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REFORMING THE SENATE

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RITCHIE: I'd like to start today by asking if you could tell me about the origins of the Culver Commission and what the whole purpose of that reform was, towards the end of your term as secretary of the Senate.

VALEO: I think at that time I began to realize that if the Senate was going to continue to evolve the way it was going, which meant greater and greater powers in terms of the individual member as distinct from committee structure or from party structure, that they would have to take another look at the way the whole Senate was managed. Certainly that idea was going around in my mind for some time because I saw the potential for a good deal of chaos if there wasn't this reexamination of its processes. Mansfield, without saying it in so many words, was obviously thinking that because at one point he said to me: "It's a good thing we're getting out now, Frank, it's going to get tough around here," or something to that effect, because he saw what was happening not only on the floor but in the structure. He continued to resist in the leadership any expansion of staff. I don't think we added more than one or two members during the dozen years that he was majority leader, and he always turned back a lot of money as a

result of that. But there was constant pressure on him to use that money to the advantage of the majority or for some legitimate legislative purpose.

People began to think in terms of staff growth. But he resisted that, and I guess except for one or two appointments, mostly under the pressure of Russell and one or two of the other conservatives, he held the line very strongly. The issue kept coming up in the Policy Committee meetings. Mike Gravel came in a couple of times and made a big pitch for more staff, how he couldn't possibly keep up with his committee assignments without more staff. And one of the results of that was the Gravel—maybe Moss and Gravel resolution. I'm not sure who was primarily responsible for it, I think it was a Senate resolution, I don't think it was done with the House, but it provided that where a committee staff professional was not supplied to each member by the committee, the member would be given additional funds in his office budget to provide such a staff person for every committee he was on. This was really a very bad piece of legislation, because the immediate effect of course was to break up the concept of a professional committee staff quite apart from politics. The net result was that every committee staff then began to be split between Democratic and Republican designees.

Again, knowing how members of the Senate usually function, the idea of having a choice as between letting the chairman of a committee appoint the staff person or appointing him himself under his financial control, it was obvious that the choice would always fall wherever possible on the second alternative. That's precisely what has happened over the years. After the Gravel change there were additional tendencies towards fragmentation of responsibility beyond even where it had gone at that point.

At the same time the Senate was still functioning not only under archaic rules but under an archaic management structure. We've discussed the modernization of the disbursing office and the beginnings of modernization of the secretary's office, thanks largely to Marilyn Courtot with a lot of cooperation from Darrell St. Claire and myself. We were beginning to do something about those things. But there were other areas of the Senate that everybody knew existed where things were either being done because they had always been done that way or because other cores of competing power were in existence. Essentially, in terms of the management of the Senate as a whole, the cores of competition were in the Rules Committee and the sergeant at arms office and in the secretary's office. So I began to think again in terms of a British approach, which would be to consolidate the all-Senate staff functions under one officer of the Senate. Perhaps again because of personal bias to some degree but also because the

secretary's office, I believe, was the oldest office in the Senate, and also because at that point it had become quite free of political pressures, it seemed to me that the logical place was in the secretary's office. I was getting close to retirement in any event, so it would not have meant much to me except that I could have left it here as a fait d'accompli.

Well, just at about this time, [John] Culver came into the Senate. He was a man obviously of very persuasive oratorical powers. He spoke up in caucus, accepting Mansfield's invitation for new members to speak up and not wait around for any length of time, but to talk if they had anything to say. He began to complain about the impossibility of the services that were being supplied, and how archaic the Senate structure was. Another reformer was [Dale] Bumpers of Arkansas, who joined Culver on a number of occasions. Bumpers made a very strong complaint at one point in the meetings that Mansfield held from time to time for the younger members. I recall suggesting to him afterward a resolution—as a matter of fact I framed it for him—as one way of getting at the particular problem he was at that point concerned about (I can't remember now what the substance of it was). He looked at it and he sort of smiled and said, "But this will get me in trouble with the older members." I said I didn't know if it would get him in trouble with them, but anything he wanted to do to fix the question which he had raised depended upon

his readiness to challenge the existing structure. He was not prepared to do that.

My inclination then was to think more in terms of Culver, who seemed to be perhaps a little less concerned with survival and a little more anxious to get the reforms through that he wanted. At one time he made a statement, I believe it was at a luncheon for new members which Mansfield held from time to time. I underscored his statement for Mansfield later. I said, "Maybe the time has come to do something about some of these procedures. The proposal came, interestingly enough, exactly at the time when [Mark] Hatfield was very much concerned with the archaic office structures in the senators' personal offices. He had gone to the—at that point—extreme form of computerization of his whole office routine, with the assistance of a fellow named Jerry—I can't think of his name now, but he's still with him; he's his administrative assistant—Gerald Frank. The two of them had set up what looked like a twenty-first century kind of office, at least from a Senate point of view, to take care of mail and everything else. The system was very mechanized, and he kept making remarks about how the Senate should really catch up with the times. So I thought the moment might be right to try to push it.

I was trying to figure out how you could get at the problem. If you set up a commission within the Senate, or a special committee, you would always run into the vested interests each pleading

their own case for their own particularly ends. So the thought occurred to me that it was time to let somebody from the outside take a look at the Senate and see what they thought. They would find, I thought, many of the same obvious flaws in the structure that I could observe at close hand. So we did it that way. I remember proposing a slate to Mansfield. I didn't know any of the people who came in for the commission, but I had gotten, I believe, from the Library of Congress and from Beth Shotwell, or someone else, a list of names of people who had been prominently associated with public service commissions of one kind or another in that period. We also, I believe, asked for some suggestions from other members as to who might be suitable for this kind of an assignment.

We decided that we would call it the Culver Commission since he would introduce the resolution and then Mansfield would pick it up from there. Culver did introduce the resolution; he was very anxious to do it. We cleared it with [Hugh] Scott and Hatfield in advance. We decided to work very closely with Hatfield on it, and we did. I think Scott presented a list of names. There was a fellow named Kenneth Davis who worked for Scott in that period, and he was always an easy person for me to work with. He was enlightened in his view of the Senate and the Senate's role, and we rarely had a problem. Gerald Frank was designated by Hatfield to serve with the commission. We set up the commission and

brought in six or seven outsiders, all of whom would have had some relevance to the kinds of problems we would be dealing with. That was the origin of the Culver Commission.

I served ex officio with them as did Jerry Frank on behalf of Hatfield, I don't remember what title we had. Everybody agreed that former Senator Harold Hughes would make an excellent chairman for this group, and he did. We got someone named Vincent Rock, who had served in similar capacities, to become the staff director of the commission, and he did an excellent job in connection with it. He and I together worked out the strategy for the study. We outlined a number of the areas that we wanted to explore. We wanted to do something that would have some practical possibilities so we decided at the outset not to get involved with the question of committee jurisdictions per se, but only in the sense that they might relate to the consolidation of the all-Senate functions. Vincent Rock ran an excellent commission. I thought his people were well selected. The only suggestion I made to him on staff was to include Ernest Griffith as a writer of one of the studies.

We had three or four candidates for the job of staff director; Vincent was one of them. I hardly knew him, I think I had met him once or twice, and I knew he was interested in government structures and organization. There was a professor from George Washington University who was also considered who had not

impressed me at all. I had done a preliminary interview with some of these people. I felt the fellow from George Washington was just interested in getting connected with something in the Senate and it didn't matter what, but that he had no real grasp of what we were trying to do. When the selection came out, the chairman, who was Hughes, liked that professor from GW. I decided I really had to stand firm, because I couldn't see myself working with him. I just felt that his attitude towards the Congress was one of supercilious superiority among other things and I knew it would go nowhere. So I got Hughes on the side and I said, "I really have to caution you against it. I don't care which other one you pick, but I think that's one that you had better not pick." Well, I can't remember now exactly how it was done, but it came to Vincent Rock, and Hughes was very skeptical of Vincent Rock, but in the end, of course, he found that he was highly suitable for the job and he did do a remarkable job.

We brought in Mark Trice as a former Republican secretary of the Senate to give it some depth. We brought in educators, I think there were two college presidents on it. We brought in the woman who later became secretary of commerce, whose name now escapes me. I think she was the "House woman" in a lot of corporations because she was well known. She was a Ph.D. in economics and a very able person, but we were still at that stage where you were using women as symbols almost more than in terms of their

real competence. She came highly recommended on the basis of her past tasks. Her later activities as secretary of commerce and her work on the commission certainly underscored her capabilities.

RITCHIE: Was that Juanita Kreps?

VALEO: Yes, I guess it was. Again, I did not know her. Beth Shotwell knew of her and had recommended her very highly, among others. But in any event, that was the way the commission got underway. It met once a month, people came in for the meetings. Rock's staff people did the preliminary work, prepared the papers. The two issues I think that gave us the most difficulty were the question of consolidating control under one roof, and the question of televising the Senate proceedings. I favored, of course, the idea of consolidation under one essential staff director for the Senate, the secretary or the sergeant at arms whatever the case might be, but under one. I didn't favor the idea of televising the Senate debates, at least not on a random basis, and certainly not with the press having the right to choose when they wanted to and when they didn't want to do it.

The first problem was the question of consolidation. I don't know if I mentioned this previously, but I had a talk with the then Sergeant at Arms Nordy Hoffman, who had not been there for very long. He was appointed to the job primarily in gratitude by the Democrats for his work as staff director of the campaign

committee. They wanted to take care of him, and I think that's basically why he was selected when Bill Wannell resigned. I talked to him about the recommendation for the consolidation under the secretary, which the committee had adopted unanimously at that point. I told him that if he would go along with it, I would resign within a year and let him take the job. He wasn't sure that he wanted to, not because he didn't trust me, but he didn't trust Stan Kimmitt. This was what was bothering him. He thought he was going to have a problem with Stan Kimmitt's competing with him for that job if it were done that way. He didn't say that he would oppose it, but I couldn't get his positive endorsement of it. I don't know what would have happened had it actually reached the point of trying to implement that recommendation, whether Nordy would have gone with it or not. I don't think he would have opposed it vehemently, certainly not if Mansfield were majority leader because Mansfield was completely in favor of it.

The real problem I felt would be with Bill Cochrane in the Rules Committee, which now has a well-entrenched bureaucracy, which Cochrane had a great deal to do with entrenching. It had been very free before that. Ironically enough, when Senator Jordan of North Carolina was chairman of that committee, Cochrane was no problem even though he was on Jordan's personal staff. Jordan was always agreeable to doing it almost any way that I suggested. I never ran into any problems in dealing with Jordan. But after he

died and [Howard] Cannon took over, I guess they found Cochrane a job on that committee staff and then he worked for Cannon. Cannon was not the same sort of personality as Jordan and I think he left it pretty much to Cochrane to run the committee staff. Cochrane was interested in consolidating and extending its powers. I knew there would be resistance there.

But these issues never really had to be faced because Mansfield announced his retirement just at about this point, and once his influence was gone I knew the chances of getting the commission's recommendations through would be extremely remote. I went to Culver and pointed that out to him. He was still willing to try to push it, but he also didn't at this point want to stir too many hornets' nests. So I think the thing died a gentle death, after Mansfield left and I left. I think the recommendations of the commission were essentially right, and I'd go further and say they were were profoundly right. If the Senate is ever going to be a fully functioning twentieth century—let alone twenty-first—body, most of those recommendations make a great deal of sense, and they'll still have to do it. So far as I know, there have been no attempts made by Hatfield to press for the changes. Anyway, he was much more concerned with the automation part, and so he never really pushed any of the other things that were involved.

On the televising of the debates, I lost that one. I think the commission agreed that it would be a good idea to televise them. But so far as I know they have not yet implemented that to any great extent. Mansfield would have opposed it in any event, and Scott would have gone along with him in opposition to it, had there been any effort to open the Senate up to TV as was done on the House side. Our objections were essentially the same: for the same reasons that you don't televise the Supreme Court and its proceedings, that it tends to take away from the dignity of the process. The press tends to operate for humor and for drama, and if it didn't do that there would be very little interest in the debates in any event. So we felt that the options should remain with the Senate itself to decide when it wanted to do it, and that it should be done—at least I felt that it should be done—for major ceremonial occasions or for great moments in the Senate's history. But I felt that choice should be the body's itself, not the TV networks, because the objectives of the two were somewhat different. The Senate's was a legislative purpose, the TV was largely to keep the public interested and entertained. Sometimes those two run together, but very often they do not. That's particularly marked in telecasting as distinct from newspaper coverage which there has never been any question about. I never favored secret sessions of the Senate, I saw no purpose in them, but they did hold them from time to time.

That's the story behind the Culver Commission, and I think it sits up there in four or five volumes on the shelf. Perhaps somebody will come along someday and start from that and go on from there.

RITCHIE: Did you find that many members of the Senate were interested in this, or was it just Culver and Hughes and a few people like them?

VALEO: There were a lot of people complaining about the inadequacies of the services of the Senate at that point. There were people beginning to say, "God, we've just got too much to do, we can't handle it." Well, the more they added staff, the less time they had to do anything. This was part of the problem which one could see developing. The need to try to bring some order out of this chaos was growing very rapidly. We took what was the simplest place to start, the overall staff structure, we knew the problems of organization and the structure of the committees and the senators' own offices would be something maybe for the twenty-first century but not likely in our lifetimes. But we did feel we could do something with the all-Senate services, and I still think that can be done. If you have a leadership which is deeply interested in the Senate per se, and is not running for the presidency or something else, and if there is a secretary appointed who reflects that, or a sergeant at arms who reflects that, you could get a fairly well run Senate.

If you don't, the Senate will fall back into the ways of many state legislatures in which the jobs in the overall Senate staff structure become essentially political—not even plums, but in some ways just political dumping grounds: you don't know what to do with somebody, put him over in the secretary's office, or put him in the sergeant at arms' office, or something of that sort. That's the great danger, and to run a contemporary Senate it's not enough to do it that way. You have to have a staff which is first of all self-respecting and which can add something to the quality of the Senate's production as a legislative body, and as an advisory and counseling body with the president in some areas. I'm not even looking at the problem of where you go beyond that when you look at the House and the Senate together, whether it is conceivable that you could ever have an integrated congressional staff structure as exists in the British system, where you have two separate bodies but actually all of the staff people are affected by the same basic regulations.

I think one of the things that's going to have to come, one of the ways I see as a possible solution of this problem, is a drastic change in the way you handle state constituent business. As it is now, the great bulk of the staff in senators' offices is still essentially performing an ombudsman function. If somehow or other there were some guarantees that somewhere else in the government the ombudsman function can be performed as intimately

and as personalized as in a senator's office, you could then by offering job security as a condition for the removal of those jobs to a central government office, let's say the Library of Congress for want of a better place, or the Congressional Research Service or wherever, if you could remove those jobs from direct control by senators and then really clap a ceiling on the personnel that remains directly available to members themselves, I think you'd have the first step.

First of all, you would provide job security for the people that are involved and hence the need to drop everything for a constituent request or a constituent inquiry would not be quite as overpowering as it is now. The trade off of job security for the removal from the immediate association with the senator's offices might possibly give you a way to it. I know of no other way. But this would still be very difficult to do. Most members don't trust anything that they can't see or touch, sometimes with good reason. How would you prevent that kind of an organization, if you were to set it up, from falling into the ways of any bureaucracy where it takes you two months to get an answer to a letter, I don't know, but I think we have to think in those terms if you are ever going to deal with the problem of order in the Senate itself.

RITCHIE: Of course, the members like to show their constituents that they were the ones who facilitated things.

VALEO: It's conceivable that you could still do that, even under that system. If the letter came into the senator, one of the requirements might be you answer it in terms of "your letter to the senator, he has urged me to do this," or whatever. There are ways in which you might deal with the immediate tactical problem. But I think the more fundamental problem is to get senators to trust a group which is not immediately under their individual control and under their purview. As it is now, this is already happening in terms of individual offices. You know, they have branches out in the field in a large state and they're all connected by computers so they don't see a lot of the mail anyhow. But they know in the last analysis that they can change that if they want, so long as the budget is under their control. The key to it of course would have to be the changing of the financial structure. I obviously don't favor anything like the British system where an individual member of the House of Lords or the Commons is really a vote and nothing more. We're nowhere near that. That involves a party structure which we don't even begin to have. But I do think that if you're not going to go that route, then you've got to, as a practical matter, remove a great deal of the staff, that is now handling constituent requests, out from under the individual offices.

Then you come to the question: what do you do next about professional staff who presumably would be left, who do not

necessarily deal primarily with constituent matters but who deal with matters of substance? There your choices are rather clear. In our system you either build a strong committee staff structure and recognize it as being nonpartisan but essentially one that is a counterfoil for the bureaucracy in the executive branch. Alternatively, that loses all meaning and you simply give a member in his own office sufficient professional staff to staff the committees that he's on but can't attend. It's interesting, one of the suggestions from [Philip] Hart, after whom this building is named, was to permit staff to do preliminary hearings, to hold the hearings in lieu of the senators as one way of saving their time. Well, the proposal raises a real question, whether this function can be performed and still give that personal contact under the constitutional right of petition which is the essential attribute of a legislative person. I would say no, that you shouldn't do that, that if a senator can't be there to hear it, or at least to receive it, then the Senate ought not to be doing it at all. I think the loss of the personal contact with the public would be the beginning of the end of the Senate.

If senators approach the problem from the proper height, as we've discussed already, in the Toynbee analogy, instead of trying to handle issues in great detail, they wouldn't have to think in terms of having staff people to run a referee kind of procedure for them. It's interesting that Hart, who was so dissatisfied

with his own achievements in the Senate, would have made that particular suggestion. He felt the Senate was beyond his reach and I think that explained his reaction. It was because he was trying to grasp the role of the Senate at the wrong level, in my judgment, rather than at the height that would have given him some real input into policy without leaving him bewildered and confused because he was not able to deal with enough of the detail.

RITCHIE: What do you account for the basic explosion of the staff? When you first came here, a senator probably had a half dozen people working in his office; now they've got thirty or forty working there, and the committees are big bureaucracies. Despite the role of people like Mansfield who wanted to keep levels low, between the 1950s and the 1970s the staff just shot up enormously.

VALEO: Yes, there are a number of factors. One has to accept, first of all, the fact that there was a propensity to grow or a pressure to grow as a result of the increasing complexity of the issues. After all, you look at the State Department or look at the Defense Department. The growth is not very much different in the Senate than it is in these other departments over the same period. I think the growing complexity of the issues and the growing demands on the federal government for responses to situations that emerge from these issues, I think that is the overriding consideration.

Then there are a couple of other factors: if you're going to be a miniature president, you have to have a miniature cabinet, and your cabinet is going to be your professional staff. Since all one hundred members think of themselves essentially as miniature presidents—they may not use that term, but that's really what it amounts to—as responsible for everything that happens within their ken, they're going to have to have a cabinet which will prompt them on each of the issues, because they obviously can't keep up with them themselves. Again, I don't see that as a major problem; I think that's legitimate. If you have five subjects which you are following very closely, you should really have five experts advising you. There's nothing wrong with that. The only question is whether you have them on committees or whether you have them in your own personal office. I think from the point of view of legislative function, it's infinitely better for the country to have them on the committee staff rather than in personal offices. But the need for professional staff is quite real. You cannot make sound judgments in five major fields of government activity, or a half a dozen or ten or whatever a member might be deeply interested in, let alone voting on the floor on another twenty-five, you cannot make informed judgments given the amount of time that's available to you without a good deal of professional help.

I think what's very important is that professional help try to think at the level that the senator should be looking at these problems. This is where you begin to run into the problem—the staff finds it cannot think of all the details by itself, because it has lowered the level at which it is looking at these problems. It isn't enough just to say that there should be democratic processes in the Philippines, you have to say there should be elections on February 7, or February 10. Staff feels a compulsion to give that kind of advice. That is an improper form of advice, certainly from staff to members and from Congress to a foreign country. It's probably improper even in the presidency or the State Department, but it's certainly improper, highly improper, from any member of Congress. It has no relevance to anything except to, perhaps, how a situation looks in the newspapers. So there I think is the problem. You've brought in an enormous number of staff people to deal with problems in a degree of detail which is not essential nor even desirable from the point of view of legislating effectively. I think this is where the growth has come from mostly and it tends to blur the principle of separation of powers.

Then another factor, which is the natural propensity for bureaucracy to grow anywhere, not just in the Senate but anywhere in government. When you add that, I think you've got the main reasons for this enormous expansion in the last twenty years. But

as I say, I'd put the complexity of the issues first. The public tendency is to put it the other way. The tendency is always to assume that bureaucracies will automatically grow. There is an element of truth in that, but I don't think it applies so much in Congress as it does downtown. I remember when I first came into government and was at the Library of Congress. This was when the government was quite small, there was a woman whom I thought was very wise. She said, "The real problem is with the Civil Service laws. They judge the importance of your position by the number of people you supervise, and until they change that basic approach to the evaluation of jobs and their relative worth," she said, "there will always be the tendency to grow." I can see that in an executive bureaucracy, but I don't think it is the main cause of growth in the Congress.

RITCHIE: Were there any members of the Senate whom you thought put together particularly effective staffs, or really used their staffs wisely?

VALEO: I'd have to think for a minute to see if there were any that were really good. I didn't know enough about the inner structure of those offices. I know which senators functioned effectively and which ones were always harassed and which ones were not. Whether that was because they had put together effective staffs or not I don't know. So I can't really answer that question with any certitude.

RITCHIE: It's a hard one to judge. I know that from time to time at elections they've said that this senator lost because his staff could never keep track of what he had done in constituent services, etc . . . . .

VALEO: Well, I'm sure Hatfield with his automated system has been very effective. Certainly Mansfield kept up—if you're looking at it from that angle, I was looking at it more in terms of substantive legislation—but from the point of view of keeping up with your constituent needs, I think many of them have done that. Anyone who was reelected you might say has done that well and has organized his office well enough for that.

RITCHIE: In terms of the legislative side, Senator Ted Kennedy always gets a lot of credit for having a well-oiled staff.

VALEO: Yes, his only problem is that he never gets anything passed! He has a lot of professional competence on his staff, but they get very few things passed. Maybe the staff is operating in a vacuum.

RITCHIE: The Culver Commission was just one of a couple of major reform efforts in the 1970s, with the setting up of minority staffs, and the Stevenson-Brock effort to reorganize committees. What was the motivation in the 1970s for all of these attempts to reform the mechanisms of the Senate?

VALEO: I think it was the great freeing of the Senate from the restraints of the old system, which one might describe as the Mansfield Senate. I think this was the major factor. He may have had great personal resistances to some of these pressures for change that grew up, but the effect of the kind of leadership which he ran was to encourage people to think in new ways about how the Senate ought to organize and how it ought to act. Well, when you say every senator must be equal, and you mean it, as Mansfield did, that leads to a whole new line of thinking. How do you make them equal? How do you get more democratic procedures in committee systems? So that was one area of this explosion.

Another one was I think that political scientists were coming into their own in this period, insofar as Congress was concerned. Again I go back to Ernest Griffith, whom I think is sort of the granddaddy of most of this. Political scientists began to make a very significant input at this point into the way the Congress was structured and functioned. A lot of them became members of committee staffs. Some of them were at the Library. A lot of them came in as professional consultants in one form or another, or just as volunteers for that matter. They came out of the universities, a good many of them. I think these were the main sources of this revolution, if you will. But the key factor, for better of for worse, was Mansfield, because he spoke of a Senate which not only welcomed this kind of innovation—personally he may not

have, but he spoke in those terms, and having spoken in those terms this was one of the consequences that flowed from it.

Bear in mind, too, that this was the period in which a lot of faith in the presidency and the bureaucracy was lost because of Vietnam. So many of the people who would have normally turned to those channels, particularly people out of the universities, began to look somewhere else to make some weight felt and to try to push the government in the direction in which they thought it ought to go. And here was the Senate, which was at this point opened up by Mansfield, and many of them came to the Senate. There was a great flow to the Capitol of the kind of people who would normally not even have thought of going to Congress with any idea or any belief or complaint. They would have automatically have thought in terms of the presidency or the executive departments. People like Dick Neustadt, for example, and others who came down to eat crow because they were essentially presidentially-oriented and really didn't see much value in any of the other bodies in the government. Because the Senate played this rather unique role of counterfoil for an executive branch and a president sort of gone wild, on this Vietnamese thing, they came to the Senate as a last hope, almost in desperation. And of course, as we've noted in connection with the Vietnamese war, there's only so much you can do from the Senate about the kind of things that are properly done

by the executive branch. This is sort of what happened, in the sixties especially, and into the seventies.

RITCHIE: You mentioned earlier that Senator Mansfield said, "We'd better get out because it's going to get worse."

VALEO: Yes. I used the other phrase. I used: "Apres nous, le deluge."

RITCHIE: Did you talk with him in advance about his decision to retire?

VALEO: Yes, he talked to me several times. I wrote his farewell statement. But before we got around to doing it, he'd been up and down this ladder a few times. One time when the Senate went real bad he said, "You know, I really don't need this job. Why should I shorten my life?" There were a couple of times he threatened in private to quit. But I could tell when he was getting close to actual retirement. I was really kind of sharing the feeling myself, because I had been around almost as long as he was, just about the same period of time. He talked to me about it, and he talked about taking care of people on the staff. I guess at this point he had decided to send Beth Shotwell up to the policy committee to take over because we had a vacancy there. He wanted to relieve the people who had been with him a long time and make sure they were taken care of after he left. He began to get very concerned with that.

Then he began to get concerned with me. I told him on a number of occasions not to worry about it, that if he really was ready to leave there was no problem. I said, "I have enough retirement and I'd just as soon go when you go." He said, "No, no, you have to stay here," and we'd go through this periodically. Then finally he must have talked to his wife about it. She was the kind of woman who might go one way one day and then change her mind for the next day. I felt that finally she had come around to agreeing to the idea of retirement and then he ran in quickly to the Senate floor to do it before she changed her mind. So that's the way it was done.

RITCHIE: Did she have a lot of influence on him?

VALEO: Oh, a great influence. I think you have to know about the background of the family. Some of this has been written up, but I don't think her role is fully understood in it. She was a schoolteacher, I believe, in Montana, and he was at that point a grade school graduate when he came back out of a number of years in military service of one kind or another, at a rather low level. He'd been in China and in the Philippines and served as a common foot soldier, I guess, a PFC in one service, the Marines. He'd served in all three services, and he'd gone in at a very early age. He'd lied about his age. When he came back I guess he was working as a mucker in the mines and somehow met Maureen, maybe through her family, who were interested in politics.

She encouraged him to go back to school, and he got his high school equivalent rather quickly and then went on, I'm sure with her encouragement and help, and got his M.A. He began teaching Far Eastern and Latin American history in Missoula. I guess they were married at that point, but life was very tough for them in that period. When he first ran, his campaign was handled primarily by his students. He didn't have any money, machine or anything else, his machine was mostly his students. I remember when he was in the House I used to go over and his wife worked at the office every day in that period. Then came the Senate.

RITCHIE: And she was something of an advisor to him during this period?

VALEO: I think whenever he felt he had a major political decision to make, whether to do something or not to do something, she came into the picture in some way. I know that he would do that with any of the speeches I drafted for him which might have been of a highly controversial and climactic nature in terms of a policy, something which was obviously going to get a lot of public attention if he did it. Before doing it he would take counsel with her. He'd say, "I'm going to take this one home with me." That usually meant he was going to consult with her on it. In the earlier political campaigns she was quite active. Later on she didn't do too much of that.

RITCHIE: Did you concur with him on the retirement, or did you try to talk him out of it?

VALEO: No, quite the opposite. I didn't encourage him, but I certainly didn't discourage him. I made it very clear that if he was worried about me and what was going to happen to me, that that was not a worry and that he shouldn't. Whatever was right for him he should do. I didn't really have any strong feelings one way or the other. I could have stayed around for a little while longer, but if it meant going that day it wouldn't have made any difference. I felt that very strongly in the job as secretary of the Senate, that had I not been in that kind of personal position, had I not had the leadership support that I had, the job would have been an intolerable one, particularly when it got involved with the federal elections and the campaign contribution law. I had to have that independence, first of all of income, and my retirement was adequate for that, and I had to have his support, because otherwise I would have had great difficulty with the job. I think any secretary of the Senate, and perhaps even more in the future, will have to be conscious of that, until such time as the support services, if they ever do, get out from under strictly political pressures and the whole system has to get out, not just the secretary's offices.

RITCHIE: You mentioned also that Mansfield was very insistent that you stay on as secretary.

VALEO: Yes, this was one of the few real problems in our relationship. I didn't really want to stay on. I mean, I had no objections to staying on for a few months to get [Robert] Byrd started, but I'd really had enough of the Senate, I felt I had made my major contribution. But he was very insistent. He said he had discussed it with Byrd and that Byrd said it was all right, there was no problem with it. Even up until that point I said, "Are you sure? Because I don't mind staying on for a few months, but I really don't need it. I've got some other ideas and some things I want to do." I'd begun to work out in my own mind what I wanted to do afterward. He said, "No, no, it's all taken care of." Well, it wasn't taken care of, and the net result was that in the caucus Stan Kimmitt made a play for the job. He had been making a play for it all along, for a long period of time. He didn't really want the job of secretary of the Senate, he wanted the job of sergeant at arms. Nordy Hoffman had expressed concerns about that to me at an earlier time. But Byrd wanted Kimmitt off the floor, apparently, and had indicated that he wasn't going to change Nordy Hoffman, so Kimmitt decided that he'd run for secretary. I guess [Ernest] Hollings got involved in it, because Hollings was connected with the Senate Campaign Committee. All of this had to do with the campaign committee—at least this is the way I pieced it together later—and Hollings had made a commitment to Nordy Hoffman to take care of him in some way, and he must have made the same commitment to Stan Kimmitt on the assumption that I

would leave—it was not personally directed against me. He had just assumed that I would leave when Mansfield left, I'm sure that's the case. As a matter of fact, Hollings wanted me to take the job of historian! Afterwards he said, "Why don't you take the job as historian?" and I explained to him that I didn't want that, that that was not what I would like to do. But once learning that Kimmitt was after the secretary's job, I felt that I had to stay with it through an election and be defeated if nothing else, but I couldn't withdraw under pressure. Again, Mansfield trying to do I'm sure the right thing, wound up giving me a problem by getting me into a situation that I had no desire to be in at all. I would have been glad to have been free of it. But having been challenged, then I felt it necessary to stay with it, if for no other reason than to sort out who my friends were and who weren't.

RITCHIE: Once you found out that Stan Kimmitt was running against you, did you campaign for reelection?

VALEO: Yes, for one day. I called every member. I guess I reached almost every member. It was on a Sunday—didn't find out until a Sunday. I made all the calls, but by that time the commitments had already been made, I'm sure again on the same assumption, many of them, that I would not be running and that I would have nothing to do with it.

RITCHIE: You didn't find any old wounds opening up at that stage?

VALEO: No, not at all. Oh, maybe two or three that I had been a little tough on in the campaign contributions law and had not yielded on what they thought might be desirable.

RITCHIE: I wanted to ask you also at that stage, looking at the Democratic party as it stood at the time when you left, and the divisions within it: what was the nature of the Democratic party by 1976 in the Senate? Were they together? Were they divided? Was it a fragmented party?

VALEO: No, I don't think it was fragmented. I think it was cohesive enough. It was not at the height of its unity under Mansfield. I think that came earlier. But it was still quite cohesive. Probably what brought it together most, even more than the Vietnamese War, was the Watergate thing. I think that was probably the height of party unity, but that was really all Senate unity as well, one could even go beyond that. It was the apex of the Mansfield Senate, if I can put it that way, because 80 or 90 percent of the Republicans plus almost without exception, maybe one or two, maybe Long of Louisiana or one or two others might have been less inclined to go along with the rest on the Democratic side on Watergate, but not more than two or three. They were all united in the belief that Nixon had to go. The only

question was how you were going to do it. So I think that was the height of party unity and Senate unity and from then on I think there was some falling off. But when we left it was still essentially a unified party.

There was no other potential leader involved at that point that they wanted to replace Mansfield with. I never even heard a rumor of a replacement of Mansfield. Members, I think, on the whole were quite contented to be Democrats, at least as far as the Senate was concerned; they might have had trouble in their states by being Democrats but certainly not in the Senate. Harry Byrd [Jr.], who was at the end of the party so to speak, still preferred to be a Democrat rather than a Republican and he met with us as part of the Democratic caucus. So it was a unified party, and it was only later after Mansfield left that it began to break up.

RITCHIE: I wondered about how deep the roots of the division between the hawks and the doves had gone? Stan Kimmitt, I suspect, was probably identified with the more conservative military-oriented Democrats, like Henry Jackson, and John Stennis. You were identified with Mike Mansfield, who was more with the antiwar group. Were there any lingering problems about that in the party?

VALEO: Not at all. I don't think so. At that point just about all of them were doves. If they weren't, they weren't talking. Even Jackson I think would have been ready to see the war end at that point, quite ready to see it end. No, it had to do more with politics and favors and that sort of thing. Kimmitt was doing a lot of favors for a lot of people; and I was not doing any favors at that point. I did them earlier, but I didn't do it at that point, and that's the way it is in politics.

RITCHIE: "What have you done for me lately?"

VALEO: That's right, the famous [Alben] Barkley dictum.

RITCHIE: During the period that Kimmitt was the Democratic secretary, did you work well with him?

VALEO: I didn't have much to do with him. He was on the floor most of the time. I had very little to do with him, actually.

RITCHIE: I've always found it interesting that Mansfield would have a man with a military background in that post.

VALEO: Well, that's one of the appointments that he later regretted, and was very honest in saying it to me. I think I told you that when he originally thought of appointing Kimmitt I had had some sounds from the Montana office which made it clear they didn't think it would be such a good idea, and that I had tried

to suggest an alternative to Mansfield, without ever mentioning Kimmitt. But he was very adamant in the way he slapped me down on that. There were two or three appointments or people he felt later rather disappointed in. One was Charlie Ferris and another one was Stan Kimmitt. When Stan Kimmitt first came in he had him in the majority leader's office before the shift-over had come so that he could become secretary for the majority. He took my old desk and the first thing he did was put up a plaque, something by Elbert Hubbard, a poem or a wise saying by Hubbard which came right out of the Rover Boy treatises of an earlier period, as I remembered them. This one was "If you're working for someone you must be real loyal to him," and so forth. Well, this really rubbed Mansfield the wrong way! He felt a little sick to his stomach on this one. He said, "Jesus, the first thing he did was to hang that up over his desk!"

But Kimmitt had a lot of ins with the military, and that meant military planes when you needed them and a number of things of that sort, and that was an important asset. And then he had also been a student of Mansfield's in Montana, so that gave him another claim, and apparently he had been a fairly good student. But Mansfield was furious with him, partly because of his retirement situation. Kimmitt was drawing a couple of pensions as well as drawing the Senate salary. Mansfield had the pay schedule that changed so that Kimmitt's total income from the government

wouldn't be about 30 percent more than Mansfield's. That was another thing that gave him a lot of trouble in connection with that appointment.

Charlie Ferris was another one he got very angry with. Charlie was a politician and a conniver. I guess he got in through Ken Teasdale who was staff director of the policy committee and had been a highly effective lawyer in the civil rights struggle. He brought in Charlie Ferris, and later wrote a letter of apology for having done so. Ferris was always running around the Senate looking for the guy who was going to be the next president. He wanted to attach himself to him. He tried Humphrey and he tried Bobby Kennedy and Teddy Kennedy and two or three others that he thought might be possibilities, and Mansfield just despised that sort of thing. But then of course Mansfield got eighty or so senators to sign a petition praising Ferris to the sky in order to get him appointed to the FCC under the other dictum—the LaGuardia political dictum—that in politics you're always doing for your enemies what you should be doing for your friends. But it's all part of the game.

RITCHIE: You mentioned also that Senator Byrd and Kimmitt didn't get along very well.

VALEO: When I first got wind that Kimmitt wanted the job, I went to see Byrd and Byrd said, "I think he's got it." I wasn't

close to Byrd, but I knew him, and I knew enough, and I assumed that he had discussed this with Mansfield, and he had agreed with Mansfield that I'd stay on. But I don't think he had counted on the Kimmitt thing at that time. I think that was valid. But the word apparently had gotten around that Byrd wanted Kimmitt, which was not really the truth. I could tell that from the calls that I made afterwards. But when I went to see him, he said, "I think he's got it, Frank." "Well," I said, "it doesn't change it. I think I've got to go through with it in any event." I said, " I just feel from the point of view of my own conscience I have to do that." I said, "One thing I think you might consider doing, if he does win it, is that I think I'd better stay on for two months to make sure that there's a smooth transition, because I think there have been a lot of changes and I'm really the only one that's privy to most of them. I think in a two-months period we can make a smooth transition." "Oh," he said, "I'll do that right away. You don't have to worry about that. Make it three months." Which was the way it was done, eventually. He moved immediately after the caucus had decided to let it be effective three months later.

RITCHIE: What was Senator Byrd's relationship to Senator Mansfield? How well did they work together?

VALEO: That's a hard question to answer. They worked all right, but they certainly were not close. Byrd kept his own counsel most of the time as did Mansfield. Byrd seemed only

interested in floor proceedings and in smaller bills. He was doing favors for members who had bills they wanted passed. In the meetings with Carl Albert and the House leadership we'd be talking about major issues, what are we going to do on Watergate or Vietnam, and he'd bring up some little bill that some member was interested in and he would ask the House leaders, "How long are you going to hold it up in the House?" That was the way he worked and that reflects, in a way, what's happened to the Senate. It's become more of a state legislature than it used to be. It's lost some of its uniqueness, I think.

RITCHIE: Well, Senator Byrd has certainly been much more interested in procedure and in the rules than Senator Mansfield ever was.

VALEO: Mansfield never was interested in that sort of thing. He used to get furious at the parliamentarians because they couldn't get the floor situation clear for him. Or at least he couldn't understand them when they tried to explain it.

RITCHIE: I wondered how useful it was to have a whip who was so thoroughly steeped in the rules.

VALEO: He liked having Byrd on the floor. It made life a lot easier for him. Byrd was perfectly willing to close the Senate at night, almost every night, and that sort of thing. So Mansfield felt greatly relieved. Byrd got very effective at

propounding unanimous consent agreements, but bear in mind that he was working with Mansfield backing, and people knew that. So what he had in those last days of Mansfield was really Mansfield's influence. When he began to go on his own, then he began to run into very great problems, in part because he was much more partisan in his viewpoint. Partisan in an odd kind of way. I mean, he's not exactly Mr. Democrat, but he's partisan in terms of Byrd and Byrd's leadership ability on the floor. He used to express himself in those terms, and that of course is precisely what Mansfield did not do. It's one of the things that made it very difficult for Byrd to understand after Mansfield why things were not running as they ran with Mansfield.

He never had a high regard for Mansfield's ability as a legislator. He just thought that Mansfield was obviously not a leader of any kind, because leaders are supposed to lead, and obviously lead, not lead subtly as Mansfield did. You're supposed to be first, not last. But the Senate works on a Chinese pattern, or the College of Cardinals pattern. In a way it's a devious body, but that's the wrong word. It isn't a devious body, it's just that if you have ambitions you keep them to yourself in the Senate, and eventually all things come to you.

RITCHIE: Speaking of ambitions, the challenge that Byrd made to Ted Kennedy was one of the more dramatic changes in the Senate, back in 1971. Byrd challenged Kennedy and won by a very narrow vote against Kennedy's expectations.

VALEO: Yes. I think [Warren] Magnuson was the key vote in that. He was angry at Kennedy for something, I forget what it was. But I remembered there was something that bothered him, troubled him, Magnuson talked to me about it at the time. I think that was the key vote. He probably drew Jackson and one or two of the others with him. He should normally have been a Kennedy vote, except for something Kennedy had done or said. Then you had Chappaquiddick. It was a low point for the whole Kennedy family mystique. It just reached the saddest point of the whole experience.

RITCHIE: What was Mansfield's role in that election?

VALEO: Totally neutral. He didn't try to defend Kennedy. He made one broad statement, that the leadership was satisfied with the present structure. He would never go further than that, never did in any of the elections. It made Pastore extremely angry at him one time for this reason. He wouldn't endorse Pastore who was his friend and staunch supporter. He said, "This is a decision for the caucus, not for me."

RITCHIE: Did you have a sense that he was dissatisfied with Kennedy as whip in any way?

VALEO: No. He gave no sense of being dissatisfied with Kennedy. On the other hand, he gave no sense that the Senate would fall apart if Kennedy weren't reelected. I think he was probably relieved that Kennedy was defeated. Again, I'm going on assumptions here, but only for two reasons: First of all I think he was worried about the Kennedy family and I think I mentioned he felt they were operating under a bad star and they would always be having troubles and that it would probably kill Ted Kennedy just like it killed his brothers if he kept moving forward in politics. I think that was part of it. Furthermore he didn't like Kennedy's staff people. He had trouble with Kennedy's staff people. I did too. They were pressing, furiously ambitious. One of them later became a congressman from Utah, I'm trying to think of his name, and then he tried to run for the Senate again just a few years ago and was defeated. He was Kennedy's floor man and he was always on the floor when Kennedy was whip. Mansfield did not like him, he had real reservations about him. His name was Wayne Owens.

RITCHIE: You mentioned about how when Senator Byrd took over from Senator Mansfield he was surprised that things didn't run quite the way he expected they would. I was wondering what your evaluation of Senator Byrd has been as the Democratic leader since then.

VALEO: You come to what you want your Democratic leader to do and what do the times demand that he be. If I haven't already made it clear I'd like to state it again. In the Mansfield period you had really three great issues in a historical sense, one being the 1964 Civil Rights bill, another one the Vietnamese War, and the third Watergate. The demand was for a national leader in the Senate, in part because the presidency was the source of the difficulties, and in part because the House leadership at that point was unable to perform the national leadership function for a variety of reasons, perhaps constitutional but also because of the personalities involved. You had John McCormack, who grew up in the Roosevelt period and never even thought that anything like national leadership could come out of a legislative body. This was a place where you sat around and did what the president wanted or didn't, or you dragged your feet if he had something that you didn't want, but you certainly never thought of leading the country from the speaker's seat if you were John McCormack. You thought of your own constituency and maybe doing some odds and ends of good national legislation.

Carl Albert might have had that capacity, but he wasn't in the job long enough and he didn't command that kind of respect in the House. I think on the whole Carl Albert was a good speaker and a very bright man, but the House being what it is, and particularly in those times, I don't think Carl Albert could have

performed it over there, and I don't think he had any inclination to perform it. From our joint leadership meetings, I would say he was perfectly prepared to defer to Mansfield, because Mansfield had already established essentially a national reputation, in the sense that the others had not. So that in a way, with a president who couldn't perform, you had to have some national figure and some place within the government where the national function could be performed, and this I think was why Mansfield was the kind of leader he was. In effect, the times demanded that kind of a leadership somewhere. In a way, it was just like the times leading up to the postwar civil rights struggle. The only place you could perform the leadership role was in the courts, and [Earl] Warren performed that role in many ways at a time when neither Eisenhower nor anyone in the Congress could have done so. I think that explains in a way Mansfield in the Mansfield Senate.

Byrd became leader, you had a [Jimmy] Carter administration to begin with, which meant it was your own administration, which limits what a leader can do, just as Mansfield was limited during the Kennedy period. Until the breakdown of the relationship with Johnson, he was very much limited in what he could do in terms of national leadership, or the kind of impression that he could exude in that setting. So I think one has at least to recognize that any Democratic leader coming first of all in a Carter administration, coming after Mansfield, was in a tough spot. As someone

might have said it was a very tough act to follow, partly because the issues weren't there. You can say you had the Iranian hostages and issues of that kind, but those are footnotes in history. What could you do in any event with that kind of an issue? When you think of anything else that happened during the Carter administration you're talking about contracting the government and putting it back in the hands of the people. You can wear a sweater and make a fireside chat, or you can walk up Pennsylvania Avenue, which is a nice public relations gesture, but in the total sweep of history it has a very limited meaning. You had that kind of a situation. Nobody felt Carter should be doing other things from what he was doing, the public's impression was that he was oh, a nice enough man, but really kind of a minor figure.

So you start with that, there were no great demands being made on the government at the time. So you had a Byrd. I don't know what Byrd's ultimate ambitions are. If he ever had any ambitions for the presidency I don't think he's had them for some years. Maybe he wants to go on the court. I suppose that's a possibility, but the older he gets the less likely that is. So he makes his role in the Senate. His whole viewpoint of the world was essentially a limited one. He began to expand it somewhat by going to China and going to Russia, and he's been doing it more in recent years, but at the beginning he had very little interest in foreign problems, other than keeping defense strong, in a national

sense he was concerned with that. He had been on the wrong side of the civil rights issue, which reduced his effectiveness considerably. I mean, no liberal would trust him after that no matter what happened. He became in a sense a state legislative leader. What else is there for him? There is nowhere in the Democratic party, in the Senate or outside of the Senate, the kind of a readiness to face new issues which demand a different kind of leadership. Now that may come. One more defeat for the Democrats and you may begin to see that kind of demand coming, but it's not there yet, and if it is then you're going to have a different kind of leadership in the Senate again.

RITCHIE: I wondered if Senator Byrd reflected the changes in the Senate in the sense that what goes on on the floor seems to be less important than what goes on in the committees, and that what the Democrats were looking for was somebody to make the trains run on time on the floor rather than to really be a leader of the party?

VALEO: In a way that's maybe all you need at this point. I don't know that the national leadership of the Democratic party can come from the Senate even in the next election. I think it's going to have to come from somewhere else. It would almost have to come from the governorships. That almost seems to be inevitable.

RITCHIE: Why do you think the Jimmy Carter administration, coming in with a Democratic majority in the Senate and House, seemed to be so much at odds with the Congress, when you'd think that they would have been pulling together?

VALEO: I don't think that they were really that much at odds. I think what you had there was the discomfort among Democrats in the Congress that they were going to lose a lot of elections unless Jimmy Carter made a better impression than the impression he was making. I think that's mostly where the dissent was. It's interesting, Carter first came down to the Senate after the Pennsylvania primary. When it looked very clear that he was going to be the nominee, shortly thereafter he came down to a Democratic caucus. Mansfield introduced him around and he made a very decent impression. Everybody figured, "Well, he is a pleasant surprise." I personally had great difficulties seeing a president coming from a small town in Georgia at that point in the country's history. I just didn't think you could produce a president in that area. But I must say I was completely wrong. Carter first of all had some appeal when he won the Pennsylvania primary, and then when he came down to the Senate I saw the appeal. It was a simplicity, not an unsophisticated simplicity, but it was nevertheless a simplicity and it registered very genuinely. Everybody was enthralled with him, as a matter of fact. He seemed like such a welcome relief after all of the

pressures that we'd been under for so many years. I think it was Hubert Humphrey who got up and suggested that the caucus unanimously endorse him, and they did, they unanimously endorsed his candidacy.

RITCHIE: But he never did really have a strong relationship with Congress, did he?

VALEO: No. But a president doesn't really have to develop one. Roosevelt had no strong relationship with Congress. He had a relationship with several congressmen and he dominated the Democratic party but he didn't have a strong relationship with Congress. Truman had it, and I'm not so sure that was healthy. I think it's a kind of in-breeding which is not necessarily the best way to do it. Johnson, you might say, had it, and look what happened. So the fact that Carter didn't have a close relationship with Congress is not a decisive consideration in my judgment, any more than in the case of Reagan. Obviously he's handling the presidency almost independent of Congress, and Congress doesn't know what to do about it. I'm sure there's a lot of hostility, particularly in his own party on this, but they don't know what to do about it. Great presidents root themselves in the voters as their own constituency, not through Congress. They let Congress stew in its juice occasionally if that's what it wants to do. But it's not easy to do that, and it's become increasingly difficult with the two-term limitation on the presidency.

RITCHIE: Carter appointed Mansfield to be ambassador to Japan. Was that Carter's initiative, or did Mansfield express any interest in it?

VALEO: I think Mansfield expressed an interest in an embassy. I think he wanted China, but that had already apparently been promised to Leonard Woodcock as part payment for labor's support. I gather he did a rather creditable job in China, the reactions were good.

RITCHIE: What was it that made Senator Mansfield want to become a diplomat just as he was retiring from the Senate?

VALEO: Well, you know he was always interested in foreign policy. We had traveled so much abroad and he knew the world. I guess that's the way he felt he wanted it. I'm surprised he's stayed as long as he has. I should have thought he'd have enough after four or five years of it. But then he seems intrigued by the idea of building up records of longevity. He's going to go in the Guinness Book of World Records for a number of things: the longest serving majority leader. And I must say, we never went into the minority while he was majority leader. And here he is the longest serving ambassador to Japan in the history of the country. I knew he would be all right for it. I knew he would have no trouble in the job, but I didn't think he would stay that long. I should think held have gotten tired of it. But then you

come back to the question, what are you going to do when you come back? Go to Florida and take it easy? Go to Montana? He's not going to go back to Montana, it's too cold there now.

RITCHIE: Have you seen him in Japan since he's been there?

VALEO: Oh, yes, several times. But I don't keep in close contact with him.

RITCHIE: He seems to be relishing the position, I gather.

VALEO: Yes, I guess he likes it. Again, I think you come back to his wife. She'll make the decision, and it will happen the same way: she'll say "We've been here long enough," and he'll say "All right," and then he'll get in quick with his resignation before she can change her mind. I think that's probably the way it will work.

RITCHIE: Looking back over your own career as secretary of the Senate, what were your proudest accomplishments?

VALEO: If you're thinking in terms of the office of the secretary, as distinct from my second role, or probably my first role which was as an advisor to Mansfield . . . .

RITCHIE: Why don't we look at each role.

VALEO: Yes, there are two of them. I think that in terms of the secretary's role, I think the effort to push the structure of the Senate staff in the direction of a nonpartisan, nonpolitical grouping, except for the principal figures in the office, the secretary and possibly the assistant secretary, but certainly the secretary. I don't think there's any desirability in having that a nonpolitical office at this point given the way the Senate functions or the Senate's history. At some time that may become desirable, but it's not now. I think my efforts to push it in that direction; I think the establishment of the new offices first of the curator and the historian—not to flatter you people here, but I think the concept of this office is an important one, and I think the way [Richard] Baker and you and the other people have developed it has added great luster to the Senate. I think those things are important. I think my efforts to preserve the dignity of the Senate and to give a larger sense of their role to the people who work in the secretary's office and their importance to the Senate and the nation, which I tried to communicate to them and which I think has not always been the case, I think those are the things I'm very contented with. I don't know if I mentioned this earlier, but when I first came into the office, my predecessor, Emery Frazier, had brought in all of the black employees. Did I mention that incident?

RITCHIE: Yes.

VALEO: I don't want to go over it again, but I think by the time I left that attitude had changed greatly in the secretary's office. That was a kind of carry over almost of a pre-Civil War period in the Senate's history. Bear in mind, I'm not interested in breaking down tradition. I think one of the biggest mistakes the Senate made was to yield to press pressure and close the barbershop. I thought that was a very desirable kind of carry over from the past, as distinct from the one involving the black employees in the secretary's office. I think those things were very important to me, and I felt very good about having left them the way I left them. And I must say, to Stan Kimmitt's credit, and certainly to Bill Hildenbrand's, that they both continued that pattern. I don't want to write the book on this secretary until its over; sometimes it takes a little longer to learn what you're really supposed to be doing in an office of public trust. So I think some of that will hold no matter what kind of secretary you have, it's bound to. Those things made the job very worthwhile doing.

RITCHIE: What about on the other side?

VALEO: On the other side, it was a kind of personal vindication designing the strategy for the civil rights floor battle. That stands out very strongly in my mind. In part

because not too long before that I had made my first vote count and was about eighteen off, so I felt that in that period of time I learned very quickly what was involved and how you could do it. I think that strategy, which involved mostly the keeping of a quorum on the floor, and then of course the bill itself, seeing that bill go through after weeks and weeks and weeks of effort to the vote on cloture, that was a great moment. Then, of course, on the Vietnamese War, the statements I wrote which were widely quoted in the press, even though my name wasn't attached to them and which probably helped to form public opinion, also helped to make Johnson describe me as "the most dangerous man in the American government" at one point, among his more effervescent statements. I think those things stand well with me.

RITCHIE: Did you ever feel a problem in the degree of anonymity that's required of a really good staff person, of giving your best to somebody else whose name will go on it?

VALEO: No, I did not, I think because in that period of my life I would not have had the capability of doing it in my own name. I mean, for personal problems of various kinds, personal limitations, it would not have been possible for me to do that. So that I never felt that. As a matter of fact, I sort of welcomed the anonymity of that period. I don't think I'd react the same way today, but at that time I think it was a unique kind of combination. Mansfield needed someone like that, and I needed

to be someone like that in that period. I think those two things came together in a very fortuitous combination for that period of time.

End of Interview #15