Multiple Sources Already Answered This Question

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  House Armed Services Committee Republican Staff Report

  A report adopted by the eight Republican Members of the House Armed Services Committee in February 2014, concluded that “given their location and readiness status it was not possible to dispatch armed aircraft before survivors left Benghazi,” although it questioned why DOD did not prepare fighters for a prolonged or different attack.
  
  The report also dismissed the deployment of an unarmed fighter aircraft from Aviano as a show of force, explaining that: “[I]n light of all these factors, majority members believe the use of unarmed aircraft, with no countermeasure capability, refueling arrangements, or targeting assistance, amidst a dangerous antiaircraft environment, would have offered only a small likelihood of benefitting those under attack. It makes sense that this remote option was apparently not more actively contemplated.”
  Source: House Armed Services Committee, Feb. 10, 2014
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  Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Bipartisan Report

  "There were no U.S. military resources in position to intervene in short order in Benghazi to help defend the Temporary Mission Facility and its Annex on September 11 and 12, 2012."
  Source: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Jan. 15, 2014
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  Accountability Review Board Vice Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen

  Admiral Michael Mullen, Vice Chair of the independent Accountability Review Board and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified repeatedly about how he personally examined this issue and determined that there was no ability to get an F-16 or another strike aircraft to Benghazi on the night of the attack. He explained that while “[t]here were plenty of assets moving” that night, there were “no planes sitting at the ready,” which meant that it would take “hours and hours” to get them combat-ready, including planning the mission, obtaining tanker support to fuel the planes, getting bomb racks, stetting the munitions, and getting permission from the host nation. He also added that NATO would not have been able to assist with the response, explaining: “I actually commanded NATO forces, and the likelihood that NATO could respond in a situation like that was absolutely zero.”
  Source: Hearing of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Sept. 19, 2013
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  Wing Commander of the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano Air Base in Italy

  Brigadier General Scott Zobrist, who at the time was the Wing Commander of the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano Air Base in northern Italy, and an experienced F-16 fighter pilot, told congressional staff that dispatching an unarmed fighter jet that night would have entailed an “incredible” risk and had the potential to “make the situation worse” because of the risk of a downed aircraft. He further explained: “I’m not sure that I would even, in my good military judgment, if I could let them do that. Nor do I think my commanders would ask me to do that because of the limitations, the probability of success would be so low and the risk would be so high.” He also explained his concerns about the effectiveness of using a strike aircraft in an urban environment at night to disperse a crowd, stating “from an F-16 pilot’s perspective, based on my experience, in F-16; or F-15E or any of our other fighter aircraft, would have limited effectiveness in dispersing a crowd or in an urban environment, especially with very little awareness.”
  Source: Transcribed Interview with Congressional Staff, March 12, 2014
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  AFRICOM Commander General Carter Ham

  General Carter Ham, who at the time of the attacks was the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, briefed the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on June 26, 2013 that in his military judgment close air support would not have made a difference that night:
  
  “It was a very uncertain situation in an environment which we know we had an unknown surface-to-air threat with the proliferation particularly of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, many of which remain unaccounted for. But mostly it was a lack of understanding of the environment, and hence the need for the Predator to try to gain an understanding of what was going on. So again, I understand that others may disagree with this, but it was my judgment that close air support was not the right tool for that environment.”
  Source: Briefing before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, June 26, 2013
  
  General Ham again confirmed his previous statements in a transcribed interview with congressional staff almost a year later, where he explained that “given the uncertainty of the situation, given the complexity of a large urban environment, and the fact that the first attack subsided pretty significantly about an hour or so after it began, that it was my military judgment that strike aircraft, close air support were not the appropriate tool.”
  Source: Transcribed Interview, April 9, 2014
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  AFRICOM Deputy Commander for Military Operations

  Vice Admiral Charles J. Leidig explained in his transcribed interview with congressional staff that “it was completely infeasible to have fighters available that night. There were no crews. There was no weapons. There was no pre-brief. … They don’t have enough gas to get there, so then you have to have tankers. The tankers are all in Europe or in northern - or in England or Northern Europe. Same thing, you have to call crews in, get them briefed, get them up, flight time, get them down there.” He further explained that because it would have taken at least 24 hours to get a fighter to Benghazi, he concluded that “there was no way we were going to get any aircraft there that night.”
  Source: Transcribed Interview with Congressional Staff, March 20, 2014
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  AFRICOM Director of Operations and Cyber

  Rear Admiral Richard Landolt, AFRICOM Director of Operations, stated to congressional investigators that he and the other commanders that night determined that the F-16s were “not available” for use because they would take approximately 24 hours to get to Benghazi, which “doesn’t give you anything, because it’s a little too late.”
  Source: Transcribed Interview with Congressional Staff, March 18, 2014
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  U.S. Army Lt. Colonel at Embassy Tripoli

  A Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli explained to congressional investigators that his discussions that night were focused on evacuating individuals in Benghazi because they could do that faster than they could get strike aircraft to Benghazi. He explained: "We are working all options. And I know that the planners back at AFRICOM were also looking at all options. But that capability was kind of understood not to be readily available any faster than an evacuation capability."
  Source: Transcribed Interview with Congressional Staff, Feb. 28, 2014
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  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey

  During a February 7, 2013 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified that the F-16s were not deployed that night because “this was the middle of the night, now. These were not aircraft on strip alert. They’re there as part of our commitment to NATO and Europe. So as we looked at the timeline, it was pretty clear that it would take up to 20 hours or so to get them there. Second, Senator, importantly, it was the wrong tool for the job.”
  Source: Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 7, 2013
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  Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta

  Then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee about why other types of armed aircraft such as armed UAVs, AC-130 gunships, or fixed-wing fighters were not deployed to Benghazi that night, explaining that they were just too far away to get there quickly: “This was, pure and simple, in the absence, as I said, of any kind of advance warning, a problem of distance and time.”
  Source: Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 7, 2013
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  Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

  Former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, who served during both the Bush and Obama Administrations said that he agreed with the military decisions made by the commanders that night, explaining that “frankly, I’ve heard ‘Well, why didn’t you just fly a fighter jet over and try and scare ‘em with the noise or something?’ Well, given the number of surface to air missiles that have disappeared from Qaddafi’s arsenals, I would not have approved sending an aircraft, a single aircraft—over Benghazi under those circumstances.”
  Source: CBS News, May 12, 2013
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  Vice Director for Operations at the Department of Defense Joint Staff

  In a briefing before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on May 21, 2013, Major General Darryl Roberson, who has served in the Air Force for 30 years and has extensive F-16 experience, agreed with General Ham’s decision not to deploy the F-16s. He explained that in his “personal opinion, it was absolutely not” appropriate to use F-16s considering the state of knowledge and state of affairs.
  Source: Briefing before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, May 21, 2013