Lessons in Global Security – Part 2

May 11, 2015

SSI_logoAbout this blog post series: In this two-part blog post, we review new publications from the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). As in “Lessons in Global Security – Part 1,” in this post, we continue our focus on SSI publications covering U.S. national security, public policy, and international relations topics. (Permission granted for use of Strategic Studies Institute-United States Army War College logo)

 The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security

008-000-01076-5This monograph reviews the outlook of the Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Lebanon, Israel, and Syria. Of these, Iran and Saudi Arabia are becoming the two behemoth forces in the Middle East. While Saudi Arabia has most control over Gulf-area Arab states and is a close ally with the United States, Iran’s closest Arab allies are Syria and the Palestinian territories that support Hamas and Hezbollah. The author presents several conclusions and recommendations for the U.S. policymakers to consider, emphasizing strategic interests as a way to bolster peaceful negotiations with Middle Eastern states, rather than persistent conflict over reform and democracy.

Recent newsworthy events relating to U.S. and Saudi relationship can be found in this article here:

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/kerry-hopes-win-pause-yemen-war-heads-talks-30839695

(Image is copyright-free from Yalibnan.com)

(Image is copyright-free from Yalibnan.com)

With the current events tie-in, these titles may be appropriate for high school global history classes as well as for university students with coursework relating to international relations and foreign policy arms control.

Legality in Cyberspace: An Adversary View

008-000-01108-7This Letort Papers series title highlights the differences in interpretation between the Euro-Atlantic nations compared to China and Russia’s views of international law in relation to cyberspace activity, including cybersecurity attacks, cyber warfare, and cyber weapons. The authors explore this issue from the Russian perspective to analyze and examine the legal status of various activities in cyberspace, including what constitutes a hostile activity.   The authors adequately present each side of the argument and confirm that to date an agreement on this expanding field of conflict has not yet been met.

US Army Cyber Command image

(Image compliments of US Army Cyber Command website http://www.arcyber.army.mil/)

Within the conclusion section, the authors present implications for U.S. policy makers to consider; including taking a closer observation of how Russia defines cyber warfare and information weapons.   After U.S. policymakers have determined Russian’s interpretations, they may be better equipped to strategizing their defense.

Students participating in cybersecurity and foreign policy programs may be interested in this text. Additionally, students pursuing a law degree may find this text informative for international law classes. Political scientists, diplomats, international law attorneys, intelligence community teams, and military strategists should keep this text on their bookshelf for referral for guidance about complex negotiations.

Army Support of Military Cyberspace Operations: Joint Contexts and Global Escalation Implications

008-000-01094-3This unclassified monograph examines past and present joint and Army cyberspace military operations, as well as how these operations may fit into the complex and dynamic sphere of international deterrence and escalation. It provides information about the founding and responsibilities of the military units that comprise the U.S. Cyber Command for offensive and defensive initiatives with network operations for protection of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) global information grid.   Primarily, these operations were developed to provide a deterrence to a nuclear threat, prior to the 21st century. Now these defenses are used to influence national response across the intelligence community and law enforcement as a method for deterrence and escalation to possibly reduce risk.

Military science and cyberspace or cybersecurity students may be interested in this text. Additionally, U.S. military personnel, U.S. international community, law enforcement, and historians may find this book useful in their operations.

(Image compliments of US Army Cyber Command website http://www.arcyber.army.mil/)

(Image compliments of US Army Cyber Command website http://www.arcyber.army.mil/)

The US Government Bookstore is receiving new print titles on a weekly basis from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, so please check for future available titles on the topics of U.S. national and global security, cyberspace capabilities, combatting terrorism, and political science issues, such as international relations and foreign diplomacy, that will be added to this growing collection at this link: http://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1609

How can I get these new SSI publications?

Shop Online Anytime: You can buy the following  publications (with FREE Standard Shipping worldwide) from the U.S. Government Online Bookstore website at http://bookstore.gpo.gov:

Order by Phone: You may also Order print editions by calling our Customer Contact Center Monday through Friday, 8 am to 5:30 pm Eastern (except US Federal holidays). From US and Canada, call toll-free 1.866.512.1800. DC or International customers call +1.202.512.1800.

Shop our Retail Store: Buy a copy of any print editions from this collection at GPO’s retail bookstore at 710 North Capitol Street NW, Washington, DC 20401, open Monday–Friday, 9 a.m. to 4 p.m., except Federal holidays, Call (202) 512-0132 for information or to arrange in-store pick-up.

Visit a Federal depository library: Search for U.S. Government publications in a nearby Federal depository library. You can find the records for most titles in GPO’s Catalog of U.S. Government Publications.

About the author: This week’s blog contributor is Maureen Whelan, Senior Marketing Team Leader for GPO’s Publication and Information Sales program office in Washington, DC. Maureen oversees print and digital content dissemination strategy and manages third party free and paid content distribution through platforms and vendors, such as Apple iBookstore, Barnes and Noble.com, Google Play eBookstore, Ebscohost databases, Overdrive, and more.

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Posted by Trudy Hawkins

Lessons in Global Security – Part 1

April 23, 2015

US Army War College Press logo

In this two-part blog post, Government Book Talk takes an in-depth look at several new publications from the U.S. Army War College. (Permission granted for use of United States Army War College Press logo)

The U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) recently has published a few very timely monographs with a primary focus on U.S. national security, public policy and international relations topics.

The Strategic Studies Institute conducts strategic research and analysis to support the U.S. Army War College curricula, provides direct analysis for Army and Department of Defense leadership, and serves as a bridge to the wider strategic community.

SSI is composed of civilian research professors, uniformed military officers, and a professional support staff. All have extensive credentials and experience. SSI is divided into three components: the Strategic Research and Analysis Department focuses on global, trans-regional, and functional issues, particularly those dealing with Army transformation; the Regional Strategy Department focuses on regional strategic issues; and the Academic Engagement Program creates and sustains partnerships with the global strategic community.

In addition to its organic resources, SSI has a web of partnerships with strategic analysts around the world, including the foremost thinkers in the field of security and military strategy. In most years, about half of SSI’s publications are written by these external partners.

Some of my personal favorites from SSI’s growing collection include the following titles:

Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 9781584874447The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and IAEA have had frequent mention in the mainstream news media recently due to ongoing nuclear weapon development discussions with Iran, as well as increased tensions with the Soviet Union.

This book reviews the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) agreements that the United States has with many countries from an historical perspective. Although a bit technical in nature, this work does include an array of essays by different contributors that analyze different articles of the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and provide their insights to the reader.

treaty image

(Treaty image courtesy of http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/)

One area that was very beneficial to me is that this work defines the responsibilities of the International Atomic Emergency Agency (IAEA) and their practices for safeguarding nuclear programs, including coverage of nuclear program inspections. This book also contains insights about nuclear weapons treaties with other countries that are already in place with the USA and provides some background to those treaties. Additionally, this text explores how treaty agreements work, mentioning “Articles” within the treaty that often pertain to terms of conditions that each country should abide.

Many political scientists, historians, and diplomats may be familiar with this process, but many American citizens who are not routinely involved in negotiations with these diplomatic matters might benefit. Also high school students may be interested in this material to stay on top of current events for their global studies classes. University and Graduate students might be interested in this material as a supplemental text for courses, such as international relations coursework required for some political science degree programs.

Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation008-000-01098-6. This monograph focuses on the making of nuclear fuel– a process that is expensive and complex. The first section of this book features “Nuclear Proliferation Matters,” which covers the argument that nuclear weapons proliferation is more likely to occur with the spread of civilian nuclear technology and that such nuclear proliferation constitutes a threat to international security—certainly if there is nuclear weapons use, but even if there is not.

The volume’s second section, “Nuclear Power, Nuclear Weapons—Clarifying the Links,” makes the case that civilian nuclear power programs actually afford a major leg up for any nation seeking development of a nuclear weapons option.

The third section of this work covers the discussion on “How Well Can We Safeguard the Peaceful Atom?” and the question of how well the IAEA and the United Nations (UN) are likely to do their job enforcing the NPT in the future.

Each chapter within this text has a different contributor to the point of view, but the overall themes are maintained. Plus, some chapters include an analysis of specific Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Articles which are helpful to make their discussion points understood. Some of the contributors’ discussions indicate that the past historical events worked well in policy, but the implementations and enforcements of the policies seemed to be more troublesome.

Additionally, within each section, historical events relating to these discussions are presented to the reader to point out a sense of initiatives that will be needed to strengthen the monitoring for greater security.

This guide helped me to better understand the intense negotiations that the U.S. foreign diplomats and ambassadors in foreign countries must engage in with our allies and other countries to achieve the end result of greater global security.

European Missile Defense and Russia008-000-01109-5. This monograph provides the historical perspective that began with fear around the time of World War II and continued through the 1950s to 1960s regarding Russia’s expansion of their missile defense and nuclear weapons programs. This book also mentions and focuses discussions around the Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Program Treaty between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (Russia).

Russian flag

Russian Flag

During the late 1990s, the United States became aware that Russia had started to sell some of its missile defense weapons to rogue states within the Middle East. These countries created another possible harm to the United States, rather than a direct attack from Russia. As a result, the U.S. began implementing missile warhead interceptors as part of their long-term defense plan.

The primary focus within the pages of this book is about America’s expansion plan to build missile defense sites in select European and Asian countries to aid in our national defense strategy and Russia’s adversarial challenges to this U.S. strategic plot. The authors have included primary source excerpts from actual conversations and speeches between world leaders that add to each of their points of discussion throughout this work.

(Images are copyright-free from copyright-free-images.com)

(Image of flag and this missile are courtesy of copyright-free-images.com)

Again, the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute has released a title with historical perspectives that can shed insights into today’s current events concerning U.S. and Russia missile defense program relations.

Undergraduate and graduate political science classes with a focus on comparative politics and U.S.-Russian relations may have interest in this book as a supplemental reading text or reference for research.

How can I get these new SSI publications?

Shop Online Anytime: You can buy the following  publications (with FREE Standard Shipping worldwide) from the U.S. Government Online Bookstore website at http://bookstore.gpo.gov:

Order by Phone: You may also Order print editions by calling our Customer Contact Center Monday through Friday, 8 am to 5:30 pm Eastern (except US Federal holidays). From US and Canada, call toll-free 1.866.512.1800. DC or International customers call +1.202.512.1800.

Shop our Retail Store: Buy a copy of any print editions from this collection at GPO’s retail bookstore at 710 North Capitol Street NW, Washington, DC 20401, open Monday–Friday, 9 a.m. to 4 p.m., except Federal holidays, Call (202) 512-0132 for information or to arrange in-store pick-up.

Visit a Federal depository library: Search for U.S. Government publications in a nearby Federal depository library. You can find the records for most titles in GPO’s Catalog of U.S. Government Publications.

About the author: This week’s blog contributor is Maureen Whelan, Senior Marketing Team Leader for GPO’s Publication and Information Sales program office in Washington, DC. Maureen oversees print and digital content dissemination strategy and manages third party free and paid content distribution through platforms and vendors, such as Apple iBookstore, Barnes and Noble.com, Google Play eBookstore, Ebscohost databases, Overdrive, and more.

 

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Posted by Trudy Hawkins

Hawks vs. Doves: The Joint Chiefs and the Cuban Missile Crisis

October 18, 2012

50 years ago this week, the world stood on the brink of nuclear war as the Cuban Missile Crisis unfolded. The United States finally decided to first blockade rather than immediately attack Cuba to prevent the Soviet Union from finishing installation of missiles that could reach the continental United States. This article introduces the little-known story of the battles between the “hawks” and the “doves” in the Kennedy Administration as related in a new publication, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 8, 1961-1964.

When President John F. Kennedy finally announced the naval blockade of Cuba and the reasons for it on national television, Americans huddled together, practiced nuclear drills, and prayed for some peaceful solution to prevent all-out nuclear war. Only decades later did the full story of brinkmanship, bravado and brilliance come out about what really happened behind the scenes during those two weeks.

Image Credit: The Arizona State Library, Archives and Public Records

A little known side of the story comes from the top military commanders who were serving the Kennedy administration during the crisis, found in the surprisingly fascinating book titled The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 8, 1961-1964, from the Office of Joint History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Kennedy Administration

This accounting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during this tumultuous period in the history of American foreign affairs goes beyond the normal third party historian’s post mortem, since the author was actually able to meet with several members of the joint chiefs in the 1970’s to add more of their personal insights, including Admiral Arleigh Burke, Admiral George Anderson, General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman during 1960-1962, and the Chairman who succeeded him, General Maxwell D. Taylor.

Image: President John F. Kennedy meets with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Photograph includes: (L-R) United States Marine Corps General David Shoup; United States Army General Earle Wheeler; United States Air Force General Curtis LeMay, President Kennedy; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor; United States Navy Admiral George Anderson. West Wing Lawn.  White House. Washington, D.C. Credit: Robert Knudsen. White House Photographs. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston

What results is an interesting amalgam of history and a peek into the tensions between military joint chiefs and the civilians to whom they reported. Describing the relationship of the Kennedy administration and the military establishment, author Walter S. Poole says: “During 1961-1962, relations between the JCS and their civilian superiors were often awkward and even confrontational” particularly between Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Lemnitzer.

The old-school Joint Chiefs were concerned about the new approach to foreign policy being espoused by the Kennedy administration, and tensions grew. According to the author:

“What most concerned the JCS was an apparent erosion of US credibility that emboldened communist leaders to pursue more adventurous policies. President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara pursued what they conceived as more flexible approaches to strategy and crisis management.”

Quick Background on the Cuban Missile Crisis

In 1962, the Soviet Union was losing the arms race with the United States. In late April 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev conceived the idea of placing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba to double the Soviet strategic arsenal and provide a real deterrent to a potential U.S. attack against the Soviet Union from the Jupiter missiles the U.S. had just placed in Turkey.  Ever since the failed Bay of Pigs invasion the previous year, Fidel Castro felt a second attack by the U.S. on Cuba was inevitable, so he agreed to host the missiles as protection.

Image: Initial U.S. intelligence estimates of possible U.S. targets within range of the nuclear-capable Soviet SS-4 medium-range ballisticmissiles (MRBMs) and SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) found by the U-2 spy plane surveillance photographs if they were launched from Cuba.  Credit: Bettmann/CORBIS

On October 15, 1962, the National Photographic Intelligence Center confirmed that secret reconnaissance photographs from an American U-2 spy plane flight the day before were finally able to definitively prove the suspicion that Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting Atlanta, the Midwest, Washington, DC, and even Los Angeles and Seattle were indeed in place and in the process of being installed and ready in Cuba within days. In response, President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara assembled the Executive Committee of the National Security Council call “ExComm” as a task force that, together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and experts from the State Department and other intelligence agencies, would debate the United States’ options to deter the Soviets from nuclear escalation.

To Blockade, Strike or Invade?

Earlier in September 1962, after cloud-obscured U-2 photos had hinted at Soviet build-up in Cuba, the Joint Strategic Survey Council had submitted a recommendation for blockading rather than invading Cuba, on grounds that a blockade would be less dramatic, require smaller resources, cause fewer casualties, and be more plausibly related to upholding the Monroe Doctrine. In his 1823 annual message to Congress, President James Monroe had established this doctrine followed by the U.S. ever since that warned European countries not to interfere in the Western Hemisphere, stating “that the American continents… are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.”

However, as the crisis unfolded, the primary debate among the military commanders of the Joint Chiefs was over whether to carry out an all-inclusive attack against Soviet and Cuban forces on the island or a surgical strike confined to just attacking the missiles themselves, the nuclear storage sites, and Soviet MiG planes.

Both President Kennedy and McNamara thought that an all-inclusive attack would inevitably lead to invasion of Cuba, and then possible counter-attacks elsewhere by the Soviets or escalation to all-out war.

But General Taylor reported that the Joint Chiefs and the combatant commanders felt “so strongly about the dangers inherent in [only] the limited strike that they would prefer taking no military action. They feel it’s opening up the United States to attacks which they can’t prevent, if we don’t take advantage of surprise.” Taylor added that his personal inclination was “all against invasion, but nonetheless trying to eliminate as effectively as possible every weapon [present in Cuba] that can strike the United States”.

According to the reports by the author, the Joint Chiefs were opposed to only attacking the medium-range ballistic missiles themselves, saying it would incur “an unacceptable risk” and that not attacking the enemy’s planes would expose the continental United States and Puerto Rico to air attack and could cause unnecessary casualties among the garrison at Guantanamo and the forces assembling for invasion.  Instead, the JCS initially recommended “also hitting tactical missiles, aircraft, ships, tanks, and other appropriate targets, as well as imposing a ‘complete’ blockade.”


Image: A meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room during the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 29, 1962, 10:10-10:58am. Clockwise from left: Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy (standing); Assistant Sec. Defense Paul Nitze; Dep. USIA Dir. Donald Wilson; Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen; Exec. Sec. NSC Bromley Smith; Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy; Sec. Treasury Douglas Dillon; Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson; Ambassador  Llewellyn Thompson; William C. Foster; CIA Dir. John McCone (hidden); Under Secretary of State George Ball (hidden); President John F. Kennedy; Sec. State Dean Rusk; Sec. Defense Robert McNamara; Dep. Sec. Defense Roswell Gilpatric; Chairman JCS Gen. Maxwell Taylor. Credit: Photo by Cecil Stoughton, JFK Library ST-A26-18-62

The Blues vs. the Reds

Even more fascinating was the story of the war gaming techniques used. To quickly develop two alternative scenarios for the President to consider, the ExComm task force split into two groups that constantly exchanged position papers and critiqued each other’s work. The “Blues,” who were to prepare the scenario for a surprise air strike, included General Maxwell Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, Director McCone, Dean Acheson, and McGeorge Bundy. The “Reds,” drafting the blockade option, included Chief of U.S. Naval Operations Adm. George Anderson, Marine Corps Commandant David Shoup, Secretary Rusk, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, and Theodore Sorensen.

Image: On October 11 last week, certain documents from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s personal papers about the Cuban Missile Crisis were declassified. In it was the above personal list of who RFK thought among the ExComm were the “Hawks” who favored an air strike (shown in the right column labeled “Strike”) vs. the “Doves” who favored a blockade of Cuba (in the left column). Note that the “Chiefs” meaning the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with General Taylor are shown on the “Hawks” Strike side of his list on the right.  Source: The National Security Archive

In less than two days, two complete scenarios were prepared and presented to President Kennedy on October 20, with competing input coming from the Pentagon and the State Department.

From this insider accounting of events, we learn that the Chairman thought that the probable sequence of events to be green-lighted would be: a political approach; a warning; air attack on the missile sites; blockade; and, if necessary, invasion, with the earliest air strike date set for October 21 (optimally the 23rd), and an invasion to begin on October 28.

However, to find out exactly what happened and how the drama played out behind the scenes, pick up a copy of this fascinating book.

HOW DO I OBTAIN “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 8, 1961-1964”?

  • Buy it online 24/7 at GPO’s US Government Online Bookstore.
  • Buy it at GPO’s retail bookstore at 710 North Capitol Street NW, Washington, DC 20401, open Monday-Friday, 9am to 4pm, except Federal holidays, (202) 512-0132.

Find this and other Government publications about Cuba in our Cuba collection.

About the Author:  Michele Bartram is Promotions Manager for GPO’s Publication and Information Sales Division and is responsible for online and offline marketing of the US Government Online Bookstore (http://bookstore.gpo.gov) and promoting Federal government content to the public.

23 Comments | Department of Defense, Military History, Nuclear, Presidents, Soviet Union / Russia, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Marines, U.S. National Guard, U.S. Navy | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Permalink
Posted by Michele Bartram, U.S. Government Online Bookstore

Four Decades since Détente and SALT

May 18, 2012

Forty years ago next week marked a historic point in Soviet-American relations. On May 22, 1972, President Richard Nixon landed in Moscow for an unprecedented week-long summit with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Premier Alexei Kosygin and other Soviet officials that culminated in the SALT I Treaty and marked the height of the détente era.

In honor of this four decade anniversary, I thought I’d write about an insightful publication by the State Department entitled “Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972” that covers this important period that marked a détente or a “thawing” of Cold War relations between the two superpowers.

Extremely interesting are the forewords by both Nixon’s Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. In them, they talk about their personal relationship that forged “The Channel” of communications between the two governments that finally led to the breakthrough in negotiations.

Kissinger reminisces:

On March 25, 1971, according to the transcript of a telephone conversation with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, I remarked: “When we are both out of government service, which will be a lot later for you than for me, I hope you will let me read the reports you send in on me.” … My remark to Dobrynin was an interlude in what evolved into almost daily exchanges. What was later named “The Channel” began as a general exchange of views. Starting in 1971, the Channel became the principal venue for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Don’t change “The Channel”  

According to Kissinger in “The Détente Years”, “The Channel” became one of the pathways of change, and “produced a number of significant agreements”, including:

  • an agreed approach on Strategic Arms Limitation (May 1971);
  • the conclusion of an agreement regarding access to Berlin (September 1971);
  • the announcement of a Soviet-American summit agreement (October 1971); and
  • President Nixon’s visit to Moscow (May 1972), at which agreements, the most important of which were a treaty regulating Ballistic Missile Defense and a five-year freeze on deploying additional offensive strategic weapons, were concluded. The two sides also published an agreed statement on principles of international conduct.

Image: Nixon and Brezhnev shake after signing the SALT treaty on May 26, 1972 (Source: Corbis Images).

Pass the SALT, please

The highlight of the publication is the discussion about the lead-up and issues during the Moscow Summit and the final negotiations of the SALT I Treaty.

SALT I, the first series of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, had begun in November 1969 to explore ways to halt or reduce the arms race, particularly nuclear weapon proliferation. This week of meetings from May 22 to 26, was set up after those years of negotiations to finalize and sign a number of agreements that increased cooperation and reduced the mutual nuclear threat between the two nations.

Image: Nuclear Limits. (Source: Time Magazine, 1972)

On May 26, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), the most significant of the multiple agreements reached during the Moscow summit. The terms of the SALT treaty limited the USSR and the United States to only 200 anti-ballistic missiles each, which had to be split between two defensive systems.

One good (hand)shake leads to another

Among all the handshakes at this Moscow summit was another for the “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Fields of Science and Technology” which laid the groundwork for the first joint Soviet-US space flight. Called the Apollo Soyuz Test Project or ASTP, the ASTP flight lasted only nine days from July 15-24, 1975, but led to another famous handshake… this time in space.

Image: Photo of the famous handshake between Astronaut Thomas P. Stafford (f.g.) and cosmonaut Aleksei A. Leonov after a successful linkup in space of the Americans’ Apollo and the Soviets’ Soyuz spacecrafts on July 17, 1975  (Source: NASA ASTP gallery).

Innovation = Bureaucratic dismay

All in all, this publication provides unique insights from the players involved about the diplomatic communications and procedural changes and innovations that were put in place on both sides to eliminate the logjam in relations between Soviets and American administrations since the end of World War II. And sometimes these changes were done “outside” the normal processes.

As Kissinger explains in the book:

Paradoxically, the Channel worked best so long as the bureaucracy did not know of its existence. While that was the case, the participants in the interdepartmental machinery had an incentive to adjust their positions toward what they thought was feasible; in general, no one wanted to assume responsibility for failure by inflexibility…

For all the bureaucratic dismay it caused, the Channel was an innovative attempt to transcend the formalities of an increasingly bureaucratized diplomacy. It helped contain crises, saw America through a period of domestic divisions and sketched prospects for a more peaceful world.

HOW DO I OBTAIN “Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972”?

  • Buy it online 24/7 at GPO’s Online Bookstore.
  • Buy it at GPO’s retail bookstore at 710 North Capitol Street NW, Washington, DC 20401, open Monday-Friday, 9am to 4pm, except Federal holidays, (202) 512-0132.
  • Find it in a library.

About the Author:  Michele Bartram is Promotions Manager for GPO’s Publication and Information Sales Division and is responsible for online and offline marketing of the US Government Online Bookstore (Bookstore.gpo.gov) and promoting Federal government content to the public.

8 Comments | Department of State, Foreign Relations, NASA, Nuclear, Technology, Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Permalink
Posted by Michele Bartram, U.S. Government Online Bookstore

Are We Really Prepared for the Worst?

July 13, 2011

Guest Blogger Matthew Brentzel takes a look at the capabilities of U.S. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response teams.

Every so often, I look back on those horrific atrocities committed on September 11, 2001.  I remember being in middle school, where the teachers were reluctant to inform us of what was going on.  I also remember the news stories questioning the capability of our country to deal with such a catastrophe.  Although we are surrounded by fear and uncertainty in trying times, we can always find relief by looking towards the brave men and women that put their lives on the line for the good of our country.

Events like this have occurred before.  I’ve heard stories from my grandparents about Pearl Harbor and the impact it had on history.  We can all agree that these events were truly awful, but we must also accept the fact that we live in troubled times and events like these may be minor compared to the crises that could occur.  Are We Prepared?: Four WMD Crises that could Transform U.S. Security, by the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction takes a stab at discussing this heated topic in a serious but effective manner.

I really want to stress “serious, but effective.”  Through a series of four crisis scenarios, Are We Prepared? looks at such issues as nuclear proliferation, the release of chemical weapons, and even a nuclear explosion in a major city.  Perhaps most of us are more inclined to worry about preventing these events rather than preparing to respond to them, but there are times when prevention is not enough and response is necessary.  While reading this book, at first I was taken aback by its willingness to accept the possible losses in one of the scenarios, but this approach enlightens the reader by stressing the high importance of applying appropriate countermeasures. This clear, concise report delves into four different crisis simulations in detail, including preventative measures and how we can be ready to counter such events.  It also goes on to discuss the policy implications of each of these crises for the United States as a whole.

Perhaps the frightening subject matter may prevent some from reading it, but Are We Prepared? documents what we need to do to succeed in the future against an enemy for whom we perhaps can never be fully prepared.  In addition, although at first I was reluctant to believe it, this book helped me realize that we will be able to move on as a nation even though the events it describes could severely alter our future.  The only question is, “Are we prepared?”

If you are interested in politics or international relations, you can find this fascinating book on the US Government Printing Office online bookstore or browse it in a library.

6 Comments | CBRN Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear, Emergency Response, Nuclear, Terrorism | Tagged: , , , , , , , | Permalink
Posted by gpoturner2010

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