

Views and Estimates of the Committee on Financial Services on Matters to be Set Forth in the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2019

Pursuant to applicable rules and laws, the Committee on Financial Services transmits to the Committee on the Budget the following views and estimates on matters within its jurisdiction or functions to be set forth in the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2019 (FY19).

THE DODD-FRANK ACT

Regulatory Reform

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), signed into law on July 21, 2010, was the most sweeping overhaul of the regulatory structure of our financial system in more than a generation. The Dodd-Frank Act made significant changes to the federal regulatory regime covering banking, securities, insurance, mortgages, systemic risk, and consumer protection, and mandated upwards of 400 separate rulemakings.

Funding Level: N.A.

Committee's View: The Committee remains gravely concerned that the Dodd-Frank Act has failed to achieve its proponents' stated goals of promoting the financial stability of the United States, ending "too big to fail" and taxpayer bailouts, and protecting consumers. Instead, the Committee believes that the Dodd-Frank Act has endangered taxpayers and our economy by enshrining "too big to fail" in statute, creating endless new regulatory mandates from Washington that have resulted in fewer and more expensive financial products and services, increased moral hazard in markets by failing to address the true causes of the financial crisis, and hampered economic growth. The Committee has advanced numerous legislative proposals throughout the 115th Congress, including a comprehensive regulatory reform initiative, H.R. 10, the Financial CHOICE Act, to replace the failed aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act with free-market alternatives that end bailouts once-and-for-all, restore market discipline, ensure that the financial system is more resilient, pare back unnecessary and burdensome regulations, encourage capital formation and economic growth, and protect consumers by preserving financial independence and consumer choice. The Financial CHOICE Act also subjects the Federal Reserve's prudential regulatory activities – along with those of the other federal financial regulators – to the congressional appropriations process, handing the people's elected representatives an important tool with which to hold these bureaucracies accountable and achieve greater transparency in government operations. In that regard, the Committee has favorably reported to the House numerous bipartisan legislative measures to amend the Dodd-Frank

1 Act or provide regulatory relief. For example, the Committee favorably reported to the
2 House H.R. 1116, the TAILOR Act, by a vote of 39-21, which would require federal financial
3 regulatory agencies to: (1) tailor any regulatory actions so as to limit burdens on the
4 institutions involved, with consideration of the risk profiles and business models of those
5 institutions; and (2) report to Congress on specific actions taken to do so. Another example
6 is , H.R. 2121, the Pension, Endowment, and Mutual Fund Access to Banking Act, which
7 the Committee favorably reported to the House by a vote of 60-0, which would direct the
8 federal banking regulators to exclude, for purposes of calculating a custodial bank's
9 supplementary leverage ratio, funds of a custodial bank that are deposited with a central
10 bank. A third example is H.R. 4061, the Financial Stability Oversight Council Improvement
11 Act of 2017, which the Committee favorably reported to the House by a vote of 45-10 and
12 would require the Financial Stability Oversight Council, to consider the appropriateness of
13 imposing heightened prudential standards on non-banks as opposed to other forms of
14 regulation to mitigate identified risks to U.S. financial stability. The Committee disagrees
15 with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scores received for each of these measures and
16 requests that the FY19 Budget Resolution provide the necessary funding to resolve the
17 costs associated with these bills.

18 **Orderly Liquidation Authority**

19 The Orderly Liquidation Authority, established under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, gives
20 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) the authority to resolve financial
21 institutions whose failure government officials believe might pose a threat to the financial
22 stability of the United States.

23 **Funding Level:** N.A.

24
25
26
27 **Committee's View:** The Committee continues to have strong objections to the Dodd-Frank
28 Act's Orderly Liquidation Authority and the proposed manner in which such authority
29 would be implemented. Specifically, the Committee rejects the notion that taxpayers are
30 protected from future bailouts by the Orderly Liquidation Authority, under which the FDIC
31 may borrow from the Treasury to capitalize an "Orderly Liquidation Fund" to be used to
32 pay off the creditors of a failed firm. The Committee believes the Orderly Liquidation
33 Authority thus perpetuates the government guarantee enjoyed by creditors during the
34 recent financial crisis, which entrenched the "too big to fail" problem and placed taxpayers
35 on the hook for multi-billion dollar bailouts of large financial institutions. Accordingly, the
36 Committee supports replacing the Orderly Liquidation Authority with established
37 bankruptcy procedures, wherein shareholder and creditor claims are resolved pursuant to
38 the rule of law rather than the arbitrary discretion of regulators. Although proponents of
39 the Orderly Liquidation Authority point to provisions in Title II which authorize the FDIC
40 to recoup costs from large financial institutions through *post hoc* assessments, the CBO has
41 estimated that repealing Title II—as was included in the Committee reported, and House-

1 passed Financial CHOICE Act – would achieve savings of \$14.5 billion between fiscal years
2 2018 and 2028.

3 4 **Office of Financial Research**

5 Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act established the Office of Financial Research (OFR), within the
6 Treasury Department, to support the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in
7 fulfilling its duties to identify and respond to risks and emerging threats to the financial
8 stability of the United States. Thus, the OFR collects information and standardizes data
9 for the FSOC and other financial regulatory agencies, performs applied and long-term
10 research, and develops tools for risk measurement and monitoring.

11
12 Funding Level: The OFR receives its funding from outside of the congressional
13 appropriations process through assessments levied on large financial companies. The
14 Treasury Secretary’s “FY 2018 Congressional Justification for Appropriations and Annual
15 Performance Report and Plan,” indicates that the OFR’s funding level will drop by 25
16 percent, from an estimated \$101 million in 2017 to \$76 million in 2018.¹

17
18 Committee’s View: The Committee remains concerned about the scope, redundancy, and
19 potential for misuse of the OFR’s powers as well as Congress’s limited oversight of the OFR
20 and its funding. There are also concerns related the OFR’s workplace culture, and
21 allegations of mismanagement with respect to the direction and leadership of the agency
22 that have resulted in low employee morale. Furthermore, there are as many as 20 other
23 federal divisions, sections, departments, centers, committees, offices, and bureaus that are
24 capable of collecting or analyzing data that can be used by policymakers to assess risks to
25 the financial system or the broader economy. Several of these entities have missions and
26 capabilities that are virtually indistinguishable from OFR’s. The previously mentioned,
27 H.R. 10, the Financial CHOICE Act, eliminates the OFR and the Committee intends to
28 advance similar legislation in this Congress.

29 30 **CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU**

31
32 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is a federal agency created by the
33 Dodd-Frank Act to regulate providers of credit and other consumer financial products and
34 services. The Dodd-Frank Act confers upon the CFPB Director a broad mandate that
35 includes consumer protection functions transferred from seven different federal agencies,
36 and the authority to write rules, supervise compliance, enforce all consumer protection laws
37 and regulations other than those governing investment products regulated by the Securities
38 and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC.)

¹ Data source: “Resource Data Table,” p. 271, <https://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/CJ18/FY%202018%20Treasury%20CJ%20FINAL.PDF>

1
2 Funding Level: The CFPB does not receive appropriations; instead, it draws its funding
3 from a defined portion of the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System, adjusted
4 annually for inflation. For FY19, by statute the CFPB may receive up to \$663 million. The
5 CFPB’s budget authority is further enhanced by unobligated balances brought forward from
6 prior fiscal years.

7
8 Committee's View: Although established within the Federal Reserve System, the Dodd-
9 Frank Act makes clear that the CFPB is an “independent bureau” and assigns no role to
10 Congress or the Federal Reserve System to oversee either its budget or use of funds. The
11 effect of the CFPB’s unorthodox budgetary treatment is that every dollar it draws directly
12 reduces the Federal Reserve System’s annual remittances to the Treasury, thus lowering
13 the amount by which such remittances may be used to decrease the federal deficit.

14
15 The Committee continues to believe that the CFPB’s structure and funding make it
16 uniquely unaccountable to the President, the Congress, and the American people. History
17 shows that agencies shielded from accountability are prone to abuse their authority, and
18 the CFPB is no exception. While the CFPB, under Acting Director Mulvaney, has imposed
19 a temporary regulation and hiring freeze, and ordered a review of active investigations and
20 lawsuits, the Committee will continue to advance legislative proposals, such as H.R. 10, the
21 Financial CHOICE Act, to enhance accountability and greater transparency at the CFPB.
22 As part of these efforts, the Committee continues to seek reforms to the CFPB’s operations
23 and structure, including subjecting the CFPB to congressional appropriations process, and
24 reforming the CFPB’s statutory mandate to ensure that it takes into account, and seeks to
25 promote, robust market competition. These efforts parallel the CFPB’s FY2018-FY2022
26 Strategic Plan, which establishes the CFPB’s mission, strategic goals, and strategic
27 objectives. The Strategic plan refocuses the CFPB’s mission on regulating consumer
28 financial products or services under existing federal consumer financial laws, enforcing
29 those laws judiciously, and educating and empowering consumers to make better informed
30 financial decisions.

31
32 **SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION**

33
34 The SEC’s three-part mission is to (i) protect investors; (ii) maintain fair, orderly, and
35 efficient markets; and (iii) facilitate capital formation. The Chairman of the SEC sets the
36 agenda for the agency. The five SEC commissioners, with the support of the SEC staff, set
37 SEC policy by interpreting the Federal securities laws, proposing new rules as warranted
38 by market developments or Congressional mandates, amending existing rules, and
39 overseeing SEC enforcement actions.

40
41 Funding Level: Pursuant to the FY18 Annualized Continuing Resolution, the SEC’s
42 current budget authority for is \$1.631 billion. When the SEC accounts for its Reserve

1 Fund, created under Section 991 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC's FY18 spending
2 authority is \$1.681 billion. By law, the SEC has the authority to carry over unspent funds
3 from the previous fiscal year, and pursuant to this authority, the SEC carried over \$25
4 million of its \$1.631 billion budget authority from FY17. The SEC also can deposit up to
5 \$50 million in FY18 to its Reserve Fund and may obligate this full amount in the same
6 fiscal year. Thus, combined, the SEC's total spending authority for FY18 is \$1.681 billion.

7
8 Committee's View: The SEC's current spending authority of \$1.681 billion represents an
9 amount 57 percent greater than what Congress obligated to the SEC for FY10—the year of
10 the Dodd-Frank Act's enactment. It also constitutes an amount that is 86 percent—or \$776
11 million—higher than what Congress obligated to the SEC a decade ago for FY08.

12
13 Under the previous Administration, the SEC expended thousands of man-hours and tens of
14 millions of dollars in pursuit of Dodd-Frank Act mandates that had little to do with actual
15 investor protections, promulgate rules on political and social issues unrelated to the causes
16 of the financial crisis that only will serve to distract investors from the disclosure of truly
17 material information. The Committee was encouraged that the SEC's FY18 budget request
18 did not seek an increase over its FY17 funding. Further, the SEC, under the current
19 Administration, has broadened the focus of its resources to better fulfill its three-part
20 mission, particularly with respect to capital formation. The current Administration also
21 inherited an information technology (IT) system at the SEC that is replete with
22 cybersecurity risks.

23
24 For FY19, the SEC has requested \$1.658 billion of budget authority for operations—an
25 increase of 3.5 percent as compared to its FY18 request, with the increase in expenses offset
26 by matching collections of fees on securities transactions. This does not include the
27 anticipated carryover of \$25 million from FY18, which would increase the proposed FY19
28 obligations for SEC operations to \$1.683 billion. It also does not include the potential
29 obligation of up to \$50 million from the Reserve Fund. Finally, it excludes an estimate of
30 \$37.2 million for costs associated with relocating the New York regional office.

31
32 While the Committee is cautious of further budget increases in light of the degree to which
33 the SEC's budget authority has increased over just the most recent decade, a substantial
34 portion of the requested increase for FY19 can be attributed to IT and Cybersecurity. The
35 SEC must address the protection of the sensitive data that the SEC maintains in its
36 systems, as made clear by the disclosure last year that hackers breached the SEC's EDGAR
37 database and the two GAO reports that indicated cybersecurity concerns were not
38 adequately addressed during the prior Administration. The budget request also accounts
39 for a removal of the current hiring freeze for the purpose of adding certain full-time
40 positions, including a Chief Risk Officer, new personnel to focus on capital formation
41 objectives, and others that will support two new enforcement priorities—the Retail Strategy
42 Task Force and the Cyber Unit. Nonetheless, as in past years and considering that the SEC

1 anticipates as part of its FY19 budget authority a recovery of \$25 million of prior fiscal year
2 obligations (and anticipated the same for FY18), the Committee rejects the idea that the
3 only way to achieve these improvements and modernizations within the SEC is to spend a
4 substantial amount of additional money. Further, the Committee continues to be concerned
5 about both the SEC's ability to carry-over unspent funds and the SEC's Reserve Fund. The
6 Reserve Fund, which is authorized to carry a balance of up to \$100 million, is supplemental
7 funding that the SEC can access without congressional approval; eliminating it would
8 generate significant budget savings for taxpayers and restore appropriate oversight.

9
10 Throughout the 115th Congress, the Committee has advanced and will continue to advance
11 legislation to reform the SEC's operations and structure. For example, the Financial
12 CHOICE Act would modernize the SEC's operations and structure to eliminate
13 inefficiencies and eliminate the SEC's Reserve Fund. The Committee will also continue to
14 advance legislation to facilitate capital formation. For example, in 2017, the Committee
15 favorably reported to the House H.R. 4267, the Small Business Credit Availability Act, by a
16 vote of 58-2. This legislation would modernize the regulatory regime for business
17 development companies (BDCs), fill a lending vacuum and provide much-needed credit to
18 small and middle market companies, thereby generating economic growth. The Committee
19 disagrees with the CBO's prior estimates on similar BDC modernization legislation and
20 requests that the FY 19 Budget Resolution provide the necessary funding to resolve the
21 costs associated with this legislation, if any, once CBO provides its estimate for H.R. 4267.

22 23 **GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES**

24
25 The Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are
26 government-chartered public companies that purchase mortgages from lenders and package
27 them into mortgage-backed securities, which they guarantee and sell off to investors. The
28 GSEs have been in conservatorship under the auspices of their regulator, the Federal
29 Housing Finance Agency, since their financial collapse in September 2008.

30
31 Committee's View: More than nine years have passed since the bursting of the housing
32 bubble and the GSEs' financial implosion, and the Committee remains extremely concerned
33 about the continued risk that the GSEs pose to taxpayers, especially through their
34 expanded activities and the further consolidation of their dominant market share. Despite
35 recent improvements to their corporate balance sheets, the GSEs' model is inherently
36 flawed and unsustainable without taxpayer support. Accordingly, the Committee continues
37 to support legislative initiatives to wind down the GSEs' operations, repeal their charters,
38 and replace their failed business model with a sustainable, private housing finance system
39 that protects taxpayers, enhances consumer choice in mortgage financing, encourages
40 private sector investment and innovation, and eliminates moral hazard. CBO has
41 previously estimated that gradually winding down the GSEs would produce significant

1 taxpayer savings and decrease direct spending by almost \$6.7 billion over the next ten
2 years.

3
4 In the interim, the Committee urges Congress to adopt a realistic budget treatment of the
5 assets and liabilities of the GSEs. Doing so includes preventing the misuse of the proceeds
6 of the guarantee fees charged by the GSEs to investors; such funds are an important risk
7 mitigation tool to better protect the GSEs and taxpayers from future losses and should not
8 be diverted to finance unrelated government programs or initiatives. Additionally, the
9 Committee strongly recommends that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) move
10 the GSEs to an “on budget” accounting standard, as CBO has already done, to provide a
11 more transparent accounting of their true impact on the federal budget. The Committee
12 intends to advance legislation to reform the nation’s housing finance system in the 115th
13 Congress.

14 **Risk Transfers**

15
16
17 It is the Committee’s view that Federal agencies and departments that hold credit,
18 guarantee, or insurance risk that exposes the taxpayer to potential losses should explore
19 and, to the extent practical, employ risk transfers to the capital and reinsurance markets.
20 De-risking federal programs by transferring risk can help mitigate the real world impact of
21 potential losses from both significant events during ordinary economic conditions (e.g., a
22 wave of housing foreclosures) and unanticipated or extraordinary events (e.g., damage from
23 hurricanes or flooding). Risk transfers have successfully been demonstrated to minimize
24 taxpayer exposure, promote price transparency and enhance market liquidity. Both the
25 Federal Housing Finance Agency and the National Flood Insurance Program currently
26 employ and have benefitted from the use of risk transfers, which shows the ability of
27 different federal agencies to work with the private sector to manage their risks and
28 mitigate potential losses embedded in their portfolios.

29 **FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM**

30
31
32 In 1913, Congress created the Federal Reserve System to serve as the nation’s central bank.
33 It performs several functions in our economy, and its Board of Governors is responsible for
34 supervising and regulating a variety of financial institutions and activities, as well as
35 conducting monetary policy pursuant to a statutory mandate to “maintain long run growth
36 of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential
37 to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment,
38 stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates.”

39
40 Funding Level: N.A.

1 Committee's View: The Committee remains concerned about the expanded regulatory
2 mission of the Federal Reserve and the inability of the Board of Governors to articulate
3 clear guidance for how it plans to conduct monetary policy. Over-reliance on the Federal
4 Reserve to manage virtually every aspect of the U.S. economy runs the risk of
5 compromising the Federal Reserve's independence and placing taxpayers at greater risk in
6 the event that regulatory failure by the Federal Reserve contributes to another significant
7 or prolonged economic downturn. Accordingly, the Financial CHOICE Act strengthens the
8 Federal Reserve's ability to achieve monetary policy outcomes consistent with its statutory
9 mandates, bring more transparency to the Federal Reserve's efforts to achieve those
10 mandates, and protect the Federal Reserve from undue influence by the Executive Branch
11 in setting monetary policy. The Committee believes that achieving a more stable and rules-
12 based monetary policy would yield much larger benefits for taxpayers and our entire
13 economy. In addition, the Financial CHOICE Act promotes greater accountability at the
14 Federal Reserve as it would fund the non-monetary activities of the Federal Reserve's
15 Board of Governors and the 12 regional banks through the congressional appropriations
16 process. The Committee believes that the mandate of achieving the goal of maximum
17 employment pertains to all communities in the United States. The Federal Reserve is
18 expected to use its resources to achieve maximum employment in all communities for the
19 betterment of our economy as a whole.

20 21 **DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT**

22
23 Established in 1965, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is a
24 cabinet-level agency that has principal responsibility for implementing and overseeing
25 federal housing assistance programs. HUD administers a wide variety of programs, such as
26 rental assistance programs for lower-income families, homeless assistance programs,
27 community development programs, the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) mortgage
28 insurance programs, the Government National Mortgage Association's (Ginnie Mae)
29 mortgage-backed securities program, fair housing programs, and programs that aid
30 community and neighborhood development and preservation.

31
32 Committee's View: The Committee intends to explore innovative proposals and ideas that
33 seek a better way to meet HUD's mission "to create strong, sustainable, inclusive
34 communities and quality affordable homes for all." In the past, that mission was measured
35 by how many programs were created and how many taxpayer dollars were appropriated.
36 Yet, 52 years later and more than \$1.655 trillion in total lifetime appropriations, it is an
37 open question whether HUD has truly met that mission. HUD remains overly bureaucratic
38 and fails to set priorities that define its mission. The Committee believes that HUD needs
39 an organizational overhaul and a modernized mission to fight the root causes of poverty.
40 HUD should be restructured to optimize the alignment of its various divisions and
41 consolidate overlapping and duplicative programs, as well as to ensure the efficient
42 utilization of its human capital. Such reforms would both result in greater budget savings

1 for taxpayers and allow for assistance to be targeted to individuals with the most acute
2 need. The Committee intends to review two ideas that could significantly improve how
3 HUD meets its mission to improve lives and communities in a cost-effective way. The
4 Committee also understands that using funding efficiently does not only include the
5 programs at HUD, but also includes the use of appropriated taxpayer funds for the
6 procurement of interior décor for HUD’s headquarters.

7 **Enhancing Housing Choice Portability**

8
9 The Committee intends to explore new policies that would enhance the housing choice
10 voucher program. Currently, the Section 8 program provides housing assistance to over
11 three million low-income families and individuals each year through two elements: tenant-
12 based rental assistance and project-based rental assistance. Tenant-based rental
13 assistance vouchers are portable subsidies that low-income individuals can use to offset
14 part of their rent in the private market with any participating housing provider. By
15 contrast, project-based rental assistance is a subsidy attached to a unit of privately-owned
16 housing that houses low-income tenants; if the family moves, the subsidy remains with the
17 unit of housing.

18
19 The Committee questions whether the current voucher program is effective in facilitating
20 access for low income families to affordable housing, employment or education
21 opportunities. The tenant-based rental assistance voucher program should be enhanced to
22 encourage recipients of housing assistance to move to areas with greater opportunities.
23 Testimony before this Committee highlighted previous proposals to develop a Housing
24 Choice Voucher Mobility initiative with the goal of facilitating collaboration, encouraging
25 Housing Choice Voucher program participants to move to lower-poverty areas, and
26 expanding families’ access to areas of economic opportunity. The Committee believes that
27 changes in the Housing Choice Voucher Program would result in measurable metrics where
28 the children of families using this enhanced mobility would have greater long-term
29 economic and educational achievements, and thereby break the intergenerational
30 dependence on government assistance. As part of its review, the Committee will also
31 examine the conduct of landlords participating in the Section 8 Program and investigate
32 HUD’s oversight of landlord participants to ensure rules and regulations are being followed.

34 **Public Housing Modernization**

35
36 The Committee intends to explore new policies that modernize how public housing is
37 managed and uses federal funds. Currently, there are approximately 3,800 public housing
38 authorities that administer and maintain section 8 and public housing stock. This
39 fragmented national system of state-chartered entities contributes to the lack of voucher
40 portability and may further constrain individual choice and economic mobility. Moreover,
41 the system, which was federally created in 1937 and last overhauled in 1998, has
42 experienced significant regulatory burdens and a lack of innovation to match contemporary

1 issues. Two programs—Moving To Work (MTW) and Rental Assistance Demonstration
2 (RAD)—have sought to combine innovation and flexibility. However, these programs are
3 not a panacea for overhauling a federally funded housing system that appears outdated.
4

5 Over the past two decades, despite the investment of tens of billions of dollars in the
6 development and maintenance of public housing units, the quality of such units continues
7 to deteriorate. The Committee recognizes that this trend is not sustainable and that new
8 approaches to public housing are necessary, including the implementation of alternative
9 means to finance affordable housing development. The Committee will investigate the
10 impact of funding of Public Housing Authorities and seek ways to ensure capital repairs are
11 made to improve the health and well-being of residents. To make more capital available to
12 maintain and rehabilitate public housing, the Committee continues to support RAD. RAD
13 permits public housing authorities to partner with local developers, property owners, and
14 nonprofit organizations to preserve affordable housing units that would otherwise fall into
15 disrepair, become uninhabitable, and eventually leave the affordable housing stock. When
16 implemented properly, RAD could streamline HUD’s rental assistance programs, increase
17 resident choice, and improve resident mobility. Future enhancements of existing programs
18 will also mean innovating beyond the government owned-and-operated public housing
19 model towards new housing delivery models that harness the abilities of non-profits and
20 other cost-effective service providers.
21

22 A significant component of the public housing delivery system involves small and rural
23 communities. Of the approximately 3,883 public housing authorities that administer and
24 maintain Section 8 and public housing stock, 1,486 agencies administer between 50-249
25 units or vouchers and are designated small agencies; 701 agencies administer between 1-50
26 units or vouchers and are considered very small. Combined, small and very-small public
27 housing authorities, as defined by HUD, comprise 56 percent of the 3,883 public housing
28 agencies, administering six percent of the total number of units and vouchers funded by
29 HUD. The Committee will review the impact of regulation on small and very-small public
30 housing authorities and explore whether to provide regulatory relief in a way that eases
31 compliance costs while ensuring that small and very-small agencies serve residents in an
32 equitable and fair manner.
33

34 The Committee believes that HUD has a responsibility to quickly and efficiently disburse
35 funding for natural disasters, especially the disasters that devastated the Southern United
36 States and communities across the country in 2017. This would include adequate
37 safeguards to ensure that funds are appropriately used to benefit the many citizens that
38 were affected in Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and California, and
39 are still awaiting relief.
40
41
42

1 **EXPORT-IMPORT BANK**

2
3 The Export-Import Bank is an independent agency that provides taxpayer-backed export
4 financing through various loan, guarantee, and insurance programs.

5
6 Funding Level: The Export-Import Bank receives \$95.5 million in FY18 appropriations for
7 administrative expenses and \$5.7 million in FY18 appropriations for the Office of Inspector
8 General

9
10 Committee's View: Given the Export-Import Bank's authorization through September 30,
11 2019, the Committee will continue to conduct rigorous oversight of its operations and
12 governance to protect taxpayers from risk associated with the those operations, ensure it
13 complements rather than supplants the private market, and eliminate waste, fraud, and
14 abuse within or affecting the Export-Import Bank. Additionally, the Committee remains
15 concerned that the application of government accounting standards under the Federal
16 Credit Reform Act fails to fully account for the risks borne by the Export-Import Bank and
17 supports the use of a more comprehensive accounting regime to determine the Export-
18 Import Bank's cost to taxpayers.

19
20 **MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS**

21
22 The multilateral development banks (MDBs) provide concessional lending and grants to the
23 world's poorest countries and engage in non-concessional lending to low and middle-income
24 creditworthy countries.

25
26 Funding Level: As passed by the House (H.R. 3354, 115th Congress)

- 27
- 28 • International Development Association: \$658.66 million in FY18 appropriations
 - 29 • Asian Development Fund: \$47.39 million in FY18 appropriations
 - 30 • African Development Bank (includes African Development Fund): \$141.8 million in
31 FY18 appropriations
 - 32 • International Fund for Agricultural Development: \$30 million in FY18
33 appropriations

34 Committee's View: In the past, the U.S. has determined the level of its support to MDBs
35 through pledges made by the Treasury Department on behalf of the U.S. to international
36 organizations, which are subsequently considered and funded by Congress through the
37 appropriations process. The Committee notes that, relative to Congress's willingness to
38 appropriate funds in support of the MDBs, the Administration has previously over-
39 committed the United States in pledges to such entities. Therefore, the Committee
40 recommends that the Administration refrain from making commitments that the U.S. is
41 not prepared to fully fund.

1 In December 2016, the Obama Administration pledged \$3.871 billion for the eighteenth
2 replenishment of the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA-18),
3 subject to approval by the following administration and the availability of appropriations.
4 This level was subsequently lowered to \$3.291 billion, representing a 15 percent reduction,
5 in the Trump Administration’s FY18 and FY19 budget. The Committee has been concerned
6 by management deficiencies at the World Bank, including weak project implementation and
7 insufficient prioritization of development results. As a result, the Committee favorably
8 reported H.R. 3326, the World Bank Accountability Act of 2017, by a unanimous vote of 60
9 to 0, which codified the Trump Administration’s reduced request and made a share of
10 future IDA appropriations contingent on reforms. The House passed this legislation on
11 January 17, 2018. The Committee urges Treasury to strongly advocate that governments
12 receiving assistance from the MDBs refrain from human rights abuses and corrupt
13 activities as a condition of continued funding. The Committee also believes that the MDBs
14 should undertake rigorous program evaluations and forensic audits to ensure that U.S.
15 taxpayer contributions are not squandered on ineffective initiatives.

16 17 **INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND**

18
19 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) seeks to ensure the stability of the international
20 monetary system and provides loans to countries that are experiencing actual or potential
21 balance of payment problems. The IMF also provides technical assistance to low- and
22 middle-income countries intended to help such countries effectively manage their financial
23 affairs.

24
25 Funding Level: In FY16, an increase of U.S. quota in an amount equal to 40,871,800,000
26 Special Drawing Rights. (Congress also rescinded an equivalent amount from the IMF’s
27 “New Arrangements to Borrow” program, which is a set of credit arrangements between the
28 IMF and certain member countries used to supplement IMF quota resources for lending
29 purposes.)

30
31 Committee’s View: The Committee will monitor the operations of the IMF’s lending
32 programs to ensure that Treasury is managing risk effectively and securing the timely
33 repayment of taxpayer funds. The Committee urges the Administration to advocate for
34 greater fiscal discipline and budget transparency in countries borrowing from the IMF.

35 36 **COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES**

37
38 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is a multi-agency
39 panel chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and charged with analyzing proposed
40 foreign direct investment (FDI) to identify and, if possible, mitigate any threat to national
41 security a proposed transaction might present. Exercising the authority provided by section
42 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, the President may, if a threat is identified and is

1 unable to be mitigated by some change in a transaction, prevent consummation of a
2 transaction or unwind one that has taken place. Congress last updated the CFIUS
3 authorizing statute in 2007. CFIUS is currently facing increasing challenges, such as
4 China’s aggressive, state-driven industrial policy and its investments in critical U.S.
5 technologies with potential military applications. As the volume of cases and the complexity
6 of transactions before CFIUS continues to grow, the Committee, which holds primary
7 jurisdiction over CFIUS, is examining the statute with an eye towards modernization.
8

9 Committee’s View: While each agency that is a formal part of the CFIUS process, and any
10 other agency with expertise in a particular transaction, contributes its own staff to the
11 CFIUS analysis of a transaction, the Treasury Department performs a “ministerial” role of
12 arranging meetings of staff and scheduling transactions for consideration, and thus has a
13 particular need for staff assigned to CFIUS. Because Treasury’s CFIUS work is spread
14 across several mission areas and owing to the peculiarities of appropriating for Treasury’s
15 non-tax work, there is no identifiable budget line for CFIUS. Regardless of the outcome of
16 efforts to modernize CFIUS, the Committee believes that resources need to be
17 reprogrammed from other, less critical functions and instead devoted to the CFIUS process
18 to ensure thorough scrutiny of covered transactions, that analysis is completed in a timely
19 fashion, that mitigation agreements are effectively monitored and enforced, and that
20 CFIUS maintains awareness of relevant non-noticed transactions. While the FY19 budget
21 proposal makes clear that the President and Treasury are committed to a well-functioning
22 and effective CFIUS process, the Committee believes that the commitment should be more
23 specific in terms of financial and human resources even if no statutory update occurs, and
24 that any CFIUS modernization will require more resources to ensure the process functions
25 properly.
26

27 **FIGHTING THE FUNDING OF TERRORISM**

28

29 The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) coordinates the Treasury
30 Department’s efforts to stop the financing of terrorism, money laundering, and similar
31 forms of illicit finance, principally through its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and
32 the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), but also through capacity-building
33 efforts by the Office of Technical Assistance (OTA). As the major components within TFI,
34 OFAC is responsible for administering U.S. sanctions against drug traffickers, human
35 rights abusers, and rogue nations, while FinCEN receives, analyzes, and makes available to
36 law enforcement data reported by financial institutions on activities that potentially
37 indicate violations of the law.
38

39 Funding Level: The President’s Budget requests \$159 million for TFI, a \$36 million
40 increase from the 2017 enacted level. The Budget requests \$118 million for FinCEN, a \$3
41 million increase from the 2017 enacted level. The Budget also requests \$25 million to

1 proactively and strategically protect Treasury Information Technology systems that carry
2 out TFI responsibilities.

3
4 Committee's View: The Committee appreciates the importance of robust diligence to fight
5 the funding of terrorism and other financial crimes in a global and increasingly digital
6 financial system. For that reason, in the 115th Congress, the Committee established a new
7 Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance to review the tools and policies to stop and
8 block the illegal flow of funds. Additional TFI funding will enhance national security and
9 allow Treasury to continue to apply maximum economic pressure to isolate rogue nations,
10 such as North Korea, and to strengthen multilateral cooperation in the Persian Gulf with
11 the build out of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center in Saudi Arabia. The Committee
12 supports responsible efforts to enhance FinCEN's ability to meet the new challenges posed
13 by the growth of threats from North Korea, terrorist organizations, and drug trafficking
14 organizations that are fueling the opioid crisis.

15
16 The Committee will examine ways to improve the allocation of resources within, and
17 improve the operations of, TFI, including the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA). The
18 Committee will work to enact a multi-year authorization for FinCEN and would seek to do
19 the same for TFI and OFAC if there is agreement to separate those accounts from the main
20 Treasury funding account.

21
22 The Committee also fully supports the critically important job the Treasury's OTA does to
23 enhance the capacities of public finance ministries and central banks in developing and
24 transitioning economies to strengthen their public finances and safeguard their financial
25 sectors. These efforts by OTA help strengthen ministries of finance, create more equitable
26 and effective tax policies, develop means of public finance and government debt
27 management, and assist with the development of anti-money laundering and counter
28 terrorist financing regimes around the world. A government that builds effective public
29 financial institutions and maintains effective oversight of private institutions can become a
30 valuable partner in the global effort to combat terrorist financing. The Committee fully
31 supports the OTA's mission in helping developing and transitioning nations establish the
32 building blocks of a modern market economy.

33 34 **STRENGTHENING, SIMPLIFYING, AND UPDATING THE BANK SECRECY ACT**

35
36 The current anti-money laundering (AML) / countering the finance of terrorism (CFT) legal
37 regime has seen only iterative changes since its inception, and is in need of reform in order
38 to prevent undue regulatory burdens on financial institutions, and simultaneously
39 promoting national security interests and deterrence of criminal activity through the
40 financial system.

1 Committee's View: The Committee is considering changes to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) to
2 address gaps in the AML/CFT regime. FinCEN's adoption of its Customer Due Diligence
3 rule in May 2016 is recognition of the need to modernize the BSA and the Financial Action
4 Task Force (FATF) in its mutual evaluation of the U.S.'s AML/CFT regime in December
5 2016 also recognized that some gaps still exist in the AML framework. The intended
6 outcome of the proposed legislation to update the BSA under consideration by the
7 Committee will be to ensure that the vast resources that U.S. financial institutions put
8 towards AML/CFT efforts are both efficient and effective, and simultaneously enhance
9 national security and contribute to law enforcement efforts to combat financial crime. In
10 doing so, the Committee will address the compliance burdens of financial institutions and
11 provide law enforcement with a more complete and detailed picture of illicit financial
12 activity.

13

14

OFFICE OF MINORITY AND WOMEN INCLUSION

15

16 Federal financial agencies have undertaken several initiatives to promote greater economic
17 opportunity within the financial services industry, including, but not limited to, Section
18 342 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which established Offices of Minority and Women Inclusion
19 (OMWI) within various federal financial regulatory agencies.

20

21 Funding Level: Varied

22

23 Committee's View: The Committee wants economic opportunities for all and increased
24 participation for under-represented populations in all aspects of the financial services
25 industry. The Committee supports appropriate levels of funding for the Offices of Minority
26 and Women Inclusion and other oversight efforts to eliminate illegal discrimination,
27 including the documentation of discrimination at federal financial regulatory bureaus and
28 agencies.