

**Carl M. Marcy**  
Chief of Staff  
Foreign Relations Committee, 1955-1973

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**Interview #6**  
**Hawks and Doves**  
(Wednesday, October 26, 1983)  
Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie

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The Foreign Relations Committee in hearings, (left to right) Senators Frank Church, Frank Carlson, George Aiken, Bourke Hickenlooper, and J. William Fulbright. Carl Marcy is seen in the center background.

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**RITCHIE:** We were talking, the last time, about the mid-1960s, and looking through your memoranda I noticed that you met at that time regularly with a man named Igor Bubnov, who was the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy. There is a whole series of your conversations with him. I wondered what the purpose of that series was and if you could tell me a little bit about your conversations, and why you held them on such a regular basis?

**MARCY:** Don, you're going to have to jog my memory more than that. I hadn't thought of the name Bubnov for a long time, but I recognize it. I don't have any recollection of what we talked about. Let me say this, I'm reasonably sure that it was an initiative from Bubnov's side, because there wouldn't have been any reason that I can think of why I or the Committee would have initiated any discussions with him.

**RITCHIE:** They tended to be quite a bit about Vietnam, and about the United Nations. This was 1967, 1968, I guess. I found it interesting, especially in light of our conversation last week about your visiting the Soviet Embassy, that there seemed to be a regular

channel, at least for a while, and I wondered if that was fairly common in your career, or was that an unusual circumstance?

**MARCY:** Don, I don't recall if there was any unusual circumstance. I remember in connection with conversations with people in the Soviet Embassy it was the general practice to keep a record of any conversation we had with any one in the Soviet Embassy, for our own record keeping purposes. We almost invariably told the Department of State of meetings that we had so there was some record in official channels that we were talking with the Russians. But the purpose was not to get particular information from them, or to communicate things which they had to say to us. Can you give me an idea of what some of the memoranda may have been about?

**RITCHIE:** There were some about continuing the "Spirit of Glassboro," for instance. I wondered if it was tied into the idea of keeping relations with the Soviet Union on a fairly positive course at a time we were fighting in Vietnam, if there was any connection there?

**MARCY:** That doesn't ring a bell with me at all. I guess, now that I look back, it would make sense to try to do that, but I don't recall that we had that as a purpose.

**RITCHIE:** It may be that the meetings weren't quite as regular as they seemed in the memos, but there were several of them that ran through that period.

**MARCY:** Well, I guess you'll have to look elsewhere for enlightenment!

**RITCHIE:** There was a lot of discussion in the memos on the United Nations and its role in Vietnam. Could we move from there to talking about the United Nations? Considering your earlier interests in the United Nations were you disappointed in the United Nations' activities related to Vietnam, or lack of focus on Vietnam? Or did you think there was any way the United Nations could have focused on Vietnam?

**MARCY:** No. Probably, during that period, the administration and Secretary Rusk were making a point of the fact that we were not alone in Vietnam. I remember testimony from the secretary on several occasions in which he referred to the number of states that were helping us. He at one point spoke of fifteen or twenty states that were supporting us. Of course, the Australians were quite active in Vietnam during at least part of that period of time. But I do remember one subsequent incident which interested me. That was: a few years after Secretary Rusk had spoken of the nations that were helping us, Pat Holt, in

checking through an aid program one year, discovered that one of the nations helping was Colombia. As he looked

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into the matter, he did discover that the Colombians had helped us in Vietnam, but that it had been in the nature of the United States supplying an aircraft to the Colombians, painting the Colombian Air Force insignia on the aircraft, loading the plane up with officers of the Colombian armed forces and their wives, putting some Red Cross supplies in the hold, and taking off for Vietnam; with--again as I recall--a stop of two or three days outward bound in Hawaii, and the return trip with stops for a similar period of time in Hong Kong. That was one of the things that created great skepticism in my mind--the propensity the administration had for describing the numbers of states that were supporting us in Vietnam, and leaving the impression that the international community was backing us extensively. But when it came right down to one or two specific examples, there wasn't much. It might be worthwhile for someone, sometime to check out with those governments and see actually what they did to help us in Vietnam.

**RITCHIE:** Well, we have an example now where the invasion of Grenada seems to be in violation of international law, the Rio Pact and the United Nations. The United States seems to have gotten to the point where it really doesn't even conceive of operating through the United Nations. Do you think that this was pretty much the way it was in the 1960s?

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**MARCY:** I think that's right. I started out being a great supporter of the role of the United Nations in international relations, and being pleased when Harry Truman went into Korea and did it under the auspices of the United Nations. As a matter of fact, the forces in South Korea today still fly a UN flag. But subsequent to Korea, somehow the United Nations just didn't seem to be terribly important. And our government was not making use of the United Nations except as it served our purposes. As I look back over that period, it was interesting to see that at one point we--the United States--used to boast of the fact that we had never vetoed a resolution in the Security Council, and the Soviets were always vetoing resolutions. I think we were supporting the United Nations as long as it seemed to be consistent with the policies that we supported. It was during that period of time that the United Nations began expanding vastly in numbers of members. It started out with around fifty members and it's gone up to over a hundred now as new states came in after they had acquired independence. The nature of the organization was changing, whereas first it had been almost an instrument of United States foreign policy, it was gradually no longer such an instrument because we were not able to have our way as much as we had hoped to, or had gotten accustomed to in the earlier time. I suppose if you were to look at the

record over the last ten years, you probably would find that the United States has vetoed more measures in

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the Security Council than has the Soviet Union, almost a complete reversal. Cause and effect? Hard to say. Something for historians to examine.

**RITCHIE:** Getting back into the Vietnam issue, and Fulbright and the Committee, when I was looking through your memos I came across a letter you wrote to Chalmers Roberts in 1967, with a wonderful quote in it. You said: "Rusk tends to be a missionary and Fulbright a historian-philosopher. Rusk wants to force change or use force to keep change within control. Fulbright tends more to see change as an evolutionary process." It seems to me that that summarized so much of what you've been saying. Would you still ascribe to that view of the difference between the two men?

**MARCY:** Yes, that sounds much more astute than I recall myself being at any time! But I think that is an accurate reflection of Fulbright's attitude at that time, and probably was reflecting my own to some extent. I suppose it's the distinction today between the soft-liners and the hard-liners, between the evolutionists and those who think international relations can be controlled by a superpower. I think what happened, Don, was that the United States, isolationist before World War II, came out of the war rather surprised to find it was the greatest, most powerful nation in the world. We had become the leader of the Free World without our having sought leadership. I think what was surprise at first gradually came to be

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accepted, and perhaps by now even welcomed. I think for a while the leadership role in which we had been cast became almost a religion. We felt a responsibility, we accepted the responsibility, and then we in time resented it when largely through the development of nuclear weaponry it became clear that we could not have our way everywhere, and that there was another power that was in a position to challenge us--not only to challenge us, but to threaten us for the first time in our homeland. I think that one still finds that division, if you could call it that, in attitudes as to what the role of the United States is. There is still evidence, there is evidence in the present administration, that there's a group in the United States that will not be satisfied until it is clear that there is one superpower, and maybe another power is not quite as super as we are. The actions we have seen in the last week, the invasion of Grenada, or the position which we are taking with respect to Nicaragua, indicates that that philosophy still exists and is perhaps in a time of ascendancy.

My general philosophy is that most of United States foreign policy--let's call them aberrations--are temporary aberrations and that the pendulum swings back again. I don't know, coming back to your earlier point about the United Nations, whether we're ever going to swing back into thinking the United Nations is going to serve United States purposes in general. I think making the UN universal almost automatically created a Third World which we cannot manage, even though we still try.

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**RITCHIE:** Fulbright represented that evolutionary change attitude, but it seems that the Foreign Relations Committee as a whole basically adopted that outlook. He wasn't that far removed from the other members of the Committee. Is there a sort of a natural selection in the Senate that senators who believe in military solutions wind up serving on the Armed Services Committee, and senators who are inclined towards diplomatic, evolutionary approaches to world policies wind up on the Foreign Relations Committee? Or does membership on those committees begin to perhaps influence the people who serve on them?

**MARCY:** There is an initial selection made by senators who want to be on one committee or another--and that depends upon a variety of things. If a senator is from a farm state he wants to be on the Agriculture Committee. And I suppose that for the period when Fulbright was chairman, new senators came in, and knowing of his reputation, wanted to be on that committee, even though they might disagree with him. But you also make a subsidiary point which I think is very valid, and that is: once a senator is on a committee, he tends to be influenced by the nature of the business that comes before the committee. Fulbright, over a period of years, was able to--let's say--educate members who came onto the Committee. When they came as a junior member they looked to him as the most experienced. And Fulbright always thought of himself as an educator. Going over the executive transcripts, and maybe even the public

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transcripts, one will find a good many instances in which another senator would say to Senator Fulbright, "Well, Senator, you've convinced me," or "You have educated me," or "I have gradually come around to your point of view." I think specifically of Senator Symington saying that, but that's just one that sticks in my mind. For a senator to admit to another senator that the second senator has educated him is rare. One may be educated, but one doesn't like to admit it. To admit that one of your colleagues may have changed your point of view on something is awkward.

**RITCHIE:** Symington for a long time was one of the few members of the Committee who really had a military bent, or background, having been Secretary of the Air Force, but in the 1960s, with the break with the administration, was

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there any pressure to put some hard-liners on the Committee, to have more of a voice for the Johnson administration on the Committee?

**MARCY:** I don't know of any such pressure. I would not normally have felt it. Pressure to put an individual on the Foreign Relations Committee would have been exercised through the Democratic or Republican leadership. I do believe that during the latter part of the '60s there was a conscious effort for the Republicans to put on the Committee senators who were of a hard-line persuasion than Senator Fulbright. I think, for example, of the senator from Pennsylvania . . .

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**RITCHIE:** Hugh Scott?

**MARCY:** Hugh Scott. And the senator from Michigan, [Robert] Griffin. There may have been one or two others. When they came on the Committee they represented quite a different point of view than the Committee had been accustomed to.

**RITCHIE:** In what way?

**MARCY:** Well, in the sense of tightening up party lines. It seemed to me during the '60s the Committee seldom divided along party lines. I think Fulbright was a little ahead of the thinking of most members--ahead in the sense of being more skeptical of military power as a foreign policy tool. But most of the members seemed to agree with his general approach, and it was not until the Scotts and the Griffins came along that there was more evidence of party discipline, party influencing of the thinking of members of the Committee. Indeed, it was after Griffin and Scott came on the Committee that for the first time that provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, with respect to staff, was applied. I'm referring to the provision which said that if a majority of the minority wants to have a staff person assigned to the minority, they may do so. I don't remember when that authority was first exercised, but it must have been 1970 or '71, it was very late in the period of time when I was with the Committee.

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**RITCHIE:** Did that cause some problems for you, setting up a minority staff?

**MARCY:** Well, it caused some anguish when it was done the first time. But the anguish was mitigated by the fact that Senator Aiken and I had a close relationship. He was then the ranking minority Republican. He normally stopped by my office on the way to the Senate floor. He would show up about 11:30 or 11:45, and we would chat about Committee business and any other thing that came to our minds. When the Republican minority caucused--I'm talking about

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the Committee minority--and decided to ask to have a staff person assigned specifically to the minority, I was a bit anguished when that decision was made known to me. But the day after the decision was made, Senator Aiken stopped in my office and said, "I know this probably bothers you, but the minority authorized me to pick a staff member who would serve the minority and authorized me to go out and hire such a person if necessary. I want you to know that I have picked Robert Dockery to represent the minority." Well, Dockery was a staff member and had been for a number of years, so there was really no change. Communication between Dockery and me and the other members of the staff was very much the same. There was little partisanship that entered at that point. But it did satisfy a distinct feeling on the part of the minority that they needed to have somebody with whom they could communicate and confide, a feeling that the other members of the staff tended to work mostly for the majority.

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And that's characteristic. The majority does have the controlling votes. When reports are done, and there are minority views, there is concern that their views are not reflected perhaps as much as they should be.

**RITCHIE:** You had the Republican hard-liners coming on, but it seems to me there were a couple of Democratic hard-liners who came along at that point. I was thinking about Tom Dodd of Connecticut. He joined the Committee in the mid-60s.

**MARCY:** Yes.

**RITCHIE:** Could you give me an assessment of him? I'm curious in the sense that his son is now a member of the Committee, but seems to take a different approach.

**MARCY:** I can't give you much of an assessment of Senator Dodd. We had a good relationship. I certainly was conscious that he was harder-line than most members, but it did seem to me that he devoted most of his time and attention to the Judiciary Committee. I don't feel that his presence was as disruptive--that's too strong a word--worrisome as the subsequent period of time when Scott and Griffin came on on the Republican side.

**RITCHIE:** Going back again to the problems of the Vietnam war. Did you find that in 1967 and 1968, as the relations between the administration and the Committee really worsened, that it became

difficult to get administration witnesses to testify on Vietnam, and to make themselves as available as they had been before?

**MARCY:** Yes, it did become more difficult. There was more persuading to be done. I had to insist that we get witnesses. Certainly, Lyndon Johnson was not very cooperative with the Foreign Relations Committee after the break between him and Fulbright. I think there was a reluctance to testify. It's one thing if the Committee sides with the administration. Then witnesses are a dime a dozen. But if the witnesses have to show up and display their wares before a skeptical forum, they don't like that so much. It's a little more awkward to get them. I don't recall any instance when we had a knock-down drag-out fight about getting witnesses. There were a number of awkward situations that developed, however. It became much more difficult, for example, to persuade the executive branch to provide aircraft for senators to travel abroad, perhaps a minor point but nevertheless it's one of those things that conveys a certain prestige to travel in Air Force One or Air Force Two, or a jet, as distinct from an old propeller aircraft.

**RITCHIE:** I heard there was an incident where President Johnson appointed a committee--I think he sent Senator Mansfield to Vietnam aboard an air force jet, at the same time Senator Fulbright was going to a parliamentary meeting in New Zealand.

**MARCY:** That's right.

**RITCHIE:** And Fulbright went on an old prop plane and Mansfield took the air force jet to Vietnam.

**MARCY:** That was very interesting. I think Senator Morse was going on that trip, too. I had a real struggle with the administration to get any aircraft at all. But at that time I guess Mansfield was still pretty gung-ho in support of the United States in Vietnam. He was majority leader and he felt a certain obligation there, and he had a good relationship with President Johnson. Fulbright certainly did not; and Senator Morse certainly did not. So even though Morse and Fulbright were of the same party as the president, there was no way that you could see the close relationship between the Democratic president and those particular Democratic senators.

**RITCHIE:** Did Fulbright express much regret over his deteriorating with Johnson?

**MARCY:** No, not to me. He accepted it. I'd have to say that he was sorry that the relationship had broken, but I never detected any feeling on his part that it could



have been any other way. He, so far as I know, never resented having spoken his piece about the Dominican Republic, and his increasing critical attitude towards our involvement in Vietnam. He spoke out. I know he did try to make his peace with Johnson several time, but it was clear that there was no peace there. I think Fulbright made an effort, but it got nowhere with Johnson whatsoever.

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**RITCHIE:** One other official that interests me at that time was the National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy. It seems to me that about the Kennedy/Johnson period the National Security Advisor really began to come into his own as a prominent figure and getting more attention, and yet unlike State Department officials he was immune from the Senate. He didn't have to go up for confirmation, and he wasn't called to testify. Was there any sense of frustration on the Committee's part that there was a key person in the foreign policy decision making who was beyond their touch and who wouldn't testify?

**MARCY:** Yes, there was. The administration was adamant that the National Security Advisor was not to be a witness before the Foreign Relations Committee. That continued; it continues today. When [Henry] Kissinger became National Security Advisor under President Nixon, Senator Fulbright and he and I did arrange several private meetings with Kissinger. However, he never came to the Committee. We met one time at Senator Fulbright's home; we met several times at the Court of Claims Building off Lafayette Square. But we never met in the White House with the Security Advisor as a Committee, and never met with the Security Advisor on the Hill in the Committee offices.

**RITCHIE:** Were there any kind of informal meetings with Bundy when he was Security Advisor?

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**MARCY:** I don't recall any. It may have been that Bundy came to see Fulbright from time to time, or individual members, but I don't know. And I think the same thing probably was true with respect to Kissinger. Kissinger did see Senator Fulbright privately in his offices from time to time, but he never appeared before the Committee, to the best of my recollection. I always have to say to the best of my recollection, Don, just to be sure that you don't have a memo that indicates that my memory is weaker than it sometimes seems.

**RITCHIE:** Well, actually it's been nice that the interviews can go along with those memos, because I think those memos are going to be a really fine research tool for people doing foreign policy studies, and in effect what we've been able to do is to follow the series along and talk about some of the highlights in them. Certainly, in terms of my formulating questions, it's helpful to be able to brief myself by reading them.

**MARCY:** Well, I have been wondering if I ought to refresh my recollection by going over those memos before we continue. But if you don't mind taking the memory the way it comes back, and you do the refreshing, that's fine with me.

**RITCHIE:** I think that's a good system.

**MARCY:** All right.

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**RITCHIE:** To refer to a memo in this case, one that interested me was a list of suggestions you made back in 1966 to Senator Fulbright about proposed hearings for 1967. One that you suggested was a hearing on a constitutional amendment to define the war powers of Congress and the presidency. It strikes me that this is the beginning of the rumblings for a War Powers Act. I wondered if you could talk about the problem of war powers as Vietnam defined it, and some of the concerns within the Committee, as well as your own concerns.

**MARCY:** I think, Don, I was reflecting the increasing concern of the Committee about our involvement in Vietnam. That increasing concern was a reflection of the constituencies pressures that were being brought to bear on the senators. Senator Fulbright became more and more concerned about how to get out of Vietnam. In the earlier period he was not so much worried about how to get out of Vietnam as to how we settled the situation. That's when we went through this exercise that I mentioned earlier when he was searching for some means whereby we might neutralize the Indochinese area from possible confrontations of the kind we were involved in. But I don't recall specifically talking about the war power at that time. It must have come up because it was clear that we were in a war, and we were beginning to question how much authority the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had in fact transferred to the president.

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**RITCHIE:** It was an early reference to something that would develop later on.

**MARCY:** Yes.

**RITCHIE:** Were there any checks that the Committee could have imposed that it wasn't on the presidency? There was no declaration of war, but was there any other action open to the Committee at that stage?

**MARCY:** I don't think so. The Committee was powerless. The funds for waging the war came from other committees and other sources. There was no monetary limitation that the Committee could initiate. It was on record with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. With American boys involved in a foreign land the feeling was you can't back away from them. You can't leave them there. Very much the same

situation that President Reagan is now facing with respect to the Marines [in Lebanon]. The decision is made, they're there, and then there is this patriotic instinct that you can't lose in war, you can't back away. If you do, all the men who have died, have died in vain. I guess they don't die in vain if they win a war. It was just that. It was an inhibition which grows out of patriotic nationalism. I mentioned earlier that during this period, as Fulbright became more and more critical of American involvement in Vietnam, he had a rule that he would not travel abroad. He felt that if he went abroad

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he would inevitably be questioned, and he was not the kind of person who wanted to be put in a spot in which he would have to express an opinion in a foreign country which was at loggerheads with the position that our government was taking. So he didn't travel. I should put in a footnote here, because he was criticized for not having gone to Vietnam. I remember a number of instances in which people would say: "How can Fulbright be critical of Vietnam? He's never even been there." Well, he was there at some time, but it was much earlier. It was in the late '50s, I guess. I was not with him at that time, but he had been in Vietnam at an earlier time. But he didn't feel it was necessary to go to Vietnam in order to understand what was happening.

**RITCHIE:** Senator Fulbright became something of a hero to the anti-war movement, because he was an establishment figure who early on spoke out against the war, and questioned it. Did you have any contacts with the growing anti-war movement in 1967 and 1968? Did the Committee feel any pressure from them?

**MARCY:** When we did get into hearings that involved some aspect of Vietnam, there were always a few public witnesses who we always heard, but the public witnesses never carried very much impact. I think if you look at the record you will find that there were not any very distinguished public witnesses. The "best and the brightest," in the words of David Halberstam, were either in the

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administration or very quiet. I don't mean to reflect on those who testified, but there were no former Secretaries of State, or Secretaries of Defense, or big businessmen, people of that kind, who were coming around to testify in criticism of our involvement in Vietnam. It was not until, and you'll have to supply the date, until the March on Washington [Moratorium] . . . .

**RITCHIE:** 1969.

**MARCY:** At that time Senator Fulbright did meet with a group of the protestors. I recall a Navy officer who assumed a leading position in that protest. My best

recollection is that Fulbright met this officer--I think--at some social function during that period of time. I remember Fulbright coming to me the next morning and saying he had invited the officer to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee the next day and asking me to get the notices out and get the senators there. It was a quick decision that he made. Again, my recollection is that that was a very significant hearing at that particular moment, well covered by television, well covered by the press. That's what sticks in my mind.

**RITCHIE:** Do you recall him ever expressing any feelings or opinions about the teach-ins and the protests and the student antiwar demonstrations that were going on at that time?

**MARCY:** No, I don't.

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**RITCHIE:** One of the interesting people of the Committee, who came on in the 1960s, was Eugene McCarthy. I gather that you worked with him on a number of projects. He came to personify the anti-war movement by 1968. What type of a person was McCarthy when he was a member of the Committee?

**MARCY:** Always stimulating, democratic with a small I'd," very concerned. I remember when Gene McCarthy decided to run for president, it was during a hearing in the new Senate Office Building. I don't recall who the witness was. It probably was Secretary Rusk. It may have been McNamara, probably was Secretary Rusk. It became clear that Senator McCarthy had *had* it. He stood up and stomped out of the hearing room into the back office. I could see he was distraught, so I got up and followed him out. One of the press people, Ned Kenworthy of the *New York Times* saw what was happening, and he got up and left. McCarthy and I walked out into the hall, and Ned Kenworthy was there. About all I remember of that conversation was McCarthy saying, "Someone's got to take them on. And if I have to run for president to do it, I'm going to do it." Just flat out. I think that Ned Kenworthy will remember that conversation, because he and I talked about it several times. It was the first indication that McCarthy, so far as I know, without any backing whatsoever, would run. But he said he had had it. McCarthy is still around, you

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know. You might want to do an interview with him. He's just survived a heart attack. It would be interesting to see if he remembers that particular point.

**RITCHIE:** Speaking of his presidential campaign, what did you think of his attempt to take on Lyndon Johnson? Did you see it as a quixotic affair, or did you take it seriously?

**MARCY:** Well, as time went on people obviously took it more and more seriously. I was not involved in the campaign. I liked the idea, however. I felt very badly that he didn't get the nomination. I have always felt that if McCarthy had been nominated he would have defeated Nixon. But that's only a feeling, I don't know what the polls would show. It always seemed to me, too, that if Humphrey had been able to separate himself more completely from Johnson's position on Vietnam, he would probably have defeated Nixon.

**RITCHIE:** McCarthy has something of a reputation of a poet and a dreamer, was he a man for hard realities as well, or was he intellectually removed from realities?

**MARCY:** I never felt he was intellectually removed from realities. I thought he was a pretty smart fellow. I guess if you are sensitive, have poetic instincts, and a quick wit, that does not necessarily mean that you're separated from reality. I was always a great admirer of Gene McCarthy.

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**RITCHIE:** One of the issues that he took on in the mid-160s was the whole question of more congressional supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency. I think he put in some of the first resolutions to pursue that. That looked like something you had an interest in as well, and I wondered if you worked with him at all on that.

**MARCY:** Yes, I did. At an earlier time Senator Mansfield had made a move in that direction. Then at a later time I did work with Senator McCarthy in drafting legislation to exercise more supervision over the intelligence agency. Again, that didn't go anywhere.

**RITCHIE:** Were you becoming increasingly concerned about the role of the CIA in foreign policy in the '60s?

**MARCY:** Yes, although it's hard to pinpoint any particular incident. It was during that period that I first began to be aware of the extent to which CIA employees had infiltrated the career foreign service of the United States. Infiltrate may not be quite the right word, because I think it was done with the consent of the State Department, but many of the officers stationed in foreign countries were not employed by the Department of State, they were employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. At one time, we did get figures on the number of CIA employees, as contrasted with the numbers of State Department-paid employees, in several embassies overseas. I remember being quite shocked at the time by the fact that in several of the embassies there were nearly as many CIA people

on the payroll as there were foreign service people, although they were all listed as foreign service officers. They had rank and diplomatic status in the countries to which they were accredited. So I was worried about that infiltration of the foreign service by the CIA.

**RITCHIE:** Did you think there were other members of the Committee who shared your concerns?

**MARCY:** I don't recall anyone but Senator McCarthy who was particularly concerned about it. I think they were surprised. But the CIA was a different department, in a sense. The Committee didn't feel that it had any--in fact the Committee did *not* have any-jurisdictional supervision over the Central Intelligence Agency, anymore than we had, say, over the Department of Defense. The Committee's department was the Department of State, and as long as State was not fussing about it, the Committee didn't fuss. The Committee tended to look at the CIA and the Department of Defense as agencies which would appear before the Committee once or twice a year to provide information in the area of intelligence or in the area of military defense, as sort of separate from what the diplomats were doing; they were a supplementary source of information.

**RITCHIE:** Did anyone in the Department of State ever express concern to you about the increasing role of the Central Intelligence Agency?

**MARCY:** I suspect that there were some who did, but I do not remember any specific instance. There should have been. I guess I'm speculating, I just can't speak of specific cases.

**RITCHIE:** Well, one of the big turning points in the Vietnam war was the Tet Offensive at the end of January 1968. The big North Vietnamese/Viet Cong offensive all over Vietnam. Do you recall what kind of an impact this had on yourself and on the members of the Foreign Relations Committee?

**MARCY:** There was increasing concern, certainly my reaction by that time was what a disaster area Vietnam was turning out to be. This tended to underline my feeling, and that of increasing numbers of Committee members, that there was no light at the end of the tunnel.

**RITCHIE:** Then by the end of April 1968, Lyndon Johnson withdrew from the presidential race. Was there any thawing of tensions between Johnson and Fulbright, and between the administration and the Committee, once Johnson was no longer an active candidate and was committed to negotiations on Vietnam?



**MARCY:** No, I don't think there was any thawing at all. I think there was pleasure on the part of some of the Committee members after Secretary McNamara left and Clark Clifford came in. Clark Clifford had a very good relationship with members of the

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Committee. There was a feeling that he was not necessarily dovish but more rational, less committed to carrying on the war in Vietnam, and was looking for a way out. I think that was a very common feeling at the time. I know Fulbright had a number of conversations with Clifford during that period. It was during that period that word got out that we were going to step up the number of troops in Vietnam again. Whether that was before Johnson--I guess that must have been just before Johnson decided not to run. Fulbright became very worried about that and talked with Clark Clifford and a number of others about what a mistake it was. That was also a time when we had just finished our investigative hearings on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which occupied a good bit of time. We were trying to find out what had happened. It was almost history at that time. We had a very difficult time getting McNamara to testify before the Committee. He did, just a day or so before he left office.

**RITCHIE:** Clifford, as a new member of the cabinet, was able to make overtures to the Committee and build some bridges. Do you think that Rusk by that stage was just embittered over his relationship and nothing would have changed?

**MARCY:** I think that's correct.

**RITCHIE:** Was the Committee at all kept informed on what was happening in the Paris negotiations with Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance?

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**MARCY:** I don't think so. A couple of people on the staff, maybe Jim Lowenstein and [Richard] Moose, were they still there then?

**RITCHIE:** I think so.

**MARCY:** They were still on the Committee. They may have kept in contact with the negotiations. I seem to recall several memos that I did at that time, making suggestions.

**RITCHIE:** Mentioning Lowenstein and Moose and others, the Committee staff was growing in the 1960s, as the Committee's interests were growing. How did this affect your functioning as staff director?

**MARCY:** It stayed very much the same. Lowenstein and Moose had their area of responsibility. They worked well with each other. They did their reports. They testified before the Committee in executive session after each of their visits to Vietnam. They're not the kind of people who need supervision. They were both former Department of State career officers. They were attuned to the kinds of things that I needed to know. I had implicit confidence in them. I don't recall any particular problems that we had.

**RITCHIE:** Did you find that staff members were going overseas more during this period and doing more first-hand investigating?

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**MARCY:** Yes. We were doing much more of that. But Lowenstein and Moose were the ones who really took on the main assignment for themselves for the reports which they did. I had mentioned earlier during the Joe McCarthy period when the Committee was very reluctant to have staff people go abroad by themselves without a senator in some way being associated. That gradually broke down so that by the late '60s there was no question. We always needed the approval of the Committee for assignments of this kind, but we had had no incidents that reflected on the Committee. I did have one or two cases where some staff member didn't demean himself quite properly under some circumstances, but they were very minor and didn't cause any fracas. Nothing to disturb the Committee about.

**RITCHIE:** Especially when staff were sent to Vietnam, did the administration cooperate with their being there, or did they object to them being there? Was there any sense of "not butting in?"

**MARCY:** I don't recall any particular fuss about it. That was one of the advantages of Lowenstein and Moose. They had come out of the establishment, so the presumption was that they were responsible individuals, that they were cleared, and they were. They didn't blab to the press when they would come back. They would report to the Committee. They were very dissatisfied in some cases with the reception that they got in the missions overseas, but they did not just talk to the ambassador and the ambassador's staff. They made it a

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point to talk with American press people there, foreign press, foreign diplomats, so they got a much broader picture of the situation than they ever would if they had stuck with the embassy. So unless the administration was adamant and were just going to say "No, we are not going to permit you," they were as free as press people, and they acted that way.

**RITCHIE:** When they got ready to go on one of these fact-finding trips, did you map strategy with them? Or was it pretty much assumed they knew what they were going to do?

**MARCY:** No, they mapped their own. They worked very well together.

**RITCHIE:** They came out with some first-rate reports.

**MARCY:** Oh, they did. They did a beautiful job. What is the rule? If it's not broken, don't fix it. I guess I was probably skeptical during the first mission, but by the second time they'd gone abroad, there was not much to be skeptical about, because they were doing such a great job.

**RITCHIE:** Well, we're about to move into the Nixon years and the continuation of the war in Vietnam under different leadership, but before we do that, I wondered if there was anything else about the Lyndon Johnson years and any thoughts about Johnson that we haven't covered that you think we should.

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**MARCY:** Don, you've done such a good job of reminding me of everything that I can't think at the moment of anything that we haven't touched on. I think some of these things we could have covered in greater depth if my memory were better. I say this partly by way of apology, but there were so many things bearing on the Committee during this period that I was very lucky to have a secretarial staff that kept a decent record. I was very lucky to have competent individuals throughout the staff at the period of time. We didn't have any backbiting or jealousies, certainly of any significant kind. It was always a pleasure to have people of that kind to work with. Competent men and women of integrity. Pat Holt was always up-to-date on everything, so if I were away for a time, there was never any question whatsoever about Pat taking over.

**RITCHIE:** You had some remarkable continuity of staff over that period, people like Morella Hanson, and yourself, and Pat Holt, and others who had been on the Committee since the 1940s and early 1950s. It seems unusual by comparison to many of the other Committee staffs.

**MARCY:** Well, I think it was unusual at that time, and compared to today it's the difference between day and night. I look now at that staff after I have been gone from there only ten years. There are about three people who were there when I left in 1973. One

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of them is printing clerk, and there is the clerk of the Committee, and the third an aide to the minority.

**RITCHIE:** Speaking of the records of the Committee, someone at the National Archives was telling me that the Committee saved none of the petitions and memorials on Vietnam, which surprised me. Do you recall if there was a decision on that, or was it just that you were so overwhelmed with material coming in?

**MARCY:** I don't recall. Petitions and memorials would have gone to Morella Hanson to put in the files. While Morella was originally trained as a historian, I think she was so overwhelmed that she dumped a lot of stuff. I don't mean by that to blame Morella, but I do remember several times that I thought there were things that we should have kept and I would look for them and discover that they had been destroyed.

**RITCHIE:** I had a feeling that the sheer volume was the issue.

**MARCY:** I think that was very much the case. You run out of file space after a time. But Morella would be the person, you ought to talk to her about that, see what her theory and her policy was. You tell her that I said I thought she threw out too many things. But then, I didn't have to worry about storing them! One of the things about Morella was that she has one of the best memories of

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anyone in the place, so if it was in the files she could find it. If she couldn't find it in the files she could usually remember enough to serve the purposes of the moment.

**RITCHIE:** That strikes me as one of the problems of a staff starting out as a small staff and growing larger, with the issues becoming more complicated. Just keeping track of the correspondence, the reports, the material, must have become quite a burden as events went on in the '60s and '70s.

**MARCY:** Well, it did, but fortunately Morella protected me from that. I remember when I was getting ready to leave the Committee and trying to see what records I might want to use. I was absolutely appalled at how much stuff there was. I never did go over it very carefully. I hope most of it is in the Archives. [End of Interview #6]