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THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Interview #8

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RITCHIE: After Kennedy's assassination, how quickly did things begin to change with Johnson in the White House?

VALEO: Well, of course, everybody was pulling for Johnson at that point, after the Kennedy assassination. There was some muttering at Johnson, poor Johnson, because it happened in Texas, unrelated kinds of hostility still being expressed to Johnson. But basically everyone really wanted Johnson to take over. And he did. He was smart enough to keep on the whole Kennedy staff, almost intact. The splurge of Great Society legislation, which was about to come, was really the fruition of the first two years of the Kennedy administration, when he had many experts and many politically creative people working on a program which he eventually expected to present. I think it would have come about the third year of his administration, had he lived. So, in effect, Johnson really picked up the ball from Kennedy.

I think, at least my impression was from the way he behaved from then on in, at least for the first two years, that Johnson was determined to prove that he could do this program, because of his legislative skills, in a way that Kennedy would never have been able to do it. If all other things were equal, that

is probably true. Johnson had enough understanding of the legislative process and would have brought in people who had sufficient understanding of it to move a great deal of this legislation, whereas Kennedy and the people he brought in did not have, in all cases, that kind of legislative acumen. But all things were not equal. There were many other things that favored Johnson when he came in.

First of all, we had the massive national sympathy for the death of a young and very popular president. And with Johnson, you had an older man saying, "I'm going to do what he wanted, come what may," and everybody would nod their heads in agreement, "Yes, we have to do what he wanted." So you had that kind of thing working for Johnson. In addition to that, you did have Johnson's power among the southern legislators, which Kennedy did not have at any time; Southern legislators who would want Johnson to succeed, whereas they would have been not necessarily hostile to Kennedy, but indifferent to his success. Then, I think, the final fact was that you had Mansfield in the leadership, which set the stage almost perfectly for the kind of program that was about to be pushed forward as the Great Society legislative program.

I remember Johnson's "We Shall Overcome Speech." I don't know who did it, might have been Dick Goodwin, because he kept him on at the time along with Walt Rostow and others of Kennedy's group. Or it might have even been Ted Sorensen, who was really an

outstanding speech drafter. But the speech to a joint session was very moving. He got a tremendous and very heart-felt ovation in the House chamber, and he was off. I guess he had his eye on Bobby Kennedy, even then. He was always concerned about Bobby Kennedy. He knew Bobby Kennedy was the political manipulator under Jack, and he knew that Bobby Kennedy really did not love him. But he bided his time to deal with that. On the executive side you can get that from other sources better than I can give it to you. I was only looking on as an observer, and I would catch an occasional comment in the meetings which I attended.

I was at this time secretary for the majority, either acting or elected, I can't quite remember how the chronology had worked out. We began to get this flood of legislation. The attitude expressed in that Mansfield speech, right after Kennedy's assassination, about the legislative situation in the Senate, was kind of reflective of what was going to come later on in the legislative program. People just didn't want to be bothered discussing it, even. I mean, they were just prepared to vote for it in most instances. They had their minds made up one way or the other, and most were favorable to the program. It was essentially this long-neglected social situation in the United States which the legislation of the Great Society was designed to correct.

Dirksen became more and more cooperative with Mansfield. This was partly Mansfield's doing. Mansfield handled Dirksen

beautifully. He deferred to Dirksen a great deal. Dirksen responded. Dirksen was a bit of a ham, and he loved the spotlight. He was not a fool; you couldn't win him over by blatant flattery, and Mansfield never tried that, but he did defer to him, and Dirksen responded extremely well to that kind of treatment. As far as I know, he never crossed Mansfield, never took delight in a defeat that Mansfield may have suffered. He still remained very partisan, and there were a couple of points you could press the button and Dirksen would become extremely partisan. But it was never directed at Mansfield, it would always be directed at other people on the Democratic side whom he thought were trying to maneuver him or manipulate him. He was a charming man. I got to know him very well during the civil rights debate because I spent a lot of time in his office, but we'll defer that until we discuss the civil rights question.

The Senate moved pretty much as Mansfield wanted it to move. It was a nine to five thing, well, actually a twelve to five, or eleven to five. He began an interesting practice: he began coming in a little earlier, sometime in this period, to accommodate people who wanted to make speeches. So instead of making them at the end of a session each day, they'd make them at the beginning, and the Senate would wind up normally about five or six o'clock. I can't recall any really serious hang-ups in the Senate until the Civil Rights bill in this period. But, again we come back to the Vietnamese

thing, and Mansfield constantly had his eye on that, and I had my eye on it as well. Johnson simply continued Kennedy's policies for the time up until the '64 election. A lot of good legislation was passed, but the key piece was the Civil Rights bill, so we really have to go to that now as the main legislative problem in that period.

As you looked around the Senate after Kennedy's death, there were really no changes in the membership of the Senate and probably no great likelihood of any changes in votes. The outlook at that point was still rather grim for civil rights. Mansfield, and certainly I would have concurred, was persuaded there was only one way in which this issue was going to be won and that was by getting sixty-seven votes, which was what was needed for cloture. That was not going to be an easy task. You couldn't possibly do it without Dirksen's cooperation. You had to envision a line of division in the Republican party on any issue, which again in the context of the time would have been called a liberal issue, a significant liberal issue and you could count on six or seven Republicans falling on the Democratic side. Well, with the Democratic majority and losses in the South you could pass a lot of legislation on that basis. But if you needed sixty-seven votes you had something that was entirely different. You were talking then about midwestern, western Republicans, and Dirksen above all, because a lot of people went the way Dirksen went on the Republican side. On

liberal issues they were normally on the conservative side, normally against it, but in an extreme situation they might be persuaded to go in the other direction.

The details in which the bill came up elude me now, except that it was suddenly decided, I think on the basis of what was happening in Atlanta and Birmingham and other places, that civil rights legislation could wait no longer, that it had to move, and if it didn't the country was going to have some very serious problems, in the South in particular. So the decision was made in the administration and conveyed to Mansfield, who was still reluctant to face the issue, that it had to be faced and it had to be done. It would have been in '64, so it would have been the second session of that Congress. The decision was made early in the Congress, or perhaps not too long after Kennedy was assassinated, that we had to go this way, and one way or another, we'd have to make the attempt. It was going to be win or lose but we had to make the attempt.

The question came up of how you were going to do this in the Senate. I wrote a memorandum on this—I don't know if it's in the record—on an approach. By this time I'd learned a little bit about how the Senate worked on the floor and I felt myself competent to do that kind of thing and offer that kind of advice. I wrote a memorandum on how the thing could be approached, if we were going to have any chance of doing it, taking

into consideration the leader's determination that it was not going to be done by anything other than a cloture vote, unless there was a yield on it before, which was highly unlikely. I had watched, in the previous years, two debates on civil rights, and studied very carefully how Russell, who was the leader of the southern forces in the opposition to it, worked. He enjoyed an alliance with the Senate rules, which are great rules, providing you assume that time is endless and that everybody will be gentlemanly and not excessively use time. Well, if you accept those two premises, then they work fine. But obviously, they are easily manipulated without violating them. It's just the way they are set up to protect every individual member in the fullest exercise of his rights, and if all people choose to exercise their right fully, or even a half a dozen, the Senate is in trouble. To hold up the Senate in that period you didn't need more than seven or eight members in agreement, and that only had to do with questions of exhaustion, because there was no way that the Senate could pass a measure which seven or eight senators were determined to oppose until their death, if you will—at least legislative death.

Russell knew the rules well, he was a delightful man in that respect. He knew what he was doing on the floor at all times. He did it with a certain amount of deference and a certain amount of aggressiveness. But basically he was a graceful man and he knew

how to handle himself on the floor without antagonizing anyone deeply. But he could tie everybody in knots because of his knowledge of the rules. I don't know how many times people like Paul Douglas and others would think they'd found an answer in the rules and they'd come forward and try to hit Russell head on, and then all of a sudden they'd find themselves flat on the legislative ground again, because there was no way in which you could use the rules to beat a determined, small group of opponents.

The thing was that Russell, while in the business of winning, always looked as though he was being badgered and beaten. That was the secret of his effectiveness. He would say, "Here we are, holding out, just a small group of patriots trying to make the Senate see the light, and we are being pushed and pilloried." Well, of course the exact opposite was true. The six or seven who were in opposition were pushing and pillorying the overwhelming majority, but the majority didn't realize fully that was happening. In the previous Civil Rights bill debates that I had watched, the proponents would come out in pajamas for quorum calls and Russell would have them there all night long, while he would be home sleeping. All he needed was two people on the floor and they needed fifty-one.

The key to passage of the Civil Rights bill became the holding of a quorum on tap at all times. If you could do that, it seemed to me, you could focus sufficient attention on the issue to

make the public realize that the situation wasn't at all as it was being contended, that these five or ten people were winning a great victory over the others because of the Senate's archaic rules. Then you could paint the opposition as really serious obstructionists on a very important national measure. So my first recommendation to the majority leader was that he organize an ever-ready quorum for the Senate. You could only again do this with Dirksen's cooperation, because there weren't enough Democrats allowing for absenteeism and occasional situations in which they could not be there, to keep the quorum there at all times.

There were two main attorneys on the civil rights issue. One was on the Majority Policy Committee, a fellow named Ken Teasedale who had been recommended by [Stuart] Symington and came from St. Louis. He'd been in the Justice Department briefly. He was heart and soul with the idea of civil rights legislation. He was a very bright lawyer and a very fine fellow with a good sense of humor. The other one was Neil Kennedy, who was Dirksen's attorney, I believe, on the Judiciary Committee. Neil was an extremely conservative Republican, but once Dirksen had made up his mind to go on civil rights, Kennedy was prepared to go with him. We had a number of meetings, myself and Teasedale and other Senate lawyers; there were two other lawyers on the Republican side and Ken Teasedale had a couple of assistants whose names escape me now.

The first order was for the policy committee attorney, Ken Teasedale, to work with the Republicans to organize a regular roster at least two or three weeks in advance for guaranteed appearance at the Senate. We knew that we had about fifty-eight people or thereabouts who were willing to do a little extra in order to pass the bill. The rest might have voted with us, but would not necessarily want to do any extra work. So that gave us eight people who could be off at any given time, but there always had to be the fifty-one on call. They organized the quorum and fifty-one did appear regularly and promptly.

Before this was done, Humphrey was brought into it. Mansfield had decided that there was no way in which a bill could go through the Judiciary Committee, that [James] Eastland would block it as chairman, no matter how you tried it. There was no way you could possibly get it through. So he decided that the only way would be to do what amounted to the committee work right on the floor of the Senate, in effect with the Senate sitting as a committee of the whole. He had only one man in mind. He never considered anyone else but that it would have to be Hubert Humphrey who would carry the ball on the floor. Of course, Hubert was more than anxious to do it. It was the thing that he was born for, to do this civil rights bill. When he got the bill he mastered the problems and legislative technicalities almost within a day or two. He had a full grasp of what was involved in it. He

also had very strong lines out to civil rights groups, Negro groups and others, to the labor unions, some of which were supporters of the measure. He could use them to try to bring some pressure to bear on individual members. Mansfield would never do that, but Hubert had no qualms about doing it. In a way, it's part of the proper procedure, the constitutional right to petition. So Hubert was designated to run the show on the floor, and to carry the substantive part of the debate.

Again, the critical factor in breaking the filibuster was to hold that quorum on the floor at all times. A corollary of that was that you would have to take the lead away from Russell in terms of tying up the Senate. Russell always tied up the Senate when there was a filibuster. He would not let the committees meet while the Senate was in session, for example, which is permissible under the Senate rules. One man at that time, one objection, would have prevented committees from meeting. Of course, Russell would do that, and then senators with little interest in the measure on the floor would be irritated at the people who were pushing it because it interfered with their committee activities. When we started on the Civil Rights bill, Mansfield announced right off the bat that no committees would be permitted to meet while the bill was under discussion on the floor, that all other business of the Senate would be stopped until the Senate faced what was then the most critical issue in the country. Russell was

taken aback by this. He was quite surprised. He looked up at Mansfield. Mansfield was stealing his thunder in effect.

But the difference was that public opinion in the country had shifted from a position of essential indifference to civil rights; it had now become activist in terms of wanting to see civil rights legislation. Except in the South, this had become a major factor of influence, stronger in some places than others, but no one in the Midwest at this point needed to fear a positive vote on civil rights for any reason. That would be true also in the West, as well as in the Northeast, which was, of course, the citadel of the push for civil rights legislation.

After the maintenance of the quorum on the floor at all times there was a decision to take the bill out of Eastland's hands. That was done by a parliamentary maneuver which was a perfectly proper one. When the House bill came over, Mansfield intercepted it at the door. That prevented a routine referral to the Judiciary Committee. It meant the bill would lay on the table, subject to referral or to direct taking up by the Senate. Eastland did not push that issue. There was some ritualistic outrage at violating the Senate's normal procedures, and so forth, but by that time, everyone knew that this was the only way that you could possibly move the bill. Ironically, Wayne Morse defended Eastland's prerogatives in this, and if I can recall correctly, Mansfield offered to send it to the Judiciary committee for three

or four days, with the understanding that it would be reported back on a day certain, which meant that it could no longer be bottled up in Eastland's committee. I don't remember whether we actually sent it or not. It made no difference in the outcome of the bill. The bill then was on the floor of the Senate and in effect had been taken up.

If you recall, I mentioned we had gotten cloture the previous year of the session against a Wayne Morse filibuster. That had been a harbinger for what might come later. One of the effects of that was to weaken the arguments that people from the West would use for not voting for cloture, although professing to believe in the content of a bill. The reasoning went something like this: we're small states and the cloture rule is designed to protect us as small states, therefore even though I'd love to vote for gun control I just can't vote for cloture on it; if you can get it to a vote we'll be glad to vote for it, but So it was a way of straddling and walking on both sides, although many westerners, such as Carl Hayden, took it very seriously. He made a point to say that he had never voted for cloture in his life and he meant not to do that. But it was really an escape hatch for difficult pieces of legislation for many of them.

The debate droned on from day to day. Russell tried his usual tactics, which was to suggest the absence of a quorum, make it live, count the heads; this time fifty-one would show up. Mansfield

lengthened the session till about six o'clock in the day, but he would go no later than that. Meanwhile, word would reach us that Johnson was raving: "Why doesn't Mansfield go round-the-clock? Why doesn't he go round-the-clock? That's the only way we'll ever get civil rights legislation." Well, Mansfield wasn't about to go round-the-clock, and Mansfield told him that he was going to do it his way—or sent word back that it would have to be done this way or it wouldn't be done at all. And Johnson deferred to that.

I don't know whether Johnson understood that this was the only way you could really get a major Civil Rights bill at this point. He had in mind the experience by which he'd gotten the initial civil rights bill after many years, which had something to do with voting rights. But what we were talking about here was a bill which in the case of the expansion of rights for blacks was tremendously different. Maybe ten times as many aspects of civil rights were involved in this as were involved in the original voting rights bill. That is not to make light of the voting rights act; that was an important bill and it began to open the gates for what was coming later. But this was a geometric expansion of that bill. It involved public facilities, it involved giving teeth to the voting rights, it involved just so many things that had to be done, and for which the riots were taking place, or were the sources of the riots.

The debate went on, and Russell saw what was happening. There was irritation now in the committees that couldn't meet—I guess Mansfield made one exception to that, and that was the Appropriations Committee, because the bills would have to be available at the end of civil rights debate in any event. I think that was the only exception that was made, but all the other committees were stopped from meeting. They were furious, because this was where you got your publicity and this was where you presumably did your creative work in legislation. But this time the blame was not on the leadership; it began to fall on those who were filibustering the legislation. The reason that it was possible to shift the blame was because Russell could not make the majority look foolish. Once you had a quorum on the floor, there was no way in which you could make the majority look foolish. Several times, as the debate wore on, we didn't really have the quorum, but the Southerners began then not to push it to the limit. They didn't want people called back, because there was enough irritation with them already. And we were determined; we had the sergeant at arms ready to pick them up and bring them in as necessary if the quorum was forced to a live quorum. So they avoided doing that. After having tried it several times, and seeing that we could produce a quorum within a half hour or there about, they dropped that as a tactic. They simply droned on in speeches to keep the Senate going and to prevent a vote, hoping, I think, for a compromise.

As the process wore on, we began to pick up a vote or two for cloture. This was being done in several ways. It was helped by the pressure generated by Hubert's allies on the outside, who were constantly around. Mansfield did not want to meet with any of the people who were pro-civil rights. He stayed completely out of that aspect of it; he left it entirely to Hubert. We began to get public announcements here and there to this effect: if this goes on much longer, I may have to vote for cloture. It was very clear at this point, that was the only way the legislation was going to be brought to fruition. There would be no compromises on the substance of the legislation itself, except for adjustments that were necessary, but that would not be the basis for passing the bill. It would be done by cloture and no other way. And you began to hear people who were shifting or on the fence, or said, "Give it another week, and we'll see; then maybe we better go for it." These were reports of progress that kept coming back to us from either Hubert's people or our own policy committee people.

We were adding up the votes. I was keeping a very close tally. I was extremely conservative in my counts. I wanted to be sure we had them. Then word came down one day through Mike Manatos, who was Larry O'Brien's assistant in the legislative liaison office of the White House for the Senate. Mike Manatos had been in the Senate; he had worked for a [Joseph] O'Mahoney of Wyoming, at one period, so he knew the Senate quite well. He was

an amiable person. Everybody liked him. He spent a lot of time working in the Senate. He worked the offices; he was around all the time; he knew his job. He was constantly talking with members or staff people.

So he came down one day, I was in Mansfield's office—oh, before I get to that, I've really got to give you something else: what was happening was that we were meeting very regularly in Dirksen's office, with his group of pro-rights people, who included not only the staff people but in terms of senators it included Jake Javits from time to time and the fellow from Nebraska . . .

RITCHIE: Roman Hruska?

VALEO: Hruska. Hruska was a lawyer, he had a very legal mind. Hruska eventually voted for cloture. He was for it, but he wanted the bill delineated precisely. Bobby Kennedy used to come down occasionally. More often than not he had the tall fellow who later became attorney general . . .

RITCHIE: Ramsey Clark?

VALEO: No, not Ramsey Clark.

RITCHIE: Or Nicholas Katzenbach.

VALEO: Katzenbach used to come down. And the best one he had was a chap who later became legal counsel to IBM. He was an outstanding lawyer. Do you remember his name? A very bright, extremely bright lawyer.

RITCHIE: Burke Marshall was down there then.

VALEO: That's who it was, Burke Marshall. He was awfully good. Not only was he good, but he didn't rub people the wrong way. Katzenbach rubbed people the wrong way, and Bobby Kennedy had a lot of natural, in-built enemies. I personally think Burke Marshall did more than any of the lawyers from the Justice Department to move this bill in the Senate, to work out the legal compromises which satisfied the lawyers, and there were many at that period involved in it. They were all lawyers, almost, except Dirksen was not, I was not, and Mike Manatos was not, and of course Mansfield was not. These meetings would occur frequently. They were designed to hold Dirksen, who assured everybody he was for civil rights, but also to help him make adjustments that would enable him to get key people on his side to go along.

So while the debate was going on on the floor, this was going on in the back rooms, mostly in Dirksen's office, by Mansfield's insistence. He had a bar back there, and they'd sit around by the hour and try to work out various legal questions. Then for some reason or other they moved over to Mansfield's office, and they

were housed in the back room of the majority leader's office, the Justice Department lawyers. I guess Dirksen needed his office for other matters. So the Justice lawyers mostly sat around in Mansfield's back office, playing with words and waiting for something to develop, or if there were questions, trying to answer them. That was the actual working arrangements. They would work mostly, not so much with me or Mike Manatos, but more with Ken Teasedale and Neil Kennedy. Neil speaking for Dirksen, and Teasedale speaking for Mansfield in those exchanges with the Justice Department lawyers.

The thing went on, and we kept adding up votes. We were getting two or three over the sixty mark when word came down through Mike Manatos one day from the White House. He said, "I was talking with the president, Frank. He thinks this has been going on too long and he's got so many other things that we have to do. He wonders how he can help to perhaps speed it up." I looked down the list of senators and I said, "Well, Mike, if he wants to do it, he might try a call to Bourke Hickenlooper. There's no reason why Hickenlooper shouldn't eventually vote for this thing, but he's now on the negative list. He's not with us. Ask him to give Hickenlooper a call; he always liked him. See if he can persuade Bourke to consider going for cloture." Two days later, Manatos came back and he didn't say anything to me. I asked, "Did you tell that to the president?" He said, "Yeah, I did and he said,

'What the hell's the matter with Frank?' That was his response. 'He's asking me to get Bourke Hickenlooper? That's like asking me to get Strom Thurmond to vote for civil rights!'"

I laughed. I went out on the floor shortly thereafter and I found Bourke Hickenlooper in the Republican cloakroom. He was an old friend of mine from traveling with him on Foreign Relations Committee business. He always liked me personally, even though our views weren't the same. He said, "Come over here and sit down Valejo." He always called me "Valejo." I sat on the sofa next to him. He said, "How's my valet?" That was a reference to something that had happened on one of the trips we were on together. It was an election year for him in the '50s, and Drew Pearson had done a column on him, or Jack Anderson, who was then Pearson's assistant. They had a column on Bourke Hickenlooper that said: "We're glad to tell the people of Iowa, where Bourke Hickenlooper is running, that the senator was not traveling in the Far East with his valet." The column said, "We received an anonymous note that Hickenlooper and valet were traveling in the Far East." This was a typical State Department wire that had obviously misspelled my name. He said, "The person he was traveling with was somebody named Valeo, and he's a legitimate staff man from the committee." They called him out there, I guess Anderson called him—he later told me the story. Anderson asked him, "Is it true that you were

traveling in Asia with your valet?" He said, "What?" You know, you'd have to know Hickenlooper to know how ridiculous that was. The last thing he would want was anybody near him helping him with his clothes. He said, "What the hell are you talking about?" Anderson said, "Well, I've got a copy of an authoritative wire here that says you've been traveling in Asia with your valet." "Oh," he said, "for Christ's sake, you mean Valeo." And that was the way the story had developed.

Anyhow, I sat down next to him. I said, "I've got a funny story for you." He said, "Well, go ahead and tell me." I related the story, right down to the Strom Thurmond part, of what had come from Lyndon Johnson. Hickenlooper got very red in the face. He obviously didn't appreciate being linked with Strom Thurmond, who was then a militant segregationist. He said, "Well, what the hell. He doesn't know what he's talking about. I've got nothing against civil rights, it's just that the goddamn bill is no good. If they'd make some changes in it, maybe I could go ahead and support it." I went back and I told Mansfield what had happened. He said, "Go in there and talk to those lawyers"—this would have been Katzenbach and the other Justice people. Mansfield said, "You and Mike go in there and tell them I'm going to bring Hickenlooper in here and they're to make any changes in the bill that he wants." Then he called Hickenlooper. I was there when he

called him. He said, "Bourke, I understand you're not satisfied with the bill. You know, it's not frozen. Why don't you come on over here and talk to these lawyers. I'm sure you'll find them very amenable to changes."

Well, we had gone in to tell the lawyers in precisely the words of Mansfield how they were to treat Hickenlooper. Hickenlooper came in, he sat down. I don't know how much he was hostile to the actual bill itself, but he went through it. "Well," he said, "that phrase ought to be changed. That won't go." Of course, lawyers hate to give up any words they've already gotten in, but they swallowed hard and made three or four really minor changes in the bill. "Well," he said, "that's a hell of a lot better bill than it was." He said, "I'm not giving you any promises, I'm not saying I'm going to vote for this, but the bill is a lot better now than it was before." Well, the debate went on then for about three days more, and then I heard that Hickenlooper was ready to vote for cloture.

I knew that once he went, we would get the rest of the votes, because there were three or four people over there on the Republican side with about the same measure of interest in the bill that he had, who would go the same way he went and were waiting for his lead. People like [Jack] Miller of Iowa and that real snippy fellow from Nebraska, [Carl] Curtis. There were three or four of them over there who waited for Bourke Hickenlooper's

lead on this thing, and I knew they were waiting for it. So we thought we had it. We counted and we came up with sixty-seven or thereabouts. We had Hayden in reserve. Even though he had never voted for cloture, he said he didn't want to vote for it, but if his vote was absolutely essential he would vote for it. He had reached the point where he thought it was the only thing to do. We had Clair Engle of California in the hospital, very seriously ill. We didn't know whether he would be able to come out. There were a couple of dubious votes, but we thought that we had it, and we were ready to make the attempt.

Mansfield put the cloture petition in, and the real ardent supporters were anxious to get on the cloture petition. I think we had to put an extra one in so that they could all sign it. The petition went in, and [Sam] Ervin of North Carolina immediately began to put dozens of amendments into the hopper so that they would be in order if cloture were adopted. Then that day came for the vote. I had my own list. I was right on the total but with one switch. I think we got sixty-seven or sixty-eight votes, I'm not sure. I was conservative on that, I think I had one under what we actually had. Clair Engle was the dubious one. He came in. He couldn't talk. I think he suffered from a brain tumor, and had to be supported on both sides. But you could see from the expression on his face that he was voting yes and he was so recorded. I guess it was the last great moment of his life. It was a very

moving thing to watch. Hayden was in the backroom, waiting if necessary to give his vote; it wasn't needed.

It was really a tremendous moment, and a tremendous moment in American history. Without that, I don't know where we would have gone as a country. But that definitely cast the die. Afterwards, Mansfield did not even show up for the press. He pushed Humphrey out there and he pushed Dirksen out. He pushed everyone else, but not himself. I don't even think he was there for the press interview. But that was exactly the style that he worked on anything of that kind.

Well, we had cloture. We didn't have a Civil Rights bill, but everybody knew that cloture was going to be the key to it. Something occurred then that shows the influence of trivial decisions on what happens later. We still knew very little about how the cloture rule would act, because there were so few precedents. The ones that existed, except for the Morse experience, were way back in history. Cloture hadn't been done since, I guess, 1917 or 1918. As you know, the cloture rule gives you an hour of debate for each member, nontransferable after its adoption. It also provides for no dilatory tactics, and that sort of thing. Well, here was this big pile of Ervin amendments that he had put in just before the rule went into effect. He was getting prepared to go through them and prolong the struggle against the Civil Rights bill by delaying tactics. Well, how did you handle it?

Ervin would introduce an amendment, then he'd call a quorum, and force the clerk to call the roll. It would be a live quorum, you'd get at least fifty-one members, they'd vote down the amendment. We had agreed at this point everything would be dropped; we would defeat any amendment that came in. Both leaders agreed. Unless it could be done by unanimous consent they would just defeat them. We had the votes. It couldn't be debated more than the set period of time. But with that pile of amendments, the post-cloture period could have gone on a long time; just reading them would take time.

Ervin sent word up to the desk, to Charlie Watkins, who was then the chief parliamentarian, by way of Floyd Riddick, who was his assistant and was keeping the time records. Floyd relayed the message. I happened to be standing there when it was relayed. He said, "Charlie, Senator Ervin wants to know how are you going to count the time on amendments? Whose time is charged for the quorums calls? And whose time is charged for the reading of the bill?" Charlie Watkins, God bless him, said, "Oh, we won't charge it to anyone." He said, "Just charge his debate time when he debates the amendment, but don't charge the reading time and don't charge the quorum time." I heard this, and I said, "Charlie, do you know what you're saying? He's got 150 amendments there. Just reading them can hold this thing up for another two or three weeks at least. And if all the opponents had done the same thing, you know what that could mean. The cloture rule would mean nothing."

"Oh," he said, "Frank, don't worry about it. He'll get tired of it. After he does a few of them, he'll get tired and he'll stop."

So the word went back to Ervin. Well, he did get tired of it after two days—I think partly through Russell's prodding that he better drop it. But Russell was a sensible man, and he knew the Senate. Ervin was prepared to listen to Russell's guidance on something of this kind, so the thing was dropped. But the next time we had a cloture vote, the same question was asked officially of the chair, and according to the advice of the parliamentarian, the president of the Senate or the presiding officer of the Senate replied, "According to the precedents of the Senate, the time for quorum calls and reading will be charged to neither side." So the cloture rule, which was the only weapon that you had to combat a prolonged dilatory tactic, was in effect completely sabotaged by that casual advisory of a parliamentarian, even though his analysis was correct for Senator Ervin.

Later on this casual ruling became a new way for exploiting the cloture rule and reducing it steadily to irrelevance. We're almost back to 1919, but not quite. But what it did was to compel the leadership to try to get cloture even more easily. Mansfield got off his high horse of saying "I'd never go for majority cloture." He didn't quite get that, but he eventually got it down to sixty votes, by progressive adjustments of the rule. He began to run

into people like the senator from Alabama, whose name escapes me. He served briefly; a nice man, but he learned and exploited the rules very well.

RITCHIE: Oh, James Allen.

VALEO: Yes. And Allen saw how you could easily circumvent the intent of cloture, and he used to manipulate it all the time. Then he'd go into league with Jesse Helms or someone else. But Allen was much smarter on how to handle the rules. In many ways, that one off the cuff advisory of Charlie Watkins has determined the pattern of the Senate's behavior on these critical issues more than any other single thing for the past two decades. Of course, Byrd, when he became leader, I'm told, spent all sorts of time trying to figure out how to put teeth back into the cloture rule as amended unofficially by Watkins' interpretation and how to make it more effective. It was as simple as that in the origins this problem.

There was one other thing I remember from the civil rights debate, it was I think after we got cloture, or after Russell had made his last speech in opposition to it. He came off the floor and he went over to the elevator which was right outside the majority leader's office at the time, and I was headed towards the majority leader's office. He had rung for the elevator and was waiting. He looked very tired and beaten, and I made some casual

remark to him. "Oh," he said, "what a hell of a way to make a living." I laughed and he smiled sadly and got on the elevator.

RITCHIE: All of this was taking place prior to the presidential conventions.

VALEO: That's right.

RITCHIE: Did national politics enter into this debate? Barry Goldwater was a member of the Senate, and eventually wound up voting against the Civil Rights Act.

VALEO: He voted against civil rights. No, I think Goldwater knew he couldn't get the black vote, such as it was, at that time. I think he was playing for the Southern white votes, which was still then predominant. He probably anticipated it would remain that way for a considerable length of time, if he thought of it at all. But that also reflected Goldwater's behavior. His reactions were very much those of a southerner, and a very conservative southerner.

RITCHIE: Did that enter into the discussions with Dirksen at all, on what effect it would have on the Republican party?

VALEO: No, certainly not in my presence. There may have been a great deal of it among Republicans themselves, but it did not come up during the mixed party discussions. Dirksen was the real hero of the bill, in my judgment, in the Senate—Dirksen and

Humphrey. Humphrey was flawless in his handling of the substance of the bill. He was such a bright man. And Dirksen moved a lot of his colleagues among the less conservative on the Republican side. Bourke Hickenlooper eventually was the key to the more conservative Republicans. He was the decisive figure in that sense, on the counting of the cloture vote. When he went, I knew we had it.

RITCHIE: From the way you've described it, it sounds as if Johnson really was not intimately involved.

VALEO: That's correct, he wasn't. He never was. He never understood how it would be possible to do it by cloture. He'd already been away from the Senate for a period of time, and things change, attitudes change so fast. Unless you're there all the time, listening to what's going on and picking up reactions to the news everyday, you very quickly lose touch with the changing trends that are occurring at all times in the Senate. It flows all the time. At this time it was flowing very heavily towards civil rights, and he didn't realize that, I don't think at that point. He was already beginning to get the isolation of the White House. So I think it caught him quite by surprise that Mansfield was able to do the bill in the way it was done.

Of course, he claimed most of the credit for it later. Again, he deserves some, only in the sense that he cooperated very

strongly with the civil rights groups on the outside and gave them a kind of carte blanche in blessing which helped to increase the impact of their pressures on the more reluctant members. But he himself played virtually no role in it. It was all done, insofar as there was a role, it was done by the Justice Department, and not much even by Bobby Kennedy. I come back to the people whom I thought were critical, and Burke Marshall I would put at the top of that list. He was very effective with Republicans in persuading them to make adjustments, or giving in and yielding to things which they wanted changed in the bill, in a way that Katzenbach, who was a sort of arrogant man—he was intellectually arrogant—would not be willing to do. He would make a big mountain out of a molehill, very often. But Burke Marshall knew how to move and maneuver, and he was a smart lawyer as well. I certainly would give him top credit.

Bobby Kennedy was interesting to watch in that period, particularly in Dirksen's office. I guess I saw him two or three times. He was still feeling his way on the bill. Again, I think it had finally registered on him how deep the feelings were in the black community. I'll never forget reading about his meeting with [James] Baldwin, the black novelist, in that period; and Baldwin's comment afterwards: "I never saw such incredible naivety." I think that probably shocked Bobby Kennedy and probably began to make him think more deeply. I always thought that marked a

turning point in his attitude on Negro rights because he was like a kind of naive kid up until that point. But after that he began to see it more and more deeply, and I think by the time of his death he was very much emotionally involved in the issue.

RITCHIE: Would you say that Johnson's being on the fringe of this issue, or at least not intimately involved in the Senate side of it, was that similar to other bills in '64? Was he getting more personally involved in legislation?

VALEO: Very little involved. He was amazingly little involved in legislation. He'd call committee chairmen once in a while, rarely Mansfield, on a bill. He even called me once on a foreign aid bill, at home on Christmas Eve. I got on the phone and the first thing he said was, "I always said the best thing about you is your wife." That was his typical way. It came as a complete surprise to me. We had had a late session, and he was wondering what was going on. It was over a foreign aid tie-up and he was wondering what was going to happen, how it would get through. I gave him the best that I could in terms of my estimate of the situation. But he liked to do that. He liked to startle people. Of course, it delighted everybody to have a call from the president, including my young son at the time!

RITCHIE: Well, he got a tremendous amount of credit for everything that got passed that year.

VALEO: I know.

RITCHIE: Do you think that the press just assumed that because he was Lyndon Johnson, who had been the super majority leader, that everything was attributable to him?

VALEO: Yes, it was partly that, and partly that Mansfield never had a press agent, never had a press secretary, and didn't want one. He had no desire to have a press secretary. Mansfield would smile when these things would happen. It would be a very slight smile, but I could detect it, when somebody would say, "Oh, Johnson's done this thing." But somebody once said Mansfield was like a cigar store Indian, he was very poker-faced, and he would very rarely make any comments except to praise the president always. Or he'd say, "I've always said Johnson was the best majority leader the Senate ever had." He would use phrases like that, all of which would feed Johnson's ego. The press just took it as face value. They didn't know the inside story. Very few of them followed it closely. Oh, there were a few like Joe Stern of the *Baltimore Sun*, who probed a little more deeply. Sometimes Ned Kenworthy of the *New York Times*, and others, who had a better sense of what was going on, but it was limited. Most of the press get pretty superficial when it comes to handling the Senate.

RITCHIE: Why do you think that is?

VALEO: Well, they're always looking for the drama, and the drama's really a sort of afterthought. The real achievements in the Senate are not dramatic, they happen before the drama. It's only when you lay that sort of groundwork that the drama can happen. There are certainly dramatic moments in the Senate, but they have nothing to do with the way the thing has reached that point. It's usually agonizing, slow, miserable, tedious work. As Mansfield once said to me, he said, "Frank, you can do anything you want in the Senate provided you live long enough and you have enough patience." And that was the way he did it, by patience and living long enough, in the sense of being majority leader for such a long time.

RITCHIE: You mentioned at one point that he was not a lawyer.

VALEO: He was a historian, actually.

RITCHIE: Do you think that that affected his style and the way he dealt with the Senate?

VALEO: Oh, very much so. He could ignore minor things in bills and it would not trouble him at all, whereas lawyers have great difficulty doing that. Very few of them can take a broad view. They think that piece of legislation or a phrase in it is it, and that's the end of the world. But he never saw it in those terms. He saw it in the long view. He thought like a historian.

I think what he did in the Senate, in changing the Senate, was a kind of outgrowth of his historical background, plus his Chinese experience. He was very much involved in China and fascinated by China, always, in all the period I knew him. The Chinese view was also the long view. I think that those two things—and also a Chinese attitude, a predominant philosophical view in China of the bamboo as the ideal, of bending with the wind and not breaking. It's a little like "the last shall be first" kind of philosophy. Not really going too strongly against the tides, but trying to move the tides gradually in the direction you want them to go.

He was a very different kind of man in that job, and it did make for a very different kind of Senate. I don't know what would have happened on civil rights if it had not been done his way. My guess is there would have been a compromise. We would have gone around the clock and there would have been some kind of compromise which would have been a very much watered-down bill, which may very well have been inadequate for the then prevailing emotional situation in the country. You could have seen a great deal more violence. We saw a lot as it was, but you could have seen a great deal more violence as a result. So I think that his insistence that there would be no compromise on the bill, his insistence that the Senate would have to face the issue, really was a great service to the country. And I'm not sure Johnson would have handled that at all had he been in that position. He would not have

realized the depth of the combined anger and anguish that existed in the black community at that time and the measure of sympathy with the blacks in the rest of the country.

RITCHIE: Yet Mansfield himself didn't have very much of a record of seeming to be concerned about civil rights issues.

VALEO: No, as far as I know he never hired a Negro on his staff. He never felt he had to go into tokenism. Of course, he came from Montana, where there are very few Negroes. But as far as I can remember there were no Negroes on his staff. I don't think he would not have hired them, I mean be opposed to hiring them, he just never did.

RITCHIE: Didn't you hire the first black secretary to work for the Senate?

VALEO: That was on the Foreign Relations Committee staff.

RITCHIE: Could you tell me the story of that?

VALEO: When I was in the Library of Congress, I had a very small division, and they were about to let one of the girls from the typing pool go. I needed someone at the time, but apparently her typing wasn't very good. I had seen her as a very pleasant person, and obviously hard working. Whether it was good or bad typing, she was over that typewriter all the time. I asked Ernest Griffith to give her a chance in my office. I needed a typist and

I offered to take her. She was really worth her weight in gold. The typing ability was not very great, but she had a marvelous telephone manner. You know, there are some people who in effect say, "We're completely at your service," when they answer the telephone; others say, "Why are you bothering me?" Well, she belonged in the first category, and her manner was an extremely valuable asset. When I went over to the Foreign Relations Committee, I needed some secretarial help. There was a secretary in the Foreign Affairs Division at the Library, plus this girl, whose name was Thomasene Smith. She was from Tuskegee, had had a college education. She was not a good typist, I mean she really wasn't, but she did have a good manner and I thought that important. I needed to bring someone, and I think somebody on the committee staff asked me to bring someone over from the Library. Thomasene came on a loan arrangement. She so quickly proved her effectiveness on the committee that when I left they insisted upon keeping her there. So she stayed on at the Foreign Relations Committee for many years.

RITCHIE: Didn't you say that people mistook her for a Puerto Rican.

VALEO: Oh, that was Mansfield's administrative assistant, Peggy DiMichaels, who was very much impressed by this girl when she saw her on the Foreign Relations Committee staff. She said, "You know, Frank, I'm looking for someone up in the Montana

office." Well, I didn't really want to lose her at that point. She said, "I need someone like her." I said, "Well, you know, Peggy, she's not a very good typist. But she has a nice manner." She said, "What is she? Is she Puerto Rican?" I said, "No, she's black." So, I don't know. I'm sure that isn't the reason why she wasn't hired for the Montana office. I think more the fact that I had stressed that she was not a very good typist.

RITCHIE: That was when Mansfield hired Salpee [Sahagian] on his staff.

VALEO: Then he hired Salpee, on my recommendation, again through Peggy. Peggy was a difficult woman and I knew that you'd have to find someone who could live with Peggy or it wouldn't work. I guess Salpee had been over to see me and had asked me about making a change to come over to the Hill. I said, "Well, if I hear of anything I'll be glad to let you know." Just about that time, Peggy asked me if I could recommend someone else from the Library, and I mentioned her. I said, "She's awfully good but she's a little shy." Well, that didn't bother her. She interviewed Salpee and decided she'd take her on. She had Salpee in the Montana office. The Montana office, I don't know much about it, but it must have been a difficult place to work. Salpee Sahagian, who was long-suffering was not given to complaining, I'd ask her, "How's it going," and she'd give me a "what have you done to me?" sort of look. I'd say, "Well, be patient, be patient."

Then when Mansfield became whip, we needed someone in the office right away, and he said, "Who shall we hire?" I said, "You know, it's your choice." He said, "I'd like to bring someone over from the Montana office." "What about Salpee, shall we bring her over?" I said, "She's fine, she'll be very good." So that's the way it started. She worked with both of us. Then when I left to become secretary for the majority, he insisted upon keeping Salpee in his majority leader's office where she stayed until he retired.

RITCHIE: When you did hire a black secretary, there was no precedent in the Senate for it. Was any hostility to the idea of a black secretary?

VALEO: No. I think there may have been a sort of a taken aback kind of feeling, that there was a black secretary working on the Foreign Relations Committee. But it wasn't hostility as such. You couldn't be hostile to someone like Thomasene Smith. She was a lovely woman. I guess Tom Connally was still on the committee—well, maybe not—he may have been gone by then.

RITCHIE: Walter George was probably there.

VALEO: Walter George was certainly there, and Walter George had no problem with it. It was just at the beginning of the change. This was not too long after the Brown decision. We're talking about the fifties. There were blacks working on the Hill, but they were mostly in sort of menial jobs, tending offices

and that sort of thing. And a secretarial job on the Hill was regarded as a fairly high position. There weren't many.

RITCHIE: Washington was still pretty much of a segregated city.

VALEO: It was a segregated city. I remember the first time we took some of the people from our office at the Library to lunch across the way to desegregate a restaurant. It was a big experience to do that for a lot of the people in the office. I remember I had a white secretary at that point who shared the prevailing prejudices. I wanted to give a party for the staff at my apartment and told her that we were going to invite everyone on the staff, so would she send out the invitations. She came back and said, "What about her?" Referring of course, to the black assistant. "Oh," I said, "yeah, it might give us some problems at the door of my apartment building. Somebody's liable to say 'go around to the back,' the servants around the back or something like that." I said, "I'll tell you what, I want you to do me a big favor. I want you and your husband to bring her with you so we don't get into that kind of a situation." Well, she looked shocked when I asked her to do it, but she did it.

That was the way in which you broke them down, if you could, some of the divisions which nobody was really to blame for, it was part of the atmosphere. Certainly the individuals involved were

not to blame for them. We were exploring a new area of human relations in that period. I mean, you still had black people riding on the backs of buses and trolley cars in Washington.

RITCHIE: And the theaters and restaurants in Washington were segregated.

VALEO: Oh, certainly that.

RITCHIE: So that must have added something to the atmosphere that the members of Congress, even if they didn't come from Southern states, were used to in Washington, dealing with a segregated society.

VALEO: They were, yes. Now, I don't know what was the experience in the Northern offices, whether any were hiring blacks at that point for positions of responsibility, and I'm sure some of them must have been. But I never saw it. I think it would have been more common on the House side than in the Senate, if it existed at all.

RITCHIE: I think Senator Humphrey had a black staff member, because he integrated the Senate restaurant by taking him.

VALEO: His black secretary?

RITCHIE: His black staff member, a man who later became governor of the Virgin Islands.

VALEO: Oh, yes, I remember the chap. That was later.

RITCHIE: Blacks waited on tables all the time, but he was the first black person to sit down and eat a meal there.

VALEO: Yes, there was a very famous maitre d' who had been there for fifty years, named Paul, who was black. He was a clever maitre d', he was not an Uncle Tom in the old sense of the word, he knew how to handle himself extremely well, and was very highly thought of. Then there was another waiter, a man named King, who only worked the press table. The press just adored him. I think he was responsible for most of the deficits in the restaurant's accounts, he used to treat the press people so liberally when they came in to eat down there in their own room.

RITCHIE: I wanted to ask you in general about that year, '64. You mentioned you wrote that memorandum and you were feeling a little bit more confident in your position. How did you see your job as democratic secretary? Was it growing?

VALEO: Oh, yes. It was growing, and I was learning how to handle it. In that period I'd already gotten a great deal of insight into the way it worked. I was briefing people at the back of the chamber as they came in for votes. I used to play games with myself there. Senators came rushing in on a vote and would ask: "What's the vote?" as they came on the floor after the bells. You'd have to try to give it to them as rapidly as you

could. So I'd play games with myself to see how I could reduce the meaning of an amendment into a minimal number of words and still be understood.

There was one amendment in the civil rights bill about boarding houses being exempt from the civil rights bill if they had less than five or six guests. It wasn't an Aiken amendment, but George Aiken had made a classic speech on it the day before, favoring the amendment, saying "If you've got Mrs. Murphy's boarding house with a few roomers, you don't want to include it under this legislation." I remember when the amendment came up. Members started coming in and they'd say, "What's the issue? What's the amendment?" And I got it down to "Mrs. Murphy's boarding house." Four words, and everybody knew immediately what the issue was. You'd try to figure out a way to interpret the legal language of the amendment into something that would be meaningful and yet very quick to explain it.

RITCHIE: Now, when the senators would come running in for a vote like that on an amendment, would most of them tend to go with what the party position was?

VALEO: No, because Mansfield would never lay down a party position or very rarely laid down a party position. There wasn't any such thing, really. But people would say, "What's Mike doing on this?" Very often I would say, truthfully, "I don't know. I

don't know what he's going to do." He usually would hold his vote to the last, just to prevent people from following his lead on it.

RITCHIE: Why was that?

VALEO: I don't know. He wanted to avoid even the slightest semblance of pressure on members.

RITCHIE: Well, then did certain other members become pivot men. Did they say, "What is Hubert doing on this?"

VALEO: That would happen occasionally, Russell on opposition strategy to civil rights for example, but nobody became a pivot. Mansfield wanted each senator to think for himself, that's basically what he was pushing for. It was part of his grand design for the Senate, which was a kind of historic approach to it. It was the Senate of Websters, and Calhouns and people of that sort that he was after.

RITCHIE: Did you ever get a sense that people voted against bills because they were identified with other senators whom they just disliked?

VALEO: It may have happened, but I don't recall any singular instances of this. The other way would be fairly common. Somebody would say, "What's Proxmire done?" largely because they had the same interest that he had, not because they favored him on everything, but on that particular measure they felt that he had

the logical lead on it because of the circumstances of the measure itself. But, no, it was not a negative. People didn't oppose. This would have happened during the Johnson period, but not during Mansfield's period. More and more it became the kind of Senate he wanted: each individual thought out his own position, certainly on the major pieces of legislation.

The net result of this was more and more they needed staff, because if they had to have their own position on every bill, if they were not going to follow somebody else's lead, then they needed to know more about it. So consequently some of them began to try to keep staff on the floor all the time for amendments. Well, this got to be a problem after awhile. The floor got more and more crowded and Mansfield got more and more furious at the number of staff people on the floor. Occasionally he cleared the floor of that, but that was later on when the staff situation had grown very rapidly and had maybe multiplied several times already. He still wanted senators to do it themselves, and I think in a way unfairly. You know, if you're from Montana you don't have the kind of pressures that you have from a variety of constituents that you have in California or in Illinois or someplace like that. I think he never fully appreciated that aspect of it. Having come from Montana, it was more feasible to think in terms of Senate of the early nineteenth century than it would be if you were from New York or from Texas.

But he kept pushing for that kind of a Senate. He kept resisting staff expansions. I remember there was a lot of pressure for him to put people on the Policy Committee staff, and I think he turned back about sixty percent of the funds we got every year for the Policy Committee because he refused to hire any more staff. Now, I don't know how many there are in the Policy Committee, but at that time there were never more than about two or three professionals at the most, and they were lawyers primarily.

RITCHIE: Well, he wasn't interested in generating press releases, and that seems to be a large part of what the Policy Committees do now.

VALEO: Never interested in that, except in one or two issues. One issue, of course, was Vietnam, as that issue developed, and the others would have been Montana matters. Eventually he was interested also in China.

RITCHIE: What's your opinion of the low profile he kept with the press?

VALEO: He once told me, and I don't think this was his motivation, but he once said to me, "You know, Frank, we had a sheriff somewhere out in Montana. He had to get elected every year. We had an election for sheriff every year, and he was elected thirty times. And that man, the whole secret of his

success was, when anybody would say something to him about something, all he would say was, 'Uh-huh.'" Obviously, he didn't go quite that far, but he took that to heart.

He was never interested in making an egotistical impression. He could answer questions in one or two or three words and not make a long speech on things. The press would be bewildered by it. They were not used to this kind of treatment from political figures. The net result is they usually ran out of questions and they looked foolish. They didn't like that, but they knew it was their own fault. He was perfectly willing to answer questions as long as they wanted him to. I watched him a number of times. He would meet with the press once in a while in a group, but it usually would be on an issue of foreign policy that had come up in some way and he felt he had something to say on it. They had difficulty handling Mansfield. The net result of it was they either shied away from him, decided he wasn't much of a leader, or they liked him and they respected him for his integrity and his finding it unnecessary to make an impression. I think that overwhelmed them, that there could be people like that in politics.

RITCHIE: There are still very few, I guess.

VALEO: There are very few, and there always have been very few. Let's talk a little bit about the '64 election, which comes in quite naturally here and which I remember. It was the only

convention I ever went to. My association with the election started out by my being asked to check on several Senate races around the country on behalf of the Democratic Campaign Committee. I went to Texas, where Ralph Yarborough was running against [George] Bush. I went to Arizona, where Roy Elson, who was the brother of the former Senate Chaplain [Edward Elson] was running against an incumbent.

RITCHIE: Was it Paul Fannin?

VALEO: Yes, I believe it was Fannin. And I went to New Mexico, where [Joseph] Montoya was running, and to Oklahoma where [Fred] Harris was running. It was my first exposure to politics at the grassroots, so to speak. It was a very fascinating experience. I was misled on the Elson election. It looked so sure fire that I reported that one back. I was right on the others. Yarborough won handily against Bush. Harris won easily in Oklahoma, and Montoya's was a close race, but he won it. And I had called them that way. But I learned something of politics that way, and sort of enjoyed it.

I came back and we were ready for the convention, which was in Atlantic City that year. Mansfield did not go to many conventions, but he was going to that one. He said, "I want you to come up, too." There was a lot of discussion in the press then about who Johnson's vice presidential candidate was going to be.

Humphrey, of course, fresh from civil rights, was being pushed by liberal groups. Dodd of Connecticut, his name was dropped in the hat. Some people were mentioning Mansfield, and a few other names were around. Oh, George McGovern was there, but at that time he was pushing Humphrey.

RITCHIE: Eugene McCarthy was also mentioned.

VALEO: Gene McCarthy was in the picture. There were a number of people in it. I wondered why Mansfield was asking me to go to the convention. When I got there, I found he had a large suite, which was probably supplied by Charlie Englehart. Englehart owned a lot of Atlantic City, I think, among other things. Englehart was pushing Mansfield. I stayed in a motel somewhere nearby. I asked Mansfield what he wanted, if he needed anything. He said no, just to keep my eyes open. But I wasn't at all sure, so I sat down to try to write out an acceptance speech for the vice presidency. I assumed that that was a genuine possibility at that point. We had not yet had the blow-up on Vietnam with Lyndon.

Lyndon was still posing, in effect, as the peace candidate and warning that Goldwater was going to drop the bomb if you elected him, and what not. There were Democratic ads on TV showing the whole country blowing up, and then Goldwater's picture following. Democrats, no less than Republicans, can be pretty dirty in

campaigns. So I thought Mansfield would make a good contrast to Johnson as a candidate. I guess Bobby Kennedy was also being mentioned and pushed by other groups, but that seemed so remote. Johnson let it all boil along with everything else. The Kennedy mystique was still extremely strong in the country.

I simply could not write a speech on such a shoestring. I just could not get it. It sounded so ridiculous. I said, "Well, I'll just do it in three hours, if it happens." So I dropped it, but I watched what was happening I wandered around through the various hotel corridors, talking with people like McGovern and others. It was still very much up in the air about who Johnson was going to name. The keynoter that year was Pastore, by the suggestion of Mansfield. Traditionally the majority leader of the Senate has named the keynoter for the convention. He had chosen Pastore, and Pastore did a magnificent job on the speech. They were very close and very friendly at that time, Mansfield and Pastore.

Well, it went on and it was jockeyed around and of course it came down to Humphrey at the end. I'm sure that was basically labor union influence. I never was able to tell whether Mansfield was relieved or disappointed by that. Again, he's a complex man, and there may have been a little bit of both in it. I mean, he was relieved on one hand, but probably, in my judgment, disappointed. He expected Johnson to perhaps name him. But I think,

by this time the civil rights experience was beginning to separate them. They didn't see it the same way, they didn't see the Senate strategy the same way, and Mansfield was beginning to gain stature as majority leader. And I don't think Johnson wanted that. He really did not like anything that even remotely suggested a rival. So that was the Democratic convention, and as far as I know, Mansfield never went to another one. I certainly didn't.

The result of Pastore's keynote speech, which was well received throughout the country, was that Pastore came back to Washington flying real high. He expected Mansfield to name him as whip. Mansfield, following his usual procedure, said no, he didn't name anyone, it was up to the Democratic Caucus to elect the whip. It disappointed Pastore greatly. They had a rather serious—not a serious split, but their relationship cooled thereafter and never really regained the warmth that it had had in the earlier period. Pastore got very irritated with Mansfield, began not to criticize him but to be far less cooperative than he had been prior to that time.

RITCHIE: Russell Long had been critical of Mansfield's leadership before, and now he became whip.

VALEO: He became whip, replacing Kennedy, because of the Chappaquiddick. No, Kennedy beat Russell Long. Russell Long didn't become whip, I don't recall.

RITCHIE: No, Russell Long did become whip in '65.

VALEO: He did.

RITCHIE: And Kennedy beat him in '69, and then Byrd beat Kennedy in '71.

VALEO: Was it something like that? The chronological history of it really fades. But I remember Pastore's disappointment in not having been named. Russell Long got it, and Russell Long, of course, was no friend of Mansfield. He was a difficult, and in some ways, I think, a very destructive man. At that period especially he was drinking heavily and pushing oil interests, and not doing much beyond that.

RITCHIE: So Mansfield's style of hands-off denied him a whip who would have been an ally.

VALEO: Who would have been an ally, but probably also a replacement. One has also to consider that. Whereas I don't think Russell Long would ever possibly have been a replacement for him. I can't imagine that happening, his reputation being such as it was around the Senate. But I thought that it was unfortunate that Mansfield lost Pastore at that time, because Pastore was a valuable ally and would really go to bat for him on the floor, and in the Policy Committee.

At that time there was a change that I think I should mention. During the Kennedy administration the policy committee met periodically and did very little. I mean, we just took the lead from the White House and soft peddled the committee. But it developed a regular meeting pattern. The committee chairmen group would also meet regularly, mostly to do legislation. Whereas Johnson would have used those committee chairmen meetings to badger members and to beat them over the head to bring out legislation, Mansfield would even say to Eastland, "How are you doing on that civil rights legislation?" And Eastland would say, "Well, we're working on it. We're going to have a meeting next week." "Oh, that's fine." And we'd go on like that. He would never, or rarely, put any kind of even remote pressure on a committee chairman. Of course, they liked meeting with him. It was a good lunch, and at that time they weren't paying for it. Later on, I think he established a fund so they had to pay for the committee chairmen lunch. But they were really meeting just to keep in touch because you rarely saw them on the floor. The floor became the place of essentially inaction, except for votes, apart for the one vote on the civil rights bill, which came later.

I have one further recollection of that early period. I remember a friend of mine who, I guess, was head of the Washington School of Psychiatry at the time, or he headed an Association of Washington Psychiatrists. His group was so afraid of Goldwater,

they wanted to put money into the Johnson campaign. He said to me "Frank, my colleagues and I are planning to put some money into Johnson's campaign. We're so afraid of this Goldwater. He's a warmonger, and we just can't stand it. We think Johnson's fine. What do you think?" Well, I liked Johnson on the one hand for his social views, which were pretty much the same as mine. But I didn't want to say that you can't count on this guy not going to war, if that's what you're putting your money on. On the other hand, I didn't feel as though I could betray the Democratic party. So I said, "Well he's a nice man." They put the contribution into his campaign, and it came back to haunt me later. He said, "You know, we did that on your advice!" But it was all friendly and it didn't go as far as a lot of us feared it might go in Vietnam.

Once Johnson became president and the war deepened in Vietnam, the policy committee under Mansfield began to come into a different function, which was to express differences of view with the president. It became essentially an independent group. Mansfield always tried to go along with the administration, but on Vietnam less and less could he do that. Of course, that came after Tonkin. But the policy committee then began to take on its own personality. And it was a rather unique one. I guess that's a good stopping point, isn't it?

End of Interview #8