

# U.S. Court of International Trade

Slip Op. 16–104

NUCOR CORPORATION, Plaintiff, ARCELORMITTAL USA LLC ET AL.,  
Plaintiff-Intervenors, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, DONGKUK STEEL  
MILL CO., LTD. ET AL., Defendant-Intervenors.

Before: Claire R. Kelly, Judge  
Court No. 16–00164

[Denying the Government of Korea’s motion to intervene without prejudice.]

Dated: November 9, 2016

*Timothy C. Brightbill, Alan Hayden Price, and Stephanie Manaker Bell*, Wiley Rein, LLP, of Washington, DC, for plaintiff.

*Brooke Michelle Ringel, Kathleen Weaver Cannon, Paul Charles Rosenthal, and R. Alan Luberda*, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, of Washington, DC, for plaintiff-intervenor ArcelorMittal USA LLC.

*Daniel Lawrence Schneiderman and Stephen Andrew Jones*, King & Spalding, LLP, of Washington, DC, for plaintiff-intervenor AK Steel Corporation.

*Jeffrey David Gerrish, Luke Anthony Meisner, and Robert E. Lighthizer*, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, LLP, of Washington, DC, for plaintiff-intervenor United States Steel Corporation.

*Elizabeth Anne Speck*, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, of Washington DC for defendant. Of counsel on the brief was *Whitney Marie Rolig* of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Chief Counsel for Import Administration.

*David Edward Bond and William Joseph Moran*, White and Case, LLP, of Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenors Dongkuk Steel Mill Co., Ltd. and Union Steel Manufacturing Co. Ltd.”

*Brady Warfield Mills, Donald Bertrand Cameron, Julie Clark Mendoza, Rudi Will Planert, Eugene Degnan, Mary Shannon Hodgins, and Sarah Suzanne Sprinkle*, Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, of Washington, DC for proposed defendant-intervenor the Government of Korea.

## **OPINION AND ORDER**

### **Kelly, Judge:**

Before the court is the Government of Korea’s (“GOK”) motion to intervene in this action as of right under USCIT Rule 24(a). *See* Intervenor-Applicant Government of Korea’s Partial Consent Mot. Intervene As of Right, Nov. 2, 2016, ECF No. 34 (“Mot. Intervene”); *see also* USCIT R. 24(a). GOK acknowledges that it seeks to intervene as of right beyond the time limit established by the Court’s rules for doing so, which it acknowledges is no later than 30 days after the date

of service of the complaint.<sup>1</sup> *See* Mot. Intervene 2; *see also* USCIT R. 24(a)(3). However, GOK argues that it has shown good cause for the delay in filing its motion to intervene because the process of coordinating necessary approvals from various Korean government agencies before filing the motion was time consuming and complex. *See* Mot. Intervene 2. GOK asks the court “to treat these circumstances as excusable neglect under USCIT [Rule] 24(a)(3)(i).” *Id.* Plaintiff responds that GOK has not demonstrated good cause for its delay because GOK has failed to adequately explain the delay or analyze why the circumstances did not allow for approval to be obtained in a timely manner.<sup>2</sup> Pl.’s Resp. GOK’s Partial Consent Mot. Intervene 2, Nov. 4, 2016, ECF No. 38 (“Pl.’s Resp.”); *see also* USCIT R. 24(a)(3)(i). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that granting GOK’s motion where it has pled such a broad excuse without supporting its explanation with facts justifying why the motion could not have been made in the requisite time frame would render the time limit in USCIT Rule 24(a)(3) superfluous. *See* Pl.’s Resp. 2–3.

USCIT Rule 24(a)(3) permits an interested party in the proceeding that is the subject of an action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) to intervene as of right upon a timely motion or later, if that party shows good cause because of either:

- (i) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; or
- (ii) under circumstances in which by due diligence a motion to intervene under this subsection could not have been made within the 30-day period.<sup>3</sup>

USCIT R. 24(a)(3)(i)–(ii). Uniquely, this portion of USCIT Rule 24(a) provides a clear, mandatory 30-day time limit for intervention as of right. *See id.* The rule also makes clear that the time limit may be

<sup>1</sup> The complaint was filed on September 8, 2016, and Plaintiff served a copy of the complaint via certified mail, return receipt requested, the same day. *See* Compl., Sept. 8, 2016, ECF No. 8.

<sup>2</sup> GOK indicates in its motion that Plaintiff-Intervenors AK Steel Corporation and United States Steel Corporation also oppose GOK’s motion. Mot. Intervene 3. GOK states that Plaintiff-Intervenor Arcelor Mittal USA LLC takes no position and Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor Dongkuk Steel Mill Co., Ltd. consent to this motion. *Id.* Plaintiff-Intervenors AK Steel Corporation, and United States Steel Corporation have not filed separate responses to GOK’s motion.

<sup>3</sup> USCIT Rule 24(a) also requires that a party show that it is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute or that the party claim an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and be so situated that disposing of the action may impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest. *See* USCIT R. 24(a)(1)–(2). No party disputes that GOK has an unconditional statutory right to intervene under 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1)(B). *See* Mot. Intervene 2; Pl.’s Resp. 2; *see also* 28 U.S.C. §§ 2631(j)(1)(B), 2631(k)(1) (2012); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(9)(B), 1516a(f)(3) (2012).

waived only where the party provides specific facts demonstrating good cause on one of the enumerated bases. *See id.*

GOK appears to acknowledge that it knew it was filing its motion beyond the deadline for doing so. *See id.* Although GOK alleges that its motion was delayed because it was unable to secure authorization from the relevant government agencies within the 30-day time frame, GOK has offered no reason why these circumstances are excusable neglect, nor has it explained why the authorizations could not have been obtained in the 30-day time frame with due diligence.<sup>4</sup> *See Mot. Intervene.* Lacking such information, the court cannot say GOK has met the good cause standard.<sup>5</sup> GOK's excuse for filing beyond the time limit provided in USCIT Rule 24(a)(3) is pled with insufficient detail to allow the court to determine that it met any of the enumerated circumstances constituting good cause under the Court's rules.

GOK argues that "permitting it to intervene at this point in the litigation will not unduly prejudice the other parties' rights as the scheduling order and briefing schedule have not yet been finalized." *Mot. Intervene 2.* The court concedes that the prejudice to the other parties appears to be minimal, and there appears to be no evidence of bad faith in GOK's failure to intervene on a timely basis. Nonetheless, parties cannot ignore the time limits of USCIT Rule 24 with such a broad and unexplained excuse. To allow a movant to do so would effectively permit it to ignore the time limit so long as there is minimal prejudice to opposing parties without any basis in the rule for doing so. *See USCIT R. 24(a).* Moreover, such a decision would render the actual time limit superfluous, and late motions to intervene could require frequent extra adjudication for parties who choose to file late or otherwise fail to take note of the deadline for doing so. The language of the 30-day time limit indicates that the Court intended to avoid such circumstances except for specific types of ex-

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<sup>4</sup> Although GOK pleads excusable neglect, *see Mot. Intervene 2*, GOK's motion asserts that "[t]he process of obtaining approval to intervene in this appeal was time consuming and required coordination among various government agencies." *Mot. Intervene 2.* These allegations appear to better support an argument that it could not have intervened in the time frame provided by the rules with due diligence. Nonetheless, the facts asserted are insufficient to demonstrate GOK could not have requested intervention within the 30-day time frame. GOK asserts that the final decision to intervene was not made until Friday, October 28, 2016, three days before it moved to intervene. *Id.* GOK has sufficiently explained the delay in moving to intervene from the time the relevant government agencies authorized intervention, but it has not outlined what steps were taken by what agencies to diligently consider the prospect of intervention beginning on the date the complaint was served up until the deadline for intervention.

<sup>5</sup> GOK does not allege it was surprised by the deadline provided in USCIT Rule 24(a)(3), nor does it claim that it was mistaken about the deadline for filing or that it inadvertently filed after the time limit for doing so. *See Mot. Intervene 2.* GOK also does not allege that it was unaware of the deadline in the first instance or that the deadline was missed inadvertently. *See id.*

cuses. *See* USCIT R. 24(a). Where instances are described by the movant without sufficient particularity to permit the court to evaluate whether the standard is met, the court must presume the party lacked good cause for filing beyond the time limit for intervention as of right.

### CONCLUSION

Therefore, upon consideration of GOK's motion to intervene as of right, Plaintiff's response, all other papers and proceedings filed in this action, and upon due deliberation, it is hereby

**ORDERED** that GOK's motion to intervene under USCIT Rule 24(a) is denied without prejudice; and it is further

**ORDERED** that if GOK believes that the facts exist to support good cause for filing beyond the time limit provided in USCIT Rule 24(a) consistent with this opinion, GOK may file a motion with supporting facts on or before November 18, 2016.

Dated: November 9, 2016

New York, New York

*/s/ Claire R. Kelly*  
CLAIRE R. KELLY, JUDGE



### Slip Op. 16–105

GANZ U.S.A., LLC f/k/a GANZ INC., GANZ, and OWEN ROGERS,  
Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES, Respondent.

Before: Jane A. Restani, Judge  
Court No. 16–01001

[Petition to perpetuate testimony granted.]

Dated: November 15, 2016

*John M. Peterson* and *Elyssa R. Emsellem*, Neville Peterson LLP, of New York, NY, argued for petitioners. On the brief was *Russell A. Semmel*.

*Jason M. Kenner*, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, NY, argued for respondent. With him on the brief were *Benjamin C. Mizer*, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, *Jeanne E. Davidson*, Director, and *Amy M. Rubin*, Assistant Director.

### OPINION AND ORDER

#### Restani, Judge:

Before the court is petitioners' Ganz U.S.A., LLC f/k/a Ganz Inc. ("Ganz USA"), GANZ, and Owen Rogers (collectively, "Ganz"), verified petition to perpetuate testimony seeking authorization to depose Lawrence J. Mruk, a retired former supervisory import specialist

with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) stationed at the Port of Buffalo, New York. Verified Pet. of Ganz U.S.A., LLC, Ganz, and Owen Rogers for Dep. to Perpetuate Test. 1, ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Respondent United States (“the government”) opposes Ganz’s petition. Opp’n to the Verified Pet. of Ganz U.S.A., LLC; Ganz, A Canadian Partnership; and Owen Rogers for Dep. to Perpetuate Test. 1, ECF No. 9 (“Gov’t Opp’n”). The court orally granted the petition at a hearing on November 8, 2016, and now, as it previously indicated, provides this written opinion.

Ganz USA is an importer and re-seller “of gift offerings, collectibles, seasonal gifts, and home decor products” including “plush animals, giftware, fashion accessories, and fragrant candles for the home.” Pet. Ex. B at 3. Ganz believes the government will file an action against it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1582 to collect nearly \$22.7 million in civil penalties under 19 U.S.C. § 1592 and withheld duties for gross negligence and improper delay in implementing a December 19, 2007, Customs ruling pertaining to the customs valuation of certain imported giftware and toys. Pet. at 1, 2–3, 10. In fact, Customs has already made demands for these penalties. Pet. Exs. Q, R, V. Ganz argues that it has a defense: while a reconsideration request of the Customs ruling was pending, Customs officials at the Port of Buffalo allowed Ganz to postpone implementation of the appraisal method prescribed in the December 19, 2007 ruling—a postponement that Customs now does not acknowledge. Pet. at 5, 10; *see also* HQ H006576 (Dec. 19, 2007); HQ H026063 (Aug. 17, 2010). Ganz believes Mruk has personal knowledge of facts relating to this defense. Specifically, Ganz, which has deposed another retired Customs employee, Patricia M. Handzlik, pursuant to an agreed upon order of the court, Order, *Ganz U.S.A., LLC v. United States*, No. 16-mc-01000 (June 1, 2016), ECF No. 12, argues that Handzlik “indicated that [Mruk] had . . . responsibility” over an agreed upon postponement to the implementation of a new method of Customs appraisal and the submission of Compliance Improvement Plan (“CIP”) by Ganz. Pet. at 10; *see* Pet. Ex. A at 21, 24.

In order “to perpetuate testimony about any matter cognizable in this court” and before an action is filed, a party must file a “verified petition” pursuant to U.S. Court of International Trade (“USCIT” or “CIT”) Rule 27. That rule provides:

The petition must ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to depose the named persons in order to perpetuate their testimony. The petition must be titled in the petitioner’s name and must show:

- (A) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in this court but cannot presently bring it or cause it to be brought;
- (B) the subject matter of the expected action and the petitioner's interest;
- (C) the facts that the petitioner wants to establish by the proposed testimony and the reasons to perpetuate it;
- (D) the names or a description of the persons whom the petitioner expects to be adverse parties and their addresses, so far as known; and
- (E) the name, address, and expected substance of the testimony of each deponent.

USCIT R. 27(a)(1). As the CIT has not previously issued an opinion interpreting this rule, the court finds instructive the opinions of other federal courts construing the analogous Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1); *VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc.*, 759 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“This rule gives district courts the authority to grant a petition authorizing a deposition to perpetuate testimony even before a lawsuit has been brought[.]”); *see also* USCIT R. 1 (“The court may refer for guidance to the rules of other courts.”).

A petitioner must demonstrate (1) “[a]n expectation that a suit will be filed that cannot be then filed,” (2) “[t]he substance of the testimony the petitioner expects to elicit and the reasons the testimony is important,” i.e., that the testimony is “known” to the petitioner, and (3) “[a] risk that testimony will be lost if not preserved.” 5 J. Moore, *Moore’s Federal Practice* § 27.13[1], p. 24 (3d ed. 2015) (hereinafter 5 Moore’s); *see also* USCIT R. 27(a)(1); *Ash v. Cort*, 512 F.2d 909, 912 (3d Cir. 1975) (“Rule 27 is not a substitute for discovery. . . . [but instead] is available in special circumstances to preserve testimony which could otherwise be lost.”); *In re Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A.*, 251 F.R.D. 97, 99–100 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[Petitioner] is required to make an objective showing that without a Rule 27 hearing, *known* testimony would otherwise be lost, concealed, or destroyed.” (emphasis added)); *In re Petition of Allegretti*, 229 F.R.D. 93, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); *In re Checkosky*, 142 F.R.D. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1992). Typically, “[a] district court must order discovery if satisfied that perpetuating the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice.” 5 Moore’s § 27.02[1], p. 7.

First, Ganz has demonstrated a reasonable expectation of future litigation. Ganz has presented evidence that Customs served Ganz

with notices of penalty, and that both Customs and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have threatened Ganz with bringing an action. Pet. Ex. T at 3; *see id.* Exs. S, V. The government argues that, although the current waiver of the statute of limitations, signed by Ganz, extends the statute of limitations until July 1, 2017, Ganz could force the government to file a penalty action by Ganz simply not further extending the waiver until mid-2019, as DOJ has requested. *See Gov’t Opp’n* at 2 n.2. Even if this is true, at this point, where the waiver has not been signed, litigation is still imminent and expected. And, it would be inappropriate to punish Ganz for seeking an administrative resolution to the dispute. *See Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States*, 68 F.3d 1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (determining that perpetuation might be appropriate even though the petitioner, which was in the middle of an Internal Revenue Service administrative process, could still seek full relief through that process). Moreover, Ganz would be a defendant in a 28 U.S.C. § 1582 action, meaning Ganz itself cannot bring the action. *See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp.*, 297 F.2d 49, 55 (9th Cir. 1961) (“The position of one who expects to be made a defendant is different, and we think that such a defendant should be, and is, entitled to use the Rule, upon a proper showing, to preserve important testimony that might otherwise be lost.”). Indeed, according to Ganz, approximately \$22.7 million in civil penalties and withheld duties is at stake in a potential action, Pet. at 1, 2–3, and it appears unlikely the government would forego litigation to recover such a large sum if the administrative process does not yield a resolution. Thus, Ganz has met its burden of demonstrating an expectation of litigation.

Second, the testimony sought is reasonably known to Ganz and unique to Mruk. Regarding the postponement of implementation of a new appraisal method, Ganz provided evidence to support its reasonable belief that Mruk had knowledge of a March 26, 2010, phone call at which postponement of implementation was apparently acknowledged. Pet. Ex. A at 7, 15; Pet. Ex. C. ¶ 9. And, Handzlik testified that Mruk wrote a portion of an email dated April 25, 2011, which auditor Fred R. Lowenberg sent, providing the port’s position that it “can no longer afford to postpone the application of the HQ reconsideration ruling HQ H026063 to Ganz[’s] future entries.” Pet. Ex. N at 1; *see* Pet. Ex. A at 21, 24 (“Mr. Mruk wrote that for Mr. Lowenberg.”). Regarding the CIP, Ganz also provided evidence that Mruk had involvement with Ganz during the development and implementation of that plan. Pet. Ex. J at 1. Although the exact testimony cannot be elicited until an actual deposition has been conducted, Ganz has demonstrated that the scope and nature of the Mruk’s potential

testimony is largely known. 5 Moore's § 27.13[3], p. 26 ("Experience teaches that advance knowledge of testimony is seldom more than petitioner has a reasonable basis to expect will be given."); *Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione S.p.A. v. M/V Allegra*, 198 F.3d 473, 486 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a district court must determine only that the petitioner "largely knew the substance of the information that it sought to preserve").

Third, despite the government's arguments to the contrary, the testimony runs the risk of being lost due to Mruk's age and the passage of time since the relevant events occurred. Courts have explained that "the advanced age of the proposed deponents" is a relevant factor. *See, e.g., Penn Mut. Life Ins.*, 68 F.3d at 1374, 1375. In evaluating a potential deponent's age as it affects the risk that testimony may be lost, courts have suggested that persons of ages in the same ballpark as Mruk may be persons for whom perpetuation of testimony is appropriate. *See VirtualAgility*, 759 F.3d at 1319 (indicating in dicta that preserving testimony may be appropriate where potential deponents were "over 60" and "over 70"); *see also Penn Mut. Life Ins.*, 68 F.3d at 1375 (eighty-one years old); *Texaco, Inc. v. Borda*, 383 F.2d 607, 609 (3d Cir. 1967) (seventy-one years old); *De Wagennecht v. Stinnes*, 250 F.2d 414, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (seventy-four years old). Furthermore, in *Texaco*, the court reasoned that there was a risk that testimony would be lost, in part, because "the memory of events already dating back some eleven years grow dim with the inexorable march of time, even on the part of one on the sunny side of the proverbial three score and ten years." 383 F.2d at 609 (footnote omitted). Not only is Mruk, who is sixty-eight years old, of an age similar to that discussed by other courts, but also the events at issue occurred over five to nine years prior to this action, thereby increasing the risk that his memory regarding the relevant conduct may be fleeting. Furthermore, Mruk is retired from federal service and, therefore, not subject to the direction by his former government employer to provide testimony, and is not prohibited from moving to a location that may prove inconvenient to the parties. Rather than being a fishing expedition seeking fact discovery, as the government argues, Ganz appears to be legitimately seeking an opportunity to preserve the type of testimony that USCIT Rule 27 was designed to preserve.

For the foregoing reasons and having determined that the government's remaining arguments lack merit, the petition is granted. It is hereby

ORDERED that the verified petition is GRANTED; and it is further



ORDERED that the oral deposition of former U.S. Customs and Border Protection supervisory import specialist Lawrence J. Mruk is permitted under the following terms and conditions:

1. The deposition shall be conducted in Buffalo, New York, or in another location convenient to Mruk;
2. The deposition shall be conducted prior to January 17, 2017, on a date agreed to by the government, which agreement shall not be unreasonably withheld;
3. The deposition shall continue for no more than four hours of examination time, which is exclusive of breaks, intermissions or, if necessary, calls to the court to resolve issues;
4. The deposition shall be limited to Mruk's personal knowledge of or involvement with issues pertaining to this petition concerning the events of the period December 19, 2007, through May 1, 2011, including the issuance or implementation of Customs headquarters rulings H006576 and H026063; and it is further

ORDERED that the verified petition is granted solely for the purpose of perpetuating testimony by deposition, as described herein. Other forms of discovery that would otherwise be available during litigation under USCIT Rule 26 are not permitted, but petitioners reserve the right to conduct discovery in future proceedings under USCIT Rule 26, subject to any restrictions a court may order; and it is further

ORDERED that the testimony perpetuated in accordance with this order is to be used only in a judicial enforcement proceeding that the United States may bring against the petitioners, as described in the verified petition, or in another judicial proceeding as permitted by USCIT Rule 27(a)(4). No additional deposition of Mruk may be taken with regard to any area of inquiry identified in this order, except with leave of the court.

Dated: November 15, 2016  
New York, New York

*/s/ Jane A. Restani*

JANE A. RESTANI  
JUDGE

