



**Department of Homeland Security**  
**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**



**SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO**  
**THE CONGRESS**

April 1, 2018 – September 30, 2018

# Inspector General's Message

The Honorable Kirstjen M. Nielsen  
Secretary  
Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Madam Secretary:

I am pleased to present our semiannual report, which summarizes the work and accomplishments of our office during the second half of fiscal year 2018.

The audits, inspections, and investigations we conducted during this reporting period should help improve treatment and care of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainees at detention facilities; make progress toward implementing controls to regulate access to Department of Homeland Security facilities and systems; and ensure the Federal Air Marshalls Services maximizes its resources to address its highest risks. In addition, our work will enhance the United States Coast Guard's oversight of information technology investments, and ensure Federal Emergency Management Agency funds are put to better use to improve management and oversight of disaster-related programs.

The Department and its components have worked with us to correct hundreds of issues and improve the economy and efficiency of programs and operations. Based on the Department's actions this period, we closed 149 recommendations issued in this and prior periods. Our work in this reporting period has resulted in improved overall effectiveness and a more secure homeland as well as improved management and oversight of programs and operations to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

This year we mark the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Inspector General Act and the creation of the original 12 Offices of Inspector General. Our office was created in 2003. We are part of a community that has grown to include 73 statutory Inspectors General who collectively oversee the operations of nearly every aspect of the Federal government. Every 6 months we provide Congress with a report detailing our independent oversight of the Department. This report is our 32<sup>nd</sup> semiannual report. In the years to come, we look forward to continuing our efforts to provide independent and effective oversight of the Department and working with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on important issues that cut across our government.

Sincerely,



John V. Kelly  
Senior Official Performing the Duties  
of the Inspector General

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
# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments

April 1, 2018 – September 30, 2018

During this reporting period, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed audits, inspections, and investigations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the Department’s programs and operations.

## Reports Issued to DHS

We issued 30 reports, including 2 management alerts, and 4 reports on Disaster Relief Fund spending (appendix 5), as well as 406 investigative reports, while continuing to strengthen our transparency and internal oversight.



Our reports provide the DHS Secretary and Congress with an objective assessment of the issues the Department faces. The reports also offer specific recommendations to correct deficiencies and improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS’ programs.

## Dollar Impact

Our audits resulted in questioned costs of \$45,234,688 of which \$332,138 did not have supporting documentation. The Department recovered or deobligated from audits \$50,053,802. (See appendix 6.) We issued 3 reports identifying \$4,964,641 in funds put to better use. Additionally, we reported \$32,417,115 in recoveries, fines, and restitution from investigations and \$72,947,509 in forfeited assets.

Type of Impact	Amount
Questioned Costs	\$45,234,688
Funds to be Put to Better Use	\$4,964,641
Management Agreement that Funds be Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$50,053,802
Funds Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$50,053,802
Recoveries from Investigations ( <i>Not from Fines and Restitution</i> )	\$5,548,964*
Fines from Investigations	\$11,486
Restitution from Investigations	\$26,856,665
Asset Forfeiture <sup>1</sup>	\$72,947,509

\* The recovery amount includes \$5,212,896.63 in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) deobligation.

<sup>1</sup> The asset forfeiture amount was obtained from numerous defendants, pursuant to judicial orders as a result of a joint investigation with the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (Seattle), Homeland Security Investigations (Sacramento), and the U.S. Secret Service (Chicago).

# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

## Investigations


We initiated 395 and closed 433 investigations. Our investigations resulted in 41 arrests, 65 indictments, 46 convictions, and 18 personnel actions. We have included, in accordance with the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*, information regarding the number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities and indictments that resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.

Type of Investigation*	Number
Open Investigations as of 4/1/2018	1,266
Investigations Initiated	395
Investigations Closed	433
Open Investigations as of 9/30/2018	1,228
Investigative Reports Issued	406
Investigations Referred for Prosecution	102
Investigations Accepted for Prosecution	51
Investigations Declined for Prosecution	44
Total number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution	20
Total number of indictments and criminal information during the reporting period that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities	29

\*All data was obtained from the Enforcement Data System, which is the Office of Investigation's case management system.

Note: Investigations accepted or declined may have been received in a prior reporting period.

## Investigations resulted in



# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

## Complaints

The OIG Hotline is a resource for Federal employees and the public to report allegations of employee corruption, civil rights and civil liberties abuses, program fraud and financial crimes, and miscellaneous criminal and non-criminal activity associated with waste, abuse, or fraud affecting the programs and operations of the Department.

Complaints	Number
Total Hotline Complaints Received	15,885
Complaints Referred (to programs or other agencies)	23,044*
Complaints Closed	22,202*

\*Complaints referred and closed included complaints received in prior period.

## Whistleblower Protection Unit

DHS OIG investigates allegations of whistleblower retaliation made by DHS employees and applicants for employment; uniformed United States Coast Guard members; and DHS contractors, subcontractors, and grantees. DHS OIG primarily conducts investigations under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, and pursuant to the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 U.S.C. § 1034; *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information*, Presidential Policy Directive 19; *Security Clearances and Classified Information*, 50 U.S.C. § 3341; and the *Enhancement of Whistleblower Protection for Contractors and Grantees*, 41 U.S.C. § 4712. Investigation by DHS OIG is mandatory under these statutes when a prima facie case of retaliation is determined. Additionally, in certain instances, DHS OIG conducts investigations pursuant to the *Whistleblower Protection Act*, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (WPA).

The DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Program consists of two components. The first is the Whistleblower Protection Unit (WPU), which has a Director, and when fully staffed, has three investigative counsel and two whistleblower investigators.

The WPU is primarily responsible for complaint intake and assessment, whistleblower retaliation policy formulation and legal research, and full investigation of whistleblower retaliation complaints.

The second component is the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator (WPC). The WPC is a department-level resource for educating and advising DHS employees about whistleblower protection rights and remedies. The WPC operates independent of WPU but collaborates frequently with WPU.

# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

## Activity During Current SAR Period

During this semiannual report (SAR) period, the WPU received 98 complaints that, on their face, alleged retaliation for protected whistleblower activity. Of those 98, 2 were declined because WPU determined the complaint did not meet the legal threshold for whistleblower retaliation. In 7 other instances, the complaint was already the subject of an open inquiry being conducted by another agency (such as the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, or the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), or falling within the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) process. Per DHS OIG policy, we deferred to the prior actions and did not open an additional investigation. In 11 instances, the retaliation alleged did not fall within one of the three types of investigations where statutes mandate DHS OIG to investigate. Full investigation of these complaints is discretionary, and in those instances, the WPU declined to open an investigation. We closed 4 complaints due to a lack of response from the complainant, and in 1 complaint, the complainant withdrew their complaint after filing. There are 46 complaints currently pending WPU review. We also opened 2 new investigations from complaints received during this SAR period. Finally, we received 25 allegations of retaliation that fall under the *Equal Employment Opportunity Act*, and not the WPA; therefore, the WPU does not have jurisdiction over these complaints.

Whistleblower Retaliation Complaints	Total
<b>Whistleblower Retaliation Complaints Subject to In-Depth Review</b>	<b>98</b>
Complaints Closed Because Legal Standard for Retaliation not Met	2
Complaints Closed for no Response from Claimant	4
Complaints Closed in Deferral to Other Agency Investigations	7
Complaints Withdrawn	1
Complaints Declined for Discretionary Investigations	11
Complaints Pending Further WPU Review	46
Complaints Converted to Investigation	2
Complaints that involve EEO retaliation, not WPA	25

WPU closed 1 whistleblower retaliation investigation during the SAR with a report of investigation. The report of investigation did not substantiate the allegations of whistleblower retaliation; therefore, the WPU did not make recommendations in that case.

During this reporting period, the WPU also handled some time-intensive special projects at the request of Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Integrity Committee.

# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

## Substantiated Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations

During a previous reporting period, WPU closed Case WRRRI-I16-CBP-DET-17715-092917 and reported that we anticipated additional actions related to our work. We now provide information about the official(s) found to have engaged in retaliation, and any consequences the agency imposed to hold the official(s) accountable.

Case – WRRRI-I16-CBP-DET-17715-092917

Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations	Total
Total Investigations Opened During SAR Period	6
Current Total Active Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations	42
Investigations Closed	1
Reports Issued	1

OIG substantiated an allegation that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) denied a CBP Officer (complainant) a training opportunity in retaliation for a protected disclosure. Subsequent to our Report, CBP reported that the responsible management official received special training on how to properly handle similar situations in the future. CBP has informed us that human resources is also evaluating all the supporting documentation to determine whether any additional actions are necessary. OIG will continue to monitor this matter and report any additional actions taken.



# Office of Inspector General and Department of Homeland Security Profiles

The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* officially established DHS, with the primary mission of protecting the American homeland. The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* also established an OIG in the Department by amendment to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*. By this action, Congress and the Administration ensured independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations of DHS' programs and operations.

The President appoints and the Senate confirms the Inspector General, who reports directly to the DHS Secretary and Congress. The Inspector General Act ensures OIG's independence. This independence enhances our ability to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as to provide objective and credible reports to the Secretary and Congress on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS' programs and operations.


OIG Offices	DHS Component and Offices
Executive Office Office of Audits (OA) Office of Counsel Office of Enterprise Risk Identification and Management Office of External Affairs Office of Information Technology Audits (ITA) Office of Inspections and Evaluations (I&E) Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight (IQO) Office of Investigations (INV) Office of Management	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) Directorate for Management (MGMT) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Office of Inspector General (OIG) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Operations Coordination Office of Partnership and Engagement Office of Public Affairs Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans Privacy Office Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) United States Secret Service (Secret Service)

# Summary of Significant Office of Inspector General Activities

Since 2003, our work has inspired significant Department and congressional action to correct deficiencies identified in our audit, inspection, and investigative reports. We issued more than 10,414 recommendations to improve the economy, effectiveness, efficiency, and integrity of the Department's programs and operations. As of September 30, 2018, the Department took action to address all but 545 of those recommendations. Congress has also taken notice of our work and called on us to testify 153 times since our office was created.

During this reporting period, we issued 30 new reports and 116 unique recommendations to the Department; we closed 149 recommendations, issued in this and prior periods, because of the Department's actions. Congress also recognized our work by calling on us to testify one time about our efforts to improve the Department.

## *OIG Activity April 1, 2018 – September 30, 2018*



We have highlighted a number of audits and inspections that we conducted during the reporting period in the following seven focus areas:

- Disaster-related Activities
- Financial Management
- Immigration
- Information Technology Cybersecurity
- Law Enforcement
- Terrorism
- Investigations

# DISASTER-RELATED ACTIVITIES

During this SAR period, we issued eight disaster related reports, including audits of grant funds. Of note, we questioned \$33 million awarded to the Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority in California. We also recommended FEMA recover \$20.4 million from a wastewater treatment plant in Mississippi. We also made observations of FEMA’s debris monitoring efforts for Hurricane Irma.

## What We Found

### **1 Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority, California, Provided FEMA Incorrect Information for Its \$33 Million Project (OIG-18-62)**

The Authority provided incorrect information to FEMA. FEMA relied on this information and awarded the Authority more than \$33 million to replace and relocate its wastewater pipeline. We questioned the entire \$33.1 million as ineligible because the Authority did not comply with Federal regulations and FEMA policies and procedures in preparing cost estimates for FEMA.

### **2 FEMA Should Recover \$20.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Diamondhead Water and Sewer District, Mississippi (OIG-18-63)**

Mississippi did not fulfill its grantee responsibility to ensure the District followed applicable Federal grant requirements. FEMA made errors in calculating the 50 Percent Rule when deciding to replace, rather than repair, the Diamondhead Wastewater Treatment Plant. As a result, FEMA awarded the District \$18.9 million in ineligible replacement costs. We identified \$1.5 million of improper procurement, unsupported costs, duplicate insurance benefits, and uncompleted project costs that FEMA should disallow to the District.

### **3 Management Alert — Observations of FEMA’s Debris Monitoring Efforts for Hurricane Irma (OIG-18-85)**

FEMA’s guidance for debris monitoring lacks sufficient information to ensure adequate oversight. Post Hurricane Irma, FEMA’s damage estimates for Florida and Georgia exceed \$4.2 billion, with debris removal operations constituting approximately 36 percent of the total Public Assistance cost. Such costs are expected to reach about \$1.5 billion in these states. Without adequate guidance and oversight of debris removal by FEMA, there is increased risk of fraud, waste, and abuse at great cost to taxpayers.

## DHS Response

FEMA did not concur with the recommendation to disallow the \$33.1 million in grant funds awarded to the Authority. The California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) had not submitted the Project Completion and Certification Report and FEMA had not been able to review the final documentation and claim. Upon receipt of the report from OES, FEMA will review the submitted documentation and make a final determination.

FEMA officials reported they will review the calculations that were applied during the 50 Percent Rule calculation to determine whether any repair or replacement costs were incorrectly included during its analysis. FEMA officials reported they would give the District an opportunity to provide additional information and determine whether the improper procurement costs were reasonable.

FEMA officials concurred with our recommendations and are committed to ensuring responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars, including publishing clear guidance. FEMA’s Recovery Directorate will develop and publish updated Public Assistance debris removal monitoring guidance, which will include content that Federal Coordinating Officers can use to determine appropriate cost effective field presence for debris removal oversight.

## Moving Forward

FEMA continues to face significant challenges ensuring it awards grants to eligible recipients and that recipients properly manage Federal disaster funds. We will continue to focus on FEMA’s controls and documentation in support of its program, as well as FEMA’s efforts in response to Hurricane Irma.

# FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Our reports on financial management focused on the *Department of Homeland Security's FY 2017 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010*; the *Audit of Department of Homeland Security's FY 2016 Conference Spending*; and *FEMA Paid Employees Over the Annual Pay Cap*.

## What We Found

### **1 Audit of Department of Homeland Security's FY 2016 Conference Spending (OIG-18-69)**

Since FY 2014, DHS improved conference spending reporting and implemented policies and procedures to ensure proper oversight and accurate and timely reporting. However, we found instances of DHS not complying with annual conference reporting requirements. The Department failed to report two conferences costing more than \$100,000 each. The Department also did not always report all hosted conferences costing more than \$20,000 to OIG within 15 days of the conclusion of each conference.

### **2 FEMA Paid Employees Over the Annual Premium Pay Cap (OIG-18-71)**

We found that FEMA overpaid its employees because it mistakenly believed the Department's payroll provider, the National Finance Center, had controls to enforce the annual premium pay limitation, and because FEMA did not follow its own premium pay policy. In addition, FEMA has not yet determined how it will prevent future overpayments or account for the *Fair Labor Standards Act* classification issue.

### **3 Department of Homeland Security's FY 2017 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (OIG-18-72)**

DHS did not comply with the *Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act* because it did not meet one of six requirements. DHS did not meet its annual reduction targets for 2 of 14 programs assessed to be at risk. Additionally, DHS did not provide adequate oversight of components' improper testing and reporting.

## DHS Response

DHS reported that the Office of Risk Management and Analysis will continue to test conference spending yearly to assess the compliance, adequacy of procedures, and the internal controls in place over each component's conference reporting. DHS updated the conference policy on June 2, 2017, to more clearly identify the OIG 15-day reporting and report submission requirements and provided a copy to OIG.

FEMA officials reported they are working to resolve the outstanding issues identified in our report in order to complete an overpayment analysis. FEMA reported it has created a guidance document to reflect how premium pay is calculated, implemented a process for monitoring employees that may exceed the salary cap, and started running biweekly reports to identify employees who are nearing the premium pay cap.

DHS concurred with all six of our recommendations and has already begun implementing corrective actions. DHS reported that it is committed to the responsible stewardship of taxpayer provided resources; ensuring proper controls are in place to eliminate fraud, waste, and mismanagement; and continuing its focus on reducing improper payments.

## Moving Forward

DHS still requires more diligence with regard to oversight of conference spending reporting. Until FEMA strengthens its internal controls over premium pay, it will remain at risk of future overpayments. Going forward, DHS must demonstrate it can consistently perform its review and reconciliation of components' risk assessments in order to identify programs susceptible to significant improper payments.

# IMMIGRATION

During this SAR period, we assessed ICE's inspections and monitoring of detention facilities. We also continued to conduct unannounced site visits to CBP and ICE facilities. We assessed DHS' separation of families at the southern border pursuant to the Administration's Zero Tolerance Policy, and handling of unaccompanied alien children. We noted serious issues at one ICE processing center that violated detention standards.

## What We Found

### **1 ICE's Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance or Systemic Improvements (OIG-18-67)**

ICE inspections and onsite monitoring of more than 200 detention facilities do not ensure consistent compliance with detention standards, do not promote comprehensive correction of deficiencies, and do not ensure adequate oversight or systemic improvements in detention conditions.

### **2 Special Review – Initial Observations Regarding Family Separation Issues under the Zero Tolerance Policy (OIG-18-84), and subsequent report, Results of Unannounced Inspections of Conditions for Unaccompanied Alien Children in CBP Custody (OIG-18-87)**

DHS was not fully prepared to implement the Administration's Zero Tolerance Policy or to deal with some of its effects. DHS struggled to identify, track, and reunify families separated under the policy. DHS provided inconsistent information to aliens who arrived with children. In a subsequent review, we determined that CBP facilities appeared to be operating in compliance with the 2015 *National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search* with respect to conditions for unaccompanied alien children in CBP custody.

### **3 Management Alert – Issues Requiring Action at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in Adelanto, California (OIG-18-86)**

We identified a number of serious issues that violate ICE's *2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards* and pose health and safety risks at the facility, including concerns about nooses, made from braided bedsheets, in detainee cells; improper and overly restrictive segregation; and untimely and inadequate detainee medical care.

## Moving Forward

ICE must examine and assess its inspection and onsite monitoring of detention facilities to ensure compliance with standards and systemic improvements. The Zero Tolerance Policy fundamentally changed DHS' approach to immigration enforcement, and the resulting family separations sparked intense public debate. DHS has reported that it reunited most of the children in DHS custody who were deemed eligible for reunification. We will continue to monitor the Department's efforts to reunify separated families that occurred after our field visits. Finally, we will review the results of DHS' inspection of the Adelanto Processing Center.

## DHS Response

ICE officials reported they will re-evaluate the existing inspection scope and methodology for annual and biennial contracted inspections; have initiated steps to bolster the quality assurance process for contracted inspections; and are in the process of hiring additional Federal staff with subject matter expertise in ICE detention and facility inspections.

We made no recommendations in either report. The Department provided formal comments on both reports, which we incorporated into each final report.

ICE reported it is implementing corrective actions to ensure the Adelanto ICE Processing Center meets required detention standards. ICE reported that it will complete a full inspection of the Adelanto facility and a Special Assessment Review to ensure concerns identified in the report are fully inspected and addressed.

# INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CYBERSECURITY

We evaluated CBP's efforts to implement a biometric exit capability, and whether the data collected has improved DHS' ability to verify foreign visitor departures at U.S. airports. We also reviewed whether CBP's air mail inspection processes at JFK airport are effective. We determined the extent to which DHS completed an assessment of the security value of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program; and the extent to which the Coast Guard's oversight of the program ensures only eligible individuals are granted unescorted access to secure areas of regulated facilities.



## What We Found

1

### **Progress Made, But CBP Faces Challenges Implementing a Biometric Capability to Track Air Passenger Departures Nationwide (OIG-18-80)**

CBP encountered various technical and operational challenges that limited biometric confirmation to only 85 percent of all passengers processed. These challenges included poor network availability, a lack of dedicated staff, and compressed boarding times due to flight delays. Further, due to missing or poor quality digital images, CBP could not consistently match individuals of certain age groups or nationalities.

2

### **CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport (OIG-18-83)**

CBP has ineffective processes and IT security controls to support air mail inspection operations at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK). CBP inspects only a limited number of the hundreds of thousands of pieces of incoming air mail each day, largely due to difficulty inventorying and locating targeted mail, as well as having inadequate guidance, equipment, and resources. Further, servers supporting CBP's mail inspection processes do not meet IT security control requirements.

3

### **Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program (OIG-18-88)**

DHS did not complete an assessment of the security value of the TWIC program, as required by Public Law 114-278, Section 1(b). The Coast Guard does not have a full understanding of the extent to which the TWIC program addresses security risks in the maritime environment, which will continue to impact the Coast Guard's ability to develop and enforce regulations governing the program.

## DHS Response

CBP reported the program is approaching biometric entry-exit implementation in partnership with airlines/airports to ensure network connectivity to meet complex operational demands for timely aircraft departures. CBP officials reported they will develop a plan to institute photo capture enforcement mechanisms as the biometric air exit capability nears full operational capability. CBP reported they have instituted a rigorous process to review data and metrics associated with biometric facial recognition matching performance.

We made nine recommendations to CBP that when implemented should improve CBP's capability of targeting inbound international mail for additional inspection of illicit drugs and other contraband. CBP redacted their response to this report.

DHS reported it is conducting a TWIC program assessment. In addition, the Coast Guard will better define facilities that must use electronic TWIC card readers as an access control measure; is working to acquire new TWIC readers for field inspectors; and is taking steps to revise and strengthen the *Coast Guard TWIC Verification and Enforcement Guide*.



## Moving Forward

Solidifying long-term partnerships with other DHS components will be key to CBP successfully implementing the biometric capability nationwide as mandated. CBP must strengthen processes and IT controls supporting air mail inspection operations at JFK, which are vulnerable to potential attacks and operational disruptions. The Coast Guard needs to improve its oversight of the TWIC program to reduce the risk of transportation security incidents.

# LAW ENFORCEMENT

In response to congressional concerns, we reviewed assaults on CBP and ICE law enforcement personnel in recent years. We also reviewed whether CBP is effectively safeguarding information, such as images and video, collected on and transmitted from the Unmanned Aircraft Systems program. We also examined whether ICE is effectively overseeing and managing the 287(g) program as it expands.

## What We Found

### **1 Assaults on CBP and ICE Law Enforcement Officers (OIG-18-76)**

We determined the number of assaults against CBP law enforcement officers decreased from 1,089 to 856, while assaults of ICE law enforcement officers remained the same at 48. However, the data does not show a clear trend over that period, and the number of assaults annually varied widely. Our analysis showed that the data is unreliable and does not accurately reflect whether assaults have increased or decreased. Officers do not always report acts of physical resistance or attempted assaults, even when required. We also uncovered issues with the training of law enforcement officers.

### **2 Lack of Planning Hinders Effective Oversight and Management of ICE's Expanding 287(g) Program (OIG-18-77)**

ICE did not analyze program needs to determine how many additional 287(g) program managers should be hired. In addition, a lack of IT support staff and a lengthy installation process have hampered prompt delivery and installation of IT equipment. Finally, ICE may not be training law enforcement officers efficiently and is not monitoring the officers to ensure they complete required training.

### **3 CBP Has Not Ensured Safeguards for Data Collected Using Unmanned Aircraft Systems (OIG-18-79)**

CBP uses Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), a surveillance program, to support its law enforcement mission. CBP has not ensured effective safeguards for information, such as images and video, collected on and transmitted from its UAS. Although CBP did perform a privacy threshold analysis for the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Systems used in the UAS program, they did not fully implement other information security controls needed to safeguard ISR Systems.

## DHS Response

CBP reported it is actively conducting training to improve assault reporting, including: training Less Lethal Force and Firearms instructors and ensuring they conduct this training in the field. ICE officials are working to add a Use of Force, Arrests, and Discharges module to the training program offered to new supervisors, and will continue to inform personnel of the annual reporting requirement.

ICE reported it will develop a new staffing plan based on present-day enforcement, oversight, logistics, and training needs. ICE reported it will revisit Enforcement and Removal Operations policy to assess the provisions for field personnel and identify needed changes to define this reporting structure clearly. ICE assessed its expansion options for refresher training and found that centralizing 287(g) training increases the consistency and allows Designated Immigration Officers to share best practices.

CBP officials reported they will develop a process for ensuring all information systems are included in the official Office of Information and Technology system inventory. CBP reported it has established programmatic and system ownership of ISR Systems, ensuring appropriate oversight. CBP reported that the DHS Privacy Office determined that ISR Systems do not contain Personally Identifiable Information.

## Moving Forward

Without reliable data and adequate training, ICE and CBP may not be doing enough to mitigate and prevent assaults on law enforcement officers. CBP must establish an effective program structure to manage ISR Systems effectively or the systems and mission operations will continue to be at risk of compromise. Approving all new participants without adequate planning has hindered ICE's oversight and management of the 287(g) program and may be affecting participating agencies' ability to assist ICE in enforcing immigration laws and identifying removable aliens.

# TERRORISM

We reviewed the extent to which the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) ground-based operations contribute to the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) layered approach to security. This audit was the second in a series of audits on FAMS.

## What We Found

### **1 FAMS Needs to Demonstrate How Ground-based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission (OIG-18-70)**

Despite dedicating approximately \$272 million to ground-based activities, including Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) operations, FAMS could not demonstrate how these activities contributed to TSA's mission. We determined that FAMS lacked performance measures for the 24 strategic initiatives and most ground-based activities outlined in its strategic plan. Additionally, FAMS' VIPR operations performance measures fail to determine the program's effectiveness. FAMS could not provide a budget breakout by operational or divisional area.

## DHS Response

TSA reported that FAMS plans to reexamine its initiatives contained in the FAMS strategic plan to ensure they align with TSA Strategy. FAMS will update its performance measures as a result of the review. Additionally, TSA officials reported they have completed a bottom-up review of the FAMS organization and will use the review results to reallocate resources to address areas of greatest security risk.

## Moving Forward

Without effective performance measures or detailed accounting of funds, FAMS cannot ensure it is maximizing its resources to address its highest risks and cannot measure the value of its investments in these ground based activities.



# INVESTIGATIONS

Our Reports of Investigation disclosed a Border Patrol Agent (BPA) used a BPA vehicle to smuggle marijuana into the United States; a company owner defrauded FEMA; a TSA employee engaged in racketeering and money laundering; a former ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Special Agent committed bank fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud; and a BPA stole government property.



## What We Found

- 1 BPA Facilitates Drug Smuggling**  
We investigated a BPA for using his BPA vehicle to work with drug traffickers to smuggle marijuana across the Mexican border into the United States.
- 2 Company Owner Defrauded FEMA**  
We investigated the owner of a company for the theft of funds from the FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, the Severe Repetitive Loss Program, and the National Flood Insurance Program.
- 3 TSA Employee Engaged in Racketeering and Money Laundering**  
We investigated a TSA employee after law enforcement officials stopped the employee during a surveillance operation of a known narcotics/money courier. The TSA employee was observed meeting with the courier in uniform after the courier arrived at the airport. A bag carried by the courier and later found in the TSA employee's possession was found to contain more than \$130,000.
- 4 HSI Special Agent Committed Bank, Wire, and Mail Fraud**  
We investigated a former ICE HSI Special Agent for bank fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud, as part of a debt elimination scheme to defraud mortgage lenders.
- 5 BPAs Conspire to Steal Government Property**  
We investigated two BPAs for conspiring to steal Government property. Both were charged with Theft of Government Property and Mail Fraud.

## Action Taken

The BPA pleaded guilty to Conspiracy to Import Marijuana and was sentenced to 20 months' imprisonment followed by 3 years supervised release. We conducted this investigation jointly with CBP Office of Professional Responsibility.

A State Judge sentenced the company's owner to 29 years imprisonment, \$74,410.11 in restitution, and \$4,545.00 in fines. We conducted this investigation jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and several local law enforcement agencies.

The TSA employee pleaded guilty to Racketeering and Laundering of Monetary Instruments and Conspiracy to Commit Racketeering and Laundering of Monetary Instruments. The TSA employee was sentenced to 12 months of house arrest followed by 48 months of probation. We conducted this investigation jointly with the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations.

A Federal judge sentenced the former ICE HSI employee to 3 months in prison, 9 months of Home Detention without Electronic Monitoring, and a 3-year term of supervised release, ordered to pay \$42,312.00 in restitution, a \$3,000.00 fine, and a \$100 assessment. We conducted this investigation jointly with ICE OPR.

Following a jury trial, the first BPA was found guilty of Theft of Government Property and Unlawful Possession and Transfer of a Machine Gun. This BPA was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and 3 years of probation. The second BPA was found not guilty of all charges, but was terminated by CBP. We investigated this case jointly with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.

This section reports on each OIG investigation involving substantiated allegations of misconduct by a senior Government employee that we closed during the reporting period. This report is provided in accordance with the requirements of the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*. Appendix 9 provides a detailed description of all other OIG investigations involving senior Government employees that we closed during the reporting period and did not disclose to the public.

## We Investigated...

**Three USCIS managers (GS-15s)** alleged to have improperly directed their subordinate employees to approve the beneficiaries of petitioners who gained Lawful Permanent Resident status via suspected fraudulent means. These allegations were partially substantiated. The managers did advise their subordinates to approve the beneficiaries for status; however, they did so because the Service Center, where the managers and subordinate employees worked, did not possess legal authority to conduct interviews or investigations of the petitioners or beneficiaries. In addition, the Service Center did not have the authority to re-investigate the status initially granted or to rescind the immigration status of Lawful Permanent Resident petitioners. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

**A senior DHS employee (ST-00)** for allegedly disclosing sensitive information by leaving sensitive DHS material onboard a commercial airliner. We determined that the official did not safeguard sensitive but unclassified DHS information by inadvertently leaving the materials on a commercial airliner. We reviewed the documents and assessed that disclosure of their contents would not cause permanent harm to the continuing operations of the relevant program. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

**A DHS OIG manager (GS-15)** for allegedly filing a false police report; potentially committing insurance fraud; engaging in official travel abuse; engaging in time and attendance abuse; obtaining personal loans from romantic partners that were not repaid; using illegal steroids; and making false statements to TSA regarding being armed while flying on commercial aircraft. We determined that the manager did not file a false police report or commit insurance fraud. We found evidence that the manager provided misleading information during a civil lawsuit, but no criminal referrals were warranted because the statute of limitations had expired. We found that the manager failed to report personal loans on yearly financial disclosure reports as required. We did not find evidence that the manager used or received illegal steroids. We found evidence that the manager made false statements to TSA by falsely claiming to be flying armed. We referred the alleged false statements to TSA to the U.S. Attorney's Office, but the matter was declined for prosecution. The manager is no longer employed by DHS OIG.

**An Office of Health Affairs manager (SES)** for allegedly sexually harassing a DHS contractor, bullying DHS contractors, and exhibiting irrational behavior. We found evidence that the manager inappropriately tasked DHS contractors, made sexually suggestive comments to a contractor, touched a contractor inappropriately, and took multiple photographs of the contractor without permission. We found evidence that the manager failed to report outside employment in the medical marijuana industry to DHS security. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

**A former Secret Service manager (SES)** for alleged purchase and procurement improprieties. We found that these allegations were unsubstantiated. We also received allegations that a second Secret Service manager (GS-15) had stolen computer equipment from evidence. We found that the Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility had already investigated the allegations regarding the second manager and found that the manager failed to follow Secret Service procedures regarding the inventory and disposal of evidence, misused seized property, and provided inaccurate information to the Secret Service when questioned regarding the matter. The manager was subjected to disciplinary action. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

**A CBP manager (SES)** for allegedly improperly influencing and manipulating the selection and promotion process for two senior management positions. We determined that the manager was improperly involved in this personnel process, which occurred while the manager was temporarily detailed to another assignment. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

# Congressional Testimony and Briefings



The Office of Inspector General testified before Congress one time during this period. Testimony prepared for these hearings may be accessed on our website at [www.oig.dhs.gov](http://www.oig.dhs.gov).

- July 25, 2018 – U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications at a hearing entitled, *Using Innovative Technology and Practices to Enhance the Culture of Preparedness*.

We briefed congressional members and their staffs frequently throughout the reporting period. Our office conducted 17 briefings for congressional members and staff on the results of our work, including on the following OIG reports: *Fiscal Year 2016 Audit of the DHS Bankcard Program Indicates Moderate Risk Remains* (OIG-18-57); *Special Report-Certain Findings Relating to the OIG's Investigation of Allegations Involving FLETC Senior Officials* (OIG-18-65); and *Sandy Recovery Improvement Act Review* (OIG-18-66). We also met with congressional staff to discuss Member requests for OIG reviews of DHS programs and operations.



## OIG In The News

*USA Today*, *Newsweek*, and *GovExec* — among other news outlets — took notice of our audit and inspection work from April 1, 2018 – September 30, 2018.

***Terror in the skies: TSA's air marshals are “last line of defense,” but is the program really needed?***

*USA Today*  
May 17, 2018

***ICE Detention Centers Aren't Adequately Inspected, With Problems Going Unaddressed for Years, DHS Report Finds***

*Newsweek*  
June 19, 2018

***Three-Quarters of Homeland Security's Employee Non-Disclosure Agreements Fail to Comply With Federal Law***

*GovExec*  
August 14, 2018

***ICE agent gets 3 years for helping immigrants avoid deportation***

*Detroit Free Press*  
August 14, 2018

***IG: No Clear Up or Down Trend on Assaults Against CBP, ICE Officers***

*FEDweek*  
September 12, 2018

# Legislative and Regulatory Reviews and Other Office of Inspector General Activities



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## LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY REVIEWS

The *Inspector General Act*, as amended, directs the Inspector General to review existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to DHS programs and operations and to make recommendations about the impact of such legislation and regulations on (1) the economy and efficiency of DHS programs and operations, and (2) the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in DHS programs and operations. During this semiannual reporting period, we reviewed and provided comments on the following bills:

- *Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2018 (H.R. 4)*
- *Good Accounting Obligation in Government Act (GAO-IG Act) (H.R. 5415)*
- *Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (S. 3041)*
- *IG Subpoena Authority Act (H.R. 4917)*
- *The Anti-Deficiency Reform and Enforcement Act of 2018 (H.R. 6891)*

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## OVERSIGHT OF SINGLE AUDIT ACT, AS AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW 104-156



The *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, requires inspectors general take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-Federal auditors complies with Government Auditing Standards (GAS). The Office of Management and Budget requires entities such as state and local governments, universities, and nonprofit organizations that spend \$750,000 or more in Federal funds in a year to obtain an audit, referred to as a “single audit.” Non-Federal auditors perform these single audits. Our role is to take the appropriate steps to ensure the non-Federal auditors perform their single audit work in compliance with GAS. During this reporting period, we completed 16 desk reviews and four quality control reviews of Single Audit reports issued by an independent public accountant organization.

**16**  
Desk  
Reviews  
Completed

**4**  
Quality Control  
Reviews  
Completed

# Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings



## Reports and Recommendations with Questioned Costs, Unsupported Costs

### Carryover from last period


9 reports with 29 recommendations

- Questioned Costs \$74,702,561
- Unsupported Costs \$262,446

### Issued this period


2 reports with 5 recommendations

- Questioned Costs \$45,234,688
- Unsupported Costs \$332,138




**11 Reports with  
34 Recommendations**

**119,937,249 Questioned Costs  
594,584 Unsupported Costs**



### Current Status on Reports and Recommendations with Questioned Costs (QC) and Unsupported Costs (UC)



# Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings (Continued)



## Reports and Recommendations with Funds to be Put to Better Use (FPTBU)

### Carryover from last period

6 reports with 25 recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use

- Funds Put to Better Use \$36,046,061


### Issued this period

3 reports with 4 recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use

- Funds Put to Better Use \$4,964,641




**9 Reports with  
29 Recommendations**




**FPTBU  
\$41,010,702**

### Current Status on Reports and Recommendations with FPTBU




# Appendix 2 Compliance – Resolution of Reports and Recommendations


**MANAGEMENT DECISION IS PENDING**



**CURRENT REPORT INVENTORY**



**ACTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS**



Note: This appendix excludes investigative reports.



## Appendix 3

### Reports with Unresolved Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Rec. No.	DHS Comp	No. Over 6 Months
1	12/16/2011	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	3, 4	FEMA	2
2	8/28/2013	OIG-13-110	<i>DHS Needs to Strengthen Information Technology Continuity and Contingency Planning Capabilities</i>	9	MGMT	1
3	5/4/2015	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	1
4	5/10/2016	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program</i>	5	TSA	1
5	6/21/2017	OIG-17-74-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service</i>	29	USCG	1
6	6/30/2017	OIG-17-91	<i>PALMS Does Not Address Department Needs</i>	1, 5, 7	MGMT	3
7	8/4/2017	OIG-17-99-MA	<i>Management Alert - CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants</i>	1	CBP	1
8	9/14/2017	OIG-17-103-MA	<i>Management Alert - Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns</i>	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	1
9	10/24/2017	OIG-18-04	<i>(U) FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable</i>	2, 3, 4	TSA	3
10	11/16/2017	OIG-18-18	<i>Management Alert - CBP's Use of Examination and Summons Authority Under 19 U.S.C. § 1509</i>	3	CBP	1
11	11/30/2017	OIG-18-20	<i>Office of Health Affairs Has Not Implemented An Effective Privacy Management Program</i>	1, 3	OHA	2
12	1/5/2018	OIG-18-36	<i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (Redacted)</i>	1, 2	ICE	2
13	2/21/2018	OIG-18-53	<i>Immigration and Customs Enforcement Did Not Follow Federal Procurement Guidelines When Contracting for Detention Services</i>	2	ICE	1
					<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
1	OIG-10-11	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2009 Financial Statements and Internal Control Over Financial Reporting</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCG
2	OIG-11-16	<i>Customs and Border Protection's Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at Land Ports of Entry</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
3	OIG-11-92	<i>Efficacy of Customs and Border Protection's Bonding Process</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
4	OIG-12-07	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2011 Integrated Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	5	\$0	\$0	USCG, FEMA
5	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
6	OIG-12-26	<i>(U) Transportation Security Administration Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secured Airport Areas</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
7	OIG-12-79	<i>Opportunities to Improve FEMA's Public Assistance Preliminary Damage Assessment Process</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
8	OIG-12-132	<i>CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
9	OIG-13-20	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS FY 2012 Consolidated Financial Statements and Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting</i>	16	\$0	\$0	USCG, ICE, OCIO-OCFO, FEMA
10	OIG-13-80	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Enforcement and Removal Operations' Contract Funding and Payment Processes</i>	3	\$0	\$0	ICE
11	OIG-13-92	<i>Marine Accident Reporting, Investigations, and Enforcement in the United States Coast Guard</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCG
12	OIG-13-104	<i>Technical Security Evaluation of DHS Activities at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
13	OIG-13-110	<i>DHS Needs to Strengthen Information Technology Continuity and Contingency Planning Capabilities</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT
14	OIG-13-113	<i>DHS Needs to Manage Its Radio Communication Program Better</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
15	OIG-13-115	<i>DHS Uses Social Media to Enhance Information Sharing and Mission Operations, But Additional Oversight and Guidance Are Needed</i>	1	\$0	\$0	PLCY
16	OIG-13-119	<i>CBP's and USCG's Controls Over Exports Related to Foreign Military Sales</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
17	OIG-14-18	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2013 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	10	\$0	\$0	MGMT, ICE, USSS, USCG, DHS
18	OIG-14-32	<i>Ensuring the Integrity of CBP's Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
19	OIG-14-47	<i>U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Advanced Training Center Acquisition</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
20	OIG-14-105	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Management of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
21	OIG-14-132	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport</i>	8	\$0	\$0	TSA, ICE

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
22	OIG-14-142	<i>(U) Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
23	OIG-14-150-D	<i>FEMA and the State of Louisiana Need to Accelerate the Funding of \$812 Million in Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Funds and Develop a Plan to Close Approved Projects</i>	1	\$0	\$812,238,776	FEMA
24	OIG-14-151	<i>FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain Management System May Not Be Effective During a Catastrophic Disaster</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
25	OIG-14-153	<i>Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
26	OIG-15-06-D	<i>FEMA Needs To Track Performance Data and Develop Policies, Procedures, and Performance Measures for Long Term Recovery Offices</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
27	OIG-15-08	<i>Ohio's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012</i>	1	\$3,559,067	\$0	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
28	OIG-15-10	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	31	\$0	\$0	USCG, FEMA, ICE, MGMT, NPPD, DHS
29	OIG-15-18	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at John F. Kennedy International Airport-Sensitive Security Information</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP, ICE
30	OIG-15-29	<i>Security Enhancements Needed to the TSA PreCheck™ Initiative</i>	4	\$0	\$0	TSA
31	OIG-15-38	<i>Science and Technology Directorate Needs to Improve its Contract Management Procedures</i>	1	\$0	\$0	S&T
32	OIG-15-45	<i>Allegations of Granting Expedited Screening through TSA PreCheck Improperly (OSC File No. DI-14-3679)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
33	OIG-15-80	<i>DHS Should Do More to Reduce Travel Reservation Costs</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
34	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
35	OIG-15-88	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at San Francisco International Airport</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
36	OIG-15-94	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2014 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
37	OIG-15-107	<i>New York's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010-12</i>	8	\$67,360,082	\$0	FEMA
38	OIG-15-108-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the Department of Homeland Security National Protection and Programs Directorate Internal Affairs Division</i>	1	\$0	\$0	NPPD
39	OIG-15-112	<i>Follow-up to Management Alert - U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Facility, San Pedro, California</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
40	OIG-15-128-D	<i>FEMA's Process for Selecting Joint Field Offices Needs Improvement</i>	1	\$0	\$1,553,000	FEMA
41	OIG-15-140	<i>DHS Can Strengthen Its Cyber Mission Coordination Efforts</i>	3	\$0	\$0	PLCY, ICE

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
42	OIG-16-01-D	<i>FEMA Faces Challenges in Verifying Applicants' Insurance Policies for the Individuals and Households Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
43	OIG-16-02	<i>The FPS Vehicle Fleet Is Not Managed Effectively</i>	3	\$0	\$2,519,077	MGMT
44	OIG-16-06	<i>Fiscal Year 2015 Financial and Internal Controls Audit</i>	15	\$0	\$0	USCG, CFO, ICE, MGMT, NPPD, DHS, FEMA
45	OIG-16-10	<i>FEMA Faces Challenges in Managing Information Technology</i>	4	\$0	\$0	FEMA
46	OIG-16-17	<i>ICE and USCIS Could Improve Data Quality and Exchange to Help Identify Potential Human Trafficking Cases</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCIS
47	OIG-16-20	<i>U.S. Secret Service Needs to Upgrade Its Radio Systems</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USSS
48	OIG-16-37	<i>Conditions at CBP's Forward Operating Bases along the Southwest Border</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
49	OIG-16-47	<i>FEMA Does Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Its National Flood Insurance Write Your Own Program</i>	4	\$0	\$0	FEMA
50	OIG-16-51	<i>CBP Needs to Better Plan Its Implementation of the DHS Prison Rape Elimination Act Regulations</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP



## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
51	OIG-16-54	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
52	OIG-16-64	<i>2014 White House Fence Jumping Incident</i>	6	\$0	\$0	USSS
53	OIG-16-75	<i>CBP Needs Better Data to Justify Its Criminal Investigator Staffing</i>	5	\$0	\$0	CBP
54	OIG-16-78-D	<i>Colorado Should Provide the City of Evans More Assistance in Managing FEMA Grant Funds</i>	1	\$2,218,535	\$0	FEMA
55	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program</i>	11	\$0	\$0	TSA
56	OIG-16-88	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2015 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
57	OIG-16-91	<i>TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA, OGC
58	OIG-16-96-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the Citizenship and Immigration Services, Investigations Division</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCIS

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
59	OIG-16-98	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - SAFER Grants</i>	1	\$18,443,447	\$0	FEMA
60	OIG-16-100	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - AFG</i>	1	\$7,124,893	\$0	FEMA
61	OIG-16-115-D	<i>FEMA Should Suspend All Grant Payments on the \$29.9 Million Coastal Retrofit Program until Mississippi Can Properly Account for Federal Funds</i>	4	\$0	\$26,899,836	FEMA
62	OIG-16-123	<i>CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility's Privacy Policies and Practices</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
63	OIG-16-126-D	<i>FEMA Can Do More to Improve Public Assistance Grantees' and Subgrantees' Compliance with Federal Procurement Rules</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
64	OIG-16-127-D	<i>FEMA Can Enhance Readiness with Management of Its Disaster Incident Workforce</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
65	OIG-16-128	<i>TWIC Background Checks Are Not as Reliable as They Could Be</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
66	OIG-16-134	<i>TSA Needs a Crosscutting Risk-Based Security Strategy</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
67	OIG-16-138	<i>DHS' Progress in Implementing the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act</i>	3	\$0	\$0	MGMT
68	OIG-16-139-D	<i>FEMA Acquisition of a Joint Field Office for DR-4223 in Austin, Texas</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
69	OIG-17-01	<i>USSS Faces Challenges Protecting Sensitive Case Management Systems and Data</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USSS
70	OIG-17-03	<i>AMO and Coast Guard Maritime Missions Are Not Duplicative, But Could Improve with Better Coordination</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT, USCG, CBP, ICE
71	OIG-17-04	<i>TSA Could Improve Its Oversight of Airport Controls over Access Media Badges</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
72	OIG-17-05	<i>DHS Is Slow to Hire Law Enforcement Personnel</i>	2		\$0	ICE, USSS
73	OIG-17-06-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$1.8 Million of \$5.5 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Columbia County, Florida, for Tropical Storm Debby Damages</i>	3	\$1,172,835	\$0	FEMA
74	OIG-17-09	<i>DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Improvement</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
75	OIG-17-10	<i>The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel</i>	4	\$0	\$0	USSS
76	OIG-17-12	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	\$0	\$0	USCG, CFO, FEMA, CBP, USSS, NPPD
77	OIG-17-14	<i>Summary Report on Audits of Security Controls for TSA Information Technology Systems at Airports</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
78	OIG-17-22	<i>DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
79	OIG-17-24	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2016</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
80	OIG-17-25-D	<i>The Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority in Victorville, California, Did Not Properly Manage \$32 Million in FEMA Grant Funds</i>	3	\$23,785,177	\$0	FEMA
81	OIG-17-36	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	4	\$0	\$0	CBP

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
82	OIG-17-38-D	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
83	OIG-17-42	<i>H-2 Petition Fee Structure is Inequitable and Contributes to Processing Errors</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCIS
84	OIG-17-43-MA	<i>Management Alert on Issues Requiring Immediate Action at the Theo Lacy Facility in Orange, California</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
85	OIG-17-49	<i>Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information</i>	6	\$0	\$0	I&A, CRCL, OGC, PRIV, SEC, DSEC, COS,
86	OIG-17-51	<i>ICE Deportation Operations</i>	4	\$0	\$0	ICE
87	OIG-17-56	<i>DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays Is Hindered by Insufficient Technology</i>	5	\$0	\$0	MGMT, ICE
88	OIG-17-59	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2016 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
89	OIG-17-74-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service</i>	19	\$0	\$0	USCG
90	OIG-17-91	<i>PALMS Does Not Address Department Needs</i>	4	\$0	\$0	MGMT

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
91	OIG-17-99-MA	<i>Management Alert - CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
92	OIG-17-101	<i>Improvements Needed to Promote DHS Progress toward Accomplishing Enterprise-wide Data Goals</i>	2	\$0	\$0	I&A, MGMT
93	OIG-17-103-MA	<i>Management Alert - Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns</i>	2	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
94	OIG-17-110	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Management of Its Flood Mapping Program</i>	4	\$0	\$0	FEMA
95	OIG-17-112	<i>Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness</i>	8	\$0	\$0	TSA
96	OIG-17-114	<i>CBP's IT Systems and Infrastructure Did Not Fully Support Border Security Operations</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
97	OIG-17-115-MA	<i>Management Alert - Security and Safety Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson Sector</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
98	OIG-17-116-VR	<i>Verification Review of OIG-11-67</i>	1	\$0	\$0	PRIV
99	OIG-17-117-D	<i>Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York</i>	2	\$808,159	\$0	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
100	OIG-17-119	<i>ICE Field Offices Need to Improve Compliance with Oversight Requirements for Segregation of Detainees with Mental Health Conditions</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
101	OIG-18-01	<i>Hazard Mitigation Grant Funds Awarded to MEMA for the Mississippi Coastal Retrofit Program</i>	3	\$0	\$0	FEMA
102	OIG-18-03	<i>USCIS Needs a Better Approach to Verify H-1B Visa Participants</i>	3	\$0	\$0	USCIS
103	OIG-18-04	<i>(U) FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable</i>	3	\$0	\$0	TSA
104	OIG-18-05	<i>DHS' Controls Over Firearms and Other Sensitive Assets</i>	5	\$0	\$0	MGMT
105	OIG-18-07	<i>DHS Needs a More Unified Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Administration</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
106	OIG-18-08	<i>FEMA and California Need to Assist CalRecycle, a California State Agency, to Improve Its Accounting of \$230 Million in Disaster Costs</i>	3	\$107,002,492	\$65,397,921	FEMA
107	OIG-18-10	<i>Biennial Report of DHS' Implementation of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015</i>	2	\$0	\$0	NPPD

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
108	OIG-18-13	<i>FEMA and CBP Oversight of Operation Stonegarden Program Needs Improvement</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
109	OIG-18-15	<i>Coast Guard IT Investments Risk Failure Without Required Oversight</i>	4	\$0	\$0	USCG
110	OIG-18-16	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	42	\$0	\$0	DHS, USCG, USSS, CBP, FEMA
111	OIG-18-17	<i>Napa State Hospital, California, Should Improve the Management of Its \$6.7 Million FEMA Grant</i>	2	\$4,788,492	\$0	FEMA
112	OIG-18-18	<i>Management Alert - CBP's Use of Examination and Summons Authority Under 19 U.S.C. § 1509</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP
113	OIG-18-19	<i>Review of CBP Information Technology System Outage of January 2, 2017</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
114	OIG-18-20	<i>Office of Health Affairs Has Not Implemented An Effective Privacy Management Program</i>	9	\$0	\$0	OHA
115	OIG-18-23	<i>USCIS Has Been Unsuccessful in Automating Naturalization Benefits Delivery</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCIS



## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
116	OIG-18-24	<i>Department of Homeland Security's Use of Other Transaction Authority</i>	3	\$0	\$0	MGMT
117	OIG-18-27	<i>TSA's Adjudication Resources Are Inadequate to Meet TSA PreCheck Enrollment Goals</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
118	OIG-18-32	<i>Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Detention Facilities</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
119	OIG-18-34	<i>DHS' Implementation of the DATA Act</i>	3	\$0	\$0	MGMT
120	OIG-18-36	<i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (Redacted)</i>	4	\$0	\$0	ICE
121	OIG-18-38	<i>Unsupported Payments Made to Policyholders Who Participated in the Hurricane Sandy Claims Review Process</i>	7	\$0	\$0	FEMA
122	OIG-18-41	<i>DHS Needs to Strengthen Its Suspension and Debarment Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
123	OIG-18-51	<i>Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement</i>	6	\$0	\$0	DHS
124	OIG-18-53	<i>Immigration and Customs Enforcement Did Not Follow Federal Procurement Guidelines When Contracting for Detention Services</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
125	OIG-18-55	<i>Swearing-In Ceremony of David J. Glawe, DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis</i>	1	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
126	OIG-18-56	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2017</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
127	OIG-18-57	<i>Fiscal Year 2016 Audit of the DHS Bankcard Program Indicates Moderate Risk Remains</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
128	OIG-18-58	<i>USCIS Has Unclear Website Information and Unrealistic Time Goals for Adjudicating Green Card Applications</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCIS
<b>Total</b>			<b>454</b>	<b>\$236,263,179</b>	<b>\$908,608,610</b>	

#### Report Number Abbreviations:

A report number ending with “D” is a grant audit.

A report number ending with “MA” is a Management Alert. These reports identify conditions that pose an immediate and serious threat.

A report number ending with “IQO” is a report issued by the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight.

A report number ending with “VR” is a Verification Review of an issued report or recommendation to verify DHS management has taken agreed upon corrective action.

# Appendix 5

## Reports Issued

	<b>Date Issued</b>	<b>Report Number</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>Unsupported Costs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>Funds to be Put to Better Use<sup>(c)</sup></b>
1	4/9/2018	OIG-18-60	<i>The City of Waterloo, Iowa Jeopardizes \$1.9 Million in Estimated FEMA Grant Funding</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
2	4/10/2018	OIG-18-61	<i>Verification Review: Better Safeguards Are Needed in USCIS Green Card Issuance (OIG-17-11)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
3	4/26/2018	OIG-18-62	<i>Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority, California, Provided FEMA Incorrect Information for Its \$33 Million Project</i>	\$24,843,002	\$0	\$4,527,346
4	5/4/2018	OIG-18-63	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$20.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Diamondhead Water and Sewer District, Mississippi</i>	\$20,391,686	\$332,138	\$21,045
5	5/11/2018	OIG-18-64	<i>Cache County, Utah, Needs Additional Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its FEMA Grant</i>	\$0	\$0	\$416,250
6	5/22/2018	OIG-18-65	<i>Special Report - Certain Findings Relating to the OIG's Investigation of Allegations Involving FLETC Senior Officials</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	<b>Date Issued</b>	<b>Report Number</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>Unsupported Costs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>Funds to be Put to Better Use<sup>(c)</sup></b>
7	6/1/2018	OIG-18-66	<i>Sandy Recovery Improvement Act Review</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
8	6/26/2018	OIG-18-67	<i>ICE's Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance or Systemic Improvements</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
9	7/26/2018	OIG-18-68	<i>Most Complaints about CBP's Polygraph Program Are Ambiguous or Unfounded</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
10	7/13/2018	OIG-18-69	<i>Audit of Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2016 Conference Spending</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
11	7/24/2018	OIG-18-70	<i>FAMS Needs to Demonstrate How Ground-based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission (Redacted)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
12	7/31/2018	OIG-18-71	<i>Special Report - FEMA Paid Employees Over the Annual Premium Pay Cap</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
13	8/9/2018	OIG-18-72	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2017 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	<b>Date Issued</b>	<b>Report Number</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>Unsupported Costs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>Funds to be Put to Better Use<sup>(c)</sup></b>
14	8/10/2018	OIG-18-73	<i>DHS' Non-disclosure Forms and Settlement Agreements Do Not Always Include the Required Statement from the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
15	8/14/2018	OIG-18-74	<i>Special Report - Lessons Learned from Previous Audit Reports Related to California's Practice of Managing Public Assistance Grant Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
16	9/5/2018	OIG-18-75	<i>Summary and Key Findings of Fiscal Year 2017 FEMA Disaster Grant and Program Audits</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
17	9/4/2018	OIG-18-76	<i>Assaults on CBP and ICE Law Enforcement Officers</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
18	9/19/2018	OIG-18-77	<i>Lack of Planning Hinders Effective Oversight and Management of ICE's Expanding 287(g) Program</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
19	9/21/2018	OIG-18-78	<i>USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
20	9/21/2018	OIG-18-79	<i>CBP Has Not Ensured Safeguards for Data Collected Using Unmanned Aircraft Systems</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	<b>Date Issued</b>	<b>Report Number</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>Unsupported Costs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>Funds to be Put to Better Use<sup>(c)</sup></b>
21	9/21/2018	OIG-18-80	<i>Progress Made, but CBP Faces Challenges Implementing a Biometric Capability to Track Air Passengers Departures Nationwide</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
22	9/26/2018	OIG-18-81	<i>DHS Support Components Do Not Have Sufficient Processes and Procedures to Address Misconduct</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
23	9/27/2018	OIG-18-82	<i>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition FY 2017</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
24	9/24/2018	OIG-18-83	<i>CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport (Redacted)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
25	9/27/2018	OIG-18-84	<i>Special Review - Initial Observations Regarding Family Separation Issues Under the Zero Tolerance Policy</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
26	9/27/2018	OIG-18-85	<i>Management Alert - Observations of FEMA's Debris Monitoring Efforts for Hurricane Irma</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs <sup>(a)</sup>	Unsupported Costs <sup>(b)</sup>	Funds to be Put to Better Use <sup>(c)</sup>
27	9/27/2018	OIG-18-86	<i>Management Alert - Issues Requiring Action at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in Adelanto, California</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
28	9/28/2018	OIG-18-87	<i>Results of Unannounced Inspections of Conditions for Unaccompanied Alien Children in CBP Custody</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
29	9/28/2018	OIG-18-88	<i>Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
30	9/28/2018	OIG-18-89	<i>(U) S&amp;T Has Taken Steps to Address Insider Threats, But Management Challenges Remain</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
			<b>Total</b>	<b>\$45,234,688</b>	<b>\$332,138</b>	<b>\$4,964,641</b>

### Notes and Explanations:

(a) DHS OIG reports the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of costs it questions. The Total Questioned Costs column includes the Federal share of all ineligible and unsupported costs reported.

(b) The Unsupported Costs column is a subset of Total Questioned Costs and is shown separately as required by the *Inspector General Act*.

(c) The Funds to be Put to Better Use column only includes the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of our cumulative reported findings or recommendations.

# Appendix 6

## Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	OIG Recommended Recovery (Federal Share)	Amount DHS Agreed to Recover (Disallow)	Amount DHS Will Not Recover (Allowed)	Amount DHS Recovered/Deobligated
1	10/8/2014	OIG-15-01-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$13.0 Million of Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to The Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, New Orleans, Louisiana</i>	\$3,839,224	\$4,838,716	\$0	\$4,838,716
2	10/8/2014	OIG-15-02-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$3 Million of Ineligible Costs and \$4.3 Million of Unneeded Funds from the \$110 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Columbus Regional Hospital, Columbus, Indiana</i>	\$1,720,315	\$1,720,315	\$0	\$1,720,315
3	7/5/2017	OIG-17-93-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$3.9 Million of \$13.2 in Grant Funds Awarded to the Borough of Lavallette, New Jersey</i>	\$2,393,842	\$2,437,159	\$2,437,159	\$2,437,159
4	7/5/2017	OIG-17-93-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$3.9 Million of \$13.2 in Grant Funds Awarded to the Borough of Lavallette, New Jersey</i>	\$332,869	\$259,142	\$110,712	\$259,142
5	11/16/2017	OIG-18-17	<i>Napa State Hospital, California, Should Improve the Management of Its \$6.7 Million FEMA Grant</i>	\$225,240	\$221,542	\$0	\$221,542



## Appendix 6 Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated (Continued)


	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	OIG Recommend- ed Recovery (Federal Share)	Amount DHS Agreed to Recover (Disallow)	Amount DHS Will Not Recover (Allowed)	Amount DHS Recovered/De obligated
6	9/28/2017	OIG-17-113-D	<i>The Covington County Commission Needs Additional Assistance in Managing a \$5.4 Million FEMA Grant from Winter 2015 Storms and to Save Millions in the Future</i>	\$40,555,883	\$40,555,883	\$0	\$40,555.883
7	5/4/2018	OIG-18-63	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$20.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Diamondhead Water and Sewer District, Mississippi</i>	\$21,045	\$21,045	\$0	\$21,045
	AUDIT REPORT TOTAL			<b>\$49,088,418</b>	<b>\$50,053,802</b>	<b>\$2,547,871</b>	<b>\$50,053,802</b>
	Investigative Recoveries <sup>(d)</sup>	4/2018- 9/2018					\$5,548,964
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>\$49,088,418</b>	<b>\$50,053,802</b>	<b>\$2,547,871</b>	<b>\$55,602,766</b>

**Report Number Abbreviations:** OIG-XX-XX-D Disaster Relief Fund Report

**Notes and Explanations:** (d) Recoveries, other than administrative cost savings, which resulted from investigative efforts.

## Appendix 7

### Contract Audit Reports



The ***National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008*** requires that we list all contract audit reports issued during the reporting period containing significant audit findings; briefly describe the significant audit findings in the report; and specify the amounts of costs identified in the report as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed. This act defines significant audit findings as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs in excess of \$10 million or other findings that the Inspector General determines to be significant. It defines contracts as a contract, an order placed under a task or delivery order contract, or a subcontract.

We did not process contract audit reports meeting the criteria of the *National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008* during this reporting period.

**Questioned Costs**

**N/A**

**Unsupported Costs**

**N/A**

**Disallowed Costs**

**N/A**

# Appendix 8

## Peer Review Results



Section 5(a) (14) – (16) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, requires OIGs to include in their semiannual reports certain information pertaining to peer reviews of or conducted by or of an OIG during and prior to the current reporting period.

### **Peer Review Conducted of DHS OIG Audit Operations**

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) OIG completed a peer review of DHS OIG Audit operations on August 27, 2018, for the FY ending September 30, 2017. Our audit offices received a peer review rating of “pass with deficiency.” We concurred with and will implement corrective actions to address all of the recommendations in the EPA OIG’s System Review Report.

#	Recommendation	Status
1	Identify the root cause for the departures identified from Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) in audit planning, assessment of evidence, supervision, indexing, and reporting disclosures for the sampled Emergency Management Oversight (EMO) assignment, as well as the other seven terminated assignments.	Estimated completion: January 31, 2019
2	Update its policies and procedures as necessary to address the deficiencies.	Estimated completion: January 31, 2019
3	Verify that changes to the DHS OIG system of quality control, and the integration of the EMO into the Office of Audit, resolves the deficiencies in the areas of audit planning, assessment of evidence, supervision, indexing and reporting disclosures.	Estimated completion: March 30, 2019
4	Schedule an off-cycle peer review with the CIGIE to verify that changes to the DHS OIG system of quality control provides reasonable assurance of conformance with GAGAS.	Estimated completion: April 30, 2019, pending scheduling by CIGIE

## **Appendix 8**

### **Peer Review Results (Continued)**



#### ***Outstanding Recommendations from Previous Peer Reviews of Audit Operations***

The DHS OIG does not have any outstanding recommendations from any previous peer reviews conducted of or by DHS OIG.

#### ***Investigative Operations***

The Office of Investigations was not subject to a peer review during the reporting period. Our investigative operations received a peer review rating of “compliant” in September 2016, as a result of a review completed by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. The review noted three “best practices” and two observations, but did not result in any recommendations.

We did not conduct a peer review of another Federal Inspector’s General investigative operations during the period.

# Appendix 9

## Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

	Affected Agency	Allegation
1	CBP	<b>We investigated two CBP officials (both SESs)</b> for engaging in prohibited personnel practices to promote two friends into the Senior Executive Service (SES). In addition, one of the CBP officials allegedly misused official travel to attend a National Football League game. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
2	CBP	<b>We investigated a CBP manager (GS-15)</b> for wasting government funds on the purchase and implementation of a failed CBP computer system. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
3	CIS	<b>We investigated a CIS manager (GS-15)</b> for refusing access or otherwise delaying the release of information to ICE HSI agents engaged in lawful and routine law enforcement action. We also investigated an allegation that HSI supervisors attempted to identify and retaliate against the individuals who notified Congress of this incident. We found that the Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) manager and contract security personnel did delay the agents, but the manager's supervisors quickly corrected the situation. We found that the allegations of reported reprisal by HSI supervisors were unsubstantiated.
4	TSA	<b>We investigated a TSA manager (GS-15 equivalent)</b> for breach of government ethics rules, procurement fraud, and wasted government funds by stealing a technical concept and submitting a bid for a TSA contract through the manager's private company. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
5	FPS	<b>We investigated an FPS official (SES)</b> for potential procurement irregularities based upon the SES's pre-existing friendship and communications with the president of a firm that was awarded a contract by the SES's organization. We also investigated the SES's communications with Federal Protective Service (FPS) contractors regarding potential employment opportunities for a family member and an associate, neither of which came to fruition. We found no evidence that the SES improperly influenced the contract award. We found that the inquiries regarding the family member and associate created an appearance of a conflict of interest issue, but did not rise to the level of an actual conflict of interest.
6	ICE	<b>We investigated an ICE/HSI manager (GS-15)</b> for exchanging sexually explicit text messages with the subject of an HSI marriage fraud investigation. We found that the manager exchanged sexually explicit text messages with the individual, but was not aware of the individual's involvement in a marriage fraud scheme and had no involvement or influence with the HSI investigation.
7	ICE	<b>We investigated two ICE/HSI managers (SESs)</b> for allegedly failing to comply with an international agreement, resulting in the death of an ICE/HSI informant, which was then covered up by ICE/HSI staff. We found that the ICE HSI officials failed to comply with reporting requirements on multiple occasions, but we found that the allegations that this led to the informant's death and a cover-up were unsubstantiated.

## Appendix 9

### Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public (Continued)

	Affected Agency	Allegation
8	ICE	<b>We investigated an ICE/HSI manager (SES)</b> for retaliating against a subordinate that the manager had assaulted during a previous meeting. [This alleged assault was previously reported by DHS OIG in a preceding reporting period.] We found that the allegation of retaliation was unsubstantiated.
9	DHS	<b>We investigated a former DHS OIG manager (GS-15)</b> for an inappropriate personal relationship with a government contractor employee, misuse of DHS property and communications systems, and involvement in litigation that precluded the manager from maintaining a security clearance. We found that these allegations were unsubstantiated.
10	Secret Service	<b>We investigated two Secret Service managers (both SES)</b> for subjecting an employee to a hostile work environment through discrimination and retaliation. We found the allegation unsubstantiated.
11	TSA	<b>We investigated two TSA managers (both SESs equivalents)</b> for falsifying the results of an organizational review, which was used to demote the complainant. We found that these allegations were unsubstantiated.
<b>Total: 11</b>		

# Appendix 10

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMO	Air and Marine Operations
BPA	Border Patrol Agent
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CIGIE	Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
COS	Chief of Staff
CRCL	Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
CWMD	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
DSEC	Deputy Secretary
EMO	Office of Emergency Management Oversight
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ERO	Enforcement and Removal Operations
FAMS	Federal Air Marshal Service
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
FPDS-NG	Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation
FPS	Federal Protective Service
FPTBU	Funds to be Put to Better Use
GAGAS	Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GAS	Government Auditing Standards
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
I&A	Office of Intelligence and Analysis
I&E	Office of Inspections and Evaluations
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
INV	Office of Investigations
IQO	Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IT	information technology
ITA	Office of Information Technology Audits
JFK	John F. Kennedy International Airport
MGMT	Directorate for Management
NPPD	National Protection and Programs Directorate
OA	Office of Audits
OCFO	Office of the Chief Financial Officer
OCIO	Office of the Chief Information Officer
OES	Office of Emergency Services
OGC	Office of General Counsel
OHA	Office of Health Affairs
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OPR	Office of Professional Responsibility
OSC	U.S. Office of Special Counsel
OTFOC	Other Than Full and Open Competition
PA	public assistance
PALMS	Performance and Learning Management System
PLCY	Office of Policy
PRIV	Privacy Office
QC	Questioned Costs
S&T	Science and Technology Directorate

# Appendix 10

## Acronyms and Abbreviations (Continued)

SAFER	Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response
SAR	semiannual report
SEC	Secretary
SES	Senior Executive Service
SRG	Special Reviews Group
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TWIC	Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(U)	Unclassified Summary
UAS	Unmanned Aircraft Systems
UC	Unsupported Costs
U.S.C.	United States Code
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
VIPR	Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
WPA	Whistleblower Protection Act
WPC	Whistleblower Protection Coordinator
WPU	Whistleblower Protection Unit



# Appendix 11

## OIG Contacts and Locations



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Jennifer Costello	.....	Chief Operating Officer
Lorinda Couch	.....	Chief of Staff
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Erica Paulson	.....	Assistant Inspector General/External Affairs
Sondra McCauley	.....	Assistant Inspector General/Information Technology Audits
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# Appendix 12

## Index to Reporting Requirements

The specific reporting requirements described in the *Inspector General Act*, including Section 989C of the *Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010*, are listed below with a reference to the pages on which they appear.

<b>Requirement:</b>	<b>Pages</b>
Matters Referred to Prosecutorial Authorities	4
Report of Whistleblower Retaliation	5
Recommendations with Significant Problems	Nothing to Report
Summary of Significant OIG Activities	9 – 17
Review of Legislation and Regulations	18
Reports with Questioned Costs	21
Reports Recommending that Funds Be Put to Better Use	22
Summary of Reports in which No Management Decision Was Made	23
Prior Recommendations Not Yet Implemented	24 – 41
List of Audit Reports	42 – 46
Peer Review Results	50 – 51
Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees Not Disclosed to the Public	52 – 53
Management Decision Disagreements	Nothing to Report
Revised Management Decisions	Nothing to Report
Summary of Instances Where Information Was Refused	Nothing to Report
Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	Nothing to Report
No Establishment Comment Received Within 60 Days of Report Issuance	Nothing to Report
Inspection, Evaluation, or Audit Closed and Not Publicly Disclosed	Nothing to Report

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