

RPTR KERR

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI,  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: [REDACTED]

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 19, 2015

Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room HVC-205,  
Capitol Visitor Center, commencing at 10:07 a.m.

Appearances:

For the SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI:

DANA CHIPMAN, CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

MARK GRIDER, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL

CARLTON DAVIS, INVESTIGATOR

SARA BARRINEAU, INVESTIGATOR

SHERIA CLARKE, COUNSEL

HEATHER SAWYER, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL

BRENT WOOLFORK, MINORITY SENIOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF

For the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

AUSTIN EVERS, SENIOR ADVISOR

Mr. Grider. If we can go on the record, please. This is a transcribed interview of [REDACTED] conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks of the U.S. diplomatic facility in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Mr. [REDACTED], could you please state your full name for the record, please.

Mr. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Mr. Grider. On behalf of the committee, we appreciate you taking the time and willingness to come in and talk to us today. My name is Mark Grider. I'm one of the counsel on the committee's majority staff, and I'm going to take a second here and let everybody go around the room and introduce themselves.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke, majority staff.

Mr. Woolfork. Brent Woolfork, minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer, minority staff.

Mr. Davis. I'm Carlton Davis, and I work for Chairman Gowdy.

Mr. Chipman. Dana Chipman with the majority staff.

Ms. Barrineau. Sara Barrineau with the majority staff.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Mr. Grider. Okay. Thank you, everyone. I would like to go over some ground rules and explain how the interview will proceed

this morning.

Generally, the way the questioning proceeds is that a member from the majority will ask questions first for up to about an hour. Then the minority will have an opportunity to ask questions for an equal period of time, if they so choose. Questions may only be asked by members of the committee or designated staff member. We'll rotate back and forth, 1 hour per side, till we're out of questions, and then the interview will be over.

Unlike a testimony or deposition in Federal court, the committee's format is not bound by the Federal rules of evidence. The witness, you, and your counsel may raise objections for privilege subject to the review by the chairman of the committee. If these objections cannot be resolved in the interview, the witness can be required to return for a deposition or a hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted to raise objections when the other side is asking questions. This has not been an issue we've encountered in the past, but I just want to make sure you're clear of how it -- sort of how the process works.

Mr. [REDACTED] Okay.

Mr. Grider. This session is to begin as unclassified. If any question calls for a classified answer, please let us know, and we'll reserve that answer until we move into a classified setting.

All right. In preparing for the interview, I don't believe

any of my questions will go into a classified information based on the documents that I've reviewed. But if you feel it does, please confer with Austin, and we will handle accordingly.

You're welcome to confer with counsel at any time throughout the interview, but if something needs to be clarified, we ask that you just make it known to me, and we'll clarify the question.

If you need to discuss anything with your counsel, we'll go off the record, stop the clock, and provide you an opportunity. We can even do a coffee break just to make sure you all are clear.

We'll also take a break any time it's convenient for you, so this can be every hour or when you need, you know, 15 minutes or if you need a break, just let us know. We want to -- obviously, you know our goal is to make you as comfortable as possible so that we can just obtain the facts and what happened.

As you can see, to your right, an official reporter is taking down everything you say with a written -- everything I say and you say with a written record, so we ask that you give verbal responses to all questions, yes and no as opposed to the nods of the head. I'm going to ask the reporter to please feel free to jump in any case you do respond nonverbally or I overtalk the witness or I'm too quiet, so I give her full authority to jump in at any time.

Also, we should both try not to talk over each other so it's easier to get a clear record. I want you to answer our questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible. We'll take our

time and repeat or clarify any questions, if necessary.

If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or do not remember, as you know, it's best not to guess. Please give us your best recollection. If there are things you don't know or can't remember, just say so, and please inform us who, to the best of your knowledge, may be able to provide a more complete answer to the question.

All right. Do you understand that you have an obligation to answer questions truthfully from Congress?

Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

Mr. Grider. This applies to questions posed by congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand that?

Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

Mr. Grider. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false statements. Do you understand that?

Mr. [REDACTED] Yes.

Mr. Grider. All right. Is there any reason you're unable to provide truthful answers to today's questions?

Mr. [REDACTED] No.

Mr. Grider. Okay. That's the end of my preamble. I always like to check with the minority to see if they have anything to say.

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Ms. Sawyer. No.

Mr. Grider. Okay. And my colleague here will be working in

tandem with me, so if, you know, she's always welcome to jump in and ask additional questions because our goal is to get a complete record so --

Mr. [REDACTED] Okay.

Mr. Grider. All right. We want to just sort of mark down the time. All right. We've got say what.

Mr. Evers. 10:07.

Mr. Grider. 10:07 it is. All right. We just want to get some general background questions, and, you know, look, I'll give you just sort of a general overview of where we're headed, so you know, you can be at ease.

I'm going to ask you just some general background questions about your history. I think a number of us here are really interested in the role in the DS command center, so we want to just sort of walk through that, and then the structure. You know, I've been in the command center. I haven't been in the DS command center, so if you can walk us through that aspect, and then the information that's coming in and the information that's going out and how that whole process works.

And then in order, to stay within my hour, more than likely I'm going to try to direct our attention to the day and the night of the attacks. So that's sort of the general outline. We may have to come back in order to get everything within the hour.

Mr. [REDACTED] Okay. That's fine.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q All right. So can you briefly walk us through your education and professional background prior to joining the State Department?

A So I attended [REDACTED] got a bachelor's degree in criminal justice, and I did Russian studies. And while I was with the State Department, I attended War College, so I ended up getting a master's degree in strategic planning. As far as education, that's sort of pretty much all.

Q Absolutely. So can you tell me, when did you start with the State Department, what year?

A 2001.

Q Okay. And what was your role, and sort of can you walk me through sort of your positions, starting in 2001 all the way up to current?

A Oh, yeah, absolutely.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A So in 2001, right out of special agent training, I was recruited into Mobile Security Deployments Division, and now it's Office of Mobile Security Deployment. So that was a 3-year assignment, then moved to the [REDACTED] for 2 years, and then moved to [REDACTED] as the assistant regional security officer for 3 years, and then went to War College in Norfolk, Virginia.

Q Let me just make sure I'm tracking with you. So I know



2001 to 2004, [REDACTED] Then 2 years, 2006 you were in [REDACTED]?

A In 2007 in [REDACTED].

Q Okay. And then you were in the War College around 2008; is that correct?

A Yes. So 2001, I had to go to special agent training.

Q Sure.

A So that eats up about a year of your time.

Q Fair enough.

A And then I was with security deployments, was about 3 years after that, so that's why we were in the office.

Q Okay. Fair enough.

A So then [REDACTED], 3 years; [REDACTED] was 3 years; War College was 11 months, and then to the command center for 2 years.

Q So tell me, just -- I just want to make sure we're all on the same page. So would that have been 2009 you were sort of entered into the command center?

A Oh, no. So I came out of [REDACTED] in 2010.

Q Okay. Okay.

A Did 1 year War College, basically.

Q I see.

A 2011 is when that ended.

Q Okay.

A I joined the command center then for 2 years.

Q Okay. Good. So 2011 to 2013, you were in the command center?

A Correct.

Q And then we'll come back to that time period, but let's continue on after 2013.

A 2013 to now, I've been with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] It's in office again, and yeah, so I'm assigned to them, [REDACTED].

Q Okay. And is that based here in D.C.?

A It is, yeah.

Q Okay. Very good. Thank you.

So let's go back to sort of that 2011, 2013 time period.  
When you entered the command center, what was your title and role?

A I entered as a senior watch officer.

Q And can you explain to us what exactly is, you know, the role of a senior watch officer?

A Sure. So senior watch officer basically runs the operations on the floor at the command center, so our job is to make sure that you have, you know, watch officers that are on time, they're carrying out their assignments or tasks properly. Our job is to make sure that all the protocols are followed when incidents take place, you know, notifying seniors, basically carrying out day-to-day operations inside the command center.

Q Okay. So one thing that would be helpful is can you give me just sort of the hierarchy. So you have -- start from the bottom and sort of work up. So you have the watch officers, senior watch officers.

A Let me come back down actually, from the top. It'll be easier for me to explain like that.

Q Appreciate it.

A So we have the director of the command center, the deputy director of the command center where their office is sort of off to the side, so they are not necessarily on the floor.

Q Sure.

A Then you have the senior watch officer who oversees the operation on the floor, and then you have -- the protocols are you have to have a minimum of two watch officers, and that's a requirement that we have in our policy. Then we have several contractors that are on the floor, two or three, sometimes it goes up and down, the numbers assigned to technical operations group, or TOG is what they call it. Then we have one individual assigned to personnel tracking locators, and at the time we had, I think, two or three people working on a product called, "DS Daily." It's a ~~secret, no phone~~ <sup>SECRET/NO FORN</sup> kind of product that they prepare basically, and it's sent to everybody basically throughout the intel community.

Q So just to clarify, you're saying during the time period that you were there, in addition to the director in command, the deputy director, the senior watch officer, the two watch officers, some of the contractors, the individual that is sort of the personnel tracking locator, in addition, there were individuals there. Were they contractors that were sort of --

A No. They are full-time employees, basically. Their job is to create this product called "DS Daily."

Q "DS Daily," okay. To your knowledge, is that sort of a permanent position? Are they still there today, and were they there prior to you or is that --

A They moved to a different division now, but yeah, back then, it was -- it's all under the same directorate.

Q Sure.

A They just moved to a different office where it's -- aesthetically and workplace is much more comfortable for them.

Q All right. Fantastic. So I'm going to focus on your time period, 2011 to 2013. Who was the director of the command center, the deputy director during your time period there?

A [REDACTED] was the director.

Q Did you get that? [REDACTED]?

A [REDACTED]

Q [REDACTED] Okay.

A [REDACTED] was the deputy director. The reason why I pause is there a time when [REDACTED] arrived and [REDACTED] was not necessarily in the office yet, so I'm not sure if [REDACTED] had arrived at the time or not. I don't know. I can't remember that far back, to be honest with you.

Q And can -- I'm not sure if we got the last name.

A Oh, [REDACTED].

Q So you have [REDACTED].

A [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], I'm sorry.

[REDACTED].

Q All right. And so during the 2011, 2013 time period, were there other individuals that took those positions, or were they --

A So [REDACTED] was the -- again, when we say 2011 or '12, 2011 to '12, we had a different management, and when Benghazi happened, at that time, we had [REDACTED] that had arrived, and he was the deputy director. Whether [REDACTED] had -- was already there or not, I'm not sure.

Q So during the attack, [REDACTED] was the deputy?

A Correct.

Q And during the attacks, was [REDACTED]?

A That's where I'm not sure.

Q Okay. All right. Just walking down. So you were the senior watch officer. Is there only one senior watch officer or --

A So each watch, so there's three 8-hour shifts. Each watch has a watch officer, and we had one extra senior watch officer that was -- I'm sorry, each watch has a senior watch officer, and we had an extra senior watch officer in case one of us was sick or something, you know, they could be in office --

Q Sure.

A -- to support. And each senior watch officer had individuals assigned to their team.

Q Sure.

A So you sort of stayed with your team as you moved from one shift to the next one.

Q Fair enough. Can you -- if you recall, do you know the other two to three other senior watch officers during sort of -- we'll just sort of focus in on sort of during the attack that may have been rotating through the future.

A Sure. So one of them was [REDACTED].

Q [REDACTED]?

A Uh-huh. I don't know the third one. We had a switch again. You got to understand, it's summertime, so we had a lot of transition happening.

Q Sure.

A So between one leaving and the next one coming, I'm not sure which -- who was there, but I can give you all the senior watch officers' names that I remember there.

Q Yeah, go ahead. Please.

A So we had a guy named [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], but [REDACTED] replaced [REDACTED], so I'm not sure [REDACTED] was there during Benghazi or not.

Q All right. We're going to keep working through this, but let me just move on. It's my understanding that perhaps you had -- well, I'll ask you. What was your normal watch officer time period? Was it like 8:00 to 5:00, or what was your --

A That day. So the three different shifts are from 6:30

until 2:30, I think, 2:30 to 10:30, and then all the way around.

Q So 6:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.?

A Correct.

Q 2:30 p.m. to --

A 10:30.

Q -- 10:30. And what was your shift?

A Mine, on that day, was morning shift.

Q So you had the 6:30 a.m. --

A From what I remember, it was the morning shift.

Q -- to 2:30 p.m. Do you recall, during -- you know, the attacks, who else, once you left, who had the 2:30 to 10:30 shift?

A No. I wouldn't be able to remember that.

Q You don't think it was [REDACTED], [REDACTED], or [REDACTED]?

A It was definitely not [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] had the midnight shift, so either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] must have had that one.

Q Okay. And so that midnight shift, that would have been [REDACTED]?

A Yeah. Oh, yeah, it was [REDACTED].

Q All right. Okay. So I always like to just get it -- sort of a visual of the command center. How large -- it seems like there is about 8 to 10, maybe 15 people. So how large is the room? Can you sort of give us sort of the size of the room and where it was located? I think I know, but where, you know, where in Virginia it was located?

A It was located in Rosslyn, [REDACTED],

██████████. As far as the size of the command center, maybe I want to say about 2,000 square feet, if that makes any sense.

Q And it seemed like the director and the deputy director of the command, they may have had offices?

A So their office is sort of cut off -- not cut off, but their space is partitioned right off the floor, and their doors open into the command center.

Q Okay.

A So if something happens, an alert goes off or whatever, they can actually hear it, and they can walk out.

Q And so did you -- as the senior watch officer, did you have a desk or did you have an office, or where were you -- or were you sort of walking around the night of --

A So the way -- the center is designed sort of like a horseshoe, and what you have is large screens where we can monitor stuff. In front of the screens is that sort of horseshoe, you know, tables and workstation set-up where you have the watch officers and everybody else sitting. Behind them, there's a smaller desk space for a senior watch officer where you're overlooking at everything that's happening over their shoulder, seeing the screen, and then what they're working on.

Q Very good. Okay. Thanks. That's helpful.

All right. So let's go to sort of the technology, and I think in my first hour, I'm trying to get to some places. We'll come back and maybe my colleague will help me a little bit more,



sort of flesh out some of this. But let's talk about the technology and sort of the information coming in and how it was during that time. I don't know anything about it, so you tell me there were screens, telephones, faxes, so how were you getting information?

A Okay. So domestically, you have agents that might call in for regular law enforcement-related database checks. So the watch officers have access to several different types of databases, internal diplomatic security databases, some are just, you know, let's say, regular law enforcement databases. So agents will call in and ask for the watch officers to conduct checks, maybe log entries, suppose they're transporting, you know, a prisoner from A to B, you know, they give the mileage, you know, something very routine as that.

Q Sure.

A Maybe an alarm going off from one of the domestic field offices, and where we have to notify, maybe, the supervisor of that office, hey, your alarm is going off, somebody needs to go over and check it. Phone calls, fielding regular phone calls from the general public, phone calls from different members of the law enforcement agency, some citizens that might call looking for some information.

Q So domestically, the general, you know, information coming in, requests. So let's go to the post and sort of this international, you know, Cairo.

A Okay.

Q You know, so tell us how you were getting information whether it be from Tripoli?

A All right.

Mr. Evers. Sorry. Just for the sake of the record. Are you talking specifically about any particular days or are you talking generally --

Mr. Grider. Right now, we're going just -- if you can just sort of lay a foundation of just sort of --

Mr. [REDACTED] Sure.

Mr. Grider. -- broadly you're getting information, and then we'll sort of pinpoint it. Is that okay?

Mr. Evers. Yeah. Because you mentioned Tripoli and Cairo. I wasn't sure whether --

Mr. Grider. Yeah.

Mr. Evers. -- it was broad or not.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Let's go broad right now. And then --

A Okay.

Q -- we'll sort of focus in on the time?

A Okay. I understand.

Q Go ahead.

A So from overseas, there's a variety of ways we get information. Some are emails, some are internal, basically, products or systems that were set up for agents to report back to

us.

Q So tell us, can you --

A Spot reports, variety types of reports. Some are cables. I mean, we monitor all source cable coming from different intelligence community members that might -- and then we're sort of sorting through to see if there's anything related to diplomatic security or State Department. Basically we're serving as a distribution center to route information that we see that might be of importance to different department heads or seniors to make a decision.

Q All right. So if you had to break down sort of the percentage of information when it came to sort of these posts, how would you rank, you know, majority are emails or spot report? If you had to sort of say, hey, look, you know, for an 8-hour shift, you know, predominantly the traffic was X and then the next tier was Y.

Mr. Evers. If you can say.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q If you can say.

A I guess, depending on the day, some days you might end up getting, you know, 10, 15 spot reports coming in from different post general centers. I think there are over 270 posts that we're monitoring. So during the daytime to overseas to domestic, interaction is not as much because they're probably sleeping at that time, but at -- the nightshift ends up taking the brunt of

those reports and everything else, but as far as the cables, those are just constantly coming through, yeah.

Q Okay. With respect to cables, if an ambassador or someone sent a cable, let's say someone sent a cable to the Secretary, would that cable have to come through the command center or was there another -- are there other sources or ways information could have gotten to different individuals, or were you all the one-stop shop for any information coming through initially?

A No, absolutely not. So our primary job at the DS command center was to look for anything related to diplomatic security or security-related information, not necessarily State Department-wide information. We have State operations that primarily deals with everything else. Our main goal is the security at the embassies and our personnel.

Q But if there is a cable concerning security, more than likely it would have come through your shop and been routed to the correct --

A Even if it didn't come through our shop, let's say it was at a level we couldn't see it, or maybe whoever was sending out the cable forgot to put us on the distribution list. Generally, we would either have State operations or some other agency that might call and say, hey, have you seen this cable, you know, just take a look at it.

Q Okay.

A So generally, security-related information would be flagged to us if we didn't actually see it ourselves.

Q Okay. You mentioned State operations. Where are they located?

A Out of Main State building.

Q Okay. And what was your sort of relationship or communication back and forth? How did you all communicate back and forth?

A Emails or phone.

Q Okay. So was there -- Skype is not the right word. Were there video teleconferences, or you know, could you see the other individual?

A No, not necessarily, but we had regular tours at the operation center, and watch officers from the operation center used to come over to our center to sort of become interoperable to understand what our mission was and what their mission sets are, because we had areas where we overlap a little bit, so we just basically to iron out things and make sure the personnel would understand each other's missions. We had a lot of this interaction going back and forth.

Q Could you tell me the two distinct different missions? So in your -- based on your opinion, what was sort of the State ops mission and what was your mission area?

A I know what my mission is. Theirs, I'd say everything else because I know, having been at the DS command center and seen

all the different aspects that we have, I don't think I would be able to accurately describe what their full mission set is so --

Q We're going -- we're getting closer to the night of the attacks and --

A Sure.

Q But just in a general perspective, did you have the capability to view different posts? I mean, view, let's say, Tripoli, for instance, or Cairo, you know, was there -- you know, were you able to see whether it be in real-time or feeds about certain security going on?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So can you tell me more how that worked?

A As far as how the technology works?

Q Yeah, yeah. So was it real-time?

A It is -- well, as close to real-time as it possibly can be, I guess. I'm sure there is some minutes, seconds of lapse here and there. The reason why we have contractors -- remember that's the technical operations group --

Q Correct.

A -- is so that I personally don't have to be the expert of figuring out what the lapse time is or, you know, how things work.

Q Sure.

A What I do know is some posts -- or the posts where we do have camera feeds coming from, we're able to monitor some of

that information at the command center.

Q All right. So let's take -- let's take Cairo. Were you able to monitor -- was there a monitor? Were you able to -- let's get -- direct our attention to sort of the month of September. Were you able to monitor protests or what was going on in Cairo in real-time?

A Yes.

Q And so -- and I'm just trying to sort of visualize this. Was it on a big TV screen or you look at this little feeds where you're sort of like a security manager and you're seeing little feeds, or you know, explain to us how?

A So, you know, you have cameras installed at different areas throughout the embassy.

Q Okay.

A So the perspective that you're seeing at the command center on your monitors is just that small little camera feed that you get.

Q Okay.

A So on a big monitor, the size of a maybe two or three large screens, right. Let's say 52-inch, so times that four, what we have is maybe a, I don't know. Small square boxes that are showing different camera feeds coming in at the same time, all coming from the same post, for example.

Q Sure, sure.

A So for Cairo, it might have 10 cameras.

Q Okay.

A 10 camera feeds that we're monitoring at one time.

Q And let's say Cairo had 20 or 30 cameras. Were you -- did you have the ability to sort of switch from one camera to the other? Or who was controlling -- who would control the feed that you were seeing?

A Well --

Q Does that make sense?

A As far as who's controlling the feed, I don't know, but what I do know is whatever angle the cameras are facing --

Q Sure.

A -- that's the angle it stays. We cannot manipulate the angles.

Q Okay.

A Is that what you were asking?

Q Yes. To a degree, yeah. And then let's say you were only able to see 10 cameras, but let's say there's 20 -- a total of 20 cameras.

A Right. Okay.

Q Are you able to switch from camera A to go to camera W?

A Yeah.

Q So you can control --

A You can add more --

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Mr. Evers. I'm sorry, we're getting a little cross talk, I think so, for the court reporter. I thought we'd just maybe slow



down just a little bit.

Mr. Grider. Absolutely. Thank you. Austin.

Mr. Evers. Sorry to interrupt.

Mr. [REDACTED] Yeah, you can have -- you can have however many cameras you have, however many you can fit on one screen, so total number of -- total number of screens or total number of cameras you might be able to monitor might be 10 at a time, for example; so, yes, you might have 10 up, but that doesn't mean you have to stay and continue monitoring the same thing. You can switch back and forth between other camera feeds as well.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. So that's how it worked at Cairo?

A That's how it works for all embassies.

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EDTR HUMKE.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q So with respect to Tripoli, you were able to -- essentially the same. And then what about Benghazi?

A So you know, I was shaking my head to you when you said Tripoli, but what I want to correct is I know at the time there were some issues with camera feeds coming from Libya. I don't remember monitoring Benghazi because Benghazi was, again, just another -- one of the many posts out of those 270 that we monitor. So I personally don't remember monitoring Libya or Tripoli because during my shift, Libya or Tripoli were not on a map, per se. Nothing was really happening there at the time that I knew of.

Mr. Evers. You're talking about September 11th or generally?

Mr. [REDACTED] No, no, no. I was talking about September 11th.

Mr. Evers. Right.

Mr. [REDACTED] But you're asking generally, yeah, Tripoli might have been one that we looked at whenever there were, you know, maybe an attack or some incident that took place, might have brought that camera up just to sort of monitor for a day or two, but yeah.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Very simple here, a question here. Obviously, you didn't have 270, you know, different cameras or screens to watch

every post. To your knowledge, how was that determined, which monitor you'd be focussing on Tripoli or focussing on Egypt for that given day? What was sort of the basis for, okay, we're going to look at Tripoli, or no, we're not looking at Tripoli. We're going to look in, you know, Iraq because you only had so many -- you only had the ability to look at so many locations at one point in time, so how was that sort of ranked and prioritized? Does that make sense?

A Yeah. Sure. So now I think we're getting to a SBU area. Am I okay to discuss?

Mr. Evers. And I was going to -- I meant to say this earlier. In terms of the layout of the DS command center's capabilities, as you mentioned in your preamble, we're going to try and keep the conversation at an unclassified level, but I think law enforcement capabilities, what types of information we're monitoring, how it's being routed probably falls within the category of sensitive but unclassified information that is not appropriate for broad public dissemination.

As always, we're happy to talk about specific information, if necessary, but in answer to your question, we can speak at the unclassified level here, and that includes SBU information.

Mr. [REDACTED] Okay. Fair enough. So the priorities are based on, you know, the events that are taking place worldwide.

Sometimes it's the senior watch officer that might make a decision on what cameras to monitor based on the incidents that are

happening, or sometimes it might be the deputy director or the director walking out and saying, hey, keep an eye on, you know, such and such post.

So it depends on, I guess, what the feel of the day is, what kind of reporting we're getting from overseas, what post is basically showing maybe signs of distress or maybe things that we need to keep an eye on.

Mr. Grinder. Okay. Let's go off the record for one second.

[Discussion off of the record.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q All right. So let's turn our attention -- we may come back to a little bit more specifics with respect to those earlier issues, but let's direct our attention to sort of the time period of September 10th and through, let's say, the 15th. I'll direct your attention to Cairo. So can you tell me, you know, were you there when the protest in Cairo started?

A Yes.

Q So tell me about that day. You came in what, 6:00 a.m.?

A Man, I wish I knew. I knew down to that specific time.

Q You're a person, I imagine, you probably came in at 5:00. You're a person that --

A No, no, I mean, the general time, sure, I'm sure I came an hour earlier. So Cairo, the reason why I remember Cairo is primarily because I was out to lunch. One of the watch officers

called me and said, hey, come on back, looks like Cairo is getting hit, so I run back, basically left my lunch, came back to sort of deal with that situation. As far as time-wise, so I'm saying lunch, maybe 12ish, I guess, but I'm not sure on the timing at all.

Q All right. So can you walk me through what you observed, what happened with Cairo, what information was coming in, so if you can just sort of walk me through that.

Mr. Evers. Can we go a little bit more specific about the date because you asked about several days.

Mr. Grider. Fair enough.

Mr. Evers. And I think history says there is quite a bit happening over those days.

Mr. Grider. Sure. But to your knowledge, Cairo happened on what day?

Mr. Evers. I don't -- I'm not a fact witness.

Mr. [REDACTED] I don't.

Mr. Grider. All right. Fair enough. So I think the witness and I know Cairo happened on September 11th, correct?

Mr. [REDACTED] I'm not sure on the dates, but whatever date you tell me, I'll go with the date when Cairo happened.

Mr. Grider. Okay. So we're focussing on the Cairo protests and attacks. I don't know how more specific than that.

Mr. Evers. Sure.

Mr. Grider. That's what I asked. Okay.

Mr. Evers. Just for the sake of the record, I wanted to -- I mean, let me -- actually let me discuss.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Evers. So, sorry. For the sake of the record, all I was asking to flag several days of Cairo, and then I think you were talking about a specific incident. While the witness may not have the date of the year, I think you're talking -- sorry. The specific day of the year that events happened, I think his memory is probably -- and you can ask him that -- we're talking about the day that the -- the event that you're asking about in Cairo are the same -- happened the same day as the events that happened in Benghazi. Is that what you're talking about?

Mr. Grider. That's correct.

Mr. Evers. Okay. I just wanted that clarity because you named several days, and Cairo had zero events on other days.

Mr. Grider. I think he was understanding me. So you weren't -- so I'll try to be more clear. Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q All right. So you were at lunch on the day of the Cairo attack; is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. So can you walk me through what happened on that day? You came back from lunch. What did you observe? What did you hear?

A So to clarify for you, so when we say Cairo event,

there were many events that have happened to Cairo up to that, Tahrir Square, and everything else, so the date that we're talking about specifically is the continuation of, you know, at the end of that day, sort of when the midnight shift picked up is when Benghazi happened, so we're talking about that general day.

Q That's correct.

A Okay. So, you know, I got a phone call from the watch officer asking me to come back. I walked into the command center. We had the monitors up. We had an open line with Marine security guards at post in Cairo, just sort of -- basically there's really not much you can do physically to assist them except start notifying the seniors at that point.

So you know, we started following our protocol of notifying the seniors of what was going on at post so that they were aware of what was happening on the ground.

Q Okay. So let's talk about you were saying, you had an open line, so you add an open line with post. Do you recall who was sort of -- you know, one of their RSOs, who was calling?

A So the general protocol is we just call post 1 which is manned by the Marine security guards, and any one of the Marines might pick up the phone, so as far as who it was, I'm not necessarily sure of that.

Q Okay. Were you receiving any emails, to your knowledge?

A So when I walked in, we hadn't really gotten to a point

of an email yet. What we had were some, I think, information about protests that were happening close by the embassy, but as far as when I walked into the command center, we saw people sort of trying to climb over the wall is when I was there.

Q Okay.

A So up to that point, we knew there were protests going on but we were the expecting protests to be happening anyways.

Q How did you know that there were protests taking place? How did you come to that conclusion?

A So, again, from what I remember, it was around 9/11. We knew that there were already several cables that had gone out informing all posts to be on the defensive side, basically, not to take just big travels anywhere away from post. Some posts were asked to stay in and not necessarily move from that area.

And the expectation was that there was going to be protests right around 9/11 worldwide throughout the Muslim countries and maybe even some of the other countries, but primarily we were focused on the hot areas, what we considered one of them being Cairo. You know, you had the Arab Spring and all these things happen there, so we knew there was, you know, situations going on there, so --

Q Was there any monitoring of like Twitter feeds, or did you all Twitter anything going on as sort of -- do you all have that capability?

A We don't.



Q Okay.

A We didn't at the time.

Q Okay. So social media was not being monitored as well?

A Not at the time that I remember.

Q You had mentioned seniors. So you're getting the information from the Marine security guards through the open line. You're observing that there's protests and people that are climbing over the wall, and then you said we want to relay that information to seniors. So, can you tell me who you're relaying the information to with respect to Cairo?

A To when I say seniors?

Q Yes.

A So the director of International Programs is the office that's sort of, is over the RSOs or is in charge of the RSOs or security at the embassies, so notifying maybe the desk officers within International Programs or what we refer to as the IP desk officers that were covering Cairo. From desk officer all the way up to regional director, up to -- I think she was a deputy assistant secretary. Up to Charlene Lamb, basically, who was in charge of International Programs. When I say seniors, we basically step up all the way until we notify someone at that rank, and at that point, we let them sort of inform others as they see fit.

---

Generally, an email goes out with a distribution list that has DS seniors, and I'm not necessarily sure who else is on that

list.

Q So I think you answered my second question is how did -- let's say, let's take Charlene Lamb. How was the information getting from the command center to Charlene Lamb?

A So during the day, it would be an email followed with a phone call at the same time. So the watch officer might pick up the phone and start calling to notify them. Second one is sending an email out to that mass distribution list that we were talking about.

Q So did a watch officer have the capability of picking up the phone and relaying information up, or did they relay it to you and that you were in charge of relaying the information?

A No, any of the watch officers could do that. It was based on, you know, who was doing what at the time.

Q During the Cairo protest, did you observe anyone else in the room? Were there -- did Charlene -- I'm just going to -- was Charlene Lamb there? Were there other officials coming in to observe?

A I don't recall, and I'll tell you why. After that, it wasn't just Cairo. There were many other protests that were happening that sort of continued on after Cairo, and throughout the day we had multiple seniors coming in and going back upstairs again, and then that sort of followed on the next day with Benghazi.

So every time I walked in, I would see a bunch of seniors

setting there from Charlene Lamb all the way to director level, so all of that is very fuzzy. So I don't recall whether on that very minute while we're monitoring Cairo she came down or not. But it's very common that they would actually come down just to see the cameras, to hear what's going on on the open line.

Q Okay. The operation center on the 7th floor pertaining to Cairo, what information -- so I understand you were giving information to seniors like Charlene Lamb and up. How was that information being passed on to the ops center at State?

A Via email or phone call.

Q I think I've looked at a few of the emails, and I guess I'm just trying to figure out sort of the organization. I understand it's chaotic. When you say email, did you have responsibility to sort of vet the email and then the, you know, the deputy would vet the email and then send out, or was it anybody had the ability to just sort of shoot out an email based on what they learned quickly?

A So the watch officers, as they would get the information, they would draft the email, sort of let the senior watch officer know, hey, I'm sending out this email, and then off it would go. The majority of the time, though, we try to stay away from drafting our own emails. It was really forwarding emails back and forth.

So if you think of the command center as the office that produces reports, it would be false. They are primarily there to

help distribute the information back and forth, sort of route the information where it needs to go. Phone calls, where you cannot necessarily -- right, someone has to -- somebody calls in, let's say from Cairo and says, hey, we're under attack. They don't have time to also follow up with an email, so we would write down, let's say such and such person reported they're under attack, and then that email might go over to State operations.

But as far as who was drafting emails or what was being routed to the operations center, that would be sort of coordinated amongst the watch officers and the senior watch officer, but one person wouldn't have monopoly over who's going to write that or who's going to edit it.

Q I'm using this name just because it's the one name that I think you recall with respect to a senior, so I'm just using this as an example. So a senior came in, let's say it's Charlene Lamb, did they have the ability to ask questions and get realtime information, or would you just turn around and sort of tell them what you were seeing? How did that interaction go? Would the senior sort of be sitting in the back wall or were they able to engage and watch and form their own conclusion?

Mr. Evers. And can I just ask, are you asking in general is that something seniors can do, or did you -- or specific memories about what DS -- DAS Lamb did?

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Mr. Grider. That's good. That's good.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q So in general. Let's go in general.

A In general. Any of the seniors can walk into the command center at any time.

Q And interact? Ask questions?

A Just to say hello, talk to people, even sometimes test you. Hey, what would do if this happened or that happened, you know. Really just to determine what the protocols are, you know, who they'd be notifying, that kind of stuff, so yes, there's -- there's plenty of interaction.

Watch officers all know that throughout the day and even sometimes at midnight you might have a senior watch -- or senior, DS senior walk in and say hello to you or just sit down or maybe use the workstation, so it's possible, yes.

Q Are you familiar with the name Eric Boswell?

A Yeah, of course.

Q Can you tell me what's his title and role?

A Under Secretary of Diplomatic Security. Ambassador Boswell is what we refer to him.

Q And do you recall on, you know, during the Cairo protest and the attacks, do you recall --

A You know, I think I misspoke. He's not under secretary. I think Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security is what his title is.

Q Would he be considered one of the seniors in your definition of a senior?

A Oh, absolutely.

Q Okay. Do you recall seeing him on September 11th or September 12th while you were there?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. I'm going to get this name wrong. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] or --

Ms. Clarke. [REDACTED]

Mr. [REDACTED] Oh, [REDACTED]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Yes.

A He's a senior. Again, I wouldn't recall if I saw him personally, yeah.

Q But you would -- as far as your definition of getting information to seniors, [REDACTED], Eric Boswell, Charlene Lamb would all fall in that category?

A Those names should be in the DS seniors' distribution list, if that's what you're asking about.

Q Okay. Yeah. And then what about, are you familiar with [REDACTED]?

A I know [REDACTED].

Q And what was his role?

A He was not at the command center. I don't remember what his position was at the time. I don't recall actually, but I know he was somehow involved. Maybe he was special assistant or -- but I'm not sure what his title was at the time. He's a

special agent as well.

Q In your role, did you interact with him or obtain information from him?

A Again, I don't remember what his position was. If he was a -- maybe a desk offer for IP, it's very possible that we interacted over time, but it's been several years also.

Q Sure. I think you answered this question, but I just want to make clear in my notes. You stated earlier about sort of it was known that there was a protest in Cairo, and I think you answered it, but I just want to make clear. I'm looking back at my notes. What was sort of the basis of that sort of knowing that there was a protest?

A Well, the basis was 9/11, right, so we knew we were getting close to 9/11. That date was sort of significant itself. We knew that there was a cable that had already gone out to a post sort of notifying people to be on an offence, basically on be vigilant as far as with their travels, and you know, restricting their travel or so, and we were sort of expecting protests to sort of take place because that was -- that had been the precedent from the year before and years before, from what I understand.

So the expectation was, yes, something was going to happen. As far as where this was going to take place, we were not sure.

Q Did any of your officers observe protests or --

A You mean in Cairo?

Q Yes.

A Well, Cairo had -- if you remember, at the time, I think there were many protests going on, not necessarily in front of the embassy, but you know, at Tahrir Square. Again, I had been to Cairo before, but I'm not necessarily sure where those protests were. I know the embassy is very close to Tahrir Square, so it would be very easy for the protestors to sort of, you know, mingle their way over to the embassy.

Q Okay. So let's move from Cairo to around something like 2:00 after lunch to -- to your recollection on sort of the attacks and what happened, you know, from 2:00 on, on September 11th?

A 2:00 p.m. on, you mean?

Q Yes.

A See, I wasn't there, so I wouldn't know.

Q So you went home?

A Yeah, I went home.

Q You told me that you went home. What information -- I mean, you had a Blackberry, I imagine. What information did you receive at home, or what were you --

A So I went home, changed my clothes, went to work out. After I worked out, I came out, I think it was maybe 10:00, close to 10:00 p.m. or so. And I saw there were a few emails from some of the watch officers. Remember, we're a team, in a sense, right, so some of the watch officers had called me asking if they were allowed to go in to help out.



Really, what they were looking for is would I authorize them to go and work overtime, and I was not so sure what was going on. And I said, why, is there something going on, they said yes. Looks like there's something going on in Libya, you know, is it okay for us to go in. I said, yeah, if they're looking for people, that's fine.

The reason they were asking that question is because that morning they had to come back in to work 6:00 a.m., so 10:00 a.m. -- I mean, 10:00 p.m. for them to go back to work, that's the reason, when I was asking are we okay, because I still have to have enough manpower for me continue my operations in the morning.

So I sort of authorized that and said, okay, no problem, but I was close enough to Rosslyn where I could actually drive in and see what was going on. So, you know, in my work out clothes, I walked in, and sure enough, multiple seniors sitting around the command center, everybody sort of hunched over their workstations, you know, very focused, phone calls coming in, and so I realized something big was going on but it wasn't my watch for me to take over.

The deputy director was there, the senior watch officer that was in charge of that shift was there, and they had, at that point, both of the watch officers from my team that were already present. So they had enough manpower on the floor, and I asked, hey, do I need to help out, and they said, no, you know, it's getting late, you need to be ready to go tomorrow morning. Why

don't you go home and sleep and, you know, we'll see you in the morning.

Q Do you recall who you may have observed when you went in at 10:00 p.m.?

A I do definitely remember Charlene Lamb and Eric Bultrowicz -- no, not Eric. Scott Bultrowicz. I'm sorry if the names are messed up. I'm sorry.

Q What, if anything, did you -- did you have a conversation with them at all or --

A No, they were all very focused on what was going on. I know my conversation was primarily with the deputy director, just to say, hey, do I need to be here -- and I was in my workout clothes and we had seniors there, so it wasn't really appropriate for me to stay there.

Q Anyone else that you observed?

A You know, [REDACTED], who was running the shift, you know, some of the watch officers there, my two watch officers that were there, you know. You want their names?

Q Yeah, that would be great.

A Okay. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

Q Okay. When you went in with respect to feeds, did you observe Tripoli?

A I don't remember.

Q You don't know if that was up?

A I don't remember that.

Q And you don't recall what feeds were up at the time when you went in at 10:00 p.m.?

A The seniors were more important to me than the monitors, so --

Q I understand. I understand. Fair enough, fair enough. I'm just asking. Okay. So you went home, and then what, you know, on September 12th, what happened?

A Again, the dates, I'm not sure if it was the 12th or not, but basically the next morning, you know, 6:00 a.m., you know, I came in. The whole crew that was there continued working, and it was sort of hard for them to relinquish, sort of move on, so you know, that turnover generally takes about 15, 20 minutes. Depending on what kind of events you have going on where I have to brief you, but just about that 20 minutes or so, you know.

This turnover ended up lasting for a couple of hours before we could get them out of their chairs and send them home. Primarily because everybody was sort of too focused and there was just too much going on.

They had been working on a lot of the information throughout the night, so they didn't want to necessarily get up and walk away and take that information with them, so they want to sort of describe everything, so yeah.

Q We'll talk a little bit more of sort of that turnover process. I want to get to just a quick emails, but let's touch on that. Did anyone brief you about what happened, or how did you

get up to speed quickly? How did that take place?

A So yeah, so the senior watch officer at some point as the watch officers are conducting their operations, senior watch officer will brief the new incoming team as to what was going on, where they are at the time, you know, what are some of the tasks that they've left that need to sort of be completed.

So again, I don't remember the specifics, but that's the general way to pass the information to the next team. And then as the watch officer sits down, as they're replacing the watch officer that's seated at that workstation, they have their own interaction, hey, you know, can you send out these last two emails, or I'm finished with this, or I'm expecting a phone call from such and such, so there's some briefings going on there as well.

So senior watch officer does his thing for about 20 to 30 minutes. When he's done, the watch officers basically approach the floor and then they get a briefing from the watch officers themselves, and they sit down and start logging in and, you know, sort of taking over the workspace.

Q Did you receive any -- I understand there is sort of verbal briefings. Was there any documents that you may have received, notes or documents?

A I am sure I received notes and documents. I just don't remember what they were or -- there was too many papers being printed at that time, sort of making sure we had enough folders

for seniors to be able to review what was going on throughout the night, so I'm sure there were a lot of documents being made.

Q So bottom line is the way you got up to speed was verbally and you would have had documents that would have been sent throughout the night as well?

A And the emails, too, as we sit down, and then yeah, yeah.

Q All right. Let's just take a look at one quick email here. I'll mark this as exhibit 1.

A Okay.

[REDACTED] Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Do you recall this exhibit 1?

A I mean, I see the conversation is mine, so --

Q Okay. We're going to sort of move back and forth, but first, let's just start off with document exhibit -- document number C, as in Charlie, 05390678. It's an email. Why don't you walk me through just the "from" and the "sent," and you can tell me -- tell us who the two individuals are, if you recall, just at the top?

A So [REDACTED], they are all special agents. Some, I don't remember again what their positions were at the time, but all of them are special agents assigned to the SO. One -- you know, as far as what their specific assignments were at the time,

I'm not sure. I think [REDACTED] was in IP, International Programs. [REDACTED], obviously, it says Pesh, he's got parenthesis, so he's out of Peshawar. [REDACTED], and then [REDACTED], I don't remember again what their positions were at the time, but they're all special agents.

Q Okay. So let's go to the -- it appears that these documents were together, so let's go to the second page.

A Okay.

Q Where it states the subject is "White House sees no sign of Libya attack premeditated." Do you recall seeing this email or reviewing this statement?

A I don't recall it, but I'm reading it now. So yeah.

Q What's your understanding of this statement?

Mr. Evers. The headline of an AP story; is that what you're asking about?

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Or just the -- yeah, the entire -- or the headline, or what's your understanding of it?

A That basically the White House says that there's no indication that this was a premeditated attack.

Q And then let's turn to the bottom of page 1 where I believe you responded on Tuesday, September 18th, 2012, at 1:14 p.m.

A Yeah.

Q Can we go through the two. I think these are some -- I'm not sure if there's a new individual on here. Are these all

the same individuals throughout? Let's see. Well, can you tell us, you know, you know, who are these individuals, why were you sending an email to them?

A So they're all special agents. As far as what their positions were at the time, I don't remember what their positions were, but all of them I pretty much have known all throughout my DS career.

Q Sure.

A I know [REDACTED] became the deputy RSO in Libya. So basically somehow all of them had some sort of an association with protests, or the events that were going on, basically, the protests that we were monitoring and that kind of stuff. As far as my question, is that what you're saying?

Q That's correct. You stated. Yeah, go ahead.

A Yeah. So I'm just reading exactly what this says here, the front page. It says, Deadly attacks on U.S. consulate in Benghazi was -- they have no indication that the protests were -- or "the attack was premeditated. Violent protests appear to have been sparked by an anti-Islamic film made in the U.S., which at the time, the night of Benghazi, we all sort of assumed that this was just a continuation of protests just carrying it on to a different country.

Later on, as time went on and more facts started coming out as far as what had happened, what we realized is there wasn't necessarily a protest that took place, that maybe there was

something else there. As far as what that was, we weren't sure, but we knew for sure there was no protest, so there had to be more investigations on that point.

Q So your statement at the time, you were saying that there was no protest?

A So no, what I'm saying is at the time, can you believe this.

Q Right.

A Is where I probably have either seen evidence or have heard from people around me that there was no protest.

Q Okay. Okay. Got it.

A When I say no protest, what I mean is a mass protest that we saw in Cairo.

Q I understand. So making that distinction, that's why we sent some time on Cairo, the basis of your conclusion that there was a protest in Cairo, you had certain information that formed that conclusion, correct, in Cairo?

A Absolutely, and it wasn't just Cairo, right. So right after Cairo, we had, I think, Sudan that got hit.

Q Right. I understand.

A And then right after Sudan, I want to say -- I don't know, but I know there were several posts that were being attacked at the same time that day.

Q Right on. Okay. So let's walk up to the second email. Can you walk us through who is, you know, from [REDACTED] --



████████████████████ was that individual, he would have --

A Special agent. Yeah, basically he's just basically saying was there really no protest there going on or was there any rioting in Benghazi reported prior to the attacks, and I said, no, no rioting that was reported.

Q What was the basis of that zip -- you actually said, "zip, nothing, nada." What was the basis of that?

A Probably referring to was there any rioting going on in Benghazi the night of the attack. So --

Q Right. But what's the basis of your statement? You could have said, "well, maybe."

A I guess the basis would probably be on the reports that I had seen at that point.

Q So based on the information that you had received at that point, you formed the conclusion that there was no rioting reported prior to this?

A I hadn't seen any evidence of any rioting that was reported there.

Q Okay. So based on that and these questions, did you communicate that conclusion to the seniors? Would that have been communicated to the seniors?

A I don't think so. I think this was primarily a conversation between colleagues and me where they're asking me a question. I'm sort of giving them my honest opinion of what I've seen.

Q Sure.

A So yeah, no. If a senior had asked me that, I would absolutely have told them exactly the same thing.

Q And so, to your knowledge, did that ever occur?

A As far as senior -- it didn't have to occur because they could probably -- they had the same evidence, so I'm assuming they probably came to the same conclusion. They had more information than I did, so --

Q And that conclusion was there was no rioting in Benghazi prior to the attack?

A That was my conclusion based on information that I had.

Q You received?

A Seniors might have had a lot more, and they might have completely disagreed with this, but I don't see the information they see. I'm not privy to that information.

Mr. Evers. Okay. So we are at 11:07. You want to take a break?

Mr. Grider. You need a break? You need one, for the record?

Mr. Evers. For the record, yes.

Mr. Grider. Go off the record for a second. Thank you.

[Recess.]

RPTR MCCONNELL

EDTR HUMKE

[11:22 a.m.]

Mr. Woolfork. We are back on the record. It is currently 11:21.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q Agent [REDACTED], my name is Brent Woolfork, on the minority staff. I am joined by our counsel Heather Sawyer. We appreciate you being here today. We appreciate your service, and actually coming in from where you were.

We wanted to actually continue with exhibit 1, which was the chain of emails that originated with an article. So I think you have that in front of you, so we are just going to kind of go through that document.

A Sure.

Q Now, the bottom of page 1 I notice it's an email that you had sent to several individuals which you had identified in the past hour, and that is an email dated Tuesday, September 18th at 1:14 p.m. Does that look correct to you?

A Correct.

Q It's forwarding an article that's entitled "White House sees no sign Libya attack premeditated." And that appears to be an AP article. Does that look correct to you as well?

A It does.

Q And I just want to kind of just work through that article just a little bit more, and ask you some questions along the way. First paragraph says, "The White House," quote, "The White House says it doesn't have any indication that last week's deadly attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was premeditated. But White House spokesman Jay Carney says matter still is under investigation and that assessment could change."

In the past hour that you had said that more investigation, I believe in your words, needed to occur, is that right?

A Of course.

Q And then within that, you know, he notes, Mr. Carney notes a possible in-depth assessment could change in the article. Would you agree that in situations like this, that initial assessments that might be made could change as more information is collected?

A Absolutely. Of course.

Q And just looking at that second paragraph, that starts with Carney, quote, "Carney said that so far there is no evidence to back up claims that the attacks that killed four Americans, including U.S. Ambassador to Libya were planned. He said the violent protest appears to have been sparked by anti-Islam film made in the U.S." And you had commented on that earlier.

~~Now, you had indicated on the day of the Cairo incidents that you had received calls for inquiries from other posts around the~~

world. Is that right?

A I don't remember -- can you give me a little more on what you mean?

Q Sure. On the day of the Cairo protest --

A Oh, you mean as far as more protests happening at other posts?

Q Right. You had said, I think, other RSOs had contacted the command center?

A Oh, yeah.

Q Did you have any indications from what -- is there any motivations to the attacks on those other facilities?

A Motivations, I'm not sure, but --

Q Okay.

A -- what we did have is the protests, mass protests happening at several different embassies that we were trying to monitor. So the precedence at that point was, look out for mass protests to continue on happening at other posts as well, not just, you know, Cairo, or it's not necessarily limited to just one country.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Did you hear from any of those RSOs, or anyone about, this article references anti-Islam film made in the U.S. Were you hearing at all from any of those calls on anything about a potential protest sparked by an anti-Islam film?

A Well, I know we were expecting protests, in fact, we were sort of thinking that this would be the cause of protests initially, or it would spark up protests. It might be one of the reasons why protests might actually begin or pick up. As far as whether that was the only motivator for a protest, I'm not sure. But we were monitoring that.

Q And one of the potential reasons that people might protest that you had heard about was this anti-Islam film on that day --

A Of course.

Q -- on 9/11. And it sounds like from what you're saying that there was concern that there would be, I'm going to use the term, spillover that what was happening in Cairo in terms of protests could carry over and spill over to other places in the region. Was that a prevalent concern?

A It was.

Q And was it the sense that that was indeed, in fact, happening on that day on 9/11?

A It was happening.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q I just wanted to point to the third paragraph in the article. Carney says, quote, "Carney says investigations will 'follow facts wherever they lead.' He says the goal is to find out what happened and why and to track down those responsible for the deaths."

At that point on September 18th, did you have any reason to doubt Mr. Carney's sincerity in terms of tracking down those who were responsible?

A I don't know. I know what Carney's position is, but I don't know him personally, so I have no way to doubt him or not doubt him.

Q And in particular, quote, "follow the facts wherever they lead," you had indicated this -- again, this is on September 18th that you had seen information and talked with individuals within DS that indicated that protests had not occurred. And you had said that if a senior official had asked you about that, you were given the conclusion that there had been no protests, is that right?

A Not that there had been no protests, but we had no reported, there were no reports prior to the protest.

Q Okay.

A So basically it says, was there any rioting in Benghazi reported prior to the attack? That's what I was referring to on this.

Q Okay. And you had mentioned that it was possible that the seniors may have had more information than you did?

A Of course.

Q Is that correct?

A Yeah.

Q Would it be possible that they might have intelligence

or information that would have caused them to think that there may have been a protest prior to the attacks?

A Absolutely.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q In terms of that phrase that Mr. Carney uses here, "investigators will," quote, "follow the facts wherever they lead," end quote, and just setting aside Mr. Carney, based on your experience and the people you were working with in DS did you have any reason to doubt that any of those folks, the seniors that you were routing information to, were doing anything other than trying to follow the facts wherever they led?

A No.

Q And that everyone was -- any reason to doubt that everyone was doing their best-faith effort to determine what the ground truth facts were?

A Not one bit.

Q And at the time you sent this on September 18th, and to the best that you can recall, was that effort, that investigation, the effort to find the facts and then follow them wherever they would lead, was that still ongoing?

A I'm sure it was.

Mr. Woolfork. So Agent [REDACTED], we are asking these questions because over the past few years a large part of a lot of the congressional investigations has been on whether or not there were protests that had preceded the attacks in Benghazi on



September 11th, so I'm just going to kind of ask you more about that, specifically, kind of into the process itself.

Ms. Sawyer. And just to be clear, not only whether or not there were protests, but how quickly the determination as to whether the protests occurred in Benghazi, as they had elsewhere, and then how people spoke about it.

So a lot of the focus of the investigations has been not only on factually when was an assessment made across the board about the protests, but how quickly that was made, and how it was talked about. So we did want to ask you some questions about that.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q So 3 days after, on September 14th --

A I just want to clarify something, though.

Q Sure.

A Because we are talking about rioting and then protests. And in my mind those are a little bit different things. So, I don't want us to use that sort of as if it's the same word. I just want to make sure that I'm clear on what you guys are asking for as well.

So are we asking about rioting, or are we talks about protests? Because protests are basically when people gather up outside and they are standing and screaming, and yelling, and that kind of stuff. Rioting is when people are, basically, you know, looting, you know, things similar to that nature is what I'm picturing in my mind. You know, looting stores, you know, that's

rioting, violence, that's what I'm picturing in my mind, right?  
So that's part of the discussion.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So based on that distinction, I'm going back to exhibit 1 just for a moment. [REDACTED]

A Yes.

Q Sent you a note that asked you as to whether there was any rioting in Benghazi reported prior to the attack. You then rely, "Zip, nothing nada." And rioting, in your terminology, meaning looting --

A Yeah, outside basically where there is, you know, indications that something has gone wrong outside, yes.

Q And then what about the notion of was there any protesting? You had said protesting is when in your terminology people come to an occasion --

A Gather.

Q -- and gather and vocalize their --

A Protest.

Q -- disagreement, protest, whatever. What about that notion? Was there any report, any protesting reported prior to the attacks?

A Not that day that I know of, no.

Q So your answer would have been the same?

A Yes.

Q And again, with regard to that, your honest opinion as

of the 18th would have been that there was no protest that preceded the attack?

A Yes, according to this, absolutely.

Q And that information and you have knowledge that the other folks that were seeing it, your seniors in particular, may have had additional information that potentially could contradict what your honest opinion on that date was, is that correct?

A Of course. That's correct.

Q And then just to be clear, because I have understood you to say you don't recall ever sharing your opinion with your seniors, certainly if they asked you, but you don't recall having offered it, and I think you have explained very well kind of the role of DS command center as routing information that comes in, and making sure it gets to the right stakeholders and decisionmakers. It wouldn't have been part of your role to make an assessment as to the underlying substantive assessment as to what motivated the attack, would it?

A No, it wouldn't.

Q Or to determine as a factual matter whether protests preceded the attacks, would that have been part of your job?

A Assessing it, no.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q Agent ██████, I want to ask, were you aware on September 14 of 2012 that Congress requested unclassified talking points about the attacks from the intelligence community?

A Say that again one more time. I'm sorry.

Q On September 14, 2012, were you aware that Congress had requested unclassified talking points from the intelligence community?

A I'm not. I don't remember that. I don't recall.

Q Okay. I just want to enter into the record, Exhibit No. 2.

[██████████ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Woolfork. If you would please just review that document.

Mr. ██████████ Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. And Mr. ██████████, as you review it, just to ground you, it is a two-page document, and to identify it for the record, the first page shows that it is the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on the terrorist attack on the U.S. facility in Benghazi. And we have just excerpted page 43, which is also appendix one of that report, and wanted to just ask you a few questions about that appendix one.

Mr. ██████████ Okay.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q Agent ██████████, I just wanted to point to page 43 which is the second page of the document, which is also appendix one, and looking at the middle of the page, the second paragraph. It says there that, quote, "The final unclassified version of the CIA talking points as provided to HPSCI," which is the House Permanent

Select Committee on Intelligence, "on September 15, 2012, read as follows: The currently available information suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi and subsequently its annex. There are indications that extremists participated in the violent demonstrations."

It continues: "The assessment may change as additional information is collected and analyzed as currently available information continues to be evaluated."

Now, the talking points in this document began with the CIA went through an interagency process. Were you at all aware of that interagency process --

A No.

Q -- at the time. And so given that you were not involved in the interagency process, would you have had a chance to see the initial talking points from which these -- what I just read sprung?

A No.

Q And would you have known whether or not Deputy Secretary Mike Morell was responsible for finalizing those points?

A No.

Q These points which I just read indicate that the intelligence community's assessment were that demonstrations preceded attacks which were spontaneously inspired by events in

Cairo, which we discussed earlier today. Do you know when IC changed its assessment to reflect its later conclusion that there had been no protests in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Okay. I want to introduce Exhibit No. 3.

[REDACTED] Exhibit No. 3  
was marked for identification.]

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q And this is a report from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence entitled, "Investigative Report on the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012."

And this was published on November 21, 2014. And again, I will give you a few moments. And this is a two-page document. The first page is the title page and then the second page is a part of the executive summary and I want to ask you a question about a particular paragraph.

A Is there a page that you were going to give me?

Q Yes, I am going to give it to you.

A Okay, no problem.

Q Agent [REDACTED], I had mentioned earlier that I was going to talk about a specific one, and that would be the fifth paragraph which starts with, "Fourth, the Committee concludes."

A Okay.

Q I'm just going to read into the record that fifth

paragraph. Quote, "after the attacks, the early intelligence assessments and the administration's initial public narrative on the causes and motivations for the attacks were not fully accurate. There was a stream of contradictory and conflicting intelligence that came in after the attacks. The Committee found intelligence to support CIA's initial assessment that the attacks had evolved out of a protest in Benghazi; but it also found contrary intelligence, which ultimately proved to be the correct intelligence. There was no protest. The CIA only changed its initial assessment about a protest on September 24, 2012, when closed-caption television footage became available on on September 18, 2012, (2 days after Ambassador Susan Rice spoke), and after the FBI began publishing its interviews with U.S. officials on the ground on September 22, 2012."

So this conclusion of the House Permanent Select Committee, their conclusion was that the assessment wasn't changed until September 24th, and then was based on additional evidence in the video, and then actual interviews with individuals that were on the ground in Benghazi. So this is about 2 weeks after the attacks.

We have touched upon this and I want to make sure it is clear for the record, was it your sense during that 2-week period that additional information was being collected and analyzed in order to get the fullest picture possible on what happened on the night of September 11?

A Yes.

Q And so as through that process, is it possible that assessments could have changed as that information came in?

A Of course.

Q As the HPSCI report noted, there was contradictory intelligence. And is that often the case in a crisis situation that you might get initial intelligence or information that might be contradicted later?

A Of course.

Q Okay. Now, in terms of this process, I assume -- we had talked about an email that you sent on September 18th and it wasn't until 6 days later, according to the HPSCI report, that the initial assessment or the correct assessment, essentially, was finally made. Now, in terms of these assessments, do you have any reason to believe that anyone is doing anything other than his or her best-faith, good efforts to determine the truth and convey that information with regard to what happened?

A No.

Q Did you get any sense that anyone is kind of concealing the truth in order to avoid embarrassment or to perpetuate a false scenario about these acts?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone is concealing facts for political advantage?

A Say it again.



Q Do you have any evidence that anyone is concealing the facts that occurred for political advantage?

A Not that I know of.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Were you yourself ever pressured into failing to route any particular information to the seniors, or pressured into concealing yourself the fact that you were coming to learn upon which you based your opinion that there had been no reporting of a protest or rioting before the attack in Benghazi?

A You have got to repeat that question one more time.

Q Sure. Were you yourself ever -- well, did you yourself ever fail to pass on information that you learned in the course of -- and I understand you weren't there the night of, so you were not, and just to be clear for the record, you left at 2:00, before the Benghazi attacks started, you were not in any official capacity until the next morning around 6:00 a.m., is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q So you yourself were not a recipient of any of the information that was either coming in on the line or by email, or wherever that information came in during the attacks, is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q So whatever information you then did learn yourself from the time you came in on the morning of September 12th at 6:00 through, let's say September 24th, when the intelligence committee

formally changed their assessment about the protest preceding the attacks, did you ever fail to send on the full and complete information that you received?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q And were you ever pressured not to just send on everything that you learned and asked to conceal any particular facts?

A No.

Q And do you know of anyone else who was asked to conceal facts or refused to send on --

A No.

Q -- the information?

So I think now we just want to return back to the time on September 11 that you were in the command center, so kind of when your shift started. I assume your shift started that day at 6:30?

A Yes.

Q And ended that day at 2:30, as would have been on September 11?

A The schedule was, but I'm not sure if it ended at 2:30.

Q So roughly sometime that afternoon?

A I'm not sure.

Q Okay. And we did want to talk to you more broadly about -- we have heard a little bit about Cairo from you, and what was happening with Cairo. You had mentioned that you believed that there was also unrest and protests throughout the region, so

we wanted to walk through with you a little bit of that, and get a sense from you as to how widespread that was, what information was coming in. So, if you could just share with us, was Cairo the first --

A So Cairo was the first one that I was aware of as far as having them up on -- as far as us monitoring at the command center. And I'm not sure how much time had lapsed before we heard, I think from Sudan the same thing, you know, mass protests outside, people starting to climb over the wall; a phone call comes in from the RSOs, or Regional Security Officers, sort of discussing, hey, you know, what their security defensive measures were at the time.

You know, they are taking people to the safe havens, whatever the protocols are that they are activating. And our job was primarily notifying now the desk officers for that specific country.

I remember I think Yemen was the next one that all of a sudden started getting protests where, you know -- we had one of the hotels there was transformed into a diplomatic transition center, or I forget what the correct terminology is, but basically where we housed a lot of our employees, and at some point we decided just to completely take over that compound.

There were people protesting outside of that area which we couldn't necessarily see on the cameras because that was away from, you know, any of our camera feeds. But we could see the

embassy in Yemen, for example, and we could see people protesting. And I'm sure there were a couple of other countries but I just don't recall what other ones were --

Q And as the information came in, you said one of the group of individuals you had notified would be the relevant desk officer for Yemen --

A The countries, yes.

Q -- or Sudan, or Egypt --

A Correct.

Q -- for Cairo. Who else to the extent you can give us a sense of the universe of folks you would be shooting information out to, would it be only State Department individuals? Would it also be individuals at the Department of Defense? How broadly does the Diplomatic Security routing go?

A So the way that the routing works, we forward a lot of the information that we want to share with the intel community or other agencies to State operation, and they have embeds, military embeds or, you know, liaison officers that work inside the op center, who then will cable that report to their agencies via their own means, you know, whether it be email, or cable, or whatever, you know, measures they have in place, plus phone calls.

You know, just notifying the different agencies such as, you know, National Counterterrorism Center, for example, would be one. We have an agent that is assigned to the White House situation room that would be sort of relayed over to the White House. We

have an agent that is assigned to DHS, Department of Homeland Security, so we would notify him. So we would basically get the word out to different agencies through our liaison officers as well.

Q And so at that point to the extent you can recall, you and the DSCC during your shift were monitoring at least one, two, three, four, or five different countries where protests were going on. So you guys were juggling, getting all of that information, shooting all of that information out. Is that accurate?

A That's correct.

Q And then presumably all of the people who are receiving it also were simultaneously monitoring as many situations as you all were monitoring, so --

A Of course.

Q -- there was a number of different situations. And you had indicated that -- did you, even though you weren't there, you said you found out about the attacks by being notified by some of your employees. And you then did come into the command center. Do you recall whether you had a sense, and I think you may have indicated this before, whether you initially just even on that night, had a sense with regard to Benghazi as to whether it was unfolding similarly to the other countries earlier that day, deriving from protests?

A In fact, that was my expectation when I showed up. I basically thought it must be the same thing protesters are sort of

carrying on from one country to the next one because there was already a precedent set from the earlier events throughout the day.

So when I came in my expectation was to see that exact thing, mass protests. But like I said, I mean, I was not expecting all the seniors to be sitting in a room. So my attention, instead of being at the cameras or asking people questions, it was more of a, obviously something has gone wrong. You know, do I really need to be here, or do I need to go? And just basically having a discussion with my boss.

But my own personal opinion at the time was definitely, there must be a huge protest that has started in Benghazi, or not actually in Benghazi, but something has gone on in Libya as well. But yes, the first thing that -- first assumption on my part was it must be a protest.

Mr. Woolfork. Agent [REDACTED], I just want to show you a table from September 11, 2012, and I will enter this as Exhibit No. 4.

[REDACTED] Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q And it's a cable from Main State to the American Embassy in Tripoli, as well as to all diplomatic consular posts, and this was sent at 2225 Zulu, which I understand is 6:25 p.m. Eastern.

A And there's a certain paragraph you want me to look at

or, did you want me to read through the whole thing?

Q No, I want to point you to paragraph 2, and then paragraph 3. So that's a good chunk of it, those two.

Ms. Sawyer. And paragraph -- yeah, you said --

Mr. [REDACTED] I will wait until I hear it.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q Now, just to do some housekeeping, I wanted to point to the bottom of page 2. I'm sorry, the Bates number, the document number is C05391108. Agent [REDACTED], on the bottom of page 2, it says, drafted by, quote, "DS/TIA/ITA-[REDACTED]," and quote, "Approved by: SBULTROWICZ." Could you just tell us who or what are DS/TIA/ITA, and [REDACTED]? Is that a location, or a person, or both?

A I think [REDACTED] is the name of an individual that is in charge of -- well, I'm not sure he was in charge, but was working in intel and threat analysis directorate.

Q Okay. And where is intelligence and threat analysis director located? It that within --

A It's within the same building where the command center is located.

Q Okay, and then so the intelligence threat analysis is the ITA, and do you know what the TIA is?

A TIA is threat intel analysis. So ITA falls within that. So ITA is a group of analysts that are just focused on making, you know, analytical assessments on documents or information that we get.

Q Okay, you mentioned that DS was in the same building. Was it within like the TIA/ITA structure, or is it --

A The DS command center falls under TIA, which is threat intel and analysis directorate.

Q Okay.

A ITA is another component just like the DS command center within -- underneath the umbrella of TIA, or threat intel analysis. So you have analysts which are under ITA. You have DS command center which is sort of the watch board, the watch center, and then you have PII, which is protective intelligence investigation center, and we have OSAC, Overseas Security Advisory Council, all four components fall under the TIA umbrella.

Q Okay, and then it says approved by SBULTROWICZ. Who is SBULTROWICZ, to your knowledge?

A I guess Mr. Bultrowicz, Scott Bultrowicz, I'm assuming, but I'm not sure if that is Scott or if there is another Bultrowicz there.

Q Okay. Who is Scott Bultrowicz?

A Scott Bultrowicz was director of Diplomatic Security at the time.

Q Okay, so he would have been one of the seniors that would have been at Diplomatic Security?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Now, we understand that you had left at approximately 2:00 p.m. on September 11th, is that right?



A That's correct.

Q And so as I said, this was sent at approximately 6:25 p.m. Eastern. So would you have been or not been aware that this cable had been transmitted?

A I don't recall. I don't remember.

Q Okay.

A But if there was discussions, if there were discussions about this, I might have heard about it. But I don't recall actually reading it, no.

Q And I just wanted to point you to paragraph 2. That paragraph says, quote, "In response to the upcoming release of a controversial film entitled, 'Muhammad's Trial,' hundreds of demonstrators converged on the U.S. Embassy in Cairo on September 11, 2012, with a number of protesters breaching the compound."

And then it continues, the film was allegedly supported by a Pastor Terry Jones who is planning International Judge Muhammad Day. We had talked about the protests in Cairo. You were the senior watch officer at the time. Did you recall this film, or hearing about this film at the time?

A Yeah. Now that I read it, I do recall some of that, yes.

Q And what do you recall about it?

A There was, you know, Steve Jones, the pastor out of Florida that in the previous years he had done things similar to

that, burning the Quran, and we were basically keeping an eye on posts, expecting protests to maybe be related to this as well.

Q And so that previously he had taken steps that were seen as controversial?

A Say that again? He had taken actions that were seen as controversial?

A Oh, you mean Pastor Jones.

Q Pastor Jones?

A Yes, yes, of course.

Q And had that caused a certain reaction in different parts of the world or any type of reaction?

A Yeah, of course. I think we might have lost some servicemen in Afghanistan, I think, during his first trial when he did, you know, burning the Quran.

Q Okay. I just want to point to paragraph 3, just continuing on, quote, "Violent extremist groups could have used Pastor Jones' recent statements and actions as motivation to target U.S. interests overseas. As a precaution against any potential anti-American fallout, posts should consider convening an EAC as appropriate to assess what impact this activity may have on your security environment."

Now, what is an EAC?

A Emergency Action Committee --

Q Okay.

A -- where department heads at posts meet and they

discuss whatever the situation might be, and make -- collectively, they make interagency decisions on what they need to do next.

Q Okay. And so this would have been something basically Main State directing all those at base to take a look at their situation to be sure that they are secure?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Just curious, just looking at the top of page 1 at the top it says SBU-NIACT. Is SBU sensitive but unclassified?

A Yes.

Q What is NIACT?

A I don't remember.

Q Now, at this point when this cable is sent, protesters had breached the U.S. Embassy wall in Cairo, and this cable seems to indicate there was a concern that those types of actions could occur at other posts. Does that seem accurate?

A I'm sorry, you have got to repeat that one more time.

Q Sure. Sir, at this point protesters had gone over the wall in Cairo at the U.S. Embassy, and this cable is sent out expressing concern that some more actions could take place at other posts overseas. Does that seem right to you? Is that what the thrust of that cable was?

A Yes.

Ms. Sawyer. And in fact, it seems to reflect what you expressed is your experience earlier that day, that there had been a breach of the wall and protests in Cairo, and that had been

currently extended into other countries.

Would you say that this kind of seems to reflect your experience of that day?

Mr. [REDACTED] I think so.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q And based on your own thoughts, do you have any reason to doubt the sincerity of the Department's concerns about violent extremist groups using the film to motivate the targeting of U.S. facilities?

A No.

Q Okay. You know, we talked about the events of the 11th and you had been getting calls from or getting information from a number of posts around the world, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa. Now, you had said that you were the senior watch officer until 2013, is that correct?

A Is that a time you are talking about 2013.

Q The year 2013.

A The year you mean.

Q Not the time.

A Yes, I think so, yes.

Q So in the weeks following 9/11, there were a series of incidents following Cairo, Benghazi, where there were a number of attacks or protests on U.S. facilities, including Tunis, and Khartoum, and Bogota. As senior watch officer were you present during any of those other incidents, do you recall, either those

or other ones that --

A I probably was. I just don't recall which ones specifically.

Q Okay. Do you recall any specifics about any of those other protests or attacks?

A I know that we lost a lot of cars. I know that some of the facilities were damaged, you know, doors burned, that kind of stuff. But I don't necessarily remember which ones. I just remember seeing the pictures of the damage cars at some of the embassies.

Q Do you remember any of the motivations or reasons behind some of those actions, those protests?

A I don't.

Q Okay. Anything regarding like the film that had caused a concern in Cairo?

A You know, I don't remember.

Q Okay. Given that, you know, you said you had recalled some of the attacks, do you think it made sense that at the time that the State Department had sent out the cable kind of warning of other attacks on other facilities?

A Do I think --

Q Do you think it was well-founded that they should have sent a warning calling on --

A My personal opinion, of course.

Q Okay. Now, we had talked about the protests in Cairo,

and you had indicated that you had thought and at least initially in your own opinion, that the protests had -- like the actions in Benghazi had started similar to like protests in Cairo and some of the other posts that had been reported throughout September 11th.

A Are you asking me if that was my opinion?

Q Yeah, is that right?

A My assumption was that --

Q Your assumption was that. Do you recall in terms of your conversations you had said you had -- you were at the gym. You started getting emails from your watch officers. You came back to the DS command center around 10:00 or so --

A Yeah, probably around 10:00.

Q Around that time. And you had kind of saw the seniors in the room and you were focused on the seniors. At that time, do you recall any other conversations where people also had made similar assumptions about the cause of the attack in Benghazi?

A No, I don't recall.

Q Okay. And do you recall, were you involved in some conversations?

A Yeah, I just spoke with the deputy director, [REDACTED], just primarily, you know, do they need my help? And I mean, the conversation was very short. You know, we pretty much have it at this point. I asked what was going on. They said, "it looks like we have lost the Ambassador. We can't find him." And you know, okay, well, the assumption in my mind was not necessarily anything

had happened to him, was more of maybe he is kidnapped or something when they said we lost him.

So I didn't really know what was going on, and I didn't want to continue asking questions because I didn't want to take him away from his work. So, and he pretty much said, hey, why don't you go home and just come back tomorrow morning.

Q So at that time they were getting a lot of information and so they were trying to analyze that information, and distribute it through the departments as quickly as possible?

A I would assume, yeah. I know that would be the standard protocol.

Q Standard protocol. And when you reported back the following morning on the morning of September 12th, you said you had at 6:00 a.m., or 6:30 arrival, somewhere around that time?

A Somewhere around there.

Q During that day did you have conversations with individuals then about the causes of the attack?

A No.

Q In terms of your responsibility that morning, was it kind of continuing because you had indicated earlier that turnover normally takes 15 or 20 minutes. But that morning, it took a couple of hours?

A It did.

Q So during that time you were trying to get up to speed on what was happening?

A Not necessarily get -- well, yes, part of it was getting up to speed, but the other part was actually convincing people to leave the floor. You could tell there was so much motivation there to sort of continue doing more. I don't remember necessarily if Ambassador Stevens' body had been found or not, but I know there were, you know, there were talks of maybe he being in the hospital, and who is going to go get him? There was a lot of logistical issues of trying to figure out, so there was no time really for us to sit there and discuss, you know, other things.

It was more of trying to convince people, hey, you gotta go home because you have to come back the next morning. It was more focused on the process of the situation, not necessarily focused on the event itself. For the first couple of hours I was trying to get the watch officers to go home.

Q Okay, so you are focused on trying to make sure your people are safe; not focused on kind of the motivations and what initially caused the attack, is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Now, on September 12th, were you aware that DS had provided an initial assessment on the attacks?

A No.

Q Okay. And then if they were provided an assessment that would be --

A It would be ITA.

Q ITA?



A Right.

Q And that would have be done based on like the best possible information at that point on September 12th?

A Of course.

Q And as we had discussed earlier, initial assessments can change as you receive, and analyze additional ones?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. We are just going to go off the record.

Mr. [REDACTED] No problem.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Woolfork. We can go back on the record. Agent [REDACTED], I just want you to know that we are going to conclude our hour, and then turn it over to the majority for further questions. Thank you, and we will go back off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. Let's go back on the record. All right, Special Agent, thanks again. We are going to just clarify a few matters and then sort of come to a conclusion so. Just based on your training and experience as a Special Agent, and your understanding of the command center, as a Special Agent, do you operate on instincts, assumption, opinions in a general sense?

A Sure, absolutely.

Q But that's not all you would operate on, correct?

A Correct.

Q What's the other -- you know, would you also operate on facts?

A Of course.

Q Okay. So as a Special Agent, you would, you know, you would have your instincts, but you also wouldn't just sort of report on instincts, or conjecture, or opinions, you would go and investigate that assumption and find facts to support that assumption, correct?

A Correct.

Q So with respect to the DS command center which is probably filled more than likely with agents, would you agree that the DS command center probably would get opinions, assumptions, general thoughts, but would it also go ahead and investigate those assumptions and try to find facts to support those assumptions?

A You mean the command center?

Q The command center?

A No, the command center would not investigate any information. If there's information that is maybe not complete --

Q Correct.

A -- we might go back to the originator and ask them to provide more information, you know, if a report raised more questions then we would, you know, push it back and say, you know, can you help address these questions? But the majority of the time, we would just pass that on to decisionmakers and have them

decide what they need to do. So there is an investigative office that we would forward that to.

Q Fair enough. But with respect to the command center, the information that is coming in, is it fact-based information, or opinion-based information?

A It could be both, yes.

Q Okay, all right, fair enough. So just to be clear, I just want to go back over the Cairo, and your statement, you testified that there was a protest in Cairo based on your review?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And to your knowledge, you don't recall any contradiction regarding intelligence or reporting regarding a protest in Cairo, to your knowledge?

A No.

Q No contradictions on that?

A No.

Q And you testified based on, to your knowledge, and your review, there was no protest in Benghazi, correct?

A Not that I knew of, yeah, correct.

Q And I believe government -- the exhibit 1 was on September 18th that you stated in your response to the AP article, "Can you believe this?"

So on the 18th, you held the position that there was not a protest, is that correct?

A According to this report, yeah. At the time I probably

thought there was no protest prior to the attack.

Q Okay. Very good. And this is just more of a broad question. I think based on my records, and Austin, you may know, I believe the attack started around 4:30, or hang on here, actually I think I had it at 3:42.

Mr. Evers. Eastern time.

Mr. Grider. Yes, Eastern time. Don't hold me to it.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q So let's say it is around the 3:42, 4:00 time period, Eastern time. You would have, your shift would have been over approximately at --

A An hour before that, yeah.

Q Correct. And just generally, with respect to -- okay, that's -- okay. Briefly, you had mentioned a distinction between a protest and rioting. What was that distinction again, just to be clear?

A So I have been in both in my professional capacity. So in my mind, the way I define protest is where people are basically standing around yelling, chanting, you know, showing their support for this group or that group. Rioting is where things are getting violent, and they are not necessarily obeying law enforcement orders, you know. That's how I see rioting versus protesting.

Q Very good. And what's your definition of an attack?

A An attack is when basically, you know, there's damage or injuries to property or personnel.

Q So there's a difference between a protest in your mind, a riot, and attack, those are three separate, distinct things?

A Well, I mean --

Q That can evolve?

A That's right. They are very, you know, it's very fluent there. I mean, one can lead into the next one very quickly, or it might jump straight from a protest to an attack. I mean, those are very common, so --

Q Fair enough. But in using, in reporting out something, you wouldn't use these interchangeably. If you were making a report, if you saw a riot, you would say there's a riot, correct?

A Right. So I'm looking at what the question was to me from my friend. It says, "Was there any rioting in Benghazi reported prior to the attack?" And in my mind, rioting, again, and I think previously was stated, if there was a protest, would I have said the same thing, yes. But as far as rioting, that's what I was picturing in my mind.

Q Fair enough, fair enough. Absolutely. So based on exhibit 1 at that point in time, it was your conclusion that there was no protest on September 18th. When did you, if you recall, between September 11th or 12th, to the 18th, when did you come to that conclusion that there wasn't a protest or it may have been a riot, when did you come to your own conclusion, if you recall?

A I don't recall to be honest with you.

Q Do you think it could have happened on September 11th?

A No.

Q And do you think it could have happened on September 12th?

A No.

Q But you're confident it happened on September 18th based on --

A My opinion on September 18th was that there was no protest prior to the attack.

Q Okay. All right, I just got one quick email. And I don't know if it is the exhibit --

[████████ Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Woolfork. Five.

Mr. Evers. Five. I think I'm right, 5.

RPTR BINGHAM

EDTR HUMKE

[12:30 p.m.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Just let me know when you have had an opportunity to review it.

A Okay.

Q Very good. Let's just walk through this briefly. Let's start in reverse order. So start on the second page.

I believe that is how the email came through.

Mr. Evers. Can we identify it for the record?

Mr. Grider. Absolutely. Thank you. Charlie 05389586, email from the DS command center Wednesday, September 12, 2012 at 5:05 a.m.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Now, can you just walk us through, you know, the to, the CC, and then the subject line and your understanding of the email? And then we will move to the second page.

A So yes, to the DS seniors, that is the general senior distribution list that I was talking about. So if that was to expand it would have probably anywhere from 10 to 20 or 30 names in there. PII is the Protective Intel Investigations office. ITA is the Intel and Threat Analysis. So those are distribution lists basically that go to everybody within those offices. And then IP is International Programs, which basically oversees the RSOs

worldwide.

Q With respect to the subject line, who comes up with that?

A Oh, we do at the Y center.

Q So that was, the subject line says a terrorism event notification dash Libya?

A Yeah, so what we have is it is called a critical incident notification list and sort of a threshold that you look through and it is basically, you know, if there are certain events that fall within, a bombing, you know, an attack against an embassy where someone claims that it is a terrorist attack or something then we would label it as that as we were sending it out.

You want to have some sort of a subject line so people who are receiving it they can sort of vet it through and figure out what this is related to.

Q So would a protest fall within a terrorism event notification?

A Probably not. It would probably be a protest event notification.

Q It would just be a protest event notification?

A Probably. Probably. Or it might not even say protest. It might just say event notification.

Q Okay. Okay. So whoever, I am not sure at 5:05 a.m. who would have help me there -- that would have been right before



you came in, correct?

A September 12th, so this is the day after, 11th is when it all happened.

Q Yeah.

A So I must have come in early.

Q Okay. So what is your understanding of just can you explain to us just sort of the general parameters of what is being communicated here in this email?

A That the embassy is being evacuated due to ongoing attacks that resulted in the death of 14 mission personnel and three wounded.

Q And whoever wrote this at the DS command center is showing the following terrorism event information for situational awareness. And essentially it says, please contact the DS command center directly for any followup requests for information.

So that would have been really on your watch that after this went out at 5:05 you would have been sort of --

A It would have been our watch, yes.

Q Okay.

A It would have been our shift.

Q Good.

A And the underlined text there that is sort of a pre-made wording that is automatically included, you know, whenever we are sending out mass distribution emails just to make sure people are aware that there might be things changing as they,

you know, new information might come to light.

Q Absolutely. Absolutely. I appreciate you pointing that out.

Okay, let's walk to the next, on page 1, I am not sure if it was cut off or what happened there. The bottom it says, from, it says from you to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. I am not sure if we have --

Mr. Evers. Mine says has the subject on the following page.

Mr. Grider. Right. So I don't know if it is redacted or we can assume that, maybe just forwarded.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. Do you recall if you forwarded this information on or?

A It says forward up top so yes probably I did. Right there.

Q And then, I think you have already mentioned who [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is but can you take us through?

A An agent. A DS agent.

Q And where was he at the time?

A You know, I don't remember. He might have already been at National Security Council as a liaison there or, or maybe not. I am not sure where he was at the time. But he could have been anywhere.

Q So he could have been, so these individuals here we don't know exactly but there is a possibility they could have been

liaisons to --

A Not all of them. So for [REDACTED], I know later on he went to National Security Council. At the time, I am not sure if he had already moved down there or not.

Q Okay. And if you recall -- National Security Council, are they under, they are under the White House?

A Yes.

Q Under the White House?

A Yes.

Q Let me just come back because I have a quick question on that. But. Okay. So let's move to your email sent on Wednesday, September 12, 2012, at 10:20 a.m., subject line terrorism event notification in Libya.

Can you read like just the first two sentences and then we can talk a little bit about it?

A Sure.

"It was a full on attack against our compound in Benghazi. Ambo happened to be visiting from Tripoli with an ARSO and IMO/IPO. Right around midnight when all were getting ready to sleep in their homes within the compound, 20 intruders attacked the compound with small arms fire and RPG's. Assailants started setting the buildings on fire. When Ambo's residence was ablaze, ARSO handed his cell to Ambo and ran to the rooftop to defend position."

Q Okay. Thank you. So I guess first, was this part of

your duties, or can you tell us why you put this email together or --

A I was probably summarizing what had gone on, so basically to help clarify why we were pulling people out of there.

Q And so what was the date on this again?

A It says September 12th.

Q So 10 a.m., 10:20 a.m.

And at that point, your initial email states it was a full on attack against our compound in Benghazi, correct?

A Yes.

Q Where would you have -- I mean what was the basis, do you recall what was the basis of that, you know, of that statement if you recall?

A Probably the, whatever the information I had at the time made me think that.

Q Okay. So if there was a protest, would you more than likely have put that into, you know, protest occurred and then there was a full on attack or --

A Not necessarily because this is basically stating exactly what a DS agent would want to know. They wouldn't care about how it all got to that point.

Q Sure. So, but, you know, you used the term attack as opposed to riot or protest?

A Of course.

Q Fair enough. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. The to on, for this portion of the email is svcSMARTCrossLow, do you recall what that list is for? Who would be the recipient in that particular?

Mr. [REDACTED]. I am trying to think what SVC is. No. I don't know what that is. I mean, the networks the way they are set up is sometimes when you email something out will automatically get something very similar to this. Smart is just the name of the software so it is just very possible, I don't know what that is to be honest with you.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q I'm just wondering, DS command center underneath your name, it says DS command center, SWO what does that stand for?

A Senior Watch Officer.

Q Okay. Just briefly, getting back to the different liaisons you had mentioned earlier that there may have been different liaisons from the command center in different agencies?

A Yes.

Q So can you just -- I don't know if I just didn't pick it up in my notes, where were they? Which agencies?

A So a command center at the time had one individual assigned to the White House situation room. They were actually detailed to them.

Q Do you recall who that was?

A No. They have changed. They change every year I think so I don't remember. One person was to homeland security, and

then one individual was assigned to State operations.

Q Who would have been, how would you have communicated to the person at State ops?

A A phone call or an email yes, sir.

Q And how would you have communicated to the person at homeland security?

A Same.

Q And I am going to ask you how would you have communicated to the person at the White House situation room?

A You know the White House situation room, the individual there is detailed to them. So they really work as a White House situation employee per se. So we don't necessarily go to that individual. We directly would forward stuff to the White House anyway. We wouldn't specifically direct it to him.

Q So who would you direct it to?

A To the White House situation room. We just pick up the phone and talk to them, anybody who is there.

Q And so during your time, we will back out, during the month of September, did you have an occasion to communicate with the White House situation room just generally?

A I am sure we did yeah. They would call us very occasionally they would just ask us, hey, what do you have going on, you know, back and forth, just really command centers making sure they are all in synch with what is going on worldwide.

Q Okay. So, during September 11th or September 12th, do

you recall communicating with the White House situation room?

A I don't recall but I am sure I did at some point yes.

Q And during September 11th, September 12th, do you recall communicating with the State ops?

A I don't recall, but I am positive I spoke with them as well.

Q Let me just ask just a general sort of question. In my past life I have worked with a lot of agents and as a former prosecutor I am just wondering if there was a contradiction based on facts, let's say your director of command or the deputy, a [REDACTED] or a [REDACTED], and you are were aware of the facts that you received and they were communicating -- I'm taking this away from the attack -- and they were communicating something different, in your position or your job description or just even being a special agent, would you feel an obligation to at least sort of attempt to clarify based on the knowledge that you had?

A Of course.

Q If you had heard or had seen contradictory facts going forward, you would have felt, as a special agent, an obligation to at least clarify based on the knowledge that you had received, is that correct?

A Yes.

Q I am just going the take a broad -- so from September 11th to September 18th, was there ever an occasion that you communicated the facts that how you saw them or what you

observed to anyone else?

Mr. Evers. Do you mean generally or in connection with your last question to correct the different description? I am just not sure if you may need to connect your previous question.

I am sorry, do you understand the question?

Mr. [REDACTED] Actually if you could repeat it one more time.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. So initially I had asked, in your role as a special agent, traveled, done investigations, you gather facts. You may overhear the facts seem to be different from what you observed. You communicated that you felt like this, generally there is an obligation --

A Of course.

Q And it is an environment within DS that you can communicate or sort of speak up and say, hey, this is what I observed, realizing there may be other facts, but this is what I observed, so that is sort of the environment within the command center and within DS, correct?

A Correct. I mean but that is on an individual, right? Some individuals might hold themselves back some may be more outspoken. If you are asking me how would I do it I would be probably outspoken.

Q And that was my assumption.

A Yes, sir.

Q Based on just knowing --



A Yes, sir.

Q How honorable you are and with respect to your role.

I think the minority had sort of raised the issue that there were countervailing facts coming in about the protests and what actually happened.

During that time period, I am just trying to sort of slice from September 11th to September 18th where we at least we have facts here on September 12th you stated it was an attack, obviously September 18 you were clear that it wasn't a protest, there may have been other information that sort of built that statement.

Was there ever an occasion that you gave a briefing or you communicated your opinion to others in the command center or anyone else other than your colleagues on the email?

A You know, I don't recall, but I wouldn't be surprised if I did.

Q I believe in the earlier hour I had raised the point with respect to when you came in on September 12 around 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. I believe you stated that there would have been a briefing or discussions with the new team coming in sort of briefing?

A A turnover.

Q Turnover?

A Yes, sir.

Q I believe you communicated there may have been -- there

would have been notes and information that would have been turned over to you, it wasn't just verbal, but there would have been emails and notes and important documents about what happened the night of. And I can't remember based on my notes if you recall reviewing specific reports and emails about the attack?

A I don't recall to be honest with you.

Q But you do recall being briefed verbally on what happened?

A Of course. Of course.

Q And more than likely you would have received documents about the night that -- what was actually happening in the command center on that night, you would have had those documents?

A Right. And so Benghazi is not itself, you know it is not right so you have to sort of picture all the events that have taken place the day of or the day before. So those folders were not just about Benghazi. It was all the events that were happening, that had already taken place and also ones that were starting to pick up. So Benghazi was probably another folder. There were so many.

Q There would have been a folder?

A It would have been basically information as they were passing it over to us for me to say you know I went in detail and read every single document and every single folder, it would not be accurate.

I am sure there was a lot of verbal you know turnover there,

primarily verbal, and then, hey, there is some documents if you need to go through that and look at it you are more than welcome to come whenever you want when you have time.

Q Right. And so [REDACTED] was doing the midnight shift?

A Yes, sir.

Q And so he would have briefed, he would have briefed you and possibly given you a folder of information from the midnight shift?

A Possibly.

Q Right. And then either [REDACTED] -- I can't read my handwriting -- or [REDACTED] would have more than likely, because they would have been, see, help me --

A Would have taken over.

Q Yeah, they would have been, yeah, so they would have had information that they would have turned over to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] whether it be verbal or documentary then [REDACTED] would have turned over verbal and documentary information concerning the attacks, emails, what was going on and various information of that nature, is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Can we go off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

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Mr. Grider. Well, Special Agent, I really do appreciate your time. The chairman appreciates you coming in and giving us your

best recollection and the facts and I talked to Counsel Austin and he has relayed to me about just how honorable and respectful you are about your job and the service that you have with the State Department and I do appreciate that.

I have worked with a number of agents and a number of investigations. I do appreciate your service, your time, and what you did during the attacks and prior to the attacks and what you are doing now.

So on behalf of the committee, we truly do appreciate your time here, and I just want to say thank you.

Mr. [REDACTED] Thank you?

Mr. Evers. Thank you. I appreciate it.

[Recess.]

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q We will go back on the record. It is 12:48.

As I mentioned again my name is Brent Woolfork.

I am joined by my counsel Heather Sawyer, and I just want to start by going back to Exhibit 5.

Exhibit 5 is an email. At the top of page 1 that is initially on September 12 from you at 12:30 p.m. to a list serve which was discussed in the previous hour by the majority. And I just wanted to ask you about the originating email which is on page 2 that was from the DS command center and sent Wednesday, September 12, 2012, at 5:05 a.m.

And in terms of the recipients of that, there is a number of

listeners that you were identifying earlier. And during our previous hour we had talked about the structure of DSCC, we talked about threats intelligence analysis TIA and then intelligence threats analysis ITA and the different roles. And previously you indicated that ITA is analysts that look at events and the threat information. So is it correct that those analysts in IT would have received this event notification?

A Yes.

Q And now you had also indicated that the underlying portion at the bottom of the email is a standard signature that is always included in these sorts of notifications is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q And so it says, sir, in the second sentence, the information contained in this report is provided only for immediate situational awareness.

Is that what you meant by you are providing information in this that is necessary for RSOs, the regional security officers, to carry out their work?

A So information for situational awareness, is that the part you're talking about?

Q Yes.

A Yes. It is whoever we are sending this to is really for situational awareness as to what is going on. But situations may evolve and, you know, we might end up sending them an update or so, yeah.

Q And then actually the next sentence additional reports may follow updating --

A Correct.

Q Correct information if necessary. So that is kind of the updates. So this information --

A Sort of raw data is what we sent out.

Q Raw. And as we discussed previously this raw data can evolve or change as more information is collected and analyzed, is that right?

A That is correct.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And then to the extent you indicated the folks in ITA would be the analysts and they would be responsible for collecting and analyzing the range of information that might be coming in?

A Yes.

Q And they are on this list. So to the extent they were creating an assessment in the days immediately following including on September 12?

A Yes.

Q They would have certainly seen this and either incorporated it or you know --

A Or been aware.

Q Or been aware of it at least?

A Yes.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q You mentioned, Agent [REDACTED], I just wanted to ask you a series of questions and so the committee has been looking at various allegations that have come up for the past 3 years or so and so we don't necessarily in the minority believes the allegations are true but we have been asking them of every witness and so you may or may not have information about these allegations, and if you don't we can just move on to the next one.

So I am going to kind of read through this and ask you a series of questions.

It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman has speculated that "Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down" and this resulted in the Defense Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four

Pinocchios, its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in the spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in spring of 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select on Intelligence found that quote the CIA was not collecting and shipping arms from Libya to Syria and that they found quote no support for this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence



Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel were temporarily delayed from departing the annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and the appropriateness of that delay.

The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered to stand down but that instead there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House intelligence committee's finding that there was no stand down order to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the decisions to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board, damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone in the State Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence anyone at the State Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA deputy director Mike Morell altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he told Congress that the CIA faithfully performed our duties in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and nonpartisanship.

Do you have any evidence that the CIA Deputy Director Mike

Morell gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA deputy director Morell altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally misrepresented the facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sundays talk shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the U.S. was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attack and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the President was AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors to stand down, meaning to cease all operations.

Military officials have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services Committee found that quote "there was no stand down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi."

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House Armed Services Committee that there was no stand down order issued to military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the attacks after which he stated, given where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have evidence that the Pentagon had military assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have saved lives, but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally

decided not to deploy?

A No.

Q Agent [REDACTED], I would like to thank you very much and that concludes our questions. I appreciate it. Off the record.

[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

I have read the foregoing \_\_\_\_ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

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Witness Name

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Date

*Errata Sheet*

**Select Committee on Benghazi**

The witness reviewed the accompanying transcript and certified its accuracy by providing the following corrections. These corrections are reflected in the transcript as identified below.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>ALL CORRECTIONS MADE BY WITNESS</u>
11	17	Replaced "secret, no-phone" with "SECRET/NO FORN (foreign)."