever materializes, is heavily backloaded, with most of the money to be spent in 2004 and 2005. Moreover, these funds would have to come from the current services budget. So that would mean, for instance, that the State Department would have to find about \$900 million in fiscal year 2005 out of an operating budget of about \$4 billion.

To make matters worse, last week the Senate appropriators reported out a bill that would rescind 5 percent of the emergency security funds that Congress approved less than 5 months ago. The Administration's response to this rescission has been muted. The inadequate Administration request and the potential congressional rescission, lead us to conclude that we will again be faced with the impossible choices between keeping people safe and giving them the tools they need to do their work.

We have heard a lot of discussion about how to defend our overseas missions. We think that an effective security program also needs a vigorous offensive element. It is not in our American nature to simply hunker down. We must identify terrorists and then cut them off from their sources of funds, transportation and supplies. We can't do that from Washington alone. Such a vigorous offense requires an overseas presence. It would be a grave mistake to permanently close embassies in response to terrorism. There may be good reasons for closing a U.S. mission, but retreating from terrorism is not one of them. It would be unworthy of America and it would be counterproductive.

Permanently closing embassies would create new opportunities for terrorists to flourish by giving them a haven where we cannot monitor their actions. It would cut us off from contacts with foreign law enforcement agencies. It would limit our ability to influence foreign government leaders. Pulling out embassies would abandon private American citizens living abroad, severely curtailing our capacity to advise and protect them. It would prevent us from serving American business abroad. In our war against international terror, our overseas missions serve as America's forward deployment. We cannot deploy without risk, but risk must not keep us from deploying. We have to decide where we have interests that warrant an overseas presence and then protect the people who establish that presence.

The Administration has told us repeatedly that there are no 100 percent guarantees of safety. In the Foreign Service we have always known this and accepted it. We have no desire to cower in our embassies, and we have no desire to abandon our posts. Well-designed chanceries with adequate setback will save lives, but will not eliminate all risks. We prefer accessible missions to hardened

fortresses on urban perimeters, but we recognize the need to balance accessibility with safety.

We also think that there is a lot more to security than investing in buildings and guarding their perimeters. Training saves lives just as setback does. If employees in Nairobi had been trained to duck and cover rather than run to a window when they heard a grenade blast, we could have suffered fewer casualties. The Nairobi blast also showed why locally hired guard staff require training and professional supervision. These personnel not only defend the perimeter of an embassy, but they also protect the softer targets such as homes, schools and warehouses. But, like training and residential security programs, they are the first to go in a budget cut. This undermines any investment we make in new buildings.

Security investments only pay dividends if upper management really works on security. When senior managers waive security criteria or cut security funding, they send a strong message to the field that security doesn't matter. That undercuts the efforts of our professionals who are trying to keep the people safe.

Mr. Chairman, like Congress, the Foreign Service does not want to simply throw money at security. We do want to break the cycle of interest and neglect, and replace it with sustained and adequate funding. In the immediate term, for U.S. embassies where the State Department's Foreign Buildings Office already has design and site acquisition work underway, Congress should appropriate full construction funding this year so that work can proceed. The State Department should also explore expanding the use of other Federal agency expertise, as well as private sector engineering and project management services to speed up the building program.

Mr. Chairman, the decisions that the Congress and the Administration make this year on embassy security will have profound effects on American diplomacy for years to come. The Foreign Service cares very deeply about that. We also care very deeply about our people. We ask, Mr. Chairman, that you and the Members of the Subcommittee help break the cycle of attention and neglect that places them in needless danger.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Geisler appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Geisler. Admiral Crowe, there are priorities and then there are priorities, and you pointed out in your testimony the relatively low priority accorded security concerns throughout the U.S. Government by the Department of State and other agencies, on and on. It seems that part of our problem is the Office of Management and Budget and the clearinghouse role that they play in trying to divvy up the pie of resources.

Just yesterday, parenthetically, the Veterans Affairs Committee, on which I sit as Vice Chair, we sent our budget submission to the Budget Committee, our estimates and views, which attempt to boost veteran spending by \$1.9 billion because the VA, especially the health care component, was so woefully inadequate. And again the excuse was: "OMB did it to us." We hear that over and over again in every area.

My hope is that, using your report and your testimony and the catalyst that you provide in your Accountability Review Board, we will be able in this fiscal year to significantly bump up that number, if not totally to \$1.4 billion, so that there is that sustainability.

I wonder if you can tell us how many embassies could be replaced per year if Congress authorized and appropriated that \$1.4 billion per year, and would that be adequate to provide the protection that we are looking for?

Admiral CROWE. I am afraid that you are above my pay grade here, Mr. Chairman. Of course, our mandate was to look at these two embassies specifically. And we tried to generalize our findings, but I am not privy to most of the problems in these other embassies. I think the State Department and David Carpenter can speak to this. The State Department feels that they have 260 missions and consulates that they have to be concerned about, and about 217 are not meeting the Department's standards. That is a general idea of the size of the problem.

Mr. SMITH. Would it be your testimony that this really has to be a crash program? The urgency is such that this ought to be priority one?

Admiral CROWE. The reality of the thing is that even with a crash program, it is going to take quite some time. The physical changes face two problems. First of all, getting the money; and, second, research is moving very rapidly. It is sort of like the computer industry on things like windows and barriers and walls and structures; what is good today is overtaken by events next month. The State Department is trying very hard to stay abreast, and so this will not be done with great expedition even with money. It is a protracted process. But it is the old story: If you wait and string it out, it is going to be even worse. And it does need some urgency put to it.

Mr. SMITH. One thought that I gleaned from your testimony is the very profound concern that you and your fellow commissioners have, that those embassies thought to be secure and remote, and not likely to be targets, are no longer safe—that is no longer the case. This transnational aspect to terrorism has made embassies a candidate for security enhancements, big time.

Admiral CROWE. We believe there are no longer any low-threat embassies. The State Department composite threat list was one of the villains in the piece, but the State Department recognized that, without our help, and it has already begun to refashion that list. But the way that worked was that if the regional security officer was in an embassy that was a medium-threat level—actually, the list was put together to prioritize expenditures, and then it acquired a life of its own. So a regional security officer would be told you may want more, but a medium-threat embassy should just have so much. A low-threat embassy should have less.

And people actually used that list for their own purposes, besides just prioritizing the State Department expenditures. And it was very insidious, the impact that it had. The embassies were more comfortable. We had one or two people in Tanzania tell us that they had come from high-threat levels, very exciting, and that they thought that they needed some rest, and so they chose a low-threat post and went to Dar es Salaam. It was low threat on the list. It wasn't actually a low-threat post.

So that system is being reworked right now. And we need a different attitude toward the whole thing. All embassies should consider themselves under threat.

Mr. SMITH. I remember when Admiral Inman sat where you sat and I was part of the panel when he made his presentation. We listened only in part, and that goes for the Administrations that followed, and some of the recommendations and architectures were reshaped to provide maximum protection, but we hopefully will never need another wake-up call. And now we have another admiral of distinction making the same comprehensive plea, and I do think that, judging from the comments on the other side of the aisle, this will be a bipartisan effort and hopefully we will secure the necessary funds.

Admiral CROWE. I am not sure that the wake-up call has reached OMB, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Geisler, you said that we should not turn our embassies into fortresses on urban perimeters and we should balance security and accessibility. Are you saying that we can keep some embassies in central cities with only a 20- or 30-foot setback, provided we have other security enhancements? And, Admiral Crowe, how do you feel about that?

Mr. GEISLER. There are some cities where you really can't reasonably expect there to be appreciable setbacks. I can think of Hong Kong where real estate is just so expensive. There are other places where our buildings are in multi-use high-rises that we have to look at. The point that we are trying to make, we heard in our discussions with some people in the Congress and in the media that there was an impression that what the Foreign Service wanted was to move all of the embassies out to the suburbs and put big walls around them, and that is not what we are seeking. If we can, we prefer to be centrally located, where we have access more easily to the people that we are trying to influence and where people have access to us: people who are coming in, American citizens who want overseas citizens' services, people who are using our cultural centers, et cetera. That is what we prefer. We understand if security considerations prohibit us from getting that, we will move.

It is not that we are opposed to sufficient setback. It is just that it is not our first choice if we can do without it. We trust in the professionals to make those determinations for us.

Admiral CROWE. Mr. Chairman, clearly when you are talking about very, very large bombs, the number one item to help you is standoff distance. It would surely be vastly preferred. The Commission understands, however, that there are some places you cannot get it.

There are other things you can do, like you can actually buy property in order to get a standoff distance, and in a couple of our embassies, that has been done. No matter how it works, even if we are going to build new embassies and we find places for standoff distance, it is going to be a long time before we can replace those that are in threat. So other things have to be done and can be done, and our report talked about tactics, procedures, systems, and particularly window improvements and structural improvements, et cetera, et cetera.

On the argument of openness, our embassies are not open now. They may be sitting in a place where there is a great deal of activity or in the center of the city, but you don't walk into an American

embassy any longer. I remember doing that. But you cannot do that now, because they are tightly buttoned up for security.

If you have business there, you can come and state your business, and the man that you are going to do business with comes down, gets you, you go through a rather rigorous security system, and you come into the embassy. But they are not freely open to American citizens, which is a real tragedy. But that has been brought on by security. It is the old story: Every time you do one thing, you take something away from the other. In a sense, it is a zero sum game, but you have to balance; is the gain worth the loss?

When I was ambassador in London, we weren't very close to the British Government where we were. We were in the city and in a very populated area. It was great trouble for my people to go and meet with the government. But it wouldn't have been any more trouble if we had been out in the country.

Incidentally, people that want American visas, they will go out in the country to get them. You don't have to be in the center of the city.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask one additional question and then yield to Mrs. McKinney.

The Accountability Review Board brought to light the role glass windows and doors played in the deaths and injuries sustained in the embassy bombings. The report noted that the windows were covered by 4-millimeter Mylar-protected film. I understand that about \$50 million of the \$1.4 billion has been set aside for retrofitting or replacing glass windows and doors so they can better resist bomb blasts.

What are your views on the continuing use of 4-millimeter window film versus thicker film or laminated glass?

Admiral CROWE. I cannot speak directly to how much Mylar they are buying or not buying. I can tell you our experience in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the Mylar-treated windows adjacent to the bombs were practically useless. It didn't give us a bit of protection. On those windows on the other side of the building and so forth where there was some Mylar, some of them didn't shatter as much. But for the kind of threat we are talking about, Mylar is not worth a lot of money.

Laminated glass, however—and that is moving very fast in research circles—in both embassies there were bunkers for security guards and communications systems, and specially produced laminated glass in both those bunkers stood up very well. It broke, it shattered, but it didn't splinter and injure or kill anyone.

That is vastly superior to anything else on the market, and we should have that. But our experience in Nairobi in particular also suggested that the windows have got to be more than hard, they have got to be attached structurally to the building, not just to a window frame. And window frames also come out and become projectiles. So when you start talking about making windows safer, you are talking about a major job, which I happen to think is worth it.

In my embassy in London we had 192 windows, and we had Mylar, but in Nairobi every person standing in front of the windows was killed. In our review of the attacks not only there but

other places, there is usually some kind of disturbance. In Nairobi a few shots were fired, and from the initial incident to the explosion was 2 minutes.

If we had had an alarm system and a different drill, everybody in the embassy—and there were just very few, one or two had been in Lebanon—if everybody when the shots were fired had gone under a desk or table, they would have survived. Everybody that did that survived. They were covered with rubble and had to be dug out but they survived. That kind of thing can be changed, and our report recommends that change very strongly.

Incidentally, those procedures, that is not a money thing; that is just a different way of doing your business which will pay off. But my number one concern would be windows.

Now, a lot of money should be put in other things which were mentioned by your Committee: training, external forces that protect you, et cetera, et cetera. But that window business is a killer, a real killer.

Incidentally, of the 4,000 people wounded, the majority of those were from windows in other buildings.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Ms. McKinney.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Crowe, I have one question in two parts. I think because of the work that you have done, you have become quite familiar with the way folks think over at the State Department and probably in the White House as well. Could you tell me how the proposal that we have received in Congress became so radically different from the proposal that you recommended?

Then my second question is, do you think the Department could use construction money in fiscal year 2000 if it were provided to them by us?

Admiral CROWE. Would you please state the last part?

Ms. MCKINNEY. Do you think the Department could actually use the construction money in fiscal year 2000 if it were provided to them by us?

Admiral CROWE. I was not in the State Department. They did not consult with me when they constructed their budget. However, I have had some experience. I worked for the U.S. Government for 50 years, and in the Pentagon we went through this constantly.

The State Department budget, I am sure, was drawn up with what they would require and what they would request, what they wanted, and then it was vetted in other parts—in an informal fashion—in other parts of the government before it was ever submitted: in the OMB, the White House and whoever else was impacted.

Secretary Albright said the other day the process in the government is a very fair process. Well, if you mean by fairness that a lot of people have got their hand in it, yes, it is very fair and it is very pluralistic, too.

But then it is customary to argue over those subjects. You win some, lose some. But in the end, whatever the machinery, mainly OMB and the White House say what is practical and what they can devote to the President's budget is settled, and then the Department goes back and requests that amount of money.

You can like or dislike that. It certainly is a system that is open to criticism. It is also kind of a system that the government has

to have to do their business in a certain sense. I am sure that is where the discrepancy is, what they want and actually requested is two different figures.

I said yes earlier, to Mr. Delahunt there; that in the military we have a very interesting thing happen. When a senior military officer is confirmed to serve, he goes before the Senate Armed Services Committee and in the process, they say to him, General, Admiral, if we confirm you, you must make a commitment to us that when you are up here to testify, if we ask you your personal view, that you will unequivocally give it to us.

Now, that is sort of an arrangement that I don't think applies to anybody but military officers. I think it is a very good arrangement. At least in my experience, it worked very well. We defended the Administration budget, and then some Senator would say, "Admiral, what is your personal view?" We didn't have a choice. We told them. Somehow or other, this in my judgment works a little better.

The second part of your question is a very good one, and we on the Committee realized if we were to actually get the kind of sustained program we suggested, that the State Department would probably have to have some more people, some more contracts, and then in the first year or two, or maybe even three—I don't think that is necessary, three, but they could not spend all that money.

Now, I have had some informal conversations with the State Department, and I think their judgment was that the first year we could probably in a profitable way take a security budget of about \$650 million. But by the next year we could be up to \$1.2 billion, and we could do whatever we can get from then on.

Sure, there will have to be a ramp-up, but nothing like the ramp-up proposed for this \$3 billion. I also have had a lot of experience with that in the Pentagon, and that money has a very interesting way of disappearing.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Admiral Crowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Tancredo.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Crowe, you mentioned in your testimony that you were sure that the host countries were as interested in maintaining the security of our facilities as they possibly could be. I recognize that there are relatively few things that we can ask of the host country to enhance our security arrangements at our embassies, but I do think there are things—

Admiral CROWE. Absolutely.

Mr. TANCREDO. I understand also, for instance, arrangements at one of the facilities could have been better in terms of if we had had another radio frequency, we perhaps could have had a little more warning. Is there a checklist of sorts that we can go through to make sure that our embassies throughout the world—that the host countries are providing the kind of security that we think they could provide, the responsibilities that we know that they have?

Admiral CROWE. When we establish an embassy, we have a contract with the host country that we are allowed to come there and allowed to build, and those provide that external security will be furnished by the host country.

Now, in Western Europe, for example—I was in the London Embassy—Great Britain is absolutely superb in that regard and they consider external security their problem, not ours. Of course, they have a very fine police force and a very fine intelligence section for their police force, and they take that responsibility very seriously. We could depend on it. We requested things. We could normally get it. But we were not able to make them close streets. They didn't think that was necessary.

But they certainly honor their commitment.

In certain countries in the world that make that commitment, they want to honor it and just simply are not prepared. Our report recommends that we work with those countries and that we attempt to train them where we feel they are weak, where they want training, and try to increase their capability to help us. Of course, there are some countries that just simply are not going to help us. I am not so sure we should be there, but there are some.

The argument goes, of course, we should be there whether they help us or not. That is just an issue you have to decide in your own minds whether we should. But, yes, if the local police forces for the countries are amenable to it, we should help them train, and we recommend they do.

Incidentally, the Foreign nationals who worked for the embassy in guard posts in Nairobi, there were some things that went wrong. You mentioned one—we didn't have a frequency on the radio for call-ups. But you might find some glitches in their training, and certainly the company that we had a contract with didn't make good on some of the training they had promised. But when the actual incident occurred, at the most important point, the employees at the Nairobi Embassy did exactly what they were supposed to do, and they prevented that driver from going through the peripheral barriers, prevented him from going into the garage, even when they were being shot at, and they did their duty in a rather outstanding and commendable way.

So I cannot criticize that guard force. The terrorist didn't get through the barrier, and he killed several of them in the explosion.

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Geisler, it has been alluded to in both your testimony and other areas that there is to a certain extent a culture within the Department of State that would suggest that security issues are secondary in the minds of a lot of people who work in our embassies and throughout the world, it is a secondary issue and actually gets in the way of diplomacy. It is not really something people wanted to take as seriously as they should. Certainly these two incidents would heighten everybody's awareness of it. But is there any process underway that would encourage people within the State Department to get over this aversion they have to security issues?

Mr. GEISLER. I only know of one, sir. We used to send people to the field to do crisis management training. They would do these 2-day simulations with the managers of the embassies. Those were virtually eliminated for budgetary reasons because training is always one of the first three things to go; training, residential security, and local guards.

I think we did nine of them in fiscal year 1996 and none the subsequent year. They are being replaced this year and next year with

100 field exercises to train people. But instead of these 2-day simulations where they do role playing, these are 4-hour desktop exercises with the country team.

We are not convinced that that is an adequate response.

I have seen in my admittedly brief time in the service, I entered the service in 1985 when the Inman Commission was beginning its work, and at that time there was a great deal of concern among us, the rank and file. There was mandatory training before you went abroad. You had to take a 2-day course at the Foreign Service Institute before they would send you abroad.

When we got to post, training was a very big issue. I was sent to a very isolated post, Zaire, which was considered relatively low threat. But even there, sir, everybody was concerned about security.

There has been a substantial decline, in my experience, in that concern for security, and I believe that that is the result of signals that people are sent from top management that this is not the highest of priorities. That is what needs to change.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me pick up on a point just made by Mr. Geisler. I don't know if it was within your mandate, Admiral Crowe, but as I listened to your testimony, and I know the focus has been on embassies, let me also express a concern about isolated venues and other American personnel. I am thinking of USAID men and women and Peace Corps volunteers.

In the course of your study, I take it it was just strictly dealing with embassy security, or did you give any consideration to the overall security issue as it impacts Americans serving abroad?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, we did. First of all in questioning witnesses, we took very many witnesses from organizations outside of the embassy, and we commented generally on that problem in the report. That was not our charge; but you are absolutely right, these people are at risk, and they also have a very serious security problem.

Of course, those targets are there right now and terrorists, to be candid about it, are going to choose them secondarily, not first, because what they are primarily interested in is where they can do the most damage not only in terms of casualties, but in terms of prestige, philosophically; where is the representative point of the American country in that government? That leads them to the embassy. Clearly they would much prefer embassies. One of the reasons is because they are downtown, they are in big areas where they can get a lot of people.

I have often heard, well, if you repair the vulnerability of an embassy, they will go to other targets. That statement is not true per se, because they have other targets now. They haven't gone to them. But we may force them to go to those other targets.

We suggested in our study when you build new embassies, that you take this compound or campus approach and you move all the agencies into one place so you would have the security concentrated. In my embassy in London, we had 26 Federal agencies, and they were all in the embassy.

This is argumentative, though. There are people who would certainly take exception to this. But we thought that would be the best solution from the standpoint of the government.

You have to worry about all those people, and they all represent us, and they are all at risk. I don't think the risk for them is as great right now as it is for the embassies.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I just would suggest to the Chairman and to my colleagues in Congress that we also expand our own perspective and understanding of security to extend it to all American personnel serving overseas.

Admiral, in terms of the bombings in Tanzania and Nairobi, I presume there are negotiations ongoing in terms of compensation to victims. I presume that that compensation will amount to millions of dollars.

Admiral CROWE. That is my understanding.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Put aside the obvious human concerns—when we reflect on an investment that you have recommended, and really in the final analysis putting it in very crass economic terms what it will cost us—

Admiral CROWE. There was an article in the paper the other day about a lawyer in Nairobi who has accumulated a bunch of claimants, I think he represents 2,200 people, and he is suing the Kenyan Government, and his next step is to file suit in New York.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I dare say that when that case is heard in New York, that this settlement that will be finalized by the U.S. Government will be a considerable step forward in terms of your \$1.4 billion.

Admiral CROWE. I am sure David can speak to this, but I think there has been quite bit of money given by the U.S. Government.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I posed the question, because I just wanted to frame it in commonsense terms as far as what we ought to be doing, not just simply because it is the right thing to do, because in fact it is the sensible economic investment that we ought to be making.

I think it was the Chairman that talked about the relationships between local host nations in terms of security issues. Either one of you could respond to this.

First let me ask the question, because I don't understand the term—but our reliance on warning intelligence? Can you define that for me and our reliance on it and how it detracts from security, given the changed circumstances in the past decade?

Admiral CROWE. I used the term in my remarks "tactical" intelligence as opposed to "strategic." They are not really definitive words, of course. We usually mean by strategic intelligence, intelligence that talks to the general picture in the region or area; yes, there are threats in the area, there are movements, there are people, there are things going on, A, B, C, D, who are adverse to the American interests, and that the general ambience or general environment is either threatening or non-threatening. That would be called strategic intelligence.

Tactical intelligence would be that we have had an informer come in who says, "Tomorrow afternoon there is going to be a truck drive up at 4:30 in the afternoon when there is a crush and so forth

and they are going to ignite a bomb." That is tactical intelligence. How much it tells you depends on how much they have.

I think we get 3,000 warnings a month throughout the American embassy system, and those warnings are of a general nature, like I heard you are really going to get it.

Well, by whom, and when, and where? I simply don't know that. Or just vague statements, sort of like threats going around now; the envelope shows up and says you just have been exposed to anthrax.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Your recommendation is we have to expand beyond that type of intelligence and have a different approach?

Admiral CROWE. We looked very carefully at the intelligence system, primarily because there were some charges that we did have some warnings which had been ignored. We studied that with great care. But even that had to be put in the overall picture as to whether they were credible or not credible.

Several authorities on this subject testified as to the capability of intelligence, what they can actually assure you they can do and what they cannot do. That is where we reached those conclusions.

We want the intelligence to be improved, as do all the people involved. We actually found some areas where we thought the coordination could be improved immediately, where they would work better together.

The military has the same problem. The most important piece of intelligence they want and are not capable of being assured you can get at is what is in the leader's mind. That cell that is attacking, what is it going to do? What is that guy thinking? We can't bust that. We may some day. He may do something that leads us to conclude he is going to do something else, but all that is circumstantial. That is not direct evidence.

Occasionally we get direct tactical evidence. When the State Department gets something like that, they close the embassy at that point, at that time, et cetera, et cetera.

Everybody is working on improving the intelligence. Of course, intelligence in general is moving very fast, particularly in technical things they can use. But I don't know of any intelligence yet that can pick Saddam Hussein's mind.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would just conclude by remarking on your statement that when a general officer was being confirmed by the Senate, that there was a condition to that confirmation that when he or she was posed a question and a request to proffer a personal opinion, that that would be the case. That might be an excellent practice to be expanded for all those who are confirmed by the Senate.

I reiterate my observation earlier about the opening statement by Chairman Smith regarding the request by Secretary Albright for fiscal year 2000 of \$1.4 billion, and noting that that did not occur. Again, I would just suggest that maybe in the future we should consider having someone from OMB to explain in detail this vetting process, if you will, and how we arrived here. I think it could be very informative and we could better understand the process and the problems within that process, at least from the perspective of the Congress.

I yield back. Thank you.

Admiral CROWE. It works well in Defense. You can see it right now working with the Chiefs of Staff. They have testified lately and they have been specifically asked about their personal views. I think it helps the Congress. Now that I am retired, I can say these kinds of things.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I noticed that once, whether it is retired Foreign Service officer or military, it seems we get a more ample perspective of what occurs.

Admiral CROWE. I just don't understand why.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Something about culture. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is ironic that in the 1950's our primary policy in the construction and placement of our embassies was such that we wanted to put them in high visibility areas. We wanted to showcase America, demonstrate to the world what democracy is all about. Maybe Mr. Carpenter can say that is still the policy or that has changed since the 1950's.

Then in the 1960's, there started to be terrorist acts, the Vietnam War situation, our own embassy there being attacked by terrorists. In the 1970's, it continued on. It led up to the taking of hostages in Tehran by terrorists in Iran.

Then in the 1980's, there was an attack on our embassy in Beirut, in Lebanon, and the Marine barracks also in Beirut that cost the lives of some 400 Marines, I believe, and also another attack by the embassy annex in Beirut in 1984. All this led up then to the Inman report, standards as to what are the problems attending the security and the safety of our embassies.

So what I meant, the fact that this is not a new situation, is that we in the aftermath of the Kenya and Tanzania Embassy bombings, I think Admiral Crowe, you stated quite correctly that we are now dealing with large vehicular bomb attacks. I believe this was also done during the Beirut attacks.

Admiral CROWE. It was.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And the Khobar Towers. I think we find one common element here in these embassy attacks in this 20-30 year period, in the fact they are done by terrorists. This seems to be the new public enemy number one now, not only in our own country, but certainly other nations of the world.

Admiral CROWE. A lot of those attacks were by local terrorists. Today we are facing international terrorists.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I understand that some of those attacks also had leads right into the Ayatollah and the Republic of Iran. This happened in the attacks where some 100 Jewish members were killed in Argentina, it led to Tehran. The bombings also in Lebanon also led to Tehran. So the question now is not even domestic.

My understanding now is we have the Islamic Republic of Iran with well over a \$250 million budget to train and to provide for terrorism outside the world. In fact, just the last year, there have been known 44 attempted assassinations of people outside of Iran done by the Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini.

The point I wanted to make is whether it be against military objects as well as embassies, the common denominator here is these are done by terrorists.

I wanted to ask, I think this question was alluded to earlier by Ms. McKinney from Georgia, but are we putting enough pressure on the host countries where our embassies are being built? Shouldn't that be a responsibility of the host country as well?

I know, Admiral Crowe, you mentioned our dealings with the British is par excellence. I don't think you can compare that to any industrialized country that can provide the intelligence and the security. But what about other Third World countries like in Africa and other parts of the world? What kind of pressure are we putting on the host country? Shouldn't they be responsible also for the security of our embassies abroad?

Mr. GEISLER. Well, with respect to Third World countries, Congressman, in a lot of cases these countries, it is not a question of will, it is a question of means, and no matter how much pressure you would put on these countries to do something, they are simply incapable of doing so. That is true in my own experience in embassies that I have served in Africa, for instance, where the host government just simply doesn't have the means to do that.

Admiral CROWE. So then the question arises, should you go there?

Mr. FALCOMA. I think you responded to that quite well, Mr. Crowe.

Admiral CROWE. From a security standpoint, you shouldn't. But that is not the State Department philosophy.

Mr. FALCOMA. I think also, Mr. Geisler, you did address that issue, that we should not withdraw our embassies because of these problems that we are faced with. But I think that also leads to the next question. Even though we all admit to the fact that there is no 100 percent guarantee of safety, anywhere, even if I were to walk across the street of a 4-way stoplight, there is no guarantee that I would be safe crossing that stoplight.

But I think the question that now comes as an issue is how intensive should be our training program as far as security? I made a statement earlier; it is not the construction aspects, it is the security aspects in terms of training, in terms of resources, in terms of how the personnel in these embassies are being provided for.

I notice, Admiral Crowe, in your report, that you mention something to the effect that on a collective basis, the Congress and the Administration have performed poorly in the past 10 years in providing this kind of safety or security measures for our embassies.

Mr. Geisler, I think you agreed with that assessment.

Mr. GEISLER. Oh, absolutely, sir. We think the training should be widespread, and in particular it should include the senior management in the embassies.

I sent out a worldwide message in August asking people how they felt about security where they are, what were the issues they were facing, because the reports that were coming back to the State Department were from the security professionals in the field as opposed to the rank and file.

One of the things I found out was that people felt they had not been adequately trained, and there was a system of regular drills at posts for things like ensuring that the emergency radio net was operational, that everybody knew how to operate it, et cetera, et cetera.

I also had people tell me that when there is a fire drill and the ambassador doesn't show up in the parking lot, that sends them a stronger message than any memo that the regional security officer could put out about the importance of safety.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I know that many of our embassies, ambassador residences, are about 10 miles away from our embassies. Do you consider that a security risk? Is it OK for our embassies to be separated from the residences of our ambassadors overseas? Is that a good program to continue?

I know this for a fact, for example, in the Philippines. If there was to be a terrorist attack on our embassy in the Philippines and the ambassador is separated at his residence, there is no way I could possibly see how the ambassador is going to take the leadership in telling the people there at the compound what to do or where to go or how to proceed as far as any safety or security problems may arise.

I don't think the Philippine Embassy is the only one. I think several of our major embassies are in that kind of a situation. Admiral Crowe?

Admiral CROWE. Ambassadors often live some distance from the embassies. I am not so sure that is a problem. Building residences for ambassadors close to the embassy is a very, very difficult challenge. Now, if we were to move the embassies out and build residences, we could solve that problem easily. To just move in and live off the economy and find a place for the ambassador, it is very unlikely you will find it near, although it is not totally unprecedented. Several of our embassies have it. In fact, in Spain, the ambassador's house is attached to the embassy. When we build new embassies, we can correct that problem.

But you are right. Every one of these residences, no matter where it is, is a security risk.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And prime areas for hostage taking.

Admiral CROWE. They would like to kill the ambassador, but it is only one person. These people want to really wreak some havoc.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You also mentioned, Admiral Crowe, in your statement, that our intelligence systems just did not work.

Admiral CROWE. I didn't say that.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You didn't say they did not work—

Admiral CROWE. I don't think there is any intelligence system capable of doing what we want, and that is giving complete and absolute intelligence, every day, of what is going to happen. That is not possible in today's environment.

I didn't say it didn't work. I think it worked pretty well. But the problem is that people have anticipations and expectations for their intelligence system that are unrealistic. It just can't solve all of our problems.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What would you suggest, Admiral Crowe? You have assessed that as something that there was no immediate—

Admiral CROWE. We suggested the coordination must be better. We did find a problem there. But I have had a lot of experience relying and not relying on intelligence. I am talking about my military experience now. The commander always wants the intelligence officer to tell him exactly what is going on, and it is a luxury the

commander cannot have. The commander has to take some risks on his own. He puts together the best picture he has and makes the decision. If he waits to get perfect intelligence, he will never make a decision.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Two years ago we had discussed the Inman standards, if you will, about what we needed to do as far as security is concerned, so then the Khobar incident comes up in terms of what measures were taken. Did they comply with the Inman standards? Did you find, Admiral Crowe, that the Inman standards still apply today, or should there be improvements, or is it just our lag or to execute some of the Inman standards for today?

Admiral CROWE. I think, first of all, it is necessary to understand that the Inman report made some suggestions, but a great deal has taken place since the Inman report. For example, the most important condition of all is standoff. The Inman report did not recommend a certain standoff distance. But as a result of the Inman report, and the more thinking done about it, the State Department developed a guideline which required standoff distance. So there are a lot of conditions we are talking about today that didn't come out of the Inman report.

Of course, the main thing the Inman report recommended was you build new embassies and you generate an embassy that is safer and takes advantage of modern technology. We didn't do that. We built a few, but the money just spiked and disappeared, plateaued. That was the end of that.

Now, we would like our report not to have that happen. I am not optimistic about this, but we would like very much to see our report not just go down the tubes.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So the bottom line really, gentlemen, in terms of the dialog and our assessment and our discussion here, is the fact that no embassy now is safe. There is no critical factor saying one is critical and one is less critical than the other.

Admiral CROWE. You can say some are safer than others.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Right.

Admiral CROWE. And we don't have a recommendation. Even if all our recommendations were fulfilled that would not guarantee our embassies are not going to be attacked. To make an embassy invulnerable is probably impossible. To make it safer, that is possible.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I have several questions, but I will reduce them to just one. I do thank you for your time you have spent with us today.

Admiral, in your recommendations, you point out that the U.S. response to the August bombings was resourceful, often heroic. However, in the absence of significant training and contingency planning to deal with mass casualties and major destruction from terrorist bombs, the response was occasionally chaotic and marred by a host of planning and logistical failures, especially in the area of military transportation.

You point out the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) arrived in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam about 40 hours after the bombings, having experienced delays of 13 hours. There was disjointed liaison between the State Department as the lead agency and the

Defense Department, FBI, and other agencies. The personnel selection of the FESTs was ad hoc and not ideal. Medical and other emergency equipment was not always available and ready for shipment.

Do you have recommendations to remedy that? You did say in this recommendation that State ought to look into commercial aircraft leasing. Do you think that is something that ought to be done, and any other recommendations you think ought to be looked into?

Admiral CROWE. We argued for quite some time as to how much detail our recommendations should be in telling the State Department how to organize its business, but we were concerned about the organization, and the recommendation you read was one of the main ones we made. We also suggested that these kinds of teams be prepared and be chosen ahead of time, not ad hoc, and that some training be given to them.

It is my view that having done that and talked to the people in State, that that is going to be taken seriously.

As I understand the mechanics of our report we submitted in early January, the Secretary of State has 3 months to consider the recommendations and act on them or not act on them as she sees fit, and then to inform the Congress what her approach is. So I don't know quite how that will come out. But my informal view right now from talking to State is they were very taken with that recommendation and State will do something very serious about that.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Admiral Crowe or Mr. Geisler, do you have anything else to add?

I do want to thank you very much for your testimony, especially for the good service you provide to our people overseas. This report, I think, is the catalyst that will make the difference in helping all of us. It is the blueprint. We do thank you for your service.

Admiral CROWE. I find that very encouraging, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. GEISLER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SMITH. I would like to ask our second witness if he would approach the witness table. He is David G. Carpenter, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and the Director of the Office of Foreign Missions.

Mr. Carpenter is a 26-year veteran of the U.S. Secret Service. He retired from the Secret Service in January 1998 as a Special Agent in charge of the Washington Field Office. Mr. Carpenter was previously the Deputy Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, which followed his assignment as the Special Agent in charge of the Presidential Protective Division. Secretary Carpenter's other assignments included tours of duty in Phoenix, Arizona, and Los Angeles, California, as well as permanent assignments to protective details with Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Bush, and President Clinton.

In addition, Secretary Carpenter served as Special Agent in charge of numerous Secret Service details assigned to kings, queens, and foreign heads of state. Mr. Carpenter was sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and Director of the Office of Foreign Missions on August 11, 1998.

A native of Denver, he received his BA in personnel management from Oklahoma State University.

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Carpenter, welcome. We look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. CARPENTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CARPENTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to participate in this hearing on the very important subject of securing American personnel serving overseas. I request that my written statement be entered into the record.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, your statement will be made part of the record.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would like to summarize, time permitting, the essence of my statement. I realize that time may be a factor here, and I am particularly interested in answering the questions of the Committee. But I will try to be brief, if that is OK.

Mr. SMITH. We are not in a hurry, but please proceed. Be as extensive as you would like.

Mr. CARPENTER. Thank you. By law, the Secretary of State is charged with the protection of all U.S. Government personnel on official duty abroad and their accompanying dependents. This is a solemn responsibility and Secretary Albright has made clear she has no higher priority. I would like to start by giving you a snapshot of the security environment affecting U.S. diplomatic interests.

The terrorist threat is global, lethal, multidimensional and growing. Our analysts estimate that during the past 12 months, there were over 2,400 threats or incidents against U.S. interests overseas. Their estimate for the same period a year ago is approximately 1,150 such threats or incidents. This is an increase of over 100 percent in the past year.

The threat is generated by indigenous terrorists and transnational anti-American groups and by state sponsors of terrorism. The Bin Laden organization has been the primary generator of threat information, and appears to be the most dangerous threat to U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel overseas.

Over 650 threats have been linked to this organization or to the East African bombing since August 1998. This truly transnational organization reportedly has a presence in over 25 countries and its tentacles may spread to many more.

During the past decade, prior to the tragic August 7th bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, all of the attacks against U.S. interests involved indigenous terrorist elements. While we were aware of threats from external terrorist groups, none ever materialized. The August 7th bombings demonstrated the existence of a global terrorist organization capable of and intent on attacking U.S. diplomatic targets. All our posts are now considered at risk and we need to take a comprehensive security approach.

Global or regional networks may strike where we are most vulnerable, not just in their home areas. In this environment, no system of post-by-post assessment can be perfect. However, in an effort to improve the threat assessment process, we have broadened our existing threat criteria to better assess the threats posed by

transnational terrorism, especially threats from global terrorist networks.

In addition to the threat ratings, we now factor in the vulnerability of all our posts to terrorist attacks, and under this new approach all posts should meet a high level of protection against acts of terrorism and political violence.

I would now like to share with you some of the steps the Department is taking to develop a comprehensive and long-term strategy to deal with this challenging environment.

We know that there is no such thing as perfect security. However, with these measures, our goal is to deter and to diminish the effects of possible actions to the best of our abilities. Thanks to the Congress' bipartisan support for the fiscal year 1999 emergency security appropriation, the Department of State has deployed over 120 Diplomatic Security Service (DS) special agents overseas on temporary duty; enhanced physical security with vehicle barriers, video cameras with recording devices and other security measures; worked with local governments to close or change traffic patterns in several cities; increased local guards by over 1,000 around the world; acquired or placed under contract properties to increase setback at five posts; and expanded our crisis management training program dramatically, both at home and overseas.

Immediately following the bombings in East Africa, we conducted a top-to-bottom review of the security posture of all of our diplomatic facilities around the world. The seven interagency ESAT teams we deployed recommended relocating 19 of 32 posts surveyed, mainly because of the lack of adequate setback needed to mitigate the effects of an explosive blast.

We continue to dispatch DS security augmentation teams and mobil training teams around the globe to augment security and provide training to our personnel.

We have initiated a Global Surveillance Detection Program which is up and running at 90 posts. Also in place is mandatory security inspections of all vehicles entering overseas facilities, regardless of the post threat level.

The key to the success of our security programs, however, is trained and experienced professionals who can provide essential management and leadership. Overseas, for example, State Department special agents, referred to as regional security officers, serve as the Chief of Mission's principal adviser on all security matters, and are responsible for the protection of life and classified information for all U.S. agencies, their employees, and families at posts.

Typically the RSO manages the security program that includes a vast network of physical and technical security measures, Marine security guards, a local guard program, security and counterintelligence briefings, and a broad criminal and personnel investigative program. They also administer the anti-terrorism assistance training for foreign police and do liaison with host government security.

At the majority of our missions, the RSO is the primary liaison official with host government security and law enforcement officials, gaining investigative and security support for U.S. initiatives and investigations on behalf of not only DS but of other Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies. The relationships developed through this work are vital whenever assistance from the host

government is needed to respond to threats against our people and facilities.

All the funding we use to provide security-related things could well be wasted if we don't have a significant number of well-trained DS agents and other security professionals to oversee and manage our security programs. Thanks to the supplemental appropriation, we are hiring and training 200 new diplomatic security agents in fiscal year 1999, as well as 17 security engineers, 34 security technicians, and 20 diplomatic couriers. DS has established 140 new special agent positions overseas, 75 to be assigned this year, and the remaining 65 in 2000.

Overall, we will hire and train an additional 391 employees, which include the new DS special agents as well as critical technicians, construction project managers, support specialists and security inspectors.

To maintain the security enhancements already funded and respond to the threat conditions I outlined earlier, we must continue to receive sufficient intake of security and support personnel in future years. We are requesting a total of \$268 million in fiscal year 2000 to fund the recurring costs of the programs, which I just outlined. We must strive to improve security over the long term, not to provide just a temporary fix. Without funding the recurring costs of continuing support to sustain our initial investment, these programs will not remain viable.

In addition, we hope that Congress will resist the move to take back part of the emergency appropriation to fund an unrelated supplemental to respond to Hurricane Mitch, as deserving as that may be on its own merits. The needs, however, go far beyond providing physical security enhancements and additional staffing to our existing facilities. We are now confronting an unprecedented level of credible security threats from those with transnational capabilities. Over 80 percent of our embassies and consulates have less than a 100-foot setback from the street and many are in desperate need of greater security improvements.

In Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, we are moving ahead with efforts to permanently replace the bombed structures. We have begun a model embassy project to determine what our embassies in East Africa should look like, seeking to improve efficiency, reduce the number of employees and others exposed to potential violence, and identify the resources needed to protect those who remain.

As we build new facilities, both here and elsewhere, we will tailor them to the conclusions from this project.

The fiscal year 1999 emergency security appropriation also provides \$185 million in funding for post relocation, site acquisition, design and construction for some of our highest risk posts. We are working on several posts with these funds. Since the funds became available, we have acquired land in Doha and have started construction of interim facilities. We have made substantial progress toward acquiring four more sites.

Next month the Secretary will be sending you a report on the Department's actions taken in response to the Accountability Review Boards' recommendations. The Accountability Review Boards' investigation of the bombing incidents in East Africa concluded that the Department must "undertake a comprehensive and long-

term strategy for protecting American officials overseas, including sustained funding for enhanced security measures, for long-term costs for increased personnel, and for a capital building program based on an assessment of requirements to meet the new range of global terrorist threats.”

The Department agrees with virtually all of the Boards’ recommendations and is taking a very careful look at how each can be implemented. To finance the construction costs for these projects and pursue the long-term sustained security-driven capital building program recommended by the ARB report, the Department is seeking a fiscal year 2000 appropriation as well as an advanced appropriation totaling \$3 billion for fiscal year 2001 through 2005. The advanced appropriation will enable the Department to begin to fund site acquisition, design, and construction of new facilities at our highest risk posts.

Last month, President Clinton told the joint congressional leadership that he is looking forward to working together on this issue, and Secretary Albright has affirmed that she is looking forward to working with the Congress as part of that dialog.

With the funding provided by the emergency security appropriation, State has established a high-level panel to review overseas presence. This panel has begun its work this week and is slated to conclude in early summer. It is chaired by Lewis Kaden, a prominent New York attorney, and includes distinguished representatives from the private sector and government, including Admiral Crowe. The panel’s mandate is to look at the level and type of representation required abroad to carry out America’s foreign policy interests, given resource constraints, advances in technology, and the worldwide security situation. This will include a close look at the idea of regional embassies and the tradeoffs entailed in such an approach.

The panel will also recommend criteria for reshaping our missions overseas to maximize effectiveness and security, the outline of a multiyear funding program for construction and related costs to achieve those ends.

Again, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing and for you and your colleagues’ support for the protection of our personnel overseas and the security needs of the Department of State and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

I have brought with me Assistant Secretary Patrick Kennedy and his deputy, Patsy Thomasson from FBO, to help better inform you on these issues.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Welcome to the Committee.

In Admiral Crowe’s report, it points out that the Board did find an institutional failure of the Department of State and embassies under its direction to recognize threats posed by transnational terrorism and vehicle bombs worldwide. Policymakers and operational officers were remiss in not preparing more comprehensive procedures to guard against massive truck bombs. This, combined with lack of resources for building more secure facilities, created the ingredients for a deadly disaster.

You have heard in the earlier panel some of the suggestions and comments that I and my colleagues made on both sides of the aisle with regard to what we construe to be an inadequate request for fiscal year 2000. I saw on the wire last night, and that is why I had it in my opening statement, it was reported that Secretary Albright had asked for the full \$1.4 billion. Can you confirm or deny if that is the case? That would be helpful.

If you could enlighten us further on the process that the OMB plays in cutting a budget? It seems to me, and I think it seems to my friends on this side of the aisle as well, if there is one priority we have to address, it is the protection of our people overseas. I think Mr. Geisler gave excellent testimony and pointed out that, while there is an inherent risk in a posting overseas, when all that possible is not done is done, it raises very serious questions about our commitment, and that goes for Congress as well.

So if you could speak to the issue of fiscal year 2000. If you could also speak to the issue of any rescission that may be contemplated to provide for Hurricane Mitch, whether or not any of that money will come out of or is intended to come out of the security money that was just provided in fiscal year 1999?

Mr. CARPENTER. If I may speak to the last part first, the reduction that we are led to believe will come out of our emergency appropriation would amount to approximately \$70 million. Needless to say, we would very much like to not lose that amount of money.

On your previous questions, let me start by making a statement, if I may, and then turn you to Mr. Kennedy for a little bit more discussion.

I have been in the Federal Government for approximately 27 years, most of it with the Secret Service. During that period of time, I knew one thing about the budget: It is very, very complicated, and the process is one that, quite frankly, in some ways baffles me. I am not a budgeteer. I am a security professional. To that end, my comments about the budget could be somewhat misleading and Mr. Kennedy can take it from there.

But I would like to make one statement. As a security professional, the threat that we are facing could not be more real, could not be more serious and has a need for an immediate addressal. To that end, the problem is now, and we need to start addressing it now. Going back to Admiral Crowe's testimony, that is my personal comment on this. I am sure Assistant Secretary Kennedy can carry it further.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt in either the Secretary's mind or in my mind or in the minds of other senior leadership of the Department that if we had more funds available, we could put those funds to absolutely excellent use providing for greater security of our embassies abroad.

That said, the budget process of the United States—and I am not attempting to give such a distinguished panel civics lesson 101—but as you know, it is a process. The State Department looks at its requirements. It projects its needs and it considers all of the challenges such as the one that Dave has put forward. It submits them to OMB.

OMB must reconcile multiple priorities across the needs of the Federal Government, including veterans' affairs and defense af-

fairs. It has to take due cognizance of such items as the budget caps, and therefore has to arrive at an overall President's budget that takes into consideration that multiplicity of priorities across the entire range that the Federal Government engages in overseas and domestically.

Could we use more funds? Absolutely. Is the budget process a real process that attempts to weigh competing needs? Absolutely. Could we spend those funds adequately if those funds were made available to us? Absolutely.

Going back to a point of several of the panel today, in addition to needing more funds now, we also need that long-term commitment envisioned in the President's budget request in terms of a multi-year commitment. The problem is not going to go away with what we do this year. No matter how many funds you give to us, the problem is so large and the threats against us are so pervasive from the new multinational terrorist organizations, we need assistance now and we need a long-term sustained commitment which will allow the State Department to stand up to its mission to become the platform for all U.S. Government agencies overseas.

And I will close with one point: that the State Department constitutes only about one-third of the U.S. Government employees occupying any of our embassies abroad, and therefore when money is appropriated by the Congress to enable myself and Patsy to build safe and secure embassies, we are building them to help the Department of Agriculture promote its trade and the Department of Commerce promote its activities, the Social Security Administration, Veterans Administration and the Department of Defense.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Kennedy, let me follow up on that. The top man for security who spent his entire life devoted to protecting, from Presidents to other dignitaries, has made a very passionate and persuasive case about the risk. In his written statement he says: We are now confronting an unprecedented level of credible security threats from those with transnational capabilities. Over 80 percent of our embassies and consulates have less than a 100-foot setback from the street and many are in desperate need of greater security improvement.

I would note as the process ensues with the Hurricane Mitch supplemental on the House side, I am informed that the Chairman of the State Department Committee has no offsets, does not seek to take any of the money out of security, but it is on the Senate side where that \$70 million in terms of offset is contemplated, and hopefully that can be ironed out so none of the money comes from security.

Mr. KENNEDY. We certainly appreciate the support that you and Chairman Rogers have given us over the years.

Mr. SMITH. Can you give us a number in fiscal year 2000—and again you heard Mr. Geisler state so eloquently that there is not a single penny for construction funds in fiscal year 2000. I have been in Congress for 19 years. I know the routine: next year, next year. Next year doesn't always come. There is always some priority that crowds out what was a priority while the smoke was still clearing from a bombing or some other mishap or terrorist activity. This is, I believe, priority number one. Can you provide us with a number so we can responsibly go forward with it?

Mr. KENNEDY. Admiral Crowe in his testimony mentioned a figure of \$650 million as part of a ramp-up to a larger program in the future. And I feel very comfortable in saying if we had \$650 million for construction in fiscal year 2000, we would be able to put those funds to good use, provided of course that they are not being offset against other ongoing State Department and function 150 programs.

The testimony before this Subcommittee last week talked about all of the other activities the State Department must engage in, protecting the welfare of American citizens abroad through our consular services. We could use those funds, but those would have to be incremental funding. I don't see any kind of a tradeoff where we could take a budget that has come down over the last several years and find that chunk of money.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just reiterate, when the Secretary of State asks for the money, when the very distinguished American Admiral Crowe asks for the money, when the top security man who has made it his life wants the maximum, and you have pointed out what the absorption capability is for State to actually use the money, who is in charge? Who is making the decisions that the money won't be available in fiscal year 2000?

Mr. KENNEDY. As I said earlier—

Mr. SMITH. I know that it is a process.

Mr. KENNEDY. It is a process, Mr. Chairman, of the executive branch balancing out all of the requirements across a wide range, consonant with the balanced budget agreement, which is a joint executive-legislative agreement that sets a level, and then arraying all of the priorities of the U.S. Government against that, and it is a process and I don't know what else—I wish I could be more creative.

Mr. SMITH. The President says he wants 650, and you have no argument from us. We will be tripping over each other to make sure that the money is provided, though there may be some speed bump somewhere. If we lose one more life or have one more injury, knowing the need we have not adequately addressed, then we are culpable and we should be held accountable by the widows and the families of those who might lose their lives.

This is the opportunity to say that we front-loaded some of the money last time. There was an immediate response, but often with the executive and legislative branch; we deal with a crisis and move on and then we forget that there was a crisis. That is why I think the sustainability of the funding over a 10-year cycle with no gaps is so important.

We are on the same side. We are both talking to the choir, but we have to make sure that it happens. But I would hope at the highest level, and certainly the President gets no higher, would weigh in very forcefully. At this point I will yield to Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me concur with the sentiments that you just expressed. You are so absolutely right about next year, next year. I am a Boston Red Sox fan, and we have been talking about next year since 1918.

Your testimony, Mr. Carpenter, was very instructive and very informative, and there is obviously unanimity of opinion regarding the desperate need at this point in time. I indicated earlier when

I made an opening statement about listening on C-SPAN to the testimony of Director Tenet. I don't think that there is any disagreement that we have presently and currently many Americans who are serving abroad at risk. And the Chairman is right. I think we will be tripping over each other in an attempt to set aside a discrete amount of money, that \$1.4 billion, and it has to be found without offsetting dollars from the Department of State budget.

This has to be a national priority, and I think that the testimony in the past 2 days has really informed not just Members of this Subcommittee and Members of Congress, but also the American people about the needs. You are to be commended for that.

Let me inquire whether there have been some successes. We are always informed to the losses and to the tragedies that occur, but have there been attacks or assaults on embassies that have been intercepted or disrupted through the efforts of the American Government and specifically your agency? And if so, how many and what are the timeframes?

Mr. CARPENTER. Thank you very much for asking that question. The reality is that there have been a lot of successes. There is a very good story to tell, at least in the short term.

The money that was given to us as a result of the emergency supplemental has allowed us to reduce the security vulnerability of our posts overseas dramatically. In some locations we have been able to buy adjacent properties, thus giving us the setback that we are in such need of. We have installed equipment barriers. We have closed streets with the cooperation of host governments to ensure that that setback, which was lacking prior to the August 7th bombings, exists.

We are continuing to work with local host government authorities to better develop our security programs in and around our embassies. We are training those personnel to bring them up to reasonable levels where they can actually perform a real service for us out there. We are working with the intelligence community around the world. There have been disruptions. Some have been in the papers, some have not. Arrests have been made where there was reason to believe that the persons arrested were involved in some sort of an action toward our embassies. This is an ongoing process.

The downside to all of this, or the thing that bothers me the most, is that the things that we have been able to do on the back of this emergency supplemental may not be able to be sustained long-term.

We are already starting to see where host governments who were very cooperative in the aftermath of the August 7 bombings in closing streets, allowing things to be done, giving us large numbers of security personnel and/or military personnel to cordon off our embassies, are starting to remove the barriers and pull back their people and thus diminishing our security posture. The further we get away from August 7, the more of this we are going to see and that leaves me very uncomfortable.

We are trying to replace, to the degree that we can, host government support with DS agents in a training capacity to work better with our local guards to bring them up to a level that they are providing a better service. I mentioned that we have a surveillance de-

tection program at 90 posts, and growing daily, that gives us eyes out beyond the walls, and in some cases behind.

We continue to pursue opportunities to purchase adjacent properties, realizing that even with a building program it will take 2 to 3 years for that building to be replaced. So we are going to have to defend ourselves for some time at least in the near future.

But there have been a lot of successes. We are working very hard. It is my personal opinion that one of the reasons and a primary reason that we have not had another embassy blown up or attacked is the fact of what we have done with the money given to us by you people. We very much appreciate that. We could not have defended ourselves had we not gotten that money, and I personally thank you for that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think that is extremely telling testimony that but for what we did, there may have been attacks since the bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. And I think that, for me, is not just persuasive but conclusive as to what the responsibility of not just this Subcommittee but this Congress ought to be, because we have to maintain that momentum that seems to have developed as a result of that emergency appropriation. I look forward to working with the Chairman in making sure that this happens.

I should also note that in my previous life I happened to be a district attorney, State's attorney in the greater Boston area, and worked with your Department, Secretary Carpenter, and I want to compliment the professionalism. We were able to secure the apprehension of a fugitive who was convicted of first degree murder with the assistance of your personnel in Guiana.

Mr. CARPENTER. Thank you very much. I am honored to work with some very professional, dedicated personnel, not only in DS but in the Bureau of Administration and FBO, and all of those people have made this possible. We are a combined effort, and I must say that it is taxing us to a maximum at this point.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, could I add one thing? You asked about a success story. If I might add one small one.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would like to hear from everybody as far as success stories.

Mr. KENNEDY. Two weeks ago in a central Asian capital, a series of bomb blasts rocked that city. These were not directed at the U.S. Government, but dissident elements within that government. After a small explosion, a number of local nationals started to rush toward the windows. Several of the Americans there having received training and advice from the State Department subsequent to August 7, ordered them away from the windows, ordered them into the interior corridors and told them to get down. Subsequent bombs went off and blew out most of the windows in the building. There were no American or foreign national injuries within our building. And the thickened Mylar that we had used, though it shattered, kept the shards from flying throughout the building.

So the steps that we have taken are by no means perfect. The Admiral is correct. Hardened windows may be the solution if the building will take them structurally, but interim steps plus training using the funds that you have provided, made a big difference that day as well.

Mr. DELAHUNT. One more question, Mr. Chairman, or one more request; and I don't know whether this is feasible or not, but again in terms of the tax dollar which has been saved as a result of this appropriation, I don't know if it is possible to assess or evaluate or to calculate—and again put aside the tragic human loss that might have occurred—but just again if it is feasible or calculable, what would have been the costs?

Mr. KENNEDY. We will see, working with our colleagues, if we can come up with a figure that at least has some metes and bounds to it, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Because I think that gains even more perspective. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Tancredo from Colorado.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

This is very instructive, perhaps because I am a freshman Member of Congress and therefore new to the Committee, but the background was very, very interesting. I must admit as I sit here and listen, I keep thinking about the extent to which we can actually accomplish the ultimate goal, and that is to make every embassy around the world a secure place for our employees and for the surrounding populace. And it does appear to me to be perhaps an impossible goal.

That is to say, even if we were to do every single thing that has been suggested, provide all of the dollars that have been requested, that we could not in fact ensure that American citizens could be safe from the kind of terrorist attack that we know can occur any time, any place, even if it is in the proximity of the embassy but in surrounding areas where Americans congregate.

Therefore, you have to start thinking about what is the next step or what can we possibly do to minimize the risk, and if dollars are hard to come by, how do you prioritize those dollars? If you come to the conclusion that there is no perfect way to make this a secure environment, then you have to say, "Is there a better way to spend the money?"

And although I certainly agree with my colleagues and I am happy to hear of the success stories that you have given, but we must actually, I think, being responsible individuals on our side of the table—what if you put the \$650 million or \$1.4 billion, what if you added that to the budget that would go for enhanced intelligence operations so as to perhaps prevent the initiation of such an attack? How can we balance these things? It is extremely difficult, of course, and I guess I am asking for your help in doing that. As a freshman Member of both the Committee and the Congress, how do I balance that out?

Mr. CARPENTER. I think that is a very good question. My personal opinion, and my professional opinion, is that this is not an impossible goal. We can keep Americans safe overseas. We can improve the structures in which Americans work and live overseas. We can upgrade the security. A hundred percent is never going to be obtainable in any environment. It is not obtainable domestically and it is much more difficult to even approach that overseas. But we can reduce the risk. We can mitigate the threats that are being made against us.

There are techniques. There are security measures that can be taken to reduce, if not eliminate, but greatly reduce the threats to our people overseas. One of the principles we are trying to apply and spend the \$1.4 billion we received in the supplemental in the event that we do have another attack, how are we best equipped to reduce the casualties? Also, how do we make ourselves look bigger and how do we do a better job professionally? All of this works.

When I was in the Secret Service, people would constantly say to me, "Isn't it true if someone really wanted to kill the President, they could do it?" Well, my answer was, "I wouldn't be a very good Secret Service agent and I don't think you would want me to be your Secret Service agent if I said yes to that question."

I truly believe that we can beat this. I truly believe that it takes the help of you all to supply the funds to do it. But I think it is defeatable.

I think that one of the principles here—

Mr. TANCREDO. What is defeatable? We can actually stop the attack on the embassy itself? We can reduce the number of people that are injured in the eventuality of such an attack, and in doing that one thing you immediately would encourage the people who are adversaries, once they see that that has been accomplished, the compound has been made secure, they will look at where we are vulnerable. Aren't we just kind of shifting the focus?

Mr. CARPENTER. I don't believe so. I think as Admiral Crowe said, the secondary targets out there on August 7 continue to be out there. What we are doing, by making an embassy secure, is not increasing targets, but taking a huge target off the map. That is our goal here.

It appears to be, in at least the reportings, that this is an organization, the Bin Laden group, that is intent on mass destructions. To pick off a person here or there doesn't appear to be their MO at this point. That is not to say that we are not very concerned with our employees overseas. With the emergency supplemental we are buying armored vehicles for our chiefs of mission and we are buying lightly armored vehicles for other personnel in the embassy. We are dealing with those in a very reasonable, responsible manner. We are never going to 100 percent do away with this, but I think we are greatly reducing our vulnerabilities.

I think what is at least partly key to your question is this is not just a State Department effort. While we are doing our best to be defensive, the intelligence community is working very hard to stop this in an offensive way. There are elements out there that are actively pursuing the people who we are defending against. So it is not like we can hunker down and expect to survive this. We need an offensive capability to stop these people and do away with them. The thing that is perhaps most disturbing, if Bin Laden were captured today, I am confident that this is going to continue. This is a cause. This is not one individual here, clearly.

But I assure you that there are a lot of elements that come into play that are working on this and trying to resolve it.

Mr. TANCREDO. As there must be and as has been indicated, that must be the case or else we would have seen far more incidents of this nature. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Secretary Carpenter for his fine statement at this morning's hearing. I notice that in the \$1.4 billion supplemental appropriations that we are trying to provide for the two embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, that \$627 million has been allocated for security and maintenance. What was our budget allocation before the bombing incidents in Tanzania and Kenya?

Mr. CARPENTER. As you see the papers being thumbed through, we will have to get back to you on that.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My good friend from Massachusetts said, next year, next year, next year. We are all of a sudden reacting to the given crisis that happened in these two African countries. But my curiosity, Mr. Chairman, we have always been pleading with the Administration, not just this Administration, also the previous Administration, security has been one of the deepest concerns. Now we are hearing if we had more money we could do a better job. For last year, what was the budget allocation for security and maintenance prior to the bombings?

Mr. KENNEDY. Sir, if I can split that into two pieces, the appropriation for an account that you see in the President's congressional budget called security and maintenance of buildings abroad was \$403 million for fiscal year 1999.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And the year before that?

Mr. KENNEDY. The year before that it was about \$380 million, but that is for security and maintenance, which includes leasing of properties overseas. Of that portion, physical security upgrades, meaning improvements to the actual structure of the building, is about \$17.8 million for fiscal year 1999. There is a construction security element of another \$17.4 million. And so the actual physical security part is probably under \$50 million for security upgrades to actual buildings and structures.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What was the total cost of the building of our embassy in Moscow? Wasn't it \$400 million alone?

Mr. KENNEDY. The building is \$240 million, but that is a very special building, built to technical security standards, and we only build that kind of a building in two places in the world. The building in Nairobi, Kenya will not be built to that kind of security defense.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And we are absolutely secure in Moscow as far as intelligence is concerned?

Mr. KENNEDY. I was out there in January and I watched them do extraordinary things that, off-line, I will discuss the special security parameters that we take in some place like Moscow.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Secretary Carpenter, you mentioned on an annual basis we have 2,400 terrorist threats every year?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Any particular region where it seems more than another? I would rather talk in regional terms than specifically in countries. Do we get more threats in Southeast Asia or Africa or the Middle East? Where do the 2,400 threats come from primarily?

Mr. CARPENTER. It is difficult to quantify in a given year where the majority would originate. It is not a static type of—

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It is a moving target?

Mr. CARPENTER. It is constantly moving. I would say that the Middle East has been particularly problematic, or was, prior to the August 7 bombings. I can say, without any hesitation, that since then the African continent has probably generated the majority of our threat information, but that is not to exclude any continent from having received threats during this past year.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I noticed in your statement, you mentioned that this money going to be provided is to provide additional training for 200 diplomatic security agents. How are they different from our secret agents which work abroad? Are they particularly just for the State Department, or is this part of the secret agents that come out of Treasury? I get a little confused. Who is working for whom and what?

Mr. CARPENTER. I would love an opportunity to see you and explain it in depth.

Diplomatic Security has two sides. One side is the investigative side. We have 19 field offices here in the country, which is where our agents learn their trade and learn to do criminal investigations. They go overseas as assistant regional security officers or regional security officers at the embassies. They are in charge of the security, they are the adviser to the Chief of Mission on all security issues.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Before any State Department employee goes to work in a foreign country, are they all given training not just for purposes of passing classified materials, are they all given instructions about security?

Mr. CARPENTER. Absolutely. The diplomatic security agents go to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia for, I believe, 9 weeks when they first come on the job. Then they come back here to Washington and we have our own training center in Dunn Loring, Virginia, which gives them training more specific to the Department of State.

Mr. KENNEDY. I might add, sir, that every Foreign Service person who is going abroad attends a 2-day course at the Foreign Service Institute, which is called the Security Overseas Seminar, which addresses the context of how to be safe abroad. So we do special work for the security professionals and then we have again a special 2-day seminar for everyone else.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I think what I am trying to get at is the fact that this \$627 million for security and maintenance seems to be on an increase from the previous 2 years. Do you suppose there would have never been an increase if the incident in Africa had not occurred as far as the proposed budgeting by the State Department?

Mr. CARPENTER. That is a difficult question to answer.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Let me ask you, suppose two more embassies are bombed, in East Asia or Africa or some other region of the world, what would be the response again? Have another commission again to do another Crowe report about the safety and another increase of our budgeting? I am sorry, I didn't mean to cut you off. Could you respond to that, Secretary?

Mr. CARPENTER. I have not allowed myself to even think in those terms. My focus has been on making sure what you just described as a potential does not happen.

However, to go back to your first question, I was sworn in on the 11th of August. Prior to my confirmation by the Senate, in looking at diplomatic security and its staffing, it was my strong indication prior to the bombings that DS has no bench. In other words, they are manpower poor compared to the Secret Service which is about 2,000. There are only 800 DS agents, far less than required to do the job.

I would have been making perhaps the same strong statements here had those bombings not occurred. DS does not have enough people. They responded—they posted when they needed to after the bombings, but it severely taxed our abilities to continue to do the work that is assigned to us.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And added to your problems, Mr. Secretary, the limitations of the intelligence capabilities in these embassies are far less than in any given condition; am I correct on that?

Mr. CARPENTER. The intelligence information that we receive, the veracity and the sources of it, are very hard sometimes to analyze. It does not make our job any easier, certainly.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Basically, Mr. Secretary, you are given a bicycle to do very serious work, and it is work that requires a Cadillac, but you are given a bicycle to operate under; this is basically the kind of thing that you are under pressure to do?

Mr. CARPENTER. It is a good bicycle but it is a bicycle.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A lot of the writing about how to make our embassies more secure focused on a necessary setback, Mr. Secretary. I believe you said a 40-foot setback? Is that about right?

Mr. CARPENTER. The standard that was developed after the Inman Commission was a 100-foot setback on all four sides.

Mr. SHERMAN. In many places the only way to achieve that is to close down the existing embassy, since in many of the capitals there isn't a piece of land large enough to accomplish that kind of setback, really, to move out to the suburbs, to build what could be a beautiful new embassy with a 100-foot setback, and that of course creates not only a high cost, but a great inconvenience for those doing business with the U.S. Embassy.

I wonder whether there is a way to achieve most or all of the benefits of a setback in a far less aesthetically pleasing manner, and that would be through the construction of some sort of barrier or wall, thick and steel-reinforced above and below the ground, maybe a series of walls, so that in a space of 10 or 20 feet, one could obtain the same blast resistance that 100 feet of empty space would achieve?

Mr. CARPENTER. Well, you mentioned a number of things. One, as we have tasked our missions overseas, those that have no setback now, to look at alternate locations where we might build a new facility, given the money, it should never be assumed that we are automatically looking in the suburbs versus downtown. There are a number of locations where we have adequate properties downtown which would be totally sufficient for setback purposes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Do we own them?

Mr. CARPENTER. Either we own them or they are available for purchase. We do not have a policy of basically deserting the downtown area and sacrificing our operational needs for security. Frankly, that is not a goal here whatsoever.

Mr. SHERMAN. But building a brand new embassy on a much larger piece of downtown real estate is an expensive option, and moving to the suburbs is also expensive because you have to build a new embassy, plus the operational disadvantages.

Mr. CARPENTER. Ms. Thomasson will never forgive me if I didn't allow her to answer this question.

Ms. THOMASSON. There is a lot of research being done right now inside the government. We have been working with the Corps of Engineers as the leaders in this area, as well as with TSWG to make sure that we are the beneficiary of all of their current and future research. We are working with them to develop the projects that we will be doing research on. Today there is not a wall that has been developed that would achieve the purpose that you have described. We have seen some films that would show you that in a very clear way, and I am sure that the people who have those films will be glad to share them with you.

We will continue to work with the Corps of Engineers and TSWG to see if there is not something that has been developed that we could benefit from for our embassies overseas.

Mr. SHERMAN. Has there been testing of a series of walls, perhaps taking 20 or 30 feet of setback with a series of 3 or 5 or more walls?

Ms. THOMASSON. I would be glad to share with you in an off-line conversation what we have seen in the tests. I don't know that it serves our folks overseas to tell the world about what we know about this right now.

Mr. CARPENTER. What you are suggesting is valid to suggest. We are not closing the door on any options that would be security-beneficial or cost-beneficial.

Mr. SHERMAN. I hope that a very high priority is given to security, of course; that a high priority is given to keeping costs low, and that a high priority is given to staying in a location that best fits operations. And I hope that an extremely low priority is given to the aesthetics of the situation or the aesthetic advantages of having a brand new building or the aesthetic disadvantages of having what may turn out to be a very ugly wall or series of walls, because I think that functionality and cost have got to come first.

Mr. KENNEDY. We very much appreciate that point and there is a third element I might add. We also are looking at situations where we own an existing property in a downtown area and we are just short a few feet on one side or the other. For example, in one country we have just purchased a Shell gas station and we have closed that gas station and its little 7-Eleven-like activity, and for a very few dollars we now are able to keep our embassy in that location because we have looked at it and run the cost analysis. The cost of moving it was in the tens of millions of dollars. And in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, we now have the setback we need by just taking that multidisciplinary approach and getting the taxpayer everything we can for the lowest possible price.

Mr. SHERMAN. The next kind of group of questions that I have, until my time runs out, builds on the questions of one of my colleagues. And that is, it is great to make the embassy as secure as possible, even absolutely secure, but the embassy is just one of many possible targets. And the embassy was, I think, not selected in Kenya or Tanzania out of a hatred for diplomats, but a hatred for America in total. And there are other symbols.

Along with our dramatic increase for security for embassies, is there also a budget for increasing our security at libraries and cultural facilities, at even well-known American companies or other facilities that could also be a symbolic blow to America if they were destroyed?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes and no.

There is an organization called the Overseas Security Advisory Council, which is chaired by Diplomatic Security and in which we engage with the security directors of Fortune 500 companies and other private sector American firms and organizations operating overseas to talk about the threats, make suggestions as to what they can do—it works quite well. It is one of the premier programs that we have going, so that the private sector is not left out of the latest and greatest as to intelligence information that is releasable to them, as well as measures that we are taking at our embassies to ensure security and that they may want to follow suit.

Regarding the questions that you have about Americans overseas that specifically come under the Chief of Mission authority, i.e. employees and housing compounds or apartments throughout the cities, we do address those as part of our responsibilities. One should not think that we are spending all of this money solely on one facility. We have a security program that includes such things as cameras, guards, and security patrols, so that our personnel are looked after overseas to the best of our ability. One of the factors there is probably not setback; that is not what we are talking about. But reasonable security measures are taken as well as an ongoing security awareness program overseen by the RSO and the ambassador at post.

The other facilities that you talk about are largely the responsibility of the agency there. We work with them to make suggestions as to where they may be lacking, suggestions as to what they can do to improve their security posture. But the monies that were talked about here are not dedicated to that end.

Mr. SHERMAN. But you are here as a representative in some ways not only of the State Department but of the Administration. They have submitted one overall Federal budget to us, and it provides for substantial increases of security for our embassies. Does it provide substantial monies to secure other U.S. Government buildings and the housing for U.S. Government employees which are outside the purview of the State Department?

Mr. KENNEDY. We do, in the money that you are going to be providing us, for example—that you have provided us for Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, we will have space available in that building and it will be constructed out of the funds that you have provided for agencies as diverse as the Foreign Agricultural Service, the Foreign Commercial Service and—

Mr. SHERMAN. I understood that the embassy housed many different agencies and that we are going to make significant progress to make that particular complex secure. What I am addressing my question to is what is being done in this Administration's budget to secure those American facilities that are not in the embassy complex?

Mr. KENNEDY. What we are doing, sir, is encouraging those agencies to move into the new embassy complexes. For example, the property that we are buying in Nairobi, Kenya, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that property will be big enough for the Agency for International Development, which is the other largest agency abroad in terms of pockets of people, to build their own facility on that compound and take advantage of the security penumbra that Mr. Carpenter and his colleagues will drape over them.

The other agencies in Kenya, which I will give you off-line, all of the others will be in the embassy and everybody will be in the embassy except AID, which will be on the compound; and there is one other which I will give you off-line. So we are encouraging co-location.

Mr. SHERMAN. There may be locations where a particular function could not be an embassy; it may even be in a city where we do not have an embassy or consulate. You are telling me about what is going on in Kenya. We are dealing with a worldwide problem.

Is there money in this year's budget to make secure U.S. Government buildings and facilities other than embassies and consulates around the world?

Ms. THOMASSON. In the 1999 emergency appropriation that you all provided for us, you provided \$56 million for other agencies to secure further their locations around the world that were not in fact associated with a current embassy or chancery or consulate. The FBO is working with those agencies to help them execute and to spend that money and to make their buildings more safe when they are not associated with the chancery overseas.

Mr. SHERMAN. So that is the emergency 1999 appropriation. What about the fiscal year 2000 budget?

Ms. THOMASSON. I don't know that any of those agencies asked for additional money in the fiscal year 2000.

Mr. SHERMAN. So what you described as a long multiyear program, can't do it all at once to secure our embassies, and \$56 million for our other facilities for fiscal year 1999, and then zero for fiscal year 2000 for those other facilities?

Ms. THOMASSON. I don't know, Mr. Sherman, whether they asked for money in the out years or not. I know that they are all working now to secure their facilities, and they are all looking at where we would plan to build new embassies and to co-locate, and we are encouraging their co-location with us where we would be building something new.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Carpenter, given your demonstrable expertise, I would hope that something could be arranged so that the penumbra of your security countenance could be spread over non-State Department facilities abroad.

Mr. CARPENTER. I understand your point, sir.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

Let me ask some follow-up questions. How many embassies and other missions need to be totally relocated or reconstructed, and can you give us an average cost per mission?

Mr. CARPENTER. I can tell you that the number in our surveys showed that of our 260 facilities, 217 did not meet the setback.

If you describe the problem that we are facing now as setback critical, that being a large car bomb, you need setback. You clearly need setback. So we basically have 217 facilities that need to have that setback increased. Some of that can be done, as Mr. Kennedy mentioned, by acquiring properties, and we have done that. But it is approximately 200 of those facilities that exist that don't have that option. Replacement, it appears at this point, would be the only option to the fact that they do not have setback.

Mr. SMITH. You said 200?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. What is the average cost per mission? Is there any kind of ballpark?

Ms. THOMASSON. It is awfully hard to come up with a ballpark number that would be average. There is such a variety of sizes around the world. If we replaced 217 embassies in today's dollars it would be in excess of \$10 billion to do that; somewhere between \$10 and 14 billion.

Mr. SMITH. With the \$650 million for fiscal year 2000, how many embassies could be upgraded and/or rebuilt with that money?

Ms. THOMASSON. With \$650 million we would be looking at probably two dozen embassies that we could do, depending on which size embassies we chose to select for that list. It might not come out exactly at that. In fact the estimates that we have made so far, Chairman Smith, have been parametric. We have looked at what we have and replacing what we have, and we need to refine that further and pull in the other agencies and develop more in-depth studies on each one of the embassies to give you a fixed number of embassies that we can do with that amount of money.

Mr. SMITH. And would the overriding prioritization of that be risk assessment?

Ms. THOMASSON. Security.

Mr. SMITH. Location, location, location.

Mr. CARPENTER. It is important to note that of the \$650 million, or whatever amount we are given in fiscal year 2000, a large portion would have to be dedicated to property acquisition. We don't have property to build these embassies on in a majority of the cases. We would have to first spend that money in 2000 to acquire the property. We currently don't have the money to do that now.

Mr. SMITH. The more you can document and justify how that money would be spent, obviously, the easier it will be for us to garner support for it.

Mr. KENNEDY. We would be glad to discuss it. I don't want to discuss individual countries that are at the top of the list because that is drawing large bull's-eyes on the side of their walls.

Mr. SMITH. I haven't mentioned a name yet.

Mr. KENNEDY. And I very much appreciate that.

Mr. SMITH. In terms of the 24 recommendations made by Admiral Crowe, the first 15 deal with adjustments and systems and pro-

cedures to enhance security in the workplace. The final 6, how to improve crisis management systems, and the final 3 how to deal with intelligence and information availability.

My earlier question about the delay of 13 hours which he refers to in this, is that being looked at very aggressively? God forbid anything else should happen, but are we ready right now to respond with those six recommendations that are contained within this?

Mr. CARPENTER. We are prepared. As a matter of fact, the ARB report when presented to you will detail exactly what that process is. But today we are ready to respond to that, should something happen.

Mr. SMITH. That is very encouraging. The Department's fiscal year 2000 physical security upgrade request includes \$10.9 million for the Department's share of an interagency program to upgrade certain overseas facilities to enable the deployment of Marine security guards to posts that currently lack such support. Have the other parties to this project, Department of Defense, for example, requested funding for this in their fiscal year 2000 budget, and what will happen to the program if those parties do not seek the money to cover their part of the bargain?

Mr. KENNEDY. We are in in-depth negotiations with the full panoply of players involved in the question of the deployment of the Marine security guards. My personal position is that should only a certain amount of funding become available, we would wish to go forward and do half as many Marine guards—we were going to contribute half of the upgrade costs for deploying additional Marines, and the other half was going to come from other sources.

We would go forward and simply deploy at half as many locations because the State Department fully believes that there is a significant advantage to the overall protection of American interests abroad by having Marine security guards at as many posts as possible.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Delahunt, do you have any final questions?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Just one. In terms of your comment about the paucity, if you will, of personnel and as it relates to, intelligence analysis that you receive, I presume that other intelligence agencies work with or coordinate with your Department on this; or am I incorrect?

Mr. CARPENTER. I work with them very closely and I may add that relationship is increasing daily. The relationship between ourselves, the CIA and the FBI and other intelligence gathering people, DIA, is probably at an all-time high. The cooperation as far as I am concerned is unprecedented and in very good shape.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Ms. THOMASSON. Mr. Chairman, if I might just correct myself. Out of \$650 million, as I do the math and we work with these big numbers, I am not sure that we can build 24 embassies with \$650 million. It is probably more like 15 to 18.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for correcting the record. Mr. Tancredo?

Mr. TANCREDO. Just a couple. One that was prompted by part of Mr. Carpenter's recent testimony. When you were talking about the number of agents and the fact that you were stretched in various capacities, I understand that the Department is going to run and operate an international police training school somewhere in the

world, similar to the one the FBI runs in Budapest, and a DS agent will be assigned to the police training center run by DEA in Thailand.

Now, it is also my understanding that these centers focus on controlling international narcotics traffic. That is their primary focus. And I wonder if we so desperately need DS agents abroad for security reasons. Could you explain why we have excess DS agents looking for work with police training facilities in the area of international narcotics trafficking with the FBI and the DEA and Customs Service abroad, if that is their major focus?

Mr. CARPENTER. It may be their major focus, but it is certainly not their sole focus. There are a number of agencies overseas, to include my former agency, the Secret Service, that participates. As a matter of fact, in Budapest the Deputy Director of the ILEA there is a Secret Service agent. The DS functions overseas as the main focal point for police contacts at our embassies.

The nexus between DS and overseas security is apparent. A lot of the members, a lot of the participants, the students, if you will, that come to these classes in Budapest or Bangkok, are people we know. These are people that are our main contacts back at embassies around the world. It makes sense to have a DS person there to coordinate, talk about DS activities, talk about visa and passport fraud, and the importance of assuring the integrity of those types of documents as it pertains to that particular country, not the United States.

Like with the FBI agents and Customs and DEA agents that staff these different ILEA functions, there is a great value added by having a presence there for the DS. Great value, not only to DS. Because of the contacts we make. You want to have a cop, talk to a cop. That helps us later on when they go back to their country of origin, and now they have a contact at the embassy they can work with. It helps our liaison capacity overseas tremendously and is definitely a value to us.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If the gentleman would yield for one moment, I would reinforce what the Secretary said. What you are really describing is networking, and it is absolutely essential in terms of developing that unprecedented cooperation that you alluded to. And I would applaud the fact that DS is getting into—and recommend it, because as you know, given your experience and my own, speaking for my own professional experience, it can make a world of difference when you pick up that phone and you know who you are talking to on the other side. And there is that comfort level, and the result—I think all law enforcement personnel would verify it—is significant in terms of a good result, no matter whether it is drug trafficking or the protection of our embassies.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. TANCREDO. You also mentioned just then the work they are doing in terms of passport and visa fraud, which brings up another question. And that is, is any progress being made on the prosecution of these cases, and do you know if the U.S. attorneys are more interested in taking up the cases since Congress increased the penalties several years ago?

Mr. CARPENTER. I think U.S. attorneys are always interested in prosecuting good strong cases that are brought before them.

I do appreciate the efforts to increase those penalties, because that will have, without question, a positive effect on our ability to get these passport and visa cases prosecuted. So I think there is a direct positive correlation to what was done and the desire of U.S. attorneys to take these cases.

U.S. attorneys, as you can well understand, have a tremendous workload, and there is a certain prioritization that they are doing. These cases, if big enough—and we have certainly had some very, very big cases—there is no hesitancy on their part to take our cases. Prosecution is only one element, I might add. Our goal is to stop as much of this as we can.

We have disrupted a number of operations through our programs. Working with our Consular Affairs people, there have been a number of organized crime individuals, Russian-organized crime individuals, who have tried to obtain visas and passports to get into this country. Were we able to prosecute them? No. Were we able to keep them out? Yes. So there are benefits being derived there outside of the prosecution side of the ledger.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Under the risk management strategy, there was widespread use of waivers of security standards and, as you know, there was no formal data available on these waivers nor is there a process to review whether they should be continued. Can you tell us whether or not that has changed and are waivers or exceptions to the standards still routinely granted?

Mr. CARPENTER. Waivers should not be looked at as a dirty word. There are exceptions. I think one of the understandings that one must have about standards is that they are just that, standards. They are not absolutes. They are a goal that we strive for and they were established to be a goal, not an absolute.

Occasionally we will find in overseas environments that, try as you will, you cannot satisfy that standard in its entirety. That is where exceptions are requested. When an exception is granted, it is usually done on the basis of other security measures being put in place to compensate for the fact that there was an exception.

In other words, in some locations at some of our facilities away from the embassy that house people, if you don't have setback that the standards dictate, you might try to block the street, set up bollards, or some other type of security device to account for that exception. We don't take exceptions lightly. I certainly don't. I am the one that signs the exceptions that are granted, and we look at them very seriously. But when we sign an exception, it is not looked at as a reduction in the security at that specific facility.

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank you very much for your excellent testimony. I know we will be working together on this. As Mr. Kennedy indicated earlier, the more we can consult and justify additional spending for this for the good of our people overseas, as well as the host countries, the better.

I think Admiral Crowe made a very fine statement with regard to the importance of protecting citizens from other countries who often are injured and perhaps even die, as they did in the two embassy bombings.

I want to thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle. We look forward to working with you. Your testimony was outstanding. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
4TH DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY

WASHINGTON OFFICE
2370 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3004
(202) 225-3795

CONSTITUENT SERVICE CENTERS
1540 KUSER ROAD
SUITE A9
HAMILTON, NJ 08619-3878
(609) 585-7878
TTY (609) 586-3660

100 LACEY ROAD
SUITE 30A
WHITING, NJ 08758-1331
(908) 350-2300



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3004

COMMITTEES:

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Statement of Representative Christopher H. Smith
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations
and Human Rights
March 12, 1999

Foreign Relations Authorization for FY 2000-2001: Security of United States Missions Abroad

This is the fourth and last in a series of hearings on legislation to authorize the foreign relations programs and activities of the United States for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. Today the subcommittee will consider the security of United States missions abroad and of the people who serve in these missions.

In August 1998 the world was shaken by the terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Among the results of those despicable acts was the appointment of Accountability Review Boards for each incident. Both of these boards were chaired by Admiral William Crowe, who is our lead witness today. Among the Boards' findings was

"the collective failure of the US government over the past decade to provide adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of US diplomatic missions to terrorist attacks in most countries around the world."

The Boards made twenty-four specific recommendations on a wide range of security-related issues. The recommendation that concerns us most today was that "the Department of State should work within the Administration and with Congress to obtain sufficient funding for capital building programs and for security operations and personnel over the coming decade (estimated at \$1.4 billion per year for the next 10 years), while ensuring that this funding should not come at the expense of other critical foreign affairs programs and operations. A failure to do so" --- and, again, I quote the Crowe report --- "will jeopardize the security of US personnel abroad and inhibit America's ability to protect and promote its interests around the world."

In fiscal year 1999, the Administration did propose an emergency supplemental appropriation for worldwide security upgrades in the amount of approximately \$1.4 billion, the same amount recommended in the Crowe report. This amount was about equally divided between capital improvements --- principally the reconstruction and/or relocation of the two embassies that had been destroyed --- and other security enhancements including technology, personnel, and training. In the Administration's FY 2000 budget request, however, the amount requested for security enhancements drops dramatically to about \$300 million.

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This is almost an 80% cut. The amount left after the cut is almost exclusively for the recurring salaries and expenses of the new people hired with the FY 1999 money. Looking at capital improvements --- the reconstruction and relocation of embassies and other U.S. missions --- the drop is even more precipitous, from \$627 million to \$36 million. That's a 94% reduction from the current fiscal year. Indeed, the request for next year does not fund any new embassy construction at all, because the \$36 million is only for planning and site acquisition. But this is not because the Administration disagrees with the Crowe report's finding that we need to spend billions more to reconstruct and/or relocate our embassies. The Administration still wants the money, or at least \$3 billion of it --- but it proposes to spend the whole \$3 billion in the so-called "out years" beginning in FY 2001.

In other words, the Administration embassy security budget essentially skips fiscal year 2000. If we were to represent the proposed spending as a graph, it would look like two mountains with a trough in the middle --- it starts off high at \$627 million, then dips down to near zero, then goes back up to \$300 million, then \$450 million, \$600 million, \$750 million, and finally \$900 million. And any graph that looks like this raises an obvious question: what is so special about FY 2000? What makes this the only year in which we should spend practically nothing to make our embassies safer? I look forward to hearing the Administration's answer, but the only one that occurs to me is that requesting serious money for embassies **this year** would have forced the Administration to make hard choices. They would have had either to recommend another emergency appropriation which would have had the effect of reducing the budget surplus, or to decide on cuts elsewhere in the federal budget. So it looks as though the Administration decided to punt.

One problem with putting off necessary spending until the "out years" is that the process tends to repeat itself. In fact, it gets even easier as time goes on. The spending imperatives in other areas of the budget are likely to look just as important next year as they do this year, and the memory of the bombings will be less vivid. So it will be easy to revise the budget again, to decide that no great harm will be done by putting off the security measures for one more year. Like the cartoon character Wimpy, the Office of Management and Budget fully intends to pay Tuesday for a hamburger today, but it is always **next** Tuesday that the bill will come due. And so it goes --- until the next tragedy.

Unfortunately, this prediction is not hypothetical or speculative. One of the most chilling of the Crowe report's findings is that the problems that gave rise to the bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were the very problems identified in the 1985 report of the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, chaired by Admiral Bobby Ray Inman. The Inman report was produced as a result of an earlier series of attacks on Americans abroad, including the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. And yet the Crowe report found that "adequate funds were never provided to implement the Inman recommendations."

It is up to Congress to ensure that this does not happen again. So what we need to know from our witnesses is how much it will really take to make all our overseas missions as safe as they possibly can be, and how much of this can be accomplished in fiscal year 2000 if the money is made available.

I am informed that Secretary Albright has testified that she asked the Office of Management and Budget for \$1.4 billion in FY 2000. I hope our State Department witnesses today will tell us whether this amount was for all security enhancements, including the \$300 million already in the Administration's request for recurring costs and site acquisition, or whether the \$1.4 billion was an additional amount just for the construction of safer embassies. I also hope they will give us the best estimates they can of how much of this amount could really be spent in the first year if it were to be authorized and appropriated, and of what it would buy. And I would like our other witnesses to give their own estimates of these needs and capabilities.

I know I speak for my colleagues on the Subcommittee when I say that once we know these answers, we will do our best to secure an authorization and an appropriation for the necessary amounts. We cannot afford to lose more American lives, or the lives of other innocent people, to complacency or budget gimmickry.

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY
4TH DISTRICT, GEORGIA

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL SECURITY
MILITARY READINESS



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-1011

Statement of Representative Cynthia A. McKinney
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on International Operations
and Human Rights
March 12, 1999

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
(1) 124 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-1805
FAX (202) 226-0691
DISTRICT OFFICE:
(1) 248 SYCAMORE STREET
SUITE 110
DECATUR, GA 30030
(404) 377-6900
FAX (404) 377-6909
INTERNET ADDRESS:
cymck@hr.house.gov

I wish to join our distinguished chairman in extending our appreciation to our panelists today. They are here to help us work out one of the most serious issues we face in our diplomatic process—one that affects what we do, how we do it, and where. We look forward to working with you in this effort.

Of those who put their lives on the line for our country, those who perform our diplomatic work are often among the least appreciated. Perhaps this is because what they do is often hard to explain, or especially to calculate in nice neat tables of achievements graphed against resources expended. Or maybe, for some people, it is because what they do saves lives, rather than taking them, and because they don't use things that blow people up or burn things down.

If we're serious about being a force for making things better in the world, though, these are just the kinds of people whom we should be strongly supporting. Instead, we allow ourselves to be taken in by big guns, high speeds, gee-wizardry, and all the toys that boys use to make war—and to kill other boys and girls.

Certainly I am not an uncritical admirer of the Department of State. Sometimes, in fact, I'm tempted to agree with George Will's remark that the Department is like tundra: anything you do to it makes it better. I am particularly struck, especially during our recent hearings, with how little of the obvious dedication, the sacrifices, and the competent work of the worker bees manages to get reflected in what we hear from the Seventh Floor.

This is particularly true about the proposals we've received on diplomatic security in the Department's budget submission. When the tragic bombings took place in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam last August, some of us hoped that some of this awful loss would be at least partly redeemed by a serious focus on getting rid of the security problems that helped create those tragedies and will create other tragedies if they aren't fixed. We were prepared to support a realistic, well thought out plan to remedy problems identified by Rear Admiral Inman almost 15 years ago and still uncorrected, especially the pressing problem of the physical security of our Embassy buildings—most of which, according to the Department, are over 40 years old.

Instead of giving us a program to move promptly on these problems, however, the Department's budget called for no new spending on Embassy construction and only \$36 million of spending for Embassy site purchase and design in fiscal year 2000. The only other funding for Embassy construction was included in a \$3 billion advance appropriation request for fiscal years 2001 to 2005. These funds were far less than the \$14 billion that Admiral Crowe's report called for. In addition, they were so backloaded that 60 percent of the expenses would occur in the last two fiscal years, and they were supposed to come out of the Department's current services budget.

Under this program, something like one-fourth of the Department's funding in fiscal year 2005 would be devoted to security costs, even if the advance appropriation got approved, which it most likely will not. This wasn't a real proposal to deal with the problems that put at risk the lives of our overseas staff, their families, and people who live near our Embassy buildings. This was an attempt to look like dealing with the problems while actually doing nothing. I call it "the flim-flam plan." As they should have expected, everybody who has tried to sell this flim-flam plan on both sides of the Capitol has been told it won't fly.

Last week Under Secretary for Management Bonnie Cohen refused to defend it any more. She said that the Administration was going back into a huddle and would be bringing out a new plan that would make more sense. She never made a commitment to get this plan for the authorization process, however, and this week when we received the Department's draft of the authorization bill for fiscal years 2000-2001, it was just the old flim-flam plan again. I understand we are likely to get more of that today.

I don't blame our witnesses, including Assistant Secretary Carpenter. These decisions were clearly made at a higher pay grade. But I want the message taken back that I will not support the flim-flam plan, and if necessary I will work to defeat it. I also want it understood that we, and even more our country's overseas staff, are entitled to see the improved plan that the Administration is supposedly putting together.

We are also entitled to believable assurances that the Department will reform any of its functions, such as the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, that have been in the past obstacles to getting the job done. It is scandalous that FBO is sitting on tens of millions of dollars already appropriated and unspent while the Department is asking for billions more.

I also want it understood that we are entitled to correct and honest information about this issue. The Washington Post this morning said that officials at the State Department are defending the refusal to ask for construction funding in fiscal year 2000 because the Department has not yet acquired sites or commissioned architects to design the facilities. If that is true, I would like to know why not. Even more importantly, I believe this information to be false. In Uganda, for example, we purchased the new Embassy site when Johnnie Carson was Ambassador there, and that was two Ambassadors ago. It is the only weed patch in Kampala

with 24-hour guard service. I am informed that the Department has made considerable progress with designs for the new Embassy as well. Because Kampala has been closed half the time since the bombings in August, due to security concerns, I imagine the Department can find it quite easily.

Now if the Department is going to defend its budget by putting out incorrect information, we are not going to have the trust we need to work on this important issue. To clear this up, I would like to receive within one week a status report on all Embassy site purchase and design activities worldwide. I am not asking for classified information—just an update. And I will keep asking until I get this report, although I don't expect to have to ask more than once.

In making the plans for improving our diplomatic security and in carrying them out, we need to make sure that the people who have to live with the results have a seat and a voice in making them happen. It is for this reason that I am particularly happy to have the opportunity to hear today from President Dan Geisler of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), the professional association and bargaining agent for our overseas American staff. I expect to see AFSA fully represented in the Department's planning process, as well as other activities, to ensure that Embassy buildings are constructed with accessibility and functionality as well as security in mind.

If we allow our fears to drive us into making our overseas presence look like a fortress on hills in the suburbs, we lose. And if we let our fears drive us away from places we ought to be, we lose.

In thinking about these things, the excellent reports by Rear Admiral Inman and Admiral Crowe deserve full attention, but I wish to express my serious concerns about one of their implications. I believe we have benefitted greatly, and at minimal cost, by our efforts to maintain widespread diplomatic representation. The United States and its citizens have worldwide interests and worldwide responsibilities as well as worldwide opportunities. Having people on the ground worldwide is the best way to deal with these concerns of our government and our citizens.

For this reason, I believe that efforts at regionalizing our Embassies would produce small savings in the overall budget context at extremely high costs, especially in our contact with the developing world where we are just now paying some attention to people we and our European allies have ignored and exploited for centuries. Let's not break the bridges that we have built to save on the cost of cement to repair them.

We have a chance to do some serious thinking about how we want our country to be represented overseas. We owe it to our citizens and to those who represent us abroad to take advantage of this opportunity.

**Opening Statement by
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.
Chairman of the Accountability Review Boards
for the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam**

Mr. Chairman,

I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today and discuss the recent study I chaired examining the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

The State Department has forwarded copies of our Report to the Committee. The 8-page Executive Overview includes the 24 recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards' findings. With your permission, I will make a short statement reviewing what I consider the most salient findings and then will be happy to address your questions.

Pursuant to the Omnibus Diplomatic and Anti-terrorism Act of 1986, the Secretary of State convened Accountability Review Boards on the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. These attacks killed more than 220 people, including 12 U.S. Government employees and family members, and 32 Kenyan national employees of the U.S. Government. In addition, they injured more than 4,000 Americans, Kenyans and Tanzanians. The bombings severely damaged or destroyed the chanceries in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, as well as several other buildings.

As called for by the Statute, our Report examined whether the incidents were security related, whether security systems and procedures were adequate and implemented properly, the impact of intelligence and information availability, whether any employee of the U.S. Government or member of the Uniformed Services breached his or her duty and, finally, whether any other facts or circumstances in these cases may be relevant to appropriate security management of the United States Missions abroad.

The Boards were most disturbed by two inter-connected issues: first, the inadequacy of resources to provide security against terrorist attacks and, second, the relatively low priority accorded security concerns throughout the U.S. Government by the Department of State, other agencies in general and on the part of many employees, both in Washington and in the field. Saving lives and adequately addressing our security vulnerabilities on a sustained basis must be given a higher priority by all those involved if we are to prevent such a tragedy in the future.

The Boards did not find reasonable cause to believe that any employee of the U.S. Government or member of the Uniformed Services breached his or her duty in connection with the August 7 bombings. However, we believe that there was a collective failure by several Administrations and Congresses over the past decade to invest adequate efforts and resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions around the world to terrorist attacks.

The Boards found that intelligence provided no immediate tactical warning of the August 7 attacks. We understand the difficulty of monitoring terrorist networks and concluded that vulnerable missions cannot rely upon such warning. We found, however, that both policy and intelligence officials have relied heavily on warning intelligence to measure threats, whereas experience has shown that transnational terrorists often strike without warning at vulnerable targets in areas where expectations of terrorist attacks against the U.S. are low.

The security systems and procedures at both posts were in general accord with Department policy. However, those systems and procedures followed by all the embassies under the Department's direction did not speak to large vehicular bomb attacks or transnational terrorism nor the dire consequences that would result from them. Both embassies were located immediately adjacent or close to public streets and were especially vulnerable to large vehicular bombs. The Boards found that too many of our overseas missions are similarly situated. Unless these vulnerabilities are addressed on a sustained and realistic basis, the lives and safety of

U.S. Government employees and the public in many of our facilities abroad will continue to be at risk from further terrorist bombings.

In our investigations of the bombings, the Boards were struck by how similar the lessons were to those drawn by the Inman Commission some 14 years ago. What is most troubling is the failure of the U.S. Government to take the necessary steps to prevent such tragedies through an unwillingness to give sustained priority and funding to security improvements.

The renewed appearance of large bomb attacks against U.S. embassies and the emergence of sophisticated and global terrorist networks aimed at U.S. interests abroad have dramatically changed the threat environment. In addition, terrorists may in the future use new methods of attack of even great destructive capacity, including biological or chemical weapons. Old assumptions are no longer valid. Today, U.S. Government employees from many departments and agencies work in our embassies abroad. They work and live in harm's way, just as military people do. We must acknowledge this and remind our citizenry of this reality of Foreign Service life. In turn, the nation must make greater efforts to provide for their safety. Service abroad can never be made completely safe, but we can reduce some of the risks to the survival and security of our personnel. This will require much greater effort in terms of national commitment, resources and procedures than in the past.

I should make a particular comment on funding. If we are to have a comprehensive and long term strategy for protecting our American employees abroad, it will have to be a sustained funding plan for enforced security measures and for a long-term capital building program based on a comprehensive assessment of the requirements to meet the new range of terrorist threats. We recommended budgetary appropriations of \$1.4 billion per year sustained over a ten year period.

We understand that there will never be enough money to do all that should be done. We will have to live with partial solutions and, in turn, a high level of threat and vulnerability for quite some time.

As we work to upgrade the physical security of our missions, we should also consider reducing the size and number of our embassies through the use of modern technology and by moving, in some cases, to regional posts in less threatened and vulnerable countries.

All employees serving overseas should assign a higher priority to security and adjust their lifestyles to make their workplaces and residences safer. In overseas missions, there is a tendency for people to continue doing their work in a certain way, letting the system provide for their safety. This attitude must be changed. Security priorities will have to be adjusted to make embassies tougher and to improve the overall odds. This process will succeed only if it starts at the top.

We cannot allow terrorists to force us to retreat from defending our interests abroad. Making our people safe and deterring or frustrating terrorist attacks send a strong signal of U.S. determination and capability.

Successful overseas terrorist attacks kill our people, diminish confidence in our power and bring tragedy to our friends in host countries. When choosing embassy sites, safety and security concerns should guide our considerations more than whether a location may be convenient or of historic or symbolic importance. Most host countries want our embassies to be safe. If they don't, we probably shouldn't be there. There is every likelihood that there will be further large bomb and other kinds of attacks. We must face this fact and do more to provide security or we will continue to see our people killed, our embassies blown away and the reputation of the United States overseas eroded.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues and I believe very strongly that the lives and the safety of our people serving America abroad must receive both our attention and our priority.



AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

2101 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037 -- Phone: (202) 338-4045, ext. 517 --
Fax: (202) 338-6820 -- E-Mail leg@afsa.org

**Testimony of Mr. Daniel F. Geisler
President, American Foreign Service Association (AFSA)
House International Relations Committee
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights
March 12, 1999**

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for this opportunity to speak before you on an issue of enormous importance to the men and women of America's Foreign Service. For seventy five years, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) has been the professional association which gives voice to their concerns. For the past twenty five years, AFSA has also functioned as a federal labor union. We represent some 23,000 active duty and retired Foreign Service Officers and Specialists from five government agencies: the State Department, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, the Foreign Commercial Service of the Department of Commerce, and the United States Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service.

Although we are the Foreign Service, our focus is domestic. We work for America. Our aim is to shape world events in order to enhance the security and prosperity of Americans here at home.

In the aftermath of tragic bombings of our missions in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, AFSA sent to the House International Relations Committee a list of our concerns about security. Since that time, we have followed with great interest the work of the statutorily-mandated

Accountability Review Boards under the leadership of Admiral William Crowe. Admiral Crowe's report mirrored our own concerns. With your permission, I would like to elaborate briefly on them this morning.

Our core message is that we must commit ourselves to never again suffer needless loss of life from terrorism and directed violence. But, Mr. Chairman, that does not mean that America should shrink back and cower from terrorists either.

Long-term Commitment to Protecting Lives

Over the years, we have seen our leaders focus their attention on embassy security in the aftermath of a tragedy. We saw it in the 1970's following the losses at Khartoum. We saw it in the 1980's following the losses in Beirut. We see it again today in the wake of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. We were present at Andrews Air Force Base when the flag-draped coffins returned with the remains of Americans who died in the August bombings. As the memory of each new loss fades, attention wanes. Commitment declines. Funding is diverted until a new tragedy ensues. We must break this cycle.

Admiral Crowe's report stated that the losses in East Africa resulted from a collective failure over the past decade to provide the resources needed to protect our people serving abroad. The Clinton Administration and the 106th Congress should correct this failure by committing to a sustained, adequately funded program to reduce the risks we run.

Mr. Chairman, we have grave doubts that this failure will be corrected. Our doubts were heightened by the Administration's grossly inadequate request for funds to build safer embassies. The FY 2000 budget request does not have a single penny for construction funds, even though the State Department had proposed that OMB request \$1.4 billion for worldwide security

upgrades. Instead, the request calls for a \$3 billion advance appropriation, with most of the money to be spent in 2004 and 2005. This is too little, too late. Moreover, these funds would have to come from the current services budget. This would force the State Department to find, for example, some \$900 million in an FY 2005 budget of less than \$4 billion.

In just the past few months, our counterintelligence forces thwarted plots in Albania, India, and Uganda. CIA Director Tenet testified that such lethal plots are ongoing and global in scope. Administration officials continue to point this out in Congressional testimony, including testimony before this Subcommittee. But their budget request does not match their threat assessment or their rhetoric. Our enemies will not wait until 2005 to attack us. We must not wait until then to defend our people.

We have already received indications of a possible rescission of some of the funds appropriated only five months ago for emergency security measures. Given our experiences in the past, this greatly increases our alarm. It indicates to us a lack of commitment to protecting Americans serving abroad. If our elected leaders will consider cutting recently-appropriated security funds, how much faith can we have in an advance appropriation for the year 2005? The inadequate request from the Administration and the potential rescission from the Congress leads us to conclude that we will soon be faced with impossible choices between keeping people safe and supplying them with the tools they need to do their work. This will perpetuate the collective failure to devote enough resources to protecting Americans serving abroad.

Mounting an Offense

We have heard a good deal of discussion about how to defend our overseas missions. An effective security program also needs a vigorous offensive element. It is not in our American

nature to simply hunker down. We must identify terrorists and then cut them off from their sources of funds, transportation and supplies. This requires multilateral and bilateral cooperation. We can't do that from Washington alone. Such a vigorous offense requires an overseas presence

It would be a grave mistake to permanently withdraw our embassies in response to the global terrorist threat. There may be good reasons for closing a U.S. mission. Retreating from terrorism is not one of them. Retreating is admitting defeat. It would be unworthy of America. And it would be counterproductive.

Permanently closing down an American embassy would create new opportunities for terrorists to flourish by giving them a haven where we cannot monitor their actions. It would cut us off from contacts with foreign law enforcement agencies. It would limit our ability to influence foreign government leaders. Pulling out our embassies would abandon private American citizens living abroad and severely curtail our capacity to advise and protect them. It would prevent us from serving American business abroad. In the war against international terror, our overseas missions serve as America's forward deployment. We cannot deploy without risk, but risk must not keep us from deploying.

Coping with Risk

We must decide where we have interests that warrant an overseas presence, and then take measures to reduce the risk to the people who establish that presence. The Administration has said repeatedly that there are no 100% guarantees of safety. In the Foreign Service, we've always known and accepted this.

Last August, I sent a worldwide message to Foreign Service people serving in the field asking them what they perceived as the threats to their safety. Many people were indeed very concerned about setback and truck bombs. But just as many were concerned about more common safety issues such as violent crime and residential fires. Many are concerned about traditional risks abroad, such as civil unrest, kidnapping, targeted assassination, and natural disasters. Quite a few are concerned about emerging threats, such as chemical and biological attacks. Foreign Service employees have also expressed concern that in hardening our chanceries, we may transfer risk to softer targets, such as homes and private U.S. facilities.

We are willing to cope with these risks, as we always have in the past. We have no desire to cower in our embassies, or to abandon our posts. We recognize that well-designed chanceries with adequate setback will save lives, but will not eliminate all risks. Although we prefer accessible missions to hardened fortresses on urban perimeters, we recognize and support the need to balance accessibility and safety.

Investing in People As Well As Buildings

Achieving this balance requires more than investing in chanceries and guarding their perimeters. It requires complementary investments to reduce risks to soft targets and to increase the skills of the people we are protecting. Unfortunately, these are the first items to be cut when budgets tighten. That undermines any investment we make in new buildings.

The State Department used to field teams to conduct two day emergency response simulations in the field, to train people to deal with various disasters. These were cut from the budget. They are now being replaced by four-hour desk-top exercise which are unlikely to be as effective as the multi-day simulations. If employees in Nairobi had been trained to duck and

cover rather than run to a window when they heard a grenade blast, we could have suffered fewer casualties. Training saves lives. The Nairobi blast also showed why locally-hired guard staff require training and professional supervision. These personnel not only defend the perimeter of an embassy, they also protect soft targets such as homes, schools and warehouses. Like training and residential security programs, they are among the first to go in a budget cut.

Senior Management Attention

A sustained program to upgrade buildings and equipment and to invest in people will only produce results if security becomes a genuine priority for top management of the foreign affairs agencies. When senior managers waive security criteria or cut security funding, they send a strong message to the field that security doesn't matter. The field responds to what senior managers *do*. When their actions make it clear that security is a second-order issue, they undercut our security professionals' day-to-day efforts to keep people safe. Although we have opened 40 new overseas posts in this decade, the State Department cut its Regional Security Officer positions by 10%. That, Mr. Chairman, says more to the people in the field about security's importance than any policy directive ever could.

Absorptive Capacity of the State Department

Like Congress, the Foreign Service does not want to simply throw money at security this year. We do want to break the cycle of interest and indifference, and replace it with sustained attention and adequate funding. Last October's emergency supplemental appropriation funded an overdue expansion of the Diplomatic Security Bureau. But it did little to strengthen the Foreign Buildings Office, which is not staffed to administer another substantial infusion of funds.

The State Department testified that FBO consulted the private sector, GSA, and the Army Corps of Engineers, among others, on implementing last year's emergency supplemental security program. State should explore expanding the use of other federal expertise, as well as using private sector engineering and project management services, to speed up a building program.

For U.S. embassies where FBO already has design and site acquisition work underway, Congress should appropriate full construction funding this year so that work can proceed. This will free up staff resources for future years when demands increase.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, when Admiral Crowe released his report in January, Secretary of State Albright publicly accepted her share of responsibility for the collective failure to devote adequate resources to security. The Foreign Service applauded her for this, because we took it as a sign of commitment to correct that failure. The decisions the Congress and the Administration make this year on embassy security will have profound effects on American diplomacy for years to come. The Foreign Service cares deeply about that. We also care very deeply about our people. We ask, Mr. Chairman, that you help break the cycle of attention and neglect that places them in needless danger.

Thank you.

Testimony of David G. Carpenter
Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security
Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights
March 12, 1999

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have the opportunity to participate in this hearing on the important subject of the security of American personnel serving overseas. As Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, I am here to address the efforts of the Department of State and particularly the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) in protecting our country's personnel, facilities and national security information.

By law, the Secretary of State is charged with "the protection of all United States Government personnel on official duty abroad (other than those personnel under the command of a United States area military commander) and their accompanying dependents." Since the Department provides the platform for some 30 agencies as they pursue the interests of the United States around the world, our security responsibilities are not just to State Department employees but employees of all U.S. Government agencies with personnel stationed abroad, as well as American citizens and foreign nationals seeking services at our embassies and consulates.

This is a solemn responsibility and Secretary Albright has made clear that she has no higher priority. Under Secretary for Management Cohen and the rest of her leadership team have been doing everything we can to ensure that the appropriate management tools are in place to effectively meet this responsibility.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Let me start by briefly describing the role of Diplomatic Security (DS). The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has a broad mission. Its primary function is to provide a secure environment for the safe conduct of foreign affairs. In addition, we provide protection for the Secretary of State and other senior government officials, for resident and visiting foreign dignitaries, and for foreign missions in the United States. For example, the month following the East Africa bombings we had to ensure the safety of scores of foreign ministers attending the annual United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. In October the security of the Wye Peace Talks and its high profile participants was our responsibility.

We also have the statutory authority to investigate passport and visa fraud, crimes that can facilitate terrorist and other criminal attacks against American interests. Our Protective Intelligence Investigations Division (PII) is responsible for investigations involving terrorist threats and activities directed at personnel and facilities that we are responsible for protecting.

1. The Threat from Indigenous Terrorist Groups

Indigenous or domestic terrorist groups are those that operate only within their country of origin. Such groups have a low threat projection in that their operations are restricted to a single country. They have been a constant threat to our facilities since the 1970s when many of the Marxist groups first surfaced. In general, these groups use tactics such as firing anti-tank rockets, throwing molotov cocktails, planting car bombs, or close-order assassinations. Specific credible threats from these indigenous terrorist groups are rare. From August 1998 to the end of February 1999, we recorded about two dozen threats from these groups. However, the absence of a large number of threats from the indigenous groups should not be misinterpreted as a decline in this threat. For example, from 1987-1997, there were 232 indigenous terrorist attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities. Very few of these attacks were preceded by a threat or intelligence report suggesting a threat. The threat from these groups is a general one and is based on their anti-American rhetoric and past attacks on U.S. targets. It should also be emphasized that the indigenous terrorist groups tend to carry out anti-American attacks in response to U.S. foreign policy decisions or military actions. For example, during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, U.S. targets were frequently attacked by indigenous terrorist groups in Europe and Latin American to protest U.S. air operations over Iraq.

2. The Threat from Transnational Terrorist Groups

A transnational terrorist group is one that has or can operate in multiple countries. This type of group poses a more complicated threat since its projection is much wider than the indigenous terrorist groups and consequently requires a wider deployment of security resources. Historically, these groups are fewer in number than indigenous ones. Today, there are at least three transnational terrorist groups -- Egyptian Islamic elements, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Usama Bin Laden organization. These groups generally employ indiscriminate, mass-casualty tactics such as "car/truck bombs." While all three groups are doctrinally anti-American, only the Bin Laden organization has carried out an attack on a U.S. target within the past five years.

The Bin Laden organization has been the primary generator of recent threat information against U.S. diplomatic facilities overseas. Over 650 threats have been linked to this organization or to the East African bombings since August 1998. Our analysts believe that about 33% of these threats are "viable" threats; that is, they are either logical, consistent with previous reporting of Bin Laden organization tendencies, or based on credible intelligence reports or walk-ins.

Currently, the Bin Laden organization appears to be the most dangerous terrorist threat to U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel overseas. This organization reportedly has a presence in over 25 countries and its tentacles may spread to many more. It is dangerous because it has a potentially global reach, it appears well-financed, it has a dedicated cadre, it engages in suicide attacks, it has an avowedly anti-American ideology, and it appears to have plugged into or provides support to over a half-dozen indigenous terrorist groups around the world.

As George Tenet has testified, "there is not the slightest doubt that Usama bin Ladin, his worldwide allies, and his sympathizers are planning further attacks against us. Despite progress against his networks, bin Ladin's organization has contacts virtually worldwide, including in the United States -- and he has stated unequivocally...that all Americans are targets."

3. The Threat from State Sponsors of Terrorism

The U.S. Government currently lists seven state sponsors of terrorism. Some of these states currently cause us more concern than others. The threat to our diplomatic interests from these state sponsors has not been realized, but given the nature of their relationship with the United States and their record of state sponsorship of terrorism, we cannot dismiss this threat.

4. Threats Triggered by U.S. Actions Overseas

There are a number of U.S. foreign policy or military actions that might engender reactions which would increase security concerns for our diplomatic facilities and personnel. This could be, for example, the bombings of facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan, responses to Iraqi behavior, or developments in Kosovo. In some cases, such actions trigger an outburst of anti-American activity that ranges from telephonic threats to demonstrations, bombings or assassinations.

For example, anti-American fallout occurred during our military buildup on the Persian Gulf in February of last year and again from our joint action with Britain against Iraq in December. From February 1 to March 1 last year, during a period of heightened tensions with Iraq, over 130 anti-American threats and incidents were recorded worldwide. In early December, after U.S./U.K. airstrikes on Iraq began, we recorded during a ten-day period 18 threats and 15 anti-U.S. incidents directed at U.S. diplomatic facilities in 19 countries.

Unfortunately, U.S. diplomatic facilities serve as a very visible target for anti-American militants or hostile governments who may want to send a more violent message to the U.S. Government.

Conclusion Regarding the Threat

U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel overseas have been, are and will continue to be threatened by anti-American terrorist groups, which see our presence as prominent overseas symbols of the United States Government. They are perceived by terrorists as more accessible than U.S. military facilities. The emergence of the Usama Bin Laden organization as a transnational terrorist group willing to engage in suicide attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities has dramatically increased the security threat -- a threat that unfortunately has all the attributes of a long-term security problem.

Aftermath of the East Africa Bombings

During the decade prior to the tragic August 7, 1998 bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, all of the attacks against U.S. interests involved indigenous terrorist elements. While we were aware of threats from external terrorist groups, none ever materialized. The August 7 bombings demonstrated the existence of a global terrorist organization capable of and intent on attacking U.S. diplomatic targets.

All our posts are now considered at risk, and we need to take a comprehensive security approach. Global or regional networks may strike where we are most vulnerable, not just in their home areas. In this environment, no system of post-by-post assessment can be perfect. However, in an effort to improve the threat assessment process, we have broadened our existing threat criteria to better assess the threats posed by transnational terrorism, especially threats from global terrorist networks. In addition to the threat ratings, we now factor in the vulnerability of all posts to terrorist attacks, and under this new approach all posts should meet a high level of protection against acts of terrorism and political violence.

Emergency Security Appropriation and Beyond

We want to thank the Congress for its bipartisan support of the \$1.4 billion in the Fiscal Year 1999 Emergency Security Appropriation. In the aftermath of the bombings of our Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassies, Congress' support made it possible to respond quickly to provide assistance to the bombing victims, begin restoring our operations in Kenya and Tanzania, and implement critical security measures worldwide.

I would now like to share with you some of the steps the Department is taking to develop a comprehensive and long-term strategy to deal with this challenging environment. We know that there is no such thing as perfect security. However, with these security measures our goal is to deter and to diminish the effects of possible actions to the best of our ability, remembering there can be no 100% guarantee.

With Congress' bipartisan support for the Emergency Security Appropriation, the Department of State has:

- Sent inter-agency Emergency Security Assessment Teams (ESATs) to 32 posts to assess security needs;
- Deployed 120 DS Special Agents overseas on temporary duty;
- Enhanced physical security with vehicle barriers, bollards, video cameras with recording devices and other measures;
- Worked with local governments to close or change traffic patterns in several cities;
- Increased local guards by over 1,000 around the world; and
- Acquired or placed under contract properties to increase setback at five posts.

Immediately following the bombings in East Africa, we conducted a top-to-bottom review of the security posture of all of our diplomatic facilities around the world. The seven inter-agency ESATs recommended relocating 19 of the 32 posts surveyed, mainly because of the lack of adequate setback needed to mitigate the effects of an explosive blast. We continue to dispatch DS Security Augmentation Teams (SATs) and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) around the globe to augment security and provide training to our personnel.

Host governments have allowed us to close streets, install jersey barriers and bollards, and employ vehicles as barriers at key checkpoints around our embassies. They have also been responsive to our requests for the assignment of additional host government security personnel to protect our buildings and staffs. Overall this support has been excellent; however, many countries are limited in what they can provide. The Emergency Security Appropriation has been invaluable in this regard, and its increased Anti-terrorism Assistance Program funding will pay dividends in the long-term through the training of local government officials.

We have initiated a global surveillance detection program, which is up and running in 90 posts. Also in place is mandatory security inspection of all vehicles entering overseas facilities, regardless of the post's threat level.

Fifty-three new bomb detection units have been shipped to posts, and we plan to ship 200 more by the end of this fiscal year. Three hundred new metal detectors have been sent to posts with another 300 to be shipped this fiscal year. We have deployed 16 "back-scatter" x-ray units with 82 more ordered and to be shipped by the end of the year. The "back-scatter" system detects metal and measures density for explosives.

Additional physical and technical security upgrades are ongoing, such as vehicle barriers, blast walls, closed-circuit event recording cameras with VCR control, and radios -- all designed to enhance the perimeter security of our facilities. To date, over 200 additional time-lapse VCRs have been deployed overseas.

To effectively implement the measures funded in the supplemental, the Department has consulted with the General Services Administration, the Department's Inspector General, the Army Corps of Engineers and others to take advantage of expertise and experience. We have met with major multinational companies on their approaches to large scale, cost-effective construction. We have met with those who implemented the earlier Inman program to learn from both their successes and their mistakes. We have detailed month-by-month plans for obligating funds and implementing programs, and we are providing careful oversight through regular status meetings.

Security Professionals Key to Success

The key to the success of our security programs, however, is trained and experienced professionals who can provide essential management and leadership. This is true both at headquarters and overseas.

Overseas, for example, DS special agents, referred to as Regional Security Officers, serve as the Chief of Mission's principal advisers on all security matters, and are responsible for the protection of life and classified information for all U.S. agencies, their employees, and families at the post. Typically, the RSO manages a security program that includes: a vast network of physical and technical security, Marine Security Guards (if present), a local guard program, security and counterintelligence briefings, and a broad criminal and personnel investigative program. They also administer the anti-terrorism assistance training for foreign police and liaison with host government security.

At the majority of our missions the RSO is the primary liaison official with host government security and law enforcement officials, gaining investigative and security support for U.S. initiatives and investigations on behalf of not only DS, but other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Annually, DS supports over 5,000 requests for assistance from U.S. law enforcement, ranging from counterfeit currency investigations to the apprehension of "top 15" fugitives. The relationships developed through this work are vital whenever assistance from the host government is needed to respond to threats against our people and facilities.

In short, all the funding we use to provide security-related "things" could well be wasted if we don't have a significant number of well-trained DS agents and other security professionals to oversee and manage our security programs.

Thanks to the supplemental appropriation, we are hiring and training 200 new Diplomatic Security agents in Fiscal Year 1999, as well as 17 security engineers, 34 security technicians and 20 diplomatic couriers. DS has established 140 new special agent positions overseas -- 75 to be assigned this year and the remaining 65 in early 2000. The Department's FY 2000 request includes \$41 million to provide ongoing salary, training and support costs for these direct-hire U.S. Government employees.

Overall we will hire and train an additional 391 employees, which include the new DS special agents, as well as critical technicians, construction project managers, support specialists, and security inspectors. To maintain the security enhancements already funded and respond to the threat conditions I outlined earlier, we must continue to receive sufficient intake of security and support personnel in future years.

We are expanding our crisis management training programs dramatically both at home and overseas. One hundred crisis management exercises will take place at posts this year, followed by 100 more in FY 2000. We have also trained about 700 employees domestically so far this fiscal year. This ambitious overseas and domestic training schedule will help ensure that our personnel are fully prepared to respond to future crisis situations.

I am pleased to report that we are already benefiting from a heightened awareness about how to react in a crisis. Just a couple of weeks ago, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, a series of blasts directed at the Uzbekistan Parliament Building went off near one of our facilities. During one car bomb blast, the building's windows shattered, but not a single employee was injured, thanks to this training.

We are requesting a total of \$268 million in FY 2000 to fund the recurring costs of the programs, which I just outlined, begun under the FY 1999 Emergency Security Appropriation. We must strive to improve security over the long-term, not to provide just a temporary fix. Without funding for the recurring costs and continuing support to sustain our initial investment, these programs will not remain viable.

In addition, we hope that Congress will resist the move to take back part of the Emergency Appropriation to fund an unrelated supplemental to respond to Hurricane Mitch, as deserving as that is on its own merits.

New and Rehabilitated Facilities

The needs, however, go far beyond providing physical security enhancements and additional staffing to our existing facilities. As I described earlier, we are now confronting an unprecedented level of credible security threats from those with transnational capabilities. Over 80% of our embassies and consulates have less than a 100-foot setback from the street, and many are in desperate need of greater security improvements.

In Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, we are moving ahead with efforts to permanently replace the bombed structures. On February 8, 1999, only six months after the bombings, we were proud to raise the American flag over the new interim office building in Dar es Salaam, where we had acquired five parcels of land, renovated 38,000 square feet of space, and constructed 10,000 square feet of new space. In Nairobi, we have begun renovating the interim office building, which should be completed and ready for occupancy by July. Planning for the new office buildings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi is on schedule. Site acquisition for both buildings is scheduled for mid-April and the design/build contract for the buildings will be awarded in late FY 1999.

We have begun a Model Embassy project to determine what our missions in East Africa should look like, seeking to improve efficiency, reduce the number of employees and others exposed to potential violence, and identify the resources needed to protect those who remain. As we build new facilities both here and elsewhere, we will tailor them to the conclusions from this project.

The FY 1999 Emergency Security Appropriation also provides \$185 million in funding for post relocation, site acquisition, design, and construction for some of our highest risk posts. We are working on several posts with these funds. Since the funds became available, we have acquired land in Doha and have started construction of interim facilities. We have made substantial progress toward acquiring four more sites.

For new construction projects, we will employ best practices to save time and money. These include:

- Using the design/build process, where appropriate, to reduce costs and time;
- Prequalifying a pool of American Architect/Engineering firms to reduce delivery time and procurement effort;

- Using repetitive design concepts for new office buildings in multiple locations; and
- Employing a single design/build contractor for multiple locations, possibly beginning with Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.

Accountability Review Board (ARB) Recommendations

Next month, the Secretary will be sending you a report on the Department's actions taken in response to the Accountability Review Board (ARB) recommendations. The Accountability Review Board investigation of the bombing incidents in East Africa, chaired by Admiral Crowe, concluded that the Department "must undertake a comprehensive and long-term strategy for protecting American officials overseas, including sustained funding for enhanced security measures, for long-term costs for increased personnel, and for a capital building program based on an assessment of requirements to meet the new range of global terrorist threats."

The Department agrees with virtually all of the Boards' recommendations, and the Department is taking a very careful look at how each can be implemented. It is also looking at our presence abroad to ensure that we are defining and operating under the appropriate parameters. To finance the construction costs for these projects and pursue the long-term, sustained security-driven capital building program recommended by the ARB report, the Department is seeking a FY 2000 appropriation as well as an advance appropriation totaling \$3 billion for FY 2001 through FY 2005. The advance appropriation will enable the Department to begin to fund site acquisition, design, and construction of new facilities at the highest risk locations.

Last month, President Clinton told the joint Congressional leadership that he is looking forward to working together on this issue. And Secretary Albright has affirmed that she is looking forward to working with the Congress as part of that dialogue.

There is no doubt that we need setback to adequately protect our people overseas, and acquiring setback -- whether by purchasing adjacent land or building new facilities -- costs money. If the U.S. Government cannot protect our people, no agency will be able to attract and retain them. Without people, we cannot represent America and our nation's interests around the world. And I can assure you, as the Secretary has stated repeatedly, we will not be intimidated by terrorists.

Review of Overseas Presence

With funding provided by the Emergency Security Appropriation, State has established a high-level panel to review overseas presence. This panel began its work this week and is slated to conclude in early summer. It is chaired by Lewis Kaden, a prominent New York attorney, and includes distinguished representatives from the private sector and government, including Admiral Crowe and Ambassador Felix Rohatyn. This interagency panel is to team up private sector involvement with representatives of key foreign affairs agencies.

The panel's mandate is to look at the level and type of representation required abroad to carry out America's foreign policy interests given resource constraints, advances in technology, and the worldwide security situation. This will include a close look at the idea of "regional embassies" and the trade-offs entailed in such an approach. The panel will also recommend criteria for reshaping our missions overseas to maximize effectiveness and security.

Conclusion

Again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing and for the support you and your colleagues have shown for the protection of our personnel overseas and the security needs of the Department of State and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. We look forward to working closely with you as we continue to implement the FY 1999 Emergency Security Appropriation and as Congress and the Administration deliberate and make crucial decisions regarding our security policies and programs for FY 2000 and beyond.

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A/FBO:PThomasson ok
S/CT:GGray (part) ok
NEA:AMorrison (part) ok
L/LM:IDiaz ok
H:Sandross ok
OMB:

**STATEMENT OF
JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, AND
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, INCLUDING
THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS**

**FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

March 12, 1999

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to provide a statement for the hearing record on our oversight of security at U.S. missions abroad. As demonstrated by the terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam last year, perhaps no greater challenge exists for the Department than providing adequate security to protect our people, facilities, and information. Many of these challenges have been highlighted in the recent *Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam*.

In my statement today, I will discuss OIG's key findings and recommendations to improve security, and I will identify key management challenges to reducing security vulnerabilities at U.S. missions overseas. I would like to begin, however, with a brief description of the role and mission of OIG's Office of Security and Intelligence Oversight, and the steps I have taken to significantly enhance the security oversight operations of my office since the August 1998 terrorist attacks.

OIG Operations

OIG's Office of Security and Intelligence Oversight has a unique role in the security oversight of U.S. missions overseas. In December 1988, the Secretary of State requested that the Inspector General establish an independent, comprehensive program of security oversight. The operations of my Office of Security and Intelligence Oversight provide oversight of the State Department (Department) programs established pursuant to the Secretary of State's statutory responsibility for security of all U.S. Government personnel on official duty and their family members, except those under a regional U.S. Military Commander in accordance with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.

Final

OIG's security inspections assess the ability of each post to respond to threats from terrorism, mob or other physical intrusion, hostile intelligence activities, and crime. Security oversight audits of the Department's management of its security resources examine the management and administration of security programs, determine the systemic causes of problems, evaluate the adequacy of internal controls, and identify ways to enhance Department operations and promote greater economies and efficiencies. Since 1989 the OIG has inspected over 150 missions and made thousands of recommendations to improve security. Many of the problems and challenges that we have routinely noted in our work have been recognized in Admiral Crowe's Accountability Review Board report.

The terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania last year challenged our current way of thinking about how we provide security for our posts overseas and have underscored the vulnerability of the majority of our missions. In response, I have taken a number of steps to significantly enhance the security oversight operations of my office. First, routine post management inspections now include an experienced security officer to ensure that every post inspected is subject to a rigorous review of physical security, emergency preparedness, and post management's attention to security. This year we plan to complete 31 security oversight inspections, and begin an audit of Diplomatic Security's overseas operations.

The new OIG Security Enhancements Oversight Division will provide oversight of the \$1.4 billion in emergency security funds, and future funding received by the Department, to enhance overseas security. OIG will evaluate physical and technical security being built into the new office buildings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. In addition, OIG will examine security for construction personnel, on-site construction, logistics for items used in the controlled access areas, and contract management at these posts. This Spring, an inspection team will evaluate the security at the interim office building in Dar Es Salaam and the temporary office building in Nairobi.

Because a large portion of the emergency supplemental funds will go toward procuring goods and services and the construction of new facilities, OIG plans to provide audit assistance to ensure that contract costs are reasonable. OIG may audit selected contractors prior to award and at contract completion, and provide technical support to Department contracting officers in reviewing contractor proposed costs.

Finally, we have expanded our security oversight inspections to include additional low and medium threat posts. In fact, two years prior to the terrorist attacks in Africa, because of our concerns about the security at low and medium threat posts, we expanded our work to conduct regionally based security inspections to include such posts. Prior to the bombings, the Department generally allocated security resources to overseas posts based on the threat category of the city in which the diplomatic facility was located. The Department used threat information from a variety of intelligence and other sources and published a classified "Composite Threat List." Threats fell into four categories: political violence, human intelligence, technical intelligence, and crime. Threat levels in each of these categories ranged from critical to low. Embassies with a "critical threat" rating were generally allocated more funds for security enhancements than those embassies with "low threat" ratings. The bombings of our embassies, however, have caused the Department and intelligence community to recognize that the threat

has changed dramatically and the allocation of resources based primarily on the use of the Composite Threat List is inadequate. In addition to the threat rating, the Department now factors in the vulnerability of all posts to terrorist attacks.

Key OIG Findings and Recommendations to Improve Security

Over the years, OIG has made recommendations in key areas that have resulted in improved security for the Department and its overseas missions. Although a program of sustained capital investment, as envisioned by Admiral Crowe, is essential to secure our diplomatic infrastructure in the future, such a program will not immediately alter the circumstances of personnel at our overseas posts today. Even a major building program will leave the majority of our missions vulnerable to some threats. Therefore, since August 1998, I have concentrated much of the work of our security oversight inspectors on measures the Department might take now to mitigate the vulnerabilities we must inevitably live with in the next several years.

Lines of Authority

A critical role of our security inspections is to remind chiefs of missions of their responsibility for the security of all official Americans at post. In our followup work in the wake of the 1997 Khobar Tower bombings, my office has placed increased emphasis on the chief of mission's role in security. I directed my office specifically to determine if there were ambiguities in the respective command responsibilities of the Secretaries of State and Defense at each mission we inspect. This is in accordance with the recent agreement between the Secretaries of State and Defense to establish formal memoranda of understanding with the chiefs of mission and regional U.S. military commands signed in December 1997. We have also pressed for clear security oversight of the increasing number of federal law enforcement activities at posts overseas. Our inspections in South America also resulted in ambassadors establishing clear lines of authority for security over all US Government personnel in the region.

Emergency Preparedness

Emergency procedures are required at every overseas post so that personnel can respond to a specific threat, protect the lives of personnel, and protect classified information from compromise. Our security inspections consistently find missions need to improve performance in such areas as updating emergency plans; conducting periodic fire, bomb threat, and emergency destruction drills; and ensuring that the American and local national staffs are aware of their roles in an emergency. Since 1989 the OIG has made almost 900 recommendations to correct these security deficiencies. In 1998, when the OIG focused security inspections on Western Hemisphere posts, a number of recommendations were made to improve mission response to natural disasters. I am pleased that our work resulted in precautions that may have reduced the impact of hurricanes on operations in Central America and the Caribbean.

The Department of State evacuates U.S. Government employees from overseas countries because of civil disorder, political unrest, or natural disaster. Since 1988 there have been 116 evacuations with thousands of evacuees. As a result of our audit on emergency evacuation, the Department reinstated its crisis management exercise program, which trains emergency action committees at posts on how to manage crises more effectively.

New Alarms and Drills for Vehicular Bomb Attacks

The Department needs to develop new alarms and drills to prepare personnel to take immediate cover in the event of a possible vehicular bomb attack. Our analysis of bomb attacks showed that the majority of casualties came from flying glass, and it also demonstrated the need for a new alarm system that could be activated by a local guard at the first instance that a suspicious vehicle threatened our facility. In the 1997 Khobar Towers bombing as well as in the attacks on the Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, there were only seconds between the recognition that an attack was imminent and the blast that followed. The Accountability Review Board also recognized the critical importance of these few seconds in saving lives and strongly recommended the immediate implementation of a "duck-and-cover" alarm and drill. In November 1998 the Department instructed all missions to develop such drills. Since then, the OIG has conducted more than a dozen security oversight inspections. At each post, the chief of mission strongly endorsed the recommendation for such drills, but an effective alarm system and procedures on how to conduct effective duck-and-cover drills still need to be refined.

Increasing setbacks

Setback is the preeminent security concern at posts overseas. Setback provides the most protection from vehicle bombs. Since 1988 OIG has made almost 300 recommendations that could effectively increase setback at minimal cost. For example, at one mission we recommended that officials work with the local government to alter traffic patterns around the mission. At another mission, we proposed creating increased setback by extending control over street parking spaces. However, at other missions the only way to effectively increase setback is to purchase adjoining properties, often at a cost of millions of dollars. In other cases, the mission itself must move to a new location to achieve any meaningful setback.

Arranging furniture

At some posts, activities as simple as rearranging furniture can protect lives. OIG has made recommendations on how office furniture might be arranged to provide greater protection from flying glass or falling debris.

Local Guards

The life and safety of our personnel depends on the local guards employed at our missions. Local guards generally work outside the perimeter of the mission and are the first line of defense. It was the local guards in Nairobi that prevented the bomb-laden truck from entering our embassy, where it would have caused even more destruction. Since 1988 OIG has made over 200 recommendations concerning local guards, including changes in local guard positions to

increase coverage of missions' perimeters. This would increase chances of providing early alert to a possible vehicular bomb attack. Other local guard issues of OIG concern include contract disputes, morale problems, and scheduling of guard coverage.

Construction Oversight

We have a 5-year history of overseeing one of the most significant construction projects undertaken by the Department -- the construction of the Moscow secure chancery. The Moscow Oversight Team was formed in response to the costly security mistakes that characterized previous construction efforts at Embassy Moscow. This team evaluates the physical and technical security being built into the new chancery, as well as the security for construction personnel, on-site construction security, logistics for items used in the controlled access areas, and contract management for the project. Our work has shown that flagging potential vulnerabilities during construction allows the vulnerability to be addressed promptly rather than waiting until construction is completed. With this approach we are contributing our expertise to facilitate project completion on time, within budget, and in a secure manner.

Likewise, we are working closely with the management teams responsible for replacing our missions in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. The OIG Security Enhancements Oversight Division will visit both posts in April 1999 to assess the adequacy of security measures in the interim facilities and to review the sites under consideration for the new office buildings. The OIG also recently participated in the review of sites for building a new Embassy in Zagreb.

Year 2000 (Y2K)

The Department's presence at more than 260 locations worldwide increases the Department's challenge to continue functioning effectively in the Year 2000. Embassies and consulates rely on their respective host countries' infrastructures to provide essential, day-to-day services such as power, water, telecommunications, and emergency services. In some countries these services could be disrupted if critical infrastructure components and control systems are not made Y2K compliant. OIG has been increasingly concerned about the impact of Y2K problems on our overseas operations. Our emergency planning reviews focus not only on whether a post's internal computer operations are compliant, but on how well a mission is prepared to deal with a Y2K failure in local power, telecommunication or other critical assets as it affects personnel, operations, and security.

OIG has conducted site assessments in 25 cities in 20 countries as part of an aggressive effort to review embassy preparedness and collect and analyze information on host country Y2K efforts. Early on, OIG found little contingency planning at posts in the event of a failure of basic infrastructure services on January 1, 2000. The Department is aware of this problem, and has sent a Contingency Planning Toolkit to all embassies and consulates to assist them in developing their respective plans.

Department Progress in Implementing OIG Recommendations

The Department has had its greatest success in correcting security deficiencies when it has had the resources available to do so. Of the 588 OIG security recommendations made in 1997, the Department recognized and agreed to correct approximately 90 percent of the deficiencies. Corrective action on approximately 50 percent were completed within one year. Most of these corrective steps, approximately 60 percent, such as developing new emergency action plans, conducting emergency drills, or improving close-of-business security procedures, were of minimal cost. Historically, approximately 90 percent of OIG security recommendations can be implemented for less than \$10,000 in each case. Nevertheless, for this group of recommendations, constant awareness and vigilance on the part of senior management at post and in the Department is required to maintain a high level of security, especially in the protection of information and the preparation for emergencies.

About 2 percent of OIG security recommendations cost more than \$100,000 to implement. These recommendations address major vulnerabilities, and include corrective actions such as the relocation or construction of chanceries, acquisition of property adjacent to existing facilities, major electrical system upgrades, construction of a safehaven, or adding additional security personnel. For these recommendations, the Department needs adequate long range planning and sufficient funding.

Major Management Challenges Facing the Department

Through our reviews, we have identified challenges facing the Department in establishing and maintaining adequate security programs. We have found that strong executive direction is critical. Funding deficiencies and insufficient long term planning also present significant obstacles. Further, controlling the official U.S. presence abroad, managing inter-agency resources, and the effectiveness of the Department's security management structure are concerns that we have identified in our work that were also raised in Admiral Crowe's recent report. Addressing these challenges will be critical to instituting sound, effective security programs throughout the Department and our missions overseas.

Executive Direction

At missions where ambassadors take a direct and obvious interest in security, deficiencies are identified and often overcome. When ambassadors fail to establish and manage a positive tone for the security program, deficiencies are found and often linger. Furthermore, it is clear that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security cannot sustain a viable program at overseas posts without the active support and leadership of Ambassadors.

Likewise in the Department, senior management must demonstrate high-level attention to security programs. Programs that cross bureau lines and do not have the active support of senior management consistently demonstrate security vulnerabilities. For example, our work has pointed out deficiencies in the Department's mainframe and communication systems security, including incomplete and unreliable security administration, inadequate training, and lack of access controls. The root cause for many of these deficiencies has been the lack of high-level

management attention, which directs the various bureaus to work together to form secure systems. A May 1998 General Accounting Office audit report reiterated our findings on the need for improved management of information security.

The Department has provided security coordination and guidance to assist in the development of some critical computer systems and software. However, in other cases, particularly telecommunications, the Department is modernizing systems without a parallel effort to improve information security. The Department has told the OIG that it has established a security program for the mainframe system to address risks earlier identified by OIG and to ensure that responsible officials are identified and kept informed about the systems security. The Department has also taken positive steps, such as forming a Security Infrastructure Working Group with broad participation, but continual senior management support is required to minimize security deficiencies.

We also remain concerned about the Department's backup capability for its major information systems. OIG has addressed this vulnerability in 3 audit reports since 1988, when Congress provided funding for the backup facility now located in Beltsville, Maryland. In 1998, the Department confirmed that it should now have the physical capacity to address a loss of unclassified mainframe systems at the Department or in Beltsville. The OIG expects to review the Department's progress in meeting our earlier concerns to ensure those backup sites and systems currently in place are effective. We will also assess whether issues involving planning, coordination, training and resources are resolved and whether contingency plans are fully tested.

Funding

Throughout our work we have reported that funding has rarely been adequate to provide for all the security enhancements recommended by the OIG. Admiral Crowe also recognized the price we have paid for the failure to invest adequately in a secure diplomatic infrastructure. The Accountability Review Board recommended the investment of billions of dollars over the next ten years to protect personnel against new, global terrorist threats.

The Department has mobilized resources across the board to begin projects funded in the \$1.4 billion Emergency Appropriation and to implement Admiral Crowe's recommendations. The Under Secretary for Management created steering groups to coordinate these initiatives and to manage the multitude of efforts undertaken since the East African bombings. She has welcomed OIG participation in all of these activities. These initiatives, however, address only the most obvious, immediate concerns, such as armored vehicles and emergency radios. The \$1.4 billion will not correct all deficiencies.

The Department faces significant challenges in balancing resource availability and security requirements. The type and level of security threats are constantly changing; posts are confronted with advances in technology that could render existing defenses obsolete; and the Department is faced with a budget that challenges its ability to ensure the safety of its people, information, and facilities. Some missions can be made adequately secure only if relocated. Our security workforce has been seriously diminished by steep personnel cuts and chronic underfunding. Much of the Department's security equipment is old, either at the end of its useful

life or already obsolete. The OIG believes that without sustained funding over many years, only partially offset by such intermittent funding increases as the current Emergency Appropriation or the increases that briefly followed the Inman Report in the mid-1980s, the Department will be unable to respond adequately to today's threats and those of the future.

Long Range Planning

Long range planning is required to reduce the vulnerabilities to our workforce, facilities, and information. To create an improved security posture overseas will be expensive for many years. At many of our missions security can be significantly enhanced only through major capital investments. Examples include relocating missions to safer facilities, building safe havens, or improving perimeter walls. The Under Secretary for Management has formed a number of coordinating groups to work on these issues. However, it is clear that the Department must institutionalize a long-range planning process that relates the security vulnerabilities of the most critically threatened posts to the budget process.

Daunting challenges face the Department in workforce planning. As I noted in an OIG review of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in 1997, the Department will lose more than 200 regional security officers to retirement or forced retirement by 2000. Even with a major recruitment effort, it will take years to rebuild the professional staff necessary to meet the security challenge and to secure our diplomatic infrastructure in the future. This has been a long-standing problem in the Department. The June 1985 *Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security* (Inman Report) cited the Department "for inattention to staffing needs, including 'gyrating' recruitment cycles for new officer personnel...." Like facilities planning, it is clear that the Department must institutionalize a process for long-range workforce planning.

Although the supplemental emergency appropriation will begin to remedy the funding shortfall for security equipment, the Department has a long way to go to correct the problems with its security equipment. A 1998 OIG audit of the maintenance and repair of security equipment found that, despite the fact that much of the Department's equipment, purchased in the mid-1980s, was reaching the end of its useful life or was obsolete, the Department's budget, as submitted to Congress, did not include funding for new equipment. OIG's ongoing audit of overseas card access systems has found similar problems. The Department lacks a uniform program for the installation, repair, and maintenance of the card access system equipment. Furthermore, we have serious reservations as to whether the card access control systems can effectively control access and protect sensitive information without the integration of other security measures.

Our security inspections have repeatedly demonstrated that security at "lock-and-leave" posts without 24-hour cleared US Marine Guard protection is often inadequate to protect classified material. Because of these concerns, the Department should institutionalize a process of life cycle management for security equipment that includes budgeting for the replacement of such equipment.

Additional Concerns

Admiral Crowe raises three issues in his report to the Accountability Review Boards that have also been a source of continuing OIG concern. First, at some missions, we question whether staffing has grown larger than we can protect. The Department must address security concerns in its overall process for allocating personnel and financial resources to meet foreign policy priorities and objectives. The OIG expects to share its views in this area with the Panel on Overseas Presence recently established by the Secretary. Second, managing interagency security resources. Security is not a service provided under the International Cooperative Agency Support Services program. There are significant funding differences among foreign affairs agencies and we must find a way to address these imbalances. Third, we share the Accountability Review Board's concerns about the effectiveness of the Department's security management structure.

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In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Department's most significant, immediate need is to ensure the safety and protection of U.S. Government assets overseas. Overcoming security challenges will require careful and long-term management attention. In some significant areas, the Department will not be able to address these problems without the assistance of Congress, and needs long-term congressional commitment to address critical security vulnerabilities. For our part, OIG will continue to devote due care and expertise to oversight of these vital security functions.

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