S. Rept. 106-351 - THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2000106th Congress (1999-2000)
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106th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 106-351
======================================================================
THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2000
_______
July 20, 2000.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 2901]
The Committee on Foreign Relations, having had under
consideration an original bill (S. 2901) to authorize
appropriations for security assistance for fiscal year 2001,
and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon and
recommends that the bill do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Committee Action.................................................1
II. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................2
III. Cost Estimate...................................................19
IV. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact.................................23
V. Changes in Existing Law.........................................23
I. Committee Action
On March 23, 2000 the Committee unanimously ordered
reported S. 2382, the Technical Assistance, Trade Promotion and
Anti-Corruption Act of 2000. S. 2382 was reported and placed on
the Senate Legislative Calendar on April 7, 2000, and
subsequently referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs pursuant to paragraph 1(j)(10) of rule XXV of the
Standing Rules of the Senate on April 11, 2000. Paragraph
1(j)(10) of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate
provides that, ``at the request of the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, any proposed legislation relating
to [the International Monetary Fund] reported by the Committee
on Foreign Relations shall be referred to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.'' The Banking Committee
has taken no action on S. 2382 as of the writing of this
report.
On Wednesday, June 28, 2000, the Committee on Foreign
Relations considered and unanimously approved by voice vote an
original bill based on Title VII of S. 2382, the Technical
Assistance, Trade Promotion and Anti-Corruption Act of 2000.
II. Section-by-Section Analysis
The Committee notes that, during the past 10 years, the
pool of money available for security assistance to United
States allies and partners has decreased dramatically. At the
same time, the number of countries with which the United States
needs to engage, whether to combat proliferation or terrorism
or to bolster regional security, has steadily increased. For
instance, three countries of the former Warsaw Pact are now
NATO members and receive both Foreign Military Financing and
International Military Education and Training from the United
States. Other countries which were once part of the Soviet
Union itself are now free and independent, and enjoy important
security relationships with the United States. An even larger
number of countries, now free from the Soviet orbit, are also
free to pursue closer military relationships with the United
States. Thus, for instance, this bill makes Mongolia eligible
for Department of Defense expenditures relating to excess
defense articles for the first time in history.
The Committee is concerned that a steadily increasing
number of countries are pursuing a relationship with the United
States which is funded by a steadily decreasing amount of
money. Additionally, 98 percent of the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) account is currently committed to just three
countries as a result of various peace accord commitments. Even
if the President's budget request is fully funded, only
$183,200,000 in FMF would actually be available for the United
States to build security ties to the rest of the world. This
bill seeks to arrest and reverse this decline. Section 101
authorizes an increase of $89,000,000 in grant Foreign Military
Financing over the President's budget request, and will bring
the total amount of truly ``discretionary'' FMF spending to
$272,200,000. Even so, this will not return security assistance
to 1990 spending levels.
Similarly, Section 201 fully funds the International
Military Education and Training program to maximum course
capacity. Section 301 consolidates all nonproliferation
funding, except for assistance to the International Atomic
Energy Agency, under a single funding line. In so doing, it
will protect nonproliferation assistance from numerous foreign
aid restrictions that govern the current appropriations
process. This bill fully funds the President's request and
authorizes funding for one additional, Committee-mandated
nonproliferation and export control initiative in Malta and
funds the International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC)
program at maximum capacity. This bill will strengthen the hand
of the newly-created Nonproliferation Bureau of the Department
of State in shaping a coherent U.S. nonproliferation and export
control policy. Likewise, the President's antiterrorism funding
request is fully authorized, and the Committee has applied
additional resources to ensure that the fledgling Terrorist
Interdiction Program is funded in fiscal year 2001 at the same
level as in fiscal year 2000.
In total, this bill authorizes $3,894,000,000 in security
assistance funding. This is an increase of $119,000,000 over
both fiscal year 2000 levels and the President's budget request
for fiscal year 2001.
TITLE I--MILITARY AND RELATED ASSISTANCE
Subtitle A--Foreign Military Financing Program
Sec. 101. Authorization of Appropriations
Section 101 authorizes $3,627,000,000 for fiscal year 2001
for the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program. The
administration request for fiscal year 2001 for FMF (grants and
loans) is $3,538,200,000. The actual level of FMF funding for
fiscal year 2000 is $3,420,000,000.
Subtitle B--Other Assistance
Sec. 111. Defense Drawdown Special Authorities
Section 111 increases the special drawdown authorities of
defense articles and services from defense stocks, and for
military education and training, to assist foreign countries
from $100 million to $150 million.
Current law grants the President the authority to draw down
from existing stocks within the Department of Defense to assist
in emergencies or when he determines it is in the national
interest. This section expands the authority by making
nonproliferation and antiterrorism activities eligible for the
special drawdown authorities relating to defense articles and
services, and to military education and training, to assist
foreign countries. The increase in financial authority is meant
to allow for incorporation of nonproliferation and
antiterrorism objectives without sacrificing the President's
flexibility to respond to unforeseen emergencies and foreign
policy objectives relating to combating international
narcotics, international disaster assistance, and migration and
refugee assistance.
Sec. 112. Increased Transport Authority
Section 112 raises the space available weight limitation
that is imposed on the transportation of excess defense
articles (EDA) from 25,000 pounds to 50,000 pounds.
Currently, a variety of limitations are imposed on the use
of Department of Defense funds to transfer excess defense
articles to foreign nations and international organizations.
Moreover, even when such an expenditure is authorized, free
transportation of EDA may only be provided on a space available
basis if it is in the U.S. national interest to do so, the
recipient nation is a developing nation which receives less
than $10,000,000 in FMF and IMET, and the weight of the items
to be transferred does not exceed 25,000 pounds.
In limiting the weight of defense articles to no more than
25,000 pounds, current law will preclude the transportation of
a large number of United States Coast Guard ``self-righting''
patrol craft which have recently been declared excess but which
weigh approximately 33,000 pounds. Over the next four years,
more than 50 of these vessels will be eligible for transfer to
foreign nations under the EDA program. However, the current
weight limitation will preclude shipment of the vessels on a
space available basis to foreign countries. This, in turn, will
increase the cost of transfer of the defense article to would-
be recipients, and likely would cause many nations to decline
U.S. offers of these vessels. As a result, the United States
Coast Guard could incur unnecessary expenses due to delays in
finding foreign recipients of the craft, and possibly be forced
to demilitarize vessels for whom a foreign customer could not
be secured. Raising the weight limit to 50,000 pounds will
obviate this problem.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Sec. 201. Authorization of Appropriations
Section 201 authorizes $65,000,000 to carry out
international military education and training (IMET) of
military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries.
The administration request for fiscal year 2001 for IMET is
$55,000,000. The actual level of IMET funding for fiscal year
2000 is $50,000,000. IMET is provided on a grant basis to
students from allied and friendly nations, and is designed to
expose foreign students to the U.S. professional military
establishment and the American way of life, including the U.S.
regard for democratic values, respect for individual and human
rights and belief in the rule of law. Section 201 authorizes
funding of the IMET program at its maximum capacity. Funding
beyond this level cannot be absorbed due to limitations in
number of courses and classes.
Sec. 202. Additional Requirements Relating to International Military
Education and Training
Section 202 amends Chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, relating to International Military
Education and Training (IMET), by adding two new requirements.
First, selection of foreign personnel for the IMET program will
be done in consultation with United States defense attaches,
who are uniquely positioned to recommend candidates. The
Committee is concerned to note that defense attaches are, on
occasion, excluded from this process. By mandating
consultation, the Committee intends to secure the complete
involvement of defense attaches in nominating individuals for
the IMET program. Naturally, selection of foreign personnel,
and overall management of the IMET program remain the
responsibility of the Department of State.
Section 202 also requires that the Secretary of Defense
develop and maintain a database containing records on each
foreign military or defense ministry civilian participant in
education and training activities conducted under this chapter
after December 31, 2000. This record shall include the type of
instruction received, the dates of such instruction, whether it
was completed successfully, and, to the extent practicable, a
record of the person's subsequent military or defense ministry
career and current position and location. The Committee expects
that the record of a person's subsequent career will include
positions held, reports of exceptional successes or failures in
those positions, and any credible reports of involvement in
criminal activity or human rights abuses. The Committee
believes that such a database will improve the effectiveness of
foreign military education and training activities by enabling
the Department of Defense to better determine: what follow-up
training may be most appropriate for previously trained
personnel; which courses are most effective in improving the
performance of foreign military personnel; and where personnel
are located in foreign defense establishments who, by virtue of
their prior training, are most likely to understand U.S. modes
of operation and share U.S. standards of military
professionalism.
TITLE III--NONPROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROL ASSISTANCE
Sec. 301. Nonproliferation and Export Control Assistance
Every major category of U.S. foreign assistance, except for
nonproliferation and export control assistance, is governed
under multiple sections, or entire chapters, of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA). The FAA contains chapters
authorizing international narcotics control, military
assistance, peacekeeping operations, antiterrorism assistance,
IMET, development assistance, and funding for international
organizations, to name a few.
Although the President has declared a state of national
emergency to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and associated delivery systems, the FAA does not
contain a specific chapter to authorize and direct such a
clearly important form of U.S. foreign aid. Funding for the
nonproliferation and export control activities of the
Department of State derives from a variety of disparate
authorizations passed at various times. As a result, this
category of funding does not enjoy the same status as other
types of foreign assistance. Appropriation of funds for
nonproliferation and export control activities is cobbled
together annually by the Appropriations Committee under a
catch-all account that also includes demining and contributions
to certain international organizations. Thus the Department of
State is invariably forced to make ``trade-offs'' between
nonproliferation and export control funding and funding for
other activities. Finally, other nonproliferation and export
control funding is contained within the amounts appropriated
for the ``newly independent'' states of the former Soviet
Union, and is thus subject to restrictions if the President
cannot certify that Russia is not proliferating technology to
Iran (which he has, to date, been unable to do).
By adding a new chapter to Part II of the FAA, the
Committee intends U.S. nonproliferation and export control
assistance to be given equal stature with other authorized
activities. The Committee expects the Department of State, in
the future, to consolidate all of its nonproliferation funding,
except for funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency
(which is governed by a separate authorization under the FAA),
into a single, integrated request to be authorized under
Chapter 9 of the FAA. The Committee further expects that the
Nonproliferation Bureau of the Department of State will be
given authority over the use of funds authorized by this
chapter.
The new chapter to the FAA incorporates existing
authorities under Sections 503 and 504 of the FREEDOM Support
Act (which are the principal extant authorities for
nonproliferation and export control activities). The new
sections 581 and 582 carry forward those authorities, but also
emphasize the need for programs to bolster the indigenous
capabilities of foreign countries to monitor and interdict
proliferation shipments. Section 583 directs the President to
ensure that sufficient funds are allocated to the transit
interdiction effort. To this end, the section contains
authority for the Secretary of State to establish a list of
countries that should be given priority in U.S. transit
interdiction funding. The Committee suggests that the initial
designation of the transit country list include those countries
mentioned in the fiscal year 1999 Congressional presentation
document as ``key global transit points'' (e.g. the countries
of Central Asia and the Caucasus), the Baltics, Central and
Eastern Europe, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Cyprus, Malta,
Jordan, and the UAE).
Section 584, which will be part of the new chapter of the
FAA, makes clear that two of the same limitations which apply
to antiterrorism assistance also apply to nonproliferation and
export control assistance. Section 584 permits the use of
unrelated accounts to furnish services and commodities
consistent with, and in furtherance of, Chapter 9 of the FAA.
However, it requires that the foreign nation receiving such
services or commodities pay in advance for the item or service,
and that the reimbursement be credited to the account from
which the service or commodity is furnished or subsidized.
Foreign Military Financing may not be used to make such
payments. Section 584 also makes clear that Chapter 9 does not
apply to information exchange activities conducted under other
authorities of law.
Section 585 authorizes $129,000,000 for activities
conducted pursuant to Chapter 9 of the FAA. This amount
captures several activities currently appropriated within the
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs Account, and the FREEDOM Support Act Assistance for
the New Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union.
The covered programs, at the administration's requested levels
of funding for FY2001, are: $15,000,000 for the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund; $14,000,000 for Export
Control Assistance; $45,000,000 for the Science Centers; and
$36,000,000 in NIS export control and border assistance
funding. The administration request for fiscal year 2001 thus
totals $110,000,000 for all Chapter 9 authorized activities.
The Committee's increase of $19,000,000 above the
administration's requested levels is intended to support two
Committee initiatives contained in sections 303 and 304.
Specifically, this increase supports funding of the
International Science and Technology Centers at maximum
capacity (which requires an additional $14,000,000); and
establishment of a static cargo x-ray facility in Malta as the
first of the transit interdiction programs to be managed under
the new authorities of the FAA (a $5,000,000 program).
Sec. 302. Nonproliferation and Export Control Training in the United
States
Section 302 authorizes the expenditure of $2,000,000 in
nonproliferation and export control funding for the training
and education of personnel from friendly countries in the
United States. The Department of State already engages in a
vigorous training program, and funds numerous activities which
are implemented by Department of Commerce personnel. However,
much of this training is conducted overseas. The Committee
urges the Department of State to place emphasis on bringing a
select group of officials from friendly governments back to the
United States to engage in an intensive training program which
draws upon the expertise of all relevant U.S. government
agencies. This training should focus on those nonproliferation
and export control activities which would most benefit from
being conducted in the United States. Finally, the Committee is
concerned with declining travel and training budgets of U.S.
government agencies tasked with combating proliferation. The
Committee hopes this trend will be arrested, but urges the
Department of State, in the interim, to seek to offset the
effects of this decline using the funds authorized under this
section.
Sec. 303. Science and Technology Centers
Section 303 authorizes $59,000,000 in nonproliferation and
export control funding for the Department of State's
international science and technology centers. The
administration request for fiscal year 2001 is $45,000,000. The
actual level of funding for fiscal year 2000 is $59,000,000.
The Committee expects that this not only will fully fund all
ongoing activities at these centers, but will allow a
significant expansion in the number of research grants offered
to Russian scientists formerly employed in the development of
missiles and chemical and biological warfare programs.
Section 303 also expresses the view of the Committee that
frequent audits should be conducted of entities receiving ISTC
funds. This will be necessary in light of the administration's
interest in expanding the role of the ISTC to provide funds to
redirect the expertise associated with the Soviet Union's
biological warfare program. U.S. obligations under the Chemical
and Biological Weapons Convention, as well as under domestic
law (e.g., P.L. 106-113), prohibit the furnishing of assistance
to offensive biological warfare programs. It thus is essential
that the United States audit entities that receive assistance
to ensure that the United States is not contributing, albeit
unknowingly, to an offensive biological warfare program (or to
entities that are proliferating technology to rogue states).
Moreover, the obligation to conduct audits should be spread
equitably throughout the United States Government.
Sec. 304. Trial Transit Program
Section 304 authorizes $5,000,000 in nonproliferation and
export control funding to establish a static cargo x-ray
facility in Malta, provided that the Government of Malta first
gives satisfactory assurances that Maltese customs officials
will engage in random cargo inspections of container traffic
passing through the Malta Freeport, and will utilize the x-ray
facility to examine random shipping containers.
Malta is the ideal location for a trial transit
interdiction program. The country's location, along one of the
busiest trade routes in the world, has made it a crucial
shipping center. The Malta Freeport is ideally situated as a
redistribution point, linking trade between Europe, Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia. For instance, direct shipments from the
Black Sea to Malta take less than 15 days. From various ports
in Europe, Russia, and Asia, large cargo vessels offload their
containers into the Freeport. The containers are then stored
temporarily and are reloaded onto smaller ``feeder'' vessels
which service ports in North Africa, including Libya.
The Freeport went into operation in April, 1990. According
to Maltese Freeport documents, that year alone, 231 vessels
offloaded 94,500 containers. Since that time, the volume of
activity at the port has steadily increased. In 1996, the
number of ships calling at the Freeport reached 1,383. Nearly
600,000 containers transited the facility that year. For 1999,
according to a January 10, 2000 article in a Maltese daily
newspaper, 1,464 container ships utilized the Freeport. At this
time, estimates of container traffic are not available to the
Committee, but presumably the number well exceeded half a
million.
The steadily rising level of container traffic in the
Freeport is noteworthy. The volume can be expected to increase
if plans to further expand the port's services are implemented,
thereby making one of the world's largest deepwater ports all
the more robust.
The Malta Freeport Act, which establishes the Freeport as a
legally separate entity from Malta proper, creates specific
proliferation concerns. Currently the Freeport has its own
Minister, and customs functions have been conferred upon the
Freeport Authority which he oversees. Maltese Customs does not
receive information on transshipments, and may not operate in
the Freeport without permission. While the Freeport has never
refused such a request, the fundamental lack of transparency,
and the inability of Maltese customs to conduct random
inspections, means that effective export enforcement is
impossible at this time.
The Committee is concerned with this situation since Malta
is undeniably being used as a transit point by various entities
engaged in weapons proliferation. For example, in one instance
of excellent cooperation between the Freeport and Maltese
Customs officials, a shipment of chemical warfare precursor
chemicals was seized. Similarly, the United Kingdom recently
uncovered a massive shipment of missile parts slated for air
delivery to Libya via Malta. While this latter incident did not
involve the Freeport, it nevertheless is further evidence that
various countries are seeking to use Malta as a transit point
for deliveries of dangerous commodities to North Africa.
The Committee notes that Maltese-U.S. relations have
steadily improved over the past several years. The Government
of Malta has demonstrated a genuine commitment to
nonproliferation and bolstering its export control capability.
Therefore the Committee favors initiation of a trial transit
program with Malta, provided that the Maltese Government takes
the necessary steps to render this program viable (namely, by
opening the Freeport to periodic, random inspections by Maltese
Customs officials). The Committee hopes that this program, if
successful, might serve as a model for programs in other
designated transit countries.
Sec. 305. Exception to Authority to Conduct Inspections Under the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998
The Chemical Weapons Convention, which was approved by the
Senate in 1997, has an extensive inspection regime which allows
potentially intrusive inspections of chemical companies in the
United States. The Senate was concerned about the threat posed
to business proprietary information during the course of an
inspection. As a result, the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act of 1998 imposes a requirement that a special
agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) accompany
every inspection conducted in the United States.
However, there is minimal benefit to the FBI's monitoring
of inspections at chemical destruction sites. Such inspections
pose little risk to national security or trade secrets and--
because of their lengthy duration--a constant FBI presence
would be expensive to maintain. This section gives the FBI an
exemption from the requirement to be present at inspections of
U.S. chemical destruction facilities.
TITLE IV--ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE
Sec. 401. Authorization of Appropriations
Section 401 authorizes $73,000,000 in antiterrorism
assistance for fiscal year 2001. The administration request for
anti-terrorism assistance for fiscal year 2001 is $72,000,000
(including the request for the Terrorist Interdiction Program
(TIP)). The actual level of funding for fiscal year 2000,
including the TIP, is $38,000,000.
TITLE V--INTEGRATED SECURITY ASSISTANCE PLANNING
Subtitle A--Establishment of a National Security Assistance Strategy
Sec. 501. National Security Assistance Strategy
Section 501 requires the annual preparation of a National
Security Assistance Strategy (NSAS) to be submitted in
connection with the annual foreign operations budget request.
The purpose of the NSAS is to establish a clear and
coherent multi-year plan, on a country by country basis,
regarding U.S. security assistance programs. The current
process utilized by the United States Government is entirely
insufficient and is run on an ad hoc basis. Seldom is a
thoroughly researched, thoroughly justified proposal for
security assistance put forward to the Committee. This, in
turn, has encouraged parallel Congressional initiatives and
earmarks which often are put forward with a comparable level of
foresight and planning. As a result, it seems that the
Political-Military Affairs Bureau of the Department of State
does not currently possess sufficient control over the
allocation of security assistance funds, despite its clear
mandate to manage these programs (except for nonproliferation
assistance).
Currently there is no clearly articulated organizing
principle for U.S. military assistance. Nor is there a coherent
set of benchmarks, or measurements, against which the success
of individual programs with various countries can be measured.
As a result, military assistance funding proposals are often
vague and seemingly unjustified. For instance, the most recent
Congressional presentation documents justify the provision of
FMF for Southeast Europe as ``contributing to regional
stability in Southeast Europe by promoting military reform.''
No further elaboration is given. It is hardly surprising, in
light of this sort of justification, that the administration's
security assistance requests seldom are fully funded by
Congress.
The Committee expects the Department of State to transform
fundamentally the way that the United States conceptualizes
security assistance. Utilizing a model more akin to the
Department of Defense's planning process, the Department of
State is expected to pull together a comprehensive five year
plan, which will evolve on an annual basis, setting forth a
specific programmatic objective for each country and explaining
how the requested funds will accomplish that objective.
Additional, secondary objectives are to be added as necessary.
The Committee believes that the plan for each country should be
developed at the U.S. mission level, and should be coordinated
by the Department of State with all relevant U.S. government
agencies with a role in U.S. security assistance programs. The
bottom-up document that results is then to be coordinated with
the top-down policy guidance set forth in the National Security
Strategy of the United States, and by the Secretary of State
(in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
The Committee expects the resultant document to be a
comprehensive National Security Assistance Strategy which
provides a robust, detailed justification for security
assistance funding that is requested. Rather than the current
process, which yields unclear and unmeasurable objectives for
U.S. security assistance programs, it is expected that the NSAS
process will ensure that the type and amount of assistance
given a country is determined programmatically. Progress can
thus be measured by the administration and the Congress. In
turn, the Committee anticipates that such an initiative, led by
the Political-Military Affairs Bureau of the Department of
State, will substantially improve Congressional understanding
of the administration's initiatives and bolster Congressional
support for the President's military assistance request.
Sec. 502. Security Assistance Surveys
Section 502 authorizes the use of $2,000,000 in Foreign
Military Financing to conduct security assistance surveys in
foreign countries for the purpose of preparing the National
Security Assistance Strategy required pursuant to Section 501.
Subtitle B--Allocations for Certain Countries
Sec. 511. Security Assistance for New NATO Members
Section 511 authorizes $35,000,000 in grant FMF and
$7,000,000 in IMET funding for the three new NATO members (e.g.
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). The administration
request for fiscal year 2001 for these three countries is
$30,300,000 in grant FMF and $5,100,000 in IMET funding. The
actual level of grant FMF funding for the three for fiscal year
2000 is $22,000,000. The actual level for IMET funding for
fiscal year 2000 is $4,570,000.
Section 511 also directs the President to give priority to
supporting the objectives set forth by the Senate in its
resolution of ratification for the protocols adding the three
new NATO members. Specifically, the Committee expects the
administration to ensure that FMF and IMET funding is used to
support the ability of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
to fulfill their collective defense requirements under Article
V of the Washington Treaty. The Committee also expects the
administration to use the additional funds provided to expand
U.S. efforts to improve the ability of these countries to
protect themselves from hostile foreign intelligence services.
Sec. 512. Increased Training Assistance for Greece and Turkey
Section 512 authorizes $1,000,000 in IMET funding for
Greece and $2,500,000 in IMET funding for Turkey for fiscal
year 2001. The administration request for IMET for fiscal year
2001 is $25,000 for Greece and $1,600,000 for Turkey. The
actual level of IMET funding for Greece for fiscal year 2000 is
$25,000. For Turkey, the actual level of IMET funding for
fiscal year 2000 is $1,500,000.
The Committee is encouraged by numerous indications of a
warming in Greek-Turkish relations. This improvement has
manifested itself in several ways, ranging from Greek agreement
to Turkish candidacy for membership in the European Union to
the large number of bilateral agreements that have recently
been signed during reciprocal visits of foreign ministers
(including agreements on transportation, tourism, cultural
heritage, and customs issues). In the interest of bolstering
this process the Committee authorizes a substantial increase in
funds for International Military Education and Training (IMET).
It is the Committee's expectation that the administration
will use these additional funds to support the process of
rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. Specifically, the
Committee urges the administration to ensure that $1,000,000 of
the additional resources, evenly divided between the two
countries, is used for joint professional military education of
Greek and Turkish officers. The Committee notes that this type
of training will build personal relationships between the
militaries of these two important NATO allies, and will
reinforce the process that is already underway.
Sec. 513. Minimum Allocation for Egypt and Israel
Section 513 authorizes $1,980,000,000 in grant FMF for
Israel and $1,300,000 in grant FMF for Egypt for fiscal year
2001. This corresponds to the administration request for fiscal
year 2001. The actual level of grant FMF funding for fiscal
year 2000 is $3,120,000 for Israel (including the Wye
Supplemental) and $1,325,000 for Egypt (including the Wye
Supplemental). In addition, this section directs that FMF funds
for Israel for fiscal year 2001 be disbursed not later than 30
days after enactment of this Act or on October 31, 2000,
whichever is later. To the extent that Israel makes a request,
FMF funds shall, as agreed by Israel and the United States, be
available for advanced weapons systems. Not less than 26.3
percent of such funds can be used for procurement in Israel of
defense articles and defense services, including research and
development. The Committee expects that Israel's annual aid
package will be provided under the usual terms, including early
disbursal of both the ESF and FMF, offshore procurement of at
least 26.3% of its military aid, and that the aid be provided
in the form of a grant.
Sec. 514. Security Assistance for Certain Countries
Section 514 provides individual authorizations of grant FMF
and IMET funding for ten countries. Specific authorizations are
detailed on the following two charts:
GRANT FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administration
Country Authorized for Request for Actual for FY2000
FY2001 FY2001
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estonia................................................ \1\ $6,500,000 $6,350,000 $4,000,000
Latvia................................................. \1\ 6,500,000 5,350,000 4,000,000
Lithuania.............................................. \1\ 7,500,000 6,500,000 4,400,000
Philippines............................................ 5,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000
Georgia................................................ 5,000,000 4,500,000 3,000,000
Malta.................................................. 1,000,000 ................. .................
Slovenia............................................... 4,000,000 3,500,000 2,000,000
Slovakia............................................... 8,400,000 8,400,000 2,600,000
Romania................................................ 11,000,000 11,000,000 6,000,000
Bulgaria............................................... 8,500,000 8,500,000 4,800,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Section 514 authorizes an aggregate total of $20,500,000 in grant FMF for the three Baltic countries, but
does not provide individual authorizations within that total. Thus this is the recommended apportionment.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administration
Country Authorized for Request for Actual for FY2000
FY2001 FY2001
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estonia................................................ \1\$1,250,000 $800,000 $700,000
Latvia................................................. \1\ 1,250,000 750,000 700,000
Lithuania.............................................. \1\ 1,500,000 750,000 700,000
Philippines............................................ 1,500,000 1,400,000 1,400,000
Georgia................................................ 1,000,000 475,000 400,000
Malta.................................................. 1,000,000 100,000 100,000
Slovenia............................................... 1,000,000 700,000 650,000
Slovakia............................................... 1,000,000 700,000 650,000
Romania................................................ 1,500,000 1,300,000 1,100,000
Bulgaria............................................... 1,200,000 1,100,000 1,000,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ As in the case of FMF, Section 514 authorizes an aggregate total of $4,000,000 in IMET for the three Baltic
countries, but does not provide individual authorizations within that total. Thus this is the recommended
apportionment.
Sec. 515. Border Security and Territorial Independence
Section 515 provides an integrated authorization of
security assistance funds for the GUUAM countries (e.g.
Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) and
Armenia. Specifically, Section 515 authorizes a package of
$20,000,000 in grant FMF, $10,000,000 in nonproliferation and
export control assistance, $5,000,000 in IMET funding, and
$2,000,000 in antiterrorism assistance.
These funds must be expended in accordance with the
individual requirements of their respective accounts. Thus, for
instance, the $20,000,000 in grant FMF may only be utilized for
activities authorized in connection with the FMF program.
Likewise, nonproliferation and export control funds must be
spent on the objectives set forth under Chapter 9 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Similar restrictions apply to
the other authorized forms of security assistance. Thus, as
assistance to Azerbaijan under this section is still subject to
section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act, such assistance may be
provided only for antiterrorism or nonproliferation and export
control purposes.
The funds authorized under Section 515, totaling
$37,000,000, must be spent for the purpose of assisting the
GUUAM countries and Armenia in strengthening control of their
borders, and for the purpose of promoting the independence and
territorial sovereignty of these countries. These funds also
are specifically authorized, pursuant to Section 499C of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, for the purpose of enhancing
the abilities of the national border guards, coast guard, and
customs officials of the GUUAM countries and Armenia to secure
their borders against narcotics trafficking, proliferation, and
transnational organized crime. The Committee intends that funds
authorized by this section be used in Uzbekistan solely for
nonproliferation purposes.
Finally, it bears emphasizing that the Committee strongly
supports the cooperation on political, security, and economic
matters promoted and facilitated through the GUUAM group. The
United States should promote these endeavors as part of its
strategy to help these states consolidate their independence
and strengthen their sovereignty, to help resolve and prevent
conflicts in their respective regions, and to promote democracy
and human rights. In addition, the Committee strongly supports
political, security, and economic cooperation between the
United States and Armenia.
TITLE VI--OTHER PROVISIONS
Sec. 601. Utilization of Defense Articles and Services
Section 601 amends Section 502 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 to make clear that defense articles and services
may be furnished by the United States to foreign nations for
antiterrorism or nonproliferation purposes (in addition to
other currently authorized purposes).
Sec. 602. Sense of the Senate Regarding Excess Defense Articles
Section 602 calls on the President to sell more defense
articles, rather than merely give them away, using the
authority provided under Section 21 of the Arms Export Control
Act. It urges the President to use the flexibility afforded by
Section 47 of that Act to determine the ``market value'' of
Excess Defense Articles and to sell such items at a price that
can be negotiated. When the Department of Defense uses too
rigid a definition of ``market value,'' and that price cannot
be commanded, the item is instead transferred on a ``grant''
basis pursuant to Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, thereby forgoing revenues. This section encourages the
Department of Defense to ascertain the ``market value'' on the
basis of local market conditions rather than solely on the
basis of a generic formula applied by the Department of Defense
for accounting purposes.
Sec. 603. Sense of the Senate
On May 24, 2000, the Secretary of State announced seventeen
initiatives (collectively known as the Defense Trade Security
Initiative, or DTSI) designed to reform the manner in which the
United States regulates trade in weapons and sensitive
technology. The Committee, which was not consulted in a timely
fashion on the Defense Trade Security Initiative, nevertheless
welcomes most of the proposed changes to the International
Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR). These changes, ranging from
greater flexibility in licensing of commercial arms sales to
the establishment of a robust common database, are long
overdue. Indeed, several of the initiatives mirror
recommendations made by the Committee at various times.
Accordingly, the Committee will support many of the seventeen
measures, which will make U.S. defense companies more
competitive in the global market.
Under Article 1, Section 8, of the United States
Constitution, the Congress possesses sole constitutional
authority to ``regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.'' The
President may only engage in such an exercise to the extent he
has been authorized to do so by the Congress. Most of the
seventeen DTSI measures, which clearly relate to the regulation
of commerce, have been implicitly authorized in advance by
Congress. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) requires the
President to administer export controls for certain commodities
and also contains a measure of flexibility, allowing the
President to alter export control requirements through
regulatory changes. Indeed, numerous regulatory modifications
have been made using this authority. Thus the constitutionality
of a regulatory change to implement many of the proposed
initiatives is well established.
For several years, the United States has, under Section
38(b)(2) of the AECA, permitted unlicensed trade in defense
articles and defense services with Canada. This practice,
popularly called the ``Canada exemption,'' has been supported
by Congress in light of the unique defense trade relationship
between the United States and Canada. In a June 28, 2000,
letter to Chairman Helms, the Secretary of Defense stated an
intent ``to negotiate a Canada-style exemption to the ITAR with
the U[nited] K[ingdom] and Australia.''
But the Congress has hardly encouraged broadening this
exemption to other countries. On the contrary. On March 16,
2000, in a letter to the Secretary of State, the Chairmen and
ranking members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and the House Committee on International Relations--the two
Congressional Committees with sole jurisdiction over the AECA
and regulation of defense trade--expressed concern about
expanding the Canadian exemption:
The existing Canadian exemption should not be viewed
as a useful model or precedent for exemptions for other
allies. It exempts defense articles and services that
will remain in Canada for its use, or be returned to
parent corporations in the U.S. for further export. It
is only justified because of the integration of our
defense industries (with most recipients of defense
articles and services in Canada being subsidiaries of
U.S. companies) and because our neighbor to the north
was historically expected to prompt fewer law
enforcement problems due to license free exports. Other
allies, on the other hand, need U.S. technologies to
incorporate into their defense items and for re-export.
The Canada exemption is a unique one, based on an
intertwined defense industrial base, a close law enforcement
relationship, and geographical considerations. These same
considerations do not apply to either the United Kingdom or
Australia (to say nothing of other countries), despite the
close military, intelligence, and law enforcement relationships
that the U.S. government has with the governments in London and
Canberra. For instance, defense commodities being shipped
between the United States and Canada are far less susceptible
to diversion than items shipped longer distances on cargo
vessels which must make multiple port calls before arriving in
the final port of destination. Moreover, unlike the case in
Canada, many major U.K. defense companies are now jointly
partnered with other European firms.
For these reasons and others, the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General raised serious questions about how a
Canada-like exemption would affect U.S. export controls and law
enforcement efforts. Their concerns turned, in short, on the
fact that elimination of a licensing requirement for various
weapons and defense commodities would remove an important law
enforcement capability for the United States, placing
heightened reliance upon the United Kingdom and Australia to
stop diversions of U.S. equipment and to provide the type of
evidence needed to prosecute violations of the AECA.
In his June 28, 2000 letter, the Secretary of Defense
assured the Chairman that the licensing exemption for certain
countries would need to be accomplished through ``legally
binding agreements to ensure their export control and
technology security regimes are congruent to our own. In
exchange for these ironclad arrangements, we are prepared to
offer an exemption to the ITAR similar to that long-provided to
Canada.''
The Committee is pleased to note this emphasis on codifying
any broad ITAR exemption in a legally-binding agreement. As the
Department of State noted in connection with the START Treaty:
``An undertaking or commitment that is understood to be legally
binding carries with it both the obligation to comply with the
undertaking and the right of each Party to enforce the
obligation under international law.'' This right of enforcement
is of singular importance in this case, because noncompliance
with the undertaking presumably could result in the diversion
of United States weaponry or technology.
Disturbingly, the initiative to provide license-free trade
to various countries would seem to depend upon the operation,
albeit enhanced, of domestic export control laws in such
countries. As such, the initiative is very much at risk of
being codified in a format that is not legally binding. Care
must be taken, therefore, to craft the obligations of both
parties in a manner which preserves the legally-binding nature
of the agreement.
The Committee expects to exercise close oversight of any
agreements reached with foreign nations that provide for
unlicensed trade in defense articles and defense services. The
Committee reserves judgment on whether any agreements
contemplated with the United Kingdom or Australia in this area
should be undertaken in an executive agreements or in a treaty
subject to advice and consent of the Senate. The Committee
expects, as stated in Section 603, that the Secretary of State
will consult with the Committee as to whether the DTSI
licensing exemption for various countries should be codified as
a treaty. Were the Secretary of State to conclude bilateral
treaties with the United Kingdom and Australia to achieve the
objectives set forth under the DTSI initiative, the Committee
would anticipate the earliest possible consideration of such
important measures. Alternatively, the Committee has the option
of amending Section 38(b)(2) of the AECA to limit the
President's flexibility to approve unlicensed trade--with
Canada or any other nation.
Sec. 604. Additions to United States War Reserve Stockpiles for Allies
Pursuant to Section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended, the Department of Defense can make additions
to the War Reserve Stockpiles for Allies stockpiles only as
periodically provided for in legislation. For fiscal year 2000,
the President requested authority to make additions to
stockpiles in South Korea ($40,000,000) and Thailand
($20,000,000). The Committee provided this authority under
Section 1231 of the ``Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and
2001'' (P.L. 106-113).
For fiscal year 2001 the Department of Defense has asked
for an additional $50,000,000 authorization for the Korean
program. Section 604 provides this authority for fiscal year
2001.
Sec. 605. Transfer of Certain Obsolete or Surplus Defense Articles in
the War Reserve Stockpiles for Allies to Israel
Periodically the Department of Defense requests
authorization to transfer defense articles out of War Reserve
Stockpiles to the host country in question. The defense
articles are to be sold to the host nation. The Committee
provided similar authority to make such transfers to South
Korea and Thailand pursuant to Section 1232 of the ``Admiral
James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001'' (P.L. 106-113).
Sec. 606. Stinger Missiles in the Persian Gulf Region
Section 606 permits the replacement, on a one-for-one
basis, of Stinger missiles possessed by Bahrain and Saudi
Arabia that are nearing the scheduled expiration of their
shelf-life.
Sec. 607. Excess Defense Articles for Mongolia
The Committee supports the furnishing by grant of excess
defense articles (EDA) and services to Mongolia. Unfortunately,
given the weak nature of its national economy, which has led to
difficulty in funding its military budget, Mongolia cannot
afford the cost of packing, crating, handling, and
transportation of EDA, even if the EDA itself is provided at no
cost. Section 607 provides the Department of Defense with the
authority to absorb the costs of transporting EDA to Mongolia,
thereby allowing the receipt of much needed equipment. However,
the Committee intends to continue the practice of requiring
from the Department of Defense a detailed description of such
costs in each proposed transfer. Were such costs to grow beyond
a reasonable level, the Committee's continued support for such
authorities would be jeopardized.
Sec. 608. Space Cooperation with Russian Persons
Section 608 amends the Arms Export Control Act, provides
for increased reporting and certification to Congress, and
expands the ability of the President to regulate missile-
related cooperation by providing him with the discretionary
authority to terminate contracts in the event that he
determines that a violation of the MTCR sanctions law (Section
13(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act) has occurred.
Currently, Chapter 7 of the Arms Export Control Act imposes
mandatory sanctions on proliferating entities. However, those
sanctions apply only to prospective licenses and contracts. The
authority does not exist, within Chapter 7, to terminate an
existing license in the event that an individual has been
discovered to have proliferated missile technology subsequent
to the granting of the license. This deficiency became apparent
in discussions with the administration regarding the proposed
co-production arrangement between Lockheed Martin and a Russian
rocket-engine firm, NPO Energomash. Concerns had arisen
regarding Energomash due to reports that UNSCOM had determined
that the Russian firm may have been seeking to violate the U.N.
sanctions and embargo on Iraq and work with the Iraqi missile
program. Similarly, press accounts and testimony before
Congress have suggested that Energomash-designed engines are
present in Iran, although those engines could have come from a
multiplicity of sources.
Despite these concerns, the Administration elected to
proceed with Congressional notification of the co-production
arrangement, as it will help ensure U.S. military satellite
launch capabilities. In responding to Committee inquiries
regarding the Administration response should the aforementioned
transfers be shown to have occurred (thus subjecting Energomash
to MTCR sanctions), the Assistant Secretary of State for
Political-Military Affairs noted that the provisions of Section
42 of the AECA (which is a general authority to suspend,
terminate, or amend U.S. Government authorization for defense
transfers) would need to be employed in this case since no
specific retroactive termination authority exists within the
actual sanctions law. Section 608 provides that missing
authority to the President, should he choose to utilize it. It
is important to underscore that this authority is completely
discretionary.
Section 608 also requires the President to make an annual
certification to the Committee that various Russian space and
missile entities doing business with the United States are not
suspected of contributing to Iran's MTCR-class ballistic
missile program at any time since January 1, 2000. These
certifications must be made annually for the first five years
of a license between a U.S. firm and a Russian entity. However,
there is no penalty in the event that a certification cannot be
made (presumably because suspicion has arisen). The MTCR
sanctions law only operates in the event that the President
makes a formal determination that a transfer, or a conspiracy
to transfer, occurred. In short, the certification required
under Section 608 does not go beyond the annual report that the
President is required to submit to Congress under the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000. It is nevertheless useful because
it will ensure that the Department of State continues to focus
on Russian entities doing business with the United States. This
provision is also intended to encourage U.S. companies working
with Russian space entities to maintain pressure on their
counterparts not to proliferate technology to Iran.
Finally, Section 608 rectifies an unintended reporting
loophole in the Arms Export Control Act that resulted from
amendments to integrate the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
within the Department of State and a subsequent decision by the
Department of State on licensing technical exchanges and
brokering services under Section 36 of the AECA. Specifically,
for MTCR-related transfers governed under Section 36(b) and (c)
which fall below the Congressional notification threshold, the
administration currently must nevertheless submit a report to
the Committee explaining the consistency of such a transfer
with U.S. MTCR policy. However, MTCR-related licenses covered
by Section 36(d) which fall below the notification threshold
are not captured fully by this reporting requirement. Section
608 rectifies this problem, and ensures that MTCR-related
transfers of both Category I and Category II components and
systems are covered under the reporting requirement.
Sec. 609. Assistance for Israel
Section 609 sets into place the phase out of annual U.S.
Economic Support Funds to Israel. Beginning in FY 1999, the
United States and Israel agreed to a plan whereby Israel's
annual economic assistance would be reduced in equal increments
of 10 percent (equivalent to $120,000,000 per annum), resulting
in the ultimate phase out of the ESF program. In order to
ensure Israel's continued security in the face of the loss of
annual economic support, Israel requested and the United States
agreed to, an annual increase in Foreign Military Finance equal
to half the reduced ESF amount (or $60,000,000).
By FY 2008, the authorities of this section will result in
an aggregate annual reduction in authorized foreign assistance
of $600,000,000. Calculations made in this section are not
intended to factor in rescissions or supplemental
appropriations, and are intended to work from the original
baseline figure from FY 1999 of $1.2 billion in ESF.
TITLE VII--TRANSFERS OF NAVAL VESSELS
Sec. 701. Authority to Transfer Naval Vessels to Certain Foreign
Countries
Section 701 provides authority to the President to transfer
twelve naval vessels to Brazil, Chile, Greece, and Turkey.
These naval vessels either displace in excess of 3,000 tons, or
are less than 20 years of age. Therefore statutory approval for
the transfers is required under 10 U.S.C. 7307(a).
The two PERRY class frigates proposed for transfer to
Turkey under lease/sale authority were approved by Congress to
be transferred to Turkey by sale in the fiscal year 2000 ship
transfer legislation. Because of Turkish financial
uncertainties caused by recent natural disasters, however, this
proposal, which is in addition to the sale authority previously
granted, is needed to give Turkey some flexibility in
determining the most appropriate means to acquire the ships.
Two KNOX class frigates are proposed in this section to be
transferred to Greece on a grant basis.
Sec. 702. Inapplicability of Aggregate Annual Limitation on Value of
Transferred Excess Defense Articles
Section 702 ensures that the value of naval vessels
authorized for transfer by grant by this Act will not be
included in determining the aggregate value of transferred
excess defense articles.
Sec. 703. Costs of Transfers
Section 703 provides that all costs are to be borne by the
foreign recipients, including fleet turnover costs,
maintenance, repairs, and training.
Sec. 704. Conditions Relating to Combined Lease-Sale Transfers
Section 704 authorizes the transfer of high value ships on
a combined lease-sale basis under Section 61 and 21 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2796 and 2761 respectively).
Sec. 705. Funding of Certain Costs of Transfers
Section 705 provides authorization for the appropriation of
funds that may be necessary for the costs of the combined
lease-sale transfers in order to satisfy the requirements of 2
U.S.C. 661c. These funds are authorized to be appropriated into
the Defense Vessels Transfer Program Account, which was
established in the fiscal year 1999 ship transfer legislation.
Sec. 706. Expiration of Authority
Section 706 provides that the transfers authorized by this
Act must be executed within two years of the date of enactment.
This allows a reasonable opportunity for agreement on terms and
for execution of the transfer.
TITLE VIII--DEFINITION
Sec. 801. Definition
This section defines, for the purpose of this title,
appropriate committees of Congress, as the Foreign Relations
Committee and the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and
the International Relations Committee and the Armed Services
Committee of the House of Representatives.
III. Cost Estimate
In accordance with rule XXVI, paragraph 11(a) of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the
following estimate of the cost of this legislation prepared by
the Congressional Budget Office:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, June 29, 2000.
Hon. Jesse Helms, Chairman,
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed
cost estimate for a bill to authorize appropriations to carry
out security assistance for fiscal year 2001, and for other
purposes.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Joseph C.
Whitehill.
Sincerely,
Dan L. Crippen, Director.
Enclosure.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
Summary
The bill would authorize $3.9 billion for foreign military
financing (FMF) and other security assistance programs in 2001.
It would authorize the transfer of 12 naval vessels to foreign&
countries and otherwise address foreign policy. Assuming
appropriation of the authorized amounts, CBO estimates that
implementing the bill would cost about $3.9 billion over the
2001-2005 period. Because it would not affect direct spending
or receipts, the bill would not be subject to pay-as-you-go
procedures.
The bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal
governments.
Estimated Cost to the Federal Government
The estimated budgetary impact of the bill is shown in
Table 1. The costs of this legislation fall within budget
functions 150 (international affairs) and 050 (national
defense).
Basis of Estimate
The bill would affect spending subject to appropriation in
two ways. In most instances, the bill would authorize program
levels for 2001, and those amounts are shown in Table 2. In
other instances, the bill would provide changes in areas where
no program level authorization currently exists. While section
10 of Public Law 91-672 requires that appropriations for
foreign assistance be authorized by law, that provision is
routinely waived by foreign operations appropriation acts.
Changes in authorizations are shown in Table 3 relative to the
funding level for 2000.
For this estimate, CBO assumes that the authorized amounts
will be appropriated by October 1, 2000. We also assume that
outlays will follow historical patterns for the affected
programs except for funds for Israel (as described below).
Authorization of Program Levels
The bill would authorize appropriations for program levels
in several areas.
Foreign Military Financing. The bill would authorize the
appropriation of $3,627 million for FMF in 2001. Within that
amount, the bill would earmark $1,980 million for Israel and
require the disbursement of the funds within 30 days of their
appropriation or October 31, 2000, whichever is later.
Requiring early disbursement would shift outlays of $550
million into 2001 from 2002.
Other Programs. The bill would authorize appropriations of
$202 million for nonproliferation and antiterrorism assistance
and $65 million for international military education and
training.
Table 1.--Estimated Budgetary Effects
[By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars--Spending Subject to Appropriation]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spending Under Current Law for Security Assistance
Programs:
Budget Authority \1\.................................... 4,987 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays....................................... 3,309 2,525 1,201 279 17 6
Proposed Changes:
Estimated Authorization Level........................... 0 3,925 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays....................................... 0 2,192 784 859 32 7
Spending Under the Bill for Security Assistance Programs:
Estimated Authorization Level \1\....................... 4,987 3,925 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays....................................... 3,309 4,717 1,985 1,138 49 13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 2000 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
Naval Vessel Transaction Fund. The bill would authorize the
transfer of 12 naval vessels to foreign countries. The bill
would authorize the sale of four vessels by installments to be
paid over a number of years. The other eight would be given
away.
CBO estimates the transfers would not affect outlays
because we do not expect any of the four authorized sales to
take place and because there would be no forgone receipts from
giving away the other eight vessels. If the government did sell
the four ships in installments of more than 90 days, such sales
would meet the definition of direct loans subject to the
requirements of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 and would
require an appropriation for the cost of the subsidy, which the
bill would authorize in such sums as would be necessary. CBO
estimates that the subsidy authorization would amount to about
$31 million based on information from the Department of Defense
(DoD) and military attaches that the asking price for the four
ships would be approximately $170 million dollars. Because CBO
expects that the countries would prefer that their ships be
produced locally, we expect that the sales of those four ships
and consequent outlays and offsetting receipts would not occur.
That is, we estimate no outlays from the $31 million
authorization and no collections of sales receipts.
Table 2.--Authorizations of Program Levels
[By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign Military Financing:
Authorization Level.............................................. 3,627 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................................ 2,030 716 835 27 7
Nonproliferation and Antiterrorism Assistance:
Authorization Level.............................................. 202 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................................ 131 44 20 4 0
International Military Education and Training:
Authorization Level.............................................. 65 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................................ 31 24 4 1 0
Naval Vessel Transaction Fund:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................... 31 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................................ 0 0 0 0 0
Total:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................... 3,925 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................................ 2,192 784 859 32 7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes in Authorizations of Appropriations
In addition to authorizing program levels, the bill
contains provisions that would lead to changes in future
spending, assuming appropriations consistent with this bill,
but for which no amounts are authorized or earmarked. In Table
3, those implicit changes to future funding levels are shown
relative to the funding level for 2000. Because these changes
relate to programs not currently authorized and not authorized
in this bill, the net change in outlays shown in Table 3--
totaling -$672 million over the 2001-2005 period--are not
included in either Table 1 or Table 2.
Future Funding for Israel. The bill contains provisions
that would combine to lower future aid to Israel. One provision
would gradually eliminate grants to Israel from the economic
support fund by reducing the authorization of future
appropriations by $120 million a year through 2008. (In 2001,
the reduction would amount to $11 million less or $109 million
because of the across-the-board cut required by Public Law 106-
113.) Another provision would authorize that future FMF funding
for Israel be increased by $60 million each year over the same
period.
Special Drawdown Authority. The bill would raise by $50
million per year the limit on the President's authority to draw
upon the resources of DoD for various needs, including
international emergencies. It would add antiterrorism and
nonproliferation assistance to the purposes for which the
special authority could be used. Other provisions of the bill
would authorize the use of DoD's resources to transport excess
defense articles to Mongolia and would double the tonnage limit
on excess defense articles that DoD may ship on a space
available basis. Assuming the appropriation of the necessary
funds, CBO estimates that the provisions would increase
spending by $233 million over the next five years.
Table 3.--Changes in Authorizations of Appropriations as Compared to the 2000 Levels of Appropriations
[By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Future Funding for Israel Economic Support Fund:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................... -109 -229 -349 -469 -589
Estimated Outlays................................................ -109 -229 -349 -469 -589
Foreign Military Financing:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................... \1\ (60 120 180 240 300
)
Estimated Outlays................................................ \1\ (60 120 180 240 300
)
Special Drawdown Authority:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................... 50 50 50 50 50
Estimated Outlays................................................ 38 47 49 49 50
Total Changes from 2000:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................... -59 -59 -119 -179 -239
Estimated Outlays................................................ -71 -62 -120 -180 -239
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The amount for 2001 is included in the authorized amounts shown in Table 2 and is not added into the total
for this table.
Pay-As-You-Go Considerations
None.
Previous CBO Estimate
On April 6, 2000, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for S.
2382, the Technical Assistance, Trade Promotion, and Anti-
Corruption Act of 2000. This bill is substantially the same as
title VII of that bill. This bill, however, does not contain a
section on export controls as in S. 2382, which would impose
private-sector mandates and would have revenue effects. The two
bills have different sections dealing with excess defense
articles and transfer of obsolete articles in the war reserve
stockpile for Israel, and those provisions in this bill would
not affect direct spending. Finally, this bill would authorize
the transfer of fewer naval vessels.
Intergovernmental and Private-Sector Impact
The bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in UMRA and would not affect the budgets of
state, local, or tribal governments.
Estimate Prepared By
Federal costs: Joseph C. Whitehill. Impact on state, local,
and tribal governments: Leo Lex. Impact on the private sector:
Jean Wooster.
Estimate Approved By
Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget
Analysis.
IV. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with rule XXVI, paragraph 11(b) of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has concluded that
there is no regulatory impact from this legislation.
V. Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill,
as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be
omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in
italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in
roman):
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
* * * * * * *
Sec. 502. Utilization of Defense Articles and Services.--
Defense articles and defense services to any country shall be
furnished solely for internal security (including for
antiterrorism and nonproliferation purposes), for legitimate
self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in
regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with
the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the
recipient country to participate in collective measures
requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining
or restoring international peace and security, or for the
purpose of assisting foreign military forces in less developed
friendly countries (or the voluntary efforts of personnel of
the Armed Forces of the United States in such countries) to
construct public works and to engage in other activities
helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly
countries. It is the sense of the Congress that such foreign
military forces should not be maintained or established solely
for civic action activities and that such civic action
activities not significantly detract from the capability of the
military forces to perform their military missions and be
coordinated with and form part of the total economic and social
development effort.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 506. Special Authority.--(a)(1) If the President
determines and reports to the Congress in accordance with
section 652 of this Act that--
(A) an unforeseen emergency exists which requires
immediate military assistance to a foreign country or
international organization; and
(B) the emergency requirement cannot be met under the
authority of the Arms Export Control Act or any other
law except this section;
he may direct, for the purposes of this part, the drawdown of
defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense,
defense services of the Department of Defense, and military
education and training, of an aggregate value of not to exceed
[$100,000,000] $150,000,000 in any fiscal year.
(2)(A) If the President determines and reports to the
Congress in accordance with section 652 of this Act that it is
in the national interest of the United States to draw down
articles and services from the inventory and resources of any
agency of the United States Government and military education
and training from the Department of Defense, the President may
direct the drawdown of such articles, services, and military
education and training--
(i) for the purposes and under the authorities of--
(I) chapter 8 of part I (relating to
international narcotics control assistance);
(II) chapter 9 of part I (relating to
international disaster assistance); [or]
[(III) the Migration and Refugee Assistance
Act of 1962; or]
(III) chapter 8 of part II (relating to
antiterrorism assistance);
(IV) chapter 9 of part II (relating to
nonproliferation assistance); or
(V) the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act
of 1962; or
* * * * * * *
Sec. 514. Stockpiling of Defense Articles for Foreign
Countries.--(a) * * *
(b)(1) * * *
[(2)(A) The value of such additions to stockpiles of
defense articles in foreign countries shall not exceed
$60,000,000 for fiscal year 2000.
[(B) Of the amount specified in subparagraph (A), not more
than $40,000,000 may be made available for stockpiles in the
Republic of Korea and not more than $20,000,000 may be made
available for stockpiles in Thailand.]
(2)(A) The value of such additions to stockpiles of defense
articles in foreign countries shall not exceed $50,000,000 for
fiscal year 2001.
(B) Of the amount specified in subparagraph (A) for fiscal
year 2001, not more than $50,000,000 may be made available for
stockpiles in the Republic of Korea.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 516. Authority of Transfer Excess Defense Articles.--
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(e) Transportation and Related Costs.--(1) * * *
(2) Exception.--The President may provide for the
transpostation of excess defense articles without
charge to a country for the costs of such
transportation if--
(A) * * *
(B) * * *
(C) the total weight of the transfer does not
exceed [25,000] 50,000 pounds; and
* * * * * * *
SEC. 547. CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.
The selection of foreign personnel for training under this
chapter shall be made in consultation with the United States
defense attache to the relevant country.
SEC. 548. RECORDS REGARDING FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS.
In order to contribute most effectively to the development of
military professionalism in foreign countries, the Secretary of
Defense shall develop and maintain a database containing
records on each foreign military or defense ministry civilian
participant in education and training activities conducted
under this chapter after December 31, 2000. This record shall
include the type of instruction received, the dates of such
instruction, whether such instruction was completed
successfully, and, to the extent practicable, a record of the
person's subsequent military or defense ministry career and
current position and location.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 574. Authorizations of Appropriations.--(a) There are
authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out
this chapter [$9,840,000 for the fiscal year 1986 and
$14,680,000 for the fiscal year 1987] $73,000,000 for the
fiscal year 2001.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 9--NONPROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROL ASSISTANCE
SEC. 581. GENERAL AUTHORITY.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law that restricts
assistance to foreign countries (other than sections 502B and
620A of this Act), the President is authorized to furnish, on
such terms and conditions as the President may determine,
assistance to foreign countries in order to enhance the ability
of such countries to halt the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, and advanced conventional
weaponry. Such assistance may include training services and the
provision of equipment and other commodities related to the
detection, deterrence, monitoring, interdiction, and prevention
or countering of proliferation, the establishment of effective
nonproliferation laws and regulations, and the apprehension of
those individuals involved in acts of proliferation of such
weapons.
SEC. 582. PURPOSES.
Activities conducted under this chapter shall be designed--
(1) to enhance the nonproliferation and export
control capabilities of friendly countries by providing
training and equipment to detect, deter, monitor,
interdict, and counter proliferation;
(2) to strengthen the bilateral ties of the United
States with friendly governments by offering concrete
assistance in this area of vital national security
interest; and
(3) to accomplish the activities and objectives set
forth in sections 503 and 504 of the FREEDOM Support
Act (Public Law 502-511).
SEC. 583. TRANSIT INTERDICTION.
(a) Allocation of Funds.--In providing assistance under this
chapter, the President should ensure that not less than one-
quarter of the total of such assistance is expended for the
purpose of enhancing the capabilities of friendly countries to
detect and interdict proliferation-related shipments of cargo
that originate from, and are destined for, other countries.
(b) Priority to Certain Countries.--Priority shall be given
in the apportionment of the assistance described under
subsection (a) to any friendly country that has been determined
by the Secretary of State to be a country frequently transited
by proliferation-related shipments of cargo.
SEC. 584. LIMITATIONS.
The limitations contained in section 573 (a) and (d) of this
Act shall apply to this chapter.
SEC. 585. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to
be appropriated to the President to carry out this chapter
$129,000,000 for the fiscal year 2001.
(b) Availability of Funds.--Funds made available under
subsection (a) may be used notwithstanding any other provision
of law and shall remain available until expended.
* * * * * * *
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998
* * * * * * *
Sec. 303. Authority to Conduct Inspections.
(a) Prohibition.--No inspection of a plant, plant site, or
other facility or location in the United States shall take
place under the Convention without the authorization of the
United States National Authority in accordance with the
requirements of this title.
(b) Authority.--
(1) Technical secretariat inspection teams.--Any duly
designated member of an inspection team of the
Technical Secretariat may inspect any plant, plant
site, or other facility or location in the United
States subject to inspection pursuant to the
Convention.
(2) United States government representatives.--The
United States National Authority shall coordinate the
designation of employees of the Federal Government to
accompany members of an inspection team of the
Technical Secretariat and, in doing so, shall ensure
that--
(A) a special agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, as designated by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, accompanies each
inspection team visit pursuant to paragraph
(1);
(B) no employee of the Environmental
Protection Agency or the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration accompanies any
inspection team visit conducted pursuant to
paragraph (1); and
(C) the number of duly designated
representatives shall be kept to the minimum
necessary.
* * * * * * *
(c) Exception.--The requirement under subsection (b)(2)(A)
shall not apply to inspections of United States chemical
weapons destruction facilities (as used within the meaning of
part IV(C)(13) of the Verification Annex to the Convention).
The Arms Control Export Act
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 7--CONTROL OF MISSILES AND MISSILE EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY
Sec. 71. Licensing.--
(a) Establishment of List of Controlled Items.-- * * *
(d) Exports to Space Launch Vehicle Programs.--[Within 15
days after the issuance of a license for the export of items
valued at less than $14,000,000 that are controlled under this
Act pursuant to United States obligations under the Missile
Technology Control Regime and intended to support the design,
development, or production of a space launch vehicle system
listed in Category I of the MTCR Annex,] Within 15 days after
the issuance of a license (including any brokering license) for
the export of items valued at less than $50,000,000 that are
controlled under this Act pursuant to United States obligations
under the Missile Technology Control Regime or are goods or
services that are intended to support the design, utilization,
development, or production of a space launch vehicle system
listed in Category I or II of the MTCR Annex, the Secretary
shall transmit to the Congress a report describing the licensed
export and rationale for approving such export, including the
consistency of such export with United States missile
nonproliferation policy. The requirement contained in the
preceding sentence shall not apply to licenses for exports to
countries that were members of the MTCR as of April 17, 1987.
* * * * * * *