# OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 

## 36th Report <br> 1984

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# OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 

36th Report<br>1984



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## EREEACB

This report is the 36 th in a series to be submitted under section 163(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 anc its preajecessor legisiation. I/ The trade agreements program encompasses "all activities consisting of, or related to, the aministration of international agreements which primarily concern trade and which are conciuced pursuant to the authority vested in the President by the Constitution . . ." 2/ and other legislation. Among such other laws are the Reciprocel Trate Agreements Act of 1934 (which modified the Tariaf Act of I930 and started the traoe agreements program), the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the Trade Act of 5974 , the Trace Agreements Act of 1979 , and, most recentiy, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.

The report consists of a sumary, an overview, five chapters, and appenices. The overviem briefiy Gescribes the economic and interrationai trace environment witnin winch U.S. trade policy was conducted in 1984. Chapter I treats speciai topics that higniight developments in the trace agreements sphere during the year. Chapter is is concerned with activities in the General Agreement on Tariffs anc Trade (GATT), the main area of multilaterai trade-agreement activities. Such activities outside the GATP are reportec in chapter IFI. Chapter IV 心iscusses bilateral reiations between the United States and its major trading partners. The adminisiration of u.S. law, including ciecisions iaken on reneciai actions available to u.S. industry and lapor, is discussed in chapier $V$. The period covered in the report is calencar year 1984, although occasionaliy, to enable the reader to understand developments more fully, events in early 1985 are also mentioned.

The mechanism Dy wich mosi decisions concerning the operation of the tracie agreements prog=am are mace is the Trade Poiicy Comittee (TPC). The TPC is chaired by the Presicient's principal advisor on international trade, the united States Trace Representative.

This report was prepared principaliy in the Trade Reports Division of the Commission's Office of Economics. Assistance was provided by the Commission's Office of Trade Agreements and Tariff Affairs, Cffice of Congressional tiaison, Office of Incustries, Office of Data Systems, and office of Economics (Investigation Suppori Division).

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In October Z984，Congress passec and the Presioen signec the most
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## THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS

The primary focus of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during 1984 continued to be on the work program proposed at the Minisieriailevel meeting in 1982. Foremost on this agenda were issues such as services, counterfeiting, agricultural subsidies, anđ dispute settlement. Lack of consensus among GATT members stalled progress on a safeguards code. At tine 1984 annual session, the Contracting parties agreed to begin a formal exchange of information on services trađe in early 1985. They also agreed to a waiver of U.S. GATT obligations with respect to tariff provisions of the U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative. A large number of disputes were brought before GATT panels in 1984. Of four cases initiated by the United States, two were completed; panel reports were adopted urging Canada to adapt the administration of its Foreign Investment Review Act to comply with GATE rules and requesting Japan to eliminate its quantitative restrictions on leather imports.

## TRADE ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE GATT

In 1984, the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) continued to emphasize the need to "reverse protectionist trends." A major outcome of the OECD's May Ministerial-ievel meeting was the agreement to advance by 1 year the final stage of Tokyo Rounc tariff cuts scheduled for 1986. The Ministers also approved a work program 亡o develop specific proposals aimed ai fighting protectionism. Other trade-related activities of the OECD consistea primarily of ihe impiementation of existing work programs covering such lopics as agriculturai trade, trade in high-technology goods, and international technology iransfers. The Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises was also amended to further improve the climate for iniernational investment and the confidence between muliinational enterprises and governments. Changes in ine guidelines for mixed credits remained an issue of considerable debate throughout 1984 ; the United States continued io advocate raising the minimum allowable level of aid in mixed credit packages in order to discourage the use of this type of subsidized export credit.

Three major trade-related topics that grew out of the Sixin Unitec Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1983, continued to be the focus of work in UNCTAD in 1984: (i) trade preferences for developing countries and the overall functioning of the international trading system, (2) protectionism and structural adjustment, and (3) comodities trade. The erosion of the principles and rules of the international frading system, including the spread of protectionist measures, particularly concerned the developing-country participants.

The United States remained a participant in internationai comodiey agreements covering coffee, sugar, wheat, juie, and naturai rubber. In i984, the jute agreement entered into force provisionally and the agreement covering cocoa was extended for 1 more year. Negotiations were held to replace the agreements covering cocoa, natural rubber, and sugar; however, no new agreements were completed.

In 1984, the United States continued to advocate estabiishing a multilateral set of rules to govern services trade. The GATT and OECD hosted important discussions on the issues and problems related to trade in services, while UNCTAD focused on services' role in the development process. The frade and Tariff Act of 1984 authorized the negotiation of a free trade agreement with Israel that included for the first time provisions explicitiy covering services trade.

## DEVELOPMENTS IN MAJOR U.S. TRADING PARTNEES

In 1984 , the United States experienced an overall merchandise $\in$ ecee deficit of $\$ 110.9$ billion, $1 /$ of which $\$ 92.3$ billion (or 83 percent of the total dericit) was with the country's major trading partners (under review in this report): Canađa, the European Community, Japan, Mexico, Taiwan, South Korea, and Brazil. The strength of the U.S. dollar was largely responsible for the influx of imports and the weak demand for U.S. exports. while U.S. exports to each of iis major irading partners increased in 1984, but nok enough to keep pace with the rapid growih of imports.

The most noteworthy developments in United Staies-Canadian trade Eelaíions in 1984 were the jump in the U.S. trade deficit with Canada and continued interest on both aides for further liberalization in bilatemal trace. The U.S. trade deficit with Canada jumped from $\$ 15.4$ biliion in 1983 to $\$ 21.8$ billion in 1984 ( 20 percent of the total U.S. trade deficit). Despite the mountiag U.S. deficit, trade relations between the woriois iargest trading partners remained very good. Even though interest in the sectoral approach to free trade between the two had waned by yearend, serious efforts to iiberalize bilateral trade continued.

United States-European Community (EC) trade =elations worsened in 1984 as protectionist pressures on both sides of the Atlanitic mounted. EC exports to the United States benefited by the rise in the value of the dollar, which enabled the Europeans to achieve a $\$ 12.1$ billion trade surplus with the United States. Steel dominated the bilateral trade agenda in 1984, but this issue was oniy one of several differences over approaches to international trade that remained unresolved at yearend. The EC imposed restrictions on certain imporis from the United States in retaliation for curbs on imports of specialty steel imposed by the United States in 1983. In March 1984, the EC increased tariffs on styrene, polyethylene, sporiing goods and equipmeni, and snow skis; anc imposed quantitative resirictions on methanol, vinyl acetate, and burgiar aiarms. In another steel case, rising U.S. imports of sieel pipe and tube from the EC led the United States to embargo imports of such products Erom the EC from November 29, 1984, to yearend after negotiations on a voluntary resiraint arrangement broke down.

Although no major ruptures took place, 1984 was a difficuli year for United States-Japanese trade relations. A year of iniense trade talks resulied in oniy a few market-opening measures by the Japanese. High technology cominated the trade agenda for much of the year. Two major high-technology issues were proposed Japanese resirictions on foreign-made sateliites and drafi laws that would change the terms of competition in

1/ This merchandise trade balance statistic is based on imports valued on a customs (dutiable) basis. when c.i.f. imports are used, this figure would be $\$ 123$ billion.







 deb亡 service zressures on そin






 the GSP proguam in ze8t, ain mere conceree wich the new U.S. policy that




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 (USTR) to negotiate voiuncay =esinaine agneanents nith major worie suppliers.




 duiles were imposeć, as a resuit of 23 on inese investigeitions, on a voial of 18 prociucis from s cominzies.




 countries.





service industries to obtain section 30 －maecijes．of the six petitions filed in 1983，oniy the thmee concemninz Eonėgn mestaicizons on ü．S．soybean exporis remain unvesoこvect．

The taniEE ローovisions oE Ene Caribbean Besin 3conomic Recovery Act， comoniy refermec to as the Canjbbean Basin Znitiative（çu），went Euliy into effect in 2984．The GBI has become the major U．S．Gujy－preference progiam usec by Gamiobean countries Eon exporijng to the united Siates．Duty－Eree


 p上ocucti－mainly eiect＝ical 引tems and toys．At the enc of i984，u．S．Gustoms Service requirenents for showing ezigiziżey uncer G3I were simpifiec．

Changes＝esulting Ezon the last amnual mevien oE the oniginal GSp prog＝am of the united States becane efEective in farch zosi．Procecure and schedules
 Trade anc Tamisf Act of i984 and went into efiect in januany Ig85．One najor consequence of these changes in tine revien paocess is tiat the President has greater authomity to cetamine countuy eligiozz ity arc procuct specific benefit leveis than uncen the zuev̇ous cs？scheme．In the js84 produci



 because of jmport sensitシv̇もy．Uncez manciatovy comeetzizive－neec provisions，


 which ne detemminet that a bemesísamy countwy no jomgen neecied GSp treatment to be compe亡itive．

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[^1]The year was also characterized by a rise in protectionist sentiment ora both sides of the Atlantic. In the past, cyclicai expansion nas resulted in an improvement in world trade and an alleviation in bilateral irace tensions. Although the brisk expansion in worid trade in 1984 offered an opporiunity to improve the trade climate and lessen the calls for increased protectionism, the improvement did not occur. This was due to a number of factors, particularly the lopsicied nature of the recovery. The impressive growth in output and employment in the united states contrasted sharpiy with mocest growth and rising unemployment in westem Europe. An even greater disparity existed among the develoting nations. These international differences in the strength of the recovery were reflected in trade, with the jniteć States providing a disproportionately large share of stimulus to the expansion of world trade in 1984.

The large U.S. deficit precipitated calls For sectorai protection, and perceptions of "unfair" foreign competition encouragec cails for action against imports in general. Certain industries sought to "stem erosion of domestic and international market shares and to relieve the sirain of adjustment made more acute by the strong dollar." I/ Thus, while the United States continued to acivocate free trade, and in particular supported the initiation of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, it aiso took such actions as negotiating voluntary restraint agreaments on steel and reinforcing bilateral textile and apparel agreemenis by using vaiue-açed tests to determine country of origin.

Accordingly, the year"s "trend toward worle protectionisu in generat, and toward bilateral anc product specific agreements in parijuijar, is symptomatic of the arift of the worle trading system away from free trade principles embodied in the GATT." 2/ Against this backdrop of increased calls for protection, recorchigh levels of imports, a soaring merchandise trace deficit, and an overvalued dollar, the United States functioned as the engine of world trade growth in 1984. This report focuses on one aspect of that engine--the operation of the U.S. trace agreements program.

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## CHADPER i

## SEEECTED ISSUES IA TRADE AGREEMENTS ACTIVITIES IRE 2984

## INTRODUCTIOR

This chapter describes actions taken in 1984 on a number of major trade fronts: comprehensive new tracie iegisiation, imported steel, and a bilateral free-trade agreement wiin israel. The Trade and Tariff Aci of 1984, signed Enco law in October, aćdresses a number of trade issues, inciucing renewal of the Generaijzed System of Preferences, negotiations on services and high technoiogy goocis, and rerom of existing uníair tracie statules. In September, the Presicent announced a nine-poini Government program for the steel industry which had as its centerpiece the conclusion of voluntary resiraini agreements with major steel supplying countries. These agreements would imit imports to about 18.5 percent of apparent U.S. consumption in each of the next five years, the Presicent esimated, down sharply from the 26.6 percent share registered by imports in 1984. Later in the year, the President concluded a bilaterai free trade agreement with Israel. The accord is the firsi free irade agreement the united Siates has concluded on a bilateral basis. Each of these developments is explored in greater detail below.

## TRADE AND TARITE ACT OE 1984

On Ociober 30, 198\%, President Reagan signed the Trade and Tarirf Act of I984 (Pubic Law 98-573) into law. The signing marked the culmination of a lengthy cebate on a variety of adminisiraition proposais as weil as congressional initiatives on changes in U.S. irade law. This debate was conducied in the midst of mouning irade deficits and during an election year. This section briefiy describes several of the major provisions of the act. These inciuce the renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences, toade with Iszael, the Internaiional Trace and Investment Act, trace Iaw reform measures, the Steel Import Siabilizaiion Act, the Wine Equily Aci, and miscelianecus other provisions.

## GSP Renewal

A major impetus to passage of the 1984 trace legislation was a cesire to extend the GSD, which was scheduled to expire on January 3, 1985. The GSP is a unilateral program of duity-free treatment for imporis from deveioping countries. I/ Titie $V$ of the act extends the GSP for $81 / 2$ years, through July 4, 1993, anc makes several major changes in the program.

Changes were made in the criteria that the President considers when cetemining a counlry's eligibiliiy for GSP benefits. The President is now mandated to consider whether or noi a couniry affords iniernationaily recognized worker rights to its workers when extending GSp benefils to ils products. The exieni to which a country provides protection for intellectual properiy righis and reduces barriers to investment and irade in services are

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A majoz issue that Congress haci to rasolve was whether to delegate taこiff－cutting authority to the President or to require subsequent congressionai approval for any negotiated tariff reductions．Each House took a different apwroach．The final version of the legislation required the Presioent to obtain congressionai approval for the duty reductions negotiated以立た Iszaè under section 102 of the Trace Act of 1974 ，which outlines special ＂East－track＂procedures to be followed in congressional consideration of $2 g=e m e n t s$ to reduce nontariff barriers．In general，these procedures require the President to notify Congress 90 days before he enters into an agreement． Once the agreement is submitted for congressional approval，each House has
 sたニict time limits apply．This section expires on January 3 ，is88．

For an agreement witn Israel，the 90－day consultation period was waived．$\equiv$ finth respect to all other countries，the fast－track procedures may appiy to consideration of bilateral free trade agreements if the President notifies the Senate Einance and the House ways and Means Committees 60 days before the 90 －day consultation period required under section 102 ，provided もhat nethher conmittee đisapproves during the 60－day period．

The Act aiso required that the impiementing legislation for the United States－israej free trade agreement include the same emergency relief provisions for gerisnabie agricultural products that were contained in the Caribjean Basin Economic Recovery Act．These provisions allow the President， in section 201 cases invoiving perishable products，to withdraw duty－free そreatment immediately upon reconmendation by the Secretary of Agriculture． This Nithćamal would remain in effect until a negative determination is made By Che Comission，a Presidential decision is made on import relief，or Changeí circumstances are founc．Finally，the act specificaliy states that the Unitec Stztes－istael trade agreement will not exempt israeli imports from increasec duties or other Eorms of import relief uncer the major import relief statutes．

## Enternationai Trade and Investment Act

Eitie if of the act contains the International Trade and Investment Act， aiso zefermec to as the＂reciprocity＂provisions．These provisions are intencec to enhance the ability of the President to negotiate removal of Eoreizn nontariff banriers to U．S．exports．This title aiso addresses areas of International trace that were identifiec as important to the U．S．economy but mere not consicered to be adequately covered by U．S．trade laws．These areas inciuće trade in services anc high－technology products，foreign direct investnent，anc protection of inteliectual property rights．

A numper of provisions were incluodec to improve the U．S．Government＇s abitity to responc to foreign market barriers．Eirst，the United States Trade Represenvative is required to report annually to the Congress on signiricant

E／She impiementing iegislation for this agreement was signed by the President on june 11，2985．For a discussion of the details of the agreement， see the Einal sec．of this chapter．
barriers to U．S．exports and Eoreign direct investment．These reports will
 being taken to obtain the removal of the barniers．Seconc，secion 301 of the
 investigations uncier that section anc to ceEミne the key tems that orovide the basis for Presidential action uncer section 301．三＇

Several provisions of 亡itie İI relate to services．Einst，explicit negotiating authority is provided to the ？＝esiden Eor trade in services． u．S．negotiators are ¿inected to seek eijnination or recuction of jarriers anci to deveiop intemational tuies，inciucing aispute settiement procecures，for services trade．Secona，the Secretary of commerce is required to estaíinsin a service industries cevelopment orogran to improve the comoetitiveness of u．S． service industries．Thinç，the retaijatory authority of the ミresident under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 was amended to make clear that the President is authorize to retaliate against foreign jarijers to ü．S．services by imposing restrictions on foreign service provicers．

The Presicent was aiso given similar authoचity to negotiaie the removal of or reduction in barriers to Eorejgn Eimectinvesiment．In acijtion，the President was given autionity to impose duties on other inport restrictions in response to foreign ewort perfomance requirements that aciversely affect U．S． economic interests．

Finaliy，the Paesident was giver aithoniもy to negotiate trace agmeements affecting high－technoiogy procucts．Anong the regotiating objectives are the appiication of the principie of rational もueatment，or treatment no less favorabie than that accoraec comestic Eims，to trabe in jigh－technojogy
 foreign countries．In aciction，the act gave the Presicient the authority to negotiate lower dutjes，inclucing cuty－free treatment，on semiconductors anci parts of semiconductors anc conputers．

## Trecie इas Re\＆omm

Tikie VI of the act contains severai moćifications to the antidumping and

 are technical in natune anc wene incencec to aiazify anc sinoijfy proceecijngs uncer these statutes．Discussion oも the majoz revisions rollows．

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Antiむumping anc countervaizing citty シnvesijgations may je suspenced if an agrement can be reachec with the foreign govemnent or the major exporters of the procucts uncer investigation．The act anencs this authomity to requize verificatミor winen a setえさemert agreenent is basec on an＂ofミset＂もax；to

ㄱ／The President is authorized in sec． 302 of the Prade Act of 1974 to take action agains a foreign コロacizce winch he Eincs munceasonable，unjustifiable， or discmiminatory＂anc a buncien on $\because . S$ comeze．Seciᄎon 30k of the frade






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## Cumizもion




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## Threat os ざざいシy







## Section 202




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of planis or the underutilization of production capacity; and inventories are defined to include those of domestic producers, importers, wholesalers and retailers.

Second, a new method of congressional disapproval of Presiciential decisions on section 201 cases was enacted. Under prior law, if the Eresicent provided relief different from that recommended by the Comission or deciined to provide any relief, Congress could direct the Presideni to impose ihe relief recommended by the Commission. It could do so by passing a concurrent resolution, which must be approved by the majority of those present and voting in each House, within 90 days of the President's decision. This "legislative veto" was considered to have been rendered unconstitutional by the 1983 Supreme mourt dec sion in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chacha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) and Consumers union of the United Staies, Inc. V. The Federal Trade Commission, 691 F2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982). I/ The new procedure employs passag of a jcint resolution to overturn the president's rejecion of a Comaissiun reccmendation. Joint resolutions may be vetoed by the President, and if vetoed, Congress may override the veto by a two-thirds majority in each House.

## Steel Import Stabiiization Act

The enforcement authority necessary to implement President Reagan's program of steel import restrictions is provided in title VIII of the act. On September 18, 1984, the President announced that he would not use nis authority under section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 to restrain steel imports. The President's decision foilowed an affirmative finding anc recommendation of import relief by the Commission under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. Instead, he announced his intention to seek voluntary restraint agreements on steel imports. As a result, the USTR proceeded to negotiate bilateral agreements with major steei-exporiing countries. 2/

The purpose of this tiile is to give the President authority to enforce these agreements by allowing him to require a valid export license as a condition of imporiing steel products into the United States. Authority to enrorce the 1982 U.S.-EC arrangement on pipes and tubes was also provided. The latier provision reflected concern that the U.S.-EC arrangement on carbon steel had failed to restrain the increase in EC snipments of pipe and iube products into the United States.

Tḣs enforcement authority was granted for up to 5 years. However, the authority will expire if the President does not annually determine that the major U.S. steel companies have committed substantially all of their steel-related net cash flow to reinvestment and modernization investments anci that, in general, the industry has taken steps to maintain its international competitiveness. In addition, each major company must commit 1 percent of its net cash fiow to retraining workers. This retraining requirement can be waived by the President with respect to specific companies if he finds that unusual economic circumstances warrant a waiver.

I/ The Chabina decision involved a one House legislative veto and the FTC decision involved a two House veto.

2/ For details of the steel program, see the following section.

## Wine Provisions

Provisions affecting wine trade are found in title IX, the Wine Equity and Export Promotion Act, and in title VI.

Title IX requires the USTR to identify major wine-trading countries that are potential markets for U.S. wine and that maintain tariff and nontariff Darriers to U.S. wine. The USTR is then required to consult with these countries to seek reductions in or elimination of these barriers. If appropriate, the President is required to take retaliatory action under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. By November 1985, the USTR is to report to Congress on the success of these efforts.

In addition, title VI contains a special provision for grape growers. For a 2-year period, for purposes of antidumping or countervailing duty investigations on wine and grape products, the domestic industry shall be defined to include grape growers as well as wine producers. This provision effectively gives grape growers standing to file unfair trade practice cases against wine imports.

Miscellaneous Provisions (Titles I and II)
TSUS onanges
The act contains 70 amendments to the tariff schedules of the United Siates. Among these amencments are new break outs of telecommunications procuci ciassirications, which is incenced to improve the monitoring of imports of teiecomunications equipment.

## Maxixing requinements

The act requires that the country of origin be marked on imports of pipe, pipe fittings, compressed gas cylinders, and manhole parts and assemblies.

## Customs brokers

A new administrative system for regulating customs brokers was estabiミshed. This system includes new licensing procedures and penalties.

## Prace Remedy Assistance Office

Section 221 of the act is intended to make the trade laws more accessible to swali businesses. To accomplish this objective, two steps were taken. First, a Trade Remedy Assistance Office was established in the Commission. This office will disseminate information to the public on the import relief statutes. Secondly, each agency involved in administering one of these statutes is required to provide technical assistance to small businesses in the preparation of petitions anc applicalions for remedies and benefits provided by the statutes.


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 countries.






 more than one-fourth of the sizel consumed in the Unitec siates.

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[^4]anc since that time a variety of measures，incluating a Roor price sysiem the trigyer paice meohanism）and a surge monitoning system have been mployea by the U．S．Government to control imporis of steei．A brier cescription or these measures is proviced in the chronology on the Coliowing page．

The European Comanity anc newiy incustaializing countries such as Brazil and korea have been patijcularty affectec by the more than 200 tracie cases invoiving carbon steel products investigaied by the U．S．Govemment since こ98․ Duties have been leviet by the Uniteu states to ofiset the subsidies anc cunping Cound in these cases，and other restrictions have been appien．
 a bijateral agreenent with the united States in 1982 restricting the shimment by memor states to a certain share on the U．S．mazke I．feturn，the u．b． industry winncem cases that had ainegec wiain trace practices oy jc
 U．S．－bounc stee？shipments．In cetum，the U．S．Department of Comerce did not impose countervailing tuines on sura proticis．Ane in z983，the Eresident imposec import relief in the form of a sezies of urderly markeing


## The Commission＇s Kecomendation

Bethiehem Sieez Compozizon anc the Uniké Sieeiworkers of gnerica finec a petition with the Comission on Jamazy 24 ， 1984 under section 20 of the Trace Act of 1974，cequesting temporary relief from impori competizion for a wice zange of carbch anc ceriain ailoy sieel procucis．3／0n june 22 ，1984，

I／JC suppiers were ailowec to supply dicferent shazes on apparent U．S． consumtion for aifferen prokuts ranging from 2.20 percent for in plate and 21． 85 percent for stee piling．A separate agreement on pipes ane tubes was aiso conclucien．For a complete cescription of this binateral arrangenent，see U．S．Internationai Trace Comission，operaijon of the Trace Agreements


2／区or a compiete sumary on U．S．actions wider antidumpina anc countervaining duty laws affecting stee prokucs in effect at any time curing
 Znfomation：Iron anc Steel，（U．S．Intemationai Inade Conuission，usigc Publication 841，January Z985，app．6）．

3／The scope of the petition was all carbon and ailoy steal mili procucis， except stainless steel anc tooi sieel producis．Seṡdes the basic steel mili procucts，severai finsi ilez fabuicatec steel producis were inchuciel witnin the scopa of the petition because of the zirect impact that impozis of such procucts were feli to have upon the basic steet incusizy．The peitioners

 the restrictions conianec in the Fain Tracie in Steei fot pencing berone Cong＝ess in 298ヶ．

## Chronology of Developments affecting U.S. Steel Trade

1959: For the first time since World war II, the United States imports more steel than it exports.

196?-67: Import penetration in the United States rises from less than 5 percent in 1960 to 12 percent in 1967 . U.S. steelmakers file nearly 300 antidumping cases, but only 8 are uitimately decided in the industry's favor.

I968: Import penerration reaches 16.7 perceni. United States begins negoiiations with European nations and Japan to obiain voluntazy restraints on their steel shipments to the United States.

1969: Japan anc several European nations announce their inieni to impose voluntary resiraints on their exports of steel io the United Siaies Lhrough 1972.

1977: Dumping duties imposed after finding of LTFV sales of japanese sieei piate in the United States.

1978: The Trigger-Price-Mechanism (TPM) is implemented. Imports inat enter below "trigger" prices may trigger an antidumping investigation which would be self-iniiiated by the U.S. Government.

1979: Import relief under section 201, which is scheduled to be terwinate for specialty steel in 1979, is extended for 8 monlhs until 2980 .

1980: U.S. Steel Corporation files dumping cases againsi seven European countries regarding carbon sieel procucis. As a resuli, the trigger-price mechanism (TPM) program is suspendeci. In May, ine Comission makes affimative injury determinations in mosi of the U.S. Steel-initiated cases. In Sepiember, adminisiration re-imposes TPM, revising "irigger" prices upward. Producers withdraw their suits.

1981: Specialiy steel imporis are monitored by a new surge review program under which significanl increases in imports or a produci from a couniry could be used as the basis for the Government io initiaie antidumping or countervailing duty cases.

The Department of Commerce secures a Memorandum of Understanding from Japanese nail producers. The agrement teminated an anticumping investigation in exchange for a Japanese assurance tnat sales would be made at or above Commerce's publishec price levels for a 2-year period.

Is82:

1983: The Comission votes affimatively on the 201 specialty steel import =elief case. The ?resicemt increases tariffs on certain stainless steel pzocucts and imposes ouotas on otners. Late in the year, orđeriy marketing agreements for specialty steel procucts are conclucee with Japan, Canacia, Polanc, Argeniina, Spain, Austria, anc Swecen.

The USTR mejects a 301 petition filed in 1982 by the American Iron \& Steel Institute that alleged that Japanese agreements with major European steel wroducers were in violation of the GATT.

1984: Betnleher Steei Corp. and the United Steelworkers of Anerica file a petition for relief under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 . In Juiy, Eine Commission makes affimmative determinations on semifinished steer, plates, sheets and strip, wire and wire products and structumai shapes anc unitis. The President announces a new Government progiam for the steei industry in September and by December conciudes market-share imitation agreements with sever major steel exporters.
the Comission mace affimmative ceterminations covering approximately 75 percent of the voiume of the steel procucts uncer investigation. I/

[^5] largest peraentaze of toial stee之 zroむuctjor and ine widesi diversity in apolication．The major customers for the steel procucts covered by the Comission＇s invesitgation are the construction，machinery，incusirial ecuioment，tooj，automotive，anc shipbuilci̇ns incustries．The principai scurces of Emoorts of these s亡eei procucis in the 1979－83 period were japan， Gemany，Canacia，Korea，ヨance，Belgim，Luxembourg，Brazin，Spair，and South


Se九亡on 20I Eequires the Comission to wetemine whether an ariicie is Deing importec in such increasec quantities as to be a subsianijal cause of sezious injury or threat thereof to the comestic incustry，anc if so，ic zecomenc the zeijef that woule prevent on zemedy the injuiy．The Comission may oniy make an affimative determination uncer secion 201 if it finds that （I）imports of the articie are increasing either absoluie？y or relative to comestic procuction；（2）the comestic inuustry is seriousiy injured or亡hreatenec ainin serious infury ；anc（3）bhe increased imporis are a substanitai cause of the iniury Sounc or threatenec．In the process，the Comission considers other possibie causes of injury inat may be more important causes inan imporis．

In maxing its afinmakive Einaing，the Comassion citeo figures incicating the steen intusiny＂s azisis anc the subtaniiai role imporis piayec in it．Among the facis cived by une comission in ies fincing were－－2／
－U．S．procucers＂net snipnents of ain steel mili producis dropped to a 20 －year 10w or 62 mivizon tons in I982．Aithough snipmenis三noreasec in i983，the 2983 shipment ievel was 39 percent below line zeak shipment level of inl minlion jons in i973．This representec the secone jowest annuai level of shipments since 1964．
－Gapacity uijlization ceciinec frox 87.8 perceni in i979 tc a low of 48．i percent in i982．A 56.2 percent in Ic83，capacity utisization was stivi quite iow．
－The average numer of morkers empioyef in i．S．Eims procucing prociucs sujuect lo the invesiigation decinec by 4 percent from

－The overall financial perfomance of the najor producers of carbon and alloy steel procucis reached recore lows in 1982 and 1983 ，when Io inえegraiec prociucers hac combinea operaiing losses of
 oniy $\$ 28$ miziion or i．ב perceni of saies．Debi－io－equily raiios were suive nigh for ine iniegraied procucers，at l． 7 to i in 1982 anc $2 . \pm$ さo in 2983 ．

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[^7] Ghe commssion＇s zemeny recomenciaion because＂impori reijer is not in ine nationai economic interesu．＂In bis memoramcum for the Unijed siates Gracie Represenもa亡ミve，そhe Presiciert saic：Z

> Be must do all ne can io avoia paoiecíonism, vo keep ounmarket oper 亡o Eree anci Eain compeizi̇on, anc lo provide
in the national economic inverest to take actions wich
put at＝isk thousanç of jobs in steel fab＝icaíing anc
other consumins incustries or in the other sectors of the
ت．s．economy that aigit be azEecEec by compensaikon on
be enṫたec．．．Zowever．I have beciced to esiabijsh a
govermmen poijcy for the stee jncustry．I believe that
this new poi三cy is the best way to respond to the
legitimate concerns of the conestic incustry winle
maintaining access vo our mazket 5oこ inose wino もこaもe
こえさニジ。

In ijeu of the Gomission＇s recommencition，bhe Presicen oubiné a nine－poin U．S．Governnen prognam Goz ine suee incusimy 2／The major componen of the program was the negoi undersumejings，or suspension agreemenis mith countries＂wose exporis to the
 surge in jnports．＂UnEan suiges were cescaioec in the Presiaend＇s becision



 of 297t，to ensure that the counizies co no mainiain unrestriciec access to the＂．S．marixet．Jxisting agreemenis，suat as ine Jc arrangemeni and voluntary mestrainis by South Afmica anc fexico were to remain in effeck bl Accorcitrg to the Presicen，the net resuit of this prozram ioulc be to mecuce

 tons anmually．ji

[^8]Ôher points of the Presideni＇s steel program include－－
（i）Support of legislation in Congress to make enforcable at U．S．borciers all VRA＇s and surge－conirol arrangemenis；I；
（2）Continuing consultaiions with trading partners to seek einminaiion of trade－distoring and irade－restricting praciices； $2 /$
（3）Koniioring of ine efforis taken by the sieel indusiry to adjus ana modernize；3／
（A）Ar inieragency review of all U．S．Governmeni dumesiic iax， reguiatory，and antitrusi laws and policies that could hinder the abizity of the steei indusiry to modernize；
（5）An analysis of Comesic steel plate capacity in relation io emergency needs； 4 i
（6）Deveiopment of a program to assist workers anc communities âuerseiy affecied by steei imports．5／
$0-$ Decenioe：-9, 1984，the United States Trace Representative announced that basic agreement with the governments of seven major steel exporting countries hac been reachea on limiting their steei shipments io a specirieci siare of the $\dot{\operatorname{lin} .} \mathrm{market}$ for the 5 years from October I，1984．6／The market sinexes asmead to were as follows：


Source：Ofi̇ce or the Unilea States Trade Representaidve．

[^9]Snipments or siainiess sieel products anci of carbor sieel sheet, piate, tubuiar goods, shapes, and bars were coverec by the agreements, but negotiations on the specific mix of producis anc aijowabie shifis bewween


A VRA with the EC, restricting its overall market share to about 5.9 percent of the u.S. market, had been nesotiaked prior to the announcenenit of the President's sieel program, anc it is expectec to continue tnrough こ985. J/ The December agreements, cominned with the previousiy negotiaited agreement with the EC, cover about 75 percent of totai u.s. imporis of affectec products. ${ }^{\prime \prime}$

In the President's steel program, semifinishea sieel imports were io be restricted to about i. 7 million tons. As part or the steei nezotiaijons concluded by the USTR in December i984, semifinishec sieel imporis from the seven countries subject to agremenis wili be ijmitec to i. m milion tons in 1985. Import levels for the foliowing $h_{i}$ years have yet io be arranged. Neariy 600,000 tons of ine overall impori limilaiion would appear io remain to De Eivicied among the iargesi U.S. sources of semininished sieei--carace, Sweden, and the EC couniries. Whe agrement Leveis for senirinished stees shipnenis in 2985 are as follows:

|  | 1. 2000 |
| :---: | :---: |
| Sounity | tons |
| Brazii- | 700 |
|  | 100 |
| Mexico- | 100 |
|  | 100 |
| Korea- | 50 |
| Spain-- | 50 |
| Austこa! | 1.0 |
|  | -, İO |

Sounce: Dffice of the United Siates Trace Representai̇ve.

Antiority to eniorce these VRA's is contained in tivie VIIF cí the Tracie anc Tariff Act of 2984, which inciudes the option to require that vaite export ijcenses be presented as a concition for entry of sieel exports inio ine United States. The apport licenses mould be issued by the supplien courumy

[^10]government in accoriance with vRA＇s with the unitect states．If The
encoreenent authority encis after 5－years fron october i，1984，or at the eno of any year during this 5 year pemioc if the Presioent does not determine that the mejor sieel companies have met certain mocernization and competitiveness requirements．$\underline{\xi}^{\prime}$ The Commission was requestec by the USTR to monitor and －aport on the steel industry＇s efforis to ajust and modarnize and on the competitive condizions in the steel indusiny．The annal Comission reporis ane due to the President by August in each of the 5 years inrough 1989 ．

With respect to the other woints of the Presideni＇s steet program，the ac＊ainects the Secretary of Labor，in consultation with the Sieel Advisory Comttiee，to submit a proposed plan of action for assisting workers in commnities ifat are adversely affected by steel imports．

## Toreign Reacivion

Trozowing the announcenent of the President＇s steel program，some inading рミーtners expresseঞ concern that inis policy might intensify io protectionist Pressures in thein own counizies anش that it was jnconsistent with GATT Tuies．The reliance by Contracting Pariies on so－caliec＂grey area measures＂引s an issue that has been discussed primariiy in tine context of the estainishment of a BATT saifguaris cocie．3／Jssentially，there is concern that z zaniferation of grey area measures outside the discipitne of the oamr coulc lead to increasingiy prokected world markets anc may have the effect of ＂eartelizing narikets，of penalizing the most efficieni suppijers，anc often三eaf to trade diversion and poiiticai EEictions，even if this was not intended by the conctries which have sought them．＂4／

In anrouncing his intention to seek import rastrainds，the president had亡naiaztea that＂ithe Acminisuration＇s hope is that this combination of actions，takem without protectionist intention or effeci，would enabie one of the Unitec States＂most basic and vital industries to return to a level ＝Iaying fiele，one in minich steel is traied or the basis of manket forces，not
 fears by pointing out that the steel progran is inniled in duration，incluces zravisions to encourage and monitor the comestic sieel indusiry＇s adjustment efforts，and reinforces U．S．efforis to eliminaie irade distoriions and irade mestraining z＝actices in other markets．

ㄹ／Tiもie YITY is also referred lo as the Sieel Impori Stabilization Act．
$\underline{\underline{2}}$ ；mese inciuce meinvestment of substantially all net cash flow into the ṡeei sector，witizno less than 2 percent comitkec to worker retzaining，anc taking sufficient action to maintain international competitiveness，incluaing cost controi measures，procuctivity increases，anc production or卫rice－competitive anć quaiity－compeiitive producis．

3f＂Arey area neasures＂is the term usec to describe trade actions techicajly 末aken ouiside Gam mules．See the 35 th operaikons of ine Trade Ag＝eements Progzam，for discussion of the efforts of the Safeguards Comittae to deveiop a safeguards coce and the pressures for and possibie inpijeations of grey area measures．
\＆Safegnard Commitiee Chaiman＂s＝eport November 1983.
玉f Ronaic Reagan，Kemorancur For the united States Trade Representative


## Current Situation

Fuil year data for 1984 incicate that the situation of the stean tacuatuy continued io weaken. Imports accounted for 26.6 percent of U.J. consumption of steel in i984, up from 20.5 percent in 1983, and the indusiry reconcec its third straight year of iosses. However, the 1984 loss of $\$ 290$ milinen was less than the $\$ 3.9$ biliion loss in 1983. Employment coninued to crop in 1984, anc the 1984 iotal of 154,000 workers was sharply cown from 1983's average of 159,000. The work force is less than one-fourth of peak incustey employment of 544,300 in 1943. The steel industry's sitwation coninnued to deteriorate in the lasi two quarters of 1984. Capacity uilijzation rates Eeil Erom 77.4 percent in the April-June 1981 quarter to 61.2 percent in the July-September period and 56.2 percent in the October-December quarier. Production leveis and capacity uilization rates improved moaerately in the first quarter of 1985, with output reviving to 22 miliion shori tons Eman I9 miliion short tons in the final quarter of 1984. Capacity utilization rose to 66.3 percent. But employment failed to increase, remaining at ine 254,000 level, and impori penetration stood at 27.6 percent. $1 /$

By mict-May 1985, the Administration had finalized negotiations on the specific terms of restraint agreements with Japan, Korea, Brazii, Spain, Australia, Finland, Mexico, and South Africa. These VRA's are to cover sieaz imporied during the 5 -year period beginning October i, i984. Wosi finisoec stee $i$ product lines will be covered, including product iines on whin the Comission made a negative injury determination and some product ines ron which section 201 relief already exists. The administration is continuing io consult with oither smaller suppliers with respect to possible acíilionai VRA's. Imports from supplying countries for which VRA's have not been negotiated--including Canada, Sweden, Austria, Venezuela, Taiwan, and severa: other European couniries-will be monitored by the USTR. 2/

## UNITED STATES-ISRAEL FREE TRADE AREA AGREEEENT

The administration recently submitted an accord to Congress to eiminate all tariffs between the United States and Israel by 1995. This itiateral free trace area (Fith) agreement, the mosi comprehensive that the United Siaies has reached with any country, would eliminate tariffs and noniariff barriers on virtually ail trade between the two countries. 3/ The major purpose of the agreement is elimination of custom duties between the two trading pariners. According to the USTR the current $\$ 3.7$ billion trade between the United Siates and Israel could quadruple within 3 years as a resuli of the agreement. f/

1/ U.S. International Trade Comission, Monthly Report on Seiectec Steel Industry Data, USITC Publication No. 1700, May 1985, based on Cata Erom the American Iron $\&$ Steel Institute and the U.S. Depariment of Comerce.

2/ Office of the United States Trade Representative, "Brock Announces Successful Steel Negotiations," Press Release No. 84/26, Dec. IS, I98i.

3/ An FTA is a bilateral agreement in which each country removes trade barriers with respect to the other. Under article XXIV of the GATr, signaiories may establish an FTA if the agreement eliminates duties and otiner trade restrictions on "substantially all trace" and does so in a "reasonabie" length of time. An FTA deviates only from the GATM most-favored-nation obligations and not from the entire document.

1/ Stuari Auerbach, "U.S., Israel sign trace agreement," The washingion Post, Apr. 23, 1985, p.C4.

## Зeckg＝0um

The Ismae：Gowemment Einst zroposê the Ecea of a Uni̇ec Siaies－Israel


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 the 心eneral Ag＝eemeri or TaniEs anc Traće．The ETA anc GATP are iniencied to
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U．S．prociucts are Encreasing y ai a competitive íjsaćvaniage in Ismae＿s



[^11]

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The increase trade that will occur as a result of the ETA agremeni will
 the Unitec States; existing U.S. anticumping or anniervaining cuty laws wil
 Act of 1974 aiso will not be affectea by the FrA, the agreement coes speli out the concitions uncer which duties can be applied as a result of escape clause actions.

## Overvies of the ZTA fyreement

The agreement consisis of a paeamie, 23 anticies ami a annexes.

## Staged ei̇mination of impori duties

 between ihe iwo inaciing parmers. This will be accomplisied according to several principles: (i) all comerciai procucis are coverec jy ine agreemeni; (2) duiles on $a$ imilec numper of import sensitive soocis will be phasec out, in stages, over ien years; (3) on most incusiniai paoducts, u.S. goocs mil
 eligible rom GSP uniil aí siages are impiemeniec.

In determining ine caiegories, Doif couniries considerec the impozi sensitivity of individual producis during ine negoiiaiions. Erom the u. S.

 category i. Those prociucts fow whin there may be genean sensivivity in ine United States, but which are not Eikely lo be yrocucec competilively in tine
 eiiminated by 7989.

Products that are more import-sensitive than those in caiegory İo jui that were not speciEicaiby jenti三iec oy the USTX foasec on Ensomation proviced by the Commission) as "mos sensitive," are in caiegovy EIE. I/
 products (such as artichokes anc avocacoes), and certain bromine compounds. Finaily, those procucts icentified by the USTR as mosi sensiijve are in category IV, or the "Ereeze" category. The USTR icentifiec 7 catezories of most-sensitive procucis: ceriain caiegozies of olives, denyraiec onions anc garlic, citrus frujt juices, cut roses, certain bromine prociuets, anc cercain golc jeweiry. 2/ Israei's insi of mosi-sensitive iiems incluces garijc, olives, Gaies, grapes, apples anc apricois, unanufacturé iobacco, ceriain dairy procucis, refrigerators, rerrigeraiion equipmeni, aluninum bazs, and radio-navigaiionai equipmeni. 3/ the phasing ouv of customs duites will be accomplishec by january I, 2995 , accoraing io the four caiegories of procucis. each of which wi: EOMOW a Giferent siaging paivern:

I/ In 1984, the Comission concuatea a siudy io detemine tine probabie economic effaci of providing duby-free ifeaimeni for imporis from Ismaj on incustries in ine united Skaies procucing ijke or cirecily compeitizve articies anc on consumezs. The resuits of tins invesigzaijon were inamsmiviec to the USTR but the stucy jisseif remains conizienizai.

2/ Statemeni of Assisiani USTR, Dorai S. Coozer jefore ine Eouse mays and Means Comittee, on U.S.-Israel Free Mraje Area ngreemeni, March ó i985.

3/ Orfice of U.S. Trade Represeniative.

Category I--Duties on products in this category win je eiminaied immediately upon implemeniation of the agreement.

Category II-Duties on producis in this caiegory wili be aiminated by January I, 1989. Category Ii producis wili fail inco 3 groups: (i) products on which Israeli duties on imports from ine $\exists \mathrm{C}$ will reach zero by 1989, (2) the majoriiy of producis on winici U.s. Guiles will be reduced as a resuli of Tokyo Rounc Miiinlateral Traie Negoijaiion MTN) concessions; and (3) all other producis in category II. winen the FTA is implemented, Israeli duties on products in line Eirsi group will be reduced to the level of cuites applicajie io goocis from the ze. Simultaneously, U.S. duiies on products in the seconc group will be cui to the final Tokyo Round raie. Duties on producis in the third group generally will be cul by both countries by 20 percent. These raies will then become the base rates for duty reductions of so percent on January 1,1987 , and 40 perceni on January $1,1989.1 /$

Category III--Duties on products in this caiegory will be eliminaied, in eight steps, by january 1 , 1995. A reciuction of 20 percent will become effective upon impiementation of the FTA. Recuctions of
10 percent will be made on January 1 of each of the following 5 years. On January 1,1992 , a 20 -percent recuciion will become effecivive, and ine final reduction of 10 perceni wili de made on January 1 , 1995. 2/ $^{\prime}$

Category IV--Products in this category have been identinied by both countries as most sensiそive within the context of the agreement. Duties on products in this category will remain unchanged until jamuary $I_{\text {. }}$. 1990. Before that date, a formula for reducing iariffs will be devised Eollowing receipt of acivice fom the relevant incustry groups and government agencies. Duites on these proaucts wili be eliminated by 1995.

Table 2 summarizes the value and perceniage of trade to be ioberaiized in each stage of duty reductions for both the United Siates anc Israei. Thus,for the United States, the cumulative value of irade io be ijberaijzed under the agreement (based upon 1982 urade) is $\$ 5 \pm 5$ milizon. Eo= israel, the cumulative value of irade io be liberalized is \$2,278 mỉi三on.

## Other key provisions of the agreement

In addition to establishing a tarife regime ( ${ }^{\text {describec above) differeni }}$ from that contained in the U.S. concessions under GATT, the FTA contains oiher provisions which differ from existing provisions in ine GATT Enai would otherwise apply.

[^12]Table 2.--Trade in each stage of duty reductions

| Stage |  | U.S. imports <br> from Israel |  |  | Israeli impores from the United States |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | : | Value | Share of total |  | Value |  | Share of total |
|  | : | 1,000 | Percent |  | 1,000 |  |  |
|  | : | dollars |  |  | dollars |  |  |
|  | . |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| I. | Immediate----------- | \$414.7 | 80.5 |  | \$670.8 | : | 52.5 |
| IT. | 1989---------------- | 27.8 | 5.4 |  | 402.8 | : | 31.5 |
| IIT. | 1995---------------- | 4.7 | 0.9 |  | 39.5 | : | 3.1 |
| IV. | Freeze | 67.9 | 13.2 |  | 164.4 | : | 12.9 |
|  | Total----------- | \$515.1 | 100.0 |  | \$1,277.5 |  | 100.0 |
|  | : |  |  | . |  | . |  |

Source: Statement of Dorai S. Cooper, Assistant USTR, before the House Ways and Means Committee, Hearings on United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement, Mar. 6, 1985.

Safeguards (art. 5)
Either country may take action if imports from the other threaten serious injury to comestic producers. U.S. laws providing remedies against unfair trace practices, for example, and antidumping and countervailing duty laws remain unchanged by the FTA.

Infant incustry (art. 10)
This provision iimits Israel's right to apply protective measures to benefit infant incustries. The FTA aliows Israel to impose customs duties until 1991 on goods not produced in Israel when the FTA is implemented. The duties may not exceed 20 percent and, 2 years after imposing the duties, the tariffs on U.S. products must be reduced by at least 5 percent per year. All duties musi be eliminated by January 1,1995 .

Balance of payments (art. 11)
Botin partners may exercise their GATT right to take temporary measures when threatened by a serious balance-of-payments situation. The FTA limits this right, however, by requiring consuitations with the partner and by putting sirict limitations on the use of quantitative restrictions and other measures such as import deposits and surcharges.

## Areas aiso covered by GATr codes

The FTA agreement addresses three trade issues that are the subject of
GATE
coảes:

- Subsidies (annex 4). --Israel will eliminate its export subsidy programs within 6 years and will accede to the GATT Subsidies Code.
－Licensing（art．I2）．－The agreement restricis the cAm righi lo reguire import licenses，but it coes permit ijcensing in cerbain instances，for example，亡o protecネ pubiic safety on lo enfozce stancards．Joth couninies win submit，and upcite as necessany，thein 1isi of シmmoris subjeci to İcensing．
 GAD procuremeni coce ihat provides for the waiver of＂buy nationai＂ resinictions on a reċorocal Daṡs for a vaミieby of purchases．Under ine PTA，the Uniteć Staies anc Israel agree to a funther eijminaijor of government procureneni＝elated inade restrictions．Thus，the ERA will 2liow Israeli and U．S．Suppliers io compeie with domesijc companies on certain purchases by iowezing the threshold for application of the eATr code from $\$ 156,000$ to $\$ 50,000$ ．Ismael also agrees to eimiraie＂buy naそional＂resirictions with regarc to purcinases of nonmilitary products by its 保insty of Deferse and to relax the offset recuirements on civilian govemmeni purciases．


The FTA provióes Eon こeざ幺in new bỉateral zighis anc obligations：

 ETA OT GATP．


 the agreemeri．but restrictions basec on ag＝icuitural policy
 the imporiation 0．こ＝ocucts subiect to inese＝estrictions．

0 Kosher ians（ari．8）．－－Israel tas the－izhito impose，on the principle of naitonal treatmeri impori resiziciions for ine purpose of亡́s kcsher iaws．
－Expori rechiremenis（ari．23）．－－kosi jssues of inieresi io investors are currerivy coverec by the unived Stabes－Ismael Treaty of Finercshiz，
 ’an with comesije investnents，ane expropziakion oriy Eor pubic purposes anc with compensaijon．uncer the agreement，ail zighis and obiigzijons of line Fow remain；however，the FRA socifically stipuiates that recuirements to export or 引urchase comestia goocis and services wizi noi ¿e a concition Eor investnent cr Er recejuing invesimeni incenijves．

The agreement also incluces provisions that create consui̇ation mechenisms，set out rules of crigin，encourage cooperaion，anc zeafyim bilatcral anc mitilaterai trade comattmenis．
－Services（art．26）．－－Services are covered in the Fra by a＂Declaration on Trade in Services．＂Uncer inis provision，boun pariies only agmee that they＂recognize the imoriance of itace in services and the need to mȧntain an open sysien of services exports which woulc minimize Eestこミとtions on the flow of trace between the two nations．＂Although this ceclarasion is noi legaliy binding，both sides have agreed io continue talks uncier the FTA umbrella to sirengithen their commitment to Eree taade in services．The wrA is ihe firsi irade agreemeni ever nego亡̇え亡ec $亡 0$ explicitly cover a full range of trade in services．The agreement comats each partner to mork toward opening its markets to the other＇s service incustries and to provide the same treatment as is given comestic companies．The FTA also seeks to make infomation on iaw and reguiatjons affecting services open and readily accessible．

0 Ruies of origin（annex 3）．－－To qualify Eor PTA treatment，products misi be of U．S．or Esraeli origin．The rules of origin governing zroひucts eZシgibie Eoz FMA benefits are similar to the CBI Tules：the procuct must be impozied directly from the exporinng couniry and contain zt Ieast 35 percent iocal value adeek．Up to 15 percent of the 35 zercent can originaie in the importing country．Procucis thai are merely packaged，combined，or ailuted in the exporting country are noi eこうgible．
－Cocaulabion and Cispuie sebilement（asi．17）．－－A joint Comitiee，
 Minjsier of Industry and riade，wili be established to oversee jmpiementation of the FTA，io hoid consuliations，and to review the Cec土araijon on services．E will aiso provide a mechanism for the resoluijon 0 そ jisaierai dispuies．IE at any time either partner believes そhai the kispuie process has not resulted in a satisfattory solution to a
 or to teminaie the agreenent．

## CHAPTER II

## THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMERTS

## INTRODUCTION

In 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was formed to advance Free market principles based on the concepts of nondiscriminatory lreatment anc liberal market access in trade among nations. It is both a multilateral agreement and an organizaition. I/ Successive reforms have molded ihe GATM into a comprehensive set of rules governing most aspects of iniernationai亡rade and a forum to address disputes among trading pariners. $2 /$ Seven rounds of muitilateral trade negotiations, under the auspices of GATT, have significantly lowered world Lariff levels and have accompanied a ninefold increase in the volume of international trade.

Among the results of the 1973-1979 Tokyo Round negotiations are six agreements establishing rules of conduct governing the use of nontariff neasures and three sectoral agreements lo liberalize irade in civil aircraft, bovine meat, and dairy products. Nontariff barriers (NTB's) were perceived by both the United States and its trading partners as the greatest obstacles remaining to the expansion of international trade afier the hariff culs of the Kennedy Round. For this reason, these agreements are frequently considered the most significant accomplishments of the Tokyo Round.

## GATT ACTIVITIES DURING 1984

The GATT pursued work on a broad array of trade topics in 1984. Discussion on a proposed new round of trade negotiations iniensified and activities on the work program outlined in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration continued. $3 /$ In order io assist the reader in undersianding the content of this chapter, the chart in figure 1 presents the organizational structure of the GATT.

I/ The original framers of the GATT envisioned formation of a body called the Internaiional Trade Organization to complement the trade agreement. This proposal failed, however, so the acronym of the agreement has commonly been used to refer to the organization adminisiering ii and to the whole of trade-related activities carried out under its auspices. The term General Agreement refers solely io the actual legal document.

2/ The most recently negotiated tariff reductions are contained in the 1979 Geneva Protocol and the Supplementary Protocol, the major part of which are implemented through annual staged duty reductions thai started Jan. 1, 1980, and will end on the same date in 1987. Prominent among the numerous deviations from this process are (1) U.S. and EC texitile and steel concessions, given six stages which began Jan. l, 1982, and (2) Japan, whose regular annual reductions occur Apr. 1 of each year.

3/ For a lengthy description of the 1982 Ministerial-level session of the GATT Contracting Parties, see the Operaiion of the Trade Agreements Program, 34th Report, 1982, (United Slates International Trade Comassion Publication 1414, 1983, p. 14).
Figure 1,... ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE GATT


## The Gouncii anc Contacting Pari̇es

 Contracting Pamies（CP’s）ani ine Counciz of Remreseniaitues（ine Counciv）． The op：s meet annuaily to oversee the operation and こizection of Gam．Fins anmal session is a form for review of Gaty acizvities pursued turinz ine preceaing year anc Eor decisions on mozk for the following year．an ine interim，the Council oversees viriualiy all Gate aciju̇ijes ane acts on jéaz＝
 particularly coniroversial，as well as those ja line formaikve siage，ame Bebatec ai Counci meelings unizl consensus on a course of acijon is reachec． Nork is then parceled out to comikiees or specially createc poóies．

At ine 1984 annual session，the ç＇s adopied cecisions on the Euture course of GATT action on a numer of issues relatec to the ig82 finisieriai Deciaraiion，mosi noiabiy services，cownierfeiting，and cispuie setvlemeni． Also，the $C$＇s approvec the repori of the noriking party estabishec io exanine the U．S．request for a waiver of ivs obigations under arizcle II of the GATP．The waiver woulc ainow the United States to give preferential duty－Eree もreatment to certain Cariōean nations．Duming ic84，the Council aiso cirectec the buik of its attention to impiementation of the Ministenial work program．In Tovember I984，Ohina was granie observer siakus לo auiund Councir meetings．

## U．S．Cazibbean 3asin Iniלiative waivez＝equest


 certain goois to be importec Emom designated camiboean cuminies．This wajven woulc authorize preferenizi duizes uncer the Cariboean Basin Jconomic Recovery Aci，comoniy referme io as the Caribjean Basin Iníiaizve，aimec ai zevitaijzing the economies of cesignaiec counizies torougit inace，iax，anc
 was requestect for the infe of the ciz ouogian，mich expires Seviember 30 ， 1995．2／

A：its Movember 1984 meeting，the counis considerec ine wozixing parivis Eepori anc a draft waiver cesigned $v o$ encourage transpareni implemeniaiton of the act and to ensure that the GATT rights of outer op＇s would not be

[^13] forward ine proposec wajve＝io bhe upcomins session on ine opis．


 representes at the November session．I／

## Trace in high－technoiogy gooes

 toward the U．S．initiative for GATM work in tins araa．Jre Jnitec states announced at the March I98t Counc：meeting thai ju sou゙c jegin binaienaj


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 area are imporiani io ali GATM members，toir arc in the fuvire，ovine＝memivers continued to question bhe urgency anc p＝ionity of suck bíscussions．

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 pressures．2／These zeviews are aisc iniked do oforis io impaove bhe availabi土ity of informaijon on national luacie pozic三es anc measures．Juning
 review－inctuding infomabion on nonnoi三fé inaće neasures suća as voiunizay export restraints．3／
 bilateralism is evicent in the increasing zesori to binatenal iance agreements．Growing funtration with ine muliziaterai sysiem was novec，alonz

[^14]with greater use of grey area measures. 1/ Some GATT members also complained that major trading partners were taking measures that could be interpreted as cepartures from multilateral obligations. Among the measures noted in such complainiss were certain elements of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 198h, a new EC instrument on unfair trade practices by third countries, Japanese measures on imports of leather, and EC measures on butter sales.

## Observer status at Council meetings

In 1984, several countries applied for observer status at Council meetings. This action has been considered a precursor to formal application for membership in the GATT; however, since few countries granted observer status have made serious moves toward applying for full membership, discussions were held throughout 1984 on the status and role of observers.

Ei Salvador, Costa Rica, Algeria, and the People's Republic of China were granted observer status in 1984. The People's Republic of China first requested observer status at the November 1983 Council meeting stating that the request was without prejudice to its position regarding its legal status vis-à-vis GATT. China's accession to the textiles agreement in 1984 is an indication that it is seriously considering applying for full GATT membership. Algeria is a country to which GATT rules are applied on a de facto basis; thus, the status of its request differs from that of other requests in that it may formally accede to the GATT through a simpie notification procedure.

## Implementation of the Ministerial Work Program

In November 1982, the CP's met in a Ministerial-level session (the GATT Ministerial) and adopted decisions on a wide range of trade issues. These decisions were issued in a Ministerial Deciaration that mandated an amivtious program of work. Progress toward concrete measures on a number of Ministerial topics has been impeded by lack of consensus among GATT members on setting priorities and on determining the best course of action. Accounts of activities on some of the leading Ministerial topics follow.

## Safeguards

According to the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, a comprehensive understanding on safeguards, often referred to as a proposed Safeguards Code, was to be presented by a Safeguards Comittee to the meeting of CP's in 1983. 2/ This goal went unfulfilled in both 1983 and 1984. The mandate of the Safeguards Comittee was extended for yet another year.

I/ Grey area actions, though not precisely defined in GATT discussion, are generaliy agreed by CP's to be actions affecting trade that do not currently come under the scope of GATT rules or whose application to GATT rules is ambiguous. These actions comprise bilateral arrangements such as voluntary export restraints or orderly marketing arrangements that have quantitative limitations, surveillance systems, price undertakings, or export forecasts. Also included are industry-to-industry arrangements and unilateral actions.

2/ The Ministers directed that the understanding on safeguard actions should address such issues as transparency, coverage, criteria for defining serious injury and threat thereof, notification, consultation, surveillance, compensation, retaliation, dispute settlement, duration, phaseout, and structural adjustment.

In spite of ongoing ciscussions, the CP's have been unable io narrow their differences on a nunioer of central issues. Disagrement as to whether safeguard measures shotid be applied selectively has not been resolved. Aisc, the coverage of grey area measures continued to be a major obstacio to finalizing the agremeni. Most CP's expressed aisappointment that the code on safeguarcis hać not been completed, ciiing safeguarci measures as a prominent means of circumventing principles ance obiigaiions of GATT. Despite universai agreement on the need for a safeguards code, wide disagreement persisis over some of the fundamenial concepts involved. Speciric provisions of a coce would require continued negotiations among GATT members.

## Services I/

In 1984 the United States was once again unsuccessiaz in procuring the establishment of a woring party on irade in services. The 1982 ministeriai had invitcof inieresied CP's infomally to submit national examinaions of probiems in cifferent service industries and to exchange and review the infomation among themseives. The U.S. report on services was completeć anc submitted to the GATT in 1983. By the enc of 1984, i3 nationai stucies hac been submivted.

At the i98: yearenc session of the CP's, the U.S. Gesire to inciude services issues under the GATT framework was resisted by the ceveloping countries. Owt of the debaie, an agreemeni to ciscuss these issues more fomaliy within GATT was extracted. The Secretariat has been directed to provide support for the exchange of information and to report developments to the Council. 2/ The GP's agreec to review the results of ine examination at the next session, in November 2985.

## Trade in counterEeit goods

As directed by the Minisierial Declaration, the GATP has continued to explore whether joint acion to adicess problems of irabe in counterieit goods within the GART is appropriaie ara, in so, what action colide be taken. After proionged ciiscussion, agreemeni was rinaliy reachec in Novemper 1983 inai the GATI Secretariat would unceriake a siudy of problems in tinis area. 3/ B drafi of the study was circulated in Juiy ig84 to serve as a basis for furinem informai discussions.

At their 1984 session, the CP's agreed to estabiish a group of experis io examine the Secreiariai document anc any otner informaiton submitiec by interested parties. The group wisl incluce a representaive from the horle

I/ For further analysis of services trade issues, see the services secion in chap. III.

2/ The first formal exchange of information on services touk place in February 1985.

3/ To investigate questions of GATP jurisciction in the area of counterfeiting, the GATI Director General helc consultations on trace in counterfeit goocs with the Director General of the woric Inteziectuai Property Organization (WTPO) in eariy 1983. It was agzeeci inat the two organizaticns would cooperate in any undertaking. Although some $C P^{\prime}$ s remain unconvincec, most agree that GATM does have competence concerning the trace impact of counterfeit goois that does not conelict wieh wipo jurisdiciion.

Inieitectuai Properiy Organizaiion (WIPO) anc is to repori to the Council by Noverber i985. Alchough counterfeiling is generaily recognized as a problem, progress has been incremental since some delegations are not convincec inat the vopic warranis nish-priority treatmert in the GAm.

## Exchange rate fluctuations and their effects on tracie

Ir 1984, the iniemationai Monetary Fund (IMF) completed a siudy on tinis topic as a resuit of consuliaiions between the GATT Director General anc the Managing Dizector of the iMF. I/ GATr members had requesied the siudy as background for further discussions. Some delegations expressed disappoiniment that the study did not shed as much light as was hoped for on key questions raisec by GAFT members. The GATF nad sought to focus on the possibie effects of erratic exchange rate Eiluctuaijons on trade of small and deveioping countiies, on decisions of small traders, and on trace poijcies. However, the IME stưj claimed that little evidence has been found to shon a statistically significant relationship between exchange rate variability and trade and suggested that floating exchange rates have facilitated giobal acuustment in jnternationai trace anc payments. In lovember, ine CP's agreed bo keep the
 ongoing review of the monetary systen.

## Paobiems of inacie in naturai resouzee grociuats

As đirectec by the ig82 Ministeriai Deciaraiion, the Secretariai has underiaken background siudies or irade probiems in certain natural resource products. These stuaies have examinec the relevant tariffs, nontariff measures, anc ohner faciors affecting trace. Studies on leać and zinc were compieted in 1983 and a working party was sei up to begin review of the stucies. In 2984, the Secretariat compleied siudies on copper, fish and fisheries producis, and forestry products and forwarced these to the woring party. Stucies on tin, aiuminum, and nickel are scheculed for completion in 2985. Once ine working pariy has revisea tne compleied siudies, the Counciz wini examine ine resuivs wïn a view to proposing soiu亡ions.

The progress report of the working party was acopted at the is84 session oi the cios. In inis report, the worixing party siatec thai it was unable to reach Substantive conclusions at this time. Some of the areas of concern pointed out in the report include the exciusion of artain naturai resoumce tariffs from the Fokyo Round tariff cuts, noncoverage or coverage limitations of natural resources in certain GSP schemes, iicensing, cerificaies oí origin. 亡ariff escalation 2/, certain customs formaliiies, quoias,

I/ The stuby zas been published as IMF Occasional Pape= No. 28, Exchange Rate Volatility and world Trade, wasiningion, D.C., Jiuly 198t.

2/ Tariff escalation zefers to tariff structures in winh cuties rise with respect to increasing levels of processing. Accordingly, when duties are higher on particutar manufactured goods iham those on the semiprocessed inpuis, and wher duties on die semiprocessed prociucis are kiginer tian those on the raw maieriai inputs, processing indusiries of imporing counimies can gain substaniiai proteciion even with a smali cegree or iariff escalaiion. Developing countries argue that growih or processing indusiries in counizies proviciong raw maieriais is ihus aiscounaged.
and certain technical standards. The working pariy will continue discussions during 1985 in order to draw up its final conclusions.

## Quantitative restrictions and other nontariff measures

During i984, the Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Nontariff Measures completed an inventory of existing quantitative restriciions and nontariff measures, which includes information describing the basis for these measures and their conformily with GATT provisions. The group's work program had been broken down into three stages. The first stage consisted of compiiing documentaition from CP's for the inventory. In the second stage, the group will conduct a detailed review of these measures throughout 1985. Finaliy, the group plans to present findings and conclusions to the CP's when the review is compieted.

Detailed review of information on quantitative restrictions and nontariff measures collected from all CP's began in December 1984, thus marking progress into stage two of the group's work program. Collection of further information will coniinue concurrently in an effort to improve the quality and uniformity of information aiready submitted. In its 1984 progress report, the grolip noted that intensive review will be undertaken before presenting findings to the CP's.

## Dispute settZement procedures

In February 1984, the Direcior General, in the course of delivering a report on the status of panels, noted some of the longstanding difficuities in expedi亡ing dispute settlement. These problems inciuded (1) disagreement on panel members, (2) Eailure of parties to observe agreed deadines for submission of information, (3) postponement in adopting panel reports, and (4) slow action on implementing panel recommendations. In an aitempt to remedy certain of these proilems, the CP's adopted a proposal lo improve timeiy formation of paneis and to encourage adherence to panel deadines for submission of information. Other proposals on surveillance of implementaiion of panel recommendations and on recourse by parties when recommendalions are not fully implemenced will be considered further by the Council during i985.

## Work on the Committee Agencias

## The Consuitative Group of 18

The Consultative Group of 18 (CG-18), whose functions are similar to thai of a steering committee, provides a smaller and more manageable forum than the Council, one in which imporiant issues can be addressed in greater depin. Fis mission is to assist the CP's in formulation and implementation of GATT policies, to identify actual or potential threats to the trading system, and to discuss other broad and general issues, particularly those relaing to international economic adjustment. Its membership, consisting of boin developed and deveioping country members, rotaies annually. I/

I/ The CG-18 was established on a temporary basis in 1975 and made permanent in 1979. During 1984, the following countries were members of the CG-18: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, EC for member states, Egypt, India, Japan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailanc, the United States, and Zaire.


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Ai its シnception in 2980 ，the Gomitiee on Tanief Concessions was assignec Eesponsibitity Eor managing tazify matters．Accoraing to unis mancite，the comattee supervises the implementation anc maintenance of schedules of taniff concessions annexed to the came whe Comitiee aiso nosts Ciscussion on any tarizf melatec questions maised by memiers．In aciition， the Committee oversees certain aspects of tiee preparations sor impiementation 0f the nem taziff nomenclature known as the Eamonizec comocity Description anc Cocing System（the Mamonizec System）．If

Reponting on zrogness もuning 1984，the Thaiman or the Comitivee said that submission of iooseleaf scheduies，a system designed to keep tariff
 the iegal siaius ot looseiear schecules have aiso remaineć on the comitiee＇s agenća．

In 2981 ，the Secrevaniai uncer êzrecijon of the comitiee，jegan worix on a comon cata base for use in the renegotiation of taninf concessions uncer aーticle XXVII 2／as national bamiff schecuies are aciusied to comfom to the new Eamonized System．Infomal meeinngs むuring ine year proviced the Secreianjat with iechnical axvice or the daka base．By the enc of I984， several counimies hac begun prepaming varing schecuies Gor ine Harmonized System anc exchangeć the agriouluiral chapters of bheir schecuies．

The Comitive aiso Qiscussec probiems $=$ evaiuaing compensaiion uncer
 hign－iechnology trade，the unitec States nas shown interesi in ihis ceoaie． The topjc was raised onjginaly in zo83 uncer arizcle unviry by japan in चeaction to Ef taniff zikes on compaci disc players．3́ Japan resuesié a woriking patcy on the topic，but the council agreed that the approp＝iate form was the Committee on Pariff concessions．
 হrocuct had much b＝oacer implicat三ons thar ari̇cle XXVII aicne．The jssue， accoraing to ごapan，has sezious inade imzi三caijons for high－iechnology goous in general anc raises questions regareing ine proper use of safeguaras neasines anc the appijcation of stanciarcis that might not je acajiable to a previousiy untraĉeć product．Although infomal ciscussions have been cončuctec betreen interestec parties，no consensus bas been reacined．

[^16]Erade and deveiopment
The Comnitiee on Trade and Development (CTD) is charged with ensuring that issues concerning aeveloping countries are given priority attention, as
 continued to sponsor examinations of implementation of part IV by GATE members. At the their 1984 session, the CP's agreed to ask the CTD to examine guestions related to tariff escalation and the trade of developing countries. The suincomittees of the CTD are charged with examining protective measures taken against products from developing countries, the trade problems of ieast-玉eveioped countries, and trade in tropical procucts.

During i984, the Comittee continued consultations (callec for in the 1982 Winisterial Declaration) on implementation of part iV of the Generai Agreement. $2 /$ The consuitations are designed to assess implementation and encourage governments to consider part IV in Forming overall trade policy. Developeć countries (inclucing the united States, the EC, and japan) and a group of ceveioping country members of the Latin American Deveiopment anci Integration Association (ALADI--which includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Peru, and Uruguay) engaged in consultations on part IV implementation in 1984 . Responsibilities of deveioping countries with respect to implementation of part IV, particularly with respect to least-developec countries, have been stressed by the United States. Next year, the Commitiee has agreed to assess whether the consultations shouid coninnue on a regular basis.

## Protective measures

Examination of protective measures taken by developed countries that affect imports from developing countries is carried out by the Subcommittee on Protective Measires. The Subcommittee functions as a forum for discussion of the measures notisied by member countries. Results of the meetings contribute to the reguiar annuai review of implementation of part iv and operation of the enabling ciause. The Subcomittee reviewed U.S. measures regarding texiiles in September. The representatives of some developing countries expressed concers with U.S. countervailing duty investigations against imports of textile products from certain developing countries. The united states reiterated its position that countervailing duty actions were not protective measures, but iegitimate action in response to unfair tracie paactices.

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## Leasi-developec countries

Work of the Subcommittee on Trade of Least-Developed Countries is concentrated in three areas: (1) expansion and diversification of trade of least-developed couniries, (2) strengthening of technical cooperation regarding trade, and (3) integration of these countries into the GATT trading system. In 1984, the Subcommittee continued a series of consultations between interested least-developed countries and their trading partners. Tanzania and the Central African Republic were also asked to present information concerning their trade problems to the subcommittee.

## Tropical products

Responsibility was assigned to CTD to follow up on the Ministerial Declaration and the initiation of consultations and negotiations on trade in tropical procu is. he aim of the consultations is to liberalize trade in processea, semiprocessed, and unadulierated tropical producis. During meetings held in 1984, many developing countries expressed their disappointment with the results achieved so far in the field of tropical producis. They claimed that markei access was siill hampered by tariff escalaiion, quantitative restrictions, and other nontariff measures.

## Textiles

The Textiles Committee consists of representatives of the parties to the Protocol Extending the Arrangemeni Regarding International Trade in Textiles (generally known as the Muliifiber Arrangement or the MFA III). $1 /$ The purpose of the Comittee is to review current developments under the MFA IiI. Two subordinale bodies--the Textiles Surveillance Body (TSB) and the Subcommittee on Adjustment--assist the Textiles Comitiee. The TSB was established to supervise the implementation of the MFA. Its funciions are to examine all new import restrictions, whether imposed unilaieraliy or under bilateral agreements, for compliance with the MFA and to provide a forum for dispute settlement. The Subcomittee on Adjustment monitors botin autonomous adjustment processes and official policies adopted to facilitate adjusimeni to changes in world trade patterns. The Subcomittee also analyzes current worle production and trade in textiles.

In 1984, the Textiles Committee called two emergency sessions. At issue were three unilateral U.S. actions: (I) changes in internal U.S. texiiles trade policy and procedures announced in December 1983, (2) new country-of-origin regulations, and (3) the filing of countervailing duty petitions, alleging subsidization of exports to the United Siates, against 13 developing countries.

In December 1983, the Presidenl established standards to indicale when the import growth in a particular product category is sufficient to lrigger a presumption of market disruption. When these standards are met, the Administration is automatically required lo review markel conditions and to

1/ For a discussion of the MFA III, see the section entilled "Arrangement Regarding Iniernational Trade in Textiles" in chap. V.
decide whether a call for consultation is appropriate. 1/ Of concern to textile suppiiers is the establishment of this new automatic mechanism for Getermining when market disruption has occurred for the purpose of making calls for restraints. Textile exporters claim that the new guidelines contributed to the large number of U.S. calls in 1984 --over 100 calls on more than 20 developing suppliers, the majority of which resulted in additional restraini limits.

Also, U.S. interim country-of-origin rules, effective September 1984, tightened the guidelines determining whether "substantial transformation" has taken place in a third country when parts of the final product are exported from another country. 2/ Designed to limit circumvention of quotas, the new regulations place additional restrictions on the designation of a garment as having been "made" in a specific place if it uses imported components in its manufacture. Hong Kong, the world's leading textile exporter, challenged tinese new regulations in the TSB. The TSB ruled in December that the new regulations "disrupted" the United States-Hong Kong bilateral accord. In accordance with the TSB's recomendation, the two countries have met several times in 1985 for consultations to resolve the dispute, but little progress has been made io date. 3/

At its regular annual meeting, the Textiles Committee conducted a major review of the operation of the MFA III. The Committee reviewed U.S. unilateral actions and discussed reports submitled by the TSB and the Subcomittee on Adjustment. The TSB report noted that there has been a "more severe application of the MFA's provisions" under MFA III and that "little or no headway nas been made in the objectives of achieving the reduction of barriers and the progressive liberalization of world trade." 4/ The Subcomittee on Adjustment noted that the MFA stipulates that textile ageeements shouid not frustrate any process of structural adjustment required by changes in world trade patterns. In assessing the implementation of this provision, the Subcomittee's report sumarized and analyzed the adjustment processes taking place in both importing and exporting countries and concluded that, in general, adjustment measures taken were "in line with the objectives" of the MFA.

MFA III will expire on July 3I, 1986. In May 1984, a working party on iexiiles and clothing was formed "to examine modalities of further trade liberalization" after the current MFA has expired. The working party is examining, in particular, the possibility of bringing lextile trade back into the regular GATT framework.

[^18]In 198h, U.S. imporis or texinles and apparel coniznued io gnou rapiciz. Cimbing to percent over 1983 Ieveis, compared with a 25 -percent increase frow I982 to 1983 . Developing countries accountec for approximately inree-fourins of the 1984 increase. In açition, the 1984 U.S. trade deincit in texizie ane apparel producis reached an ail-inme high of \$5.h binlion, a $53-p e=c e r t$ increase over the 1983 recore. Various reasons have been cited fon this trenc. The strong U.S. dollar has been blanea for cecreasing u.s. exporis anc raising the trade deficit. J.S. ofriciais cite the inabinity of the ras to curb import growth. Since the wFA is both product specific and country speciEic, u.S. imports increased substaniaily in non-man yrocuck caiegories anc from countries not subjeci to resiraini ievels. If

## Salance-of-payments zestrictions

Under certain articies of the General Agreement, members of GATE can employ import restrictions to correct baiance-of-payments eifficuities. These restrictions must be monitorec, however, by the comittee on Balance of Payments Restrictions. Althoubh cuantitative restrictions are generaily
 in conjunction with consultainons with this Comatiee. Discussion coniznue this year on means of strengthening the consultative process and imporing coordination between the GATT and international financiai instivuijons on baiance of payments issues. The comitiee holds consuliations win co's wo exercise resiriciions taken for balance or payments purposes. 30\% Iun consultations and consuliations under simplified procecures, known as miniconsuilations, are unceriaken.

During 1984 the Comittee heie fuli consuibation with Hungary, Korea, Migeria, israel, anc poriugai. Consuilaibons under simpinfied proceciures mere held with Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Yugosiavia, and the Phiiippines. The Comitiee observed thai these councies hac fuifiliec the obijgations relative io GATT procedures for baiance-of-payments impori resiniciions.

Consultaiions were nele with wigezia ouring March 1984. wigenia was faced with a serious baiance-of-payments problem during the pe=ioz ze82-Z984 and had introduced trade restrictive measures to help correct the probiem.耳igerian authorities were encouraged by the Comictee to pursue poijaies of economic stabilization and diversification of produciion ane exporis as building blocks toward achievirg a more sound extemai position anc the progressive eimination of trac̃e resirintive measures.

[^19] Fingary. the Comittee observed that the balance-or-payments situation had improved as a result of the demand managemeni measures the couniry had iaken. The Comititee aiso notec Hungary's efforts to ease the restrictions introduced in 1982 and expressec optimism that Hungary may soon be in a posiiion to anounce a timetabie for phasing out the remaining restriciions and returning to automatic licensing. On consultations with ismael, ine Comittee reported to the Gouncil that Iszael faced serious balance-oE-payments anficulties. It noted that the poincies pursued in the recent past had not improved the situation and that measures now being followed give pricsily io alleviating baiance-of-payments probiens. The Comiliee asked the Secreiariat to ciarify the status of the incensing measures notiriad by Israel and unged Israet to move towarc establishing a inme scheduie for phasing out the restriciions.

In Ociober, consuilaitions were heid with Korea anc Porkugal. The Comitiee Founc that the Korean economy has been recovering in the lasi few years as a result of the appiicaiion of sounc economic poicies. In particular, Korea has succeedec in rectucing inflaiion, maintaining a high aile of growth, anc lowering the balance-of-payments deficit. Korea was urged to coninue to simplify iis jmport measures so as to bilow for greater certainty anc prediciability in its import regime. In consultainons witn Fontugat, the Comattee noted improvement in Portugai's baiance of payments in 1983 ané 2981 and expectec this trend to continue through i985 as a result of the policy measures being foliowed. Portugai reporiec its actions curing the year to reduce import surcharges and simpliry impori iicensing procedures. The Comittee mas satisfiec with the Portuguese plan to repiace the preseni 60 percent import surcharge by a vaiue-ađied tax system to be introducec by mid-1985. Furthemore, Pctugal intencs to eliminate cuanijtative restrictions on most products by January I , 1986. when it joins the $3 C$.

## Antions uncer articies of the Gererai Agreemens

Zmergency actions on imorts (ari. RIX)
Articie XIX of the General Agreement, also known as the "escape clause," allows Gatt members to jmpose temporary, emergency restricisve trade measures when actual or inreatened serious injury to a domestic industry is demonsirated. Since articie XIX provices tinat a concession may be suspended, withdrawn, or modisied oniy "to the exteri and for such iime as may be necessary to prevent or renecy" the injury, the suspensions are of a temporary nature. Prior notification to the CP's and consultation with exporing countries is required regarding ine resiriciive measures taken, except when delay of consultaiion would cause "damage difficult to repair." The bulk of ariicle XIX actions have been taken uncer this excepion, however, with consultations following implementation of the measures. The incentive for the notifying country to consuit stems Erom the buili-in right of affectec countries to unilateraliy suspend "substantially equivaleni concessions on other obligations" with or without negoiztions.

In December 1984, Canada notified the GATT of ariicle XIX ackion concerning beet and veai. Under the action, a global import quota was established at 146.5 miliion pouncs, or the equivalent of the 1985 minimam giobal access comitment asreec to by Canacia in the Tokyo Round. The cuota will be ailocated to supplier countries aecording to thesr average ie79-83 market shares.
 the impoziaijon of ceriain specialiy sieels．Discussions conceming compensaikon continued through 1983 and i984．Foilowing these discussions， the EC announcea retaliatory measures including import quotas on gymasium and ainieijc equipmeni，snowskis，and guns．At the Council meeing in eariy Eebruary I984，the united Staies ciaimed inat the retaljatory measures notified by the 5 were excessive．The United Siates agreed that the ac had the right to zetaijaie uncer ariicle XIX，uniess hne Councis iisapprovec of such action．Although the United Siates did not ask the Counci to disapprove the $\underset{\sim}{C}$ proposais，it did requesi inat the Council exienci the ine linit io ajow for furiher aitempts io bilaieraliy seivie bie ajspute．Siabing thai
 request for further extension．At a special neeing held in iate gebruany， the unitec states anounced that high－level meetings between the tino couninies has resoivec their differences conceming the appropriate amouni of compensation．As a result，the EC adiusted its retaliatory measures minch were implemented on March $1,1984$.

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The Generai Agreement is basế on reciprocal righis anéojajgaitions bo be maintainec in balance．When a couniry fails to respect a tariff concession or oviner Obijgaition or engages in a trade pracijce jnconsisieni with ine GATE provisions，the Agreement allows member countries to seek reciress inrough the むذspu亡e seちtlement proceoures of ariicles XXII and XXIII．

Under ariicie XXII，GATM members may engage in Diiaierai consuliaijons on ary mailen affecting the operation of the General Agreemeni．If consultaiion Goes not resoive the cispute，article XXIII（l）provicies for a more ávanced stage of consuitaitons in which the affectec party makes＂writien representzions or proposais io the ciner coniracting pariy or earizes＂ concernec．when inus approaché，a cATr member is requirec to give ＂sympatheiic consiceraion io the represeniations or proposals made to it．＂ If inis ievel of jilaieral aiscussion also faijs，the mathe is referrê to bhe GPis under aritic XXIII（2）．A this poini，the usual procecure is to Eefer line tispuie to a panel of individuais selecied from cpis not engazeci in the dispuie．The panel members are expected to aci as áisinierested mećiaiors anc not as representatives of their governmenis．In I984，the GP＇s aiso agreed to set in a roster of experts to serve as panelists in cases when Ajsputing pariies cannot agree on panel composition uncer the regulam procecures．

After receiving information from ail parties to the dispuie，the panel first coníiceniially presents its report to the dispuizng parijes for coment．The report is then distributea conficeniialiy ro ail Ge＇s prior bo presencatior at a Council meeting．However，bilateral seitiement among parties to a dispute is encouraged at every phase of the process，up uniti fincl acoption of a panel report by the Council．Panel reporis nomaty contain suggested remedies that the CP＇s may choose to acopt as recommenations to the disputing pariies．Mosi often，these remedies counsei eimination of khe offending practice．If the GATm－inconsisieni praciices are not eliminaiea，the cP＇s may authorize suspension by the complainant county of＂appropriate＂concessions；this authorizaiion js noi ofien granteci． Accoraing to the final paragraph of articie XXIIf，afier suç suspension by the complainant，the offeraing country also has ine right（within bo days）jo withdraw from the GATT．

## Consuitations

During 1984, GART members held ariicie KXII consultations, which are relatively infomal, on a variety of issues. A number of the notable consultations involved the United Staies and the European Community. For example, the $\mathbb{E C}$ requested article XMII consulialions with the United States on the U.S. measures on steel pipes and fittings. In January, the EC reported that a satisfactory arrangement with the united States had been reachea on the topic. Also, the EC continued to pursue its request for examination of Japanese measures affecting the world market for copper ores and concentrates. The controversy on the U.S. comestic iniernational saies corporation (DISC) law (see sec. on panel followip) may be alive again in the form of a debate over the recenily anactec Foreign Sales Corporaion (FSC) law. In January 1985, the EC requestec ariicle XXII consultaiions with the United Staies on the FSC Iegislation that Feplaced the DISC program ruled CATT inconsistent by the cp:s.

Article MYIIT(I) consuliaijons are the next and more formal step in the dispute sectiement process. Two article XXIII(1) consultations, which had not reached the panel (art. XXIII(2)) stage by the enc of 1984, are described らelow.

Ausizalian complaint on the ZC beer anc veal regime.-- In November 1984, Australia zecuesiec consultations with the European Comunity under ariscle MXIII:I. Austraija clamed that the operation of the European Community's beef and veai regine had impaired benefiis under the General Agreement. The European Commity infomally agreee to these consultations, which were expected to begin before the end of the year. Although it hoped that a satisfactory solution couic be achieved, Austalia reserved its right io bring this matter before the GP's again uncer the relevant provisions of the Generai Agreement.

EC compiaint on Cnilear dairy procuct impori measures.--In October i983, the EC requestea consuitations undez article XXIII(1) with Chile on the subject of minimum import prices for calculaing ad valorem duties, and increases in speciEic duties in acdicion to ac valorem duties applicable to imports of daizy products into Chile. The EC felt that the measures in question were incompatible with the the ceneral Agreement. Consultations held March 28, 1984, yieiced no satisfactory solution. Since then, the two counties have coninued furine consultations under article XXIII(I).

## Panels recuestec by ine Unitec states

Ganaćs Foreign Investmeni Review Act.--In March 1982, a panel was set up to examine the U.S. complaint conceming Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act (RIRA). The Unitec Siates arguec that the act led to discriminatory praciices. The panel repori, acoplec by the Council in February 1984, suggested that "there may be scope for acapting the administration of the Foreign Invesiment Review Act in such a way as to remove the implication that imported procucis are treatec less favorabiy than domesiic products." In agreeing to acopt the report, Canacia incicated that implementation of the


[^20] Warot 7882 in response to the U．S．complani that the SC subsioizes the z＝ociuciion of canned paches，vanned pears，and raisins．The uniied Siaies argued thai benefios resuling from tarinf concessions negotiaied on these products and on Enin cockiail were being impairec and nutisied by the subsicies．During previous consuliaiions，the united states aileged that the subsicies weze causing and tineaiening to cause further fismupion of u．l． exporis oi these puocucis to zo member sizies．Since this case tackied the exinemay sensitive issue of $3 C$ policies on agnicuitural subsicies，the EC
 romers of ne弓otiation anc revision，was Sinaliy issuec in juiy 1984.

－apanese import restri－cijons on ieather．2／－－In April 1983，the Council ajreac to esiajuish a panel on a u．S．complaini about Japanese leather import resizictions．Pressure to resolve the ase bilateraily coniznued even throughout the pane phase，since japan clainec the case revolved upon semsitive sociai and poiticai Essues．3f The tiso govermenis continued negotiations into 2984 ，although the panel findings were submittec to the Council in warch．In Yay I984，the GATr Council finally adopted the panei




 panel examining this U．S．complaint was compleied．Ecilowing a furiher unsuccessful aivemp at bilateral setilement，the repori was slatec for

 iarief preierences on imporis of citrus procucts from Nedileranean countries
 of regoinaiec tariet concessions．The united Siaies arguec furiher that the preierences were pervasive，since they were extended to 11 Mediderranean
 9 と三izus z＝ocucis of Enterest io ine unitec Siaies．The preferences were
 orange impozts，to 60 percent of grape $=u \mathfrak{i}$ ，and to 50 percent of lemon


[^21]


## 








 counc：シュ Uay＝ges．







































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亡amシsE concessions.
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GATR Foweve＝，the United Siates has not carnied out tine paner
 withorax the measure within the convex of solutions to jus jroacer dispute やiti Nicaragua．

## Gases among other countries

EC compaint on cariain pracioces of a Camacian provincial（Quebec） İquor joard．－－The imporiation，distribuizon，anc sale of alcobolic beverages in Canada is conirolyec by prouncial İcuor boares．The ZC aliegec ceriain ミracizes of the Quebec İcuor boant，in parizcular a markup io the saie price of aicohol，as well as other Goms of Eesiriction anc ciscrimination，ame unfair under CATP．As a resuli，the EC clamed ine Quebec liguor boarci aciシons resultê in jmporis receiving Less favorabre teeaiment vinan comesije prociucis．

In I984，the EC conductec ḃiatenai consuitations with Ganaca undez
 zeachec，the IC has fomally requestee that the matter be referrec to panei setたiement wnder articie KuIIT（2）．

South Africen complain on Canaćian（Onianio）saies tax．－－The cispute

 7 percent ontario retail saies 亡ax，bu dic not exempi impoziec goid coins Emon the tax．South Africa clainec that sales of une Xruggerand gola coins decineef steacitiy afier inirocuction of this measure．Exiencied negotiaitons

 AtEer these consuitainons with Canaca provec unsuccessiul．Soukh Antica

 imansomens．－－In February j983，New Zealanc imposec provisional andiauming Guites against exporis of Finnish electュicai inansEomers that Einianc

 Deen＝eache二．The Einnish Government clajmed inat the provisions of arijute -7 of the cemenal igneemen fac been violatec．In September 2984 ，the İnish Goverment recuestec pane seiviemeni of ine íspuie．

JC İance）cuotas agains certain orocucts Erom Fomg Kong．－－In December
 majntained quantitative restrictions not justifiee by any GeTP provisions against vazious p＝oćucts impor亡ec from Fong kong．In July ig83，the council acoptec the zepozt of the panel and the recommenciaton thai Fance teminaie





aciion on aigitai chartz watches, one of the mosi important procuct caiegories concerned. The ariicle XIX action provided GATT justification for coninuation of cuotas on this item; quotas on most other relevani product categoties had been iifled by yearend.
U.S. Comestic international saies corporation (DISC) legislation.-Lesislation amending the DISC program and implementing an aiternative designed to comply with gate provisions was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1984. I/ hithough the panel reviewing the compatability of the DISC with the GATT completec its work in 2981, followup on the panel's repori continued until zesi tue to slow progress in U.S. efforts to pass new legislation. In the thterim, the EC had pushed for work to begin on evaluating injury and compensation. Aithough many countries supported the EC proposai, the Council postonec action, arguing that the final legislation must be examined prior to cietormining compensaiion. The EC has now requested consultaitions on the eftects of tine new program that replaced DISC.
zegotietion on moc̊ificaiion of scheduies (art. RXVIIi)
AzEizle XXVIII provides a mechanism by which a CP may modify or withdraw tazins concessions. The CP wishing to take this action must enter into nesoinations noi oniy with the party with which the concession was initialiy negotiaiec, jut aiso with other parties with a principal supplying interest in the procucts concerned, and consult with other CP's which have a subsianiial interesi. The aziicie is based on the principle of compensatory adjusiment in the tamets on other products to maintain a balance of concessions. 2/ $^{\prime}$ Wegoinations on the adjustmenis to a couniry's GATT schedule, which will be necessary when it adcpis the Harmonized Sysiem tariff nomenclature, will be conducted under this articie. Its provisions are also used when a tariff item is gereraily adusted or a product is reclassified for adminisirative reasons.

Duting ig8t, the United Siates continued negotiations with severai counties that had notified article XXVIII adjustments. These countries ミnciucieq Jrazin, Sweđ̃en, India, Ausiralia, and Canada.
aceessions to the GATT (arts. KXVI and KXXIII) 3/
Wo new contacting parties were admitied io the GATP in 198:. The iotal namber of CP's currently stands at 90 . A full list of GATT membership is presentec in the following tabulation.

I/ For further details on the DISC program, see the Operation of the Trade Ascemenis Program, 34ih Report, 1982, p. 39.

2f Ari. KXYII states that "in such negotiations and agreement, which may Enciudie provision for compensatory adjustment with respect to other products, the coniraciing Pariies concerned shall endeavor to maintain a general level o: reciprocal and muiuaily advantageous concessions noi less favorable to t-age than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations."

3/Aㄴ. XXVI states that "if any of the customs. ierritories . . . possesses or acquires full auionomy in the conduct of its exiernal relations . . . such ierritory shall, upon sponsorship through a declaration by the responsible conitacking party establishing the fact, be deemed a contracing pariy." Hations not in this caiegory must accede under the procedures of ariticie XXXIII. Art. XXXIII contains the normal procedures for accession under which the CF's may accepi the accession of a new member by a iwo-thirds majority vote.

GATT Membership as of December 31, 1984
Contracting Parties to the GATT (90)

| Argeniina | Ghana | Pakistan |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Austraiia | Greece | Peru |
| Austria | Guyana | Philippines |
| Bangladesh | Haiti | Poland |
| Barbacios | inungary | Portugai |
| Belgium | Icelanç | Romania |
| Beiize | Incia | Rwancia |
| Benin | Indonesia | Senegal |
| Brazil | Ireland | Sierra Eeone |
| Burma | israel | Singapore |
| Burundi | Italy | South AErica |
| Cameroon | ivory Coast | Spain |
| Canada | Jamaica | Sri Lanka |
| Central Africar | Japan | Suriname |
| Repubiic | Kenya | Swecen |
| Chad | Korea, Repubiic of | Switzeriand |
| Chile | Kuwai̇ | Tanzania |
| Colombia | Luxembourg | Thailanc |
| Congo | Madagascar | Toge |
| Cuiba | Malawi | TEinidad and Tobago |
| Cyprus | Malaysia | Tuckey |
| Czechoslovakia | Maicives | Uganda |
| Denmark | Maita | Unitec Kirgaon |
| Dominican Republic | Mauritania | Uniled States of |
| Egypt | Mauriもius | America |
| Finlanc | Netheriands | Upper Volla |
| France | New Zealand | Uruguay |
| Gabon | Nicaragua | Yugoslavia |
| Gambia | Niger | Zaire |
| Germany, Federal | Nigeria | Zambia |
| Repubiic of | Norway | Zimbabwe |

Acceded provisionally (i)
Tunisia

Countries to whose territories the GATr has been appiied anc winich now, as independent siates, maintain a de facto applicaion of the GATN penaing Enal decisions as to their future conmercial policy (30)

| Aigeria | Guinea-Bissau | Si. Vincent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Angola | Kampuchea | Sao Tome and |
| Antigua and Barbuda | Kiribati | Principe |
| Bahamas | Lesotho | Seycinelles |
| Bahrain | Mali | Solomor isiands |
| Botswana | Mozambique | Swazilanc |
| Cape Verde | Papua New Guinea | Tonga |
| Dominica | Qatar | Tuvalu |
| Equatorial Guinea | St. Christopher | United Araj Emiraies |
| Eiji | and Nevis | Yemen, Paople's Democraijo |
| Grenada | St. ELicia | Repuojic of |

## TBPE EREMEATION OF THE TOKYO ROURD AGREEMENES

Tre following section describes the implementation and operation of the Fokyo sound agreements (informally zeferred to as the kTN codes) during 1984, as carriec owi ふy their respecive administrative committees or councils. I/ The commintees, composed of the signatories of each code, are charged wilh cverseeing implementaiion of ccde provisions and meet two or more times a year on a regular basis. Meetings also may be convenec in special sessions lo acdress a particuiar probiem raised by 2 member. The comititees acicress guestions on interpretation of code provisions and code-related disputes among signatories. The status of participation in each of the agreements, as of yearen, is shom in table 3.

## Agresment on Subsidies and Countervailirg Duties

The Agreement on Subsidies and Couniervaiing Duizes, referred to as ine Subsicies code, elaborates upon provisions of the General Agreement concerning the use of subsidies and countervailing duites. 2/ It sets guidelines for resort to these measures and eshablishes agreed upon righis and obligaiions to ensure that subsidy practices of one pariy to the agreement do not injure the tracing inierests of arother party and ihat couniervaỉing measures do not unjustifjebly impede trade. 3/

During 1384, Portugal accedec to the code, bringing its membership to 22. $t^{\prime}$ On December 31 , 1984, Spain ended the reservation to its code accession, which had ailowed a phased approach to aligning ceriain of its laws witi the requiremenis of the code. $5 /$ At lne end of 1984 , the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa were considering accession to the coce. E/

[^22]Table 3．－－Signalories to the Tokyo Round agreements：
Status as of December 3i，1984

| Courtzies $\quad:$ | Stan－ cards | $\qquad$ |  | Sovine Meais |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { : Dairy } \\ & \text { :pro- } \\ & \text { :ducts } \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { : Impori } \\ & \text { : Eicen- } \\ & \text { Sing } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { :Cミv: } \\ & : \pm i r \\ & : C E E E \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Contracting | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  |  | ： | ： |  |
| parties： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  |  | ： | ： |  |
| Argentina－－－－－－－： | AI／： |  | ： | ： | A | A | ： | SII |  | S | ： | ： |  |
| Ausiこaミia－－－－－－－ |  |  | ：AI／ | ： | A | A | ： | A |  | A | ： | ： | A |
| Austria | A ： | A | A | ： | A | A | ： | A |  | A | A | ： | A |
| Belgium－－－－－－－－－ | A ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  |  | A | ： |  |
| Beiize－－－－－－－－－－－ | ： |  | ： | ： | A | ： | ： |  |  |  | ： |  |  |
| Brazil－－－－－－－－－－－ | A ： |  | A | ： | A | ： | ： | AI | ： |  | ： | ： | $\hat{A}$ |
| Canada－－－－－－－－－－： | A ： | A | A | ： | A | ： | ： | A1／ |  | A | $A$ | ： | A |
| Chile－－－－－－－－－－－ | A |  | ：A | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  | A | ： | ： |  |
| Colombia－－－－－－－－： | ： |  | ： | ： | A | ： | ： |  |  |  | ： | ： |  |
| Czechoslovaikia－－： | Al／： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： | A |  | A | ： | ： | $\pm$ |
| Denmark－－－－－－－－－： | Al／： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  |  | Al／ |  |  |
| Egypt－－－－－－－－－－－ | ：A ： |  | ：A | ： | A | S | ： |  | ： | 8 | $\mathrm{s}^{-}$ | ： | A |
| EC 2／－－－－－－－－－－－ | －A | A | ：A | ： | A | A | ： | A |  | A | A | ： | A |
| Finland－－－－－－－－－： | －A | A | A | ： | A | A | ： | A |  | A | ： | ： | A |
| France－－－－－－－－－－ | ：A ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： |  | A | ： |  |
| West Germany－－－－： | ：Al／： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： |  | A ${ }^{\prime}$ | ： |  |
| Greece－－－－－－－－－－： | ：S ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  |  | S |  |  |
| Hunga＝y－－－－－－－－－－ | ：Al／： |  | ： | ： | A | A | ： | A | ： | A | ： | ： | i |
| India－－－－－－－－－－－ | ： A |  | ：A | ： |  | ： | ： | AI／ |  | A | ： | ： | A |
| Ireiand－－－－－－－－－： | ：A ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  |  | A | ： |  |
| Israel－－－－－－－－－－－ |  | A | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： |  | ： | ： |  |
| İる！y－－－－－－－－－－－ | ：A |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： |  | S | ： |  |
| ごapan－－－－－－－－－－－ | ：A | A | ：A | ： | A | A | ： | A |  | A | A | ： | A |
| Korea－－－－－－－－－－－ | ：$\dot{\text { A }}$ |  | A | ： |  | ： | ： | AI／ |  |  | ： | ： |  |
| Lixembourg－－－－－－： | ：A |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： |  | 2 | ： |  |
| Malawi－－－－－－－－－－： |  |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： | Al／ |  |  | ： | ： |  |
| Netherlancis－－－－－： | ：A |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： |  | A | ： |  |
| New Zeaianc－－－－－： | ：A |  | A $1 /$ | ： | A | A | ： | A． $1 /$ |  | A | ： | ： |  |
| Norway－－－－－－－－－－ | ：A | A | ：A | ： | A | A | ： | A | ： | A | A | ： | $\therefore$ |
| Pakistan－－－－－－－－－： | ：A |  | ：A | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  | A | ： | ： | $\therefore$ |
| Philippines－－－－－： | ：A |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  | A］ | ： | ： |  |
| Poland－－－－－－－－－－ | ： |  | ： | ： | A | ：A | ： |  |  |  | ： | ： | A |
| Portugai－－－－－－－－： | ： |  | ：A | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  |  | ： | ： |  |
| Romania－－－－－－－－－－ | ：A |  | ： | ： | A | ：A | ： | A | ： | A | A | ： | A |
| Rwanda－－－－－－－－－－－ | ：S |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： |  | ： | ： |  |
| Singapore－－－－－－－： | ：A | A | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | A | ： | ： | A |
| South Africa－－－－： | ： |  | ： | ： | A | A | ： | A |  | A | ： | ： |  |
| Spain－－－－－－－－－－－ | ：A |  | ：A | ： |  | ： | ： | AI／ |  |  | ： | ： | A |
| Sweden－－－－－－－－－－： | ：A | A | ：A | ： | A | A | ： | A |  | A | $\pm$ | ： | A |
| Switzeriand－－－－－： | ：A | A | A | ： | A | A | ： | A | ： | A | A | ： | A |
| Tunisia 3／－－－－－－： | ：A ： |  | ： | ： | A | ： | ： |  |  |  | ： | ： |  |
| United Kingdomı／： | ：Aㄱ／： | AI／ | AI／ | ： | AI／ | ： | ： | AI／ | ： | AI／ | 211 | ： | AI＇ |
| United States－－－： | ：A | A | A | ： | A | ：AS／ | ： | A | ： | A | A | ： | 2 |
| Uruguay－－－－－－－－－ | ： |  | A | ： | A | ：A | ： |  | ： |  | ： | ： |  |
| Yugoslavia－－－－－－： | ：A |  | ：S | ： | A | ： | ： | A． | ： | A | ： | ： | A |
| Non－contracting ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  |  |  | ： | ： |  |
| parties：： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： |  | ： | ： |  |
| Botswana－－－－－－－－： |  |  | ： | ： |  | ： | ： | A． | ： |  | ： | ： |  |
| Bulgaria－－－－－－－－ |  |  | ： | ： | A | ：A | ： |  | ： |  | ： | ： |  |
| Guatemaia－－－－－－－ |  |  | ： | ： | AI／ | ： | ： |  | ： |  | ： | ： |  |
| Paraguay－－－－－－－： |  |  | ： | ： | Prov． | ： | ： |  | ： |  | ： | ： |  |
|  | － |  | － | － |  | － | － |  |  |  | － | － |  |
| Totzi－－－－－－－－ | ： 38 | 12 | ： 22 | ： | 26 | ： 18 | $\vdots$ | 24 | ： | 24 | $\vdots 20$ |  | 22 |
|  | ： | ： | ： | ： |  | ： | ： |  | ： |  | ： | ： |  |

A：Accepted；S：Signed（acceptance pending）
l／Reservation，condition，and／or declaration．
2／The EC is a signatory to all the agreements．Because the Standarcis agreement anc the Civil Aircraft agreement cover matters that go beyord the authozity of the EC，each of the EC member states is also a signatory to these agreements．

3／Provisional accession to GATT
位，Kong Kong is covered by the United Kingdom accessions in ine Sianda＝ds， Goverment Procurement，Subsidies，Customs Valuation，Impozi Licensing，and Antidumping codes．

5／The Uniled Siates nolification of withdrawal，made in December isst，became effective Feb．i4，i985．

Debate in the Comittee on Subsities anc Counterviijng Veasumes on a number of छssues continues to be characterized by civergent views among patties as to the ̇niera＝etation of Euncmental coce provisions．these CifEerences contribute to uncertainties that inpecie the efficient operation of the code．In particular，it has iead to the inability of the committee to adopt panel reports on important cispute setilemen cases such as ine ones on pasta and wheat Elour．

Issues raisec in cobe neetings ouring is84 inclucec such items as the günelines on methocis for calculation or subsicies proposea by the committee＇s groun on experis；problems with anc ways of improving the subsioy noもj气ication process；analysis of ariicle $\ddagger 4$ anci ís applicabion by the Uniled suates （known as the u．S．comitmenis pozicy）bo developing couninies；anc the staius of panel zeports on certain cispuie seiviemen cases．A sumary of reports on councervaining duty aciions subaivied to the Comitivee semianmalyy apyears in tainle A－3，except for the report of the Unitec Sizies．Il

Debate on caicuiai̇on of subsiciies continuec cuinig Ig84 in neeuings of もine experts group charged by the comalizee mith resojving signatories： differing interpreiaiions．During 2984，ine group again circulated papers on a varieiy of issues such as substibution arawiock，physical incorporation， amorizzation anc depreciation，anc de minimis suosiciies，to name a fem．Eon the Einst time since tis Eomation，the groun came to a consensus and Gorwarçed certain papers to the Comitiee for consideration．The papers Corwarciec presertec gliedeines Eor cetermining when substitukion crawback systems constitute suibsides anc physical incorporation schemes．

The controversy sumrouncing the coce＇s mequitement Eor regular notification of subsièjes continuec in ic84．2f Tuil notifications of both ag＝icuitural anc jncusinial subsicy p＝og＝ams feil oue in z984．Through Comitiee revien of notifications，CP｀s an examine cne anothens＂suipsidy programs anc zaise quesiions zegarciing consisiency with ine agreement．In practice，the teview process has been hampered by tandy anci incompiete subuissions．During l984，changes in ine quesi̇onnaire were consiciereć as a way to improve notifications．The zrocess has aiso been slowec by iack of agreement on precisely what subṡi̇es have to be repoztea．Positions confiミu as to whether only subsidies that do not conform to the coce shounc ive
 continue to disagree aboui wnich kincis of zrogmams are consicienec suibsicies uncier the code．A practice of cross－notinicaiton，whereby one party reporis the subsioy praciices of anoiher pariy，has g＝own out of inis ísagreement．

During $798 \%$ ，a group of evejoping countries voiced concem bat the code＇s simingent comitmenis emiminating cervain expori subsióies ignore ine code＂s provision Eor＂special and cifferentiai ineakneni＂of coveloping countijes anc impecies vheir accession io ine agmemeni．in parizunlar，the

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ジme.
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 Erecuent negoこえaたこons．











[^24] 6．5，is to be interpretec narrowiy－iv coniencis that grape zowers may Eje oniy againsi grape imporis，not wine imporis．Despiie the meeizng，ine jasic controversy remainec unresoived．One of several arguments posiled by the United States notec that，in exceptional cases，the g＝one二 couic be consicezect an integral part of the incustry producing a itike p＝ocuct．Fhe conaitiee agreed to holc a concミi̇ation session in jenuany jo85．I＇

Canada and the EC consulted Eate in z984 on a Ganadian complaini ajout zo subsidies on fiozen beer sales．Cana＠a allegec inai tie subsiajes mesui＿eo in price uncercutting inconsis亡ent with p＝ovisions of the coce．

In 1984，the Unitec Siates conitnuec io seek acoption jy ine Comizuee oz the panel reporis regarding EC expori subsicies on pasia añ weai flour． Disagrement within the Commitiee on the panel findings animues oo be a stumbing block to gaining the consensus neećea for acoption of bie
 repeaied atiempis in 1981 anc 2982．3／In view of inese 2 inficult ies，ine
 with the EC．

In 1984，the Unizec Siaies conijnuec inromaj consuinaijons on jis allegaíions Unai JC and Srazilian expont suiosiéies on pouitny sales viozaie the agreement by đisplacing U．S．saies to vhimd－couniry mankeis．As has been the case since consuitaitons began in $=982$ ，ine parives couio nou arrive at a negotiaied soluiion to the dispute．The initial ig32 compiain was leveiec at the EC only，but the EC ailegec ah ea＝iy bilaierai consultations tisat jis
 thire country markeis．As such，the so ciaimec these subsioies conformec io
 meetings held in 2984 yiezeer litule on no paogress．

## Agreement on Government zrocuremen：

式ineteen huncine and eighty－foum mazkec the fourth year on operaijon of the Govermmen Procurement coce，ionmaiy knome as the Agreemeni on Govermeni Procurement（the agreement）．fif Beiore the agreement was acopied，namy governments followeć sizici＂ouy naikonai＂purchasirg poiicies，whicin oiten incluced outright bans on purchases of foreign procuats or gave substaniまai

 grape growers in the Unjite Siaies．

2／These panel reports have not been ciriaially releasec io ine pubije． However，some details hava been reporled by bie press．Appa＝enioy，Eo exponi subsidies in pasia were found io be inconsisient with ani． 9 of ine agreemeni．Eurihermore，ine panej on wheat IIour reporieciy deciinec to Getermine if EC expori subsidies on wheai fiour vioiabec aris．a añ io：of the agreemeni．

3／For a detailec discussion of wneai Sloun and pasia zispuies，see ine Operation of the made Agreemenis Prog＝am，3ith peporit 1982，02．23－25．

4／The signaiories of ine agreemeni are lisiec in bajle 3 ．
price preferences to domesiic firms. I/ The agreemeni openec new opportunities for irade by allowing foreign fimms ic compete for selectec government contracis for lhe firsi time. 2/ The agreement aiso makes ihe procurement process more open to foreign competition jy establishing common anc̉ more iransparent procedures for providing information on bias, opening and awarding bids, and settling dispuies.

The Committee on Government Procurement, whicin aminisiens the agmeement, met five times in 1984 to discuss problems in implementation anc suggestions for improving the agreement's operation. Signatories conimued negoiiaiions in 1984 to expand the agreement's provisions to purchases of goods and services not covered in the original agreement. 3/ The main topic discussed in the negotiations in 1984 were possible expansion of cocie coverage io services $1 /$ and leased products and improvements in the agreemeni's operation. Increasing the number of entities subject to the agreement"s provisions was also discussed.

## Problems in implementation

Japan's extensive use of noncompetitive procecures was the principal implementation issue deali with by the Comitilee in 1984. The code ailows signatories to use open, selective, or single-tendering procecures in making covered procurements. Open procedures aliow all interestec suppliers io submit bids. In this case, the procuring couniry is required to piace a notice of the proposed purchase in a predesignated publicaiion. Selective procedures are similar to open procedures except that the agency soliciis bics from selected suppliers, often those that have compieted a prequalificaiton process. Single-tendering procedures, on the other hand, are noncompediive. The code language makes clear hat singie iencering shouli be used oniy in rare circumstances, such as when only one supplier can meet the agency's requirements or when the product is needed on an urgeni basis.

I/ Mosi governments employ procurement praciices that limii Foreign competilion. Art. III of liee GATT specifically states that GATT rules restriciing the use of internal reguiaiions as barriers io irade do not apply io "procurements by governmental agencies of procucls purchaseć for government purposes." This exclusion allows GATT signatories to discriminaie againsi foreign suppliers or products in buying producis for their own use.

2/ Countries that sign the Agrement or Government Procurement agmee that they will nol discriminaie againsi other signatories in procuraments by speciric government agencies (referred to as coce-covered entilies) that have a contract value over a threshold level of 150,000 special drawing rights (SDR's) or US $\$ 156,000$ in 1984.

3/ The agreement stipulaies that, within 3 years of its eniny inio force, signatories will commence negotiations io expand the agreement to purchases that are not covered currently, inclucing service coni=acts. The negoiiations were begun in late 1983 and are expectef to be compleied in 1985.

4/ At present, services are only covered by ihe agreement when they are incidental to the procuremeni of supplies anc equipment, i.e., where the value of the service procured equals less than 50 percent of the total vaiue of the combined procurement of the goods and services.

Japan's overail zait of singie jendering is high-neariy do percent in i983--ane for some agencies, such as the Minisiny of Posts anc Teiecommicaijons, the zate is more than 90 percent. This anfecinueiy こetures the aineazy low share of Jazan's grocurement open to foreign suppiers. I/

The most frecuentiy cited reason by japan for using noncompetivive proceutures js that no bids subnitted under open procechures were responsive to the Government"s neec. Japan's use of a "maximumprice" system appears to je the principal zeason why no acceptajle bids are received uncer oper procedures. Wher the maximu-price sysiem, the procuring agency seis a manimu price it will pay for the procuct. If none or the bicis submitted falls at oz below the maximum price set, the agency can noncompetitivety choose a supplier of the equipmeni (i.e., resort to single-iencering procećures).

The united States and Japan hele Comai consuliations ajout this pracisce uncer the dispute setiament provisions of the coce in iaie i984. The United States claimed thai uapar's excessive use of singie-iendering praciices
 changes the balance of coverage negoilatec in ine original agrement. U.S.
 contracts bnat hac been açuztised uncer open procedures inio smailer coniracis, ane then awaring hem on a noncompetitive basis is a yiolation of ine agreenent. The Unitec suates mantains that single tercerimg js on-y ailowec in suct cases in the recuirements of the orizinai tencer ane not subsianizaily nocified. The uniied siaies is aiso concerned abou ine use of singie tencering in "Foilow-on" and puctotype purchases. The two parijes met again to $\begin{gathered}\text { iscuss ine U.S. compiaint in junuary } 1985 .\end{gathered}$

Anotrer impiementaion issue deali witn by the Comititee in i984 was the JC゚s praciice of neting out vaiue-açce taxes when decicing wheiner a contract Eails beiow the threshoid level. The United States hac fomainy
 -983 to investisate the mitier. The Gomittee adopted the report of the pane in Ey 1934. The panel concluced inat the EC pracince was not in conioniby with ajreenent requirements and recomendec that the Ec take acion to change this zractice. Eater in the year, the EC reportea that an implementation program hat beer ceveloped to respone to the panel's recommendation and that it was taking preliminary steps towards inis enc.

One signatory withcina an antivy from agreement coverage in I984. Findenis Govemment Fuel Center was turnec over to privaie owneship in the year and was thererore no longer covered by the Governeni Procurement coce. After notifying agrement signatories that it was removing the entity fron agreement cove=age, Finiand agreet to offer compensaíion, if requesiect. The gimnish action was panticulany relevan given U.S. concerns abou achieving a new baiarce of coverage when jawan turns itis lelecomanications anizity, Nipoon Teiepnone and Telegraph, and another coce-covered agency, the japan yobacoo anc Sali Corporation, over to the private sector in is85.

I/ A fow share of japan's procurements is actuaty subject to the agreenent's provisions because mosi fali beiow the threstoic value of spe 250,000. Pazi of the reasor for this is that act of the more than to Japanese coča-coveref entities concucis its own procurements. japan's raie ol
 remains ai the very nigh level of 37 perceni of above-thresholc purchases.

Every year signatories meet to review data on the amount anc iypes of procurements made by member governmenis. Some couniries submitied procurement statistics for discussion at the November Commitiee meeting. However, statistics on procurements by many signatories, including Japan and the EC, were not availaicle ai that time. The parties agreed to thoroughly review ine Gata at the February 2985 meeting. Meanwhile, they dic agree to release such data to the public $I$ year after the fomal review is completed.

## Paposals to broaden anc improve the agreement

Since November 1983, signatories have been engaging in negctiations to broaden and improve the agreemeni. An importani element of this exercise is to examine whether govermment procurement of services should be opened lo foreign suppiiers. As 2 means or beginning work on this issue, in February 2984 the United States proposed that each country prepare pilot studies on Gifrerent service sectors. In April l984, the signatories agreed on two service sectors for their jniiial pilot studies: insurance services and zrchitectural and consulting engineering services. The Unilied Siaies had been interested in obtaining consensus on concucting a siudy on compuler services as weli. In 1984. five countries agread to prepare anc exchange computer services stữies on a bilateral basis.

As 卫art of the negotiations to broaden and improve the agreement, proposais have been tabied by the United States, the EC, the Nordic countries, anc Canaca. Lengthening bid deadines, lowering the thresholc level, and putting more restrictions on derogations from agreement principles were among the suggestions made. Othez proposals inciuced jmproving staitistics and requijrirg pubiication of single-tendering procurement noiices. There was a preitminary aiscussion of these proposals at the Apmin meeting of the Comittee. However, detailed aiscussions on proposed improvements were put ofe uniti June.

At the June meeting, the parties discussed alreacy iabled suggesions as well as new proposals. The Uniled Staies proposed at the June meeting thal the agreement be modified to prohibit offset and technology-transíer requirements. It also sought ciarification of the use of quaifification procedures. The agreemeni currently requires Government agencies that empioy qualifieatior procedures to ensure that these procedures are nondiscriminatory and are followed in an open and expeditious manner. The United States has proposec code provisions that woule require that qualificaiion criieria be reievani to a firm's capability io perform the coniract and that would pronibit the use of a grading system for suppiier rims.

Broadening the agreement to cover new entidies is aiso being discussed in the renegotiating process. The United States is seeking to have entities in the telecommuncations, power generaiion, and transportation sectors opened lo foreign competition. Some countries submitied entity request lists in 1984 enumerating the foreign agencies they would like to see covered uncer the agreement. However, negotiations on expanding entity coverage did not go beyond the preiminary stage during the year.

Agrement on Technice Bamsicm to Tecie
The Siandaris code, formaily known as the Agreement on wennieal Barniers to Frade (the agremeni), entered into force on jamary I, tg80. Its aim is亡o ensure ihai technical regulations and produn sianéand do not create unnecessary obsiacles io tade. If The Comitiee on Technicai Baraiezs io Trade, which adminisiers the agmeement, mei three tines in 1984 to discuss specific problems in implemeniing the agzeement, proposed improyemenis in jus operation, and possible expansion of its coverage.

## Problems in implementation

Spain's new regulation on medical equipment and heating apparatus was the principal implementation issue dealt with by the conmittee in i984. The EC initiated formal dispute settlement procedures against Spain in zeorwary iogu abowt the regulations, and the united Siaies began a separate complaint procearure about them later in the year. the two complainis assertec that Spain violated the agreement on several counts. Eirsi, Spainis new regulations would significanily affect boin U.S. anc EC procucers, but Spain had failed to apprise formally the agreenent signatories of the new regulations or allow foreign coment before they were put into force. Furthermore, Spain applied the new rules in a discriminaiory maner: Spanish producers were given a l-year period to come into conformity with the new reguiaiions, while foreign suppiiers were required to compy with them immediately. The information required to cerify conformity with the regulaiion, including a requirement for an audil, was excessive, accoraing to the SC. Aiso, Spain hat failed to establish adequate facilities to impiement the new regulations. After having several consultations with the EC on the problem, Spain agreed to provice the deiains of its reguiations to the agreement signatories, to end discriminatory application of the regulaikons, and to make every effort to approve foreign-mace equipment in an expecitious manner. As a result, the Comillee suspenced iis investigation into the EC complaint at ins Sepiember meeing, but agreed to monitor careininy Spain's implementation of its comitments. 2/ $^{\prime}$

The unitea States also held consuliations with the EC about its new standards for triple super phosphate (TSP) Eerisizzer. The U.S. compaint centered on a new EC direciive setting water-solubility standaros for TS? fertilizer. The directive was brought to the aitention of the U.S. Goverment in a petition filed by The Fertilizer Institute uncer section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. In the petition, the Insintute claimec that the EC directive is inconsistent with the EC's obligations under the Agreement on Technicai Barriers to Trade because it lacks scientiric justirication anc effectiveiy

1/ Signatory governments are required to ensure that technical regulations and standarcs are not prepared, acopted, or applied in such a way as to obstruct international irace. Whenever possible, siandards are to be siated in tems of performance characheristics, rather than speciric cesigns. The agrement also seeks to further open nadional standards seting proceutures to foreigners by ailowing interested foreign pariies inme to coment on proposed siandards.

2/ The j.S. complain aboui Spain's new rules is scill technically in the initial bilateral consultation phase of the code's iispuia seitiement procečure.
discriminates against U.S.-produced TSP (since currently available U.S.-made fertilizer does not meet the water solubility requiremenis). lí U.S. anc ac repesentatives held consultations on the matter under ariicle $14: 1$ or the agrement on December 6 and 7, 1984. They tentatively agreed bo meet egain in eariy 1985 to discuss these issues in more detail.

## Proposals for improving the operation of the agreement

Several proposals were put forth in 1984 to improve the operation of the agreement. The proposals were designed to (i) clarify the agreemenc"s language regarding the time for bringing a proposed standard to the atieniion of other parties, (2) encourage development of a long-ierm agenda for the Committee along with a proposed work program for each of the specific items on it, and (3) require acknowledgement of foreign comments on proposed siandarcis, along with substantive responses, prior to ihe adoption of a Einal siandarci.

In an effort to ensure that a consistent approach is employed by all signatories, the Commitlee adopted language to ciarify when a proposec regulation has a "significant effect" on trade and shouid thus be seni foz coments to other agreement signaiories. The new language urges countries to notify other parties of all regulations that are likely to have an effeci on foreign producers, either directly or indirectly. In other words, whenever there is any chance that a proposed regulation will have an effect on inaie, the issuing country should notiry other parties.

At the October 1983 meeting, the United States had proposed that the Comittee develop a long-term agenda of its activities, along with timelabies for action on particular issues. As a result, in 1984 the Committee adoptec new procedures for circulating a projected agenda of nork. The projecied agenda will reflect suggestions and comments on outstanding items, but will not commit the parties to a timetable of action on particular issues.

The agreement emphasizes the importance of allowing foreign commenis on standards and asks the issuing country to state clearly the reasons why suct: comments were or were not accepted. In 1983, the EC had proposed creainng a uniform procedure for handing foreign comments on proposed standards. The EC proposed thai pariies be required to issue a written acknowledgemeni of comments received as well as a preliminary indication as io whether they woulc be accepted. However, the United States opposed the EC proposal because it called for substantive individual responses to comments received, a praciice that would be contrary to the rulemaking procedures employed by mosi U.S. agencies. (U.S. agencies address comments received when they issue finai rules in the Federal Regisier.) The United States informaily presenied an alternative proposal in 1984 that called on regulatory agencies $\hat{\text { to provice }}$ "publicly available preliminary responses, i.e., the Federal Register notice. "However, this compromise was not acceptable to the EC because it fajied to address their desire for substantive discussion of their problems wink proposed rules before they were adopled. Unable to reach a compronise, もhe

1/ The USTR accepted the petition and began an investigaiion on the natien on Oct. 1, 1984.

Committee referred the matier to the meeting of designaied national inquiry poinics $1 /$ to be held in early 1985.

## Expansion of agreemeni coverage

The Uniled States made several proposals in 1984 to broaden the agreement's coverage. It sought to have the code's language on testing and certificalion procedures strengthened in order to ensure that measures used by pariies to tesi conformity with standards do not effectively discriminate against foreign suppliers. 2/ The Comiliee agreed to have a preliminary discussion on testing and inspection issues ai its firsi meeting in 1985. The United States also continued bilateral consultaiions in an effort to reach consensus on a multilateral agreement building on the principles of the Standards code. The agreement would establish agreed upon and transparent approval procedures for telecomunications interconnect equipment. 3/

## Agreement on Customs Valuation

The Customs Valuation agreement, formally iitled the Agreement on Implementaiion of Article VII, establishes a uniform system of rules to
$1 /$ Each signatory country has designated an inquiry point to provide information on standards and standards-related procedures in their couniry. The U.S. national inquiry point is the National Bureau of Standards within the U.S. Department of Commerce. Representatives of the national inquiry points meet once every 2 years to discuss informaiion exchange issues.

2/ Specifically, the United Staies sought language that would require parties to accept foreign-generated test data and to grani so-called "type approvals." Type approvals authorize the sale of all products of a paricular iype from a particular company. The greater uncertainty and higher cosis associated with regulatory systems that issue approvals on more provisional basis (e.g., a case-by-case or shipmeni-by-shipment basis) can pose a substantial barrier to trade, the United States believes. The code currenily encourages, but does not require, mutual acceptance of test results among parties. It does not coniain provisions concerning iype approval.

3/ The U.S. draft muliilateral interconnect agreement addresses issues related to testing and approval procedures for interconneci equipment. Interconnect equipment is equipment that can be purchased by individuals and attached to the telephone network, such as telephones, modems, and answering machines. Every country regulates the types of products that can be sold in the interconnect market in order to protect the phone network from devices that might interfere with its operation. The draft multilateral agreement would ensure that signatories apply a slightly more ambitious sel of nondiscriminatory standards and certification principles than those in the Standards code when setting standards for interconnect equipment and ensuring conformity with them. In the current draft, signaiories would be required to accept test data generated in other parties and to grani type approvals for covered products.
detemine the customs value for imported goods. If The agreement provides detailec rules for celemining the vaiue of imported goods used as a basis for assessing ad valorem customs duines. The ruies promote a Eair, unirorm, and neutrai system of valuation and preciuce the use of arbiveary or ficiitious values. $\underline{2} /$ With greater uniformity of practices applied by sigraiories, exporters and importers are able to more reliabiy estimate how theis goocis will be valued jy customs auihorities. During 1984, Czechoslovakia and Botswana became signatories. Botswana is the first non-Coniracting Pa=ty to join the agreement.

During 1984, ine Comittee on Customs Valuation discussed various topics relating to the code's operation. To promote iransparency, ine signatories must inform the Commitiee of changes in cusioms laws and regulations and in their acministration. In early 1984, members agreed io carry out tnis requirement by submitiing the complete texis of naional legislation. Technical assistance, to aid developing countries as they join and prepare for application of the agreement, continues to be a priority activity. Such technical assisiance activilies were reviewed in April anc jovember 1984. In açilion, the Comitiee adopted two major decisions, one regaraing treatmen of interest charges anc the other on vaiuation of computer soriware, in ig84.

Uncer the decision on the ireatment of interest charges in the customs value of imporief goods, ine signaiories agreed that--

Cnarges for inierest uncier a financing arrangement entered inio by the buyer and relaing to the purcnase of imporied goods shail not be regaided as part of the customs value provided that: (a) such goods are sold at the price declared as the price paid or payable for the goods; (b) the Einancing arrangement was made in writing; (c) where required, the buyer can demonstrate that such goods are sold ai the price deciared or the price actualiy paic or payable, and the ciaimed rave of inieresi does not exceec the level for such transactions prevaiing in the country where, and at the time when, the financing was provioed.

The decision on the vaiuation of certain software equipment for data processing equipment proviaed that--

I/ The Customs Vaiuation agreement entered into force indernaiionally on Jan. I, I98i, zlthough the Uniied Staies ard the EC agreed to implement ine agreement on July $\bar{E}$, i980.

2/ The agreement establishes a primary method of vailution and a series of alternative methods io be applied in a prescribed sequence. First is ine transaction value methoć, where the duty is levied on the price actualiy paić or payabie for the goods with a iimiled number of adjusiments. It the primary meinoć is not feasible, using ine transaction value of an "ideniical" gocd sold to the same importing country is the second aliernative. The thirc methoci uses the transaction value of a "similar" good scld. If none of inese methods are possibie, other reasonable means consisteni with ine agreement may be used. A signaiory io the agreement is permitied to detemine customs value on eikher an f.o.i. (rree on board) or c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freighi) basis. The United Siates uses E.o.b., while mosi oinez countries use c.i.f.

For detemining the customs vaiue of imported carrier media bearing eata or insiructions，accorcing to the decision and Eor those paries who acopt this praciice，ony the cost or value of the camzier mediun itselt shail be taken into account．The eustoas vaiue shall not Enciuce the cost of value of the daia on Enstmutions，provicie that ji is disiningushec from the cost or vaiue of the carmien mecizun．

The Comittee concucted its Soumin annai review of the implemeniaijon anc operation of the agreemeni ai its Jovember i984 meeting．the signaiozies expressec a general satisíacion on their part with the jmplementation anci operaiion of the agrement．They indicaied that no subsiantiai dirficulizes had been encountered in appiying the agreement．The jarties aiso agreed that， in generat，the agreement had Eacinitaied intemaijonal irade anc had improved unîotaity in valuaiion practices．

## Anticumeing Agreement

The Anticumping agreement $\bar{y}$ prescribes the proper conduct for
antidumping investigations anc the imposition of anticumping duties based on provisions of the Generai Agreement．Ii sets guicieines for the use of these measures and related practices such as retroactive application of antidumping duties and price undertakings．2／The agreement also obligates ceveloped countries to give speciai consiôeraiton to the developing countijes jeiore appiying anijdumping cuties．Singapoze＇s accession to the agreement in is8u raisec the number of members of the coce to 22．3／

## Comaiぞさee activi亡ies

Reguiar activities of the Comitilee on Antioumping Fractices incluce reviewing national antiouming lezisiation anc acions．The comitiee Ciscusses quesions zaise $\begin{gathered}\text { by members regancing the consiscency of naionai }\end{gathered}$ legislation with the code＇s prowisions anc complaines by pariies regaraing aniidumping aciions iaken against their exporis．The comitiee is aiso responsibie for conciliaion of fomai dispuies among signaiories．Pariies to the agreement seport antioumping actions to the Conmitiee on a semiannai basis．Antidumping aciions reported by signatories in i98\＆，except tiose of the unitad Siates，are coniainee in tabie A－h．Actions unceriaken by the United Siaies are i̇isted separaiely，jn iabie A－5．

[^25]Detailec examinaiion of Austrarian antioumping iegislaijor, initiaiec in 1983, continued jnio 1984. I/ Laws of Canada, the ZC, japan, and Spain were aiso discussed. in October, Brazil infomed the Somativee that the setizng uo of administrative measures in conformity with ine agreement was incompleie anc requestec an extension of iis originaz 3-yeaz time Erame. The Comaitiee agreed to ailow Brazil more time with the uncerstaning that no anilumping actions wouid be iaken against otnez cocie members by Sraziz unti ine new procedures were in place.

During 1984, the Comittee acoptec a vaper crawn up oy the ac fac g=oup of experts on the implementation of certain provisions of the coce. The paper, entitled "Best Infomation Available in Temm of Anticie $6: 8.0$ addressed the use of "besi informaiion avaizajle" duning an invesiigaijon anc recomended procedures signaiories shoulc follow prior io using such information.

At the ent of 2984, the experts group reachec a consensus on forwarinng two other papers to the Comitiee for consideravion in 2985 . These papers concern definition of input dumping and factors to be consjoerec in determining threat of injury. Inpui cumping reiers to exporis of a proćuct. whether or not iiself dumped, thai coniain inputs purchaseć iniernaijonaliy on domestically ai dumped prices. Papers on obine issues, including ones on definition of sale, special moniloring schemes, anc cumiabion, are sizil under negoiiaiion within the group of experts.

## Dispute seitiemeni

 Witin Canacia on an anizaumping invesi̇gai̇on conciuctec by Ganaca againsi saies of electric generators from ltaiy. Since the Comitbee comsidezeo that the assistance of the ac hoc group of experis would be useful, parixauianly in examining the code's definition of a sale, cuncitiai̇on was posiooneo. Conciliation was not resumed in ig8t since the expert grou゙ こaper cerining sales was not completed.

In November 1984, the EC raisec ine issue or ine cerinivion of incusiny for wine and grape products containec in the i.s. Trace and Tariff Act cf 1984. 2/ Accoraing to the EC position, the U.S. Lam was no in line itit the code's definition of incustry. The EC formaly recuestec that consuivaizons with the United States be hela as soon as possijie. Some ŋarizes io bie agreement supporied the EC conieniion, observing thai the U.S. definilion se a dangerous precedent. Consultaizons continued without resolution indo ic85.

## Agreement on Import Eicensing Proceurures

The Comiltee on Import Eicensing helo two meetings in I984. The Comitiee focused on the necessity of having the signatories toveed io comply with the provisions of arlicie $3(c)$ of the Agreemeni on Inport Eicensing

I/ For more details see the Operaion of the Trade Agreements progran: 35ih Repori, 1984, p. 97.

2/ The EC has also Eaised this issue in the agreenent on subsióies anc councervailing dubies.

Procedures (the agreement), that import quotas must be made public. I/ One party, which was charged with noncompliance, promised to publicize the quotas in question.

At the 1984 meeiings, the Committee also agreed to a work program designed to clarify certain provisions of the agreement with special regard to the needs of developing countries. This work was to be undertaken in 1985. The Committee's efforts to compile information on the licensing system of each signatory were also discussed.

With Singapore's accession on July 20, 1984, the agreement had 24 signatories at the end of the year. 2/

## Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft

The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft provides for duty-free ireaimeni of identified civil aircraft, civil aircraft engines, and civil aircraft parts. These are enumerated in three lists in the annex to the agreement: the Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature (CCCN) list, the TSUS list, and the Canadian Tariff Schedule list. No new members acceded to the agreement in 1984. 3/

In 1984, the Committee discussed transposition of the annex to the agreement into the Harmonized System nomenclature, along with methods of incorporating aircraft concessions based on the Harmonized System into GATT schedules and national tariffs. It referred the technical aspects of this work to the Technical Subcommittee. The Subcommittee continued discussions throughout the year on converting the current annex to the format of the Harmonized System, but encountered difficulty on the differences of produci coverage between the CCCN, the TSUS, and the Canadian Tariff Schedule lisis in the annex.

Members completed negotiations during the year to expand the duty-free provisions of the annex to the agreement to new product categories. Agreemeni was reached to add 32 new categories of aircraft products (expressed in CCCN terms) to the annex, effeciive January 1, 1985. However, the agreement did not go into effect on this date for all members due to delays in the ratification process of some of the signatory countries.

## International Dairy Arrangement

The primary objectives of the GATT International Dairy Arrangement (IDA) are to expand and liberalize world trade in dairy products by improving international cooperation. Activities under the arrangement, which also

I/ The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures entered into force on January 1,1980 , committing signatory governments to simplify the procedures importers must follow to obtain import licenses. Products traded internationally are sometimes subject to bureaucratic delays and additional cost as a resull of cumbersome import-licensing systems. Such systems therefore act as barriers to international trade.

2/ For a full listing of the signatories, see table 3.
3/ For further details on membership and the provisions of the agreement, see the Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, p. 109.
includes protocols on certain milk powaers, milk fat (incluaing butter), and certain cheeses, are coorcinatec by the International Dairy products Counci. At the end of i984, is signatories fincluding the EC representing its member states) constituted the totai membership of the arrangement. I/ At yearend, however, the arrangement suffered a setback when the United States notified its intent to withdraw following the signatories" approval of EC sales of butter at below the agreed minimum prices.

The U.S. notification resulted from a series of events that began in Cctober when the Comittee of the Protocol Regarcing Milk Fat hele speciai meetings to consider a commication by the JC stating its intention to export surplus butter from EC public stocks at a price well below the minimum price currently in force. The EC said that these sales of butter to Iran and the Soviet Union would require such iow prices because of the age of the butter. Other celegations clamed there were no provisions in the arrangement allowing adjustment on this basis. The Comitcee, unable to reach a satisiactory soiution, referrec the matter to the International Dairy Products Council.

In a compromise effort, the EC, Australia, and New Zealand drafted a resolution proposing to allow the EC sales and to offer other members similar price ieeway. The United States objected on the grounds that the resolution undermined the basic minimu-price provisions of the arrangement. Though the United States dic not block the consensus needed to pass the resolution, it clearly registered its disapproval of the move by amouncing plans to reconsider its membership in the IDA. After the resolution passed, the United States formaliy notifiec the IDA, on December 14, 1984, of its intention to withdraw. 2/ In withdrawing, the U.s. reiterated its position that approval of the EC buiter sales defeated the IDA's function of stabinizing the world dairy market. At the same time, the United States voiced its frustration with the effectiveness of the TDA in zestraining the use of export subsidies.

In reaction to the U.S. pullout, the EC said the balance of rights crafted uncer the Tokyo Round (which incluced negotiation of the arrangement) would be upset. The EC argued that the United States still was obligated not to take more than its fair share of the market or to undercut the minimum IDA price. Other responses to the U.S. withdrawal were more resigned. Although some members regretted the U.S. departure from the arrangement, these members acknowledged the U.S. reasons for doing so.

During 1984, as is required annually, the Council evaluated world market conditions for dairy procucts and reviewed the functioning of the agreement. $1 /$ To accomplish this task, the Council nomally considers such items as national policies, food aid, data regarding products, and reports of the committees which oversee the three protccols. This year, for example, a comunication from Australia was considered regarding probiems in observing minimum price provisions on tenders using quotations in currencies other than U.S. dollars. In examining the issue, the protocol committees reported to the

1/ See table 3 for a full list of members.
2/ The U.S. Witharawal from the IDA became effective Feb. 14, 1985.
$\underline{\underline{\prime}}$ Minimum prices are subject to annual review. Nowever, the most recent increase was authorized in 1980 when prices were raised slightly to the following levels per metric ton: skimad milk powcer--US $\$ 500$; whole milk powder--US\$800; butter--US\$1000; anhydrous milk fat--US\$1,200; and certain cheeses--US $\$ 900$.

Counctit that, because of unioreseen exchange rate fluctuations against the dollar, an offer price cuoted in other currencies could resuli in a seling price lower than the minimm. Members agreed to keep the protocol comiltees informed regarding the detaiis of these types of inensactions.

## Arrangement Regaraing Jovine Meat

The Arrangemeni Regarding Bovine Neai (the arrangement) promotes incernaionai cooperation towarcis expansion, liberalization, anc siabilization of trace in meat and investock. With the addition of Coiombia in i984, the membership of the agreement has grown to 26. $\exists$ / The signatories incluce ail majoz beef exporing anc imporing countries, except the Soviet Union. Their trađ̃e represenis approximately 90 perceni of exports, 60 percent or imporis, and 60 percent of procuction in the indusiry. Under the arrangement, the signatories colieci and distribute data on produciion and trade. They also consuil on markei condivions anc aiscuss problems raised by menbers.

Late in iS83, severai members of the arangement expressed concern aboui the current and future condiions of the internaional bovine meat mankt. Such concerns led Argenina to request a special meeting of the International Weat Council (TKO), whin administers the arrangement, in eariy 1984. The meeting aduressed ciaims by Argenina, New Zeaianc, and Uruguay that EC subsidies on bovine beef exports had boosted the Ec's market share and helped
t become a major world suppiier. The cownizes asseried that the subsidies, contrary to article F of the arrangement, were destabilizing international market conditions and hurting less-developed exporters of jovine meat products. Some members of the arrangenent complained that, in addition to competing against the SC subsiaios, they face limiled access to the EC market. Better access to the EC market was temeci vital to expansion of world trace in bovine meat.

As a resull of fiscussion ai the special meeting, the IMC sei up a working party to consider the complainis in lighi of articie IV, paragraph 2, of the arangement. Under this provision, if the Min find evicence of a serious imoaiarce or threat of one in the iniemaiional meat market, it must identify possibie remedies to the situation. After several meetings, the working pariy coserved that condibions leading to a serious imbance in the incernaionai bovine meat market had emergec as a result or developmens occurring over the last several years. As of yearenc, since the working pariy hac not compleied drawing up recomendaions, the inf extended its mandaie into i985.

I/ See taile 3 for a fuil listing of code members.

## GRGDE ACHVETES OUTSIDE TES GATM

ERGRODUCTION
Ethougin the Genemal foreement on Taniffs anc Erade provice the broad
 aiso paニ亡ミニシpates in sevema other organizations that deai with international tuace Issues，Rotably tine onganization Eon Economic Cooperation anc こeveiopment ant the Unitec Xations conference on Frace and Deveiopment．The cacD ane the ulcrap puovice fomas for consultation anc policy coorcination on Essues jnciucing，but not inmitec to，tracie．They cover a wicier range of subjects than the GATR，but they co not ain for the same degree of specific Entemational obijgation zecuirec of GATE members．Nevertheiess，the work of these onganizations often complements the wozk cone in the GATT．Other bodies such as the Gustons Gooperation Council（GCO）and the intemational conmodity onganizations cover a nawower purview than the GATE but provicie a basis for coonijnaing anc zegulating ceztain sperific aspects of intemationai tacie． This chapeer áscusses U．S．participation in the OECD，the UNCTAD，the CCC， anc intemationai commodity organizations．It also covers the U．S．bilaterai シnvestment もreaty ¥uognan anc progmess on trace agneements in the services secたor．

## 




 menbers，（2）z＝0mote eccnomic deveiownent of mommomors，and（3）expand world
 Eoさum Eon consulもa亡̇on to Eacłi̇もa亡e volicy coorcination on a broad range of ミニヒemationaz anc economic jssues．Decisions are not bincing on incividuai memoers．Fins section js inmitec to the onganjzation＇s trace－related シュきたジこシves．

 These commetees report to tine Gouncil，the top executive docy of the oECD． Gee Counci－meets sevema times anmuary ai the Pemanent Representative level anc once anmainy at the rimisteriaz zevel．The purpose of the
 くこッecこミons．

[^26]ニュ 2084，亡ne Ministerial Councin meeting tock piace on May 17 anc 18 in Paris．Member coutries agreec io carry out poiicies that wouic exiena the economic recovery，cui unemployment，expand world irade，and improve relaiions between incusえmialized and developing countries．They wamed of the effeci on interest tates of high buaget dericiis and acivocatec sounc monetary anc fiscal policies to siabijize pmices and exchange maies．The Minisiers notec in particulat the imporiance of acaptive economic structures in achieving durabie growtr．In this context，もney ačvocated implementation of positive aciusinent poijcies and encoused the poiicies recommended in a statement by the Economic Poliay Comaittee．

The खinisters aiso reafinmed their comitment to recuce trade barriers anc strengthen the mintilateral tracing system．I／They noted that exiensive consultations among all camg mempers and eariy anc thorough preparations would be essentiai for the success of a new round．Important steps in this preparatory proeess woulc include completion of the 1982 GATM work program and Work performed jy the OSCD．

## 

Sumpuses of ag＝iculturai p＝ocuats on worić markets contimued to plague OECD procucers in 2934. At the Ministeriai neeting，the Ministers expressed concern that this situation existec in severai comocity markets due，in large part，to domestic support policies．They mace zecomendations to＂ease measures wnich hinder the requisite long－tem adjustments，and to persevere With curremt efforts aimed at rechuing protectionism and trade distoriions， and at improving the functioning of wozic marikeis．＂2／

The Gomitiee for Agriculume reached simijar conciusions in its yearly ＝eport（puoiisheci in January 1985）on the outlook for ag＝iculural policies ame markets．Arier examining individual p＝ocuci markets，ine repori noted that serious international marixt imomances exist in aimosi all fam products anc can be expecied io coniinue uniess poijcies are cnanged．The Comittee ＝ecomended that OEGD countries（I）increase efforts to recuce the surpluses while taking account of market forces，（2）avoic protectionist measures，anc （3）namonize comestic goais at the iniennational ievel In orcer to improve ثhe yerfomance ofinterna亡ionaz markets．

Progress cortimue in zo84 on the three－part worx program on intemational agnicultural trade mandated in 2982．Under part if of the work progzam，a mitiozoduci economic model has been set up to examine possibie metnods for，anc the effects of，＂a balanced and gradual reduction of卫rotection＂in va＝ious agiiculturai comodities．3／Part II，which examines the impact of national policies on agriculturai trade，resulted in tine

[^27]submission of country reporis by Canada and Austraiia. I/ Einaliy, part inf calls for an analysis of the methods that might improve the performance of worla markets. This part of the mandate will probabiy be used to draw conciusions from paris I and II to yield a finai report recommening domestic policies aimed at improving world market performance. This repori, which will be submitted at the 1986 ministerial Council meeting, will conclude the work program.

The $\overline{1} 982$ Ministeriai Council aiso mandaied a stuoy of the problems relatec to trace in fish. The repori, stili in progress, will discuss the consequences of present policies on fish trade anc the possibilities for liberalizing trade in this sector.

In $\begin{gathered} \\ 0 \\ \text { àtion, } \\ \text { in } \\ 1984\end{gathered}$ an important stucy was pubiishec examining agricultural trade between OECD countries and the developing world. 2/ The report analyzec the effecis of national and muttilateral poiicies on this trace fiow and highiighted several poinis for poiicy makers to consider: (1) the variety of developing countries with respect to their economic structure anc agriculturai trade paiterns, (2) the increasins interdepencence of nationai economies anc the mutual jenefins derived from expandec trace, and (3) the imporiance of the muliilateral role in promoinng irace growit.

## Export Crecizis Arrangement

The Arrangement on Guideiines for Officiaily Supporied Export Crediis (the arrangement) was designed to regulate government-supportea subsicies on export credits in order to insure fair competition for credit tems. This type 0 ह export subsicy offers âirect loans by government insiitutions to foreign buyers at below commercial interest raies. Due to relatively high comerciai rates of interest and a siowdown in economic activity in mosi incustriaiized countries, subsidized export financing has become an increasingly popuiar way to promote exports and maintain employment.

The original arrangement, negotiated in 1977 , set minimum interest rates for OECD countries that subsioize their expori credits. In October i983, the new arrangement took effect, estabiishing stricter guiceines io further iimit the use of subsidies on export credit. Direct interest-rate subsicies were virtuajiy eliminated on trade between industrialized countries, and subsicies to Geveioping countries were substantiaily reducea. Also, for the incsi inme, the minimum interesi zates fixed under OECD guidelines were linked to comerciai interest rates. Every 6 monins (in january anc July), the oECD

[^28]rates adjust automatically to the market rate of interest. 1/ Table 4 snows the interest rate schedule adopted on January 15 , 1985 (the second adjusiment under the new automaiic system). 2/

Table 4.--Minimum interest rate guidelines set on January 15,1985 for officially supporied expori creaits, by repaymeni periods


1/ Relatively rich countries are defined as having per capita GNP over $\$ 4,000$; intermediate, per capita GNP between $\$ 681$ and $\$ 4,000$; and relatively poor, per capita GNP below $\$ 681$.

2/ The rates adopted in July 1984 are shown in parenthesis.
3/ Countries in this category are eligible for financing from the International Development Association (IDA).

Source: OECD Press Release.

The arrangement also contains rules governing lengih of crecit, downpayments, and mixed credits. In 1984, changes in the guidelines for mixed credits became a major U.S. objective. Mixed credits combine commercial credits with aid grants intended to assisi developing countries. According to the Administration, the increasing use of mixed credits has led to trade distortion and rising costs for governments. Furthermore, mixed credits are actually being used to finance comercial export sales rather than to aid developing countries. 3/ The United States is particularly concerned thai mixed credits are supporting inđustries with high rates of return, such as telecommunications and lransportation, which should be able to sustain commercial interest rates. Throughout 1984, the arrangement specified that if the grant element of a mixed credit accounted for less than 20 percent of the total financing package, it was illegal. If the aid component was between 20 and 25 percent of the value of the export financing, OECD had to be notified in advance. Aid elements comprising more than 25 percent of the total did not require prior notification. The United States proposed to raise the minimum allowable level of aid in mixed credit packages from 20 percent to 50 percent in order to discourage the use of subsidized credits by making them prohibitively expensive. In addition, the United States hoped that, under the

[^29]proposed mules，the grant element would be used for humanitarian（i．e．， development）purposes rather than commercial purposes．While negotiaiions peogmessec in 1984，no agreement was reached by yearend．I／

Lastly，several export sectors，including nuclear power equipment， comercial aircraft，and agricultural products，are not covered by the 1983 areangement．In August，agreement was reached establishing guidelines for crecits on exports of nuclear power equipment．The agreement sets minimum interest zates at 1 percentage point higher than current arrangement rates． The maximum duration of the loan was extended to 15 years on nuclear equipment （from 10 years on other projects）．In addition，mixed credits are Probibitec．Jegotiations toward a sectoral arrangement on aircraft began towaras the end of $i 984$ and will continue in 1985．Agricultural projects are still exciuded from the OECD consensus on export credits．

## High－Technology Trade

The Comittee for Scientific and Technological Policy（CSTP），jointly With the Industry and Trade Comittees，continued to siudy problems related to Boin nign－technology trade and the international flow of technologies．In ミ982，OECD Ministers agreed io identify specific problems that affect trade in high－technology products and examine their possible solutions．In response to this mandate，a Joint Bureau of the CSTP and the Industry Committee prepared six sectoz studies on roboiics，lelecommunications，pharmaceuticals，machine tools，semiconductors，and space products in order to identify the trade 2＝obiems confronting each secior．These probiem areas were subsequentiy sumarizec in a paper drafted by the Joint Bureau for the 1984 Ministerial meeining．The issues idenifified include（I）government support for research anc deveiopment．（2）access to high technology including export controls， （3）puibi̇c procurement policies，（4）special benefits of spinoffs from mi－itary and space projects，（5）standards，and（6）export credits and promotion measures．Now，the Trade Comittee is analyzing this list of specific trade policy problems and examining the adequacy of existing trading mies in addressing these problems．The united States Government proposes inves亡igating particular market access issues faced by high－technology incustries，inciuding liberalization of government procurement markets， improvement of international discipline in standards，and reduction of taniffs，quotas，and other trade barriers applied at the border．The United States acvocates improving existing trade rules to address these problems， ratner than creating new sectoral agreements or codes．

Worix by the the CSTP also focused on ways to facilitate iniernational tecinnology transfers．The preliminary stage of this work program has亡éentified three factors that may affect the flow of technology：（1）the growing overlap between commercial，military，and scientific interest in some advanced technologies and related expori controls，（2）the inclusion of restrictions in some commercial technology transfer contracts and the varying iseatment by fifferent countries of intellectual properiy rights，and （3）resiriciions on access to governmeni－financed research and development programs by firms under foreign control．

[^30]
## Envestment

In 2984，the OECD mace severai strice towards sirenginening internainonzi cooperaiion on investment．The Committee on International Investment anc Fulitnai̇onal Enterprises（CHME）reviewed and amended ine 1976 Deciaration on International Invesiment and Muliinaiional Enierprises，a set Of princizles designec to improve the internaiional investment alimaie and to sネrengihen coníidence beiween muitinational enterprises（MNE＇s）and governments．The deciamation covers ibree areas：（1）guidelines of business practice for Mrs＇s，（2）the principle of natiorai ireatment for enterprises uncer Goreiga controi，and（3）an agreeneni on incentives and aisincentives Err inienaiionai invesimeni．The guidelines for MN：s were designed io sei siancarcis Cor MNE acivitiies vhrougnout OECD countries．Three changes were mace to surengthen then．Eirst，Ehe Ministers agreed that any country adopting nem legisiaiton that might conflici with the policies of ofher OECD members，bhus arfecting me operations，shoula seek cooperation on a bilaterai basis of settle もispuies before ine Cive．The guideines were aiso amended so that Mas wil take consmer interests more fully into account．Lasily，the guicieiines mere examined with respect to the siructural adjusiment process． After conducting a najor study of the structural adjusiment sirategies of
 dacisionaking process in order to remain as responsive as possible to locai economic conéジシャns．

The principie of national treatment states that countries shoule not treat forejon enterprises less favorably than comestic fims in like situations．There are many cases，however，where countries will not accord a Eozejon fim national 亡zeatment．In i98t，a survey of these exceptions was completec．This stucy will be periocicaily reviewed for the purpose of extercing the appiication of naiional ireatment．

Tinaziy，ihe agneemeri on incenizves and disincentives was designeci to avoic the excessive use of government measures to influence international invescment cecisions．In 2983，a survey of investment incentives and disincentives，jnciucing an assessment of the effects of these measures on internaitionai direch invesiment，was completed．Since inen，the crife，in coilaboration with the Trace Comittee，has completed a more detailed siudy on trace－reiaiec investment measures（TRIM＇s）and iheir effecis on internaiional investmeni and traze ilows．́／Based on the stway s results，consultaiion procecures between member countries have now been expanded io cover ali measumes affecing iniernationai invesiment，wheiher on not iney were ＂specioicaijy designed to provjae incentives and disincentives to iniernaiionai Aireci invesimeni．＂

At Ehe May Ministeriai Council meeting，Canada became the finai OECD country to accept the coêe of Eiberaijzaiion of Capiial Movements．This code， whic：cails for progressiveiy abolisning restrictions on international capital movenenis，was amerded to cover measures affeciing right of esiaioishment thai are particuia＝ly reievant to airect invesiment by service indusiries．2／

[^31] invesment in ceveloping countios conijnuet to ativant aivention at oeco in 1984．The CIME $\alpha$ ciozted a monk program aimec at idaniifying ways io increase the fiow of foreign fizect investmeni io deveioping countijes anci at assessing its coneribuijor to economic ceveiopment．The CHME mil explore aays io exchange views on invesment issues with deveroping couninies．Aiso， 5 ozcs members，in coliaboration mith jo developing countzies，pubishec a stujy on new forms of international investment in developing counimies．É the siney examines trencs in nem bypes of invesiment，the causes of inese imenco，ank their gossibie impiications．

## zrotectionism and stuncuraj Abjustment

One of the main features of the 2984 Winisteriai Councin＇s staiememi on international trace was the agreemen：to azvance by I year，to eaviz Io85，ail tariff cuts schecuied for igss pursuant io the Fokyo Rounh of wris．2！This action was the first significant step taken to filfini last yearis omex yiecge to＂make use of the Eavorable conćji̇ors provicen by economia zecovery bo
 cestriciions anc iraće－Gisiorting enosiic measures．＂3／Ghe councia aiso approved 2 progran to cievelop specific proposals Eor individuaj anc coilecijve action io figni protectionism．These proposels inciude（I）stučīnz resiriciions by secior，（2）strenguhening irarsparency anc ciscipijne in irade and aic financing pracizces that may have trabe－isisoring effects，（3） encouraging counizies to assess the economic impact or nem proiecionist measures and to ideni ify offseiting ijberaijzaijon measures，（f）woming towards an Encemationai agreenent on safeguarcis to zeguiate proiecitonist
 thai have 亡rade－cistorizng effects，and（ 6 ）possibiy examining irade poijejes by coumiry．

Several compitiees issuec siudi̇es aralyżng efforis to＝estrici もhe spread of proiectionism．The commitiee on Resiricijve Business panciices completed a stuby that examines how compei̇tion policies can heip comaネ
 competition anci trade policies anc Lays the grounchork Eoz devemining possible steps to je taken at the international levei to resist zrotectionisi pressures through improvec coordina亡̇on of inade anc competition oozicies． Another stioy，ertitiec＂Consumer Eozicy anc Internaizonal Irace，＂examines the relationship betneen consumer weltare anc proiecijorisi measures．三i In November，the OECD hela a symposium on the same topic that nighighied conslmer efforts to reverse procectionisi trencs in the oacd area．

[^32]The shori－tern costs of aćjustment to changing intemationai trâe patiems have piacec aôded pressures on governments io iake proiectionist neasures to brake the adjusiment process．Yet the long－tern cosis－－lower real outpui and empicyment－nay be higher．In adeikion io sponsoring erforis io resist protectionist pressures，OECD governments acopted specific positive adjustment poiicies to promote flexibility in the procuci，labor，and capitai nerkets．In tay，ine Minisiers endorsed a set of policy recomenciations inai ＂would facilitate zather than impede ine adjusiment of produciion structures to nem technoiogies，cnanging maket conditions anć sinits in internaitona？ competitiveness．．．．Strenghhening compeiiiion，improving reguration anć promoting more oper irade policies are of key imporiance．＂I／with respeck io the Labor marike，the Council agreed that reai wages siould be more mesponsive to changes in cemanc anc suppiy condibions and inat policies shoulo encourage stmaniral ahange in ways that create job opporiunities and neip workers anc effected commnities to adjusi．

## CUSTOES COOPERETEOR COUKYCE

The Customs Cooperation Council was set up in ig5z to promote common cusions z＝ocecures mong predominantly Europear states．Iis membership now inciuces most major trading partners of the worlc．2／The CCC anc ís subsiciary comaittees aim to hamonize anc simplify ine bechmical aspecis of customs procecures in orcier to facilitaie trade among members．A major focus 0 ̇． members ine iementaiion of the Hamonized System anc to compare ífferences in Files of crigin recuitrements of members．

Duzing Igra，the Nomenciature Comittee and ine Interim Hamonizet System comittee of the CCC continued to work in joint sessions to zevise drafts of the Explanatory motes for the Harmonized System．work is expectec to be completec in time for the implementation of the jamonizec system on


It another area，the Pemmanen Fechrical Comitiee of the coc acmplevec ̇ts ciants of a two－pari compendium of mules oí origin appiiec in jriemationai irade．This compendium is iniended lo serve as a basis for Ewtire agreament on the simpinfication anc hamonization of zuies of origin． The finst part，Eraftec in November I982，is a comparaitve suuy of mies of onigir in use by GCC memier couniries．The various couninies wili ze astec to ひかate their iniomaiion as to origin ruies anc procecures ame to＝esibmit it in a fonmat to be agreed upon during 1985．The secnd pari，drafled in August －984，is a compilation of rules that are parivculariy difficuit to apply anc conirol．Weetings concerning ruies or origin will conimue，anci line second part will Iater be submitled to the Council for its approvai．

[^33]
## UELES METEOES COXEZREXGE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

The ünited dations Conference on Trade and Development was creaied as an organ of the united itations Generai Assembly，in December 1964，for the purpose of promoing iniernational trade，especially with a view to acceierating economic development of less developed countries．The first UNOTAD was convened＂in orcer to provide，by means of internaiional cooperation，appropaiate sotutions to the probiems of worla irade in the interest of ain peopies anc particuianly to the urgent trade and development problems of the Geveloping couniries．＂I／Since its inception，UNCTAD＇s role nas $\mathfrak{b e e n ~ L a r g e i y ~ i ̇ m i t e c ~ t o ~ e x c h a n g e s ~ o f ~ v i e w s ~ o n ~ t r a d e ~ a n d ~ a i d ~ p r o b l e m s ~ a n o n g ~}$ countries that are at cifferent stages of economic cevelopment and have cifferent economic systems．

UNCRAD＇s membershin is open to all countzies that are members of the Un亡tec Nations on of any on the agencies related to ine organization．Iis heacquarters is in Geneva，and its governing jody is the Trade and Development Boarc（TDB）．The $2 D B$ is responsibie for UNCTAD＇s functions when the conEerence $\ddagger$ n not in session．It implements conference decisions，initiaies zesearch studies on brade anc rejated developmeni problems，and carries out preparatory work for the conferences．Seven comittees aid the TBD with its sorix：Ebe Commitiees on（I）Comocities，（2）Manufaciures，（3）Invisibies anc Financing Relatec ic Tra＠e；（4）Shipping，（5）Preferences，（6）Transfer of Technoiogy，anc（7）Economic Cooperaiion among Developing Countries．These comitiees meet evezy 2 years．The TDS hoids 2 or more regular sessions per year anc an occasionai special session．In I984，the Board met for ils 28ith anc 29もh sessions in wanch anc Seziember，respeciveiy．UNCTAD＇s conferences are heic every 3 or 4 years．İs sixir conference（UNCTAD VI）was hele in Bezgraće in June zs83．

The following seciion discusses ihose trace－reiated topics that have been the focus of ongoing work since UNOAD VI：the Integraied Program for conmoaities anc ine comon Func；proiectionism and structural adustment；and inacie preferences anci ine funcioning of lhe iniernational trading system．

## The Entegnated Zrogman Eow Commocities anc the Common Fund for Comodities

The integnated comodity progran proposec by developing countines anc
 comadi̇y－づシャシng agreenents within a generai framework and a conmon func to be usec primarijy for buffer stock Einancing．2／The purpose of the Integrated Drogran for Comocitiies（IPC）is io＂expand and diversify the trace o乞 develowing countries，improve anć civersîy their producive capaciiy，anc improve their prôuctivìy anc increase their expori earnings ．．．．＂3／

[^34]


 framework of the Iこ介：the Iṅemationai Ag＝eement on jaiurai Ruojer，


 anc jute．2／The uijber agreement，the rimt agreement to enter into force
 excessive price Eiuciuaiions．Subsecuentiy，a irend emerge ínard




The 5enes comocity agraemenio whin covers irovical bimber，is no suにた an ag＝eenent before；anć second，ecojogicai dimensions fave been iaken シュio accomit．Discussions cesigned to set ug iniernational agreements in ôner comocities，such as cotcon and tea，coniznued in 1984.

The Comon Func for comociities was conceivec by developing countries as a nechanisn io finance interncionai buñer siock operations ane to orovice annessionai loans or granis io finim morié procucers for such acivities as
 agreements on mboer，tin，nnc cothee are eligioie For Einancing uncier fine


 the agreement to cone into force， 90 acuminies must raijfy ji and iney must



E generai zevien is jeing greparec wienin UNGEAD to examine the roie of
 Te تepoーt js expectec to be compleceর someime in Ig85．

Enouectionism anc Stuncuical Açusiment



[^35]simuciumai açjusment；to Sommiaie appropriaie recomenciaions concerning proteciionism；anc to review anc monjior trade developmenis and，mineze aセpropriate，make general policy recomenciations concerning simuinmai aciustmen．

Severai imporiant poinis emergec from the annual peview conduciec ai the 28uh session of hhe TDB in 1984．Mosi deiegaiions agreec that＂proieciionisi zeessures continuec to prevai and to perpetuate a cimate of unceziainiy winct affecied imace as a whole＂anc sifinec glojal recovery．the majority of the deiegabions aiso expressec the vian that posjuive ájustment poijcies mere zequirec＂in sectors where Loss of competitiveness nać iec io undue zel̇ance on provecijonist measures，to ine cieiment of ine iniernai̇onal inaíng system．＂Lasily，severai celegations noted the innix beiween trace i三jeraijzation anc the soiution of debt problems．I／

In acítion，nearly a year after ihis manciate nac been oiven to tien ZDB， the 28 th TDB session establishec a work program on protectionism anc structural adivitmeri．It was designed in iight of＂the need to sinive for an inoroved，strengthened，open and expanding tracing sysiem so as to restore and reinforce conficence ．．．．＂ $2 /$ the work program directs the TDB，n the course of its annuai review（to be heid at ine finst reguian session each year），to invite govermments to provice information on factors reievant to the issues of protectionism ana siructurai aduustmeni．Phe－JB will accozcingiy Vozmiate appropriate ooijcy recomanciaions．Specíic aspecis to be açiressec in subsequent annuai reviews were aiso enumeraieć in the mork progran．They inciuce（i）covering ail seciors－－agriculiume， mamâactures，anć services－－anc all counizies anci groups of couninies， （2）examining the problems of protectionism and suruciurai aćjusimeni in a
 interna亡ionai inaçe and the solution of baiance－or－payments problems，．．and the İnk between the evolution of worid trade anc ine siructure of三ndusinies，＂（3）consicering poiicies to facilitate simucurai acjusumeṅ， （4）fosiering greater iransparency，（5）icentifying irencis in anl faciors ̇mporiani to ine simatural acjusimeni process（e．g．，technologicai Geveioment），anc（6）icentirying special problems of the Least－Ceveiopec くounもごさes．3／

The ceneraijzec sysiem of Preferences，Oiner Peefemences， sne the 工unctioning of the inteancionai Taecing systou

Jeveloped countries faciintate the expansion of imporis from devejoning countries generai三y through pursuit of Iiberal trade arcinvestment poijajes， anc seevifjcally through thei＝GSP schemes．t／The ESE is a Erameworix uncer which فeveiopeq countries accord prefereniial tariff vreatment io manufaccurec

[^36]gooćs expoztec by deveioping countries．Fev uncan special Comittee on
 evaluate the GSP．wnile the preEerence－giving counties concemtanted on explaining the imonovements they hac made in the scheme，inclucing nem benefits Eor tine Zeast－ćevelopec na亡̇oms，the cevezowig counizies concemmeć the introcuction of graciuation．uncer the graciuation poijcy，preferentiai も上ectment js eliminatec or phasec out on those procucts Ercm a pantioular coutzy that woule be competitive without futy－Eree status．Deveioping countries angue that grawution is not in the spinit oE the orizinai CSP


Develoning countries assent that the introduction of gracuation uncien esp Is oniy one example of the senシous erosion that has taken place in the principies anc muies of the mitilateral tuaciag system．In an examination oi the tracizg systen following the last ounc of mitionteral tace negotiacions，the TDB icentiEied Eoum main chamactenisiics：（1）cecreasec
 neasures of protection，＂particularly antidumping anc countervaiking duty cases，（3）the trenc towancis managed trade í．e．，the adoption of measures controzijng prices，quantities，anc the sources of imports，occurring outsice the GART Eramework（e．g．，use of voluntary export restraints）and covering more sectors，anc（4）refucec rejiance on unconditional MrN treatment as the guicing paincipie of internationai traće＝elations．This roport currinatec in UNGAD YI maneating the TDB to＂revien anc stucy in depth the deveioments in the 三nternationaj tracing system＂and to aake proposais and mecomemeations With sespect to the strengtnening anc improvement of the syster．In I984，a
 the review be usec as＂an exercise in consersus buizaing．＂progzess mouic requite broac agreenent on two major Emonts：（I）whe is wromg witit the systen，anc（2）concepts on winch an jnonovec system sinoula be besec．The backg＝ounc stúy alsc suggesteć key elements on winh the TDB snoulc Eocus
 The reviem coulć（1）suggest ways to cecrease oressures for protectionist neasures，possibiy by accompanying trace concessions with comestac stmeturai
 oE p＝otectionist anc íjscmininatory measures in speciEic sectors anc suggest
 negotiations betmeen countries at diEferent cevelopaent Jeveis anc mith dEEerent economic anc sociai systems，（幺）study ways to Eoster fynamia ivace

 cevelowing countwies to speec up the revien process aid rejectec by the ミncusシニシaミ̇zec mations at ちie 29だn TDS session in Seotember．

Homix contimued in Ig84 towand the estabitshment of the ciobal system of
 preferentiai tuading system among ceveloving countwies to cover joth tanife anc nontariff trace janriers．İ is intercé to suppienent any existing
 weil as comocities．While tine aim of tine scineme is to gemenaje south－South trade，deveioped coumtries have supporied the project．these nations have



 exanining the nature and diversity of import contiool measures of the developing vountmies anc thein impact on trade．Issues relating to the
 ¿iscussé．

## YACOTEATEOE AND OPERATION OF TNTERKATIONAE COMPODITY AGREEMERES

Tine neso亡̇ation of internationai comocity agreements grew out of tise conceza oE both producing and consuming nations over the disrupisve effects oE ince fïctuajions in comodity prices．During the mid－i970＇s，intermationai comodity zgreements became an issue of particular interest，refiecting the i－yomiance of comoćities trade to the deveioping countries．Since tien， comocitites policy has been in the forefront of North－South diaiogue．UNGEAD is the forum most activery invoived in this issue．I／

The Foliowing sections sumnamize the operation in 1984 of intemationai commedity agmeenents covering coEEee，sugaz，wheat，cocoa，anc tin as welt as Gie $2=0$ zgreements on naturai rubber，jute，and tropicミ．timber．Five of these ag＝eements－on coffee，sugar，natumal mbber，tin，amć cocoa－－contain soeniگic priec－stajizization mechanisms đesigned to reduce Eluctuaijons in きこices； añ reasomabiy oriced supply of the commodity to customers．Phese agreements ぞov̇ie Eo＝mamket intervention by a variety of means．Buying anci selijng of OuEEE stocks to mockeate price swings is one proninent method．Assigning ynocuction anc export quotas is another．On the other hamd，the agreements couerimg meat，jute，and tropicai timber were not speciEjcaijy ciesignec to ninimoze p＝ice Eluctuations．Instead，they seek to promote research anc neズxeを むeveさopment．

At もine ent of 2984 ，the United States was participating in the agreements cuveming coffee，sugar，wheat，tute，and natural ruboer．2／The uniter Siates上ay enter into intemational comodity agreenents through executive asteenemes，treeties requiring ratification by a two－thincis majority of the Sミnate，or jy specきícally emached legislation；a treaty is the customary ¥oute．In generai，the Unitec States Goverment has reservations concerning まnternationai price stabilization schemes on the groumds that they might ここeate long tern market distortions．In the u．S．view，wo：ie markets shoule Se Eincwec to operate freely and without government interference．U．S．poijcy \＃s generajiy to wromote research and developnent Eunding mather than market ミ゙ちもどvenちミor．

In ES8＜，the jute agreenent entered into Eorce provisionaily and the Egreement covering cocoa，set to expire in September 1584，was extencec for ㅍNu year．Jegotiations took place for new agreements covering cocoa． Matural suboben，anć sugar．

Deswite the economic recovery，the rate of increase in wolesaie prices 0 n nonoin commocities in U．S．coinar remn cecelerated significantiy in i 384. Zne the incex of nonoil comodity prices rose by 2.4 percent in issu Eojiowing


[^37]18.0 percent beiow the 1980 recorc level. If the impact of the appreviaizon of the U.S. currency on coilar prices is taken inio account, honever, tine i=8k
 higher than in 2980.
corsee
The cument Intematinonai Coffee Agreement (IGA) enterec into force in October is83, foliowing the expization of the 1975 Gofiee hzreement. It covers a b-year perioc that may be extenced for an aćcitional 2 years under the present terms. In i984, the terms of ine ICA remainec essenieily unchanged from those of the previous year. The ICA has no provisior for a buffer stock, but it coes provice for expori quotas. If The agreemant is
 reguiations estabiishec by the Intemationai Coffee Council (Ioc).
 60-kiiogram bags (a bag is ecuivalent to ajout 132 pouncis) co the z984is5 arop year. This giobal quota was mace up of 53.2 million bass wo acou 8.6 percent from the number in -983) for exporting memoers enuibec to a basia guova and 2.8 miliion bags (up ajowi 7.7 percent fom the nube= in io83; yon exporizng members exempt fron ine basic quota. The iniviai anmai expozt
 crop year i984/85 in equal amounts.

The trigger prices for upward anc donnwarc quobz movement remained ine same as in ig83. The trigat prices cperate in the folioning manmer: it the i5-day moving avezage of ine composile incicato price is ai or jeion $\$ 1.35$ per pounc, the export quoias are rectuced on a pro raia jesis by an amout of 1.0 minlion bags; in the ij-ciay moving average of the comoosive
 an amount oi 1.0 milijon bags. In December 1984 , the 15-6̂ay composite inciacator price reached $\$ 1.35$. Consequently, the giobal export anota mas decreased by a milion bags to 60.0 miliion for the -98u/85 cocree year. The export guotas may be increaseć or cecreasec funther, depencing on aćivitonai changes in the $\overline{5}-$ cay moving average oi the composite incicator paice.

Tabie 5 inćicates that turing i $980-84$, the yeariy average or the -00 s
 In is84, the monthly average composite indicator price ranged rom \$1.48 pa: pounc in zay to $\$ 1.35$ per pound in Decamber. Less coffee was haruesté tue to cimatic and transportation problems in major producing countrias, and thus prices in 1984 averagec about io percent higher than 1983 prices. hithough the agreement's prica objecinves were iargely mei in 1984, the allozaijon of
 because saies to nonmembers are excluce from the expori quoias, Soutr aniaes have been offerec in these markets reiative to the guota markeis. As a result, a two-tier matket has deveioped ane corfee has dean junazi-y singeed fron nonquata to quota markeis.
 Prosian, 33a Report, 2981, (U.S. Internationai Facie Comission, vemc Pub1iニa亡ion 1308, 2982, pp. 84-86).
－abie इ．－－Green coffee：Intematjonai coffee Organizaijon monithy avenage composite 亡ncicator prices， $\bar{Z}$／on the baṡs or the j976 agreement， $2980-84$ （In eants oer pounc）

| こaエ゙ȯ | 2980 |  | 1985 |  | 1982 |  | 2983 |  | こ98\％ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ここセuary | S¢．6s | ： | \＄1．25 |  | \＄1－24 |  | \＄2． 27 |  | 42．39 |
| Febzuary | ？． 63 |  | I． 20 |  | 1．3！ |  | 二．24 |  | 2．43 |
| Na＝0 | 2.77 |  | －． 20 |  | I． 29 |  | I． 22 |  | 1.44 |
| Аきご | $\underline{-72}$ |  | E．2］ |  | ？．24 |  | －． 22 |  | 2.44 |
| Sey | $\geq .82$ | ： | 1． 17 |  | I． 23 |  | －． 25 |  | －． 48 |
| June | 2.75 | ： | ． 99 |  | 1.21 |  | 2． 23 |  | 1． 45 |
| び2 | ？． 52 | ： | $\geq .08$ |  | I． 16 |  | 1． 24 |  | ‥41 |
| Augusi | ㄹ．34： | ． | $\pm .07$ |  | こ． 17 |  | －． 25 |  | 2.43 |
| Sepたenbe＝ | 7.25 |  | 2.07 |  | ． 23 |  | ？． 27 |  | 2.42 |
| Ocをoこe＝ | 7． 26 |  | Z．18 | － | E． 29 |  | 1． 36 |  | －． 36 |
| Noverioer | 7． 16 | ： | 7． 25 | ． | 1． 30 |  | 1.38 | ： | －． 38 |
| Decenier－ | 1.20 | ： | I． 23 | ： | 1．3I | ： | $\pm .40$ | ： | －． 35 |
| Aveにage－ | ？．5？ |  | $\pm .15$ |  | I． 25 |  | ？． 28 |  | ㄹ．${ }^{4}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

I．The incicator price is a composite of the ex－coc？New York and Hamburg－ Bremen pricas of＂Othe：Wiva Arabica＂and ex－dock Nem York anc Marseilies－ Le Havre zrices of Rcbus亡a－type green coffee．The ex－cock price of a comacizy Encluctes the costs of making the goocis availaile at docksicie of tie হort named．

Sourae：compivec from ico＊ata meportec by the U．S．Department of Asニiculture anc the U．S．Department oE commerce．

## Suge：

Fie $\operatorname{ETH} 7$ Iniernationai Sugar hgreemeni（ISA）enderec into force on
 became offective．The Interaijonal Sugar organization，locaied in iondon， acminiscers ine agreemeni．

The ISA functions through a system of burfer stocks ance expori guoias． They are manivilated wo dampen ructuaijons in the free marke orice of susan，耳！The ISA Bas been generaliy ineffeclive in conirolitng ihe free markel ¥iice of susar．The iarget p＝ice range in ine ISA during 2982－34 was IS to 23 cenis per pound．The monthly average price has been belom inat range since Februany 1982 （iable 6）．

The inefeentiveness of the ISA $=0$ reguiate sugar prices is in large part tre mesuit of sugar＇s unique characieristics．Sugar is one of the mosi widely

 beets．Tnijvicuai countries also heavily zeguiate uneir producior anc trace
 revent years，ajout 72 percent of woria sugar producion has been consumec in

[^38]Table 6.--Raw sugar: Monthly worle market prices, on the basis of the 1977 ISA, ́/ 1979-84


I/ Internationa! Sugar Agreement, monthly average prices (E.0. ports, buik basis) caicuiatec in accordance with art. 61 of the 1977 aj=esment.

Source: Compilec from data reporied by the uniteć Nations Conference on Trade anc Development.
the country of origin (ofien ai prices anc cuantiもies estajishec by the governmen and about 8 percent has been sold in prefereniai markeis. Fence, oniy ajowi 20 percent has been traded on the free market. The Eree market thus bears a Eisproporionate share of sugar shoriages and surpluses. winh price instability being the result. When crop Eailures recuce suppies, producing countries supply their comesic needs firsi, preferentiai arrangements second, and the free market demand last. The free markel woric grice often soars as a resuli. Similarly, when there are bumper harvesis, the fzee market becomes a đistress market and prices plumei. Furinermoze, since sugar cane is a peranial crop that requires about 20 months from pianting to reach full prockucion (which then is continued for several years), the zrice swings usuaily are extenced (especially on the cown sicie).

The 2977 ISA expirec on Decemjer 3i, 1984. During 1984, efforts to negotiaie a nem ISA endeck in failure due to a lack of agreemen or the romat Eor a new agreement. Because sugar prices have remained consistenily beiow the price range asiablished in the agreement in recent years, a new ist mounc recuire a substantial zeduction in the mount of sugar going to the worit market. Since major prooucers could not agree on how these cuis coule be cistribuied among the exporiers, an ISA with no economic provisicns wes negotiated. Uncer inis administraijve agreement, effective fanuary I, 三g8E, the Iniemationai Sugar organizaiion will remain in existence vo gathe= statisites and serve as a forum for the negotiaition of a new agreemend.

ま゙eeะ

 ごice zanges，or expori guotas．The Tha consists of a fineat Trade convemion






 aze nacie by vincue of the existence of a seozraie protocol ratisiec by each of

 on benalf of the Vrivec Siabes by the Secrevary of Agnicuilume on Ap＝iz 25 ，
 noi yei been acted unon by bie semie．





 one $̇$ n wincr zrociuction exceects consumpion，an alu najor exporiens have

 シnc＝easec to 25 minion ions，io 27 percent fom the 20.5 minion tons of Is32／B3．Znporis by China increasec sightiy．up to 10 minion tons Enom





 \＄9－82．00．

[^39]
## Cocoa

The Mnin Incernaiionai Cocoa Agreement（ICCA），ㄱ／acminisierec by ine
 repiacing the ICCA，1975，anc ils prececessor，ine ICCA，i972．İ was screduied 40 ieminaie on Seprember 30， 1984 ；however，during 2984 it was extendec for 1 year．Discussions iook place io develop a successor agreemeni もnroughout 2984 ，but livile progress was macie．2／

The ICCA Euncions inrough a sysien of Juffer stock purchases anc saies． One of the objectives of the agreement is to siabizize the price of cocoa beans witnin an＂indicaior price＂range of \＄1．00 per pound io \＄1．60 per pounc．During mosi of ig84，the incicator price remainec within the price zange specifiec in ine agremeni．The agreemeni aiso provides for a maximum bufEer stock of 250,000 metric tons．Buffer stock acquisiiions are finamcec by a 2－cent－per－pound fee on exports from member countries（and on imporis by memper countries from nonmember exporters；fowever，the bû̂er stock zan out of funds in 1982.

The Unitect Siates has not been a member of any of the iccA＇s because or the beijef that buffer stock agreemenis generaliy do noi work，that there is ̇nacecuate funcing for the agreement，anc that unreaiisi̇c price ranges are specifiec in the agreement．

## Tin

The Sixin Iniemaiional Tin Agreement（ITA）covers a 5－year perioc inab began in juiy 1982 anc may be extenced for an aćciiionai 2 years under ine presen bemm．The Iniemajionai Tin Councii（ITC）administers the ag＝emeni．Alihough the United Siates，Lhe jargesi in imporien，tas a memper
 Eargest tin producer，urged consumers at the March i984 quarieriy meeting to raitey the Sixin ITA by the requirec 80 －percent majority so that the agreemeni woile cone fully inic effect rather lnan oniy provisionaliy，as in now opezaies．3／Uncer such a move，members would be obi三ged to pay up ine balance 0 theiz dues，mouniing to the cash equivalent of 10,000 meizin ions ó iin．Approval would also automatically increase the ceining on ine burfer stock to 50,000 metric tons from the current 39,666 meinic tons．Expansion of the buffer stock is viewed principaily as a device for supporting the price of tin．Despite such pleas by procucing nations，consumers continued to resist ratification in 1984 in an effort to maintain curreni price leveis．

Throughout 1984，the export conirols on tin producing naiions 4／ estainished by the ITC in June 1983 were mainiained by the ITC io suppori

[^40]sagging tin prices．Daily Wew yozk iin grices curing ine first quarien oi 1984 averagec $\$ 5.95$ pez pounc，whint was mocestiy nigher than he zTA

 averagec $\$ 5.03$ per pounc Eor the seconc quazter of zish berore Eailing to
 weak もin zrices resuliec fron what the incustry sitiz consicers to be a tuge worle tin stock sumpius of some 68，000 metric tons at the ene of－98\％，もespite an inventory＝ecuciion from a wozic surpius of 80,000 meinic tons at the en of 2983.
 lower than prices or the Penang exchange anc the Kuaia Jumpun Tin Marxe

 the Kux to maintain its rloon price even though spot zaices may be iowe＝on
 proposec limiting accuisivion requiremenis on the KiTw to a ceriain ranze of prices，basec on curvency anc marke consieezaions，ailowing inn z＝ices to fail beiow the flooz price，in necessary，whit the manager Zocks for an opporinity io regain he Ficoz pzice as market conzizions ailou．Eoweven，
 grices woulc Eal to unzeascnabiy low Ievais．

The sale of surpius tin fron the U．s．Govermend stockpile zy the Eenerei Services Acministration（ $G S A$ ）vemained a contentious issue winnin the worle


 prices．3／Fin－procuning nations unget the Unitet Siates to こomit oss saies to 3,000 metric tons anmuluy oy extending tne wou into 1985 ．css sounees precict，howeve＝，that over 3,200 metric tons of tin coule be tisposet of in


[^41]The efforts of the ITC to restrict GSA lin saies have been pari of a iarger effort to restrain non-ITC exporis of $i=12$ inio the wozic mazke. The ITC is particularly concerned with exports by Brazil, a non-zC procucer. Brazilian officials have refused to discuss theỹ inn p=otuction and exports wiin the ITC, while Brazilian procucers have opposec any moves by their goverment to join the ITC. Brazilian exports accounted for 14,500 metnic tons, or almost 75 percent of iotai bazailian procuction, in i984. At the same time, the ITC remains concerned about the smugiing of tin concentates from Thailand intc Singapore for smeliing, in cefiance of ITC expozt ouotas. Incustry sources esimate that smugging acds $-0,000$ to 20,000 meticic tons amually to the markei. The ITC has thus faz =eZiec on appeais to 3zazil, Singapore, and consuming naiions to deal with these problems, which exacerbaie the existing tin surplus situation. The council is coniemplainng si=onge= actions, such as imposition of more stringent expori cuotas, is conective action is not taken.

Another factor in the market with the potemial to affect tin prices is the Association of Tin Producing Countries (ATPC). I/ The ABPC had a very negingible impact on the market in z984 due to the inabinity of memoer producing nations to agree on further expori İmitai̇ons at a i̇me of worldwice tin oversupply.

## 

Developing countries account for victially ail of the worle's procuacion and exports of natural rubber. The purpose of the Internationai ratural Rubber Agreement (INRA), the firsi commediy agreement concircec uncer UNCTAD's Integraied Program for Comodieies, is io stabilize wolic prices winhout disrupting iong-tem market irencs anc lo ensure adequate supgiy.
 current agreement expires in Ociober I985, with a provision for exiension on the present terms for up to 2 years. Ait a maeting of the signatories in Nay i984, agreement in principle was reached to begin negotiation of a new agreement. A negotiating conference is schedulec to take piace during the Cirst haif of 1985 . The parties anticipale extension of the curcent agreement to permit adequate time for negotiation anc ratificaíson of a new agneemeni. 3/

The Juffer siock establishee in the agreement provides the sole menanism for market intervention to stabilize prices. ty th the ene of 1984, the

[^42]buEfer siock containec 270,000 meinic ions，bougiti in 1982 anć is83．No significani purchases on saies we＝e macie in 1984 ，inough some stociz was ェot＝6en．The operation of the juffer stock is governec by a bainy market
 near the＂may sein＂intervention ievei．2／The price feil curing 1984 as p＝ơuction outran current consumption，ending the year（December ig84 average）
 the むíscretionary zones in both むirecijons for brief perioむs dunirg ie8k，the buEEer stock manager chose not to buy or sell furing those periocs．
 Rubzer Stuay Group reports worid procuction or 4.335 miniEon meinia ions in Z984 with wowid consumption in the same period of 4.275 milil on meiric tons． The Jintee States，the woric＇s largest user，consumed 800,000 metric tons in Is8i，a 20－perceni increase over depressed ieveis in 1983，while japan，the woricis secone iangest user，consumed 5t0，000 metric toms．\＆／datural ziboer， whtor ropzesents ziowt one－thirc of the totai market for eiasiomers，is sioniy increasing iis share of the market．largely because of naturai muber＂s superior performance in raciai tires，aircraí tires，anci large inres Ior or－ine－zoac ecuipmeni，growing markets for evastomers．

## juia

The Inivenaizonai Kgreement on Jute and Jute Producus（EJA），USe seconc commocity astement to be negobiatec uncer tre framework of UnCPAD＇s

 coñ̇i三ons Eor 6efinitive entry into force has not been met． $5 /$ By ine enc of I984， 29 jmporijng countries（represening 60 yerceni of woric jmporis）and 5 expozting members（accounting for 99 perceni of woric exporis）bać beacne signatories to the agreement．

The nemy fomed International Juie Organization（ivo），minion acminisiens the azreemest，zlans to set up a functioning body composed of procucing， emporiing，anci imporiing nations that would work together to improve the

I＇A composite－meighted average of the prices of three types of naumeai rubbe＝in foum major jniemationai marixets，expressec in ficijonai Maiaysiar／Singapore＂coliars，pariiaily definec in ItRA anc paruiaily an agreement projeciton over the tife of the agreement prepared by ihe i．S． Department of Siate，as provided in articies 30 and 40 or the IROA．

2f Foz an expianaijor of＂may seii＂，＂may buy＂and similar iemas シncorporatec in TNRA，see operations of the Trade Agreements Progzam，33e Reocri．198号 DO．S2－94．

3／さわiた。
t／Produciion and corsumpijon esimaies fron Iniernaijonal Rubber Siuay Group，Rubber Siaistijcai Buizetin，January i985．The Iniemationai RubDer Stuty Group is the recognized authority in assembiy anc inieg＝aijon of むisparate government，irade associaiion，anc oiher sources of siatistics pertaining to rubier，maxing cameful esimates where necessary to fill oaps and reconciie discrepancies．

5；Pursiant to article 40 of the IJA， 3 countries rep＝eseniting at leasi 80 percent of ine net exports anc 20 countmies accouniing for ai ieast 65 percent of net imports musi sign the IJA to bring it inio force．
manket fon jute and jute products．The new organization wouid accompish its cojectives primerily through projects in research and development，markei s＝omotion，anc producijon cost control ̇ntendec lo benefit both procucers and conswmers．The ITH Coes noi coniair provisions for the estabishment of buffer stocks， $\mathfrak{y}$ zice siabilization measures，or expozi guoias inai are often こat of onien internaiionai commodity agreements．

On Kay 7 ，3984，a projecks comituee on met in Dhaka，Bangiadesh．Seven research anó developmeni projecis and market promotion plans were approved， although none were initiatec．Top priority has been given to three of these projecis：（1）United Staies market developmeni，（2）Japanese marixet z＝omotion，anc（3）wesiern European markei promotion．The funds needed io operaie the three zrojecis，approximately $\$ 2.2$ million，have not been dotaliy acguirec．
borić procuntion of jute Eiber ciecinned sijgitiy in the last few years． Amnual procuction averagē 3.3 million meiric vons during crop years 1980－84 and is expectec to ciecline to 3.1 milijon metric tons in crop year 2984－85． Average annual woric prowiction curing jo75－78 was 3.1 milikon metric ions． Incía，the largest producer，proviće⿱㇒日勺儿 42 percent（1．3 miliion metric tons）of tre totai world jute output（3．2 million metric vons）in crop year 2983－84． Banglacesh and China were the secon and thind largesi producers，accounting for 26 arci 16 percent，respectively，of the worlo output．

Woric exports of jute fiber have continued to decine annually in recent years ard amounted to 454， 900 meiric tons in crop year 1983－84， 9 perceni less than the $\ddagger 980-8$ crop－year average of 502,200 metric ions．The level of average anaual woric exports in arop years $2975-78$ was 556,000 mer inc tons． Developing counities accounced for virtually aii exports．Bangladesh，the Bargest exporter，accountec for 76 percent（ 344,300 metric tons）of the totai ir crop year is83－84，iown Eron 1982－83，when Bangiadest accounied for 82 percent of ine ioval．

Norld exporis of jute procucts including yarn，sacijng，bags， carpeioaciking，and Eabrics）amounced to 1.1 milijon metric tons in crow year 1983－84，an 8－percent decijne from the $1975-18$ and 1980－84 crop year averages of i． 2 miliion meiric ions．As with juie fiber，developing couniries represert the largesi share of total world exports of jute products， accounting for 86 percent in 1983－84．Bangladesh，ine iargesi exporter， provicec t5 perceni of the toial in i983－84．India，the second major exporter，provided 22 percent．Bargiaciesin has mainiaineć i̇s ieading position by agg＝essive markeing，use of modern macinery，anci lower labor and raw juie costs relative to incia．

Wozie imports of jute Eiber were estimated at about 450,000 metric tons in 7984 ．This amount was 7 percent less than that of the previous year and 13 percent iess than the average annual imporis of $5: 7,800$ metric tons during 2980－84．Developing countries accountec for sighitly more than one－half of such imports in 1983．Pakistan accounied for the iargesi share（ 25 perceni） of imports by deveioping countries；Ghina and Thajiand accounted for 18 and I工 percent，respectiveiy．The Soviet Union，the largest ceveioped country importer，accounted for about 25 oercent of ihe ceveloped countries＂imporis； the unitec States about 7 perceni．
world imports of jute products increased siightiy in 1984 from the previous year, amounting to approximaiely $1, \overline{1} 75,000$ meiric ions; nowever imporis in 1984 were less than the average annual level of $1,215,000$ meiric tons curing 1980-84. Developed countries accounted for about two-ininds of total imports. The Soviet Union was the iargest imporier of juie producis in 1983, accounting for 14 percent of total world imports. The Uniied Siates, the largest importer of jute products in recent years, accounted for 12 percent of total world imports. Iran was the largest importer of juie products among the developing countries in 1983 and accounied for 6 percent of total world imports.

The major concern for IJO members is juie's competitive position with synthetics, primarily polypropylene. Jute competes with polypropylene largely on price for its share of the end-use product market. In 1983 and 1984 , the price of jute fiber increased more rapidly than that of polypropyiene, as shown in the following table.

Tabie 7.--Polypropylene and jute fiber: Quarterly prices, 1983 and January-June 1984

| Period | Polypropyiene |  | Juie ${ }^{\prime}$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | : | Type 1 2/ $\quad: \quad$ Type 2 |  |  |  |
|  |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| 1983: |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| ist quarter- | 590 |  | 289 | . |  | 312 |
| 2d quarter--- | 690 | : | 283 | . |  | 328 |
| $3{ }^{\text {d }}$ quarter--- | 750 |  | 295 | : |  | 338 |
| 4 th quarter | 815 |  | 36? | : |  | 381 |
| 1984: |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| Ist quarter | 816 | . | 397 | : |  | 408 |
| 2d quarter--- | 840 |  | 410 | : |  | 42 z |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

1/ Representative export prices from Bangladesh.
2/ "Type" refers to the grade of fiber.
Source: Compiled from data reported by the Food and Agriculure organizaijon of the United Nations.

The increase in jute prices attributed to smaller produciion by the major jute-producing countries which caused a decline in stocks and reduced the availability of jute fiber for export. The fiber price changes, along with other production variables, resulted in a very large change in relative prices of carpeibacking, one of the principal end uses of jute. As shown in the foilowing table, jute carpetbacking prices increased approximately three times faster than that of polypropylene during 1983-84.

Table 8.--Jute and polypropylene carpeibacking: Quarterly prices, ic83-84

| Period | Type 1 |  | Type 2 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Juile } \\ (6 \mathrm{oz} .) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { : Polypropylene } \\ : \quad(16 \times 8) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{lc} : & \text { Juice } \\ : & (5.5 \mathrm{cz} .) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{lc} : & \text { Polypropylene } \\ : & (16 \times 6) \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| : |  | : | : | : |
| 1983: |  | : | : | : |
| 1st quarter-------: | 68.00 | $: \quad 70.00$ | 61.00 | 52.00 |
| 2d quarter--------: | 65.00 | $: 70.00$ | 58.00 | 52.00 |
| 3d quarter--------: | 68.00 | $: \quad 70.00$ | 61.35 | 62.00 |
| 4th quarter-------: | 69.50 | $: \quad 74.00$ | 62.50 | 62.00 |
| 1984: |  | : | : | $: \quad 10$ |
| 1st quarter-------: | 73.00 | $: \quad 78.00$ | 66.00 | 70.00 |
| 2d quarier-------- | 78.00 | 78.00 | 72.00 | 70.00 |
| 3d quarter------- | 92.00 | $: 82.00$ | 86.00 | 74.00 |
| 4th quarter------- | 104.00 | 82.00 | 98.00 | 74.00 |
| : |  | : | : |  |

Source: Compiled from data reported by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

## Tropical Timber

After 7 years of preparatory work, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development convened the United Nations Conference on Tropical Timber in 1983. In November 1983, the Conference established the text of the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 5983 . The United States had a major role in the shaping of the agreement, which is not a price stablization agreement but rather is geared to research and development and market promotion aciivities (all of which are to be financed by voluntary coniributions). The agreement is scheduled to encer inio force by April 1, 1985, if a sufficient number of producing and consuming cownivies sign the agreement. 1/

## OTHER TRADE AGREEMENTS ACTIVITIES

## The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program

The U.S. Bilateral Invesiment Treaty (BIT) Program was Iaunched in Late 1981 for the purpose of encouraging American direct investment abroad. 2 / Through the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties with interestec couniries (usually low and middle-income developing countries), U.S. investors abroad are guaranteed certain rights and protections. When the risks and restrictions associated with overseas investment are thus eliminated, v.S. internaiional investment flows should increase, particularly io developing countries.

1/ The agreement entered into force provisionally on Apr. 1, 1985. Ten producing countries and 14 consuming countries had signed the agreement by that date. On Apr. 26, 1985, the United States signed the agrement.

2/ For a complete discussion of the BIT program, see the operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, pp. 36-43.

The U.S. Government negotiates BIT's using a prototype treaty that has four main objectives: (i) national or MFN treatment, (2) freedom to transfer profils and oiher funds across borders, (3) prompt and fair compensaiion in the event of expropriation, and (4) procedures for dispuie sethement. The first ireaty model was released in January 1982. The current model, which is a streamlined version of the original and should facilitate the negoiating process, daies from February 1984.

Since the beginning of the program, the United States has heid peeliminary discussions with over 40 countries. By the end of 1984, Eive countries--Panama, Egypt, Senegal, Haiii, anc Zaire--nad signed Bit's with the United States. These treaties are expected to be seni to the U.S. Senate for ratification in mid-1985. Furthermore, agreements with Costa Rica, morocco, and Cameroon are near completion, and negotiations are currently uncerway with China, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Ivory Coasi, Honduras, Burundi, Gabon, Liberia, Inconesia, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.

## Progress on Services Trade Agreements in 1984

Iniemational trade in services has been esimated ai over $\$ 500$ billion annually or approximately 20 percent of total world iracie. $1 /$ Yet liflle agreement exisis on the role services should play in trade policy. In 1984, as countries coninued to broaden their undersianding of the importance of services in their economies, as well as in the world economy, steps iowards internabional cooperation on services trade issues intensified. 2/

The United States is pariicularly interested in easing restrictions on iniemaiional trade in services. In 1980, services comprised abouk 52 percent of ictai U.S. output, compared with 37 percent in manufactures. In adcition, while the United States remains the largest single-country exporter of services, record U.S. trade deficits have been pariially blamed on the shrinking surplus in services. Unless restrictions on access to foreign markets can be lifted, the potenial for U.S. export growth will be limited. U.S. iniliatives for multilateral action to ease irade impedimenis nave been resistec, however. Some countries are reluctant to liberalize irade in services because they do not yet feel sufficienily compeilizve with Anerican suppiiers. Developing countries are particularly unwilling to liberalize services trade; they call the effort "premature" and place priority on the completion of the 1982 GATT work program. Nevertheless, the GATT, the OECD,

[^43] White the GATE anc the OJCD have confined discussions to issues anc ozojaems zezatec to trace in services，the UNGAD is studying services：roie in tine deveiopment zrocess．Since the cent is the only intemnetional orgenization
 Be Eine Eomum Eon consicemaijon of an agreement on tiade in sezvices．
 octoizen Zuesićeṅ Reagen signeć fie Irade anc Tarizz Act of zogh，rinch

 Trace Act ajso estabisinec a Service Enoustry Development Paognam in the Department oE Commere cesigned to coinect services tracie iata and deveiop poİcies to swomote U．S．semices ab＝oac．Furinemore，acnieving an ミncemationalZy agneec on set of miles to heip ensure open internationai trade




The Eo天ioning secizons outiane the ongoing work program on sezvoces trade issies in tie GATM，OXGD，and TNGTAD．Trace agreements activities in




## Gememal Ag＝eenem on zamies ane ruace

In Yovember 1982，a comprehensive worx program un services juace issues wes laumcioed at the GATR Ninisterial meeting．In orcer to provide a founcation Eom discussion of services trade issues，GATm members were asirec to unむertake naṫonai examinations of tieni service industaies and to excinange inEomation on issues in tnis area of tracie．By the enc of icsa，i3 nationaj stuates hac been suomitiec on irace in services．3／The reporis were Iargeng

I／See the next section entovaec＂Services activities in mitijateral Eorums＂．

2／Uncer Enis agneement，winch was signed in fprix 1935，the oanties
 open systen oE sewieces exports which would minimize restrictions on tie fiow of services between the two mations．＂The TVA is the first trace agreement
 as a prototype for a mateiaterai agreement in services．viner the zTs，boも゙ countaies are comittec to azpzying to services the two basic iance princioies of na亡̇onal 亡゙eatment anc 亡ransparency of regulations in oncier io ersure market access Eor semvices witn the other nation．Aitnough services are
 towanc intemmational acceptance of these principles appliec to tande jn services amd to zeview the effectiveness of the declaration with the riou of transorming the provisions into iegally bincing rights and obijgations．Eom a more citailec discussion of the U．S．－Israe Free Frace Agreement，see Chan．二．
 examinations ame the Jnitec States，Canada，japan，tine Europeam Commuity，ine
 Denmarix，Swecien，anc Norway．
cescripitve in characier anc acidressec ine Sonjowing poinis：（Z）the g＝owin of the iniemational service economy，（2）the jnacecuacy of services inacie
 （4）the impeciments to internationai tracie in sezrices．AL of the sticies zecognizec ine tising impoziance of the services secion anc the consecuent neec ᄃoz ali countries to reassess liee zoze services shoule play in inace poiicy．


 party on services to examine the issues Euntine，bui a compromise work prog＝am was adopted that provices for formal meetings among cAm members to exchange iniomation on trade in services．Basec on a revien of the i3 nationai studies by contracting parties during 1985，the Sec＝evariai will ごepare an anaiyticai sumazy of the national stucies logeiner wivh reievan inconmaion Erom international orsanizations anc a sumary of the jssues rajsec in the information exchange．This anaiyticai sumany wiz provice the basis Eon Eurther discussions in an effort to estañish comon grourcion minch the parties mذght agree in moving toware a ceieminaikon ai ine j985 ammal session on appropziate muikiakerai action．

In aćaition，nork coniznuec towazc extencing the GAnT covermeni Procumeneni coĉe to cover そure service convracts．Eresenizy，ine coce oniy covers those services inat musi accompany goods purcinases．\＃／

## Organizainon For Economic Cooperaizon anc Developmeni

In－ 982 ，the OED Ministeriai Councip Jauncoci a work zrogran io＂examine ways of zemoving uriusizeiec impeaiments to iniemaikonai inace in services
 azs iaker a two－part approach．Comitidees win sectoral experizse aze
 The Traće Comiliee and iis workino こaエiy，on the oiner hanc，are esiabishing a generai framework for consiciering service inace issues．A the toge Ministerial－level meeting in way，the Counily recognized the imporiance of services trade issues and recuesiec a repori．inciucing acijon proposais， within 2 years．
 tourism，anc banking jncustries． $3 /$ The sumvey of resinicikons on internationai insurance oŋerations conclucuec that the most serious obstacze to internationai insurance is ijmies on the right of establishmeni．The tounism study outinned two types of barriers thai affect tounist Elows： （I）zestrictions that hanper ine aīility to tavel from one country io another isuch as visas，exchange restrictions，anc special iaxes），anc（2）inpecimenis

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 uncerway．





 expeciec to be rejeased curing vie guidance for Euture work in inis area．









 began in 1979 in orcier to aciress







 ine insumance seciions of the code were upizuec．The mosi noivion onowision
 heačuarieref in one counizy and seeking to io jusiness in amoute＝．




[^45]background for negotiations. At present, the principal source of internationally comparable data is the IMF's balance-of-payments statistics. Although this data can measure broad trends, it is difficult to interpret because of problems of measurement and concept. No internationally recognized standard classification exists for the services sector. Thus, empirical analyses are hard to interpret, and it is difficult to quantitatively assess restrictive behavior in various service industries.

## United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Service issues have long been part of UNCTAD's work program. Studies have been conducted in specific service industries (notably transport, insurance, and financing related to trade) and in service issues related to technology transfer and the control of restrictive business practices. Within the United Nations, many organizations deal with service sector concerns. While some bodies are responsible for a particular subsector (e.g., the International Civil Aviation Organization), others deal with issues applicable to services in general (e.g., the World Intellectual Property Organization).

UNCTAD's interest in services intensified in 1982 when the TDB decided that when "dealing with factors of relevance to the issues of protectionism and structural adjustment and policies influencing structural adjustment and trade, commensurate attention should be paid to services." $1 /$ A resolution adopted at UNCTAD VI directed the Secretariat to continue its studies of service issues and, in particular, to examine the role of services in the development process. The TDB was also invited to consider future work in services at its 29 th session held in September 1984.

The Secretariat's study, entitled "Services and the Development Process," was prepared in 1984 in order to address the contribution of services to development and growth since the current international debate on services issues has focused largely on trade aspects. The report observes that new technologies, particularly data and information technologies, continue to result in new services and new interlinkages among services and goods that affect production, trade, and development patterns. Transnational corporations (TNC's) play a crucial role in this process since they are the principal suppliers of many services, either through direct exports or through investment abroad to supply foreign markets. One implication of the role of TNC's, which have access to the international data network, is their competitive edge over local companies. The developing countries are thus faced with a dilema: location and accessibility of data resources will be regarded as strategically important to remain competitive, but to rely on services from abroad would place them in a position of dependence. The study suggests that developing countries should strive to understand the effects of technological change and determine how trade and foreign direct investment in specific services would contribute to the development process.

In addition, the report suggests a number of issues to incorporate into the trade-oriented search for a possible negotiating framework taking place in various international forums. Emphasis should be placed on the contribution

[^46]of services to development, including the impact of various services on developing economies, the possibilities for increasing the developing countries' share of the world market for services, and the obstacles to services trade these nations may be facing. Discussions should also include the aspects of trade in services relating to technological developments and the role of TNCs, as well as the possibility of a multilateral-cooperation framework for building up the services sector in developing countries.

In addition to the Secretariat's study, four background papers were prepared for the September TDB session. These four studies examined technology, shipping, insurance, and transborder data flows in relation to trade in services and in the context of services and the development process. 1/ Despite the preparation of all these reports, the TDB meeting in September failed to reach a consensus on an UNCTAD program on services since developing countries were unwilling to recognize the role of other international institutions in services issues.

One other United Nations agency, the U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), has been particularly involved in activities dealing with services. It is currently conducting studies examining the role and effects of TNC's in various industries, including services. In these industry reports, the effect of technological changes on international competition and trade, and on the role of TNC's in the industrialization process in developing countries, will be assessed. In addition, the UNCTC is examining trade in data services (i.e., transborder data flows) and its effect on the nature of international trade in goods and services and on foreign direct investment. Case studies are being prepared on the role of transborder data flows in individual countries. The principal project under way examines the role of TNC's in facilitating trade in data services. Lastly, the agency is finalizing a code of conduct for TNC's that will cover the activities of TNC's in all sectors and include provisions particularly relevant to the services sector.

An international code of concuct on the transfer of technology has been under formal negotiation since 1978. This code will establish standards for the buying and selling of technological information across national borders and will cover almost all technological service transactions. Negotiations on the code are expected to be completed not later than the first half of 1985.

## Insurance services

## Trade

The value of insurance services is partially covered in the U.S. international transactions accounts under "private miscellaneous services," which provides separate identification only for exports and imports of reinsurance. 2/ Net export premiums received for reinsurance increased to $\$ 190$ million in 1983 ( $\$ 188$ million in 1982), whereas net impori premiums paid

[^47]accounted for $\$ 696$ million in 1983 ( $\$ 706$ million in 1982 ), continuing a trade deficit for this type of insurance. $1 /$ For the entire U.S. insurance industry, the international market remains an important scurce of income and investment. The market grew about 6 percent during 1983-84 to an estimated $\$ 8.5$ billion in receivables from international operations in 1984, approxmately 10 percent of total domestic revenues. 2/

## Trade-related activities in 1981

In October 1984, the United States completed an agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that initiates cooperation and exchange between its six member nations on insurance issues. 3/ One of the first of these exchanges was a seminar held in April 1985 to develop guidelines to judge the financial solvency of various insurance companies for reinsurance purposes.

A variety of barriers to international trade continue to face the insurance industry. Most countries lave stringent restrictions on financial operations that affect the transfer of currency, particularly where large multinational corporations are involved. Many third-world countries have additional restrictive regulations that preclude foreign service companies from competing on an equal basis as these governments are attempting to develop their four domestic insurance industries. The USTR, who has the responsibility to negotiate the reduction of barriers to trade in services, continues to pursue the reduction of these barriers through existing agreements, both on bilateral and multilateral bases. There were no bilateral or multilateral agreements reached on insurance in 1984.

The emerging internationalization of financial services has stimulated both foreign and American insurers to expand their overseas operations. In the past few years, insurance companies incorporated in nations other than Canada have steadily increased their ownership of U.S. firms. At the beginning of $1984,2 \%$ U.S. insurance companies were owned by companies incorporated in France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the

I/ Export and import data supplied by U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, from the international transactions accounts, as of September 1984. Exports include premiums received, less losses paid; imports include premiums paid, less losses recovered. These transactions are not a measure of the profitability of internalional reinsurance transactions of U.S. companies, nor an indication of their international competitive position, because risks transferred to, and assumed from, foreign insurers are usually only a small part of the total risks insured by U.S. companies.

2/ Estimated by the staff of the U.S. International Trade Commission.
3/ See earlier discussion under "Services activities in muliilateral forums". Further details concerning the insurance industry's international operating structure, barriers to trade in insurance, and international forums dealing with insurance issues are contained in Inv. no. 332-132, the U.S. International Trade Comission, The Relationship of Exports in Selected U.S. Service Industries to U.S. Merchandise Exports, USITC Publication 1290, September 1982, pp. 291-318; Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, pp. 169-172; and U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. National Study on Trade in Services, 1983, p. 220.

United Kingdom. I/ Another important trend affecting international services trade in insurance is the increasing number of risks transferred by U.S. insurance companies to their foreign affiliates, particularly those located in the Caribbean area where the tax treatment and regulation of insurance companies is more favorable than in the United States. By transferring more profitable risks abroad and poorer risks to the United States, insurance companies took advantage of lower tax rates abroad. 2/

Perhaps the most important developing issue facing both foreign and domestic insurance companies is the impact of depository institutions, including commercial banks, entering the insurance market. In response, many large insurers--particularly life insurance companies--have entered the area of managing investment income, such as offering individual retirement accounts. Legislation introduced in the U.S. Senaie in 1981 would have permitted depository institutions to sell insurance, which suggests that eventually domestic and foreign insurance companies may be competing in the U.S. and international insurance markets with other financial institutions offering essentially the same services. 3/

## Maritime transportation services

## Trade

The value of maritime transportation services is classified in U.S. international transactions accounts under "other transportation." In 1983, the trade surplus in maritime transportation services more than doubled from $\$ 52$ million in 1982 to $\$ 123$ million. 4/ Maritime transportation services as a proportion of total U.S. international transportation transactions in exports increased from 61 percent in 1982 to 63 percent in 1983; in imports, the share remained at 64 percent for both 1982 and 1983.

Total U.S. exports of maritime transportation services, consisting of ocean freight and port service receipts, rose 7 percent from $\$ 7.6$ billion in 1982 to $\$ 8.1$ billion in 1983 , with ocean freight receipts accounting for the bulk of the increase. Total U.S. imports, consisting of ocean freight and port service payments, rose 5 percent from $\$ 7.5$ billion in 1982 to $\$ 7.9$ billion in 1983. Ocean freight payments account for about 75 percent of these imports; each type of service accounted for a 5 percent share of the increase.

[^48]
## Trade-related activities in 1984

In 1984, the most significant development affecting the U.S. maritime transportation services industry was the passage of the Shipping Act of 1984. I/ This legislation amends and clarifies the Shipping Act of 1916 by reducing Government regulation of the industry and broadening antitrust immunity for cooperative actions by carriers. It overhauled the regulatory structure governing liner shipping inio and out of the United States and helped pave the way for the realignment of the trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific ocean carrier conferences. Nine trans-Atlantic groups have been consolidated into two units, one eastbound and the other westbound, and a new trans-Pacific rate group replaces several conferences that had previously covered shipments to the Far East. 2/

A second important development was legislation 3 / permitting participation by foreign-flag vessels in certain domestic trade. The legislation eases restrictions for foreign-flag vessels carrying passengers between Puerto Rico and the United States mainland until a similar U.S. flag service is established. The law, signed on October 30, 1984, is intended to put U.S. ports in a better competitive position in the passenger cruise trade.

Since West Germany and the Netherlands accepted the UNCTAD Liner Code in 1983, no other developed maritime nation has formally acceded lo it. 4/ Even though several important European nations and Japan may ratify it, the United States remains opposed to the code, since restrictive provisions encourage continuation of "closed" conferences that would effectively exclude U.S. participation. Members of the United Nations" "Group of 77 " developing countries who espoused the code were also seeking to phase out open registries or "flags of convenience" in 1984. The elimination of open registries would adversely affect shipowners, particularly in the United States and other countries with high labor costs, who register their vessels abroad to benefit from lower wages and in some cases political and tax advantages. 5/ Approximately 90 percent of the raw materials shipped into the United States is carried in such bottoms.

The Consultative Shipping Group, an ad hoc group consisting of representatives of 13 industrial countries, including Japan, met frequently in 1984 to discuss participation of U.S. flag carriers in foreign cross-trading

1/ Public Law 98-237, enacled by Congress on March 20, 1981.
2/ Further details concerning the maritime industry's international operating structure, barriers to trade in maritime services, and international forums dealing with maritime issues are contained in Inv. no. 332-132, the U.S. International Trade Commission, The Relationship of Exports in Selected U.S. Service Industries to U.S. Merchandise Exports, USITC Publication 1290, September 1982, pp. 363-389; Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, pp. 178-181; and U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. National Study on Trade in Services, 1983, p. 204.

3/ Public Law 98-563, an act to permit the transportation of passengers between Puerto Rico and other United States ports on foreign-flag vessels when United States flag service for such transportation is not available.

4/ To date, 59 countries are signatories to the UNCTAD Code (Transportation Institute, Currents, January/February 1985).

5/ As of January 1, 1983, 68 percent of the Lotal U.S.-owned fleet was registered abroad (Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Shipping and Shipbuilding, August 1984).
(foreign-to-foreign trade carried by ships from a nation other than the two trading nations), which is currently restricted under the cargo sharing provisions of the UNCTAD Liner Code. The subject of cross-trades has gained new significance to U.S. operators because it offers an opportunity to compete in international maritime trade, unlike the predominate nature of international "closed" conferences where virtually no opportunity exists for entry of other carriers.

Restrictive measures impeding foreign service operations of the U.S. maritime industry, such as market access, cargo preference schemes, minimum rate structures, restrictions on the use of certain equipment, and discriminatory port fees, continue to exist. However, section $13(b) 5$ of the Shipping Act of 1984 enables the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) to Lake action against any foreign country that impedes U.S. access to ocean trade between foreign ports. 1/

Bilateral maritime agreements between the United States and Argentina, and Brazil remain in effect. In 1984, the FMC instituted an investigation concernirig conditions in the United States-Argentina-Brazil liner trades. The FMC concluded that steps should be taken to counter anticompetitive conditions in the ocean common carrier trades between the United States and Argentina and Brazil. 2/ In addition, in 1984 a bilateral agreement with Romania concerning port access was renewed without any modifications.

An emerging trend in the shipping industry is "around-the-world" service in which a ship begins a routing at one port, circumnavigates the globe with limited scheduled stops to load and unload cargo, and returns to the original port. In 1984, Taiwan, followed by the United States, reintroduced the service which has made containerized shipping more efficient by utilizing economies of large ship operations to carry more containers and make fewer port stops, resulting in a substantial reduction in the shipping cost per container. The degree to which iniernational shippers are able to successfully compete in this new service will largely depend on comitments to invest in larger ships required to provide this service.

## Telecomunications services

## Trade

The value of certain communications services is covered under "other private services" in the U.S. international transactions accounts and reflects the division of revenues between U.S. and foreign carriers. Imports are defined as payments by U.S. carriers to foreign carriers for the use of

1/ Such action may include (1) the suspension of any or all tariffs of the common carrier, or that common carrier's right to use any or all tariffs of conferences of which it is a member, and (2) steps necessary to undertake civil penalties in the event the common carrier accepts or handles cargo for carriage under a tariff which has been suspended or after its right to utilize that tariff has been suspended. Statutory language concerning the nature of actions that may be taken is described in section $13(\mathrm{a})$ and $13(\mathrm{~b}) 1$, 2 , and 3 of the Shipping Act of 1984.

2/ Federal Maritime Commission, Section 19 Inquiry: United States/Argentina and United States/Brazil Trades, Docket 84-33.
transmission services and exports are receipts from foreign carriers for transmission services provided by U.S. carriers. These estimates also include receipts and payments between foreign communications companies and the International Satellite Communication Organization (Intelsat). 1/ Exports of communications services rose 17 percent from the 1982 level to an estimated $\$ 1.3$ billion in 1983, whereas imports increased by only 8.3 percent to an estimated $\$ 2$ billion. Imports exceeded exports by $\$ 700$ million in 1983 , largely because the majority of communications between the United States and foreign nations originates in the United States. 2/

Revenues from domestic communications services reached nearly $\$ 87$ billion in 1983, a 10-percent increase over 1982, and are estimated at $\$ 96$ billion for 1984. International revenues rose about 9 percent to $\$ 2.5$ billion in 1983 and are estimated at $\$ 2.8$ billion in 1984, accounting for nearly 3 percent of total revenues in these years. International telecommanications service revenues are expected to increase at an average annual rate of 15 percent in the next 3 to 5 years due to rapid increases in the volume of overseas telecommunications transmissions. Domestic revenues are likely to grow only 8 to 11 percent during the same period. 3/

## Trade-related activities in 1981

The international comunications industry is in a state of flux, largely as a result of U.S. policy and technological innovation which are changing the nature of the competitive environment. One of the most important and far-reaching events of 1984 was the determination by the President, upon the recommendation of the Departments of State and Commerce, that competition in international satellite communications was in the national interest, thus making global competition with Intelsat a possibility. 4/ In addition, deregulation in the U.S. telecommunications industry has led to a plethora of international carriers competing in a market that was formerly a monopoly. Further, technological innovation and economies of scale have made fiber optic undersea cables cost-effective competitors of satellite communications which may alter continued satellite dominance of iransoceanic telecommunications. 5/

1/ Intelsat is a consortium of 109 countries whose goal is to develop a global communications system; it currently carries more than two-thirds of the world's international lelephone traffic and virtually all of its international television transmissions. Comsat represents the United States in Intelsal.

2/ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Seplember 1984.
3/ U.S. Department of Commerce, 1985 U.S. Industrial Outlook, January 1985.
4/ Further details concerning the telecommunication industry's international operating structure, barriers to trade in Lelecommunications, and international forums dealing with telecommunication issues are contained in Inv. No. 332-132, U.S. International Trade Commission, Relationship of Exports in Selected U.S. Service Industries to U.S. Merchandise Exports, USITC Publication 1290, September 1982, pp. 9-18; Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, pp. 146-149; and U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. National Study on Trade in Services, 1983, p. 183.

5/ By the end of 1984, five such cables were in the planning stages, one for the Pacific and four for the Atlantic. The only one that has FCC approval at this time is TAT-8, a transatlantic cable that will be operational in 1988 and is co-owned by AT\&T and seven other U.S. carriers, Teleglobe Canada, and the members of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommuncations Administrations.

Responding to the prospect of competition, Intelsat passed a resolution in April 1984 urging all of its members lo refrain from entering into any arrangements that might lead to the establishment and use of independent satellite systems to carry traffic to and from their respective countries. Intelsat officials siated that these private systems would undermine its ability to provide services to its members, especially to third-world countries. 1/

Intelsat officials also believe that the American initiative to allow competitive systems may prompt other countries to do the same. Several groups of nations have set up regional satellite organizations, such as Arabsal in the Middle East, Eurtelsat in Western Europe, and an Indonesian system in the Western Dacific. According to State Department officials, these satellite systems are not competitors; they complement the Intelsat system and fill a need that Intelsat could not economically satisfy. 2/ To avoid violating the Intelsat arretment, which precludes actions by its signatories that would cause it suustantial economic harm, the U.S. Government does not intend to allow private satellite systems to carry voice communications that link into the public networks overseas or in the United States. Government officials feel this restriction would eliminate these companies as competitors for the bulk of Intelsat traffic.

Deregulation of the U.S. Lelecommunications industry, which permitted a profusion of special common carriers, has extended into the international market and suggests that the aggressive competition characteristic of the domestic telecommunications market is about to spread overseas. For example, a relatively new U.S. entrant (MCI) has led the way in the international voice market, initiating service to more than 10 foreign countries in 1984 and concluding agreements with countries representing 10 percent of this market. Other carriers are following in similar fashion. Recent FCC decisions gave Comsat permission to retail international circuits and provide end-to-end international services, and a U.S. carrier was given permission to deal directly with Intelsat. These two U.S. firms intend to build a series of earth stations to access Intelsat and deliver international telecommunications services; more than 10 other companies have applied to the FCC for similar permission.

These rapidly evolving structural and technological developments have tended to generate additional barriers to foreign trade in telecommunications services. Certain barriers have always existed because most governments closely regulate this industry; however, new technologies, new user demands, and new participants in the industry threaten the control governments exercise over telecommunications services. Some countries have responded to these changing circumstances by limiting foreign ownership or services, by requiring

1/ Since Intelsat's rate structure is based on an allocation of costs among members according to the volume of usage, private companies offering lower prices could attract traffic on high-volume transatlantic routes, thus increasing the costs of Intelsat's services to the poorer, low-traffic nations.

2/ Testimony of Ambassador Diana Lady Dougan and Dr. William Schneider before the Economic Policy and Trade Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Feb. 19, 1985.
local participation, or by imposing taxes on transborder communications flows. International telecommunications services are also subject to many of the same types of trade barriers experienced by other industries--restrictions on foreign exchange remittance, restrictions on foreign ownership, local work and content requirements, copyright infringement on software, and proprietary data transmission. However, in most nations, the telecommanications industry is a State-owned and -operated monopoly that plays such an important role in the country that governments have taken steps to protect these industries. In West Germany, for example, the Post, Telegraph, and Telephone Authority felt that multinational corporations using private leased lines were bypassing its network and substantially lowering revenues. To curtail this action and increase revenues, foreign lelecommunications users are now required to use certain domestic leased lines that are more expensive. I/ It is believed that this requirement may spread to other countries. 2/ Another means of controlling transborder data flows is requiring that data be processed before it leaves the country, rather than sending raw data to a multinational processing center and then back again after it is processed. These trade barriers raise the cost of doing business in foreign countries for users of international lelecommunications services as well as for providers of these services and make it more difficult to compete with the host country's industry.

Other barriers to international telecomunications services could seriously slow or stop transborder data flows. Twenty-six countries have passed or are proposing legislation that would require government approval for transmitting machine-readable data from one country to another and prohibit the transfer of some data on individuals. These restrictions would make it more difficult for foreign firms to do business in these countries, and the highly regulated nature of the telecommunications industry is likely to encourage an increasing number of barriers to trade, both in the developed and developing countries.

The telecommunications industry is subject to regulation through bilateral and multilateral agreements. Efforts by the U.S. administration are currently under way on a bilateral basis to encourage more open access in key telecommunication markets, such as Japan, along with multilateral discussions within the context of service industry initiatives within GATT. In addition, the Consultative Committee on International Telephone and Telegraph--the services and equipment standard setting arm of the International Telecommunications Union--held a Plenary Assembly in 1984 during which 266 new recommendations were approved and 373 others were amended. These new standards permitted the use of new equipment and services, mainly computerized digital services; they also clarified integrated services digital network (ISDN) and interface standards required for video, voice, and data transmissions.

[^49]
## CHAPTER IV

## DEVELOPMENTS IN MAJOR U.S. TRADING PARTNERS

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews the economic performance of major U.S. trading partners, U.S. trade with those countries, and important bilateral trade issues in 1984. United States relations with Canada, the European Community, Japan, Mexico, Taiwan, South Korea, and Brazil are discussed.

In 1984, the United States experienced an overall trade deficit of $\$ 110.9$ billion, of which $\$ 92.3$ billion ( 83 percent) was with the countries under review. The strength of the U.S. dollar was largely responsible for the influx of imports and the weak demand for exports. U.S. exports to each of its major trading partners increased in 1984 , but not enough to keep pace with the rapid influx of imports. The largest trade deficit in 1984 was with Japan ( $\$ 33.9$ billion or 31 percent of the total U.S. trade deficit), followed by Canada ( $\$ 21.8$ billion or 20 percent), and the EC ( $\$ 12.1$ billion or 11 percent). The U.S. trade deficit with the newly industrialized countries covered in this report totaled $\$ 24.5$ billion or 22 percent of the total U.S. trade deficit.

Two-way trade between the United States and each of its major trading partners increased in value in 1984. Two-way trade of $\$ 110.9$ billion between the United States and Canada in 1984 (up 25 percent from $\$ 88.5$ billion in 1983) again constituted the largest single trading partnership in the world. The second largest two-way trade partnership was that between the United States and the European Commnity, which registered $\$ 101.7$ billion (up 18 percent from $\$ 86.2$ billion in 1983). The third largest trade partnership was between the United States and Japan at $\$ 79.3$ billion (up 28 percent from $\$ 62.1$ billion in 1983).

The number and intensity of unresolved United States-Canadian trade issues were dwarfed by the growing volume of bilateral trade. Their relatively tranquil trading partnership was exemplified by the continued exploration of a bilateral sectoral free trade agreement. Although enthusiasm for the sectoral approach to the free trade intiative had waned by yearend, serious interest on both sides continues on further liberalization of bilateral trade.

Given the volume of U.S.-EC trade, the number of specific bilateral trade disputes in 1984 was small, although the relationship is hampered by serious differences over approaches to international trade. The tone of trade relations worsened in 1984, as both sides grappled with protectionist pressures at home. In addition, their domestic economic predicaments made consensus on the content and timing of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations impossible to reach in 1984. While differences over trade in steel and agriculture dominated the 1984 trade agenda, long-standing disputes over export subsidies, credits, and controls, and exchange rate fluctuations, are expected to lead the trade agenda in the year ahead.

Although no major ruptures took place, 1984 was a difficult year for United States-Japanese trade relations. Damage control was the watchword, as a year of intense trade talks resulted in only a few market-opening measures: the yen-dollar agreement, Japan's decision to liberalize farm imports, and revision of the bilateral accord on Nippon Telegraph and Telephone procurement. The two sides grappled with Japan's proposed restrictions on foreign sales of satellites and on draft laws that would change the terms of competition in Japan's market for computer software and telecommnications equipment and services.
U.S. trade relations with the NIC's were affected by the latter's drive to expand exports while simultaneously protecting domestic markets. Certainly, the U.S. trade deficit with these countries was a matter of concern to the United States during the year. Limited progress was made by the NIC's in opening up their markets. Taiwan, South Korea, and Mexico were concerned about retaining their GSP benefits, even though no country was excluded completely. The NIC's were concerned that the renewed GSP program would be conditioned upon trade concessions to the United States, particularly their record on combating product counterfeiting and on reducing barriers to U.S. imports.

Little progress was made in 1984 to resolve outstanding bilateral trade issues between the United States and Mexico. While Taiwan made some progress in reducing trade barriers in 1984, significant barriers to trade exist and this remained a sore point between the two sides. South Korea made some progress in 1984 in reducing tariff barriers, but the United States remained concerned that tariffs were being replaced by nontariff restraints. South Korea protested that the increasing number of import relief cases before the U.S. International Trade Comission in 1984 was a form of protectionist sentiment and harrassment in the United States.

## CANADA

The Economic Situation in 1984

Canada shares with the United States a belief in the efficacy of the market process and a commitment to the free-enterprise system. Canada's economy is small relative to that of the United States (one-tenth the size of the U. S. economy), and it is closely tied to the United States by a network of powerful economic and financial relationships.

The desire to maintain a strong national identity and economic independence are among the most important factors contributing to the formation of policy in Canada. For example, this desire is manifested in the concern over foreign ownership of enterprises located in Canada. Maintaining the national identity and economic unity between east and west Canada is continually in tension with the north-south pull for cultural homogenization between Canada and the United States.

In 1984, Canada's real GNP (seasonally adjusted at annual rates) rose by 0.7 percent in both the first and second quarters and more than doubled in
the third quarter, climbing at a rate of 1.9 percent. 1/ The latter reflected both a sharp buildup of manufacturing inventories and a strong performance by Canadian exports. For the year as a whole, real GNP increased 4.5 percent. This followed a healthy 8.7 percent annual increase in Canadian industrial production.

The unemployment rate remained in the 11-percent range during 1984, falling slightly from the 1983 average, perhaps reflecting the uncertainty surrounding the strength of Canada's recovery. The unemployment rate for 1984 was 11.3 percent. ${ }^{2} /$

Progress in inflation was maintained in 1984, as quarterly levels were $5.7,2.7,3.1$, and 3.3 percent. These levels were generally below those recorded for consumer prices in the United States. In 1984, consumer prices increased 4.3 percent in Canada.

The Canadian dollar, however, declined relative to its U.S. counterpari in 1984. The exchange rate declined 5.1 percent for the year, and the Canadian dollar closed the year equal to . 7568 U.S. cents.

After narrowing during 1983, the interest rate differential between United States and Canadian money-market rates increased in 1984, 3/ as shown in the following tabulation in percent:

|  | Annual |  |  | 1983 |  |  |  | 1984 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1st | 2d | 3d | 4th | 1st | 2d | 3d | 4th |
|  |  |  |  | qtr | gtr | qtr | gtr | gtr | qtr | gtr | gtr |
| United | States--12.5 | 9.2 | 10.6 | 8.5 | 8.8 | 9.6 | 9.4 | 9.7 | 10.9 | 11.5 | 9.4 |
| Canada | -------14.5 | 9.5 | 11.3 | 9.8 | 9.1 | 9.4 | 9.5 | 10.0 | 11. | 12. | 11. |

The size of the Federal deficit in Canada has become a matter of increasing concern in the last two years. The following tabulation 4/ illustrating the Canadian and United States deficits as a share of GNP, points out that the Canadian deficit is relatively greater than that of the United States.

|  | Deficit as a percent of GNP |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Period | Canada | United States |
| 1975-76- | 2.9 | 5.2 |
| 1977-78- | 4.0 | 2.7 |
| 1979-80 | 4.0 | 2.8 |
|  | 6.5 | 6.3 |
| 1983-84 (estimate)------------ | 6.7 | 5.4 |

[^50]
## Merchandise Trade With the United States

The bilateral trading relationship between the United States and Canada is marked by the largest volume of trade between any two countries in the world. Although most Americans think of Japan or the European Community in the context of U.S. trade partners, trade with Canada is 40 percent larger than that with any other country. The $\$ 111$ billion in two-way trade is greater than the trade between the United States and the EC. The United States-Canada relationship contrasts sharply with the U.S.-EC relationship. Although U.S.-EC relations were marked by a number of trade conflicts in 1983 and 1984, United States-Canadian trade relations, given the volume of commerce involved, were decidedly upbeat and free of serious disputes.

In 1983, the United States recorded a $\$ 15.4$ billion merchandise trade deficit with Canada (table 9). This was a record high, surpassing the previous high of nearly $\$ 14$ billion in 1982 --an amount substantially greater than the traditional U.S. deficit in bilateral trade with Canada. The bilateral deficit was $\$ 5.6$ billion in 1979 and has grown each year since. The 1983 deficit of $\$ 15.4$ billion accounted for over one-fourth of the total U.S. merchandise trade deficit. The bilateral deficit increased even further in 1984, amounting to $\$ 21.8$ billion, but accounted for only 20 percent of the overall merchandise trade deficit.

The value of U.S. exports to Canada increased 21.8 percent in 1984 to $\$ 44.5$ billion, after increasing by 12.7 percent in the previous year. Table 9 breaks down U.S. trade with Canada into broad industrial categories. The table illustrates that U.S. exports to Canada in 1984 rose in 9 of 10 SITC sections. The one section to register a decline was beverages and tobacco. The level of trade recorded in 1984 shows that one trading partner--Canada--accounts for over one-fifth of U.S. global sales.
U.S. imports from Canada were valued at $\$ 66.3$ billion in 1984 , representing a 27.6 percent increase over that of 1983 . This was the highest amount recorded for any trading partner in 1984 and the highest level ever recorded with Canada. The increase in 1984 was double that recorded for the year before. The strong U.S. economy contributed to the increase in U.S. imports from Canada in 1984. Imports of machinery and transport equipment (primarily motor vehicles and parts) were up nearly 40 percent and accounted for over half of the import surge. Imports increased in every broad commodity line during 1984.

Machinery and transportation equipment, section 7 , is the major area of bilateral trade between the United States and Canada. Trade in this sector accounted for 57.6 percent of overall shipments to Canada and 42.2 percent of goods received from Canada in 1984. 1/ Trade in motor vehicles accounted for most of the bilateral trade in section 7. This trade is largely governed by a 1965 bilateral agreement that provides for duty-free treatment of imports of specified automotive products.

The major items of bilateral trade are highlighted in tables B-1 and B-2. The top 20 export items shown account for 52.1 percent of all U.S. goods shipped to Canada in 1984, and the leading import items cover 62.9 percent of the total. The leading items exported to Canada from the United States were generally unchanged from 1983. However, the decline in exports of piston-type

1/ Increases over the 1983 shares of 56.5 percent for U.S. exports to Canada and 38.7 percent of U.S. imports from Canada.


[^51]engines, together with the 84 -percent increase in trucks in the 1984 period altered the hierarchy slightly. Exports of all the items but piston-type engines increased from 1983 to 1984. Other significant U.S. exports included gold or silver bullion, parts of office machinery, digital central-processing units, trucks, and parts of engines.

The five leading items imported from Canada in 1984 accounted for 37.7 percent of total U.S. imports from Canada and are the same items which led the list of imports from Canada in 1983. Imports of all five, except natural gas, ethane, and so forth, increased between 1983 and 1984. The high degree of integration between the U. S. and Canadian automobile industries is indicated by the fact that passenger automobiles and parts are among the leading items of both bilateral import and export trade.

In Canada, foreign trade has been acting as the engine for the recovery of the Canadian economy. At a time when the Canadian dollar is worth approximately 75 U.S. cents, the Canadians have been able to take advantage of larger markets in an expanding U.S. economy. As Canadian sales to the United States have grown, sales to West Germany, France, and Great Britain have contracted. Canada's 1983 surplus with the United States was largely counterbalanced by a deterioration in trade with other countries.

## Major Policy Developments Affecting Trade

Operation of the United States-Canadian Automotive Products Trade Agreement

The Automotive Products Trade Act (APTA) of 1965 implemented a bilateral agreement between the United States and Canada that removed duties on trade in new motor vehicles and original-equipment parts between the two countries. In effect, the agreement created the basis for an integrated automobile industry in North America. 1/

1/ According to art. I, the agreement has three objectives: "the creation of a broader market for automotive products within which the full benefits of specialization and large-scale production can be achieved; the liberalization of United States and Canadian automotive trade in respect of tariff barriers and other factors tending to impede it, with a view to enabling the industries of both countries to participate on a fair and equitable basis in the expanding total market of the two countries; and the development of conditions in which market forces may operate effectively to attain the most economic pattern of investment production and trade."

Because the United States did not extend this customs treatment to automotive products of other countries with which it has trade-agreement obligations, it obtained a waiver of its MFN obligations under GATT insofar as they pertain to automotive products. Canada, on the other hand, did not consider it necessary to obtain a GATT waiver because, at the time the agreement went into effect, it accorded duty-free treatment to specified automotive products on an MFN basis to all manufacturers with production facilities in Canada. There is, therefore, a difference in the application of the agreement in the two countries. In the United States, anyone may import a finished vehicle covered by the agreement duty free. In Canada, however, the duty-free import privilege is limited to vehicle manufacturers. Individuals importing motor vehicles or parts thereof from the United States must pay the Canadian duty (currently 12.1 percent ad valorem on automobiles and various rates on automotive parts).

Previous research has identified several problems in accounting for all the trade in automotive products between the United States and Canada. U.S. export statistics, for example, sometimes fail to capture as automotive items those products having a variety of end uses (e.g., engine parts, nuts, bolts, fabric for seat covers, and so forth). Consequently, a joint United States-Canadian comittee studying overall trade statistics agreed that each country should use its own import statistics to report its imports, and use the other's import statistics to report its exports. 1/ The result is the "import/import" method of reporting automotive trade used in table 10.

Table 10.--United States-Canadian automotive trade, 1964-84

| Year : | U.S. imports | Canadian imports 1/ | Canadian imports less U.S. imports |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| : |  | : |  |
| 1964------------------- | 76 | 640 | 563 |
| 1965--------------------- | 231 | 889 | 658 |
|  | 819 | $: \quad 1,375$ | 556 |
| 1967---------------------- | 1,406 | 1,889 | 483 |
|  | 2,274 | 2,634 | 360 |
|  | 3,061 | 3,144 | 83 |
| 1970--------------------- | 3,132 | 2,935 | -196 |
|  | 4,000 | 3,803 | -197 |
| 1972---------------------- | 4,595 | 4,496 | -99 |
| 1973--------------------- | 5,301 | 5,726 | 426 |
|  | 5,544 | 6,777 | 1,233 |
|  | 5,801 | 7,643 | 1,842 |
|  | 7,989 | 9,005 | 1,016 |
| 1977-------------------- | 9,267 | 10,290 | 1,023 |
|  | 10,493 | 10,964 | 471 |
| 1979-------------------- | 9,715 | 12,274 | 2,559 |
| 1980-------------------- | 8,780 | 10,552 | 1,773 |
| 1981--------------------- | 10,618 | 12,055 | 1,437 |
| 1982-------------------- | 13,292 | 10,971 | -2,321 |
| 1983-------------------- | 16,940 | 14,779 | -2,161 |
| 1984------------------- | 23,047 | 18,996 | -4,051 |
|  |  |  |  |

1/ Data from Canada adjusted to U.S. dollars.
Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, except as noted.

Note.--Data exclude trade in materials for use in the manufacture of automotive parts and are adjusted to reflect transaction values for vehicles.

1/ The committee's study, entitled The Reconciliation of U.S.-Canada Trade Statistics 1970, a Report by the U.S.-Canada Trade Statistics Committee, was published jointly by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and Statistics Canada.

Since the inception of the agreement, the value of two-way trade in automotive products between the United States and Canada has increased nearly 58.7 times in nominal dollars and approximately 12 times after adjustment for inflation. In 1984, U.S. shipments of automotive products to Canada increased 29 percent to $\$ 19.0$ billion (table 11). Assembled vehicles accounted for 33 percent of shipments in 1984, a share unchanged from 1983. Dutiable imports into Canada of automotive products were valued at $\$ 961$ million in 1984, representing 5 percent of total U.S. automotive product exports Lo Canada (table 11).

Canadian shipments of automotive products to the United States increased 36 percent in 1984 to $\$ 23.0$ billion. Assembled vehicles accounted for 64 percent of the annual shipments. Dutiable imports of automotive products were valued at $\$ 1,350.2$ million, or nearly 6 percent of total automotive product shipments from Canada. The major categories of dutiable items for both Canada and the United States are replacement parts for motor vehicles (only original-equipment parts are accorded duty-free treatment under the agreement), tires, and tubes.

In 1982, for the first time in 10 years, the United States had a deficit in automotive trade with Canada. This deficit recurred in 1983, as Canadian automobile manufacturers were able to take advantage of the increased demand in the United States for larger cars. 1/ This continued in 1984 as shipments from Canada continued to outstrip U.S. sales to its APTA partner. The deficit soared from $\$ 2.2$ billion in 1983 to $\$ 4.1$ billion in 1984 , an increase of 87 percent. Until 1982, the United States normally had enjoyed an overall automotive trade surplus with Canada--the surplus in the skill-intensive, high-technology parts sector being lessened by the deficit in trade in assembled vehicles. Although Canada's auto parts deficit has increased in the last 3 years, its surplus in trade in vehicles has been more than enough to override this, resulting in an overall automotive trade surplus.

## New foreign investment policy in Canada

During the Trudeau era, Canada's Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) came to symbolize the country's concern with maintaining a distinct national identity in the face of significant foreign investment from the Uniled States. The process by which FIRA reviewed proposed investments into Canada had come to be viewed as increasingly burdensome and even to constitute an unreasonable impediment to foreign direct investment. In a recent survey of potential investors, the Conference Board of Canada found that Government regulations and foreign investment controls had a deterring effect on foreign investors. 2/

1/ Larger cars account for a disproportionately high share of Canadian automotive production. The production of larger cars has been encouraged by the commitments of Canadian motor-vehicle manufacturers to increase Canadian value added. Although Canada accounted for 12.9 percent of overall North American assembly capacity in the 1982 model year, its assembly capacily for larger cars was 22.8 percent of the tolal, and only 5.7 percent of North American capacity for small cars. Thus, when gasoline prices jegan falling in 1982 and U.S. consumer demand shifted toward larger cars, U.S. manufacturers had to rely heavily on their Canadian assembly operations.

2/ The Conference Board of Canada, A Fit Place for Investment?, Study No. 81, Ottawa, 1984.

Table 11.--U.S.-Canadian automotive trade, by specified products, 1983 and 1984
(In millions of U.S. dollars)


1/ U.S. import data.
2/ Duty free under the United States-Canadian Automotive Products Trade Agreement.

3/ Canadian import data converted to U.S. dollars as follows: 1983, Can\$1.00=US\$0.80199; 1984, Can\$1.00=U.S.\$0.77202.

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Conmerce and Statistics Canada.

Note.--U.S. imports are f.a.s. or transaction values, as published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Canadian imports are valued on a similar basis.

The fact that Canada has come to be viewed as less inviting to foreign investors has been recognized by the leadership of the new Government. After campaigning to make investors more welcome in Canada, the new Government went on record as wanting to distinguish its position on foreign investment from that of the previous Government. Joint ventures and industrial partnerships with foreign companies and entrepreneurs were to be encouraged.

In December 1984, legislation was introduced into Parliament to change the name of FIRA to Investment Canada. The new name is intended to underscore the agency's revised mandate to encourage investment. Its role is intended to be positive rather than restrictive in order to emphasize the Government's efforts to foster investment. The agency will continue to review major investment proposals of national economic significance. It will also assume the more positive role of facilitating "job-creating investment" and assisting in identifying new ideas, new technologies, and new export opportunities for investment in Canada. Priority sectors where increased capital investment is expressly desired are energy, rail transportation, applied technology, and basic infrastructure.

The Investment Canada Act exempts all new investments from Canadian Government review. It also raises the threshold value for exemption from reviews of takeovers of Canadian companies from $\$ 3$ million to $\$ 5$ million. The legislation should result in faster, simpler decisionmaking, with the total number of investments subject to review being reduced by 90 percent. The basic criterion for determining whether proposed investments are of "significant" benefit to Canada has been eased. The new legislation requires only that a proposed investment be of "net" benefit to Canada.

The new act represents a broad change in Canada's rules governing foreign investment. Following the GATT case against FIRA, 1 / the previous Government had been interpreting the legislation increasingly liberally. This is borne out in table 12, which shows that the approval rate for both new businesses and acquisitions in Canada increased in fiscal 1984. It is uncertain how the recent legislative changes will influence the inflow of new capital into Canada.

Development of the sectoral free trade initiative
In the 1970's, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau pursued a trade and investment policy that hindered foreign investment in Canada and foreign ownership of Canadian industries. The hallmarks of this policy were the Foreign Investment Review Agency, the "Third Option," $2 /$ and the New Energy Policy (NEP). FIRA closely scrutinized prospective foreign investments, determined whether or not they were of significant benefit to Canada, and established performance requirements for foreign firms; the "Third Option" policy was a major reorientation of Canada's posture towards her trading partners: the Canadian Government attempted to de-emphasize its "special" trade relationship with the United States and emphasize trading ties with Japan, Europe, and the Pacific Rim countries. Then, in October 1980, the

[^52]Table 12.--Summary of actions taken by the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Agency on applications from the United States and Western Europe for investment in Canada, fiscal years 1983-84


Source: Foreign Investment Review Agency, Tenth Annual Report, Foreign Investment Review Act, 1983-84, Ottawa, Oct 1984.

Canadian Government created the NEP: its top priorities were to increase Canadian ownership of the oil and gas industry to 50 percent and to achieve energy self-sufficiency by eliminating oil imports, both by 1990. Consequently, these official policies were coupled with a swelling sense of Canadian nationality and self-determination and resulted in an overall decrease in the percentage of foreign owned firms. 1/ In the trading arena, the Canadians did increase the total value of exports to the EC and Japan, but they failed to significantly increase their export share to these two areas. $\mathbf{2}^{\prime}$

## Shift in Canadian attitude

Towards the end of the seventies and through the early part of the 1980s, Canadian sensitivity to foreign investment began to change because of a general economic downturn and increased levels of unemployment. This gradual shift became more distinct during the recessionary period in Canada that started in mid-1981 and persisted until the early part of 1983. 3/ Then, in the latter part of 1983, the Canadian econony improved its performance record and proceeded on its road to recovery. Two main driving forces were recognized as stimulating the recovery: the increased volume of merchandise exports and the growth in residential construction. Export growth and the employment opportunities provided by it are directly attributable to the strong U.S. recovery during the same year.

[^53]Canada capitalized on the U.S. recovery by increasing exports to the United States, fueling the expanding American economy. As a result, the importance of export markets to the long-term economic growth and well-being of the Canadian economy was underscored. In addition to identifying and stressing export markets as both pillars and catalysts to their economy, the Government perceived that any U.S. protectionist sentiment could start to discriminate against Canadian exports. In such a scenario, the Canadians could find themselves without stable and predictable world and U.S. export markets and, in turn, diminishing returns from their export sector. Therefore, it was determined that Canada must maintain unobstructed access to its main trading and export market in order to continue to secure and to expand its own economy.

## Origin of the initiative

In August of 1983, the Canadian Government released an official discussion paper entitled Canadian Trade Policy for the 1980's, an analysis of Canada's overall trading performance, philosophy, and status in multilateral and bilateral trade issues. The paper confirmed the reversal in Canada's trading posture and attitude. The emphasis on the "Third Option" was abandoned; the traditional United States-Canadian "special" relationship was to be further strengthened and developed. Additionally, the report strongly supported and urged continued multilateral negotiations, while simultaneously proposing more bilateral discussions with the United States as another option for enhancing trade relations.

More specifically, the document presented the idea of a sectoral free-trade agreement with the United States It stressed that this type of agreement was not a new proposal and cited the 1965 automotive products agreement (APTA) in the North American (i.e. bilateral) context and the GATT aircraft agreement on the multilateral level. A sectoral free trade agreement would identify certain Canadian and American areas that could benefit from the elimination of all tariff barriers in the flow of goods and services between the two countries. The supporters of this arrangement argued that it would facilitate the growth of certain industries on both sides, create jobs, benefit both consumer populations and manufacturing sectors, and, lastly, aid in intrasectoral adjustments (internal rationalization).

## United States-Canadian Bilateral Trade Issues

## U.S. reaction to the sectoral free trade initiative

The U.S. reaction to this unexpected Canadian overture for freer trade was positive. In September 1983, both U.S. Trade Representative William Brock and U.S. Ambassador to Canada Paul Robinson recognized this move by the Canadians as a possible step to further expand and liberalize international trade between both countries. Although Brock and Robinson applauded this movement, they wanted to see specific proposals before negotiations on any type of sectoral free-trade acconmodation were begun.

## Rationale for initiative

Even though the multilateral trade negotiations of the Tokyo Round will make 65 percent of U.S. exports to Canada and 80 percent of Canadian exports to the United States tariff free by 1987, the Canadian tariff structure will still protect manufactured and processed products more than primary comodities and extractives. The sectoral free trade initiative is an additional alternative to further improve the trading positions of both Canadian and American businesses and industries. Through this type of piecemeal approach to free trade, it is argued that both countries could make economic and financial gains. For instance, the Canadian economy is only one-tenth the size of the U.S. economy, and its consumers are scattered thoughout the country. Therefore, any additional access to the U.S. market is advantageous because the increase in potential consumers will create economies of scale, a greater degree of industrial specialization and many more intrasectoral adjustments. While it is true that these effects will be felt on both sides of the border, it is argued that Canadian firms that are competitive enough will benefit more from such an accommodation than already well-established U.S. industries and businesses.

On the other hand, U.S. industries and businesses could gain further and more profitable access to raw materials, especially oil and gas, and benefit from a more robust Canadian economy that translates into an expanded market for U.S. exports; also, American multinational corporations with subsidiaries in Canada would be able to assign production to plants in either Canada or the United States on the basis of efficiency. Furthermore, an agreement for sectoral free trade would not only eliminate all tariff barriers in selected areas, it could also lead to further negotiation on nontariff barriers. Also, the resulting duty-free areas would create broader and more predictable markets, and a positive investment atmosphere would evolve from this development. Sectoral free trade may also identify ways and means to promote reciprocal trade expansion.

In addition to the aforementioned economic and trade consequences, some political advantages are possible in pursuing a sectoral free trade dialogue instead than discussing an entire free trade area. Bilateral negotiations could create a positive tone in United States-Canadian affairs and stem the tide of growing international protectionism. In turn, a new round of multilateral trade negotiations could be sparked by or evolve from this initiative. Also, the sectoral negotiation route is not an irreversible process, and it lends itself to a gradual "learning-by-doing" technique. These two aspects are important because a rekindling of Canadian or American nationalism in the form of Buy Canadian or Buy American provisions could be avoided. Thus the practical political considerations are integral, if not essential, parts to the success of any sectoral free-trade agreement. Without the political will and bureaucratic skill on both sides, the actualization of the initiative will be impossible.

## Chronology of United States-Canadian actions and meetings

The Canadian Government specifically mentioned the clothing and textile industry as a sectoral candidate for duty-free trade with the United States in their discussion paper of August 1983. On February 16, 1984, the Canadian Textile and Clothing Board, a Government agency, reported in an "interim" statement a split opinion among representatives from the clothing and textile
industries over the benefit of freer trade with the United States. One day later, on February 17, U.S. Trade Representative Brock met with Canadian International Trade Minister Regan to discuss freer trade and free trade zones. Brock and Regan exchanged similar inclinations to pursue negotiations on a sectoral free trade policy. They decided on rough work schedules and determined that more technical and statistical studies were needed. On June 6, they met again and then the two ministers instructed their officials to examine prospects for certain sectors, such as steel, agricultural equipment and supplies, computer data services, and urban mass transit equipment. Both meetings were exploratory and both sides were prepared to commence their respective studies.

## Selection of specific sectors

During the past year of proposals, negotiations and studies, each side mentioned additional sectors that they felt would be economically beneficial and politically acceptable. These sectors were considered possible candidates for duty-free trade areas. Among the specific sectors mentioned were the following: petrochemicals, clothing and textiles, "informatics," 1/ electrical power equipment, beef, furniture, wood products, cosmetics, alcoholic beverages, nonferrous metals, fisheries, and professional and scientific instrumentation. From the official list and this informal list of recomended items, each country has stressed particular domestic industries that could benefit and prosper from these new market and trading conditions because of either their comparative advantage or their excellent growth potential. The American sectors thought to have excellent growth potential are telecommunication equipment, informatics, furniture, woodworking, machinery exports (such as power-generating equipment), agricultural machinery, general industrial machinery, metal, paper, and professional and scientific instruments and medical equipment. 2/ Whereas the Canadians are considered to possess comparative advantages or opportunites for growth in the following sectors: urban mass transit, textiles, certain petrochemical products and specialty steel. 3/

As a followup to the agreed-upon studies, USTR Brock submitted a request to the U.S. International Trade Commission to conduct an investigation under section 332 (g) of the Tariff Act of 1930 and to advise the President as to the probable economic effects of providing duty-free treatment for certain imports from Canada on industries in the United States producing like or directly competitive articles and on American consumers. Brock requested the Comission's advice on 10 specific sectors: furniture, wood and wood products, paper and paper products, cosmetics and perfumery, petrochemicals, alcoholic beverages, informatics, steel and steel products, pesticides, and certain agricultural machinery. 4/

1/ Informatics is a word used to embrace all forms of high-technology computer and communications goods and services.

2/ Thomas K. Brewer, "Opportunities in the Canadian Market," Business America, Sept. 5, 1983, p.5.

3/ B.W. Wilkinson, "Canada--US Trade Policy Relations, Views and Conments, 1984, p. 101-02. Business Week, Jan. 16, 1984, p. 43.

4/ The findings of the Commission were transmitted to the USTR on Mar. 15, 1985.

## Obstacles

By the end of 1981 , many formidable obstacles still remained in the negotiation process toward any sectoral free trade agreements. A difficult barrier for both countries would be to obtain approval by GATT. If the Canadians and Americans decide to exchange concessions of a discriminatory or preferential nature that could conflict with the MFN principle, a waiver through either article XXV:5 or through the free trade area provisions of article XXIV would be necessary. Among other obstacles in the way of fruitful negotiations are the Canadian Federal and Provincial Governments' procurement policies, the high value of the U.S. dollar and the change of ruling political parties in Canada.

On both levels, the Canadian Government plays a larger and more overt role in Canadian industry and business than does its U.S. counterpart. Both the Federal and Provincial levels have Crown corporations, essentially Government-owned firms that usually prefer to purchase Canadian-made goods and services. Although several of these organizations are customers of the United States, some American industries and businesses think that in Canada they are at a distinct disadvantage in competing against Crown corporations. This handicap is even more distorted with the high value of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the Canadian dollar. These two aspects tend to aggravate existing trade relations and could hinder any progress on the sectoral free trade front, particularly as some U.S. industries seek more protection rather than freer trade in light of these factors.

Finally, Canada is experiencing a transitional phase because of the recent national elections. The new Government is exploring trade policy options on a number of different fronts and these possibilities will be outlined later in 1985 in the form of an official Government release. This document should provide a clearer view of future economic objectives and Canadian trade policies.

## Status of initiative by the end of 1984

As a result of these obstacles, the initiative was in a state of flux at the end of 1984, with neither side adopting a negative position or openly embracing the proposal. In addition, the Mulroney government, which was elected in September 1984, seems to be taking a more cautious approach to the initiative than did the former government. Alternatives to the sectoral free trade approach in the form of so-called functional approach have been mentioned. They would be an attempt to harmonize United States and Canadian trade policies in such areas as government procurement, and antidumping and antisubsidy practices. This tack may prove to be more feasible and to generate faster results because it is much less politically volatile. ${ }^{\prime} /$

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## Maritime boundary dispute settlement

A long-standing boundary dispute between the United States and Canada was resolved in 1984 with a decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that delimited the continental shelf and the 200 -mile fishing zones off the east coast of both countries. The finding resolved the bilateral issues of fishing rights and offshore oil exporation and development; it also set an international precedent for the resolution of maritine boundary disputes.


#### Abstract

U.S. fishermen have been working the area of Georges Bank since 1820. Canadian fishermen only began significant fishing in the area in the 1960's. The extension of both United States and Canadian fishing jurisdictions to 200 miles in 1977 resulted in overlapping boundary clains in the Gulf of Maine. (See figure 2). The ICJ's resolution of these claims had a significant effect on the fishing rights of each country. Fish and shellfish landed from the disputed portion of Georges Bank are worth over $\$ 100$ million per year. Groundfish and scallops are the principal catch in the area. The disputed area was between 13,000 and 15,000 square nautical miles in size; it included one of the world's richest fishing grounds, the northeastern half of the Georges Bank.


The dispute appeared to be moving toward settlement in 1979 through two linked treaties: one on the boundary and the other on fisheries. But the latter treaty was not ratified, and progress toward resolution of the dispute stalled in early 1981. In a treaty that entered into force on November 20, 1981, each country agreed to ask the ICJ to adjudicate the dispute and to accept its decision in the case. Three sets of written pleadings were followed by oral arguments in May of 1984. The ICJ decision was announced in October 1984. It essentially divided the disputed area in half, but gave Canada maritime jurisdiction over a particularly rich portion of the waters and the sea bed. 1/

The Gulf of Maine case was one of the first cases to be decided at the ICJ since the 200 -mile exclusive economic zone concept was fully accepted as international law. In 1977, the United States and Canada extended their fisheries jurisdictions as a reaction to the overfishing of the Northeast Atlantic fishing grounds by fleets from Japan and both Eastern and Western Europe. Such extensions of coastal-state jurisdictions seaward to 200 nautical miles have become more frequent in the last two decades, leaving in their wake hundreds of maritime boundary disputes. Settlement of the Gulf of Maine dispute by the ICJ further develops international law in an area of exceptional importance to the international legal community.
$1 /$ For a discussion of the ICJ decision and its potential impact on United STates and Canadian fishing, see Conditions of Competition Affecting the Northeastern U.S. Groundfish and Scallop Industries in Selected Markets, United States International Trade Commission, Publication 1622, December 1984, pp 203-207.

Fignure 2.--United States - Canada Maritime Boundary Determined by the International Court of Justice


## THE EUROPEAN COMIUNITY

## The Economic Situation in 1984

In 1984, the EC economy charted a modest rate of recovery from the recession of the early $1980^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$. The EC economy was fueled in part by increased exports to the U.S. market. 1/ EC industrial production in 1984 grew 4.5 percent over 1983. The EC registered a 2.2 percent average growth rate in real GDP in 1984, up from 0.9 percent in 1983. The EC's economic recovery was led by a growth rate of 2.9 percent in Italy, 2.4 percent in West Germany, and 2.0 percent in Britain. France's growth rate was 1.4 percent in 1984. The EC inflation rate for 1984 averaged 5.5 percent, down from 7.7 percent in 1983--the best economic news to emerge from Europe in 1984. The rate of inflation was about 2.1 percent for West Germany, 5 percent for Britain, 6.5 percent for France, and 9.1 percent for Italy. The EC's current account was balanced in 1984. EC members' budget deficits averaged 5.3 percent of GDP.

The EC's growth rate was not strong enough to reverse the rising tide of unemployment in 1984. There were 13 million persons unemployed in the EC during 1984, bringing the average rate of unemployment to 11.6 percent, up from 10.4 percent in 1983. The rising level of unemployment was Europe's principle economic problem in 1984. The rate of unemployment was 8.6 percent for West Germany, 11.1 percent for France, 13.5 percent for Italy, and 12.2 percent for Britain.

## Merchandise Trade with the United States

Table 13 shows that the total value of two-way U.S.-EC trade increased from $\$ 86.2$ billion in 1983 to $\$ 101.7$ billion in 1984 . U.S. exports to the EC represented 21 percent of total U.S. exports to the world in 1984. U.S. imports from the EC constituted 18 percent of total U.S. imports from the world in 1984. The table shows that the United States recorded a merchandise trade deficit with the EC of $\$ 12.1$ billion, up from a $\$ 1.3$ billion deficit in 1983. The United States had trade deficits with West Germany ( $\$ 8.5$ billion); Italy ( $\$ 3.7$ billion); Britain ( $\$ 2.8$ billion) and France ( $\$ 2.1$ billion). The U.S. trade deficit with the EC constituted 11 percent of the total U.S. merchandise trade deficit with the world. The strength of the U.S. dollar was a major factor in making EC exports more attractive to U.S. consumers. U.S. exports to the EC rose slightly from $\$ 42.4$ billion in 1983 to $\$ 44.8$ billion in 1984. U.S. imports from the EC rose from $\$ 43.8$ billion in 1983 to $\$ 56.9$ billion in 1984. The record U.S. merchandise trade deficit with the EC is generally attributable to both the strength of the dollar and the economic recovery in the United States.

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[^56]Table B-3 shows that the leading items in U.S. exports to the EC in 1984 consisted of office machinery parts ( $\$ 3.0$ billion), computers ( $\$ 2.6$ billion), soybeans ( $\$ 1.8$ billion), coal ( $\$ 1.5$ billion), aircraft parts ( $\$ 1.5$ billion), engine parts ( $\$ 1.3$ billion), and aircraft ( $\$ 1.0$ billion). With the exceptions of soybeans and aircraft, the value of each of these items rose in 1984 over the previous year's level.

Table B-4 shows that the leading items in U.S. imports from the EC in 1984 consisted of motor vehicles ( $\$ 6.2$ billion), crude petroleum ( $\$ 4.7$ billion), motor fuel ( $\$ 1.1$ billion), and airplanes and airplane parts ( $\$ 884$ million). The value of these items rose in 1984 over the previous year's level.

## Major Policy Developments Affecting Trade

## Agriculture

In March 1984, the EC's Council of Agricultural Ministers agreed to implement the EC's farm price package for 1984-85 which included a number of measures to reform the controversial Comon Agricultural Policy (CAP). The EC set production quotas on surplus products, set lower comon EC farm prices, proceeded to gradually eliminate Monetary Compensatory Amounts 1/, and empowered the Commission of European Communities to negotiate tariff quotas on nongrain feed ingredients (NGFI's) at the GATT. 2/

The EC's 1984-85 farm package set milk production quotas for 5 years at 1 percent above 1981 milk deliveries. If milk producers or dairies exceed their assigned limits, fines are imposed. The milk production quota for $1984-85$ was 98.4 million tons. Members were allowed to produce additional quantities of milk during a transition period from 1984 to 1985. To cover this cost, the co-responsibility levy that dairy farmers already pay as part of the EC's program to discourage surplus production was raised to 3 percent of the target price. The EC also placed production curbs on wine and reduced various production or consumption subsidies in the livestock, butter, and fruit and vegetable sectors.

CAP prices in 1984-85 were tied to attempts to reform the CAP. Average common farm prices for $1984-85$ were reduced by 0.5 percent when expressed in European Currency Units (ECU's). 3/ Although average prices were increased by 3.3 percent when converted into national currencies, the EC's 1984 inflation rate of 5.5 percent meant a decline in real farm income. Milk and sugar prices were frozen at 1983 levels.

[^57]New trade instrument
In April 1984, the EC adopted a new trade law to strengthen its defense against "unfair trading practices" used by nonmembers in EC and foreign markets. $1 /$ The new law allows member firms and Governments to lodge complaints with the Commission of the European Communities if they believe they are victims of unfair commercial practices--practices used by nonmembers that are incompatible with international law or the rules commonly accepted by the EC's main trading partners regarding commercial policy. If--after its investigation--the EC finds material injury caused or threatened to EC industry, the new law provides means for taking countermeasures against the offending country, such as imposition of quotas or increased duties. A novel provision in the new instrument authorizes the EC to identify and counter injury met by EC firms in export markets. 2/ By yearend 1984, no EC member or firm had lodged a complaint under the new trade law.

## Information technology

In February 1984, the EC adopted a new, 5-year, $\$ 1.3$ billion program to promote research in information technology (IT) called ESPRIT--European Strategic Program for Research and Development. 3/ ESPRIT is designed to encourage cross-frontier research and development (R\&D) collaboration among member Governments, firms, and research centers to aid European high-tech industries. The EC pays one-half of research projects whose participants are from two or more member states. ESPRIT was created to help improve Europe's third place standing--after the United States and Japan--in R\&D and commercial exploitation of IT products. The EC has a large trade deficit in IT products and believes that individual members and firms cannot reverse the deficit since their scale of resources committed to R\&D is too small to be effective.

For the first year of the ESPRIT program, the Commission of European Communities chose 104 projects (out of a total of 441 proposals) to receive research grants. The 104 projects involve 270 firms, universities, and research centers in the EC and deal with microelectronics, software technology, advanced data processing, office automation, and computer-aided design and manufacture. Five non-EC multinational firms are involved in nine ESPRIT contracts through their EC subsidiaries: ITT (three projects), AT\&T

1/ In 1982, the Council of Ministers called for the EC to respond more quickly and efficiently to unfair trading practices used by nonmembers that cause injury to EC industry. The EC's Commission responded in February 1983 with the proposed new trade instrument. Previously, such import relief actions were taken with the agreement of all member governments and most in the EC found the method to be ineffective. The EC already has trade defense instruments that include antidumping and antisubsidy procedures and surveillance or safeguard mechanisms.

2/ The EC claimed the new law was partly inspired by section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 and gives the EC the same scope for action as the United States and Japanese Governments already have. The subsidized sale of U.S. wheat flour to Egypt in early 1983 may have accelerated pressures in Europe for adoption of the new instrument.

3/ Information technology refers to industries whose products process or transmit information.
and Bell Telephone (two projects each), and IBM and Digital (one project each). Their combined participation represents about 2 percent of the 1984 ESPRIT program. Japanese firms were not among the recipients of ESPRIT grants for 1984.

## Lomé Convention III

On December 8, 1984, the third Lomé Convention (Lomé-III) was signed by the EC and 65 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries after a year of difficult negotiations. The new 5-year treaty came into force in March 1985. The Lomé Convention is a long-term treaty governing nonreciprocal preferential trade between the EC and ACP states. Under the terms of the treaty, the EC provides grants and loans to the ACP states from the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank to finance development projects, tariff reductions on many ACP farm exports to the EC, and ACP industrial free trade access to the EC. In a program called STABEX, the EC is conmitted to covering losses on ACP countries earnings from 48 agricultural export products due to a drop in prices or production. In a program called SYSMIN, the EC provides financial aid to the mining industries of the ACP members. Lomé-III will cost the EC 8.5 billion ECU's during its 5-year duration.

## Enlargement

Negotiations took place during 1984 to set the terms of accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC, now scheduled for January 1, 1986. Both countries applied for membership in 1977, but serious accession negotiations did not begin until 1983. In 1984, the chief stumbling blocks to agreement revolved around the terms of accession, in particular the transition period during which both sides would eliminate trade barriers. Spain and Portugal argued for longer transition periods during which import levies and quotas on products from the EC would be progressively reduced. The EC argued for a longer transition period during which imports of Iberian wine, olive oil, fruits and vegetables, steel, and textiles would be subject to progressively reduced quotas. 1/

## U.S.-EC Bilateral Trade Issues

Some of the trade problems between the United States and the EC stem from fundamentally different approaches to state interventions in the ecomony; others are narrower problems over specific products like steel pipe and corn gluten. When compared to a trade turnover of $\$ 100$ billion, the value of trade in products on which the two sides differ appears small. Yet when viewed

[^58]in terms of specific sectors--e.g., wine and wheat--there are serious problems. The tone of the relationship in 1984 was not conducive to resolving bilateral trade problems. Threats of protectionism were heard across the Atlantic as both sides grappled with their relative economic predicaments. I/ Competition grew increasingly sharp in 1984 as the two trading giants competed for third country markets, particularly North Africian and Middle Eastern agricultural markets. Much of the trade discord is rooted in different approaches to economic and trade policy that are as old as the United States-EC relationship itself. Differences in 1984 revolved around usage of export subsidies and credits, $2 /$ export controls, $3 /$ and exchange rate fluctuations. 4/ A brief review of specific bilateral lrade issues follows.

## Steel

Trade in steel was a major problem area in bilateral relations during 1984. On March 1, 1984, the EC imposed restrictions on certain imports from the United States in retaliation against U.S. curbs on imports of specialty steel imposed in 1983. The EC increased Lariffs on styrene, polyethylene, sporting goods and sporting equipment and snow skis; and imposed quantitative restrictions on methanol, vinyl acetate, and burglar alarms. The EC invoked GATT rules, claiming the U.S. actions entitled it to compensation at a level substantially equivalent to the trade in specialty steels lost or impaired.

Imports of pipes and tubes from the EC, while not included in the U.S.-EC Arrangement Concerning Trade in Certain Steel Products 5/ (the Arrangement) negotiated in 1982, were to be held at 5.9 pecent of apparent U.S. consumption under the terms of a separate letter of understanding. According to the understanding, consultations were to be held should EC shipments exceed this

[^59]level. Negotiations in late 1984 between the United States and the EC failed to limit the surge in imports of EC pipes and tubes, which had reached a level of almost 14 percent of apparent U.S. consumption.

On November 29, 1984, the United States Government embargoed imports of all EC steel pipe and tube until yearend 1984. The United States claimed that the increase of stee! pipe and tube imports from the EC contravened the letter of understanding in the 1982 U.S.-EC Arrangement. 1/

## Agriculture

Trade in wine and corn gluten feed again dominated the bilateral farm trade agenda in 1984, although neither side took restrictive action against the other.

The EC is concerned about continued access to the U.S. wine market. Its wine exports have steadily risen from $\$ 583$ million in 1980 to $\$ 825$ million in 1984. As a result, the EC protested a section of the Trade and Tariff Act 1984 that allows U.S. grape growers to introduce antidumping and countervailing duty complaints against wine imports for a period not to exceed 2 years. Previously, only U.S. Wine producers were allowed to lodge such complaints. 2/ The EC has challenged the legality of the law based on GATT rules which specify that only producers of the same or a like product may introduce complaints. The Commission of European Communities initiated consultations under the GATT subsidies code in late 1984.

On April 12, 1984 the EC notified the GATT its intent to substitute zero duties on corn gluten feed and other NGFI's with tariff quotas. 3/ The EC would apply variable levies once the quotas were exceeded. The EC subsequently opened compensation negotiations under GATT article XXVIII with the United States. The EC offered to cap U.S. imports at 3.4 million metric tons without offering additional compensation. The United States rejected this and the issue remained unresolved by yearend.

1/ In January 1985, the United States and the EC reached an agreement that reduces the EC share of the U.S. market for steel pipe and tube to 7.6 percent in calendar years 1985 and 1986. Within the overall ceiling, EC exports of oil-country tubular goods are restricted to 10 percent of the U.S. market. The agreement also deals with imports that were embargoed since November 1984. It provides for 60,000 tons to be released by U.S. customs warehouses of which not more than 28,000 tons may be sold as country tubular goods. Shipments in excess of that 60,000 tons that are now in U.S. customs warehoures, may enter only after the EC issues licenses consistent with their internal burden-sharing plan and are included within the 7.6 percent limit.

2/ On Jan. 27, 1984, the U.S. International Trade Conmission instituted preliminary countervailing duty and antidunping investigations to determine if the U.S. wine industry was materially injured by certain wine imports from France and Italy on which grants were alleged to be paid. The petition was filed by the American Grape Growers Alliance for Fair Trade. In March 1984, the Commission made a negative determination in these investigations.

3/ Corn gluten feed, a high-protein; high-fiber, NGFI, is a coproduct of the corn-refining process. Corn refining is a procedure by which products such as starch, oil, and syrup are extracted from the corn kernel. The substances that remains after these products are removed is corn gluten.
U.S. exports of corn gluten feed to the EC, its largest customer, rose from $\$ 426$ million in 1980 to $\$ 562$ million in 1983 before dropping to $\$ 515$ million in 1984. The recent drop in exports is cited by the U.S. industry to refute EC charges of increased imports. With the popularity of corn gluten as an animal feed, the usage of grain in animal feed has declined. The EC believes that use of domestic grain in feeding has dropped, forcing the EC to export grain with subsicies at considerable cost.

## Fisheries

In 1984, the United States and che EC negotiated the renewal of a 1977 agreement that regulated the access of EC fishermen to U.S. fishing waters. The 1984 agreement will be in effect through 1989. In exchange, the EC agreed to share expertise, facilitate the transfer of harvesting technology to the U.S. fishing iridustry, and foster joint fishing arrangements between the two sides.

## JAPAN

The Economic Situation in 1984
The Japanese economy performed extremely well in 1984. Overall economic activity advanced at a healthy clip, industrial output rose significantly, inflation was low, and domestic investment was strong. As Japan's recovery from the recent recession gained momentum in 1984, real gross national product grew by 4.9 percent and industrial production rose by more than 11 percent, its first double-digit advance since 1976.

The marked recovery in demand came chiefly in the form of sharply rising exports. Indeed, the United States increased its purchases of Japanese products by nearly 40 percent in 1984. Private investment in plants and equipment followed exports as a source of growth. Fixed capital investment performed better than it has done in 4 years, registering a 7.7 percent increase from 1983. However, other components of domestic demand, such as personal consumption and new housing starts, were relatively weak. Strict budgetary restraint meant that fiscal policy's role in reinforcing the economy's export-led recovery was slight.

Japan maintained strong growth in 1984 without reviving inflation. Consumer prices showed an average rise of only 2.2 percent, the second lowest annual price increase in 23 years (just behind 1983's 1.9 percent rate). A relatively nonexpansionary monetary policy and weak world commodity prices helped to moderate upward pressures on wholesale prices, which were up just 0.3 percent from the previous year.

The only trouble spots in Japan's economic picture were unemployment--averaging 2.7 percent of the workforce in 1984, the highest figure in 32 years--and business failure rates, which rose 8.8 percent in 1984, mainly in the textiles, construction, and food processing industries. Still, Japan's unemployment rate was the lowest among industrialized countries in 1984.

The yen started 1984 at around Y234:US $\$ 1$ and appreciated to the low 220's by early March. From midyear onward, however, the yen steadily lost strength, closing the year at $\mathrm{Y} 251: \$ 1$, mainly in response to sharply increased capital outflows. The weakness of the yen precluded the use of monetary policy to stimulate the economy. Nevertheless, the money supply expanded about 7 percent in the year and interest rates were relatively low, with the Bank of Japan's discount rate averaging 5 percent and the comercial loan rate 6.25 percent.

## Merchandise trade with the United States

The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with Japan swelled by over 72 percent from 1983 to 1984 and totaled $\$ 34$ billion at yearend. The rapid recovery of demand in the United States and relatively slower economic upturn in Japan were both behind the widening gap, as was the continued strength of the dollar. A 7-percent rise in U.S. shipments to Japan was more than offset by a 38 -percent increase in U.S. imports from Japan. Higher Japanese sales of capital goods, autos, steel, and consumer electronic products contributed to the rise (table 14).
U.S. exports to Japan totaled $\$ 22.7$ billion in 1984. Two agricultural products, corn and soybeans, led the list of items exported by the United States to Japan. (Table B-5) Japan, as well as the other major Far East trading partners, Taiwan and Korea, imported principally agricultural commodities and raw materials from the United States while exporting finished goods.

However, some progress was made by U.S. exporters in marketing manufactured goods in 1984. U.S. exports of machinery and equipment--the leading product sector--rose by more than 8 percent in 1984, accounting for $\$ 5.1$ billion in shipments despite a 33 -percent decline in the value of aircraft sales, usually the most important single item in this category (table B-5). U.S. exports to Japan of computers, power-generating equipment, metalworking equipment, transformers, broadcast and comuunications equipment, automotive parts, and aircraft engines and parts each increased by more than 20 percent in 1984. Food and live animals was the next leading export category, accounting for $\$ 4.7$ billion in shipments in 1984--up 10 percent from 1983. Crude materials followed, at $\$ 4.4$ billion, 6 percent higher than in the previous year. Sharp declines in U.S. shipments of coal, tobacco, and logs and lumber were offset by sizeable increases in sales of inorganic chemicals, steel scrap, raw cotton, and hides and skins.
U.S. imports from Japan jumped by 38 percent in 1984 , to $\$ 57$ billion. Machinery and transportation equipment were by far the largest import categories, accounting for about three-fourths of total U.S. imports (table B-6). At $\$ 42.1$ billion, such purchases were 41 percent higher than in the previous year. Automobiles was the most significant single item in this category, but capital goods--such as business machines, metalworking machinery, electrical machinery, and other transportation equipment--purchases were all up by more than 60 percent in the year. 1/ Manufacturad goods

1/ For a more detailed treatment of U.S. imports of automobiles from Japan, see the discussion under "Autmobiles" later in this sec.
Table 14.--U.S. trade with Japan, by SITC 1/ Numbers (Revision 2), 1982-84


[^60]Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.
classified by chief material was the next leading category, with the value of steel imports alone rising by 63 percent from 1983. Within the miscellaneous manufactures category, imports of scientific, professional, and medical equipment were more than double their 1983 levels, and consumer goods registered a healthy 36 -percent increase as U.S. purchases of video equipment and televisions jumped by more than 60 percent.

## Major Policy Developments Affecting Trade

Japan took several measures in 1984 that may significantly affect the flow of goods, services, and investment capital across its border. In late May, Japan embarked on a campaign to accelerate the integration of its domestic money markets into the world financial system and to speed the deregulation of its domestic capital markets. As a result, Japan lifted some of its interest rate controls and significantly widened the scope for foreign borrowing in Japan. Later in the year, Japan passed legislation that would deregulate its telecomunications market, a step that may open new opportunities to foreign suppliers. This legislation was part of a broader movement to deregulate certain industries in Japan.

## The deregulation movement in Japan

In recent years, Japan has been attempting to reduce Government participation in certain sectors of its economy. This "administrative reform movement" is designed to stimulate growth and efficiency by introducing competition into formerly regulated economic sectors. The first major advance toward this goal was the decision in 1984 to deregulate Japan's telecommunications system and privatize its major domestic phone company, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT). The plan to turn over the distribution and sales of cigarettes from the Government-controlled Japan Tobacco and Salt Monopoly (JTS) to the private sector in 1985 is also part of this movement. Both decisions, and their implications for trade, are discussed below.

## Telecommunications equipment and services

After nearly 3 years of debate, Japan passed three bills on December 20 designed to allow competitors to enter into Japan's telecommunications equipment and services market. The laws passed in 1984 allow entry by private businesses, effective April 1, 1985, into both the data and specialized communications services markets and the market for customer provided equipment--telephones, answering machines, etc. By 1987, the doors will be opened to competitors in Japan's market for regular long distance telephone service.

The legislation eliminates NTT's monopoly in the common carrier market and recasts the giant firm as a semi-public corporation, with two-thirds of its shares to be sold to the public by 1990. $1 /$ Although the reorganized NTT will be limited to offering domestic services, it will be given certain freedom in management that the present NTT lacks. The new NTT will be able to offer data communications services along with telephone and other basic services and will be allowed to invest more freely in related areas of business. This latter freedom will enable the new NTT to create affiliate companies in equipment and services fields. (NTT does not actually produce telecommunications equipment now.)

1/ Initially, more than 50 percent of the new NTT's shares will be Government-held.

Because Japan's telecomunications market is second in size only to that of the United States, the new telecomunications law could potentially open substantial new opportunities to foreign service and equipment suppliers. 1/ However, the terms of such competition will largely be given form in the ministerial ordinances carrying out the NTT break-up. Drafting of these ordinances, expected to be finalized by mid-1985, is being closely monitored by foreign governments to ensure that foreign firms will have fair opportunities to compete. In particular, they want to prevent the creation of administrative barriers--such as unnecessary technical standards, discriminatory certification procedures, or preemptive registration requirements--to selling communications equipment and services in Japan. Japan took steps in 1984 to assuage these concerns and agreed to review implementation of the legislation in three years.

## Cigarettes and other manufactured tobacco products

For many years, foreign firms have been seeking increased access to the $\$ 10$ billion (in 1983) Japanese market for cigarettes and other manufactured tobacco products. Most feel that the primary barrier to foreign penetration has been the presence of a Government monopoly that controls pricing and distribution of cigarettes and other tobacco products, the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation. U.S. producers, who are highly competitive in the world market, only had a 2-percent share of the Japanese cigarette market in 1984.

In August 1984, the Japanese Diet passed legislation that would end the monopoly by JTS over manufactured tobacco sales as of April 1, 1985. (JTS will continue to be the country's sole cigarette manufacturer.) The privatization of JTS could considerably open Japan's market to foreign cigarette suppliers. Once implemented, the measures should end Japanese Government control over distribution, enable foreign firms to independently set prices and marketing strategies, and allow continued expansion of the number of retail outlets permitted to handle imported tobacco products. However, the actual market-opening effect of this legislation will hinge on the manner in which it is implemented. Prices will no longer be set by the Government, but they will still be subject to Ministry of Finance approval. The United States has asked Japan to ensure that the approval process is truly transparent, essentially automatic, and neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.

## Financial market liberalization

In late May, Japan agreed, with U.S. prodding, to adopt a series of measures that will make it easier for foreigners to borrow funds in Japan. The measures are embodied in a jointly written report released on May 29, 1984, by the Japanese Minister of Finance and the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.

1/ Japan is the second largest market in the world for telecomunications equipment, accounting for approximately 9 percent of world consumption and 11 percent of world production. NTT's procurenent comprised about 40 percent of the market in 1983. Until now, imports have played a very small role in Japan's telecomunications equipment market, accounting for only 1.4 percent of consumption in 1983. See Japanese Government "External Economic Measures": the U.S. Government's Assessment of their Implementation and Impact, (U.S. Department of State, for the Senate Foreign Relations Comittee, October 1984, p. 29-30).

In 1983, the United States had strongly urged Japan to relax restrictions on foreign participation in its capital markets and to take steps that would allow the yen to become a more widely used currency. The Reagan Administration felt that such steps could take pressure off the dollar in foreign exchange markets and allow the international financial system to operate more efficiently.

During President Reagan's visit to Tokyo in November 1983, Japan promised to further open its financial system and the two countries created a task force to propose ways to achieve this goal. $1 /$ In six meetings over as many months, the task force developed a set of recommendations to liberalize foreign access to Japan's financial markets. The Report on Yen/Dollar Exchange iate Issu 3 S 2/ presented concrete proposals to widen the number of yen-denominated asset instruments available to foreign and Japanese firms and broaden the availablity of financial instruments carrying market interest rates in Japan. When the report was released, Japan indicated that it would pursue most of the measures outlined over an agreed-upon timeframe. The measures agreed to in May 1984 fall into four categories:
o liberalization of Japanese barriers against the inflow and outflow of capital;
o "internationalization" of the yen;
o equal treatment of foreign financial institutions under Japanese banking and financial regulations; and
o deregulation of domestic Japanese capital markets, allowing more instruments to yield market-determined rather than fixed interest.

Since total saving in Japan has far exceeded total spending in recent years, the measures agreed to in 1984 are likely to result in higher capital outflows from Japan. This outflow is likely to weaken the yen in foreign exchange markets. Despite this possibility, the United States Government believes that removing restrictions will provide important benefits to foreign firms by allowing them to draw more freely on Japan's vast pool of savings. At the same time, Japanese savers will benefit from higher, market-determined yields on their deposits.

1/ The Japanese side believed that the United States could take one step to increase Japanese direct investment in the United States--force the repeal of unitary tax laws in the 12 states that apply them. In response to these concerns, the Secretary of the Treasury submitted a report to the President in June. In the paper, Secretary Regan argued that a State's taxing authority should extend only to the "water's edge," that is, it should not consider income earned by overseas affiliates of parent companies in that state. Several States are considering doing away with their unitary tax laws voluntarily.

2/ Japanese Ministry of Finance-U.S. Department of Treasury Working Group to Japanese Minister of Finace Noboru Takeshita and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan, Report on Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate Issues, May 1984.

## United States-Japanese Bilateral Trade Issues

Although no major ruptures took place, 1984 was a difficult year for United States-Japanese trade relations. Both countries faced significant domestic policy dilemas in the year, and their responses are certain to have wide implications for future bilateral trade flows. Damage control was the watchword as a year of intense trade talks resulted in only three major market-opening measures: the yen-dollar accord signed in late May, Japan's early April decision to liberalize farm imports, and the revision of the bilateral agreement on NTT procurement. After reaching consensus on these issues, the two sides spent much of the year stalemated over proposed Japanese restrictions on foreign sales of satellites and on aspects of proposed laws that would change the terms of competition in Japan's market for computer software and teleconmunications equipment and services. Meanwhile, the United States continued to be concerned about Japan's poor implementation of commitments to open its Government procurement system. Japan was also slow to fulfill its 1983 promise to minimize "red tape" barriers to manufactured imports by giving foreigners easier access to its standards certification system.

Although a good deal of political capital was expended on high technology and financial market issues in 1984, old standbys remained on the agenda, particularly autos, textiles, steel, and electronics. Japanese suppliers were affected by a number of U.S. antidumping, countervailing duty, patent infringement, and escape clause actions. Japanese high-technology electronics firms began to complain in 1984 about disingenuous use of U.S. trade laws to limit their U.S.-bound shipments. However, U.S. industry concern about unfair Japanese trade practices proved justified in some instances. As Table A-6 demonstrates, there were more antidumping orders and findings put into effect against Japanese products in 1984 than against the products of any other country.

Japan took several steps to promote imports in 1984. It lowered tariffs on products of interest to U.S. and developing country exporters and also conducted a number of seminars and buying missions in the United States. But American frustration with slow progress on bilateral issues continued to mount, particularly in light of the burgeoning U.S. trade deficit with Japan. As preparations for a Reagan-Nakasone meeting slated for January 2, 1985 were underway, U.S. trade officials decided to vigorously press Japan in 1985 for more open access to its markets for telecomunications equipment and services, electronics, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and forest products.

## Agriculture

Though U.S. agricultural exports to Japan totaled some $\$ 6.75$ billion in 1984, American farm interests and the U.S. Government believe that they would be even higher were it not for the continued existence of quantitative restrictions and other barriers to imports. Japan has maintained quantitative restrictions on 18 categories of agricultural products for more than 20 years. The United States believes that these restrictions violate GATT accords and has pressed the Japanese Government to remove them. Japan has, in fact, gradually enlarged the quotas, though not at a pace that satisfies the U.S. Government. After 2 years of bilateral debate about the agricultural quotas, Japan finally agreed in 1984 to double its quota allotments for beef and citrus products over a 4 -year period and to ease restrictions on other farm imports.

## Beef and citrus

The most important quantitative restrictions in terms of potential U.S. sales are those on beef and citrus. These quotas remained the major source of tension in 1984. Under a bilateral accord reached in 1979, Japan had raised its quotas on beef, citrus, and citrus juice over a 4-year period. The United States, in turn, waived its right to challenge the quotas and other restrictions on these products in the GATT until the agreement expired on March 31, 1984. As the 4-year period drew to a close, a great deal of tension surrounded the negotiation of a new agreement. Japan had initially wanted a simple extension of the 1979 agreement, but U.S. negotiators sought both a larger increase in the quotas and a commitment by Japan to eventually end all quantitative limits on these products. Tensions were somewhat muted on April 7, 1984, with the signing of a new accord. The new agreement calls for an approximate doubling of the quotas for both categories of products over a 4 -year period (table 15). The two Governments also agreed to continue discussions on further liberalization of Japan's agricultural quotas before April 1987. Liberalizing moves on citrus juice were concluded as well. 1/

Table 15.--Japan's import quotas for beef, oranges, and orange juice, 1984-87
(In metric tons)

| Year | Beef | Oranges | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Orange } \\ & \text { juice } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1984 | 37,700 | 92,500 | 7,000 |
| 1985 | 44,600 | 103,500 | 7,500 |
| 1986 | 51,500 | 114,500 | 8,000 |
| 1987 | 58,400 | 270,500 | 8,500 |

Source: United States Trade Representative.

## Other agricultural products

Bilateral consultations about Japan's other agricultural import quotas began in April 1982. Though Japan made several small expansion offers, they fell far short of U.S. requests. Because of the lack of progress, the United States initiated dispute settlement procedures in the GATT regarding Japan's quotas on 13 categories of agricultural products. 2/ Consultations were held

1/ In addition to expanding the quota, a new blending requirement was put into effect. Half of the orange juice imported under the quota may now be blended with Japanese juice at a rate of up to 90 percent imported juice and the other half may be blended at up to 50 percent imported juice. Previously, orange juice products in Japan could only contain 50 percent imported juice.

2/ The United States is seeking elimination of 13 quotas--those on preserved milk and cream; processed cheese; dried leguminous vegetables; provisionally preserved oranges and tangerines; starch and inulin; unroasted peanuts for human consumption; prepared and preserved beef and pork in airtight containers; grape sugar and other sugar; fruit paste and puree; canned pineapple and fruit pulp; noncitrus juices; tomato sauce and ketchup; and other food preparations.
in July 1983 and again in September 1983, but were subsequently put on hold to await the outcome of the beef and citrus discussions. On June 29, 1984, the United States announced that it was dropping its GATT case for 2 years in exchange for certain measures by the Governnent of Japan. These measures included elimination of quotas on 5 categories of products; $1 /$ expansion of quotas on 4 other products; 2/ and lowering of tariffs on 32 products. 3/

## NTT procurement

In early 1984, the United States and Japan renewed the bilateral agreement on NTT procurement. The new agreement will be in effect for 3 years and will be reviewed each year in April. 4/

The revised agreement reaffirms Japan's commitment to open NTT's sizeable purchases to U.S. exporters, while strengthening that commitment in a number of ways. Among the improvements incorporated into the revised agreement are conmitments by NTT to treat United States and Japanese firms on an equal basis in all of NTT's R\&D activities; to accept bids in English at NTT's New York office; and to aggregate purchases so as to make them comercially attractive to foreign suppliers. The new agreement also mandates annual reviews of NTT's implementation.

High technology
U.S. concern about Japanese industrial policy was reinforced in 1984, as Japan threatened to limit foreign participation in three potentially lucrative high-technology sectors: communications satellites, computer software, and telecomunications equipment and services.

## Communications satellites

Japan had placed restrictions on imports of communications satellites in 1983 in an effort to promote the development of its own industry. The United States--Japan's leading foreign supplier of communications satellites--was alarmed by the Japanese ban, since U.S. makers stood to lose substantial revenues if the ban was enforced. The United States, therefore, demanded the ban's withdrawal, arguing that it was inconsistent with Japan's obligations

1/ Quotas were eliminated as of Apr. 1, 1984, on hi-test molasses and other sugars; selected noncitrus fruit purees, pastes, pulps, and juices; and various other food preparations containing less than 50 percent added sugar. Import quotas on prepared and preserved pork will be eliminated on Apr. 1, 1985, while quotas on grapefruit juice will be eliminated on Apr. 1, 1986.

2/ The products were tomato ketchup and sauce, peanuts, processed cheese, and corned beef.

3/ Twenty of these cuts were new tariff reductions while the remaining 12 cuts were accelerations of the final Tokyo Round tariff reductions.

4/ The first United States-Japan Agreement on Telecommanications Procurement went into effect on Jan. 31, 1981. A three-track system for foreign bidding was set up, calling for open bidding for simple parts, negotiated bidding for more complex equipment, and use of a more transparent process to designate suppliers of items developed jointly with NTT. During the first 3-year agreement, which expired in December 1983, U.S. sales to NTT increased from a negligible level to about $\$ 140$ million in 1983. Despite this growth, U.S. firms supplied just 4.5 percent of the products procured by NTT in 1983.
and economic stature. Japan countered that the action was within its sovereign rights and did not violate international agreements--the National Space Development Agency, the principal purchaser of communications satellites in Japan, is not covered by the GATT Government Procurement Code or the bilateral NTT accord. Thus, Japan felt it was not obliged to open the agency's contracts to foreign suppliers.

On April 27, 1984, the Japanese Government, in response to U.S. pressure, said that private firms would be allowed to purchase foreign-made satellites when NTT deregulation bills passed the Diet. (Until that time, only the Government was allowed to offer satellite services, so it continued to be the sole purchaser of communications satellites in Japan.) Government agencies, including the privatized NTT, would only be allowed to buy foreign satellites if such purchases were consistent with Japan's space development "vision." The Science and Technology Agency's, "Long Range Vision on Space Development," issued in July 1983, had identified the space industry as crucial to Japan's future technological development.

However, the statement did little to allay U.S. fears. The vague wording of the April policy pronouncement, together with the caveat that imports must be consistent with a satellite industry promotion plan, served to reinforce U.S. concerns about being closed out of the Japanese Government market. The United States has officially requested clarification of the April statement, but the Japanese Government has not yet responded. In the meantime, several private consortia are being formed in Japan to offer satellite services. Host have indicated interest in buying U.S. satellites, but under the new telecomnunications regime, private firms will not be allowed to offer satellite services until 1987.

## Computer software

The United States Government was very concerned in 1984 about a proposal under consideration by the Japanese Government that would change the legal protection for computer software in Japan. At present, the rights of computer software developers in Japan are protected by copyright laws. The legislation under consideration would protect computer software using patent concepts. Developers would have fewer rights under the proposed law; the length of time that software developers would retain sole distribution and other rights would be cut drastically; and they would have to reveal more proprietary information to secure even these limited rights. The U.S. Government is concerned about the proposals since adequate protection of computer software is of profound importance to the competitive and financial strength of U.S. computer companies.

The United States Government believes that only legislation that bases computer software protection on copyright concepts can adequately protect the rights of software developers. Since the Japanese proposal is fashioned after patent law, the United States is opposed to it per se.

The United States is also opposed to some of the specific clauses of the Japanese proposal that would limit developer's rights. For example, the

Japanese Government would be given the authority to force software developers to license their software. Software developers would thus lose control over the distribution of their programs, possibly undermining their ability to recoup development costs. (The Japanese Government claims that developers would receive fair compensation, but the U.S. side remains unconvinced of the propriety of this system.) Other clauses would shorten the term of protection from the current 50 years to 2 to 15 years, require registration of software, and require submission of actual programs to the Government. U.S. firms are concerned that the contents of these submissions might help competing Japanese companies gain technical and proprietary information.

After much international and some domestic opposition, the proposal was withdrawn from consideration in late 1984. However, some forces in the Japanese Government apparently believe that changes in the law are needed to help Japanese computer companies catch up. The United States is therefore concerned that changes in Japanese software protection laws may still be implemented.

## Telecomunications equipment and services

The deregulation of Japan's telecomunications market discussed earlier should expand opportunities for U.S. investors in Japan's telecomunications services market and, by increasing competition in Japan's telecommunications equipment market, create new opportunities for U.S. suppliers. Nevertheless, the United States has several specific concerns about how the break-up will work:
(a) whether the new NTT will continue to honor the bilateral agreement on NTT procurement;
(b) whether U.S. firms will be able to compete freely in Japan's newly deregulated markets for long-distance and specialized communications services, value-added networks or VAN's; 1/
(c) whether Japanese customers will be free to purchase telecommunications equipment (phones, modems, answering machines, etc.) from foreign suppliers; and
(d) how such equipment will be certified as being in conformity with Japan's product standards.

1/ A value-added network is a private network that uses part of the public network. In a value-added network, customer-owned equipment, combined with lines leased from the public telecomunications system, is enhanced with the addition of data processing capabilities, such as FAX or long-distance services.

The Ministry of Posts and Telecomunications (MPT) has considerable regulatory power over the Japanese market for telecommunications services. 1/ The United States believes that the competitiveness of U.S. firms will depend very heavily on how MPT interprets its regulatory authority. U.S. negotiators have emphasized the importance of registration and notification procedures that are transparent, cbjective, and nondiscriminatory. It also would like assurances that business plans submitted for registration purposes will be treated in confidence, and that such applications are handled promptly. In an April 1984 announcement, the Japanese Government promised to ensure that registration and notification procedures would be simple and transparent. Foreign interests also want to obtain reasonable assurances that the new NTT will not be allowed to use revenues gained in the common carrier market to subsidize ventures in other segments of the telecommunications industry. The Japanese Government has promised to take steps to ensure fair competition between the privatized NTT and other telecomunications firms.

MPT will also be responsible for developing standards for computers, terminals, and other equipment to be connected to a telecommunications network. 2/ All such equipment must then be certified as being in conformity with these standards by entities designated by MPT. MPT is currently in the process of drafting the technical standards for telecommnications equipment and deciding which testing entities will be allowed to certify conformity with them.


#### Abstract

The United States has two concerns about the proposed equipment standards. The first is the number and kinds of standards proposed by Japan for such equipment. The Japanese Government has suggested that some equipment may have to meet up to 60 different quality and performance standards. The United States believes that this will pose a significant and unnecessary stumbling block to foreign sales in Japan. However, it has thus far been unsuccessful in its attempts to convince Japan that "harm to the system" should be the sole criteria used to judge whether equipment may be attached to


[^61]the telecommunications network (as in the United States). 1/ Japan maintains that some of the standards it is imposing are needed to maintain the overall quality of telephone services.

The second U.S. concern has to do with Japan's proposed procedures for certifying telecomunications equipment as being in conformity with Government standards. At one point, it appeared that an industry trade association would be given the task of testing and certifying telecomunications equipment. U.S. suppliers feared that an industry organization composed of its Japanese competitors could effectively lock them out of the market. The United States has asked Japan to set up one truly independent testing entity, such as the Federal Communications Commission in the United States, to conduct these tests. Furthermore, equipment may have to receive up to five different certification marks, including ones from NTT, MITI, and the industry association. Obtaining these marks would be extremely time-consuming and costly.

## Automobiles

Automobiles were the leading U.S. imporl from Japan in 1984, accounting for nearly one-fourth of the value of total U.S. imports in the year. Voluntary restraints continued to be applied to Japanese shipments in 1984. The restraints had been sought by the U.S. Government in 1981 so that the U.S. industry would have time to adjust to intensified Japanese competition. An initial restraint that limited exports of autos to 1.68 million units in Japanese fiscal year 1981 was extended in 1982 and again in 1983. The restraints are administered by the Japanese Government, and in fiscal year 1984, Japanese shipments were capped at 1.85 million units (plus a ceiling of 90,848 units for "Jeep-type" vehicles). 2/

1/ The phone system in the United States is the world's largest computer. It employs digital coding, electronic transmission, and packet switching to transmit voice and data signals between millions of households and businesses around the country. "Harm to the system" was the criteria developed by AT\&T in the United States when the markel for the supply of interconnect equipment, or equipment attached to the phone network (phones, answering machines, modems, computer terminals, etc.), was opened to competition in 1979. Standards for interconnect equipment in the United States were to be designed to make sure that equipment attached to the phone network would not cause harm to the overall system. The concept of "harm to the system" encompassed three essential criteria: (1) that equipment attached to the network should not cause physical damage to it (burning wires or connectors, etc.); (2) that equipment attached to the phone network should not cause the network to malfunction (e.g., by distorting signals); and (3) that equipment attached to the system should not cause interference to other users of the system. The United States Government asked Japan to use this frame of reference when drafting standards for interconnect equipment.

2/ "Jeep-like" vehicles were set at 82,500 during FY 1981-83.

The restraints have limited Japanese imports. In 1984, actual imports from Japan were 1.95 million units or 18.4 percent of the U.S. market (table 16). I/ In 1983, auto imports from Japan totaled 1.87 million units and accounted for 20 percent of the U.S. market. In 1980 , the year prior to the restraints being imposed, Japanese producers had a 22.4 percent share of America's car market.

Table 16.--U.S. imports of Japanese automobiles, 1981-84

| Category | 1981 |  | 1982 | : | 1983 |  | 1984 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| - |  |  |  | . |  |  |  |
| Quantity----------million units--: | 1.91 |  | 1.80 | . | 1.87 |  | 1.95 |
| Value, actual----million dollars--: | 9,491 |  | 9,608 |  | 10,756 |  | 12,349 |
| U.S. Market share---------percent--: | 22.3 |  | 23.7 |  | 20.0 |  | 18.4 |
| Average unit value-------dollars--: | 4,969 |  | 5,337 |  | 5,751 |  | 6,332 |
| : |  | : |  | : |  |  |  |

Source: Compiled from two U.S. International Trade Commission reports: "U.S. auto industry: U.S. factory sales, retail sales, exports, imports, apparent consumption, suggested retail prices and trade balances with selected countries for motor vehicles," USITC Publication 1585, September 1984, and "The U.S. Auto Industry: Monthly Report on Selected Economic Indicators," USITC Publication 1650 February 1985.

The restraints have also affected car prices. In a February 1985 report, the U.S. International Trade Comission estimated that retail prices of Japanese cars were from 17 percent to 35 percent higher than they would have been absent restraints. 2/ The study also suggested that U.S. car manufacturers benefitted from the restraints in terms of higher profits and greater sales: profits for U.S. makers rose to a record $\$ 9.8$ billion in 1984 and sales for U.S. automakers were about 8 percent higher during the restraint period than they would have been otherwise. The study indicated that u.S. automakers used the restraint period to improve their operating efficiency by cutting costs, scrapping excess capacity, and improving distribution networks.

## Steel

Japan, which accounted for nearly one--fourth of the United States' imports of steel in 1984 and was, therefore, among the countries most affected by the 1984 U.S. decision to restrict steel imports until 1990. 3/ Steel was one of the leading U.S. imports from Japan in 1984 and the value of U.S. purchases was up by more than 60 percent from the previous year.

1/ The discrepancy between the announced voluntary limits and actual imports can be attributed to the difference between fiscal and annual years, and the fact that the quota is based on Japanese exports as opposed to U.S. imports. Japan also defines autos differently. For example, jeeps, four wheel drive station wagons, and vehicles such as the Subaru "Brat" are not considered automobiles for quota purposes.

2/ U.S. International Trade Commission, "A Review of Recent Developments in the U.S. Auto Industry Including an Assessment of the Japanese Voluntary Restraint Agreements," USITC Publication 1648, February, 1985.'

3/ For more information, see sec. on safeguard actions in chaps. I and V.

In December 1984, the United States concluded arrangements with seven steel-exporting countries, including Japan, which provided each country with a limited fixed share of the U.S. steel market. Japan agreed to restrict its share of the U.S. finished steel market to 5.8 percent.

However, the two sides continued to haggle over the specific terms of the restraint agreement. Japan wanted the restraints to be embodied in a year-to-year renewable agreement, with annual reviews to examine changes in market demand and industry performance. It also wanted the flexibility to decide the mix of products to be shipped within its 5.8 -percent market share. The United States preferred an agreement with rigid limits on shipments of each product. It also wanted the agreement to be retroactive to October 1 , 1984 (i.e., to count all shipments since that time against the first year quota), and to remain in effect for 5 years without reviews or revisions. The two countries remained far apart on the specifics of the restraint agreement at yearend.

## Other bilateral issues

The United States and Japan held discussions in 1984 on a number of other trade issues. High Japanese tariffs on certain products, cumbersome testing and paperwork needed to receive regulatory approval in Japan for products subject to industrial standards, quotas on leather, and closed Government procurement were key U.S. concerns. Japan was concerned with U.S. restrictions on imports of machine tools imposed for national security reasons.

## Tariffs

Although Japan has the lowest average tariff rate in the industrialized world 1/, Japanese tariffs on some manufactured and agricultural products remain high, inhibiting penetration of the Japanese market by competitive foreign products. Japan has unilaterally reduced its tariffs in each of the five "packages" of trade liberalizing measures announced since December 1981.

On April 27, 1984, the Japanese Government announced it would reduce or eliminate tariffs on 31 industrial items, such as color photographic film, kraft paper, and wine. Japan also proposed advanced implementation by 2 years of its scheduled Tokyo Round reductions on 1,130 industrial products, if the European Community and the United States would do likewise. It later decided to unilaterally advance the MTN tariff cuts by two years as of April 1, 1985.

The April 1984 tariff reductions will reduce tariffs on several items of interest to the United States, including photographic film, farm machinery, and alcoholic beverages. In total, 25 of the 31 manufactured products on the reduction list are of interest to the United States. In 1983, these items accounted for roughly $\$ 500$ million of U.S. exports to Japan. The United States is still asking Japan to reduce its tariffs on other products, including forest products, aluminum, aramid fiber, grapefruit, walnuts, and wine.

1/ Its average ad valorem tariff rate is 2.5 percent, compared to the European Community's average rate of 2.6 percent and an average rate of 3.2 percent for the United States.

## Standards

U.S. companies have complained for some time about the way regulatory requirements, particularly product standards, are drawn up and enforced in Japan. Makers of medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and other manufactured goods suggested that such practices often act to their disadvantage. In response to these concerns, Japan made major revisions in its standards process in 1983, but the revisions have not yet benefited a significant number of U.S. firms. 1/

The United States has since asked Japan to allow foreign testing agencies such as Underwriters Laboratories to become official testing agents, or "designated entities," for the Japanese Government. The United States feels that such a step would allay concerns by some U.S. suppliers about subjecting their production facilities to outside scrutiny, minimize the language problems frequently encountered in working through Japanese testing entities, and lower the costs of using the simpler process adopted in 1983. Toward this goal, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry approved two U.S. testing firms to conduct factory inspections for American suppliers in 1984. In addition, the Ministry of Health and Welfare has approved one U.S. testing firm to test food products, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries also approved a U.S. organization for grading and labeling U.S. exports.

The United States has also expressed interest in having U.S. and other foreign technical experts participate in the standards-drafting process in Japan. Standards are frequently first drafted by private trade associations in Japan and then adopted as regulations by the Japanese Government. Japan has expressed some willingness to allow foreigners to take part in these activities. However, they have thus far played a minor role in the drafting process. 2/

## Leather

Japan continues to maintain quantitative restrictions on both semifinished and finished leather products. The United States believes that it could sell Japan more manufactured leather products if quotas were removed. U.S. negotiators have pursued liberalization of Japan's leather

1/ Products that are subject to official standards in Japan are generally approved by the Government using a two-step regulatory process: first, a producer's factory is inspected and registered; and second, sample products are tested and approved. These steps are often conducted by quasi-Governmental bodies called "designated entities." Revisions to Japan's standards certification laws in 1983 established the legal basis for foreign companies to use the two-step approval process in Japan. Before 1983, a different--and in many foreign producers' views, disadvantageous--set of procedures was used to certify imported goods. Foreign products were frequently subject to expensive and time-consuning dockside or lot inspection, a process that foreign suppliers believed was much more cumbersome than the relatively simple two-step process used for domestically produced goods.

2/ One reason for the lack of participation is that they are not fully apprised of drafting activities taking place. To help get around this problem, MITI issued a list of 250 standards-drafting activities that would result in official "Japanese Industrial Standards" (JIS) in July 1984 and circulated it to interested American experts.
quotas in the GATT several times since 1979. In 1983, the United States formally requested the formation of a dispute panel under article XXIII of the GATT .

In mid-March 1984, the GATT panel concluded that the quota restrictions were inconsistent with Japan's obligations under the General Agreement and thereby nullified and impaired U.S. rights. The GATT subsequently suggested that Japan progressively eliminate its import restrictions. The United States has asked the GATT to monitor closely Japan's steps to liberalize its leather import system. Japan agreed to abolish its 15 -percent tariff on wet blue chrome leather by April 1, 1985. It also agreed to allocate import quotas so that importers requests for quota allotments would be fully met and to make public the size of the leather quota. To date, however, Japan has not said it will eliminate its quota restrictions.

## Government procurement

The United States Government maintains that Japanese government procurement has remained essentially closed to U.S. and other foreign suppliers, despite Japan's accession to the GATT Government Procurement Code and numerous promises to purchase more from overseas suppliers. Japan opens a relatively small percentage of its procurement to bidding under the Code, and of that procurement, more than half is ultimately awarded on a noncompetitive basis. The U.S. Government formally sought consultations with Japan on this matter in 1984 under the auspices of the Code. 1/

## Machine tools

Japan's rapidly rising sales of numerically-controlled machine tools in the United States have been the topic of bilateral trade talks for several years. Japan is the leading foreign supplier of machine tools to the United States and the U.S. government has grown concerned about the substantial and growing share of U.S. machine tool consumption accounted for by imports. In 1984, the Department of Commerce completed an investigation under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 on metal-cutting and -forming machine tools. The investigation was begun in order to determine whether the increased role of imports in the U.S. economy posed a threat to the national security. Although the Secretary of Commerce submitted the investigations findings to the President on February 27, 1984, at the close of year, the President still had not acted on the report. The President could restrict imports of machine tools if he believed that such action were necessary to safeguard the national security.

## MEXICO

## The Economic Situation in 1984

Mexico made an impressive recovery from its 1982 debt crisis in both 1983 and 1984, especially in the area of international economic performance. After declining more than 5 percent in 1983, its GDP expanded at an estimated 3.5 percent in 1984. Petroleum production in 1984 was about the same as in 1983. Agriculture, chemicals, in-bond industries and nondurable consumer

[^62]goods were the principal contributors to growth. The subject year was the second in the 3 -year economic adjustment program Mexico was required to implement in exchange for financial support by the IMF.

The second-largest debtor in the world (after Brazil), Mexico has an estimated foreign debt of $\$ 96$ billion. In 1984, repayment obligations for one-half of this debt were restructured, giving Mexico some latitude to strengthen its domestic economy. Nonetheless, with oil revenues reduced by softening prices and its budget still not adequately controlled, Mexico was compelled to continue its austerity regime. 1/

Mexico's estimated budget deficit in 1984 amounted to 6.9 percent of the GDP. This was more than the IMF-stipulated budget deficit of 5.5 percent for the year, but a sharp drop from the 18 percent in 1982 and the 8.7 percent in 1983. Inflation slowed from 80 percent in 1983 to 59 percent in 1984.

In 1984, Mexico maintained a positive balance on current account for the second consecutive year and a positive trade balance for the third. Because imports rebounded from their very low level of 1983 , the trade surplus of $\$ 13.5$ billion was somewhat lower than the $\$ 14.5$ billion surplus of 1983 .

Having precipitated a global financial crisis in August 1982, $2 /$ Mexico subsequently impressed the world with its responsible attitude as a debtor. The trade and current payment surpluses attained by Mexico in 1983 and 1984 created a favorable climate for renegotiating the terms of its foreign debt.

In September 1984, Mexican officials and a 13-member bank steering committee representing Mexico's biggest foreign commercial creditors reached a tentative debt restructuring agreement covering one-half of the country's estimated $\$ 96$ billion overall foreign debt. 3/ The accord, a multiyear agreement, was a radical departure from the 1 -year foreign debt agreements previously negotiated since the debt crisis. It was agreed that payments of Mexico's $\$ 48.7$ billion public debt to commercial banks 4/ falling due between 1985 and 1990 would be stretched out over 14 years. The new maturities are expected to reduce Mexico's debt-service ratio from a projected 74 percent to less than 50 percent.

The rescheduled part of public debt consists of (1) $\$ 23.6$ billion of outstanding balances that originally fell due between 1982 and 1984, but had been rescheduled in 1982 and 1983 , (2) $\$ 20.1$ billion of outstanding balances that fell due between 1985 and 1990 but were not rescheduled, and (3) a

[^63]post-crisis loan of $\$ 5$ billion granted in 1983. The loan agreement also saves Mexico significant amounts of interest payments by linking interest rates to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) rather than to the U.S. prime rate, which is generally higher.

It is believed that the new debt payment accord will free Mexico after 1985 from complying with the restrictive IMF conditions imposed. Mexico's rigorous 3-year economic stabilization program was put in force in 1983 as a condition for credit authorization by the IMF $1 /$ and will expire at the end of 1985. Nonetheless, creditor banks will be entitled to receive information related to Mexico's financial and economic developments.

## Merchandise Trade with the United States

Table 17 shows that the U.S. merchandise trade balance with Mexico in 1984 was negative for the third consecutive year. However, at $\$ 6.3$ billion, the U.S. deficit compared favorably with the $\$ 7.9$ billion recorded a year earlier. Until 1981, the United States traditionally had a merchandise trade surplus with Mexico. U.S. exports to Mexico in 1984 amounted to $\$ 11.5$ billion, up 31 percent over 1983. U.S. imports from Mexico totaled $\$ 17.8$ billion, up 6.9 percent.

Mexico continued to be the fourth largest single market for U.S. goods in 1984, after Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Table B-7 shows that the growth of exports during the year was led by machinery and transportation items. U.S. shipments in this category rebounded to their 1982 level following a sharp decline in 1983. As in earlier years, auto parts led the list of specific export items to Mexico, with sales soaring during the year. Substantial increases were also recorded in shipments of electronic components and electrical equipment. Many of these were for Mexico's in-bond plants to assemble products that are later returned to the United States. Chemical exports were also up, replacing food as the second largest category of overall exports to Mexico. Larger shipments of oilseeds (mostly soybeans) and hides and skin contributed to the rise in exports of crude materials, the third leading category of U.S. exports to Mexico in 1984.

Mexico ranked third as a source of U.S. imports in 1984, behind Canada and Japan. However, the overall value of imports was kept relatively low by the declining value of its largest component, mineral fuels. Mexican crude oil shipments to the United States were down in both volume and value. Nonetheless, crude oil remained the top item imported from that country, dwarfing shipments of all others. Table B- 8 shows imports in this section dropped 8.3 percent, to $\$ 7.8$ billion, though they were still responsible for 44 percent of overall imports from Mexico. U.S. imports of Mexican natural gas also dropped precipitously. Effective November 1, 1984, Mexico suspended its gas exports to the United States over a disagreement on price.

1/ Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th report, 1983, p. 282.
Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.

Manufactured imports from Mexico were up in all major categories, also reflecting the effect of Mexico's effort to target manufactures as major export earners. I/ Other causes were the strong dollar and the vigorous economy of the United States, which generated demand for imports overall. Imports of machinery and transportation equipment, the second leading category of overall imports from Mexico, soared--increasing 32 percent. Automobile parts, telecommunication equipment, and office machines were the leading items in the category. Most of these imports entered the United States under TSUS items 808.30 and 807.00 , thus the United States levies duty only on the value added in Mexico. 2/

Table 18 shows imports from Mexico under TSUS iLems 806.30 and 807.00 in 1982-84. Items entering under TSUS 807.00 continued to rise as a share of overall U.S. imports from Mexico, accounting for 22.2 percent of the total in 1983 and 26.9 percent in 1984.

Table 18.--U.S. imports from Mexico entered under TSUS items 806.30 and 807.00 , 1982-84


Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Imports of food--the third major category from Mexico--were virtually unchanged from 1983. Coffee, shellfish, and vegetables continued to be the leading items in this group.

[^64]As a developing country, Mexico is also a beneficiary of the GSP program of the United States. In 1984, GSP imports from Mexico were valued at $\$ 1$ billion, or 6.2 percent of total U.S. imports from Mexico. Mexico fared best among all the advanced beneficiary countries in terms of the annual GSP product review. Of the 22 new products that were added to the GSP product list for all beneficiaries, 12 were positive responses to petitions by Mexico. Various colored or special glass items accounted for the bulk of these newly eligible products. Moreover, no items from Mexico were summarily graduated from the GSP list in 1984. $1 /$

## Major Policy Developments Affecting Trade

PRONAFICE, the Mexican Government's current medium-term economic and trade policy, is spelled out principally in the National Industrial Promotion and Foreign Trade Program. This progran was presented by President de la Madrid in July 1984. Covering 1984 through 1988, PRONAFICE provides guidelines for the restructuring of Mexico's industry as a complement to the country's National Development Plan (PND) released in 1983. To minimize the country's current account deficit, PND set a goal of real annual growth of the GDP for 1983-88 at 5 to 6 percent and of growth in manufacturing at 7 to 8 percent. $2 /$

Unlike prior economic programs, PRONAFICE links industrial development and foreign trade together in one plan. This plan clearly reflects the high priority Mexico accords to export-oriented production. Industrial production linked to exports is targeted for the highest rate of annual growth ( 7.6 to 9 percent), followed by production linked to import substitution (7.3 to 8.6 percent). The largest segment of manufactures, which least depends on foreign supplies and markets, is targeted to grow at the slowest pace ( 6.6 to 7.7 percent.)

In 1984, the Government took new steps that affect foreign trade and investment. The Government's measures in the area of exchange rates, foreign investment, comprehensive regulations issued for the pharmaceutical industry, and new regulations for the automotive industry are discussed below.

## Exchange rate policy

The international value of the Mexican peso continued to erode in 1984. Official daily devaluations added up to 32 percent by the end of the year--substantially less than the 59-percent annual inflation rate. In December 1984, the Government accelerated the peso's depreciation to make exports more competitive and arrest renewed capital flight from the country. The Government raised the currency's daily depreciation rate, which had been 13 centavos since September 1983, to 17 centavos. 3/ Analysts and exporters, who considered the peso overvalued, had been urging the Government to take this step for some time.

[^65]For the first 9 months of 1983, the peso remained largely stable; then began its controlled "creeping devaluation" in September, continuing at an accelerated rate from December 1984, as stated. 1/ By the end of 1984, when the peso began to depreciate at an accelerated rate, it traded at about 206 pesos to the U.S. dollar.

## Foreign investment regulations

In 1984, the Government continued to emphasize interest in attracting direct foreign investment. Nonetheless, in his annual State of the Nation address in September 1984, President de la Madrid defined the role of foreign investment in these words:
"Foreign investment must continue to be viewed as a complement to domestic investment. We will ensure that the saving and entrepreneurial talent of Mexico provide the fundamental and sustaining force for investment and growth."

Regulations of entire industries with large foreign ownership continued in 1984, despite the possible adverse effect on foreign investment and trade. The automotive decree of October 1983 2/ was followed by decrees regulating the pharmaceutical industry in February and October 1984. The Government proceeded with these steps despite strong opposition from the United States and other foreign governments on behalf of their corporate investors. 3/

While the Government claims that its foreign investment policy is flexible, foreign interests view it as vague, with unclear rules. This perception of the Government's control of prices, exchange rates, and industrial operations and Mexico's recession have created a deteriorating investment climate in the country. Foreign investment inflows, which had increased through 1981, have subsequently abated.

Mexico has followed the policy of "Mexicanization"--majority control of investments by Mexican nationals--since the early $1920^{\prime}$ s, even though from time to time it made some effort to attract foreign capital into the country. 4/

[^66]In February 1984, Mexico's Minister of Commerce and Industry (SECOFIN) published a detailed list of industries in which majority participation of foreign partners might be authorized under specified conditions. The designated industries are predominantly in production areas such as heavy machinery, transportation equipment, electronic equipment, high technology, and chemicals and in service areas such as hotels. The selection was based on these industries' ability to bring needed technology and know-how into the country, their requirement for a large investment per enployee, and their high export potential. The February guidelines also indicated that, through incentives, new investment of existing foreign ventures would be channelled into geographic priority zones, and that modernization of plant and better use of local inputs would be accorded priority treatment. The February regulations were followed in August by technical provisions that facilitate onerous administrative requirements for foreign investors.

## Regulation of the pharmaceutical industry

In February 1984, the Govermment issued a decree regulating the foreign-dominated pharmaceutical industry and followed this with implementing regulations in October. The Government used these regulatory procedures to stave off domestic political pressures calling for the nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry.

The decree was designed to make the Mexican pharmaceutical industry more self-sufficient by increasing the contribution of Mexican-owned laboratories--especially in the manufacturing of active ingredients. $\mathbf{1}^{\prime}$ Another objective of the decree was to increase the supply of low-cost drugs. In this context, it mandates generic labeling of some 500 basic retail drugs, calls for uniform pricing of generic drugs of equivalent value, and sets stringent price controls for a group of essential medicines. 2/

Some 70 active ingredients (antibiotics, fermentation derivatives, and synthetic products) are singled out for priority development, with the objective of import substitution. Domestic laboratories are given preferential financing, research and development funds, and tax and other economic incentives. Also, the domestic laboratories are to be favored in Government procurement of basic drugs.

The decree places a variety of requirements on all drug companies. They must now purchase at least 20 percent of their raw materials from domestic sources and elevate this level to 50 percent within 3 to 5 years. The companies are also urged to export a substantial share of their production and make a net contribution to the balance of payments. 3/ Enforcement of this provision is expected to give the industry a positive trade balance by 1988.

1/ Price Waterhouse, Doing Business in Mexico, 1984, p. 5.
2/ Ibid.
3/ Business Week, Apr. 30, 1984, p. 54.

The Mexican pharmaceutical industry is currently dominated by some 75 foreign companies. Foreign companies, mostly from the United States, reportedly supply 72 percent of Mexico's drug market. As a result of their major implications for Mexico's foreign trade and investment, these regulations caused a conflict between Mexico and foreign governments (e.g., the United States, West Germany, and Switzerland). Foreign corporations in Mexico complained that the new decree generally interferes with their ability to respond to market forces. For example, controlled prices provided for in the decree fail to reflect the cost of research and development that went into a product. Most important, foreign companies pointed out that the regulation discriminated against them in terms of production rights, benefits from subsidies, performance requirements, and opportunities to obtain Government contracts.

In response, the Government pointed out that many of the items in dispute will not be available from Mexican firms for some time; thus substantial purchases will still be made from multinational drug companies. In the implementing regulations issued in October, the Government removed some of the most discriminatory features of its February decree, but many contentious issues still remain. 1/

## Regulation of the automotive industry

In August 1984, the Mexican Government published the implementing regulations for its most recent automotive decree, which was issued in September 1983. 2/ The new regulations strengthened some provisions of the 1983 decree and demonstrated resolve to implement the controversial measure. 3/

The implementing regulations issued in 1984 contained measures that had not yet been provided for in the 1983 decree. They include provisions regulating the domestic content of new automotive products in conjunction with minimal export requirements. For example, a new product line developed exclusively for export would face minimum local content requirements of only 0 to 29 percent. Meanwhile, another line of which less than 60 percent was intended for exports would be subject to a local content requirement as high as 50 percent. 4/

1/'On Apr. 3, 1985, the Mexican Government announced more meaningful modifications of the pharmaceutical decree, which involved easing some of its most controversial measures, including price controls and mandatory replacement of trademarks with generic labels.

2/ Operation of the U.S. Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, p. 295.
3/ See also Operation of the U.S. Trade Agreements Program, 34th Report, 1982, p. 209. The automotive decree of 1983 was preceded by other automotive regulations aimed at developing the domestic industry and Mexico's automotive trade balance. The first Mexican automotive decree was issued in 1962 and later amended in 1972 and 1977. These regulations provided for improving the automotive trade balance by both import substitution and export promotion. The Government tried to raise the domestic content of Mexican products by forcing automakers to assemble cars locally for the Mexican market. The 1983 decree was groundbreaking in its efforts to remedy the inefficiencies of the Mexican auto industry through restricting the number of product lines for manufacturers. This decree also provided for detailed, rigorous "local content" (the ratio of Mexican "value added" to "total output") requirements through 1987.

4/ Business Latin America, Oct. 24, 1984, p. 338.

The regulations of 1984 also strive to assure the development of a local auto parts industry, including engines. They provide that by 1986 at least 50 percent of the domestic content required of a given production line must be Mexican auto parts. 1/

## United States-Mexican Bilateral Trade Issues

In 1984, the United States continued to press Mexico for more open trade and investment policies, while Mexico proceeded to combine its export promotion drive with protection of domestic markets. Little progress was made toward resolving a number of contentious issues between the two countries.

Mexico is not a member of the GATT, and it does not have an equivalent bilateral accord of a broad scope with the United States. 2/ Mexican subsidies and resultant countervailing by the United States continued to be the biggest problem in bilateral relations. This matter has strained bilateral relations since 1982 and has been the principal obstacle to a comprehensive United States-Mexican trade accord. Negotiations nonetheless progressed to mutual comitments by the spring of 1984, when Mexico was ready to phase out certain subsidies and the United States was ready to apply the so-called "injury test" in making countervailing duty determinations. 3/ An injury test makes it more difficult for U.S. producers to obtain countervailing action by the U.S. Government. 4/ As a result, since 1982 the U.S. Government processed a comparatively large number of countervailing duty cases filed by U.S. companies against imports from Mexico. On December 31, 1984, 11 countervailing duty orders were in effect against Mexican products, such as steel, bricks, cement, ceramic tile, chemicals, wearing apparel, and lime. 5/

A potential source of future disputes was averted, at least temporarily, when a House version of what is now the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 was introduced that would have amended current U.S. countervailing duty law by including national resources' subsidies within the definition of countervailable actions. This provision was stricken from the legislation during conference. The change could have affected certain 1983 decisions not

1 / Ibid.
2/ On Apr. 23, 1985, when the United States and Mexico signed an agreement on subsidies and countervailing, they also announced to shortly begin to negotiate a general commercial agreement. Such an agreement could cover issues such as tariff and nontariff barriers to mutual trade and investments and the establishment of regular consultation procedings.

3/ The signing of a subsidies' agreement was, however, held up at the time until it was signed on Apr. 23, 1985.

4/ Because Mexico was not a signatory of the GATT Subsidies code, until the April 1985 signing of a subsidies' agreement, its products had not been entitled to an injury test under U.S. countervailing duty law. A determination by the Department of Commerce that subsidies were applied to Mexican exports resulted automatically in the imposition of countervailing duties; such action was not tied to demonstrated injury of a U.S. industry as required under the subsidies code.

5/ See table A-8.
to levy countervailing duties on imports of ammonia, cement, and carbon black from Mexico. 1/ These cases were based on clains of U.S. producers that, due to natural resources' subsidies, Mexican natural gas, heavy fuel oil, and petroleum feedstock are much cheaper than the same materials produced in the United States. Since these inputs account for a high proportion of the value of ammonia, cement, and carbon black, such imports from Mexico may cause injury to the domestic suppliers of the U.S. market. 2/ After prolonged debate, however, U.S. legislators voted to delete the proposed measure. Meanwhile, some adversely affected U.S. producers reportedly continue to seek remedial action.

On the positive side, officials and academics of the two countries met in August 1984 to discuss Mexico's industrial policy in the context of possible cooperation, especially in the areas of steel, automotive production, petrochemicals, and electronics. The U.S. Government also continued to assist Mexico with trade preferences under the GSP program and trade-related credit guarantees. However, credits and credit guarantees provided by the Commodity Credit Corporation for Mexican purchases of feedgrains, oilseeds, and other farm products were significantly down in fiscal year 1984 as a result of falling imports from Mexico. 3/ For financing nonagricultural U.S. exports in Mexico, a $\$ 500$ million open-ended EXIMBANK credit line went into effect during the year under review.

## Restraints on Mexican steel exports

Mexico is one of seven countries with which the United States negotiated a voluntary restraint agreement in December 1984 limiting its steel shipments to the U.S. market for a 5-year period, beginning October 1984. 4/ Mexico agreed to restrict exports of finished steel to no more than 0.36 percent of apparent U.S. consumption during this period. Steel products manufactured in Mexico's in-bond plants (maquiladoras) remain outside the scope of restrictions. In exchange, the United States made a commitment to seek the termination of unfair trade investigations on steel items subject to the agreement. ${ }^{\text {/ }}$

The contraction of the domestic market after the Mexican debt crisis caused Mexican steel producers to unload their output on foreign markets, especially in the United States. The surge of steel imports from Mexico in 1983 prompted U.S. producers to file unfair trade complaints on a variety of

1/ The law would not have "reversed" these decisions but would have called into question the outcome of cases filed after the enactment of the law.

2/ In its 1983 subsidy determinations, the Department of Commerce found that the low Mexican prices of natural resources should not be considered subsidies. The House bill for the 1984 trade legislation (with support from the Senate) disagreed, considering that a significant part of production cost was accounted for by these resources.

3/ See "Merchandise trade with the United States" earlier in this sec.
4/ On Sept. 18, 1984, the President outlined his policy to deal with unfair trade in steel by seeking negotiated agreements with major suppliers within a $90-$ day period. See also "The Steel Import Porgram" in chap. I.

5/ The accord was signed on Feb. 27, 1985.
steel products. In 1984, steel imports from Mexico decreased from their 1983 level. In April, the Mexican Government unilaterally restrained exports to the United States in response to U.S. charges of unfair trade practices. Nonetheless, the steel conflict between the two countries was not resolved until the VRA was attained in December.

## Transborder trucking

In October 1984, President Reagan signed the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, which makes it more difficult and expensive for Mexican trucks to operate in the United States beyond the border region. The dispute between the two countries on transborder trucking began in 1981, when the United States expressed concern about the lack of reciprocal treatment of U.S. truckers in Mexico. With minor exceptions, Mexico does not allow U.S. truckers within its territory. The first U.S. restrictions of Mexican trucks operating in the United States became effective in September 1982, followed by new measures in 1983. These stipulated that Mexican public carriers needed special permits to show compliance with U.S. insurance and safety requirements. 1/

The 1984 legislation is a response to Mexico's failure to improve the balance of trucking operations. It requires that Mexican truckers obtain special certificates of operation from the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission when crossing the border. To get such a permit, operators must prove that their trucks are insured, meet all U.S. safety standards, and are up-to-date in Federal highway use tax payments. The new provisions also extend restrictions that previously had applied only to public carriers to private carriers and to most types of cargo that were heretofore exempt. The regulations place major limitations on the type of cargo that "for-hire" trucks--trucks that carry goods not owned by their operator--may transport. Maquiladora plants in the border area claim to be affected by these provisions since they rely heavily on for-hire trucks.

## TAIWAN

The Economic Situation in 1984

Assisted largely by a strong recovery in the United States, Taiwan's economy performed very well in 1983 and continued to do so in 1984. A 23-percent increase in exports, mostly to the United States, led the economy to a 10.3 percent growth in 1984 . Per capita income increased from $\$ 2,682$ in 1983 to almost $\$ 3,000$ in 1984. Unemployment was less than 3 percent.

Despite high growth, Taiwan had surprisingly low investment levels. Fixed investment expanded only 4 percent in the first half of 1984 , following a slow period in 1983. Foreign investments did slightly better, increasing 7 percent from January to August in 1984. About 43 percent of these investments were in electronics and electrical product ventures. 2/

[^67]Taiwan continued to maintain a healthy balance of payments position in 1984. The current account surplus grew rapidly after 1982 from $\$ 2.2$ billion to $\$ 4.5$ billion in 1983. By the end of 1984 , the current account surplus was about $\$ 7.8$ billion. Foreign currency reserves were $\$ 16.4$ billion. The mounting surplus strengthened the balance of payments position, but the large reserves also contributed to inflationary pressures. Consumer prices, which rose by less than 1 percent in 1983, increased by about 3 percent in 1984. To help ease inflation, Taiwan authorities proposed to reduce foreign exchange holdings by increasing imports and reducing capital inflows. By the end of 1984, little had been done to increase imports, but efforts were taken to control the inflow of capital.

In early 1984, the Central Bank of Taiwan persuaded public and private enterprises to borrow New Taiwan (NT) dollars from domestic sources rather than using foreign loans to finance imports and investments. Domestic borrowing was also encouraged for early repayment of outstanding foreign currency loans. These and other efforts resulted in a decline in the outstanding public external debt from $\$ 7.1$ billion in 1983 to $\$ 6.7$ billion by mid-1984.
U.S. banks were adversely affected by the policy changes, although they were not the specific target of Central Bank policies. Japanese and West European banks were able to capture a larger share of Taiwan's domestic financial market because high U.S. interest rates discouraged many short-term borrowers. The U.S. share of Taiwan's financial market dropped from 32.6 percent in 1982 to 10.7 percent in 1983 . U.S. commercial and Government loans totaled only $\$ 0.19$ billion in 1983, a 68.8 -percent decrease from 1982. In the first half of 1984 , long term loans from U.S. sources totaled only $\$ 0.07$ billion.

## Merchandise Trade with the United States

Table 19 shows that two-way trade between Taiwan and the United States totaled $\$ 19.4$ billion in 1984 , up from $\$ 15.5$ billion in 1983 . Taiwan is the United States' sixth largest trading partner, but the Uniled States is Taiwan's largest two-way trading partner. Taiwan's exports to the Uniled States have risen steadily since 1981 and are likely to continue to do so. This is partly because the U.S. market is relatively open to Taiwan imports while other markets (e.g., Europe) are less accessible. In addition, the economic recovery has been strong in the United States but sluggish in other markets. I/ Taiwan has attempted to reduce its dependence on U.S. markets by developing other markets but has not been wholly successful. The continuing appreciation of the NT dollar vis-à-vis European currencies makes Taiwan-made goods less competitive in non-U.S. markets and constrains attempts to diversify Taiwan's export markets. 2/ Taiwan's other major markets are the European Community, Japan, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Hong Kong.

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[^69]Exports from Taiwan to the United States, as a percentage of total exports, increased from 39.8 percent in 1982 to 45 percent in 1983. The United States Look nearly half ( 48.8 percent) of Taiwan's exports in 1984 and supplied 23 percent of its imports. Major products imported into the United States during the year included footwear, office machinery, apparel, and consumer electronics. Over 60 percent of Taiwan's shipments of items such as electronics, footwear, and sporting goods went to the United States.

Tables $B-9$ and $B-10$ show the leading export and import items in U.S. trade with Taiwan in 1984. Mosi of Taiwan's imports are energy, raw materials, industrial intermediates, and capital goods. (These commodities accounted for almost 93 percent of all imports in 1983. Consumer goods, which face trade barriers such as de facto bans and tariffs ranging from 50 to 100 percent, accounted for less than 8 percent of total imports in 1983.) Agricultural comodities, comprising about 30 percent of all products bought from the United States, and raw materials dominated Taiwan's imports from the United States in 1984. Major items were corn, soybeans, cotton, wheat, hides, and timber. Imports of raw materials from the United States maintained a strong position, with coal imports increasing 28 percent after dropping in 1983. (In 1983, Taiwan's successful energy conservation program and increased reliance on nuclear power resulted in a decline in its demand for coal.) Other major U.S. exports to Taiwan included machinery and transportation equipment, and chemicals.

## Kajor Policy Developments Affecting Trade

## Restrictions on grain imports

In January 1984, the Taiwan Board of Foreign Trade (BOFT) placed several restrictions on grain imports, including (1) a temporary ban on imports of rye, oats, buckwheat, and lupines, (2) a reduction in the maximum allowable import quantities for corn, soybeans, wheat, barley, and sorghum from 6.6 million metric tons (MT) in 1983 to 6.4 million MT in 1984; and (3) an increase in the surcharge on all grain imports. (This surcharge is separate from import tariffs and is used to subsidize local grain production and finance agricultural R\&D.) In addition, BOFT stopped banks from issuing import permits for unmilled rye, unmilled oats, unmilled buckwheat, and lupines until further notice.

In 1984, Taiwan also began offering incentives to farmers to diversify from rice production to corn and grain sorghum. U.S. sales of these products, which accounted for 9 percent of total U.S. exports to Taiwan, are likely to decline as the program accelerates. 1/

## Free trade zones postponed

Since the early $1980^{\prime} s$, Taiwan authorities considered establishing free trade zones in Taiwan, but the plans were indefinitely postponed in October 1984. The project was originally outlined in a study by the Bechtel Corporation. It proposed a network of areas that would offer facilities for

1/ U.S. Department of Commerce, Business America, Mar. 4, 1985, p. 31.
warehousing, transshipment, manufacturing, and communications. In announcing the indefinite postponement, the Council for Economic Planning and Develcpment cited political and security considerations as major hindrances to setting up the zones. The council has recommended instead that restrictions on foreign exchange settlements and tariff rates at the three existing export processing zones be liberalized. To stimulate development of the export processing zones, the minimum capital investment requirement was raised from NT $\$ 6$ million to NT\$30 million. 1/ Those export industries permitted in the zones include precision machinery and instruments, electric and electronic products, optical and photographic equipment, chemicals, metal products, and certain consumer items. 2/

## Trade liberalization

Concerned that the growing trade surplus could beccme an obstacle to future development, Taiwan announced in early 1984 that it would begin liberalizing its trade regime for industrial products. Plans called for lowering tariff and nontariff barriers, improving access to the local market by foreign investors, and gradual removal of local content and export performance requirements. Although details of the relaxed restrictions are not available, export and local content requirements--major barriers--are still in place and unlikely to be removed in the near future.

Although de facto bans are still in force for a number of items to protect domestic industries, BOFT removed or liberalized restrictions on many items in late 1983 and early 1984. BOFT also considered a proposal to expand the list of items not requiring import licenses from 2,950 items to over 8,000 items, or about one-third of all categories included in BOFT's commodity classification. The changes would be implemented over a period of years, so their effect would not be immediate.

High tariffs remain a major trade barrier, but some progress was made when tariffs were reduced on about 1,000 items (mostly wood, paper, leather and electronic products). These tariff reductions were scheduled to go into effect in early 1985.

Authorities in Taiwan also plan to reduce the maximum import tariff rate from the current 100 percent or more to 80 percent in 1985, eventually lowering it to 65 percent within the next 5 years. The 10 percent import valuation uplift is scheduled for elimination in late 1985.

## Anti-counterfeiting measures

Increased publicity in 1984 about Taiwan as a major producer of counterfeit goods sparked activity by authorities intent on improving the nation's international image. Approval by the Executive Yuan of new copyright legislation is expected in 1985, marking the most significant step in anti-counterfeiting activities since the trademark law passed in 1983. The proposed legislation would reportedly increase the number of items eligible for protection, including computer software, sound tracks, lectures, musical instruments, artistic performances, and scientific and engineering designs.

[^70]However, it would provide protection for foreigners only and would not provide exclusive translation rights for foreign authors. New unfair competition and patent laws are also reportedly under consideration by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

The new legislation would call for stiffer penaliies for offenders and will supposedly give unregistered foreign firms in Taiwan access to Taiwan courts. To further discourage violators, Taiwan now requires verification of permission to use a foreign trademark or brand. Although some observers have argued otherwise, Taiwan authorities assert that their efforts to interdict counterfeiters have been effective and public attitude toward counterfeiting is changing as local producers begin to recognize the importance of establishing their own brands abroad.

The recent signing of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 provides further incentive for Taiwan to pursue protection of intellectual property rights. Section 502 of the act provides that the President take into account, when determining GSP eligibility and benefit levels, the extent to which the country is providing adequate and effective means under its laws for foreign nationals to secure exclusive rights in intellectual property, including patents, trademarks, and copyrights. 1/

## Taiwan-Toyota joint venture canceled

After years of talks, plans for a joint venture with Toyota Motor Co. of Japan fell through. Taiwan wanted to use the project as a means to enter the world auto market and planned to invest $\$ 530$ million in 1984 into the venture. About 300,000 units were scheduled to be produced annually, beginning in 1986. Despite numerous attempts at a compromise, negotiators from both sides were unable to surmount two difficult issues: the plant's export ratio, and the cars' local content proportion. Taiwan authorities asked that half of the targeted production be exported and 90 percent of car parts be procured locally. 2/

## United States-Taiwan Bilaterel Trade Issues

## U.S. trade deficit with Taiwan

The perennial U.S. deficit with Taiwan continued to strain commercial relations between the two trading partners in 1984. 3/ The Uniled States has registered a trade deficit with raiwan since 1967, but the imbalance has increased dramatically in the past few years and has become a serious U.S. bilateral trade problem. The U.S. deficit increased from $\$ 6.9$ billion in 1983 to over $\$ 10$ billion in 1984.

[^71]The imbalance has resulted primarily from Taiwan's relatively closed market. Taiwan authorities are concerned that continued large deficits with the United States will harm bilateral trade relations and affect its GSP status. The new GSP legislation authorizes the President to restrict GSP benefits to those countries that either do not sufficiently open their markets to U.S. products or do not provide adequate protection for intellectural property rights. Taiwan accounted for 24.8 percent of all U.S. GSP imports in 1984. Taiwan authorities wish to maintain their GSP benefits, but large trade surpluses with the United States and the many complaints about Taiwan as a source of product counterfeiting are cause for concern.

In 1984, Taiwan took steps towards narrowing the trade gap. For example, tariff reductions (effective January 1985) on 59 categories of U.S. products (about 1,000 items) were announced. The reduction in import duties is intended to cut the average tariff from 31 percent to 26 percent. The 10 percent import valuation surcharge was reduced to 5 percent in early 1985 and is scheduled for elimination by yearend 1985.

Although the tariff liberalization will have little immediate impact for U.S. exporters, this and other liberalizations could lead to a substantial increase in future U.S. sales to Taiwan. The lower duty rates range from 15 to 30 percent on products such as semiprocessed leather goods, wood products, and chocolate confectionary. The duty cutbacks could also provide better opportunities for U.S. exporters to ship cosmetics, synthetic fiber rugs, photographic film, glass products, and compuler products. These ilems were originally not scheduled for liberalization until January 1987. Despite the liberalizations, however, substantial tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and services remain a major bilateral trade concern of the United States.

In further response to the need for improved United States-Taiwan trade relations, Taiwan formed a ministerial ad hoc committee in January 1984 to provide guidelines for future trade policy. The committee made several recomendations aimed directly at core issues that have contributed to the trade imbalance with the United States, and focused on some of the tariff and nontariff barriers about which the United States has been long concerned. The committee called for (1) elimination of export requirements for American investments in Taiwan, (2) active promotion of an import liberalization program that aims at fewer import restrictions and lower duties on consumer goods and relaxation of current restrictions that apply to trade in services, (3) helping American firms promote sales in Taiwan, (4) a campaign urging domestic firms to purchase American equipment rather than leasing it, and (5) diversification of Taiwan's export markets and export items. Discussions between the United States and Taiwan authorities on ways to decrease the U.S. trade deficit with Taiwan are continuing.

## Performance requirements

Performance requirements for foreign investments are tied to Taiwan's policy objectives of promoting exports, self-sufficiency, and technological development. Specific requirements, such as targets for export sales, local content requirements (specifying a certain percentage of the final product's value that must be made in Taiwan), production capacity, and product specifications, are set for investments which are eligible for incentives and/or repatriation of earnings. The United States Government has objected to performance requirements because they encourage exports beyond what would occur under free market forces.

Local content requirements in Taiwan apply to a variety of products including automobiles, televisions, motorcycles, bicycles, telephone equipment and certain machine tools. The required local content varies by product and ranges from 50 to 100 percent. Local content requirements for new investment are limited to four product groups: video tape recorders ( 55 percent), automobiles ( 70 percent), trucks (30-35 percent), and color televisions (70 percent). I/

According to the American Institute in Taiwan, there are no published requirements for export performance, except in export-processing zones where 100 percent of production must be exported. In actual practice, however, a 50 percent export performance requirement is applied generally to all foreign investment and negotiated downward on a case-by-case basis. Taiwan authorities announced in early 198 亿 that foreign companies would no longer be held strictly to export requirements, yel invesiors in some targeted industries would still face the restrictions. Export requirements for automobiles, for example, will still be strictly enforced, while in other industries the export quota will be more flexibly applied.

## Barriers to market access

The United States remained concerned about the considerable tariff and nontariff barriers to markets in Taiwan. The tariff reductions on a number of items in 1984 were helpful, but the rates remained high--generally about 60 percent. Imports with particularly high tariffs included machinery, word processors, home and kitchen articles, and processed food products. De facto import bans were used regularly and implemented through administrative orders or by denying an import license for an item. U.S. products subjected lo import bans included frozen chicken, peanuts, pears, soda ash, and certain chemicals and industrial products. Barriers in the service sector were also a major source of contention with the United States in 1984. A number of constraints continue to exist on the activities of foreign banks, insurance companies, and participants in joint ventures. Nontariff barriers effectively blocked imports of alcoholic beverages and pharmaceuticals and other health-related products.

## REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Economic Situation in 1984

Korea's carefully managed economy grew 7.6 percent in real terms in 1984, compared with a growth of 9.5 percent in 1983. According to the Bank of Korea, mining and manufacturing were the leading sectors, with an annual growth rate of 14.4 percent, while construction, agriculture, fisheries and forestry performed poorly relative to previous years. 2/

[^72]Korea's growth was fueled by a strong, demand-driven U.S. economy that drew in Korean exporis and by a rapid increase in private domestic consumption. In the past, exports were the chief vehicle for growth; however, since 1983, the domestic market has played an increasingly important role. I/ In 1984, real per capita GNP was $\$ 1,998$, compared with $\$ 1,884$ in 1983. Domestic sales rose rapidly on such consumer durables as automobiles, refrigerators, washing machines, and microwave ovens.

Korea is the largest borrower in Asia and the fourth largest borrower in the world after Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. By yearend 1984, Korea's sovereign debt was $\$ 43$ billion, up from $\$ 40.1$ billion in 1983. The
 15 percent by 1986. Compared to other heavily indebted nations, Korea's situation is exceptional in that it maintains an excellent credit rating. Korea's economy, characlerized by carefully controlled monetary and fiscal policy, is also relatively more balanced and is able to switch into new areas of industrial exports to pay its bills, rather than depending on a few raw material exports that are vulnerable to fluctuating demand and prices. 2/

Korea's current account deficit was $\$ 1.36$ billion in 1984 , compared with $\$ 1.6$ billion in 1983. On a balance-of-payments basis, total 1984 exports increased to $\$ 29$ billion from $\$ 24$ billion in 1983. Total imports rose to $\$ 30.6$ billion from $\$ 26$ billion. $3 /$ According to Bank of Korea officials, services and transfer account activity turned into a deficit of $\$ 273$ million in 1984 from a surplus of $\$ 157$ million the previous year.

## Merchandise Trade With the United States

As in previous years, textiles were Korea's most important worldwide export, accounting for about 23 percent of lotal Korean exports on an f.o.b. basis in 1984. 4/ Ships ( 16 percent of total exports) were the second largest export item, followed by iron and steel products (11.9 percent) and electronic and electrical products (ll percent). Crude oil was the largest single import (about 19 percent of total imports on a c.i.f. basis), followed by electrical machinery and electronics (10.4 percent). Korea's imports of grains, soybeans, raw cotton, and raw skins and hides, all of which came mainly from the Uniled Stales, were also up in 1984.

The Uniled States and Japan remained Korea's largest trading partners, accounting for nearly 50 percent of Korea's total trade with the world. Japan regained its position from the United States as the largest exporter lo Korea (which it held prior to 1982), but the United States remained the largest market for Korean goods. Over one-third (about 37 percent) of total Korean exports in 1984 went to the United States. Table 20 shows U.S. trade with Korea from 1982 to 1984. The U.S. 1984 trade deficit with South Korea was a record high $\$ 3.5$ billion, compared with $\$ 1.5$ billion in 1983.

1/ Far Eastern Economic Review, Ltd., "South Korea", Asia Yearbook 1985, p. 180 .

2/ Paul Ensor, "Sovereign debt debate," Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan. 24, 1985, pp. 62-63.

3/ Government of Republic of Korea, Office of Customs Administration.
4/ Source for Korean trade data is Government of the Republic of Korea, Office of Customs Administration.
Table 20.- U.S. trade with Korea, by SITC $1 /$ Numbers (Revision 2), 1982-84

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

## Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.

Although U.S. trade with Korea had been approximately balanced until recent years, U.S. sales to Korea have generally been bulk commodities and raw materials while Korea has sold finished products to the United Stales. This is partly a consequence of the relatively limited access to Korea's markets for finished products and has contributed to the steadily rising deficits for the United States. Major exports from the Uniled States to Korea in 1984 were agricultural (i.e., corn, wheal, cattle hides, and soybeans). 1/ Machinery and transportation equipment were also leading ilems. The performance of major U.S. exports was mixed in 1984. Agricultural products decreased about $\$ 190$ million from 1983 values; power-generation equipment was down $\$ 100 \mathrm{million}$; and Lelecommunications equipment dropped by $\$ 70$ million. However, chemicals increased by $\$ 200$ million; hides and skins increased by $\$ 80 \mathrm{millinn}$; and :cientific instruments increased by $\$ 40$ million. $2 /$ Leading imports to the United States from Korea included integrated circuits, apparel, and footwear.

## Major Policy Developments Affecting Trade

## Tariff reforms

Korea continued its relatively slow progress toward liberalization of its economy in 1984. 3/ In January 1984, the Government began a 5-year tariff reform and reduction program aimed at reducing its tariff rate structure from the average rate of 23.7 percent in 1983 to a targeted rate of 18.1 percent by 1988. As a first step, tariffs were reduced on 734 items ( 31.8 percent of tariff items) and raised on 300 items in 1984 . This resulled in a lowering of the average tafiff rate for manufactured goods from 22.6 percent in 1983 to 20.6 percent in 1984.

Korea also maintains a flexible tariff system to cope with short-ierm fluctuations in the economic situation. The following changes were made in components of the flexible lariff system in 1984:

## Tariff quota

The tariff quota allows a temporary reduction of tariff rates (up to 40 percent) on certain imported goods in order to meet any surges in demand and to stabilize domestic prices. The number of items suject to this system was reduced to 7 on July 1, 1984, from 30 in July of the previous year.

## Emergency tariff

The emergency tariff is temporarily applied to discourage "unnecessary" imports of certain luxury goods or to protect local industry when there is a surge of imported goods. In 1983, 104 items were subject to this duty. It was reduced to 38 in January 1984, and a further reduction to 10 items was made in July.

1/ See tables B-11 and B-12.
2/ U.S. Department of Commerce, Business America, Mar. 1, 1985, p. 30.
3/ See also "United States-Korean bilateral trade issues" below.

## Adjustment tariff

The adjustment tariff was introduced on January 1, 1984, to adjust tariff rates as necessary, in order to protect domestic industries from sudden sharp increases in newly freed imports resulting from import-licensing liberalization. Adjustment tariffs may be applied within 3 years of an item's import liberalization date. These tariffs differ from emergency tariffs in that they can only be imposed on products that are newly liberalized. Adjustment tariffs can be increased to a maximum of 100 percent for a period of 6 months to a maximum of 3 years. Adjustment duties were imposed on 14 items on July 1, 1984.

Import liberalization

Import liberalization continued to proceed gradually in Korea during 1984. Import licenses are required for all goods but are issued automatically for "automatic approval" items, subject to some general limits. Over 300 products were removed from the import-restricted list at midyear, raising the level of import liberalization from 80.3 percent in 1983 to 84.8 percent in 1984 (i.e., in $1984,84.8$ percent of the customs items, by eight-digit CCCN numbers, were removed from the list of restricted imports). However, certain newly liberalized items remain subject to "surveillance" and may be returned to the restricted list if imports increase drastically. A number of automatic approval items are also subject to particular approval procedures under special laws, such as the Pharmaceuticals law or other laws dealing with quantitative restrictions or national security.

The wide range of products removed from the restricted list in 1984 included liquid soaps, illuminating glassware, brass rods and wire, certain copper-clad laminated sheet, razor blades, certain lamps and lighting fixtures, certain locks for automobiles, air conditioners, electricity meters, and speedometers.

However, Korea's ability to increase tariffs on an ad hoc basis under its flexible tariff system results in a high degree of uncertainty and lack of clarity in the tariff regime. This sometimes undercuts the import liberalization process. For example, the Korean Government simultaneously announced higher tariffs as it liberalized many items. Rates of 15 to 60 percent were levied on table and kitchen glassware and copper waste and scrap. Tariffs ranging from 50 to 70 percent were levied on cosmetic soaps, machine-made carpets, and certain fibers. Other domestic goods were also given additional protection, including furs and skins, industrial and laboratory ovens, electric cables, and certain watch parts.

## Investment liberalization

During the year, several laws and administrative procedures were revised to liberalize the investment sector and increase foreign investment. The revised Foreign Capital Inducement Law (FCIL), effective July 1, 1984, was the first major revision of Korea's investment laws in more than a decade and marked a considerable liberalization in its foreign investment regime. 1/ The

[^73]revised FCIL and its implementing regulations introduced an automatic approval system for foreign investment projects that were not on the prohibited list and met the following criteria: 1/
(1) Foreign ownership is less than 50 percent. However, in cases where the ratio of exports to domestic production is above 60 percent, or where the importation of the same kind of products is liberalized and the tariff rates of those are below 10 percent, automatic approval is possible even if the foreign ownership ratio is above 50 percent.
(2) The foreign investment amount is below US\$1 million.
(3) No request is made to receive tax exemption.
(4) The foreign investment project is neither a prohibited nor a restricted project on the Negative List.

The United States was the biggest foreign investor in Korea in 1984, accounting for $\$ 191$ million in approved projects, or nearly one-half of the total foreign investment of $\$ 419 \mathrm{million}$ for the year. $2 /$ Despite the 257-percent increase in U.S. investments this represents over 1983, substantial barriers to foreign investment continue. A number of industries remain cut off from foreign investment because all investments of any significance are likely to be more than US $\$ 1$ million; the automatic approval system really does not affect such investment.

## Copyright law revision

The Korean cabinet approved proposed changes to the copyright laws designed to increase protection of intellectual property rights. $\mathbf{3}^{/}$Under the proposal, works by foreigners with permanent residence in Korea and works originally published in Korea will be preferentially protected. The proposed revisions will also grant domestic publishers, musicians, and record companies a "quasi-copyright," providing them with exclusive rights to their" publications and performances. It also will extend the period of eligibility for publication, photograph, and film copyrights to 50 years from the current 10 to 30 years. Before implementation, the proposal must be passed by the National Assembly.

1/ Government of Republic of Korea, Ministry of Finance, Investment Guide to Korea, Seoul, July 1984, p. 27. See also Ibid., pp.135-147.

2/ "U.S. was no. 1 investor in South Korea in 1984," Asian Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1985, p.4.

3/ Source for this information is the International Trade Alert, Aug. 7, 1984.

## United States-Korean Bilateral Trade Issues

Korea and the United States were increasingly involved in trade disputes during 1984. Lack of understanding on both sides appeared to be at the heart of most of the disagreements. Since the United States is Korea's largest market, Korea is concerned about what it considers to be growing protectionism. The Korean Government has argued that a flurry of protectionist activity in the United States, parlicularly an increasing number of countervailing duty and antidumping investigations, constitutes a form of harassment and a considerable barrier to trade. 1/ An increasing number of countervailing duty and antidumping investigations were initiated against Korean products, particularly steel, and color televisions. The U.S.
Government position is that its laws are not protectionist but provide a means for addressing unfairly traded goods. The initiation of antidumping and countervailing actions are legal within the GATT, and domestic producers cannot be denied due recourse if they feel they have cause for action. During the year, countervailing and antidumping restraints were placed on such Korean products as color TV sets, steel products, and bicycle tires and tubes as a result of U.S. administrative actions.

In the United States, some confusion has resulted from the term "import liberalization." Koreans use the term lo refer to eliminating nontariff barriers, while Americans interpret it to mean removal of nontariff and tariff barriers. The Korean practice is to open up its lightly controlled market gradually, removing many items from the import-restricted list as it simultaneously raises tariffs on the most sensitive of these items. This effectively provides tariff protection because imports of many of the newly liberalized items remain prohibitively high. The tariff barriers are then slowly reduced towards levels targeted over a period of several years. It is a slow and complex process and the result is that although relatively significant progress is made in opening the market, it is neither as much nor as fast as outside observers expect from the much-touted liberalization ratios. ${ }^{2 /}$

While the United States concedes that Korea is making progress in opening up its economy, it views the complexity and lack of transparency in the Korean trade regime as continuing to constitute a considerable trade barrier. The United States is concerned that new nontariff barriers often spring up to replace the old ones. For example, when the import ban was lifted on cosmetics, it was done with the proviso that only Korean cosmetics manufacturers could import foreign cosmetics--an unlikely event since the imports would compete with their own products. 3/ Another major concern of the United States was improving access to the Korean market, particularly for computers, chocolate, and cigarettes.

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## GSP renewal

A major concern of the Korean Government in 1984 was maintaining its status under the U.S. GSP program which was scheduled for renewal in 1985. The program was subject to much debate during the year and there was some sentiment in Congress which leaned toward terminating GSP entirely, eliminating the newly industrializing countries, or at least graduating the top three NIC beneficiaries: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea. 1/

GSP was extended through July 4, 1993, and, while not completely excluding Korea or any other NIC, it does provide criteria for the differentiation among beneficiaries according to their need for special treatment. GSP benefits will be phased out over a 2 -year period for the more affluent countries, following a determination that their per capita GNP exceeds $\$ 8,500$. The new program directs the President to consider the beneficiary country's overall trade relations with the United States when determining GSP eligibility and product-specific benefit levels.
Specifically, the President is required to consider the extent to which a beneficiary country:
(1) provides reasonable access to its markets and refrains from unreasonable export practices;
(2) provides adequate protection of U.S. intellectual property rights (e.g. patents, copyrights and trademarks);
(3) reduces trade-distorting investment practices and barriers to trade and services; and
(4) honors internationally recognized workers' rights.

## Color televisions 2/

One of the biggest bilateral trade disputes of the year involved Korea's exports of color televisions to the United States. The dispute began in October 1983, when the U.S. International Trade Commission ruled that imports of Korean color televisions materially injured the U.S. domestic industry. (After an orderly marketing agreement with Korea expired in mid-1982, Korean color television exports to the United States increased from 630,000 units per year to 1.93 million units per year by the end of 1983.) The Department of Commerce determined that three Korean manufacturers were dumping their exports through high domestic prices and assessed a preliminary average antidumping duty of 3.15 percent. That duty was later raised to an average 14.6 percent in the February 25, 1984, final determination. The U.S. Department of

1/ USITC, "New graduation rules in the revised GSP," International Economic Review, January 1985; and "GSP review" section in chap. V.

2/ Information in this section is based on "The Color TV Case," Business Korea, October 1981, pp 12-13.

Commerce performed an expedited review of the February ruling and on September 9, made a preliminary determination that found dumping margins considerably higher than the original: 20.8 percent for Goldstar, 25.09 percent for Daewoo, and 52.5 percent for Samsung. A strong reaction from the Korean Government and Korean press first labeled the finding another example of U.S. "protectionism." However, one reason the preliminary margins were so high was that the Korean firms reportedly did not adequately defend the glaring price differences between sets sold domestically and abroad. For example, a model selling in the United States in 1983 for $\$ 158.90$ reportedly sold in Korea for $\$ 306.90$.

Interested parties were given the opportunity to formally comment on the preliminary results. After receipt of the comments, Commerce extended the deadline for a final decision from October 31 to December. As a result of further verification of certain claims made by the Korean manufacturers, the final December 28 results were significantly different from those in the September preliminary results. Commerce revised the dumping margins downward for all three companies and the antidumping duties now in effect reflect these margins: Gold Star, 7.47 percent; Samsung, 12.23 percent; and Daewoo, 14.88 percent.

## Radial ply tires

The Korean Government decided to extend its voluntary restraint on exports of radial ply tires to the United States in 1984. Prior to this, the Korean Government agreed to voluntarily restrain its lire exports to the United States (for the period of October 1, 1983, through September 30, 1984) in an effort to avert antidumping action after its exports surged. Moreover, the Korean Government agreed to persuade its tire exporters to raise the price of their products by 3 to 5 percent. U.S. rubber tire manufacturers subsequently dropped plans for filing antidumping petitions.

In July 1984, however, a U.S. manufacturer did file an antidumping petition. The Korean Government, again hopeful of staving off the action, decided to extend the voluntary restraint for the period of October 1, 1984, through September 30, 1985, at the same level of 3.8 million.

BRAZIL

## The Economic Situation in 1984

Brazil, the biggest debtor in the world, was forced to continue its austerity regime in 1984. This was the second year of a 3-year adjustment program the IMF imposed on Brazil as a condition for financial support. During the year, Brazil was able to move out of economic recession at the cost of being intermittently out of compliance with its commitments to the IMF. ${ }^{\prime} /$ Brazil's GDP expanded by 4.1 percent, with agriculture growing fastest at 8 percent.

[^75]The incipient recovery in 1984, following 3 years of recession, was unable to relieve Brazil's serious unemployment problem. However, the most salient weakness of the Brazilian economy was persistent inflation, which ran at an annual rate of 224 percent, compared with the 40 -percent rate originally targeted. Inflation was fueled by the growth of the money supply and the accompanying large budget deficit, which, despite cuts in public expenditures, could not be controlled.

Brazil's international economic performance was far better than its mixed domestic economic record. The current account balance, which was a deficil of $\$ 6.1$ billion in 1983, has been estimated as a surplus of $\$ 654$ million in 1984. Brazil attained a positive merchandise trade balance, totaling $\$ 13$ billion, double the $\$ 6.5$ billion recorded in 1983 and significantly more than the surplus of $\$ 9.1$ billion promised to the IMF. A 37-percent jump in industrial exports, and a sharp reduction in oil imports were principally responsible for this notable accomplishment. International reserves more than doubled to $\$ 11.8$ billion.

Brazil's export performance would not have been possible without exchange rate policy discipline. As the cruzeiro is linked to the U.S. dollar, seventy-one "mini-devaluations" took place in 1984 in response to the dollar's rising value. These devaluations served to keep pace with Brazil's rapid inflation and maintain the Brazilian currency at a compelitive level. The yearend official exchange rate of the cruzeiro was 3100 to the dollar, reflecting a cumulative annual depreciation of 216 percent in 1981.

Despite its improved bargaining position with foreign creditor banks, Brazil was not able to conclude a restructuring agreement on its foreign debt before yearend 1984. Failure to do so was widely attributed to reluctance of creditor banks to act decisively in view of the upcoming change in Brazil's administration. 1/ Brazil's efforts to renegotiate the terms of its foreign debt were encouraged by the concessions Mexico obtained earlier in the year for its own foreign debt obligations. The objective was a multiyear agreement to restructure maturities and to lower interest rates, modeled on the accord foreign creditors concluded with Mexico. 2/

Brazil is the world's largest borrower, with an overall foreign debt of some $\$ 100$ billion at the end of 1984 . Despite positive merchandise trade balances and current account improvements in both 1983 and 1984, Brazil continues to face serious difficulties in meeting its foreign debt repayment obligations. Debt charges have absorbed 88 percent and 85 percent of Brazil's export earnings in 1982 and 1983 respectively, and they are expected to claim some 75 percent in the year under review.

A third round of debt rescheduling negotiations between Brazil and a 14 -member committee of foreign creditor banks look place in December 1984. Talks were to continue in 1985. At the December meeting, Brazil requested that the banks roll over $\$ 48$ billion due to private creditors in 1985 to

I/ Tancredo Neves was elected in January 1985 as President. His
administration has been in office since March. The President-elect himself, however, died before ever assuming his dulies.

2/ See "Mexico" earlier in this chapter.
1989. Notably, Brazil has not asked for new loans, which was seen as a sign that it handles the foreign debt burden comparatively well. Similar negotiations were expected to take place between Brazilian officials and the "Paris Club" 1 / concerning Brazil's debt Lo foreign governments, including that to the U.S. Eximbank and Lo the Commodity Credit Corporation.

## Merchandise Trade with the United States

The United States was the major contributor to Brazil's unprecedented merchandise trade surplus in 1984. U.S. statistics show a trade deficit with Brazil totaling $\$ 4.6$ billion, almost double the deficit registered for 1983. From 1968 to 1980, the balance in United States-Brazilian trade was the reverse, with the United States consistently attaining an annual trade surplus. In 1984, the decline in recent years of exports to Brazil stopped, but imports from Brazil surged by almost 50 percent.

As a country market for U.S. exports, Brazil ranked 20th in 1984. At $\$ 2.6$ billion, U.S. exports were virtually unchanged from 1983, with only minor shifts in the composition of this trade by major commodity groups (table 21.) Exports of machinery and transportation equipment (SITC 7) continued to decline, but they remained the principal category of overall U.S. exports to Brazil. Leading items in this section included auto parts, computers, telecommunications equipment, and electrical machinery. Notable is a sharp drop in shipments of U.S. aircraft and related equipment to Brazil during the year. Chemical exports, which had declined sharply since 1980, rebounded somewhat in 1984, reflecting Brazil's strong need for fertilizers and herbicides. Machinery and chemicals jointly accounted for 56 percent of overall U.S. exports to Brazil. Despite declining shipments, wheat continued to be the leading specific U.S. export item to Brazil, ${ }^{2 /}$ while coal was second on the list. 3/

In contrast to its declining role as a U.S. market, Brazil has steadily gained importance relative to other countries as a supplier of the United States. In 1981, Brazil ranked llth as a source of U.S. imports, compared with 17th as recently as in 1981. U.S. imports from Brazil Lotaled $\$ 7.2$ billion during the year, sharply up from $\$ 4.9$ billion in 1983.

Table 21 shows that imports increased in all but one major product section: beverages and tobacco. Brazilian tobacco shipments dropped from their unusually high 1983 level, when they were inflated by the anticipation of increased U.S. duties. Imports rose notably in the leading category of food (SITC 1), owing mostly to larger values of traditional tropical import items such as coffee and cocoa. However, some of the increased food imports consisted of products in which Brazil competes with U.S. production, specifically sugar, certain tobacco items, and fruit juices. Most notably, imports of fruit juices more than doubled in 1984. Consecutive freezes in Florida may now leave the U.S. industry dependent on Brazil for part of its supplies.

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However, the surge in overall U.S. imports from Brazil was caused to a large degree by increased imports of manufactured products (SITC sections 5 through 9), such as footwear, steel items, automotive products, and pig iron. This penetration reflected the results of Brazil's successful industrial policy, which targeted certain manufactures as major export earners. 1/

Among individual items, surging imports of ethyl alcohol--classified among chemicals in SITC 5--deserves special note. Brazil is the world's largest low-cost producer of ethyl alcohol made of sugar cane, which it uses as a substitute for gasoline. The Government heavily supports production, research in cane-growing lechniques, and processing lechnology.

As a developing country, Brazil is also a beneficiary of the GSP program of the United States. 2/ In 1984, Brazil was the fourth largest GSP beneficiary, and merchandise valued at $\$ 1.2$ billion or 16.6 percent of overall U.S. imports from Brazil entered duty free under this program.

## Major Policy Developments Affecting Trade

In September 1984, Brazil announced a series of measures easing trade restrictions in response to repeated urgings by the IMF and the World Bank. The measures were also intended to create a more favorable climate for Brazil's then upcoming foreign debt negotiations.

The new provisions included phasing out an ll-percent extra rebate (rebate in excess of laxes paid) to exporters of the Industrial Product Tax (a value-added tax on industrial goods.) Among export subsidies, tax "over-rebates" have been a major irrilant in Brazil's bilateral trade relations with the United States. Interest rate subsidies for exports have also been reduced.

Several new measures were designed in 1984 to relieve the Government's tight grip on imports. These were probably also intended to put a damper on Brazil's high level of inflation. The comprehensive regulation of Brazil's computer industry (informatics) was the other major policy development in 1984 with major trade and foreign investment implications. The import-liberalizing provisions and the informatics decree are discussed below.

## Easing import restrictions

Effective in 1985, the Brazilian Government reauthorized a wide range of imports that were suspended by the Carteria de Comercio Exterior (CACEX), the Brazilian Government agency for foreign trade. 3/ The Government also raised overall import value limits for registered companies 4/ following severe curtailments in recent years and raised the budget allocations slightly for imports of state enterprises.

[^77]The Brazilian Government further announced that it will liberalize the import-financing restrictions the Central Bank imposed in October 1982. The bank's resolution number 767 authorizes certain imports only on the condition that foreign financing is made available for at least 5 to 8 years (depending on the nature and value of imports). A new measure in the September 1984 trade reform package allows pay-back periods from 180 days to 5 years. This provision should make it easier for Brazilian importers to take advantage of foreign credit facilities.

Another one of the new Brazilian trade provisions reduces import surcharges to 10 to 30 percent and incorporates them into the tariff schedules. Tariff surtaxes up to 100 percent of the ad valorem value have been in effect since 1974 on over 4,000 categories of imports. Authorization of tariff increases of up to 60 percent is also part of the September package of trade measures.

Still another measure narrows the applicability of Brazil's so-called "Law of Similars," which prohibits imports of products similar to those already made in Brazil. Under the newly announced, more-lenient regulations, the "Law of Similars" will not be applied to imports that receive foreign financing for more than 1 year and do not benefit from duty reductions.

## Regulation of informatics

In October 1984, Brazil passed legislation codifying a series of protectionist practices that had been in force for its high-priority computer and data-processing industry (informatics) in the last 5 years. Under Brazil's market reserve policy, production and sales rights in specified product areas are reserved for national firms. This policy has a restrictive impact on Brazil's foreign trade and investment. While restricting foreign investment in designated industries (such as petroleum, semiconductors, and informatics) and regulating it in others, Brazil would like to increase the inflow of capital to nonreserved markets.

A prior decree of 1977 blocked imports of all computers except mainframes. As a result, over 100 Brazilian electronics companies sprang up and domestic production surged. The new statute extends this import restriction through 1992, and curbs foreign investment in microcomputers, minicomputers, and super-minicomputers during the same timespan. Moreover, it broadens the definition of informatics to include any product with a digital component.

The new regulations do not affect the domestic production and sales of mainframe computers, which are dominated by Brazilian subsidiaries of IBM and the Burroughs Co. These two companies were among those U.S.-based multinationals who objected to the informatics statute while it passed through the legislative process. The protests received little support from any significant sector of Brazilian society.

Foreign enterprises can own up to 30 percent of local firms' stock, but without having voling privileges. However, foreign companies are authorized to set up plants for export in the free trade zones of Manaus and the northeastern part of the country, which are to be designated as special industrial export zones. If located in these zones. they are allowed to import technology, even if similar equipment or services are available in Brazil.

The informatics law also confirms the role of the Special Secretariat of Informatics (SEI), which was established in 1979 to implement the Government's market-reserve policy. However, it shifts the control of SEI from military authorities to a board of Governmeni and industry representatives called the National Council for Information and Technology (CONIN). The statute codifies a wide range of fiscal and financial incentives for domestic companies, including income tax benefits, accelerated depreciation, import tax benefits, preferential Government funding. It also provides for preferential Government procurement to national firms. 1/

## United States-Brazilian Bilateral Trade Issues

United States-Brazilian economic relations remained cordial in 1984. The United States continued to assist Brazil in its foreign credit crisis with funds, trade preferences, and lechnology transfer. Meanwhile, progress in resolving trade and investment disputes slowed with the approaching change in Brazil's administration.
U.S. banks currently hold about one-third of Brazil's external debt. In 1984, the U.S. Government continued supporting U.S. exports to Brazil through the Eximbank and the Commodity Credit Corporation.

Duty-free treatment for a range of imports from Brazil, under the GSP program of the United States, also continued. Efforts by the U.S. Government to shift duty-free benefits from more advanced beneficiary countries to poorer countries did not affect Brazil during the year; no Brazilian exports to the U.S. market were graduated in the latest annual GSP review. ${ }^{2} /$ In its early years, the GSP program of the United States played an especially significant role in the growth and diversification of Brazilian exports to the United States. In more recent years, part of GSP-eligible imports from Brazil have been graduated or excluded from duty-free treatment under the program on grounds of competitive limits.

In recent years, Brazil has become a competitor of the United States in U.S. and world markets for several products. The aggressive promotion of these exports triggered charges of unfair trade practices (mostly of extensive subsidization) by U.S. producers. U.S. antidumping and, especially, countervailing duty proceedings against Brazilian ilems have increased dramatically since 1981. U.S. Lrade action against Brazil has been extensive in proportion to trade between the two countries. 3/

1/ For additional information on Brazil's regulations of the informatics industry, see also U.S. International Trade Commission, Foreign Industrial Targeting and its Effects on U.S. Industries: Phase III, USITC Publication 1632, January 1985, p. 64.

2/ The concept of graduation is explained in the sec. on "GSP Review" in Chap. V.

3/ In 1984, Brazil ranked only 20th among foreign suppliers of the U.S. market, and even lower than that in prior years. Nonetheless, since 1978 some 30 countervailing duty investigations had been conducted against imports from Brazil.

In 1984, the U.S. Government instituted several new investigations against certain imports from Brazil under both countervailing and antidumping statutes, involving principally steel products. Tensions over steel between the two countries were settled by the end of 1984 in a bilateral agreement regulating such trade. Action under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1971 (designed to enforce U.S. rights under the GATT) also continued in 1984 with respect to Brazil. Such action involved U.S. complaints alleging that extensive subsidies helped Brazil to capture an inequitable share of third-country markets for soybean oil, soybean meal, and poultry. This issue was also discussed bilaterally. (Meanwhile, Brazil is in the process of reducing credit and tax subsidies in an effort to tighten its budgel.)

The United States also questioned Brazil's foreign investment policy during the year. The key issue was Brazil's new legislation passed in October, which reserves much of its national computer and related production and sales for Brazilian firms. I/ The United States favors unrestricted direct investment flows, asserting that these are preferable to loans in resolving capital shortages in Brazil (and other developing countries). $2 /$ The flow of direct U.S. investment to Brazil slowed considerably in recent years, due partly to the financial crisis and recession in that country and partly to its restrictive economic policies.

On the other side of the ledger, in 1984 Brazil continued to criticize the high U.S. interest rates that added to its debt burden. 3/ Also, Brazilian exporters became increasingly concerned over the impact of the rising U.S. dollar on their competitiveness in third-country markets. With the cruzeiro being linked to the U.S. currency, the strength of the dollar has forced Brazil into frequent devaluations. These, in turn, have increased the price of Brazilian goods overseas.

Brazil also complained that the United States does not open widely its markets to Brazilian products, even though export earnings are Brazil's major source of debt repayment. The intensification in recent years of U.S. unfair trade proceedings against Brazilian products evoked charges of U.S. protectionism. So have quantitative restrictions mainlained by the United States on certain imports--such as sugar and specialty steel--that affect Brazilian exports. U.S. tariffs on tobacco and ethyl alcohol are also on the list of Brazilian trade complaints against the Uniled States.
U.S. financial assistance provided by Eximbank, and issues relating to trade in specific products are discussed below.

## Eximbank credit facility

A $\$ 1.5$ billion special U.S. credit facility for Brazil, announced in December 1983, was signed in July 1984 and became operational in August. Its objective was to make financing of U.S. exports to Brazil possible despite

[^78]that country's large foreign debt. 1/ Short-term and medium-term export financing guarantees from Eximbank were stipulated to provide selected U.S. lending banks with repayment protection.

Under this credit arrangement, repayment of insured loans cannot exceed 5 years. Eximbank credit guarantees are available for a wide range of U.S. exports to Brazil, including agricultural commodities, raw materials, and manufactured goods. Such guarantees can also be used to insure financing, engineering, and architectural services to Brazil.

Steel
By far the most serious trade disputes between the two countries during the year continued to involve steel from Brazil. The United States is the largest single customer for Brazilian steel, which began to penetrate the U.S. market in the 1980's in sharply increasing quantities. In an altempt to avoid countervailing duties, Brazil levied an export tax in March 1984 on certain steel shipments to the Uniled States and, in April, announced voluntary restrictions on carbon steel exports for 3 years.

Brazil attained self-sufficiency in steel production in the late 1970's and began promoting exports. The Government itself made major direct investments in the steel industry; SIDERBRAS, a State company, currently owns some 60 percent of the country's steel capacity. Private steel companies enjoy major subsidies from the Government, including preferential financing, tax credits, and other incentives. 2/ In 1983, Brazil was the llth ranking raw steel producer in the world, and it is by far the largest steel producer in Latin America.

Brazil is one of seven countries with which the United States negotiated a voluntary restraint agreement in December 1984, limiting its steel shipments to the United States for a 5-year period effective October 1, 1984. 3/ Brazil agreed to supply no more than 0.80 percent of appareni U.S. consumption of finished steel products during this period. In return, the United Siates agreed to discontinue antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings against most steel imports from Brazil. 4/

1/ Brazil generally took little advantage of the $\$ 1.5$ billion U.S. credit facility. However, agricultural products were part of the products and services for which this facility was authorized. Actual utilization for agricultural ilems was less than 2 percent of credit used for all commodities and services. (Source: EXIMBANK).
$\underline{2 /}$ For additional information, see U.S. Inlernational Trade Commission, Foreign Industrial Targeting and its Effects on U.S. Industry: Phase III, USITC Publication 1632, January 1985, pp. 37-74.

3/ On Sep. 18, 1984, the President outlined his policy of dealing with unfair trade in steel by seeking negotiated agreements with major suppliers within a 90-day period. See "The Steel Import Program" in Chap. I.

4/ The agreement was signed on Feb. 26, 1985. In addition to limiting steel exports, the Brazilians agreed to hold semifinished steel exports to a level not to exceed 7000,000 tons per year. It limited Brazil's steel exporis to an estimated 1.5 million tons (to include 781,000 tons of finished steel and 700,000 tons of semifinished steel) in the initial period of the agreement: October 1984 through December 31, 1985. This compares with 1.4 million tons in 1984 and 1.26 million tons in 1983.

## Textiles

In 1984, the United States and Brazil were in the last year of their third bilateral textile agreement under the MFA. This agreement entered in force on April 1, 1982, and is due to expire on March 31, 1985. It established limits (or provided for consultation on limits) for specified categories of cotton and manmade textile products Brazil might ship to the United States. 1/ During the year under review, the Comission conducted an investigation at the request of Brazil on the possible effect of revoking countervailing duty orders on combed and carded cotton. Based on the Comission's determination in May, the Department of Comerce revoked the countervailing duties in effect on combed yarn of cotton but maintained duties on carded yarn of cotton.

## Footwear

Brazil, a major source of imported nonrubber footwear to the United States, was favorably affected by a determination of the Commission in June 1984. Following an investigation conducted under Section 201 of the Tariff Act of 1974, the Commission determined that nonrubber footwear is not being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry. 2/

Nonetheless, footwear remains a sensitive area of economic relations with the United States, which is Brazil's largest market. 3/ U.S. footwear imports from Brazil continued to rise in 1984 to $\$ 854$ million from $\$ 514$ million in 1983.

In January 1985, the Commission found good cause to institute a new footwear investigation at the request of the Senate Finance Committee. The Commission cited, among other reasons, that since its negative finding in June 1984, Congress had clarified the meaning of the provision on which the earlier investigation was based. The new footwear investigation reintroduced an element of uncertainty into Brazil's prospects for footwear exports into the United States.

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## Sugar

Brazil's sugar exports to the United States are restrained by import quotas reinstituted by the U.S. Government in May 1982. I/ Since the quotas were reimposed, Brazil has been seeking larger quota allocations on grounds that its sugar exports to the United States had been untypically low in the base period used (1979-81).

Brazil was also seeking a reduction of U.S. duty rates on sugar. Having exceeded the "competitive limit" provisions of the GSP program, Brazilian sugar does not currently benefit from U.S. preferential duty programs as does that of some other developing countries in the Western hemisphere.

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## CHAPTER V

## ADMINISTRATION OF U.S. TRADE LAWS AND REGULATIONS

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews activities related to the administration of U.S. trade laws during 1984. Sections are included on U.S. actions under import relief and unfair trade laws. Import relief laws are designed to safeguard U.S. industries from injurious, sharply increasing levels of imports when unfair trade practices are not at issue. Unfair trade laws are designed to counter the effect of foreign imports benefiting from unfair trade practices, such as dumping, certain subsidies, or other practices as defined by domistic statutes. A section reviewing the administration of other import programs covers actions under laws regulating trade with respect to agricultural products and national security considerations, and implementation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences.

In 1984, the U.S. President announced that he would not implement the Commission's recommendations for granting import relief pursuant to section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 for certain steel and copper products. For the steel products concerned, the President instead directed USTR to negotiate voluntary restraint agreements with major foreign suppliers. The Department of Commerce and the Comission continued to have a large caseload of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations during the year. As in previous years, the preponderance of investigations undertaken by the United States Trade Representative on alleged violations of trade agreements by foreign governments focused on outstanding trade issues in U.S.-EC trade.

## IMPORT RELIEF LAWS

## Safeguard Actions

Under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, the U.S. International Trade Commission conducts investigations to determine whether a product is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to a domestic industry producing a like or directly competing product. 1/ Section 201 is based on article. XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, commonly referred to as the escape clause because it permits a country to "escape" temporarily from GATT obligations with respect to a particular product when certain conditions prevail. Affirmative (or equally divided) Commission determinations allow the President to invoke GATT article XIX and to impose import relief in the form of increased tariffs, quotas, or tariff-rate quotas, as well as orderly marketing arrangements. Under section 203, the Commission conducts reviews to advise the President on the probable economic effect of extending, reducing, or terminating import relief in place. No section 203 investigations were undertaken in 1984.

During 1984, escape-clause relief continued in effect for heavyweight motorcycles and stainless and alloy tool steel, pursuant to Presidential

1/ The domestic industry consists of those domestic producers "producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported article." (19 U.S.C. 2251(b)(1)).
actions taken in 1983. 1/ Previously granted escape-clause relief for porcelain-on-steel cooking ware expired on January 16, 1984, and relief for clothespins expired on February 22, 1984.

The Commission completed five section 201 investigations in 1984. The Commission voted in the negative in the three cases concerning stainless steel table flatware (inv. no. TA-201-49), nonrubber footwear (inv. no. TA-201-50), and canned tuna fish (inv. no. TA-201-53). Affirmative determinations were made in the two cases on carbon and certain alloy steel products (inv. no. TA-201-51) and unwrought copper (inv. no. TA-201-52). Conmission recomendations and Presidential actions regarding affirmative determinations taken in 1984 are described below, as are the followup actions on the 1983 determination on stainless and alloy tool steel.

## Carbon and certain alloy steel products

On July 11, 1984, the Comission found that increased steel imports had been a substantial cause of serious injury to domestic firms and workers. Affirmative injury determinations were made by the Conmission with respect to imports of semifinished steel, plates, sheets and strip, wire and wire products, and structural shapes and units. (The Commission did not find injury with respect to imports of wire rod, rail products, bars, and pipes and tubes.) A majority of the Commission recommended to the President that he impose a combination of quantitative restrictions and increased duties on imports of certain carbon and alloy steel products for a 5-year period. The recommendation proposed that increased tariffs be applied to wire products and semifinished steel and that quantitative restrictions be imposed on steel sheet, plates and strip, structural shapes and units, and wire for 5 years. A minority of the Commission recommended that no relief be provided. $\underline{2}^{\prime}$

On September 18, the President determined that the imposition of import relief was not in the national economic interest and, instead, outlined an administration program to promote steel industry adjustment to world competition. 3/ Under this program, the President directed the USTR to negotiate agreements with countries whose exports to the United States had increased significantly in recent years. According to the President, the negotiations would result in voluntarily limiting imports to approximately 18.5 percent of the U.S. market, excluding semi-finished steel. The President concluded bilateral agreements with the Governments of Japan, Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Spain, Australia, Finland, and South Africa during 1984. 4/ The

1/ For further information on the 1983 investigations see the operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, p. 342.

2/ Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick and Rohr voted in the affirmative. Chairwoman Stern and Commissioner Liebeler voted in the negative. Comaissioner Haggart did not participate.

3/ For a discussion of the administration's steel-import-stabilization program, see chap. I.

4/ Additional agreements have been negotiated during 1985. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 signed into law by the President on October 30, 1984 provides Presidential authority to enforce bilateral restraint arrangements with foreign steel-supplying countries for certain steel products. For further information on the Act, see chap. I.
agreements, which are retroactive to October 1, 1984, are scheduled to remain in effect through September 31, 1989.

## Unwrought copper

On June 27, 1984, the Comission recommended that the President grant relief to the domestic copper industry. Two Commissioners recommended an increase in tariffs and two recommended the imposition of quotas. One Commissioner recommended that no relief be granted. 1/ On September 6, the President determined that granting import relief would not be consistent with the national economic interest. He stated that import restrictions would create a differential between U.S. and world prices of copper that would disadvantage the U.S. copper fabricating industries and shrink domestic demand for copper in the long term. At the same time, he directed the Department of Labor to coordinate retraining and relocation assistance for workers in the industry and directed the Department of Commerce to monitor copper imports and conditions in the domestic industry. 2/

## Stainless and alloy tool steel

In July 1983 the President issued a Proclamation which provided import relief on specialty steels for a 4-year period through the temporary imposition of increased tariffs for stainless steel sheet, strip, and plate and quotas based on the Commission's recommended minimum import tonnages for stainless steel bar, rod, and alloy tool steel. 3/ In October 1983, the U.S. Government concluded orderly marketing agreements (OMA's) covering 61 percent of all quota-bound specialty steel imports with the Governments of Japan, Canada, Poland, Argentina, Spain, Austria, and Sweden. 4/ The agreements reduced commensurately the remainder of the quota available to other nations. In March 1984, the EC announced retaliatory measures, taken in conformity with its rights under the GATT, to compensate for the U.S. steel actions. 5/

## Market Disruption

Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides for investigations by the Commission to determine whether imports of an article originating in a

[^81]nonmarket-economy (communist) country are causing market disruption with respect to an article produced by a U.S. industry. 1/

In its only section 406 activity during 1984, the Commission investigated the economic effect on the U.S. market of imports of ferrosilicon from the Soviet Union. The Commission's action was in response to a request on November 17, 1983, from the USTR. On February 2, 1984, the Commission determined that imports of ferrosilicon from the Soviet Union were not causing market disruption. The ferrosilicon case was the 10th investigation instituted pursuant to section 406 since the section took effect in 1975.

## Adjustment Assistance

The Trade Act of 1974 provides for adjustment assistance to workers, firms, and industries adversely affected by increased imports. Adjustment assistance to workers is administered by the Department of Labor and is delivered in the form of cash benefits for direct trade readjustment allowances as well as service benefits that include allowances for job search, relocation, and training. Assistance to firms and industries is administered by the Department of Comerce in the form of technical and financial assistance. 2/ Industrial aid through the Department of Commerce is intended to improve the ability of firms to compete in home markets and to stimulate U.S. exports of trade-affected products.

## Assistance to workers

The Department of Labor instituted 433 investigations in fiscal year 1984 on the basis of petitions for eligibility filed to apply for trade adjustment assistance, a decrease of 64 percent from the 1,217 investigations instituted in fiscal year 1983. The results of investigations completed or terminated in fiscal year 1984 (including those instituted in the previous year) were as follows:

Item \begin{tabular}{ll}
$\frac{\text { Number of }}{\text { investigations }}$ <br>
or petitions

$\quad$

Number of <br>
\hline
\end{tabular}

Source: U.S. Department of Labor
1/ If the Commission issues an affirmative determination, it must also recomend to the President a remedy for the existing or threatened market disruption. The remedy is directed only at the imports that are the source of the market disruption. A sec. 406 investigation can be based on a request by the President, the USTR, by resolution of certain committees of the U.S. Congress, or other requesters or petitioners enumerated in sec. 201(a)(1). If the President takes action following an affirmative Commission determination in a sec. 406 case, he has essentially the same options for import relief as those provided in secs. 202 and 203 of the Trade Act of 1974.

2/ Technical assistance includes assistance in engineering, production methods, financial management, and marketing. Financial assistance includes both direct loans and loan guarantees.

As a result of lower rates of eligibility for assistance than in previous years, Department of Labor expenditures in fiscal year 1984 on direct cash benefits to certified workers decreased significantly to $\$ 35.3$ million. This figure was $\$ 1.2$ million less than the estimated total expenditures in fiscal year 1983. Funds allocated in 1984 were directed predominantly to certified workers in the automobile and steel industries in the Midwest. In addition to direct financial assistance, the Department provided allowances in fiscal year 1984 for worker activities in the areas shown in the following tabulation:


## Assistance to firms and industries

The International Trade Administration in the Department of Commerce certified 398 firms as eligible for trade adjustment assistance during fiscal year 1984, a decrease of 3 percent from the 412 firms certified in FY 1983. The ITA approved the adjustment proposals of 16 certified firms and authorized financial assistance totaling $\$ 23.9$ million, including $\$ 7.5$ million in direct loans and $\$ 16.4$ million in loan guarantees. The ITA also provided direct technical assistance valued at $\$ 13.0$ million through its Trade Adjustment Assistance Centers (TAAC's) to 814 trade-impacted firms. Firms in the primary metals, fabricated metals, machinery, and miscellaneous manufacturing sectors accounted for 48 percent of all certification activity in fiscal year 1984. In contrast, firms in the apparel, leather goods, and textile sectors, which in previous years had accounted for 55 percent of all firms certified, accounted for only 28 percent of all fiscal year 1984 certification activity. 1/

The Department of Comerce awarded cooperative agreements totaling $\$ 3.2$ million to 10 industry associations for trade-adjustment technical assistance. These associations represented producers of apparel and textiles, gears, leather products, electronics, wire machinery, industrial fabrics, uniforms, sporting goods, jewelry, and onions. 2/

## LAWS AGAINST UNFAIR TRADE

U.S. law provides remedies for U.S. industries against certain types of unfair trade actions, including (1) dumping, (2) subsidies, and (3) unfair methods of competition in import trade, such as patent infringement. It also

1/ Figures compiled from information provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

2/ Trade adjustment technical assistance programs, initially funded in previous years, continued in effect throughout fiscal year 1984 for industries that process shrimp and produce industrial machinery, footwear, mushrooms, stainless steel flatware, shakes and shingles, industrial fasteners, steel, cutlery, vitreous chinaware, earthenware, work gloves, luggage, handbags, handmade glass, hand tools, wool, loudspeakers, and hardwood products.
provides for enforcement of rights under trade agreements and remedies against unfair trade practices of foreign governments that burden or restrict u.S. commerce. As a result of the numerous antidumping and countervailing duty investigations undertaken in 1984 by the International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce, 23 new antidumping orders and 14 new countervailing duty orders were imposed. Out of 46 unfair practice investigations undertaken by the Commission, 14 resulted in exclusion orders. Under section 301 provisions addressing rights under trade agreements and certain foreign practices, the USTR instituted two new investigations in 1984 concerning EC subsidies on satellite launching services and EC technical standards on fertilizers.

## Antidumping Actions

The antidumping laws are designed to prevent unfair foreign competition due to international price discrimination. Under section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, $1 /$ the United States may impose antidumping duties to offset the effects of imports into the U.S. market that are determined to be priced below their fair value based on affirmative findings by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission. The Department of Comerce investigates whether imports are being, or are likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value. 2/ The International Trade Commission determines whether a domestic industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury or whether the establishment of a domestic industry is materially retarded by reason of such imports. 3/

The Department of Commerce completed 61 final antidumping investigations in 1984 on the issue of price discrimination, an increase of 144 percent from the 25 final investigations completed in 1983. Antidumping duties were imposed as a result of 22 of these investigations on a total of 18 products from 9 countries. The Commission completed 50 preliminary and 32 final antidumping investigations to determine material injury or threat thereof. Details of antidumping actions and outstanding orders--including suspension
$1 /$ The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 amended the Tariff Act of 1930 by adding title VII, containing new antidumping provisions. These provisions were amended recently by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.

2/ Sales at less than fair value exist whenever the price of goods exported to the United States is less than the price at which such or similar goods are sold in the market of the exporting country for home consumption. If the home market sale price is not based on normal commercial considerations, or if too few domestic sales have been made to provide an adequate basis for comparison, alternative methods, such as constructed value, are used.

3/ If the Commission issues an affirmative preliminary determination concerning material injury to a U.S. industry, a preliminary and a final investigation are conducted by the Department of Commerce to determine whether the imported product is being, or is likely to be, sold at less than fair value, within the meaning of the Tariff Act of 1930. The Commission issues its final injury determination either 120 days after Commerce's preliminary affirmative determination or 45 days after Commerce's final affirmative determination. If Commerce's preliminary determination is negative and its final determination is affirmative, the International Trade Commission issues its final injury determination within 75 days after the final affirmative determination.
agreements in effect $1 /$ and revocations in 1984--are presented in tables A-5 and A-6. A sumary of antidumping cases in 1984 follows.

## Summary of U.S. antidumping activity in 1984

Petitions filed- ..... 73
Investigations completed ..... 49
Preliminary Comission negative determinations ..... 4
Final Commerce determinations:
Negative ..... 5
Affirmative- ..... 38
Final Commission determinations:
Negative ..... 9
Affirmative ..... 19
Suspensions of investigations ..... 0
Withdrawal or termination of petitions ..... 13
Final antidumping orders ..... 22
Source: Compiled from records of the U. S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission.

The Commission conpleted two administrative reviews of outstanding antidumping orders in 1984 under section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930 2/ to determine whether revocation of an order in effect would cause material injury or threat thereof, or materially retard establishment of a domestic industry. In December 1984, the Commission issued an affirmative ruling on one investigation, resulting in the continuation of the order on drycleaning machinery from West Germany. The second case on acrylic sheet from Japan was dismissed prior to the Comission issuing a determination on the merits of the case. The Department of Comerce, through its administrative review

[^82]procedures (conducted in conformity with section 751 of the Tariff Act), revoked orders in 1984 on six products: printed vinyl film from Argentina; viscose rayon staple fiber from Belgium; condenser paper from France; tempered sheet glass from Japan; perchloroethylene from Belgium, France, and Italy; and pig iron from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, and the U.S.S.R.

## Countervailing Duty Actions

The U.S. countervailing duty law originally enacted in 1897 and amended most recently by the Trade anc Tariff Act of 1984 1/ is set forth in sections 303 and Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930. It provides for the levying of special duties to countervail or offset foreign subsidies on products imported into the United States. A material injury test was added to the U.S law in 1979 in title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671) to align the law with U.S. obligations under the GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Articles originating in countries that have been designated as a "country under the Agreement" for the purposes of title VII are entitled to this injury test by the Commission. 2/ Articles imported from other countries are subject to countervailing duties regardless of whether or not there has been injury to a domestic industry. In these cases, duties are levied under Section 303 ( 19 U.S.C. 1303) by the Department of Conmerce and producers are entitled to an injury test from the Comission only if an article entered free of duty.

Procedurally, the countervailing duty law is similar to the antidumping law. The Department of Commerce determines whether a subsidy exists and the margin of subsidy. The Comission, if an injury test is required, determines whether a domestic industry has been materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, or whether the establishment of a domestic industry has been materially retarded, by reason of imports of such subsidized merchandise.

The Department of Commerce completed 39 final countervailing duty investigations in 1984, representing a slight increase over the 35 investigations completed in 1983. Countervailing duty orders were imposed as a result of 14 of these investigations on a total of 11 products from 6 countries. The Commission completed 16 preliminary and 7 final investigations on the issue of material injury or threat thereof as a result of subsidized imports. Details of countervailing duty actions and outstanding orders--including suspension agreements in effect $\underline{3}^{/}$and revocations in

1/ The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 is discussed separately in chap. I.
2/ Most of the major U.S. trading partners have signed the GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. The Conmission also conducts preliminary and final injury investigations under sec. 303 if the imports enter the United States free of duty and the international obligations of the United States so require.

3/ A countervailing duty investigation can be terminated through a suspension agreement prior to a final determination by the Department of Commerce on the issue of subsidization, if (1) the government of the subsidizing country, or exporters accounting for substantially all of the imports of the merchandise under investigation, agree to eliminate the subsidy, to completely offset the net subsidy, or to cease exports of the merchandise to the United States within 6 months after suspension of the investigation; or (2) extraordinary circumstances are present and the government or exporters described above agree to take action that will completely eliminate the injurious effect of the imports of the merchandise under investigation. The investigation is reinstituted at the same stage where it was suspended if subsidization recurs.

1984--are presented in tables A-7 and A-8. A summary of countervailing duty cases in 1984 follows.

Summary of U.S. counteryailing duty activity in 1984
Petitions filed ..... 52
Investigations completed ..... 32
Preliminary Comission negative determination- ..... 3
Final Comerce determination:
Negative ..... 6
Affirmative determination ..... 18
Final Comission determination:
Negative ..... 2
Affirmative ..... 5
Suspension of investigation- ..... 3
Withdrawal or termination of petitions ..... 6
Final countervailing duty orders ..... 14

Source: Compiled from records of the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission.

The Commission completed one administrative review in 1984, under section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930, to determine whether revocation of a suspension agreement in effect would cause material injury or threat thereof, or materially retard establishment of a domestic industry. $1 /$ On December 13, 1984, the Commission issued an affirmative ruling, resulting in the continuation of the agreement reached between the Department of Commerce and the Government of Brazil on frozen concentrated orange juice. The Department of Commerce through its administrative review procedures (conducted in conformity with section 751 of the Tariff Act) revoked orders in 1984 on two products: cordage from Cuba and scissors and shears from Brazil.

1/ The Trade Agreements Act of 1979. amended the Tariff Act of 1930 to establish, under sec. 751 (19 U.S.C. 1675), a statutory procedure for the review of outstanding countervailing duty determinations or suspension agreements. Under sec. 751(a), periodic reviews are conducted by the Department of Commerce to adjust the amount of duty. (The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 amended this provision such that the periodic review will be conducted upon request rather than annually.) Under sec. 751(b), a review of a final determination or of a suspension agreement shall be conducted by the Department of Commerce (to determine if the unfair practice still exists) or the Commission (to determine if injury still exists) whenever it receives information or a request showing changed circumstances sufficient to warrant such review. Without good cause shown, however, no final determination or suspension agreement can be reviewed within 24 months of its notice. The party seeking revocation of an countervailing duty order has the burden of persuasion as to whether there are changed circumstances sufficient to warrant revocation.

The Commission completed four special administrative reviews, under the provisions of section 104 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, of outstanding countervailing duty orders in 1984. Two others were pending at yearend. 1/ Under this provision, foreign governments or exporters of merchandise whose products, subject to outstanding countervailing duty orders and entitled to an injury test under the terms of the 1979 trade act could, for a period of 3 years, request an injury review with respect to these outsianding orders. The remairider of the requested section 104 reviews will be completed in 1985. These review investigations were conducted under section 104 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 to determine whether a domestic industiry would be materially injured or threatened with material injury, or whether the establishment of a domestic industry would be materially retarded, by reason of imports subject to these outstanding countervailing duty orders.

In the first two cases, the Commission issued affirmative determinations resulting in the continuation of the orders on the products in question. These two cases involved certain castor oil products from Brazil and cotton yarn from Brazil. In the other two cases, the Commssion issued negative determinations. As a result, the Department of Commerce revoked the countervailing duty order on these products: bottled green olives from Spain and certain tomato products from Greece. Two section 104 investigations involving imports from Spain and India of oleoresins were in progress as of December 31, 1984.

Also under the provisions of section 104, the Governments of Australia and Spain requested in 1984 that the United States terminate its outstanding countervailing duty orders on butter from Australia and vitamin $K$, ferroalloys, and unwrought zinc from Spain. In response, the Commission contacted the original petitioners. Since the original petitioners desired to withdraw the petition, the Commission published notice of the withdrawal of petition and the proposed noninstitution of a review investigation. No adverse comments were received from any source. In these circumstances, the noninstitution of an investigation has the same effect as a determination of no material injury or threat thereof. Consequently, the Department of Commerce revoked the outstanding countervailing duty orders.

## Unfair Practices Investigations

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337) provides for investigations by the U.S. International Trade Commission to determine whether unfair methods of competition or unfair acts exist in the import or sale of imported articles in the United States. The Commission determines whether the effect or tendency of such acts is to destroy or substantially injure an efficient and economically operated U.S. industry, to prevent the

[^83]establishnent of an industry, or to restrain U.S. conmerce. ${ }^{1 /}$ If the Commission determines that a violation exists, it can issue an order--subject to Presidential review--excluding the subject imports from entry into the United States or order the violating parties to cease and desist from the unlawful practices. 2/ Section 337 investigations are usually instituted on the basis of a formal complaint; the Conmission can, however, institute an investigation on its own initiative. In 1984, as in previous years, most complaints of unfair acts brought before the Commission alleged infringement of a U.S. patent by imported merchandise. The exceptions in 1984 included cases involving trademark or copyright infringement, false advertising and labeling, and antitrust violations. 3/ Unfair practices that involve dumping or foreign government subsidies must be pursued under antidumping and countervailing duty provisions of the trade laws, not under section 337. The Commission normally completes section 337 investigations within 12 months; it may take 18 months in cases declared to be more complicated.

The Commission completed 46 investigations in 1984 under section 337, a significant increase over the 24 investigations completed in 1983. No violation of the statute was found in 6 of the 46 investigations completed. Fourteen investigations resulted in the issuance of exclusion orders. A fifteenth exclusion order was disapproved by the President. The remaining 24 investigations were terminated by the Conmission prior to issuance of findings: 10 on the basis of a settlement agreement; $i$ on the basis of a consent order; 3 with prejudice to the complainant; 2 on the basis of abatement; and 1 each for noninfringement, and complainants' motion. Commission activities involving section 337 actions in 1984 are presented in table A-9.

As of December 31, 1984, a tctal of 33 outstanding exclusion orders based on violations of section 337 were in effect. All but 8 of these involve patent violations. Table A-10 lists the irivestigations that preceded the issuance of the orders.

1/ Proceedings are conducted before an administrative law judge in accord with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. Following hearings, the administrative law judge transmits to the Commission a recomended determination. The Commissioners issue the final determination after reviewing the record and the recommended determination. If the Commission finds a violacion, it must determine the appropriate remedy, the amount of any bond to be collected while the order is pending before the President, and whether public-interest considerations preclude the issuance of an exclusion or cease and desist order. Violation of a Commission order may be subject to civil penalties of up to $\$ 10,000$ per day.

2/ A patent provides its holder with the right to exclude others from manufacturing, using, or selling the patented product, process, or design for a 17-year period. An exclusion order banning imports of articles that infringe the patent for the duration of the 17 -year period is often the remedy recommended in patent infringement cases. The Commission can order temporary exclusion of articles or issue a temporary cease-and-desist order during the pendency of an investigation. The Commission does not issue such orders if there are overriding public-interest considerations. The President may disapprove an order within 60 days of issuance for policy reasons.

3/ Other examples of unfair acts include breach of contract, collusive bidding, contributory infringement, failure to mark country of origin, refusal to deal or sell, trademark dilution, trade secret misappropriation, and fraudulent inducement to enter into a licensing agreement.

Traditionally, the Comission has conducted investigations under section 603 of the Trade Act of 1974 to gather information necessary to determine whether a basis exists for instituting a section 337 investigation. The Commission is generally authorized under section 603 to conduct preliminary investigations to determine the scope and manner of its proceedings and to consolidate proceedings before it.

The Commission, on April 11, 1984, instituted an investigation on certain hydrogenerators from Japan (inv. no. 603-TA-9) to examine the market for the article and to determine if allegations by the domestic hydrogenerator industry of unfair import practices merited a full section 337 investigation. The alleged unfair methods of competition consisted of a combination or conspiracy to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, a combination or conspiracy to allocate customers or markets, and the bidding on and sale, either individually or in concert, of hydrogenerators in the United States at predatory prices. At the close of 1984, this investigation was still pending.

## Enforcement of Trade Agreements and Response to Certain Foreign Practices

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, (19 U.S.C. 2411), gives the President the authority and means to enforce U.S. rights under trade agreements, including various nontariff agreements. According to time limits imposed under section 301, the President must try to obtain the elimination of trade practices of foreign governments and instrumentalities that, upon investigation, he determines to be unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory, and that burden or restrict U.S. commerce. 1/ An interdepartmental committee headed by the United States Trade Representative conducts these investigations (including hearings if requested), usually on the basis of petitions alleging 301 violations. 2/ If the foreign entity does not agree to change its practices, the President is empowered to (1) deny it the benefits of trade-agreement concessions, and (2) impose duties, fees, or other inport restrictions, where appropriate.

During 1984, three new section 301 petitions were filed, one of which was withdrawn prior to initiation. The case brought by Transpace Carriers, Inc. concerning satellite launching services reflects the increasing effort by service industries to obtain section 301 remedies. Of the six petitions filed

1/ Within this context, "commerce" includes services related to international trade, regardless of whether such services are related to specific products.

2/ The statute provides a number of procedures to be followed by the USTR and imposes time limits on actions. If the USTR accepts the petition, the statute directs that he consult with the foreign country or instrumentality involved. In the case of a dispute between Contracting Parties to the GATT, the GATT is used as a forum for attempts to settle a dispute. On some occasions, the United States has relied on the dispute settlement provisions of the GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. Art. XXIII also includes procedures that may be used if a Contracting Party believes that a benefit accruing to it is being nullified or impaired by another Contracting Party.
in 1983, only the three concerning foreign restrictions on U.S. soybean exports remain unresolved. Table 22 provides a summary of the activity on section 301 cases during 1984 that is described in greater detail below..

## Cases instituted

## EC subsidies on satellite launching services 1/

In a petition filed in May 1984, Transpace Carriers, Inc. alleged that the Member Governments of the European Space Agency--Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom-and their space-related instrumentalities subsidize satellite launching services offered by Arianespace. In July 1984, the USTR initiated the investigation and requested consultations with the members of the European Space Agency. At these consultations, held in November and December of 1984, USTR gathered information in order to determine how to proceed further with the investigation.

## EC technical standards for fertilizers 2/

In a petition filed on August 17, 1984, the Fertilizer Institute alleged that a technical standard for triple superphosphate adopted by the EC is inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT Standards code. On October 1, 1984, the USTR initiated an investigation. Following preliminary consultations with the EC near the end of 1984 , the USTR returned to the petitioner to collect further information on the case.

## Cases resolved

## Japanese import restrictions on leather 3/

In a petition filed in August 1977 the Tanners Council of America alleged that Japan violated GATT article XI in imposing quantitative restrictions on imports of leather from the United States and alleged that Japanese tariffs were excessively high. The U.S. consultations with Japan under GATT article XXIII(1) in January 1979 resulted in an understanding that Japan would expand the quota on imported leather. Since the terms of the understanding were not realized, the United States requested a GATT panel, which was established in April 1983. The GATT Council first considered the panel report of this subject in March 1984. 4/ After Japan agreed to adoption of the report in May, it promised to take remedial measures. Japan had not, however, completed implementation of these measures by yearend and the U.S. continues to monitor developments.

[^84]Table 22.--Summary of activity on section 301 investigations during 1984

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Inv. no/ } \\ & \text { Date filed } \end{aligned}$ | : | Petitioner |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { oduct or service/: } \\ & \text { country } \end{aligned}$ | Status at yearend 1984 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 301-6 | : | Millers National |  | Wheat flour/Euro- | GATT Subsidies code panel declined to de- |
| Nov. 1975 | : | Federation | : | pean Community | termine if EC violated code rules. Re- |
|  | : |  | : | : | port not as yet adopted by code members. |
|  | : |  | : | : |  |
| $301-11$ | : | Florida Citrus | : | Citrus fruits and : | GATT panel report completed in 1984 found |
| Nov. 1976 | : | Commission | : | juices/ European: | no EC violation of GATt rules but agreed |
|  | : |  | : | Community | that U.S. exports adversely affected. |
|  | : |  | : | : | U.S. followup continuing. |
|  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 301-13 | : | Tanners Council | : | Leather/ Japan | GATT panel report favoring U.S. position |
| Aug. 1977 | : | of America | : | : | adopted in May 1985. Follow-up on |
|  | : |  | : | : | implementation by Japan continues. |
|  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 301-15 | : | U.S. television | : | Television adver- | In Oct. 1984, the case was resolved by |
| Aug. 1978 | : | licensees | : | tising/ Canada | passage of legislation applying tax |
|  | : |  | : | : | treatment to Canadian advertisers simi- |
|  | : |  | : | : | lar to that subject of the complaint. |
|  | : |  | $:$ | : |  |

301-23

Sep. $1981:$\begin{tabular}{c}
National Broiler <br>
Council

$\quad$

Poultry/ European <br>
Community

$\quad$

Ongoing consultations have yielded no <br>
results as yet.
\end{tabular}

 favoring the U.S. in May 1984, but their
adoption is blocked by lack of consensus 301-26 : California Cling : Canned fruit and : GATT panel report, completed in July 1984, Oct. 1981 : Peach Advisory : raisins/Euro- : remains confidential until adoption
by the Contracting Parties. Report to
be considered by the Contracting Parties in 1985 .
301-34 : J.I. Case Company: Front-end loaders/: Following informal GATr onsutations, $\quad$ Canada $\quad$ USTR returned to the petitioner for further information to determine how to proceed with the case. Consultations with petitioner continuing.
301-35 Footwear Indus- : Non rubber foot- : Consultations with Brazil to liberalize Oct. 1982 : tries of Amer-: wear/ Brazil : market access are continuing.
$301-40$ : National Soybean : Soybean oil and : GATT Subsidies code consultations to conApr. $1983: \begin{aligned} & \left.\text { Processors }: \text { meal/ Brazil }: \begin{array}{l}\text { tinue into } 1985 \text { to confirm Brazil claim } \\ \text { : Association }\end{array}\right) \text { that barriers have been eliminated. }\end{aligned}$
301-41 :-----do.------ Soybean oil and : Portugal agreed to phase out State tra-
 ect purchases by private importers
implementation nearly complete.
Table 22.--Summary of activity on section 301 investigations during 1984--continued

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Inv. no/ } \\ & \text { Date filed } \end{aligned}$ | : | Petitioner |  | roduct or service/ country | : | Status at yearend 1984 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 301-42 \\ & \text { Apr. } 1983 \end{aligned}$ |  | do |  | Soybean oil and |  | Consultations are continuing. |
|  | : |  | : | meal/ Spain | : |  |
|  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 301-43 \\ & \text { Sep. } 1983 \end{aligned}$ | : | Rice Millers | : | Rice/ Taiwan | : | Petitioner withdrew petition following |
|  | : | Association | : |  | : | understanding that Taiwan would limit |
|  | : |  | : |  | : | subsidized rice exports. |
|  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 301-44 \\ & \text { Sep. } 1983 \end{aligned}$ | : | Air Courier Con- | : | Air transport of | : | Argentina agreed to temporarily lift the |
|  | : | ference of America | : | time-sensitive documents/ | : | postal restrictions in 1984 and terminated them early in 1985. |
|  | : |  | : | Argentina | : |  |
|  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 301-45 \\ & \text { Dec. } 1983 \end{aligned}$ | : | Moton Picture | : | Film distribution | : | Petition withdrawn in Apr. 1984. |
|  | : | Exporters | : | Taiwan | : |  |
|  | : | Association of | : |  | : |  |
|  | : | America | : |  | : |  |
|  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| 301-46 <br> May 1984 | : | Transpace | : | Satellite laun- | : | Information gathering consultations held |
|  | : | Carriers, Inc. | : | ching services/ | : | with members of the European Space |
|  | : |  | : | European Com- | : | Agency in Nov. and Dec. 1984. |
|  | : |  | : | munity | : |  |
|  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| $\bar{N} / \mathrm{A}$ |  | Sun-Diamond Grow- | : | Raisins/ European | : | Petition withdrawn prior to initiation. |
| Jul. 1984 | : | ers of America | : | Community | : |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 301-47 \\ & \text { Aug. } 1984 \end{aligned}$ | : | Fertilizer | : | Triple super- | : | After information consultations with the |
|  | : | Institute | : | phosphate/Euro- | : | EC at end of 1984, USTR requested fur- |
|  | : |  | : | pean Comminity | : | ther information from the petitioner in |
|  | : |  | : |  | : | order to determine how best to proceed |
|  | : |  | : |  | : | with the case. |
|  | : |  | : |  | : |  |

## Canadian tax deductions for television advertising 1/

In a petition filed August 1978, certain U.S. television licensees alleged that certain provisions of Canadian Income Tax Act unreasonably denied tax deductions to Canadian taxpayers for purchase from a U.S. broadcaster of advertising time aimed at the Canadian market, since the Canadian law did allow deductions for purchase of advertising time from Canadian broadcasters. After public hearings held in November 1978 and July 1980, the President determined that the most appropriate response was U.S. legislation that would mirror the Canadian tax practice. In October 1984, the United States enacted legislation that applied such tax provisions with respect to Canada. 2/

## Taiwan sunsidies n rice exports 3/

In a petition filed in September 1983, the Rice Millers Association alleged that Taiwan's subsidies on exports of rice restrict U.S. exports and burden the U.S. support program. Consultations with Taiwan were held in December 1983 and again in January and February of 1984. The petitioner withdrew its petition after bilateral discussions resulted in an understanding providing for limits on subsidized rice exports from Taiwan. Consequently, the USTR terminated the investigation in March 1984.

## Argentine postal restrictions 4/

In a petition filed in September 1983 the Air Courier Conference of America alleged that Argentine regulations granting exclusive control over the international air transportation of time-sensitive commercial documents (i.e. express mail) to the Argentine postal system were unreasonable. Consultations with Argentina were held in March 1984. In November 1984, the President determined that Argentine practices were an unreasonable restriction on U.S. commerce. He directed the USTR to hold another consultation, as requested by Argentina, and to submit proposals for section 301 action within 30 days. By the end of 1984 , Argentina had temporarily lifted the postal restrictions concerned. Early in 1985, the case was resolved when these restrictions were lifted permanently.

## Cases outstanding

## EC export subsidies on wheat flour 5/

In a petition filed in November 1975, the Millers National Federation alleged that the EC violated GATT article XVI(3) in using export subsidies to gain more than its equitable share of world trade in wheat flour. GATT article XXII(1) consultations were held in 1977 and 1980 and technical

[^85]discussions followed in 1981. The Subsidies code dispute settlement process began in September 1981. Conclusions of a Subsidies code panel charged with investigating the U.S. allegations were issued in early 1983. 1/ The panel report was considered several times by the code committee in 1983, but was not adopted. Consultations in the GATT to arrive at a resolution to this case continued throughout 1984. The Subsidies code committee was unable to reach consensus on adopting the report of the panel. 2/

## EC citrus preferences 3/

In a petition filed on November 1976, the Florida Citrus Comission alleged that EC preferential import duties on orange and grapefruit juices and fresh citrus fruits from certain Mediterranean countries adversely affected U.S. citrus producers. Public hearings were held in January 1977 . Following the 1979 Tokyo round in which duty reduction was obtained only on fresh grapefruit, GATT article XXII:1 consultations were held. Informal discussions, formal consultations under GATT article XXIII(1), and GATT Council conciliation efforts all failed to produced a mutually satisfactory resolution. Consequently, the GATT Council established a panel in November 1982. Since agreement on panel formation was difficult, meetings began only near the end of 1983 . The panel report, completed in 1984 , reportedily found no EC violation of specific GATT rules but agreed that U.S. exports had been adversely affected. 4/ The report of the panel was scheduled to be considered by the GATT council in March 1985.

EC and Brazilian export subsidies on poultry 5/
In a petition filed in September 1981, the National Broiler Council alleged that the EC violated GATT article XVI and the Subsidies code in using export subsidies that displace U.S. poultry exports to third-country markets. The United States held consultations with the EC under Article 12:3 of the Subsidies code in February 1982. In June 1982, the United States submitted requests for information under article 17 of the code to both the EC and Brazil. Frequent consultations have been held with both the EC and Brazil since 1982. The Subsidies code committee held the first conciliation meeting in November 1983. Conciliation efforts were repeated in 1984 but, due to their lack of success, the United States continued to hold consultations with the parties. In spite of frequent consultations in 1984, a resolution to this case could not be reached. U.S. efforts in formal and informal consultations in both bilateral and trilateral settings yielded no results. 6/

1/ The panel report has not been officially released to the public. However, numerous press reports state that the panel declined to determine whether the EC export subsidies violated specific provisions of the agreement.

2/ See the chap. II sec. entitled "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties" for further information.

3/ Inv. no. 301-11.
4/ For further information, see the "Dispute Settlement" sec. of chap. II.
5/ Inv. no. 301-23.
6/ For further details, see sec. of chap. II entitled "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties".

## EC export subsidies on pasta 1/

In a petition filed in October 1981, the National Pasta Association alleged that the EC violated GATT article XVI and the Subsidies code in using export subsidies on nonprimary products (pasta) which displaced U.S.-produced pasta in U.S. market. The United States requested a Subsidies code panel in April 1982. After several meetings, the panel submitted a report supporting the U.S. allegations to the code committee in May 1984. Although the comittee considered the report repeatedly, it could not reach consensus on a decision to adopt the report. Consensus was blocked principally by EC disagreement with the recommendations of the panel. 2/

## EC production subsidies on canned fruit and raisins 3/

In a petition filed in October 1981, the California Cling Peach Advisory Board alleged that the EC violated GATT article XVI in granting subsidies on member states' production of canned peaches, canned pears, and raisins. The petitioner claimed the subsidies, which caused EC sales to displace those of non-EC products in the EC, resulted in impairment of EC tariff concessions. Following unsuccessful consultations with the EC under GATT article XXIII(1), a GATT panel was set up to resolve the dispute. After making revisions based on U.S. and EC comments, the panel circulated the report to the Contracting Parties in July of 1984. Since subsequent attempts to arrive at a bilateral settlement have proven unsuccessful, the report will be submitted to the GATT Council for consideration in 1985 and, if adopted, would be released publicly at that time. 4/

## Canadian tax and customs measures on front-end loaders 5/

In a petition filed in July 1982, J.I. Case Company alleged that Canada's regulations allowing remission of customs duties and sales tax on certain front-end loaders are unreasonable and discriminatory, burden and restrict U.S. commerce, and violate the GATT and the Subsidies Code. In September 1982 the petition was amended and refiled. The investigation was initiated in October 1982 and public hearings were held. Informal consultations with Canada under GATT article XXII were held December 21, 1982. The USTR has been conducting consultations with the petitioner to obtain more information and determine the course of any further action.

## Brazilian import restrictions on nonrubber footwear 6/

In a petition filed in October 1982, the Footwear Industries of America, Inc., alleged that Brazil's import restrictions on nonrubber footwear, which deny U.S. access to the Brazilian market, are inconsistent with the GATT and

[^86]are unreasonable and/or discriminatory and a burden on U.S. commerce. Consultations were held under GATT article XXII in April 1983. Negotiations are continuing to encourage Brazil to liberalize market access for U.S. footwear exports.

## Barriers to U.S. exports of soybean oil and meal

In a petition filed April 6, 1983, the National Soybean Processors Association alleged that the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Malaysia, Portugal, and Spain engage in unfair practices, including export and production subsidies and quantitative restrictions, that restrict U.S. exports of soybean oil and meal. In May 1983, the USTR initiated investigations against Brazil (inv. no. 301-40), Portugal (inv. no. 301-41), and Spain (inv. no. 301-42). Consultations with Brazil, requested under article 12 of the Subsidies code, were held in November 1983. Consultations with Portugal and Spain were requested under GATT article XXII and held in November and December, respectively, of 1983.

Additional consultations with Brazil under the GATT Subsidies code are scheduled for April 1985 to discuss Brazil's claim that it has now eliminated subsidy practices in this area. Following GATT article XXII consultations, Portugal agreed to phase out the practice of purchasing foreign soy products through a State trading company and to allow private purchasers to import directly. The USTR is monitoring Portuguese progress on this action. The Spanish case was still pending at the end of 1984.

## Petitions withdrawn

## Taiwan discrimination against foreign film distributors 1/

In a petition filed in December 1983, the Motion Picture Exporters Association of America alleged that Taiwan discriminates against foreign film distributors. In January 1984, the USTR decided to initiate an investigation. The USTR terminated the investigation on April 26, 1984, as a result of withdrawal of the petition.

## EC minimum import prices on raisin imports

In a petition filed July 24 , 1984, Sun-Dianond Growers of America alleged that the EC minimum import prices on raisin imports were inconsistent with the GATT. A decision on initiation was due September 6, 1984 but the petition was withdrawn prior to that date.

## OTHER IMPORT ADMINISTRATION LAWS

## Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles

The Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, generally known as the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), controls over 75 percent of U.S.

[^87]imports of textiles and apparel. 1/ Originally put into effect in 1974, the MFA has been extended three times. The current arrangement, the MFA III, will expire on July 31, 1986. Negotiations for a new textile trade agreement are scheduled to begin in June 1985.

Forty-two parties, including the European Comunity as a single signatory, participate in the MFA III. Three countries--the People's Republic of China, the Dominican Republic, and Norway-acceded to the arrangement in 1984. Panama is expected to become a signatory shortly.

The MFA was designed to promote the expansion and liberalization of world trade in textiles while avoiding disruption of markets and production lines. It is an umbrella agreement run by the GATT that provides the legal framework under which bilateral accords are made. As of yearend 1984, the United States had bilateral agreements limiting imports of textiles with 29 nations, of which 25 were negotiated under the provisions of the MFA and 4 others under the authority of section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956. 2/ In 1984, Uruguay and the Maldives negotiated agreements with the United States for the first time and Romania renegotiated its agreement covering wool and manmade-fiber products. Agreements with Malaysia and Poland were renegotiated in January 1985. These bilateral agreements enable the United States to set aggregate limits on textile exports to the United States from a particular country and/or to set limits on exports in specific categories or groups of categories. 3/ U.S. bilateral agreements cover articles of cotton, wool, and manmade fibers. Those agreements that were in effect in 1984 are listed in table 23.

Several countries strongly protested new U.S. country-of-origin regulations, charging that they disrupted normal trading patterns established under existing bilateral accords. 4/ The new rules were designed to prevent a country that filled its quota from shipping its products to another country for minor transformation so that the goods could enter through the second country's unused quota. While countries like Hong Kong and China claim that the rules will jeopardize their textile industries, it is too early to discern any changes in actual trading patterns.

[^88]Table 23.--Bilateral restraint levels on exports of textiles to the United States, by sources, 1984


1/ These quantities represent overall aggregate limits. Other quantities are totals of limits established on individual product categories.

2/ Two separate bilateral restraint agreements are concluded with Romania.
Source: The Multifiber Arrangement, 1980-1984 (U.S. International Trade Commission Publication No. 1693, May 1985).

Meat Import Act of 1979
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), under the Meat Import Act of 1979, monitors imports and U.S. production of certain meats. 1/ U.S. imports of certain meats, mainly fresh chilled, or frozen beef, are subject to quantitative limitations imposed under authority of thee Meat Import Act of 1979 and to voluntary restraint agreements negotiated under the authority of the Agricultural Act of 1956.

In December 1983, the USDA estimated that imports of quota meat in 1984 would amount to 1,190 million pounds, approximately 39 million pounds below the "trigger" level of 1,229 million pounds requiring imposition of quantitative limitations. As a result, no quotas were imposed or voluntary restraint agreements negotiated on the covered categories of meats during 1984. Actual imports of meat controlled by the act amounted to 1,141 million pounds in 1984, 87 million pounds below the trigger level and approximately 49 million pounds below the previous estimate of the Department. On December 26,1984 , the USDA estimated that, in the absence of restraint, 1985 meat imports subject to the law would amount to 1,215 million pounds, 104 million pounds less than the 1985 trigger level of 1,319 million pounds.

## The Agricultural Adjustment Act

The International Trade Commission, at the request of the President, conducts investigations under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act to determine the impact of imports on price-support or other programs of the USDA. 2/

1/ The Meat Import Act of 1979 requires the President to impose quotas on imports of meat if the Secretary of Agriculture determines that annual imports of meat will equal or exceed a specified level. This level is based on U.S. production of meat. Included in the formula is a "counter-cyclical factor" which increases the maximum level of imports if U.S. domestic per capita supplies of meat are low and decreases the allowable level of imports if the domestic supply of meat is high.

2/ Sec. 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (7 U.S.C. 624) directs the Secretary of Agriculture to alert the President if he believes agricultural commodities are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, USDA programs, including price-support programs, or substantially reduce the amount of any product processed from a product covered by a USDA program.

If the President agrees with the Secretary of Agriculture, he directs the Commission to conduct an investigation and develop a report, including findings and recommendations, for his consideration. Following receipt of the Commission's report, the President may impose quotas or duties (not to exceed 50 percent of the imported product's value) to protect the program. In cases in which the Secretary of Agriculture determines that an emergency exists, the President may take action before the Commission investigation and report, and such emergency action continues in effect pending the Commission's eventual report and recommendation.

In September 1984, the President directed the Commission to institute an investigation to determine the impact of imported flue-, fire-, and dark air-cured tobacco and burley tobacco in unmanufactured form 1/ on the USDA's price-support and production-adjustment programs for tobacco. At the close of 1984 the results of this case (No. 22-47) were pending. 2/

Quantitative limits imposed in previous years under the authority of section 22 continued in effect throughout 1984 on cotton of certain specified staple lengths, cotton waste and certain cotton products; peanuts; certain dairy products; and sugar and certain sugar sirups and sugar-containing articles.

## National Security Import Restrictions

The Office of Industrial Resource Administration (OIRA) of the Department of Comerce completed one investigation in 1984 under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1862) 3/ on metal-cutting and metal-forming machine tools to determine the effects of imports of the subject articles on the national security of the United States. The OIRA, on February 27, 1984, submitted its findings on the machine tool industry to the President. At the close of 1984 , since the President had not acted on the report, the findings remained confidential.

The embargo on imports of crude oil produced in Libya (Presidential Proclamation No. 5141) remained in effect throughout 1984. 4/ Libyan policies and actions aided by proceeds from the exportation of oil to the United States were declared in 1982 to be adverse to the national security of the United States.

## Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act

The tariff provisions of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), 5/ commonly referred to as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), went into effect in 1984. The CBI was signed into law in August 1983 and became

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    1/ Provided for in items 170.20, 170.25, 170.32, 170.35, 170.40, 170.45,
170.50, 170.60, and 170.80 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States.
    2/ On Feb. 11, }1985\mathrm{ the Commission advised the President that these tobacco
products were not being imported in such quantities as to materially interfere
with USDA tobacco programs.
3/ Sec. 232 requires the Secretary of Commerce upon request or upon his own motion, immediately to initiate an investigation to determine the effects of imports of an article on the national security. If the Secretary finds the article is being imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, the Secretary must advise the President. Unless the President reverses this finding, the President must take whatever action for any duration he considers necessary to control the imports of the article and its derivatives so imports will not threaten to impair the national security.
4/ Sec. 232 authorizes the President to impose restrictions on imports that threaten to impair the national security. This authority traditionally has been used by the President to impose quotas and fees on imports of petroleum and petroleum products.
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5/ Public Law 98-67, title II.
fully effective on January 1, 1984. A 12-year program, the CBI is designed to foster economic development in the Caribbean Basin by providing a combination of trade preferences, aid, and investment incentives to eligible countries. 1/

The centerpiece of CBI is a one-way trade preference program that allows duty-free access of eligible products to the U.S. market, provided 35 percent of their value is added in a Caribbean Basin country participating in the program. CBI preferences constitute one of three major duty-free or duty-reduction programs available to Caribbean countries from the United States. The other two, which have been in effect for years, are the Generalized System of Preferences $\underline{2 / I}^{\prime}$ and duty provisions under TSUS items 806.30 and 807.00 . The latter provisions reduce duties for products that originate in the United States but have been further processed or assembled in a foreign country. 3/ Table A-11 shows imports from the Caribbean region in 1984 separately under these preference programs. Duty-free imports under CBI privileges totaled $\$ 578$ million in 1984 or 6.5 percent of total U.S. imports from the region.

Out of 27 potential beneficiaries, the President of the United States initially designated 20 for CBI trade benefits. This number had not changed by the end of 1984. The list of all designated and nondesignated Caribbean countries (and the overall U.S. imports from them in 1982-84) is shown in table 24. The table shows the Bahamas in the nondesignated group since the eligibility of this country as the $21 s t$ beneficiary was announced early in 1985. 4/

In 1984, total U.S. imports from the Caribbean Basin amounted to $\$ 8.9$ billion (table A-11). This was slightly down from such imports in 1983, reflecting declining Caribbean shipments of crude oil and refined oil products to the United States. Imports of oil and oil products, which account for nearly half of all U.S. imports from the region, are not eligible for duty-free treatment under CBI (or any other preferential program.) 5/ The imports of these product groups from the Caribbean Basin in 1984 are shown in appendix table A-12. Discounting the oil-related trade, U.S. imports from the Caribbean have increased in 1984.

The leading import items from the Caribbean Basin are shown in table A-13. Principal nonoil products included coffee, sugar, fresh bananas, beef, bauxite, and nitrogenous fertilizers. Table 25 shows the principal import items from the Caribbean that entered the United States under the CBI program. Many also appear on table A-13 among leading import items from the

1/ For a discussion of the CBI and its implications, see the sec. entitled "Caribbean Basin Initiative", Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983 p. 25.

2/ For a discussion of GSP, see the next sec. in this chapter.
3/ See Imports Under Items 806.30 and 807.00 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, 1979-82, (U.S.International Trade Commission Publication 1467, January 1984).

4/ For the criteria the President must consider for designating a country for CBI benefits, see Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983 pp. 27-28.

5/ In addition to petroleum and petroleum products, textile and apparel, footwear, luggage, handbags, leather wearing apparel, canned tuna, and some other products are also ineligible for CBI preferences.

Table 24.--U.S. imports for consumption from the Caribbean Basin, by country, designated or nondesignated for CBI benefits, 1982-84
(Customs value, in thousands of dollars)

| Country : | 1982 | : | 1983 | : | 1984 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Designated countries: |  |  |  |  |  |
| Caricom (except Guyana): |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 4,890 |  | 8,809 |  | 7,898 |
| Barbados | 106,631 |  | 202,047 |  | 252,598 |
| Belize | 38,464 |  | 27,315 |  | 42,843 |
| Dominica | 2,372 |  | 242 |  | 86 |
|  | 401 |  | 211 |  | 766 |
| Jamaica | 278,108 |  | 262,360 |  | 396,949 |
|  | 749 |  | 924 |  | 989 |
| St. Christopher-Nevis- |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 11,557 |  | 18,758 |  | 23,135 |
| St. Lucia------------------10: | 4,703 |  | 4,700 |  | 7,397 |
| St. Vincent and Grenadines--: | 1,394 |  | 4,276 |  | 2,958 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1,628,392 |  | 1,317,534 |  | 1,360,106 |
| Subtotal | 2,077,661 |  | 1,847,175 |  | 2,095,724 |
| : |  |  |  |  |  |
| Central America (except |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nicaragua): |  |  |  |  |  |
| Costa Rica- | 358,127 |  | 386,520 |  | 468,633 |
|  | 310,022 |  | 358,898 |  | 381,391 |
|  | 330,142 |  | 374,692 |  | 446,267 |
| Honduras---------------------- | 359,553 |  | 364,742 |  | 393,769 |
| Panama | 250,764 |  | 336,086 |  | 311,627 |
|  | 1,608,608 |  | 1,820,937 |  | 2,001,687 |
| ( |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other designated: |  |  |  |  |  |
| British Virgin Islands------: | 892 |  | 880 |  | 1,335 |
| Dominican Republic---------- | 622,510 |  | 806,520 |  | 994,427 |
|  | 309,860 |  | 337,483 |  | 377,413 |
| Netherlands Antilles | 2,106,750 | : | 2,274,510 | : | 2,024,367 |
| Subtotal------------------ | 3,040,012 |  | 3,419,394 |  | 3,397,542 |
| : |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total designated----------: | 6,726,281 |  | 7,087,506 |  | 7,494,954 |
| : |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nondesignated countries: |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bahamas------------------------ | 1,045,217 |  | 1,676,394 |  | 1,154,282 |
| Cayman Islands---------------: | 14,830 |  | 8,607 |  | 6,212 |
| Guyana------------------------- | 70,655 |  | 67,332 |  | 74,417 |
| Nicaragua------------------------ | 86,875 |  | 99,013 |  | 58,064 |
| Turks and Caicos Islands Total nondesignated- | 60,147 |  | 63,147 |  | 104,636 |
|  | 3,556 |  | 3,965 |  | 3,935 |
| Total nondesignated | 1,281,280 |  | 1,918,459 |  | 1,401,545 |
|  |  | . |  |  |  |
| : |  |  |  |  |  |
| Grand total, Caribbean Basin-----: | 8,007,561 |  | 9,005,965 |  | 8,896,499 |
|  |  | : |  | - |  |

1/ St. Christopher-Nevis and Anguilla count as two designated countries.
Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Table 25.--Leading items in U.S. imports for consumption from the Caribbean Basin, by descending value of CBI duty-free imports, 1984

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
TSUS \\
item no.
\end{tabular} \& : \& Item \& Total U.S. imports for consumption from CBI \& \(:\)
\(:\)
\(:\)
\(:\)

: \& Duty-free under CBI \& \& Share of CBI dutyfree to total CBI \& \& Leading CBI source <br>
\hline \& : \& : \& \& : \& \& : \& \& : \& <br>
\hline 155.20 \& : \& Sugars, Sirups, and molasses \& 443,667 \& : \& 207,334 \& : \& 46.7 \& \& Dominican <br>
\hline \& : \& : \& \& \& \& \& \& \& Republic <br>
\hline 106.10 \& : \& Beef and veal \& 99,822 \& : \& 81,223 \& : \& 81.4 \& \& Costa Rica <br>
\hline 687.74 \& : \& Monolithic intergrated circuits-------: \& 217,819 \& \& 58,622 \& : \& 26.9 \& \& E1 Salvador <br>
\hline 169.14 \& : \& Rum (including cana paraguaya)-------- \& 32,258 \& \& 31,684 \& \& 98.2 \& \& Jamaica <br>
\hline 170.35 \& : \& Cigarette leaf------------------------- \& 36,212 \& : \& 30,501 \& : \& 84.2 \& \& Panama <br>
\hline 170.70 \& : \& Cigars---------------------------------- \& 36,888 \& : \& 14,860 \& : \& 40.3 \& \& Dominican <br>
\hline \& \& : \& \& \& \& \& \& \& Republic <br>
\hline 685.80 \& : \& Electrical capactiors \& 38,953 \& \& 9,296 \& \& 23.9 \& \& El Salvador <br>
\hline 170.32 \& : \& Filler tobacco leaf-------------------: \& 8,490 \& : \& 8,014 \& : \& 94.4 \& \& Guatemala <br>
\hline 165.35 \& : \& Citrus fruit juices------------------- \& 7,678 \& \& 7,658 \& \& 99.7 \& \& Belize <br>
\hline 148.96 \& : \& Pineapples \& 9,527 \& \& 7,561 \& : \& 79.4 \& \& Honduras <br>
\hline 686.10 \& : \& Resistors \& 29,003 \& : \& 7,246 \& : \& 25.0 \& \& Barbados <br>
\hline 688.43 \& : \& Electrical articles and parts--------: \& 16,692 \& : \& 6,985 \& : \& 41.8 \& \& -do- <br>
\hline 170.45 \& : \& Filler tobacco------------------------ \& 6,700 \& \& 5,471 \& : \& 81.7 \& \& Dominican <br>
\hline \& : \& : \& \& \& \& \& \& \& Republic <br>
\hline 685.90 \& : \& Electrical switches \& 94,034 \& : \& 5,441 \& : \& 5.8 \& \& Haiti <br>
\hline 136.00 \& : \& Pasheens \& 6,206 \& \& 5,207 \& : \& 83.9 \& \& Dominican <br>
\hline \& : \& : \& \& \& \& \& \& \& Republic <br>
\hline 170.40 \& : \& Filler tobacco------------------------- \& 5,603 \& : \& 4,765 \& : \& 85.0 \& \& ---do--- <br>
\hline 170.60 \& : \& Strap tobacco \& 6,662 \& : \& 4,392 \& - \& 65.9 \& \& ---do- <br>
\hline 737.30 \& : \& Toy figs, springles \& 6,603 \& \& 2,917 \& : \& 44.2 \& \& Haiti <br>
\hline 152.72 \& : \& Bananas and plantai \& 4,153 \& : \& 2,614 \& : \& 62.9 \& \& Costa Rica <br>
\hline 148.03 \& : \& Mangoes \& 3,686 \& : \& 2,590 \& : \& 70.3 \& \& Haiti <br>
\hline \& : \& Total, above item \& 1,110,655 \& : \& 504,381 \& : \& 45.4 \& : \& <br>
\hline \& : \& Total, all items from CB \& 8,896,499 \& : \& 577,704 \& - \& 6.5 \& : \& <br>
\hline \& : \& : \& \& : \& \& : \& \& : \& <br>
\hline
\end{tabular}

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
area in general. While imports under CBI privileges are dominated by agricultural products (sugar, beef, rum, tobacco, and citrus juices), they also include industrial products, mostly electrical items and toys.
U.S. Customs Service requirements in effect throughout 1984 for showing eligibility under CBI had been simplified by the end of the year. 1/ It is believed that these new, less-cumbersome regulations will boost CBI trade.

Since the CBI was first proposed in February 1982, the United States has steadily increased economic assistance to the region. Such assistance will amount to an estimated $\$ 1.5$ billion in fiscal year 1985. ${ }^{2} /$ The CBI also contains legislative incentives to encourage investment in the Caribbean Basin. Its provisions permit U.S. firms to deduct from their taxes convention expenses incurred in CBI beneficiary countries, thereby fostering investment into the region's tourism. In general, the U.S. Government instituted a very broad program of investment promotion for the area, which includes providing guidance to U.S. firms wishing to establish business in the Caribbean.

## GSP Review

The results of the last annual review under the original Generalized System of Preferences of the United States became effective on March 30, 1984. 3/ The review was based on 1983 trade data. In January 1985, GSP was extended in a revised form, providing for different review proceedings and schedules. 4/

The U.S. GSP is a temporary tariff preferences scheme designed to offer the products of developing countries a price advantage over other imports in U.S. markets. 5/ Nonreciprocal duty-free treatment for designated articles is intended to help beneficiary developing countries to become more competitive in international markets and to diversify their economic structures away from production of primary goods. The U.S. GSP scheme is administered by USTR.

In the 1984 product review, 22 products, representing imports of $\$ 7$ million in 1983, were added to the list of GSP-eligible items, compared with an addition of $\$ 10$ million (based on trade in 1982) in the previous

[^89]review. Meanwhile, three products, with a 1983 import value of $\$ 33$ million were removed from the program because of import sensitivity. This compares with removals amounting to $\$ 76$ million in the previous review.

Under the statutory competitive-need provision, products accounting for $\$ 10.7$ billion in 1983 imports were removed from the GSP list, $1 /$ making them subject to MFN rates of duty effective March 31, 1984. Removals based on competitiveness amounted to $\$ 7.1$ billion in the previous review (based on trade in 1982).

Moreover, the President "graduated" 2/ $\$ 1.2$ billion in 1983 imports from duty-free treatment under his discretionary authority compared with $\$ 900$ million in the previous review. Items that were graduated in earlier years and have not been redesignated to GSP eligibility in 1984 are responsible for most new graduations. The value of products of advanced beneficiary countries (ABC's) removed from GSP eligibility in the latest review in response to petitions of affected parties totaled $\$ 183$ million (based on imports in 1983.) 3/ Almost three-fourths of these new graduations of $A B C$ products are accounted for by Taiwan, the remainder by imports from Korea and Hong Kong.

Exclusions from eligibility under both statutory and discretionary provisions totaled $\$ 11.9$ billion. For the first time in the 10 -year history of the GSP, the value of exclusions (based on 1983 trade) has exceeded the value of imports actually receiving GSP treatment ( $\$ 10.8$ billion in 1983).

In 1984, 140 countries and territories were eligible for GSP tariff treatment on over 3,000 items, with manufactures and semimanufactures accounting for a large share. The United States imported products worth $\$ 13$ billion duty free under this system in 1984 (table 26) compared with $\$ 10.8$ billion in 1983. Duty-free imports under the GSP accounted for 4 percent of overall U.S. imports and 13 percent of GSP-eligible imports during the year.

1/ There are two competitive-need limits. The first, expressed in dollars, changes yearly to reflect the growth of United States gross national product. In 1984, 140 countries and territories were eligible for GSP tariff treatment on over 3,000 items, with manufactures and semimanufactures accounting for a large share. For the purposes of this last review, the dollar limit was $\$ 57.7$ million. The other limit is 50 percent of the appraised value of total imports. Each limit is applicable to each GSP eligible article from a beneficiary country. The so-called competitive-need provisions of the GSP law establish dollar and import-share limits on the amount of any item that can be imported duty free in any year for any single country. For a more detailed discussion of the U.S. and foreign GSP schemes, see operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 32d Report, 1980, p. 226.

2/ Graduation is recognition that a beneficiary country does not currently need GSP treatment for particular products in order to be competitive.

3/ A report to Congress by the President found 5 countries (Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan) to be the most advanced beneficiary countries in 1979, having obtained a combined disproportionate share (nearly 70 percent) of total benefits (U.S. President, Report to Congress on the First 5 Years of the Operation of the U.S. GSP Progran, April 17, 1980)..
Table 26.--U.S. imports $1 /$ for consumption 2/ from GSP beneficiary countries

| Item $\quad:$ | Advanced GSP beneficiaries | : | Middle- <br> income GSP beneficiaries |  | Low- <br> income GSP beneficiaries |  | Total, all beneficiary countries | : $:$ $:$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Total, } \\ \text { all } \\ \text { countries } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| Total imports-------thousand dollars--: | : \$62,591,351 | : | \$42,482,408 | : | \$870,535 | : | \$105,944,294 | : | \$320,441,971 |
| GSP-eligible products---------do---: | : 24,745,442 | : | 4,926,473 | : | 234,117 | : | 29,906,032 | : | 99,509,858 |
| Duty-free under GSP----------do---: | : 9,629,546 | : | 3,275,696 | : | 90,618 | : | 12,995,860 | : | 12,995,860 |
| Competitive-need exclusions--do---: | : 12,286,373 | : | 780,936 | : | 32,899 | : | 13,100,208 | : | 13,100,208 |
| Other-----------------------do---: | : $2,829,523$ | : | 869,841 | : | 110,599 | : | 3,809,964 | : | 73,413,791 |
| Noneligible product imports----do---: | : $37,845,909$ | : | 37,555,935 | : | 636,418 | : | 76,038,262 | : | 220,932,112 |
| Ratio of: |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| GSP-eligible imports to total |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| imports--------------percent----: | : 39.5 | : | 11.6 | : | 26.9 | : | 28.2 | : | 31.1 |
| GSP duty-free imports to GSP |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| eligible imports---------------- | : 38.9 | : | 66.5 | : | 38.7 | : | 43.5 | : | 13.1 |
| Competitive-need exclusions to |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| GSP-eligible imports-------do-----: | $: 49.7$ | : | 15.9 | : | 14.1 | : | 43.8 | : | 13.2 |
| Other imports to GSP-eligible : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| imports------------------do-----: | : 11.4 | : | 17.7 | : | 47.2 | : | 12.7 | : | 73.8 |
| GSP duty-free to total : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| imports-------------------do-----: | : 15.4 | : | 7.7 | : | 10.4 | : | 12.3 | : | 4.1 |
| Country group share of total GSP : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| duty-free imports----------do-----: | : 74.1 | : | 25.2 | : | 0.7 | : | 100.0 | : | 100.0 |
| Country group share of total : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| competitive-need exclusions---do--: | : 93.8 | : | 6.0 | : | 0.3 | : | 100.0 | : | 100.0 |
|  | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\overline{2} /$ In this and other tables in this s | section, U.S. i |  | rt data exc1 |  | de entries int |  | the U.S. Vi |  | Is lands, |
| whīch totaled \$2.5 billion in 1984. Th | his is consiste |  | with the con |  | ept of U.S. im |  | rts used in |  | GSP |
| program for the competitive-need determ | minations. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3/ For the purposes of this table, ad | dvanced GSP ben |  | ciaries incl |  | de Taiwan, Ko |  | , Hong Kong |  | xico, Brazi |
| Singapore, and Is rael. The low-income | GSP beneficiar |  | ategory incl |  | $s$ the 26 cou |  | ies design |  | as least- |
| developed developing countries in headn category includes the other 107 countri | note 3(d) of th ies currently e |  | ariff Schedu ible. |  | of the Unit |  | States. |  | iddle-income |

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Seven advanced beneficiary countries (as defined in footnote 3 of table 26) supplied over 74 percent of overall U.S. imports that received duty-free treatment under the GSP in 1984 (table 27). These countries--. Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, Brazil, Mexico, Israel, and Singapore--were the leading GSP suppliers of the United States. GSP-duty-free imports from the ABC's amounted to $\$ 9.6$ billion in 1984. GSP imports from middle-income beneficiaries totaled $\$ 3.3$ billion, accounting for over 25 percent of the total. Low-income beneficiaries were responsible for less than 1 percent of all GSP imports. Table V-5 shows duty-free imports under GSP separately for the 7 ABC's, and the ratio of such imports to GSP-eligible and total U.S. imports from these countries in 1984. These leading beneficiaries of the GSP program were the same in 1984 as in 1983. The leading GSP importer, in terms of value, was Taiwan. GSP imports from Taiwan amounted to $\$ 3.2$ billion in 1984 and were responsible for one-fourth of all U.S. imports under the program. The highest share of overall imports from any country that entered the United States duty free under GSP was from Israel (37.8 percent). By contrast, only 6.2 percent of overall U.S. imports from Mexico entered under GSP, since petroleum, the dominant item in this trade flow, is not GSP eligible.

Based on a five-digit TSUS classification system, sugar continue to account for the largest value among all GSP-eligible items entering the United States duty free in 1984 (table A-14). Eighty-eight percent of overall U.S. sugar imports was GSP eligible during the year and 52 percent of eligible imports entered duty free. Table A-15 lists GSP-eligible imports by two-digit divisions of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). Table A-16 gives the same information by divisions of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).
Table 27.--U.S. imports under the GSP from advanced GSP


APPENDIX A

## STATISTIGAL TABLES

Table A-1.,--Leading items exported to Israel, by Schedule B items, 1982-84

Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.
Table A-2.--Leading items imported from Israel, by TSUS items, 1982-84

Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.
Table A-3.--Countervailing duty actions reported by signatories to the GATT Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 1984

Table A-4.--Antidumping actions reported by signatories to the GATT Committee on Antidumping practices, 1984

| Reporting country | : Action taken | Product : | Initiation date | : | $\begin{gathered} \text { Provisional } \\ \text { measures } \end{gathered}$ | Final outcome |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 边 | ( |  | : |  |  |
| Australia | : Austria-m-m----: |  | $8-2-83$ $7-18-83$ | : |  | 5-24-84 - Definitive duty. <br> 3-23-84 - No injury. |
|  | : Belgium----m----: |  | 5-18-83 | : | 8-5-83 | 2-17-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | ------do----m: | Phosphoric acid-m-m | 4-27-83 | . |  | 2-17-84 - No injury. |
|  | Brazil-m-m-n-: | Phthalic anhydride | 10-31-84 |  |  |  |
|  | Canada--m------ | Fluorescent lamps (20w and 40w) | 12-19-83 | : | 12-11-84 |  |
|  | -do-m-----: | Paper cold drink cups-mmmen-m-m-m-m-m-m-m-m | 10-7-83 |  | 10-26-83 | 4-10-84 - No injury. <br> 7-18-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | :-m-n-m-do-n-mmers: |  | 12-30-83 | : |  | 7-18-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | : China-m-m-m---: |  | $5-28-84$ $6-1-83$ | : |  | 4-17-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | do----m- | Ceramic tableware <br> Male industrial overalls-mum-monmon-m-n-men: | 8-12-83 | : |  | 5-9-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | --m-do---mm: | Paint brushes | 2-7-84 | : |  | 10-26-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | -do-m-m--: | Passenger car tires | 2-2-84 | : |  | 4-13-84 - No injury. |
|  | do | Steel jerricans | 4-18-84 | : |  | 6-25-84 - Case withdrawn. |
|  | Czechoslovakiam: | Passenger car tires | 2-2-84 | : |  | 4-13-84 - No injury. |
|  | :--m-m-mo-m-m-m: | Polyester woven wool worsted fabric-m-m-m-m-m- | 5-28-84 | : |  | 7-18-84 - No injury. |
|  | : E. Germany-mom: | Fluorescent lamps | 9-28-84 | : | 12-11-84 |  |
|  | : France-n-mom- | Influenza vaccine | 3-15-84 |  |  | 7-17-84 - No dumping. |
|  | -do -------: | Polystyrene | 12-30-83 | : | 4-6-84 | 7-18-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | :-mm-n-do-m-n-m: | Polyvinyl chloride general purposem-m-m-m-m-m: | 12-9-83 | : |  | 6-14-84 - No dumping. |
|  | Hong Kong | Ceiling sweep fan | 11-1-83 | : |  | 8-21-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | : Hungary - --m-m- | Fluorescent lamps | 9-28-84 | : | 12-11-84. |  |
|  | : Israel-n-m-n-mme: | Phthalic anhydrite | 10-31-84 |  |  |  |
|  | : Italy-mmon-mo--: | Cherries in brine- | 2-10-84 | . | 4-2-84 | 6-26-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | ----do-m--m- | Dextrose monohydrat | $9-28-84$ $12-23-83$ |  | 3-1-84 | 7-27-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | m---do-m--m-m: |  | $12-24-84$ |  |  |  |
|  | Japan-m-m-n---m: | Dishwashers - | 3-1-83 | . |  | 6-12-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  |  | Empty gelatin capsules | 11-7-83 |  | 11-17-83 | 6-29-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | do-m-m---: |  | 6-27-83 |  |  | 4-27-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | -do--n-m-: |  | 1-16-84 | . |  | 3-16-84 - No injury. |
|  | d | Malleable cast iron pipe fittings-m-m-m-m-----: | 1-2-83 |  |  | 2-13-84 - No injury. |
|  | --mo-do-mem: | Phosphoric acid- | 4-24-84 |  |  | 11-29-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | :-m-m----do-m-m--: | Small diameter welded carbon steel pipes and : and tubes. | 12-29-83 |  | 3-20-84 | 9-26-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | :--mm----do-m-----: | Fluoroscent lamps | 9-28-84 |  | 12-11-84 |  |
|  | -do--m-m: | Domestic gas mete | 8-1-84 |  |  | 9-26-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | do-m-x-s- | Gas space heaters-mm-mmm-m-n-m-m-n-mm-m-m: | 6-21-84 |  |  |  |
|  | -do----m- | Polypropylene film braxially oriented-n---m-m: | 5-28-84 |  |  | 7-25-84 - Case withdrawn. |
|  | -do-m-----: | Phosphoric acid-m-n-mm-m-m-n-m-m-m-m-n-m- | 4-24-84 |  |  | 11-29-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | Netherlands-m-m: | Expoxidised soya bean oilm-m-n-m-mmmom-m-n-m: | 5-18-83 |  |  | 3-2-84 - No injury. |
|  | ------do-m----: | Polyvinyl chloride general purpose homopolymer-m: | 10-31-83 |  |  | 4-6-84 - No dumping. |
|  | New Zealand=-m--: | Dishwashers ---m-m-n-m-------m-n-m-m-m-m-m-m: | 8-4-83 |  |  | 2-21-84 - No injury. |
|  | :--mm----do-m----: |  | 1-16-84 |  |  | 3-16-84 - No injury. |
|  | ---do ---m-m: | Gas space heaters | 6-21-84 |  |  | 10-26-84 - No dumping. |
|  | do | Refrigerators, display-m-m-n-m-n-m-n-m-m-m- | 6-1-84 |  |  |  |
|  | ---do------- | Sparkplugs-replacement-m-m-m-m-n-m-m-m-m-m- | 11-30-82 |  |  | 5-21-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | -do------: | Yacht winches and handles-m-m-n-m-m-m-m-m- | 11-16-83 | : |  | 2-20-84 - No injury. |
|  | -----do--mm- |  | 7-20-84 | - |  | 9-20-84 - No injury. |
|  | : | : |  | : |  |  |

Table A-4.-Antidumping actions reported by signatories to the GATT Committee on Antidumping practices, 1984-Continued



| Reporting country | : Action taken : $: \quad$ against | Product : | $\begin{gathered} \text { Initiation } \\ \text { date } \end{gathered}$ | : | Provisional measures | : | Final outcome |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Australla-con't | : | 发 | 6-8-84 | : |  | . | 8-8-84 - No injury. |
|  | : West Germany | Basalt-lined steel pipe and fittings Cold rolled sheet and coll steel | 12-23-83 | : |  | : | 2-8-84 - No injury. |
|  |  | Diagnostic reagent strips--mmemmenmen-mommen: | 1-25-84 | : |  |  | 8-24-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | -do |  | 5-18-83 |  |  |  | 3-2-84 - No injury. |
|  | ---do -m-m--: | Hot-dipped zinc coated sheet and coll steel-mm: | 12-23-83 | : |  |  | 2-8-84 - No injury. |
|  | : -m-n-m-do-m-m-m: |  | 12-30-83 | : |  |  | 7-18-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | ----do --mm-m: | Polyvinyl chloride general purpose homopolymer-: | $4-6-84$ $2-24-83$ |  |  |  | 2-21-84 - No injury. |
|  |  |  | $2-24-83$ $6-4-84$ | : |  |  | 9-18-84 - No dumping. |
|  | -: | Alloy steel chain and fittings-m-m-mmon-m-s-m: | 5-28-84 | : |  |  | 7-18-84 - No dumping. |
|  | : --m-n-m-do - - | Supermarket tr | 9-28-84 | : | 12-11-84 | : |  |
|  | :------m- | Power transformer | 8-22-84 | : |  |  | 10-11-84 - No injury. |
|  | : -cmen-m-do-memex: | Titanium dioxide pigments-mmenomommemmemex: | 3-9-84 | : |  | : | 10-16-84 - Case withdrawn. |
|  | : Austria-memememe | Alloy tool steel bars, plate and forgingsmenm-m: | 8-22-84 | : |  |  |  |
|  | : China-mmomeme: | Wooden clothespins - | 5-22-84 | : |  | : | 7-10-84 - No injury. |
|  | : ---m-m-do --wnmem: |  | 5-22-84 | : | 8-1-84 | : | 10-22-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | --do-- | Recreational camping ten | 6-15-84 | : | 9-4-84 | : | 10-30-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | -sodo -mmom: |  | 8-23-83 | : | 3-22-84 | : | 6-20-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | : --m-n-m-do-mm: |  | 6-15-84 |  |  |  |  |
|  | : Czechoslovakia-: |  | 5-22-84 | : | 8-1-84 | : | 10-22-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  |  |  | 9-12-83 | : | 2-28-84 |  | 5 |
|  | -----do -mmem: | Wooden clothespins | 5-22-84 | : | 2-28-84 | : | 5-28-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | : E. Germany - -mm: | Camping ten | 3-19-84 |  | 11-2-84 |  |  |
|  | : France-mmomen: |  | 10-31-83 | : |  |  | 2-21-84 - Case withdrawn. |
|  |  | Aluminum alloy alpine ski poles m-m-memmememe | 11-10-83 | : | 3-12-84 |  | 5-14-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  |  | Photo albums with self-adhesive leaves and/or : | 7-13-84 |  | 12-28-84 |  |  |
|  |  | components parts thereof. |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | : ---n-m-do --mmem: | Self adhesive leaves | 7-17-84 |  | 12-19-84 |  |  |
|  | : Italy -mmemox-mes: |  | 7-26-83 | : | 1-30-84 |  | 4-27-84 - No injury. |
|  | do-mmom: | Aluminum alloy alpine ski poles --memememememe | 11-10-83 | . | 3-12-84 |  | 5-14-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | -do-m-mom: |  | 7-31-84 | . |  |  | 12-19-84 - Terminated. |
|  | -mmommdo - | Shotshells and rimtire | 10-31-83 |  |  |  | 2-21-84 - Case withdrawn. |
|  | : - |  | 3-14-84 | : | 6-27-84 |  |  |
|  | : Japan-mmemmemen | Hydraulic turbines - | 9-8-83 |  | 6-11-84 |  | 9-7-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  |  | Nickel and nickel alloy pipe and tubing-mmmem: | 7-16-84 | : |  |  |  |
|  | ----do-mmem: |  | 2-19-84 |  | 11-2-84 |  |  |
|  | -mundo -mommem | High voltage porcelain insulators | 7-3-84 |  | 11-6-84 |  |  |
|  | momodo mommem: | Stainless steel nickel-mmomemensummmmemmme: | 6-2-83 |  | 1-13-84 |  | 1-13-84 - Case withdrawn. |
|  | -m-do-m-mem: |  | 6-2-83 |  | 1-13-84 |  | 1-13-84 - Case withdrawn. |
|  | : Korea-mmmemmemer |  | 7-4-84 |  | 11-9-83 |  | 2-3-84 - No injury. |
|  | : Mexico-n-mmmm: |  | 10-31-83 |  |  |  | 2-21-84 - Case withdrawn. |
|  | : Netherlands-mm: | Carbon steel and alloy platemmmonmmmmommome: | 8-30-83 |  | 10-28-83 |  | 1-26-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | : Norway-mon-oumm: | Aluminum alloy alpine ski poles memmen-mommem: | 11-10-83 |  | 3-12-84 |  | 5-14-84 - No injury. |
|  | : Rep. of Ireland-: |  | 2-4-83 | . | 12-28-83 |  |  |
|  | : Korea - -monmmom: |  | 7-13-84 |  | 12-28-84 |  |  |
|  | : -m-m--xdo mmen-m: | Alloy tool steel bars, plates, and forgings-mm: | 8-22-84 |  |  | - |  |
|  | -mondo -n-mmem: |  | 6-2-83 | . | 1-13-84 |  | 4-16-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | ---do -momem: | Nickel alloy pipe and tubemmmen-mmmmomemen-m: | 6-2-83 |  | 1-13-84 |  | 4-16-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | : | Nickel |  | : |  | : |  |

Table A-4.--Antidumping actions reported by signatories to the GATT Committee on Antidumping practices, 1984-Continued

Table A-4.--Antidumping actions reported by signatories to the GATT Committee on Antidumping practices, 1984--Continued

| Reporting country | : Action taken $: \quad$ against | 8 | Product | $\begin{gathered} \text { Initiation } \\ \text { date } \end{gathered}$ | 8 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Provisional } \\ \text { measures } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | : | Final outcome |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EC--con't | : | : | 8 |  | : |  | 8 |  |
|  | : Japan-w----- |  |  | 7-14-83 | : | 3-23-84 | : | 7-21-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 3-24-84 | : | 12-22-84 | : |  |
|  | :--------do---- |  |  | 4-13-84 | 8 | 12-28-84 | 8 |  |
|  | :--------do---- |  |  | 7-31-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | :-------do---- |  | Wrought titanium | 9-7-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | :-------do--- |  |  | 10-4-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | : Norway------- |  |  | 8-1-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | : --------do--- |  | Aluminium | 8-2-83 | : |  | : | 2-28-84 - Other action. |
|  | : Poland------ |  |  | 1-19-84 | : |  | : | 8-21-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | : -------do---- |  |  | 3-31-84 | : | 10-18-84 |  |  |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 7-21-83 | : |  | : | 8-21-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | :-------do----- |  |  | 7-31-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | :-------do----- |  |  | 8-1-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | :-------do----- |  |  | 11-16-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | : Romania---- |  |  | 1-19-84 | : |  | : | 8-21-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 8-3-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 11-16-84 | 8 |  | : |  |
|  | :-------do---- |  | Cold rolled steel sections-------------------->:- | 4-23-83 | : |  | : | 3-27-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 4-23-83 | : | 12-20-83 | : | 5-3-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | : Singapore--- |  |  | 7-14-83 | : | 3-23-84 | : | 7-21-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | : Spain------ |  |  | 9-13-83 | : |  | : | 3-31-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | :-------do----- |  |  | 10-19-83 | : |  | : | 6-28-84 - Other action. |
|  | :-------do----- |  | Concrete reinforcing bars----------------------10:- | 11-5-83 | : | 11-5-83 |  | 2-4-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 1-28-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 9-30-83 | : |  | : | 9-25-84 - No dumping. |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 1-28-84 | : |  | : | 8-21-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 3-8-84 | : |  | : | 9-7-84 - No dumping. |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 3-31-84 | : |  | : | 10-18-84 - No dumping. |
|  | :-------do |  |  | 6-1-84 | : |  | : | 10-26-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 8-1-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | -do |  |  | 8-4-84 | : |  | : | , |
|  | :------do---- |  |  | 10-16-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | :-------do |  |  | 11-16-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | : Sweden------ |  |  | 3-13-84 | : |  | : | 9-22-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | : United States |  | Sodium carbonate----------------------------8: | 4-13-84 | : | 8-2-84 | : | 11-29-84 - Definitive duty. |
|  | :------do---- |  |  | 9-7-84 | : |  | : | 9-25-84 - No dumping. |
|  | :-------do |  |  | 10-14-83 | : |  | : | 4-19-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | : Yugoslavia- |  | Artificial corundum---------------------------20: | 9-30-83 | : |  | : |  |
|  | :-------do--- |  |  | 11-8-83 | : |  | : | 8-11-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 8-3-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | :-------do---- |  |  | 8-1-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | ---do |  | Basic chrome sulphate---------------------------- | 10-16-84 | : |  | : |  |
|  | ----do---- |  | Wood particle board | -do- |  |  | : |  |
|  | :-------do- |  |  | 2-10-83 | : |  | : | 2-28-84 - Other action. |
| Finland | : Switzerland |  | Triphase and double rate electricity meterb----- | $\begin{aligned} & 3-26-84 \\ & 3-26-84 \end{aligned}$ | : | $\begin{aligned} & 10-1-84 \\ & 9-17-84 \end{aligned}$ | : | 12-21-84 - Price undertakings. |
|  | : Pakistan---- |  |  | 4-20-83 | : |  | : | 2-28-84 - No subsidy. |
| Japan | : | : | : |  | : |  | : | 2-22-84 - Case withdrawn. |
| Spain | : Italy |  |  | 4-30-84 | : | 7-30-84 | : | : |
|  | : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  |

Table A-5,--Antidumping cases active in 1984, by final outcome and USITC investigation number







[^90]Table A-6.-Antidumping orders and findings in effect as of Dec. 31, 1984

| Country and commodity | Effective date of original action 1/ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Antidumping orders in effect |  |
| Argentina: |  |
| Carbon steel wire rods- | Nov. 23, 1984. |
| Printed vinyl film | Aug. 24, 1973. |
| Australia: canned bartlett pears | Mar. 23, 1973. |
| Austria: railway track equipment | Feb. 17, 1978. |
| Belgium: sugar- | June 13, 1979. |
| Brazil: |  |
| Hot-rolled steel plate | Mar. 22, 1984. |
| Hot-rolled steel plate in coil | Mar. 22, 1984. |
| Wire rods | Nov. 16, 1983. |
| Hot-rolled sheet | June 13, 1979. |
| Printed vinyl film | Aug. 24, 1973. |
| Canada: |  |
| Choline chloride | Nov. 19, 1984. |
| Sugar and syrups | Apr. 9, 1980. |
| Paving equipment | Sept. 7, 1977. |
| Racing plate | Feb. 27, 1974. |
| Elemental sulphur | Dec. 17, 1973. |
| Potato granules | Sept. 27, 1972. |
| Pig iron | July 24, 1971. |
| Steel jacks | Sept. 13, 1966. |
| Steel bars and shapes | Sept. 25, 1964 |
| Steel reinforcing bars | Apr. 21, 1964. |
| Chile: sodum nitrate- | Mar. 25, 1983. |
| China: |  |
| Barium chloride | Oct. 17, 1984 |
| Chloropicrin | Mar. 22, 1984. |
| Potassium permanganate | Jan. 31, 1984. |
| Shop towels | Oct. 4, 1983. |
| Printcloth | Sept. 16, 1983. |
| Dominican Republic: portland cement- | May 4, 1963 |
| East Germany: montan wax- | Sept. 10, 1981 |
| Finland: |  |
| Condenser paper | Sept. 21, 1979 |
| Rayon staple fiber | Mar. 21, 1979 |
| France: |  |
| Nitrocellulose | Aug. 10, 1983 |
| Stainless steel sheet and strip | June 22, 1983 |
| Sorbitol | Apr. 9, 1982 |
| Anhydrous sodium metalsilicate- | Jan. 7, 1981 |
| Sugar | June 13, 1979 |
| Rayon staple fiber | Mar. 21, 1979 |
| Stainless steel wire rods- | Aug. 28, 1973 |
| Large power transformers | June 14, 1972 |

See footnote at end of table.

# Table A-6.-Antidumping orders and findings in 

 effect as of Dec. 31, 1984-Continued| Country and commodity | Effective date of original action 1/ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Antidumping orders in effect-Continued |  |
| Italy: |  |
| Woodwind pads | Sept. 21, 1984. |
| Strontium nitrate | June 25, 1981. |
| Spun acrylic yar | Apr. 8, 1980. |
| Rayon staple fiber | June 13, 1979. |
| Pressure sensitive tape | Oct. 21, 1977. |
| Large power transformers | June 14, 1972. |
| Clear sheet glass | Dec. 9, 1971. |
| Japan: |  |
| Cell-site transceivers | Dec. 30, 1984. |
| Titanium sponge | Nov. 30, 1984. |
| Cyanuric acid | Apr. 27, 1984. |
| Dichloroisocyanurates | Apr. 27, 1984. |
| Trichloroisocyanuric acid | Apr. 27, 1984 |
| Pagers | Aug. 16, 1983. |
| Pipe and tubing | Mar. 2, 1983. |
| Stainless clad steel plate - | Aug. 6, 1982. |
| High powered amplifiers | July 20, 1982. |
| Large electric motors | Dec. 24, 1980. |
| Portable electric typewriters | May 9, 1980. |
| Spun acrylic yarn | Apr. 8, 1980. |
| Steel wire strand | Dec. 18, 1978. |
| Carbon steel plate | May 30, 1978. |
| Impression fabric | May 25, 1978. |
| Swimming pools | Sept. 2, 1977. |
| Melamine- | Feb. 2, 1977. |
| Acrylic sheet | Aug. 30, 1976. |
| Tapered roller bearing | Aug. 17, 1976. |
| Birch 3-ply doorskins- | Feb. 18, 1976. |
| Calcium pantothenate | Jan. 17, 1974. |
| Expanded metal | Jan. 16, 1974. |
| Polychoroprene rubber | Dec. 6, 1973. |
| Steel wire rope | Oct. 15, 1973. |
| Synthetic methionine | July 23, 1973. |
| Roller chain | Apr. 12, 1973. |
| Bicycle speedometers | Nov. 22, 1972. |
| Cadmium | Aug. 4, 1972. |
| Large power transformers | June 14, 1972. |
| Fishnetting | June 9, 1972. |
| Ferrite cores | Mar. 13, 1971. |
| Television receiving sets | Mar. 10, 1971. |
| Tuners- | Dec. 12, 1970. |

See footnote at end of table.

Table A-6.-Antidumping orders and findings in effect as of Dec. 31, 1984-Continued

| Country and commodity | Effective date of original action 1/ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Antidumping orders in effect-Continued |  |
| Korea: |  |
| Carbon steel plate | Aug. 22, 1984. |
| Television receiving sets | Apr. 30, 1984. |
| Rectangular pipes and tubes | May 7, 1984. |
| Circular pipes and tubes- | May 7, 1984. |
| Steel wire nails | Sept. 11, 1982. |
| Bicycle tires and tubes | Apr. 13, 1979. |
| Mexico: elemental sulphur | June 28, 1972. |
| Netherlands: animal glue- | Dec. 22, 1977. |
| Spain: |  |
| Carbon steel wire rods | Sept. 27, 1984. |
| Potassium permanganate- | Jan. 9, 1984. |
| Sweden: |  |
| Staples | Dec. 20, 1983. |
| Staplers | Dec. 20, 1983. |
| Animal glue | Dec. 22, 1977. |
| Stainless steel plate | June 8, 1973. |
| Taiwan: |  |
| Bicycle tires and tubes- | June 12, 1984. |
| Circular pipes and tubes | May 7, 1984. |
| Television receiving sets | Apr. 30, 1984. |
| Fireplace mesh panels | June 7, 1982. |
| Carbon steel plate- | June 13, 1979. |
| Polyvinychloride sheet and film- | June 30, 1978. |
| Clear sheet glass | Aug. 21, 1971. |
| Trinidad and Tobago: carbon steel wire rods | May 4, 1983. |
| United Kingdom: diamond tips | Apr. 1, 1972. |
| U.S.S.R.: titanium sponge- | Aug. 28, 1968. |
| West Germany : |  |
| Tool steel | July 25, 1983. |
| Stainless steel sheet and strip- | June 23, 1983. |
| Barium carbonate- | June 25, 1981. |
| Sugar- | June 13, 1979. |
| Animal glue- | Dec. 22, 1977. |
| Drycleaning machinery | Nov. 2, 1972. |
| Yugoslavia: animal glue | Dec. 22, 1977. |
| Suspension agreements in effect |  |
| Canada: sheet piling- | Sept. 14, 1982. |
| Hungary: axles | Jan. 4, 1983. |
| Japan: small electric motors | Nov. 6, 1980. |
| Romania: carbon steel plate- | Jan. 4, 1984. |

See footnote at end of table.

Table A-6.-Antidumping orders and findings in effect as of Dec. 31, 1984-Continued

| Country and commodity | Effective date of original action 1/ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Revocations in 1984 |  |
|  |  |
| Belgium: |  |
| Perchloroethy lene_- May 18, 1979. |  |
| Viscose rayon staple fiber | Mar. 21, 1979. |
| Czechoslovakia: pig iron - |  |
| East Germany: pig iron O Oct. 29, 1968. |  |
| France: |  |
| Condenser paper__ |  |
| Perchloroethylene_ May 18, 1979. |  |
| Italy: perchloroethylene- | May 18, 1979. |
| Japan: tempered sheet glass $\longrightarrow$ Sept. 13, 1971. |  |
| Romania: pig iron OnC Oct. 29, 1968. |  |
| U.S.S.R.: pig iron $\longrightarrow$ Oct. 29, 1968. |  |

1/ The U.S. Department of Commerce completes a periodic review of outstanding antidumping orders and suspensions agreements, upon request, to determine if the amount of the net margin of underselling has changed. If a change has occurred, the imposed antidumping duties are adjusted accordingly. The results of the periodic review must be published together with a formal notice of any antidumping duty to be assessed, estimated duty to be deposited, or investigation to be resumed.

Source: International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Table A-7.--Countervailing-duty cases active in 1984, by final outcome and USITC investigation number

| USITC investigation number | Product |  | Country | ```Date``` | : | Pre11minary determination |  |  | : | $\begin{gathered} \text { Final : } \\ \text { determination } \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Date } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { final } \\ & \text { action } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | : |  | USITC | $\bar{\vdots}$ | ITA $2 /$ | ! | ITA $2 /$ |  | USITC 3/: |  |
|  | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
|  | : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| Affirmative: | : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| 4/ | : | Carbon steel wire rod-----------: | Trin. \& Tobago--: | 06/15/83 |  | - | : |  |  | A |  |  | 01/04/84 |
| 41 |  | Bricks | Mexico----------: | 11/18/83 |  | - | : |  |  | A |  | - : | 05/08/84 |
| $4 /$ |  | Cold rolled carbon steel sheet---: | Argentina-------: | 12/08/83 |  | - | : A |  |  | A |  |  | 04/26/84 |
| 41 |  | Carbon steel bars and shapes----: | Mexico----------: | 04/03/84 |  | - |  |  |  | A |  |  | 09/07/84 |
| $4 /$ |  | Lime-----------------------------10-1 | Mexico----------: | 04/16/84 |  | - |  |  |  | A |  | - : | 09/11/84 |
| 4/ |  | Oil country tubular goods-------: | Argentina------: | 07/11/84 |  | - | : A |  |  | A |  | - : | 11/27/84 |
| $4 /$ |  | Ofl country tubular goods------: | Mexico--------: | 07/11/84 |  | - | : A |  |  | A |  |  | 11/30/84 |
| 701-TA-202 |  | Certain shop towels-------------: | Pakistan--------: | 07/27/83 |  | A | : |  |  | A | : | A | 02/23/84 |
| 701-TA-205 | : | Certain carbon steel products---: | Brazil---------: | 10/10/83 |  | A | : |  |  | A | : |  | 06/08/84 |
| 701-TA-206 |  | Certain carbon steel products----: | Brazil---------- | 10/10/83 |  | A |  |  |  | A | : | A | 06/08/84 |
| 701-TA-207 | : | Certain carbon steel products----: | Brazil----------: | 10/10/83 |  | A | : A |  |  | A | : | A | 06/08/84 |
| 701-TA-209 |  | Carbon steel wire rod----------- | Spain----------: | 11/23/83 |  | A | A |  |  | A | : | A | 06/22/84 |
|  | : |  |  |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| Negative: | : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 5/ 303-TA-015 |  | Potassium chloride-------------- | Israel----------: | 04/26/84 |  | A | : |  |  | A |  | N | 09/14/84 |
| 4/ |  |  | Mexico----------: | 10/26/83 |  | - | : |  |  | N |  | - : | 04/16/84 |
| 4/1 |  | Carbon steel wire rod------------ | Czechoslovakia--: | 12/21/83 |  | - | : |  |  | N 61 |  | - : | 05/07/84 |
| 4/ |  | Carbon steel wire rod-----------: | Poland------- | 12/21/83 |  | - |  |  |  | N 7 |  |  | 05/07/84 |
| 701-TA-203 |  | Pads for woodwind instrument----: keys. | Italy ---------- | 11/07/83 | : | A | : |  | : | N | : | - : | 04/25/84 |
| 701-TA-210 |  |  | France--------- | 01/27/84 | : | N |  |  |  | - |  |  | 03/12/84 |
| 701-TA-211 | : | Certain table wine---------------> | Italy---------- | 01/27/84 |  | N |  |  |  | - |  | - : | 03/12/84 |
| 701-TA-212 | : | Certain carbon steel products---: | Australia-------: | 02/10/84 |  | A | : N |  |  | N |  | - : | 07/25/84 |
| 701-TA-213 | , |  | Spain -------- | 03/30/84 |  | A |  | A |  | A | : | N | 10/29/84 |
| 701-TA-214 | : |  | New Zealand-----: | 04/18/84 |  | N |  |  |  | - |  | - : | 06/04/84 |
|  | : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| Suspension | : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| agreement: | : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| 4/ | : | Unprocessed float glass---------: | Mexico---------- | 10/17/83 |  | - |  |  |  | S |  | - : | 02/28/84 |
| 4/ | : | Cotton shop towels | Peru-----------: | 04/18/84 |  | - | : A |  |  | S |  | - : | 09/12/84 |
| 4/ | : | Portland hydraulic cement-------: | Costa Rica------: | 07/18/84 |  | - | : |  |  | S |  | - : | 12/03/84 |
|  | : | : |  |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| Terminated: | : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| 4/ |  | Textiles and textile mill | Portugal-------- | 08/15/84 |  | - | : |  |  | - |  | - : | 12/21/84 |
|  | : | products and apparel. | : |  | : |  |  |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| 4/ | : | Textiles and textile mill products and apparel. | Panama----------: | 08/17/84 | : | - | : |  | : | - | : | - : | 12/04/84 |
|  | : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| Withdrawn: | : | : | : |  | : |  | , |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 4/ | : | Carbon steel products-----------: | Mexico----------: | 12/08/83 |  | - |  |  |  | W |  | - : | 04/25/84 |
| $4 /$ | : | Potassium chloride--------------- | USSR------------: | 04/16/84 |  | - |  |  |  | - |  | - : | 06/06/84 |
| 4/ | : | Potassium chloride--------------: | East Germany----: | 04/26/84 |  | - |  |  |  | - |  | - : | 06/06/84 |
| 701-TA-222 | : | Certain cast-iron pipe fittings--: | India----------- | 09/18/84 |  | W |  |  |  | - |  | - : | 10/09/84 |
|  | : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |

Table A-7.--Countervailing-duty cases active in 1984, by final outcome and USITC investigation number--Continued

| ```USITC investigation number``` | : | Product | : | Country | Date petition filed 1/ | : | Prellminarydetermination |  |  | : | Finaldeteprmination |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Date } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { final } \\ & \text { action } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | : |  | : |  |  | : | US ITC |  | ITA 2/ | : | ITA 2/ |  | USITC 3/: |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Pending at } \\ & 12 / 31 / 84: \end{aligned}$ | : |  | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
|  | : |  | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
|  | : |  | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| $4 /$$4 /$ |  | Welded carbon steel pipes and | : | Spain----------: | 08/13/84 | : | - | A | A | : |  | : - | - | Pending |
|  | : | tubes. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
|  | : | Textiles and textile mill | : | Peru------------- | 08/14/84 | : | - | P | P | : |  | : - | - | Pending |
|  |  | products and apparel. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
|  | : |  | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
|  | : |  | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 4/ |  | Textiles and textile mill | : | Singapore-------: | 08/14/84 | : | - | : N | N | : |  | : | - | Pending |
|  |  | products and apparel. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 4/ | : | Textiles and textile mill | : | Sri Lanka-------: | 08/15/84 | : | - | A | A | : |  | : | : | Pending |
|  |  | products and apparel. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 4/ |  | Textiles and textile mill | : | Thailand--------: | 08/15/84 | : | - | A | A | : |  | : | : | Pending |
|  |  | products and apparel. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 4/ |  | Textiles and textile mill | : | Turkey----------: | 08/15/84 | : | - | : A | A | : - |  | : - | : | Pending |
|  |  | products and apparel. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 4/ |  | Textiles and textile mill | : | Argentina-------: | 08/15/84 | : | - | A | A | : - |  | : | : | Pending |
|  |  | products and apparel. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 4/ |  | Textiles and textile mill | : | Indonesia-------: | 08/15/84 | : | - | A | A | : |  | : - | : | Pending |
|  |  | products and apparel. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 4/ |  | Textiles and textile mill | : | Malaysia--------: | 08/15/84 | : | - | A | A | : |  | : - | : | Pending |
|  | : | products and apparel. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| $4 /$ | : | Textiles and textile mill | : | Columbia--------: | 08/17/84 | : | - | A | A | : |  | : | : | Pending |
|  |  | products and apparel. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 4/ |  | Textiles and textile mill | : | Mexico----------: | 08/17/84 | : | - | - | - | : |  | : - | : | Pending |
|  |  | products and apparel. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 4/1 |  | Fabricated automotive glass---- |  | Mexico----------: | 08/27/84 | : | - | A | A | : |  | : | - | Pending |
|  | : | Textiles and textile mill | : | Philippines----: | 08/30/84 | : | - | A | A | : |  | : - | : | Pending |
| 4/ | : | products and apparel. | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
|  |  | Welded carbon steel pipe \& tube | : | Mexico----------: | 11/23/84 | : | - | : | - | : |  | : | - : | Pending |
| 4/ | : | products. | : | - |  | : |  | : |  |  |  | : | : |  |
|  | : | Paper-related school and office | : | Mexico---------: | 12/12/84 | - | - | : | - | : | - | : - | : | Pending |
|  | : | supplies. | : | - |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 701-TA-215 |  | Oil country tubular goods------ |  | Brazil ----------: | 06/13/84 | : A | A | A | A | : A |  | : | : | Pending |
| 701-TA-216 |  | 011 country tubular goods------ |  | Korea----------: | 06/13/84 | : A | A | A | A | : A |  | : - | - | Pending |
| 701-TA-217 | : | 011 country tubular goods ------ |  | Spain-m-------: | 06/13/84 | : A | A | A | A | A |  | : - | - | Pending |
| 701-TA-218 | : | Certain cold-rolled carbon steel | : | Korea-----------: | 06/18/84 | : A | A | N | N | N |  | : | - : | Pending |
|  |  | products. | - | - |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 701-TA-219 |  | Certain cold-rolled carbon steel |  | Korea-----------: | 06/18/84 | : A | A | A | A | A | A | : - | - | Pending |
|  | - | sheet. | : | - |  | - |  | : |  | : |  |  | : |  |
| 701-TA-220 | : | Certain welded carbon steel | : | Spain----------: | 07/17/84 | : A | A | A | A | - |  | : - |  | Pending |
|  | : | pipes \& tubes. | : | : |  | - |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 701-TA-221 } \\ & 701-\mathrm{TA}-223 \end{aligned}$ |  | Certain cast-iron pipe fittings | : | Brazil---------: | 09/18/84 | : A | A | A | A | : |  | : - | - | Pending |
|  | : | Agricultural tillage tools------ |  | Brazil---------- | 09/28/84 | : $A$ | A | : | - | : | - | : | - | Pending |
|  | : |  | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |
| 701-TA-224 |  | Live swine and fresh, chilled | : | Canada--------: | 11/02/84 | : A | A | : | - | : | - | : - |  | Pending |
|  |  | and frozen pork. | : | : |  | . |  | : |  | : |  | - | : |  |
|  | : |  | : | . |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |  |

Table A-7.--Countervailing-duty cases active in 1984, by final outcome and USITC investigation number--Continued

| suspension agreement (S), terminated |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| USITC investigation number | : Product |  | Country $\quad \vdots$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Date } \\ & \text { petition } \\ & \text { filed 1/ } \end{aligned}$ | ! | $\begin{gathered} \text { Prellminary } \\ \text { determination } \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\bar{\vdots}$ | $\underset{\text { determination }}{\text { Final }}$ |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | : |  | US ITC |  | ITA $2 /$ | ! | ITA $2 / 1$ |  | USITC 3/: |  |
|  | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |  |
| 701-TA-225 |  | Carbon steel plates, whether or | Sweden----------: | 12/19/84 | : | - |  |  | : |  | : |  | Pending |
| 701-TA-226 |  | Carbon steel plates, whether or | Venezuela-------: | 12/19/84 | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | - : |  |
|  |  | not in coils. | V | 12/19/84 | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : | Pending |
| 701-TA-227 |  | Hot-rolled carbon steel sheets---: | Austria---------: | 12/19/84 |  | - |  | - |  |  |  |  | Pending |
| 701-TA-228 |  | Hot-rolled carbon steel sheets--: | Sweden---------: | 12/19/84 |  | - |  | - |  |  |  |  | Pending |
| 701-TA-229 |  | Hot-rolled carbon steel sheets---: | Venezuela-------: | 12/19/84 |  | - |  | - |  |  |  |  | Pending |
| 701-TA-230 |  | Cold-rolled carbon steel plates and sheets. | Austria--------: | 12/19/84 | : | - | : | - | : |  | : |  | Pending |
| 701-TA-231 | : | Cold-rolled carbon steel plates and sheets. | Sweden---------: | 12/19/84 | : | - |  |  | : |  |  |  | Pending |
| 701-TA-232 | : | Cold-rolled carbon steel plates and sheets. | Venezuela-------: | 12/19/84 | : | - |  |  |  | - |  |  | Pending |
| 701-TA-233 | : | Galvanized carbon steel sheets---: | Austria---------: | 12/19/84 |  | - |  | - |  |  |  | - : | Pending |
| 701-TA-234 |  | Galvanized carbon steel sheets---: | Venezuela-------: | 12/18/84 |  | - |  | - |  |  |  |  | Pending |
| 701-TA-235 | : |  | Brazil---------: | 12/20/84 | : | - |  | - |  |  |  | : | Pending |
|  | : | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | : |  |

[^91][^92]Table A-8.-Countervailing orders and findings
in effect as of Dec. 31, 1984

| Country and commodity | Effective date of original action 1/ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Countervailing duty orders in effect |  |
| Argentina: |  |
| Oil country tubular goods | Nov. 22, 1984. |
| Cold-rolled steel sheet- | Apr. 26, 1984. |
| Wool | Apr. 4, 1983. |
| Leather wearing apparel- | Mar. 17, 1983. |
| Nonrubber footwear | Jan. 17, 1979. |
| Woolen garments | Nov. 16, 1978. |
| Australia: sugar content of articles- | Mar. 24, 1923. |
| Brazil: |  |
| Certain carbon steel products | June 20, 1984. |
| Pig iron | Apr. 4, 1980. |
| Cotton yarn | Mar. 15, 1977. |
| Certain castor oil products | Mar. 16, 1976. |
| European Cormunity: sugar 2/ | July 31, 1978. |
| France: nitrocellulose- | Mar. 22, 1983. |
| India: |  |
| Certain iron-metal castings | Oct. 6, 1980. |
| Certain fasteners- | July 21, 1980. |
| Oleoresins | Apr. 9, 1979. |
| Israel: fresh cut roses | Sept. 4, 1980. |
| Italy: forged under-carriages | Jan. 4, 1984. |
| Japan: |  |
| Chains of iron or steel- | Aug. 24, 1978. |
| Certain fasteners- | May 6, 1977. |
| Korea: |  |
| Certain steel products | Feb. 18, 1983. |
| Steel pipes and tubes | Feb. 18, 1983. |
| Bicycle tires and tubes | Jan. 12, 1979. |
| Mexico: |  |
| Oil country tubular goods | Nov. 11, 1984. |
| Lime | Sept. 11, 1984. |
| Bars, rebars, and shapes | Aug. 17, 1984. |
| Bricks | May 8, 1984. |
| Portland hydraulic cement and cement clinker | Sept. 21, 1983. |
| Carbon black | June 20, 1983. |
| Iron-metal castings | Mar. 2, 1983. |
| Toy balloons and playballs | Dec. 27, 1982. |
| Litharge, red lead, and lead stabilizers | Dec. 6, 1982. |
| Ceramic tile | May 10, 1982. |
| Leather wearing apparel | Apr. 10, 1981. |

See footnote at end of table.

Table A-8.-Countervailing orders and findings in effect as of Dec. 31, 1984-Continued

| Country and commodity | Effective date of original action 1/ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Countervailing duty orders in effect-Continued |  |
| Pakistan: cotton shop towels | Mar. 4, 1984. |
| Peru: |  |
| Cotton sheeting and sateen | Feb. 1, 1983. |
| Cotton yarn- | Feb. 1, 1983. |
| Philippines: canned tuna | Oct. 30, 1983. |
| South Africa: |  |
| Steel concrete reinforcing bars | Oct. 28, 1982. |
| Steel wire rope | Sept. 27, 1982. |
| Certain steel products | Sept. 7, 1982. |
| Ferrochrome- | Mar. 11, 1981. |
| Spain: |  |
| Carbon steel wire rod | Dec. 10, 1984. |
| Oil country tubular goods | Nov. 30, 1984. |
| Stainless steel wire rod- | Jan. 3, 1983. |
| Certain steel products | Jan. 3, 1983. |
| Amoxicillin trihydrate and its salts | July 27, 1979. |
| Ampicillin trihydrate and its salts | Mar. 22, 1979. |
| Oleoresins | Feb. 28, 1979. |
| Chains and parts thereof, of iron or steel | Jan. 24, 1978. |
| Sweden: viscose rayon staple fiber- | May 15, 1979. |
| Trinidad and Tobago: carbon steel wire rod | Jan. 4, 1984. |
| United Kingdom: |  |
| Stainless steel plate- | June 23, 1983. |
| Float glass | Dec. 27, 1982. |
| Uruguay: leather wearing apparel | July 17, 1982. |
| West Germany: float glass | Dec. 27, 1982. |
| Suspension agreements in effect |  |
| Argentina: wire rod- | Sept. 27, 1982. |
| Brazil: |  |
| Frozen concentrated orange juice- | Mar. 4, 1984. |
| Certain tool steel products | Mar. 21, 1983. |
| Stainless steel products | Feb. 2, 1983. |
| Small diameter welded pipe and tube- | Dec. 27, 1982. |
| Carbon steel wire rod | Sept. 27, 1982. |
| Carbon steel plate- | Sept. 7, 1982. |

See footnote at end of table.

Table A-8.-Countervailing orders and findings in effect as of Dec. 31, 1984-Continued

| Country and commodity | Effective date of original action 1/ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Suspension agreements in effect-Continued |  |
|  |  |
| Colombia: |  |
| Roses and other cut flowers - | Jan. 12, 1983. |
| Leather wearing apparel | Apr. 2, 1981. |
| Costa Rica: portland hydraulic cement- | Dec. 3, 1984. |
| European Community: sodium glucanate- | Nov. 30, 1981. |
| Mexico: |  |
| Unprocessed float glass. | Mar. 1, 1984. |
| Yarns of polypropylene fiber | Feb. 7, 1983. |
| Pectin- | Dec. 7, 1982. |
| Polypropylene film- | Dec. 7, 1982. |
| Peru: cotton shop towels | Sept. 12, 1984. |
| Singapore: |  |
| Certain refrigeration compressors | Nov. 7, 1983. |
| Steel pipes and tubes- | June 1, 1983. |
| Galvanized steel wire rod- | Apr. 29, 1983. |
| Carbon steel wire rope | Sept. 27, 1982. |
| Prestressed concrete steel wire strand | May 21, 1982. |
| Revocations in 1984 |  |
| Australia: butter | Oct. 5, 1928. |
| Brazil: scissors and shears | Feb. 11, 1977. |
| Cuba: cordage- | Aug. 19, 1954. |
| Spain: |  |
| Ferroalloys | Jan. 2, 1980. |
| Unwrought zinc | Apr. 8, 1977. |
| Vitamin K- | Nov. 16, 1976. |
| Bottled green olives- | Oct. 26, 1974 |
| Greece: certain tomato products | May 12, 1972. |

1/ The U.S. Department of Commerce conducts a periodic review of outstanding countervailing duty orders and suspensions agreements, upon request, to determine if the amount of the net subsidy has changed. If a change has occurred, the imposed countervailing duties are adjusted accordingly.

2/ Includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Greece.

Source: International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Table A-9.--Section 337 investigations completed by the U.S. International Trade Commission during 1984 and those pending on Dec. 31 , 1984


[^93]Table A-9.--Section 337 investigations completed by the U.S. International Trade Commission during 1984 and those pending on Dec. 31 , 1984--Continued

| Status of investigation | Article | Country affected | Commission determination or other action |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| : |  | : |  |
| COMPLETED-- |  | : |  |
| CONTINUED: |  | : |  |
| : |  | : |  |
| 337-TA-166-- | Certain computerized jacquard pattern cutting systems | West Germany | No violation. |
| 337-TA-167----: | Certain single-handle faucets | Taiwan- | Violation. 1/ |
| 337-TA-168----: | Certain combination punch press and laser assemblies and components thereof. | West Germany---------: | Terminated on the basis of a settlement agreement. |
| 337-TA-170 | Certain bag closure clips- | Is | Violation. $1 /$ |
| 337-TA-171- | Certain glass tempering systems | Finland | Do. |
| 337-TA-172----: |  | Japan | Terminated on the basis of a settlement agreement. |
| 337-TA-173----: | Certain valves | Italy | Do. |
| 337-TA-175----: | Certain metal and wire shelf products and accessories- | Canada----------------: | Terminated with prejudice to the complainant. |
| 337-TA-176----: | Certain outboard motors and components thereof-------- | Japan---------------- | Terminated on the basis of a settlement agreement. |
| 337-TA-177---: | Certain film web drive stretch apparatus and components thereof. | Canada---------------: | Terminated on the basis of a consent order. |
| 337-TA-178----: |  | Hong Kong------------- | Violation. $1 /$ |
| 337-TA-179----: | Certain spherical roller bearings and components thereof and tools and equipment for the manufacture thereof. | West Germany---------: | No violation. |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 337-TA-182/ } \\ 188 \text { 4/ } \end{gathered}$ | Certain fluidized supporting apparatus and components thereof. | Japan and France-----: | Terminated on the basis of abatement |
| 337-TA-186----: | Certain tennis rackets | Beligium and France---: | Terminated on the basis of a settlement agreement. |
| 337-TA-191----: | Certain stretch wrapping apparatus and components thereof. | Canada---------------: | Terminated on the basis of a consent order. |
| PENDING: |  | : |  |
| 337-TA-75 5/--: | Certain large video matrix display systems and components thereof. | Switzerland-----------: | - |
| 337-TA-174---: | Certain woodworking machines- | Taiwan and South Africa | - |
| 337-TA-180---- | Certain x-ray image intensifier tubes | Netherlands---------- | - |
| 337-TA-181----: | Certain meat deboning machines - | do---------- | - |
| 337-TA-183---: |  | Canada, Italy, Poland, and Spain. | - |
| 337-TA-184----: | Certain foam earplugs | West Germany, Sweden,: Japan. | - |
| 337-TA-185---: | Certain rotary wheel printing systems | Japan and West : Germany. | . - |
| 337-TA-187---: | Certain glass construction blocks | ```France, West Germany,:``` | - |
| 337-TA-189---: | Certain optical waveguide fibers | Japan-----------------: | - |
| 337-TA-190----: | Certain softballs and polyurethane cores therefor | Ta1wan---------------: | - |
| 337-TA-192---: | Certain spring balanced arm lamp heads-- | do | - |
| 337-TA-193----: | Certain rowing machines and components thereof | -do-----------: | - |
| 337-TA-194---: | Certain aramid fiber | Netherlands-----..----: | - |
| 337-TA-195----: | Certain cloisonne jewelry | Taiwan----------------: | - |
| 337-TA-196---: | Certain apparatus for installing electrical lines and components therefor. | Canada---------------: | - |
| 337-TA-197----: | Certain compound action metal-cutting snips | Taiwan-----------------: | - |
| : | and compents thereor. | . |  |

[^94]Table A-9.--Section 337 investigations completed by the U.S. International Trade Commission during 1984 and those pending on Dec. 31, 1984--Continued

Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, Office of Unfair Import Investigations.
Table A-10.--Outstanding section 337 exclusion

See foot notes at end of table.
Table A-10.--Outstanding section 337 exclusion

| Investigation no. | Article | Country | U.S. patent no. | $\begin{gathered} \text { Date } \\ \text { exp } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | patent <br> ires |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 337-TA-82A--- |  |  | 28,269 2/ | Dec. | 10, 1991 |
|  | Certain headboxes and papermaking machine | Sweden-----m- | 28,269 2/---- |  |  |
|  | forming sections for the | : |  |  |  |
|  | continuous production of | : |  |  |  |
|  | paper, and components | : |  |  |  |
|  | thereof. | Taiwan |  |  | 7, 1994 |
| 337-TA-83-- | Certain adjustable window shades and components thereof. |  |  | Feb. |  |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & : \\ & : \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |
| 337-TA-87----- | Certain coin-operated audiovisual games and components thereof. | Japan-m------ | Nonpatent | - |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 337-TA-88--- | Certain spring assemblies and components thereof, and methods for their manufacture. | Canada---m-m- | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 3,782,708————: } \\ & 3,866,287 \cdots-\cdots: \end{aligned}$ | Jan. <br> Feb. | $\begin{array}{ll} 19, & 1991 \\ 19, & 1992 \end{array}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 337-TA-99---- | Certain molded-in sandwich panel inserts and methods for their installation. | Japan------m | 3,392,225------: | July | 9, 1985 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 337-TA-105--- | Certain coin-operated audiovisual games and components thereof. | Japan and Taiwan. | Nonpatent-----: | $\cdots$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 2, 1987 |
| 337-TA-110 | Certain methods for extruding plastic tubing. |  | 28,959 2/-----m: | Dec. |  |
| 337-TA-112 | Certain cube puzzles----m | Taiwan, Japan,: and Canada. | Nonpatent------: |  |  |
| 337-TA-114-- | Certain miniature plug-in blade fuses. | Taiwan-m----: |  | Sept. <br> Aug. <br> Nov. <br> Dec. | 30, 1992 <br> 9, 1994 <br> 8, 1994 <br> 26, 1995 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 337-TA-118--- | Certain sneakers with fabric uppers and rubber soles. | Korea | Nonpatent | Feb 1, 1989 |  |
| 337-TA-120-- | Certain silica-coated lead chromate pigments. | Japan-m-س-m- | 3,639,133—-----: | Feb | 1, 1989 |
| 337-TA-137-- | Certain heavy duty staple gun tackers. | Taiwan-----m- | Nonpatent------: |  |  |
| 337-TA-139 | Certain caulking guns----m-m: | Taiwan and Korea. | 4,081,112-----: | Mar | 28, 1995 |
| 337-TA-140 | Certain personal computers and components thereof. | Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Switzerland.: | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 4,136,359--س--س:- } \\ & \text { 4,278,972--- } \end{aligned}$ | Jan. <br> July | $\begin{array}{ll} 23, & 1996 \\ 14, & 1998 \end{array}$ |
|  |  |  | : |  |  |
|  |  |  | : |  |  |
|  |  |  | : |  |  |
| 337-TA-146 | Certain canape makers-------: | Taiwan-m-----: | 268,318 1/-----: | Mar.June | $\begin{array}{ll} 28, & 1995 \\ 11, & 1985 \end{array}$ |
| 337-TA-150 | ```Certain self-stripping eletrical tap connectors. Certain plastic food storage containers.``` | Taiwan----m-m: | $\text { 3,388,370}-\cdots:$ |  |  |
| 337-TA-152 |  | Hong Kong and Taiwan. | Nonpatent |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1/ Design patent. <br> 2/ Reissued. |  |  |  |  |  |

Table A-11.-U.S. imports for consumption from the world and from the

| Item | 1982 | : | 1983 | : | 1984 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| - |  | . |  |  |  |
|  | 242,339,988 |  | 256,679,524 |  | 322,989,519 |
|  | 8,007,561 |  | 9,005,965 |  | 8,896,499 |
| Ratio of imports from Caribbean Basin to imports from the : | 3.3 |  | 3.5 |  | 2.8 |
| Dutiable value of imports from Caribbean Basin-1,000 dollars-: Imports under items 806.30 and 807.00 $\qquad$ <br> do | 5,547,313 |  | $6,236,632$ 752,052 |  | $5,169,164$ 824,002 |
| Ratio of 806.30 and 807.00 imports to dutiable imports <br> from the Caribbean Basin $\qquad$ | 10.9 |  | 12.1 |  | 15.9 |
| Ratio of 806.30 and 807.00 imports to total imports <br> from the Caribbean Basin | 7.6 |  | 8.4 |  | 9.3 |
| Duty-free value of imports from the Caribbean Basin- | 2,460,248 |  | 2,769,333 |  | $3,727,335$ |
| GSP duty-free imports from Caribbean Basin------------- | 399,124 |  | $604,137$ |  | $626,007$ |
| Ratio of GSP duty-free imports to duty-free imports <br>  | 16.2 |  | 21.8 |  | 16.8 |
| Ratio of GSP duty-free imports to total imports <br> from the Caribbean Basin- | 5.0 |  | 6.7 |  | 7.0 |
| CBI imports from Caribbean Basin-----------1,000 dollars-m: |  |  |  |  | 577,704 |
| Ratio of CBI-form imports to duty-free imports <br> from the Caribbean Basin---------------------------percent-: | - |  |  |  | 15.5 |
| Ratio of CBI-form imports to total imports <br> from the Caribbean Basin $\qquad$ |  |  | - | . | 6.5 |

Table A-12.-U.S. imports for consumption of selected products from the Caribbean Basin, 1984



Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to totals shown.
Table A-14.--Imports for consumption of leading GSP-eligible items,

Table A-14.--Imports for consumption of leading GSP-eligible items,
by descending value of GSP duty-free imports, 1984--Continued

Note. --Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.
Table A-15.-Total U.S. imports for consumption and imports eligible for GSP treatment, by SITC Number, 1984



Source: Complied from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Note. --Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.
Table A-16.--Total U.S. imports for consumption and imports eligible for GSP treatment, by import

| SIC |  | Description | Imports eligible for GSP treatment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | : |  | Total | : | GSP-eligible |  |  | : | Duty-free under GSP : |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Total |  |  |  |  | : |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No. |  |  | U.S. |  |  | : | Share | : |  | : | Share | : |  |  |  |
|  | : |  | imports | : |  |  | of | : |  | : | of | : |  |  |  |
|  | : |  | consumption | : | Value. |  | total | : | Value | : | total | : | GSP |  |  |
|  | : |  |  | : |  | : | U.S. | : |  | : | eligible | : | source |  |  |
|  | \% | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
|  | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | Million | : |  | : |  | : | Million |
|  | : |  | ----Million |  | ars |  | Percent | : | dollars | : | Percent | : |  | : | ollars |
|  | : | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |
| 01 |  | - Agricultural products-m-n------- | 6,935 | : | 565 | : | 8.2 | : | 118 | : | 20.8 | : | Mexico-----: |  | 404 |
| 02 | : |  | 977 | : | 13 | : | 1.3 | : | 13 | : | 96.2 | : | Indonesia--: |  |  |
| 08 | : |  | 978 | : | $1 /$ | : | - | : | $1 /$ | : | 100.0 | : | Taiwan-me: |  |  |
| 09 | : |  | 3,410 | : | 50 | : | 1.5 | : | 27 | : | 53.9 | : | French | : |  |
|  | : |  |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | Polynesia |  |  |
| 10 | : | Metallic ores and concentrates--m- | 1,626 | : | 66 | : | 4.0 | : | 54 | : | 82.2 |  | Pe |  |  |
| 12 |  | : Coal and lignite-----m--m-m-m- | 44 | : | - | : | - | : | - | : |  | : | - : | : |  |
| 13 |  |  | 37,677 | : | - | : |  | : | - | : | - | : | - | : |  |
| 14 | : Nonmetallic minerals, except fuel-: |  | 1,858 | : | 92 | : | 5.0 | : | 69 | : | 74.3 | : | Mexico-----: |  | 21 568 |
| 20 |  |  | 11,997 | : | 1,778 | : | 14.8 | : | 1,081 | : | 60.8 | : | Argentina--: |  | 568 |
| 21 | : |  | 88 | : | 48 | : | 54.0 | : | 32 | : | 67.6 | - | Dominican | - | - |
|  | : |  |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | Republic. |  |  |
| 22 |  | Textile mill products---m-m-m- | 3,467 | : | 121 | : | 3.5 | : | 92 | : | 76.5 | : | India--n--: |  | 21 |
| 23 |  | Apparel $\qquad$ <br> Lumber and wood $\qquad$ | 13,907 | : | 476 | : | 3.4 | : | 264 | : | 55.5 | : | Hong Kong--: |  | 197 |
| 24 |  |  | 4,838 | : | 687 | - | 14.2 | : | 500 | : | 72.8 | , | Taiwan-----: |  | 165 |
| 25 |  | Furniture and fixtures <br> Paper and allied products-m-n-m- | 2,458 | : | 933 | : | 37.9 | : | 443 | : | 47.5 |  | -س---do-----: |  | 418 |
| 26 |  |  | 7,431 | : | 331 | : | 4.5 | : | 223 | : | 67.6 |  | -m-do-----: |  | 96 35 |
| 27 |  |  <br>  | 1,070 | : | 84 | : | 7.8 | : | 43 | : | 51.5 | - | -m--do--m- |  | 35 |
| 28 |  |  | 11,987 | : | 851 | : | 7.1 | : | 741 | : | 87.1 | - | Mexico-m-a-: |  | 31 |
| 29 |  | Petroleum refining products---m-m- | 21,059 | : | 2 | : | . 0 | : | 1 | : | 45.1 | : | Netherlands: |  | 1 |
|  | : |  |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : | Antilles |  |  |
| 3 X | Miscellaneous products-m-m-m-me- <br> Rubber and miscellaneous plastics-: |  | 611 | : | 181 | : | 27 | : | 738 | : | 62.5 | - | Taiwan |  | 398 |
| 30 |  |  | 4,364 | : | 1,181 | : | 27.1 | : | 738 | : | 62.5 | : | Taiwan-m--- : |  | 398 122 |
| 31 |  |  | 6,785 | : | 507 | : | 7.5 | : | 353 | : | 69.5 | : | Brazil----- |  | 122 |
| 32 |  |  | 3,784 | : | 584 | : | 15.4 | : | 428 | : | 73.3 | : | Taiwan-m---: |  | 122 |
| 33 | Primary metal$\qquad$ Fabricated metal productsm-n-m-m- |  | 22,117 | : | 1,336 | : | 6.0 | : | 835 | : | 62.5 | : | Brazil-----: |  | 394 |
| 34 |  |  | 6,803 | : | 1,738 | : | 25.6 | : | 1,092 | : | 62.8 | : | Taiwan-m---: |  | 496 |
| 35 | Machinery, except electrical <br> Electrical machinery---m----------- |  | 27,619 | : | 4,909 | : | 17.8 | : | 1,282 | : | 26.1 | : | -do |  | 3,038 |
| 36 |  |  | 35,325 | : | 7,432 | : | 21.0 | : | 2,128 | : | 28.6 | : | ---do-----: |  | 3,706 |
| 37 | Transportation equipment--------->: |  | 54,295 | : | 1,738 | : | 3.2 | : | 264 | : | 15.2 |  | -do---- |  | 1,335 |
| 38 |  | Instruments ------------------>: | 7,699 | : | 865 | : | 11.2 | : | 459 | : | 53.1 | : | --m-do----- |  | 134 |
| 39 |  | Miscellaneous manufactures-------->: | 9,689 | : | 3,439 | : | 35.5 | 8 | 1,702 | : | 49.5 |  | ---do-----: |  | 1,396 |
| 99 | - |  |  | : | 82 | : | 0.9 | : | 14 | : | 17.4 | - | Veneruela--: |  | - |
|  |  |  | -9,545 | : | 29,906 | : | 0.9 | : | 12,996 | : | 43.5 | . | Venezuela |  | 13,100 |
|  | : |  | 320,442 | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  | : |  |

APPENDIX B

## LEADING ITEMS OF TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES

 AND MAJOR TRADING PARTNERSTable B-1. --Leading items exported to Canada, by Schedule B items, 1982-84

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U. S. Department of Commerce.
Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.
Table B-2.-Leading items imported from Canada, by TSUS items, 1982-84

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { TSUS } \\ & \text { Item No. } \end{aligned}$ | Description | 1982 | : | 1983 | : | 1984 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | : |  | : |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | : |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | : |  |
|  |  |  | : |  | : |  |
| 62, |  |  | : |  | : | 10,125,335 |
| 692.11 | Passenger automobiles, snowmobiles and other miscellaneous vehicles | 5,810,454 |  | 7,278,947 |  |  |
| - | (Automotive Products Trade Act). |  |  |  |  |  |
| 475.15 | Natural gas, methane, ethane, propane, butane and mixtures thereof- | 4,830, 883 |  | 4,263,742 |  | 4,192,140 |
| 692.33 | Parts n.s.p.f. of motor vehicles, not alloyed nor advanced beyond cleaning, partly machined (Automotive Products Trade Act). | $1,825,754$ | : | 2,791,045 |  | 3,780,775 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 692.03 | Trucks valued at \$1000 or more each (Automotive Products Trade Act)-: | 2,589,482 |  | 2,737,179 |  | 3,692,754 |
| 252.65475.10 | Standard newsprint paper Crude petroleum, topped crude petroleum, crude shale oil, distillate and residual fuel oils, testing 25 degrees a.p.1. or more. | 2,730,255 |  | 2,732,234 | : | 3,224,596 |
|  |  | $1,256,329$ | : |  |  | 2,477,699 |
| 800.00 : |  | 1,561,941 |  | 1,768,688 |  | 1,964,899 |
| 605.20 : | Gold or silver bullion, dore and precipitates | 1,393,490 |  | 1,359,470 | : | 1,832,407 |
| 475.05 : | Crude petroleum, topped crude petroleum, crude shale ofl, distillate residual fuel oils, testing under 25 degrees a.p.1. | 1,391,012 |  | 1,492,531 | : | 1,777,058 |
| 202.03 : | Spruce lumber---------1. | 1,034,181 |  | 1,624,955 |  | 1,746,306 |
| 250.02 : | Wood pulp; rag pulp; and other pulps derived from cellulosic fibrous materfals and sultable for papermaking. | 1,386,688 | : | 1,363,975 |  | 1,678,908 |
| 660.49 | Piston-type engines other than compression-ignition engines for automobiles, including trucks and buses (Automotive Products Trade Act). | 632,364 |  | 1,013,837 | : | 1,370,253 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 480.50 \\ & 692.32 \end{aligned}$ |  | 514,603 |  | 485,093 |  | 546,428 |
|  | Parts n.s.p.f. of motor vehicles, not alloyed nor advanced beyond cleaning, partly machined. | 328,778 |  | 365,696 | : |  |
| 692.21 | Automobile truck and motor bus chassis and bodies (Automotive Products Act). | 327,268 |  | 589,842 | : | 543,022 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 772.51 | Pneumatic tires, n.e | 350,372 |  | 366,186 |  | 486,885 |
| 618.02 | Unwrought aluminum n.e.s., other than alloys of alumi | 266,482 |  | 353,133 |  | 460,450 |
| 618.06 | Other unwrought alloys of aluminum | 262,719 |  | 395,276 |  | 445,714 |
| 601.24 : | Iron ore, including manganiferous containing not over 10 percent by weight of manganese, and the dross or residuum from burnt pyrites. | 360,352 | : | 339,472 |  | 413,519 |
| 676.52 |  | 203,698 | : | 246,120 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 41,747,290 \\ & 66,342,454 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Total | 29,057,105 | : | 33,463,292 |  |  |
|  | Total, U.S. imports from Canad | 46,328,510 | : | 51,982,346 | : |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | : |  |

Note,--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.


| Schedule <br> B <br> Item No. | Description | 1982 | : | 1983 | : | 1984 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 676.55 | Parts of automatic data processing, photocopying, calculating, accounting and similar machines incorporating a calculating mechanfsm. | 2,016,436 |  | 2,392,731 |  | 3,046,662 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 676.28 | Digital central processing units, auxiliary storage units, input units, output units, and combinations thereof. | 1,958,155 |  | 2,145,334 |  | 2,648,975 |
|  |  | : $2,801,549$ |  |  |  |  |
| 175.41 |  | 2,801,549 |  | 2,190,285 |  | 1,766,404 |
| 521.31 | Coal; petroleum and other coke; compositions of coal, coke, or other carbonaceous material used for fuel. | 2,362,094 |  | 1,395,641 |  | 1,514,639 |
| 694.65 |  | 1,499,847 |  | 1,413,759 |  | 1,470,228 |
| 660.54 | Parts of compression-ignition piston-type engines, and non-pistontype engines. $\qquad$ | 1,241,734 |  | 1,191,283 | : | 1,261,055 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 1,027,215 |
|  |  | 783,230 |  | 1,112,107 |  | 1,027,215 |
| $687.60$ | Electronic tubes, transistors, integrated circuits, diodes, rectifiers, mounted plezoelectric related electronic crystal components, parts. | 611,022 |  | 630,077 | : | 823,152 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 184.80 \\ & 250.02 \end{aligned}$ | Other animal feeds and ingredients therefor, n.s.p.f Wood pulp; rag pulp; and other pulps derived from cellulosic fibrous material fibrous and suitable for paper making.$\qquad$ | $624,222$ |  | 805,879 |  | 728,974 |
|  |  | $698,949$ |  | 650,196 |  | 677,733 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| '664.05 | Excavating, levelling, boring, extracting maŗhinery, excluding front-end loaders, pile drivers, not selr-propelled snow plows, and parts. | 877,206 |  | 625,338 | : | 605,353 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 712.50 | Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking electrical quantities, except electricity meters, and parts thereof. | 494,171 |  | 520,980 |  | 564,989 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 678.50 \\ & 685.90 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 354,211 \\ & 401,538 \end{aligned}$ | : | 367,746 |  | 509,823 |
|  | Electrical apparatus for making, breaking, protecting, or connecting |  |  | 401,455 |  | 504,642 |
|  | to electrical circuits, switchboards, and control panels, parts |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | thereof. | : 342,674 |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 660.49 \\ & 130.34 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 342,674 \\ & 787,537 \end{aligned}$ | : | 416,833 | : | $494,618$ |
|  | : Corn or maize, not donated for relief or charity-m-m-m-m-m-m-m |  | : | $\begin{aligned} & 585,604 \\ & 426,314 \end{aligned}$ | : | $\begin{aligned} & 491,195 \\ & 471,983 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & 170.33 \\ & 676.27 \end{aligned}$ | Filler tobacco, cigarette leaf, stemmed and unstemmed | $440,280$ |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 379,126 | : | 452,898 | : | 470,666 |
|  | unit and input and output capability. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 433.10 | Chemical mixtures and preparations, n.e.s-m-m-m | 415,457 |  | 419,250 |  | 403,945 |
| 605.70 | Precious-metal sweepings and other precious-metal waste and scrap-- <br> Total <br> Total, U.S. exports to the European Community | : 330,683 |  | 589,673 |  | 399,557 |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 19,420,122 \\ & 45,723,222 \end{aligned}$ | . | $\begin{aligned} & 18,733,382 \\ & 42,420,383 \end{aligned}$ | . | $\begin{aligned} & 19,881,806 \\ & 44,795,655 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Note. --Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.
Table B-4.-Leading items imported from the European Community, by TSUS items, 1982-84

Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.
Table B-5.-Leading items exported to Japan, by Schedule B items, 1982-84

Note. --Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.
Table B-6.-Leading items imported from Japan, by TSUS items, 1982-84

Note. --Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.
Table B-7.--Leading items exported to Mexico, by Schedule B items, 1982-84

Table D-8.-Leading items imported from Mexico, by TSUS items, 1982-84


[^95]


[^96]Table B-10.--Leading items imported from Taiwan, by TSUS 1 tems, 1982-84


[^97]Table B-11.--Leading items exported to Korea, by Schedule B items, 1982-84

|  | Description | : | : |  | : | 1984 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { Schedule } \\ \text { B } \\ \text { Item No. } \end{gathered}$ |  | 1982 | : | 1983 | : |  |
|  |  |  | : |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | : |  | , |  |
|  |  |  | : |  | : |  |
| 687.60 | Electronic tubes, transistors, integrated circuits, diodes, rectifiers, mounted piezoelectric, related electronic crystal components, parts. | 278,349 | : | 390,449 | : | 481,760 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 300.10 | Cotton, not carded, not combed, and not similarily processed, having a staple length under $1 / 8$ inches. | 385,974 |  | 355,196 |  | 418,623 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 130.34 | Corn or maize, not donated for rellef or charity | : 331,720 |  | 559,692 |  | 327,829 |
| 130.65 |  | 298,758 | : | 304,772 | : | 293,819 |
| 694.65 | Parts for alrcraft and spacecraf | 180,780 |  | 249,589 |  | 256,736 |
| 120.14 | Whole cattle hides-m----- | : 143,030 |  | 165,354 | : | 242,639 |
| 175.41 | : Soybeans, other than seed for planting | 141,879 |  | 201,200 |  | 186,788 |
| 607.08 | : Carbon steel and iron waste and scrap | 111,417 |  | 109,770 |  | 158,710 |
| 475.07 | Crude petroleum; topped crude petroleum; crude shale oil; and distillate and residual fuel oils derived from petroleum, shale, or both. | 269,450 | : |  | 126,832 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 108,145 |  | 121,780 |
| 521.31 | Coal; petroleum and other coke; compositions of coal, coke, or other carbonaceous material used for fuel. | 127,122 | : |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| .678.50 | Machines n.s.p.f., and parts thereof | 42,581 |  | 57,157 |  | 117,618 |
| 250.04 | Waste paper and paperboard; scrap paper and paperboard products fit only for remanúfacture; flax and hemo fibers to be used in paper making. | 61,699 | : | 73,234 | 103,367 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 684.62 | Electrical telegraph (including printing and typewriting) and telephone apparatus and instruments; and parts thereof, n.s.p.f. | 197,154 | : | 169,905 |  | 100,106 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 694.40 \\ & 200.35 \end{aligned}$ | Airplanes-----------------------11 | 61,969 | : | 2,322 |  | 95,472 |
|  | Logs, softwood and hardwood, including pulpwood, in the rough, split, hewn, or roughly sided or squared. | 86,681 | : | 96,797 | : | 87,745 |
| 250.02 | Wood pulp; rag pulp; and other pulps derived from cellulosic fibrous materlals and suitable for paper making. | 52,698 | : | 71,717 | : | 75,573 |
|  |  | : 43.660 |  |  |  |  |
| 676.55 | Parts of automatic data processing, photocopying, calculating, accounting and similar machines incorporating a calculating mechanism. | 43,660 |  | 88,071 | : | 75,442 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 676.28 | Digital central processing units, auxiliary storage units, input units, output units, and combinations thereof. | 45,597 | : | 60,629 |  | 64,994 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 404.05 | : Cycilc intermediate hydrocarbon compounds, except derivatives------ | 20,417 |  | 46,482 |  | 61,319 |
| 685.90 | Electrical apparatus for making, breaking, protecting, or connecting to electrical circuits, switchboards, and control panels, parts thereof. <br> Total | 47,991 |  | 63,565 |  | 59,131 |
|  |  |  | : |  | : |  |
|  |  |  | : |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 2,928,924 \\ & 5,318,136 \end{aligned}$ | : | $\begin{aligned} & 3,299,544 \\ & 5,684,605 \end{aligned}$ | : | $\begin{aligned} & 3,456,281 \\ & 5,785,966 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Total, U.S. exports to Kor |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | : |  |  |  |  |  |

Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.



[^98]Table B-13.--Leading items exported to Brazil, by Schedule B items, 1982-84

Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.
Table B-14.--Leading items imported from Brazil, by TSUS items, 1982-84



[^0]:    1/ Section 33 (3) of the Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978) むirects that "the Intemationai Trade Comission shall submit to the Congress, at ieast once a year, a factual report on the operation of the trade agreements program."

    2/ Executive Order No. I1846, Mar. 27, 1975.

[^1]:    
    
    
    

[^2]:    1/ Feceral Reserve Bulietin, May 1985, voi. 7i, no. 5, p. 283.
    2/ Ibic.. $\hat{\mathrm{p}} .284$.

[^3]:    三/ For a detailed discussion of GSP perfomance in 1984, see chap. V.

[^4]:    
    

[^5]:    ㄹ/ The Commission cetemined that increased imports of carbon and alloy steel pletes, sheets anc strip, wire and wire products, anci structural shapes anci units were a substarital cause of serious injury to the domestic steel industries producing trose products, and that increased imports of semíinishec steel products were a substantial cause of serious injury or threat of semious injury. Comissioners Stern and Liebeler voted negatively on all product innes. For semifinished steel, Comissioners Lodwick and Rohr voted affimatively on the jasis of threat of serious injury, and comissione= Eckes voter affimatively on the basis of preseri injury.

    The Commission's negative determinations on other product ines were based on the Eindings that intma-incustry competition (wire rods anc bars) anc an unusually severe cecline in demand (railway-type products) had greater adverse effects on the steel industry than dic import competition.

[^6]:    三／U．S．Zriemational Traće Comission，Carbon anc Cetiain Alioy Sieei
    

    位 Pronicis．
    

[^7]:    
    
    
    
     measures．For exampie，comissioners Locioija anc Jont mecomencé thai
    
    
    
    
    
     202（c）of the Traće Act oE zoう¢．

[^8]:    
    
    
    3／The sieel proz＝am cit not specioy how the U．S．Eovermeni woulc detemine
    
    i／OEEice OE Ene United Staies Iracie Represenlaivive，＂Brock Announces
     In acíi̇ion to ine prociucis coverec under ine iniviai ananngement with ine EO， the acminisizakion conclubec negotiations wiin ine Jo in January ig85 to ijmiv pipe anc tibe exporis to 7.6 percen of the U．S．pipe ane tube marke in Ic85
     ijmit thein semirinished sieel exporus to ine unitec Siaies，as pari of the
    
    
    
    

[^9]:    ＝i This tegisiation，the Trade and Tariff Aci of 1984，was signed into law or 2 こと． 30 ，i984．Titie Vifi of this act provides the enforcement authority さ゚ー the VRA＇s on sieej．

    Ef Inciuned in this point would be efforis by the administraiion in the CECD to ban export suiosicies or mixed credits on the exportaiion of steet making ecuipment by OECD countries．This is part of a broader U．S．policy to む̇Ecounage subsidization of investment in sectors where a structural woric ove＝suppiy exists．

    3／The Comission would perform this function．
    $\dot{\leq}$ me Depariment of Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency wouic perforn this function．

    इ＇The Secretary of Labor，in conjunction with the local commaities，would be responsibie for cevelopment of this program．

    E！AEcitionaz agreements were negotiatec in 1985.

[^10]:    1/ The arrangement with the $\Xi C$ is administerec by appiying the suppiying counizy's market share zo a forecast of apparent consumption to arrive ai an actuat quota levei. Shontiails or excesses in market share due to errous ax the forecast are Eactoreu inio a subsequeni period's quoia level.

    2/ Ofíce of the United siaites Trece Representaitve, press release bitiz. Dec. 29, 1984.

[^11]:    I／The signing was Coilowed by Congressional consioezaijon of the impiemeni ing Legisiaijon on a East－inack puocess．Jncer inese expecitec きrocecures，once the legisiation js fomaliy submiziec to congress，it camoネ be amenced and acijon musi be iaken mithir 50 jegisiaikve auys．

    2／SLaiemen of RoDeri Lighinizer，Depuiy USTR，before ine Sincominitee on Tracie，Fouse comitive on kays anc Means，on proposec unitec Sizies－ismaez
    
    
     sensicive products on whic Eulu JC concessions were celayec unity Dec．3I，1979．Israel eliminaiec duties on about oo pe＝cert of jus incustaiai
     the remaincer of incustrial imporis was orisinaijy scheduiec to be phased in
     stages．Esraei has askec Eom joth of these extersions anc wili eizninate
    

[^12]:    I/ For example, the reduced duties for item TSUS 200.35 (asses and burros) are as follows: Sept. 1985--12 perceni; Jan. I, $1986-12$ perceni; 1987--4.8 percent; Jan. 1, 1989--duty Eree.

    2/ For example, the reduced Guties for $\operatorname{lnSUS} 300.60$ (yarns of cotion) are as follows: Sept. 1985--9.6 percent; 1986--8.0 perceni; 1987--6.5 perceni; 1988--5.4 percent; 1989--4.3 percent; 1990--3. 2 perceni; 1992--I percent; 1995--duty free.

[^13]:    ㄱ Ari．XXV adcresses joini acizon by the GP＇s and provides thai in exceptional circunsiances the $C$ º＇s may waive ar obijgainon imposed ay the Generai Agreement if the decision is approvec by ino－ininds of the voies casi and that this two－thiras comprises more thar haif of ail Cp＇s．In this case， a waiver would exempi ine united Siates from the obijgaiion of ganniing ail its 亡tading partners iariff treatment on ceriain procucts equai to that accordec nations in the Caribiean Basin program，as requized unce＝the canc art．I provision for nondiscriminatory ineatmene．

    2／The Unitec States arguec that a waiver was iusi̇fiec because tine GBI program was consisient with the 1979 Decision on Differenital anci vore Favorabie Freatment，Reciprocity and Fuller Pariicipaijor of Developing Cowntries（the＂enabling clause＂）．It argued Euriner that the prognam noulc neither create new barriers nor impece ine trace of any Cp：s，but provide a もemporazy（II－year）extension of cre－way，du亡y－free treaiment io nosi procucts from Caribbean countijes．

[^14]:     agreed to grant the U．S．waivez zecuesi．
    
    
     resist protectionisi pressumes in the formuation and impienembation of national trace poiicy and in proposing legisiation；ane eiso to refain Enom taking of maintaining any measures inconsisient win gam ame lo make determined efforis to avoid measures which woulc inmit or iiscont international trade．＂

    3／Uncer regulat GATP proceoures，members are responsibie Eon moizoying catc of their own national measures，anc in some cases they noitify measumes of other members thai arfech intemai̇onal izace faisc known as oross－
     contained in these notificaiions．

[^15]:    
    
    
     assess．An ecuazy ĖEEEculi jssue concerne $\begin{gathered}\text { vanying iniempreiations and }\end{gathered}$
     ョgニシージミume secもoー．
    
    
    

[^16]:    三／Accoñing to an agmement finaijzed in the Custons Cooperaiion Councij， the Yamonizec System has been quopté foz imajemeniaijon on jan．Z， 2987. For more deiaiis，see＂Oustoms Cooperaijor Counciz＂in cinap．II．
     provides for consulbation and negotiaijon on moairicaijons in bounc tariffs．

    3／In inis cieble of imporiance vo irade in nigh－techology goocis ii．e． sooćs 亡hat are Erequentiy nem entrant on giobai marixets），the cental
     voiume of irace in a new nroduct nas not neachec high enough levels to provicie a Guani̇iaijve basis for negotiaijons．In suat cases，the existing fomula for betemining compensation mighi not be auecuate．

[^17]:    I/ Pari IV, aciced in 1969, and the "enaibing clause," negotiated during the 2979 Tokyo Round, aliow special consideration of interests of developing countries. The enabling clause allows developing countries to receive differentiai and more favorable treatment from other GATr members with regard to (I) tariffs accorded under the GSP, (2) nontariff measures governed by GATT codes, (3) tariffs and, under certain conditions, nontariff measures among developing countries under regional or global trade arrangements, and (4) measures appliec to ieast-developed countries, in particular. The enabling clause also provides for greater adherence by developing countries to the obligations of GATT membership, adherence that is commensurate with each country's ievel of economic development.

    2/ The fizst rown of consultations, initiated in 1983, was held with Finªnd, Norway, Sweden, Austria, and Hungary.

[^18]:    I/ A request for consultation to discuss the possible imposition of quanitative limits on a country's textile exports to the United States is rê̂erred to as a "call." Calls allege market disruption as a result of textile imports.

    2/ Country-of-origin rules were published in final form by the U.S. Customs Service on Mar. 5, 1985.

    3/ For another discussion of the new U.S. country-of-origin regulations, see
    "Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles" in chap. V.
    4/ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Textiles Surveillance Body, "Report of the Textiles Surveillance Body to the Textiles Committee for the Major Review of the Operation of the Arrangement Regarding International Trade ミn Textiles 1984," p. 149.

[^19]:    If For a complete discussion of the MFA bỉaterai accozas ane the effect os quantitative restraints on import leveis, see The Wuitifiber Amangemeni, 1980-1984 (U.S. Internationai Trace Comaission, USI马C Puoiicaijon Zsc3, Vay 1985).

    2/ Art. AII provices for the implementa"ion of impozi restaiations by ce"s in order to safeguard the balance-of-payments position. Such measures iaken by then to "Corestall. . . or to stop a serious decine in Its moneiany reserves" or in the case of low monetary reserves "to achieve a reasonajo rate of increase in its reserves" are to be mainiained oniy to the exient thai the conditions justify their application and are to be progressiveiy relaxed. In adition, unecessary damage to the interesi of other op's is to be avoided. Art. XYIII provices for the veras unce= which developiry countries may iake these and cher measures for the purooses of tevelopaen: in excepion to normal obiigaiions under the General Agreement.

[^20]:    E/ For more detais of this dispuite and the panel report, see the operation of the Race Agreements Program, 35th Repori, 1983, p. 69.

[^21]:    If See aiso sec． 3010 the Frade Act of こo74，In chap．Y．
    2＇Tinis éspute is a contination of a 2979 compaint filed win the u．s． Govemmant uncer section 30 of the Trade tat of 1974 by the Tanners＇Council oE Anezica．Bineterai consuitations iec to an understancing that look effect in 2979 anc expired in itarch 2932．The uncersianding，which cailed for quota三ncreases anc imprved quoia－licensing procedures，proved inerfecive and the allottec u．s．quctas went unfillec．After further consultaiions with japan Eajlec，the United States resorted io conciliaijon by a GATT panel．
     its nes ニictions ane hecessary for socioeconomic reasons；i．e．to protect the气conomaelly cepzived こiass of people empioyec in the domestic leather
    
    ty Ses aiso＂Eniorcement of inaĉe agreenents ane response io certain foreign
    

    玉！The pane：report couth not be adopiec at this time as a fesuli of EC opposition．
    （6）Fuzthe backgrounc on this case may be founc in lhe Operation of the
    

[^22]:    I/ The Tokyo Round agreements eniered inio Ecrce on Jan. I, 1980, except for those on government procurement and or cusioms valuaion, which entered into Sorce 1 year iater. The Gusioms Valuation agreement, however, was impiemented earijer (July i, 1980) by the United States and the EC.

    2f The formal title of the agreement is The Agreement on Interpretaiton and Application of Aziicies VI, XVI, and XXIII of the GATT. For a descripiion of the agreenent, see the Operation of the Trade Agreemenis Program, 31st Report, 1579, DP. 45-46.

    3/ If one signatorys subsidized exports cause material injury to another signatory's domestic industry, the injured pariy may either impose countervailing duties to offset the margin of subsidy or request that the exporting country eiminate or limit the effect of the subsidy. The code aiso ajlows a signatory to seek redress for cases in which another signaiory's subsicizec exponts cisplace its exports in inirci-country markets.
    !/ See table 3 for a full listing of this cocie's membership.
    इ/ Under this reservation, Spain agreed to introduce a value added tax to repiace its cascade iax system by Jan. 1, 1985. Spain had asked the code comaintee to agree to extend the reservation, but in light of reluctance on the part of code members, Spain went ahead with withdrawal of the reservation.

    末/ Early in i985, Philippines, Indonesia, anc Turkey also joined the code.

[^23]:    ㄱ U．S．actions are described separaiely in chap．V anc reporiec in vable A－7．
     to a cuestionnaire regaraing the hosi country＂s subsidy programs anc io upaate these notifications in the intervening years．

[^24]:    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    

[^25]:    I／Formaily calied The Agreament on Implementation of Arcicie vi of the GATP，the agreement was negoitatec duzing the ookyo Rounc in 2973－79 as a replacement to the originai Anticumping agreement．The renegotiacion was concucted to bring ceriain provisions，especiainy ihose conceming detemination of injury，price unceriakings，and the collection of anizumping Guties，into line with similar provisions in the Agreement on Subsicies anc Countervailing Duties aiso concluced in the Fokyo Round．

    2／in price undertakings the exporier volunieers＂．．．io zevise its p＝ices or to cease．．．［cumpingl ．．．so that the authorikies are sainsíiec that the injurious effect of the cumping is eiminaied．＂

    3／See table 3 for a full lisiing of this coce＇s membersnip．

[^26]:    三／Cumeent members of the osce ane Austwalia，Austzia，Beigium，Canada， Demarik，Einianc，France，fest Eemany，Ereece，Icerand，Frelanc，İaly， Jaミan，Jumemoums，the Nethenlanćs，New Zealand，Norway，Poriugal，Spain，
    
    
    

[^27]:    I／They reagnizec that an injtiative for a new rounc of mitilateral traçe negotiations＂would be of the utmost importance to a strenginening of the I三beral trace syster and the growth of trade opportunities．＂

    2／OOmmincue of the OECD Ministeriai meeting heic in Paris on May 18，2984， OEGD Press Relaase，Vay 13， 1984.

    3／Comocities to be stucijed in the model jnclucie iairy p＝oducis，cereais， meats，sugar，feedstufes other than cezeais，anc imits and vegetables．

[^28]:    I/ The Unitec States, the European Commanity, and Austria were expecied io complete their country studies by May 2985 , and reports by japan and jew Zealand will foliow in laie 1985.

    2f Organization Eor Economic Cooperation anc Development, "Agricuitural TraGe with Deveioping Countries: Trends and Impiscations for Agriculiural Policies in OECD Countries," June 1984.

[^29]:    1/ For a more complete discussion of the automatic adjustment mechanism, see Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, p. 119.

    2/ The minimum interest rates established in October 1983 remained in effect until the first automatic adjustment in July 1984.

    3/ "OECD Support for Mixed Credit Crackdown Growing; except in France, Italy," Inside U.S. Trade, April 20, 1984, pp. 7-8.

[^30]:    Z／Ai the annual Ministerial Council meeting held in Apr．1985，OECD members agreed to raise the minimum allowable level of aid in a mixed credit package from 20 to 25 percent．

[^31]:    If TRITS are investment measures that affect trade or are motivated by drade poliay consioemations．Examples inciude locai－content regulations arci expont requiremenis．

    2／For an exampie，see the section on progress on services trade agreements in the OECD，in this chapter．

[^32]:    I／OEGD，Develoment Centre StuGies，Charles Onan，式似 Forms of
    Internationa！Investment in Deveiopins Countries，Paris，I98h．This suacy suggests that Eoreign direct invesiment is being replaced by＂nea roms of investment＂consisiing of coniractuai and joミni－ventume ammangemenis．

    2／Only Japan has iaken sieps 亡owara carrying oủ this agreeneni．See
    chap．V for cetails．
    3／Commnique of the OECD Minisierial meeing heic in Eanis on May 18，E984， OECD Press Release，Way 18，1984．

    4／OECD，＂Competition 2nc Tracie po＂jaies－Their Iniversction．＂2984．
    5／OECD，＂Consumez zoiicy and zniernaitonai Tace，＂2984．

[^33]:    三 Commaigue of the OECD Kinisterial meeting neic in Paris on Yay I8， 1984 ， OEGD Press Reiease，May I8，I984．

    2／The United States became a member on Nov．5，1970．Ali najor U．S． traciang partners，excepi Mexico，are now also members．

[^34]:    E／Unまte二 Nations，Proceeciing of the United Nation＇s Conference on Trace anc Deveioment，Geneva，Sar．23－テune I6，1964，vol．i，Einal aci－preamble， 1964，2．4．

    2／Wost intennationai commocity agrements use buffer stocks as ineit price－conivolling mechanism．As comociliy prices fall io some predeiemined Fevei．the buffer－stock manager begins buying to hait the price decline and buile up slocks．Converseiy，when prices fise lo some precelerminec level． Ghe manage begins seining io restrain increases in market prices．

    3／Proceedings of the Unived Vaitons Conference on Trace and Deveiopment． vol．i，Repori and Annexes，p． 7.

[^35]:    
     comocity agmeements covering cofree，sugan，wheat，cocoa，anc in．For a
    
    
    
    
     As of wancin 22，j985，Ehe agmeement nac been matifiec by 84 naijons thai
    
    
    

[^36]:    If For টhe views of various un deiegates，see Unitec 式ations Gonference on Trade anc Deveiopment，Tracie anc Development Board，＂Report of the Tace and Deveionment Board on ius Mwenty－Eight Session，＂Geneva，Miy 23，z984， 22．93－742．
    
    3／DDic．，？．Z2．
    \＆／Por a discussion of the operaiton of the U．S．GSP sysiem in I984，see にhap．U．See the operation of ine Trade Agreements Progiam，35in Repont． 1983，כo． $15-25$ ，for a ceiajled discussior of the renewal of the U．S．GSP z＝og＝am．

[^37]:    －See the previous section of this report for a eischssion of UNCTAD＇s Integrated Program for comodities（IPC）．

    2！The United States signed the tropical timber agreement on Ap：．26， 1985.
    3．The tur wholesale price index is a weighted average of prices for
    30 commoḋties．

[^38]:     3rogan．336 Zeport，I981，pe．86－88．

[^39]:    
    
    
    
     Goine，see une comaission＇s hisi Ouariezy Repori io ine Conozess ame the
    
    
    
    
    
    

[^40]:    ㄱ The two C＇s in the initials for the International Cocoa Agreement（ICCA） aze used to Gistinguish it from the International Coffee Agreement（ICA）．

    2／A conference neld in early 1985 also endec withoui a repiacement agreement むue 亡o differences beiween procucing and consuming na亡ions on price levels and the mechanism for revising lhem．

    3／At preseni，the Sixih EmA nas been atifiec by oniy a 65 perceni majority of consuming naikons．
    a／Uncer inese controis tin exporis were limited io 22,000 metric tons per quarier，or 30.6 percent iess than exporis for the base perioc，the thinc quarier of 5982.

[^41]:    If Fin prices are cuoted on The kun in Malaysian Goliars．Wher the zuice
     ذs requinec to buy tin on the oven manke to suppoz zaices．Duning－esh，
     the tloor price．
     funcions in much the same maner as the Eenang exchange，with the buefa＝－siock
    
     Vine xiv．
     signec a memoracum of unciersiancing（NOU）Vat mposed a ceining on GSA saies of 2,855 metric vons in 1984 ．The entize U．S．sizabegic inn sionkize，as of December is8u．equainec i89，725 metnic cons．
     nations agyeed to exienc the vou into zo85．Uncer the prowisions of the
     consuitations if tine anount of tin tisposec of 3y esk exceecs 3，000 metzic tons cuazing＝o85．

[^42]:    I/ The ATPC, consisting of Maiaysia, Inconesia, Thaiiand, Austiaija, Boivia, Zaire, and Nigeria, began operations in i983 anc acts incepencentiy of the ITA. While the ATPC is not authozized to impose such economic measures as export controls, other unspecified economic measures to support tin prices may be considered. Its actions thus far have been confinec primarily to the areas of tin research and developmeni of new uses fon inn.

    2/ See the Operation of the Tracie Agreements Program, 33c Revort, $=98$, ㄹ. 91 , for more detail.

    3/ Telephone conversation with Gorcion jones, U.S. Dept. of Siaie, Facch $5,1985$.
    $4 /$ See the Operation of the Trace Agreemenis Program, 32nc Report, 1980
     of the Trade Agreements Program, 33c Report, Z98, anc operation of the Trace Agreements Program, 34ih Report, 1982. for acicivional cetails.

[^43]:    I/ For an extensive discussion of services trade issues, incluåing problems of definition and cata collection, see the Operation of the Trade Agreement Program, 35th Report, 1983, p. 142.

    2/ Services comprised well over 50 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in each of the member couniries of the European Comanity in i981. In I979, more than half of the work force in 12 developing countries was employed in services. (See the national studies on trade in services submitied by the United Staies and Japan to the GATT.) In addition, UNCTAD issued a report stating that "many services play a far nore important role in the development process than is indicated by their direct contribution to GD?." United Naiions Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Board, "Services and the Development Process," August 2, 1984. (See the next seciion entilied "Services activiiies in multilateral forums-UNCTAD.")

[^44]:    I／For a discussion of the pijou siacies on ceriain service incusinies uncertaker for inis woごk 2rog＝am，see cinap．II．

    2／OECD，＂OCED COwnil Meeling ai Ministerial Level comminaue，＂he OZOD Observe＝，Nay 1982 ，？．E．

    3／OECD，Iniernaijonai Trace in Services：Insurance，1983；OECD，Obsiacies Lo Intemational Mourism in the OECD A＝ea，to be puibishec，see＂he Oosiacles
     OECD，Internaiionai Trace in Services：Sanking，1984．

[^45]:    I／In principle， 211 trace in services js coverec jy injs こoce．One doce s obijgaijons apply to a さ̇si of invisioie Emansacijons inai coven aoin Eransactions by specific service incuisinies（sucí as シnsumanee）arcí
     not contain overall provisions for mignt of esiabijsmene on subnaikonai－
     to a specifíc incustzy．

[^46]:    1/ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Board, "Report of the Trade and Development Board on its Twenty-Eighth Session," Geneva, May 23, 1984, p. 11.

[^47]:    1/ Transborder data flows refers to the flow of data via computer-communication systems between countries.

    2/ Reinsurance is insurance which one firm buys from another in order to write an amount of insurance on a single risk greater than its capital assets would permit.

[^48]:    1/ American Council of Life Insurance, 1984 Life Insurance Fact Book, 1984 , pp. 89-90.

    2/ Anthony J. DiLullo, "Service Transactions in the U.S. International Accounts, 1970-80," Survey of Current Business, November 1981, p. 40.

    3/ U.S. Department of Commerce, 1985 U.S. Industrial Outlook, January 1985, p. 61-1.

    4/ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, September 1984.

[^49]:    I/ Testimony of Ms. Joan Edelman Spero of American Express Company before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, House Banking Committee, June 11, 1984.

    2/ Communications Week, Nov. 5, 1984, p. 28.

[^50]:    1/ Country statistics in this chapter are generally drawn from International Economic Review, a monthly staff publication of the Office of Economics, U.S. International Trade Commission.

    2/ The monthly rate fell below 11 percent for the first time in December 1984, when Canadian unemployment was registered at 10.8 percent of the labor force.

    3/ Federal Reserve Board.
    4/ Data from Canadian 1983 Federal Budget and U.S. Office of Management and Budgel.

[^51]:    Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.

[^52]:    1/ See Operation of the Trade Agreements, 35th Report, 1983 5. 231-2.
    2/ The "First Option" was to have closer bilateral ties with the United States, while the "Second Option" was to maintain the existing terms of trade with the United States.

[^53]:    1/ From 1971 to 1981, the percentage of foreign-owned, non-finance-based industries decreased from 37 percent to 26 percent.

    2/ The total value of Canadian exports to the EC remained at 12.5 percent of Canada's total value of world exports from 1973 to 1980. The percentage traded with Japan during this timeframe dropped from 7.14 percent to 5.9 percent. (IMF, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (Vol.I), 1980; p. 196, table 3).

    3/ Operation of The Trade Agreements Program, 33d Report, 1981, p. 120; Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, p. 218.

[^54]:    1/ Even the Trade Declaration issued as part of the Quebec summil on Mar. 17-18, 1985, did not shed a great deal of light on the status of the sectoral rree-trade initiative. President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney charged their respective trade leaders to establish a bilateral mechanism "to chart all possible ways to reduce and eliminate existing barriers to trade and to report to us within six months."

[^55]:    1/ The EC's Comission estimates that the increase in U.S. imports from the EC countries in 1983 and 1984 contributed approximately 0.3 percent to the growth of the EC's GDP in both years. Commission of the European Comunities, "Annual Economic Review," European Economy, November 1984.

[^56]:    Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.

[^57]:    1/ Monetary Compensatory Amounts are internal border payments and deductions to offset the distortions that currency changes cause common EC farm prices.

    2/ With this mandate, the EC's Comission began negotiations with third country suppliers to cap imports of corn gluten feed and other NGFI's with appropriate compensation. The EC claims such action is required as part of a broader effort to reform the CAP, lower CAP costs, and encourage homegrown production of NGFI's.

    3/ In 1984, one ECU averaged US $\$ .83$.

[^58]:    1/ By yearend 1984, accession negotiations with Portugal were largely completed. Portugual responded to EC pressure and agreed to continue to restrict textile exports to the EC. Negotiations with Spain continued through early 1985 and became entangled over Spain's access to the EC's exclusive 200-mile common fishing zone and to the EC market for fruits and vegetables. Spain agreed to limit fruit and vegetable exports to the EC during a transition period following accession to buy time for southern EC farmers to adjust to new competition. The EC agreed to restrict during a transition period exports of EC beef, cereals, and some milk products to Spain in response to Spanish fears of an influx of these products.

[^59]:    1/ Import relief pressures mounted in the United States due to the surge of imports fueled by a very strong dollar, and in the EC because of high unemployment and sagging industrial competitiveness.

    2/ One of the most confrontational differences is over export subsidies. The United States argues against the EC's usage of export subsidies and the EC argues against the U.S. usage of export credits as means to facilitate exports. The EC's subsidized sale of surplus butter to the Soviet Union in late 1984 prompted the United States to respond by leaving the International Dairy Arrangement (for more information see section on the International Dairy Arrangement in chap. II). No progress was made in 1984 to negotiate an understanding on these matters.

    3/ The EC protested the proposed Export Administration Act, which was not adopted by the U.S. Congress in 1984 but is expected to be reintroduced in 1985, over the questions of export controls and extraterritoriality. Certain EC members disagreed with the United Slates about which exports products have military applications and thus should be subject to COCOM restrictions on sales to the Soviet bloc. The United States and the EC also disagreed on the extent to which U.S. domestic law extends to foreign companies that are subsidiaries of U.S. firms. The EC believes that U.S. domestic laws should not apply to U.S. subsidiaries abroad.

    4/ EC members and the United States differed in 1984 over the strength of the U.S. dollar relative to the European currencies. Differences over whether exchange rates should be set by coordinated policy or by the market have actually plagued relations over many years.

    5/ See Operations of the Trade Agreements, 35th Report, 1983 p. 231-2.

[^60]:    1/ Standard International Trade Classification.

[^61]:    1/ The market for VAN's in Japan was divided by the law into three categories for purposes of licensing and regulation: Class I, Special Class II, and General Class II. Class I firms are common carriers that install, own, and operate their own communications circuits. Class II firms lease common carrier circuits. Special Class II firms provide large-scale service. General Class II firms offer small-scale services. Roughly speaking, Special Class II firms are long-distance phone networks like Sprint and MCI in the United States, while General Class II services include small, in-house phone systems that use part of the public network and phone/bank account links or credit checking systems. Foreign ownership in Class I firms may not exceed one-third of the firm's total capital. Although there are no restrictions on foreign investment in Class II telecommunications enterprises, a variety of restrictions apply to large scale VANs, including registration with MPT of an acceptable business operation plan and possession of sufficient--in the judgement of MPT--financial and technical capacity to carry out the firm's proposed operations. Small VAN firms are required to notify MPT of their plans to offer services.

    2/ For a more general treatment of U.S. standards-related problems in Japan, see the "Standards" sec. below.

[^62]:    1/ For a more detailed treatment of these consultations, see the Government Procurement Code see in Chapter II of this report.

[^63]:    1/ In February 1985, the IMF became critical of Mexico for not meeting some of its economic goals for 1984. Also in February, Mexico announced the sale to the private sector or the closing-down of over 200 State-owned enterprises as a measure to curtail Government expenditures.

    2/ See Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 34th Report, 1983, pp. 193-196.

    3/ On Mar. 29, 1985, part of this agreement, covering $\$ 29$ billion, was signed by most creditor banks.

    4/ Mexico's total public sector debt amounted to $\$ 67.5$ billion in September 1984. The portion not covered in the proposed agreement is comprised of loans from international organizations that already have favorable terms.

[^64]:    1/ For details, see Foreign Industrial Targeting and Its Effects on U.S. Industries; Phase III: Brazil, Canada, The Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan, U.S. International Trade Commission, USITC Publication 1632, Jan. 1985, p.181.

    2/ Item 806.30 of the TSUS applies to nonprecious metal articles that are (1) made or processed in the United States, (2) exported for more processing abroad, and then (3) returned to the United States for further processing. Item 807.00 applies to articles that are made in whole or in part of U.S. components, assembled abroad, and then imported into the United States. The existence of these provisions in the U.S. tariff has stimulated the establishmeni of in-bond plants ("maquiladoras"), which are the principal sources of 806.30 and 807.00 imports from Mexico. Mexican authorities do not levy import duties on U.S. shipments into the "maquiladoras" or export duties on outbound shipments.

[^65]:    1/ See also "GSP Review" in chap. V.
    2/ See Operation of the U.S. Trade Agreements Program, 35th report, 1983, p. 283 .

    3/ In March, 1985, the Government further increased the daily rate of depreciation to 21 centavos per day.

[^66]:    1/ The daily 17-percent centavos depreciation rate, as the previous 13-centavos slide, was applicable to both the "free rate" and the "controlled rate" of the Mexican currency. Mexico's dual-exchange-rate system, featuring two different rates of exchange, had been maintained throughout the year, with parallel depreciation in both the free and the controlled rate. For a discussion of Mexico's two-tier exchange-rate system, see Operation of the U.S. Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, p. 298.

    2/ Operation of the U.S. Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, p. 295.
    3/ See "Regulation of the pharmacutical industry," immediately following.
    4/ Mexico's treatment of foreign investment is based on three laws with their respective resolutions: the 1973 Law to Regulate Foreign Investment, the 1973 Technology Transfer Law, and the 1976 Law on Inventions and Trademarks. The 1973 foreign investment law codified previously existing statutes, policies, and regulations governing foreign investment and established a National Commission on Foreign Investment (NCFI). Under this law, Mexican citizens--with very few exceptions--must retain controlling interest in foreign investment ventures. The current administration insists that there is no need to change the statute; instead, it allows the NCFI to make exceptions and to authorize certain foreign investors majority ownership.

[^67]:    1/ See also Operation of the U.S. Trade Agreements Program, 34th Report, 1982, p. 210.

    2/ Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd., "Taiwan," Asia Yearbook 1985, p. 254.

[^68]:    1/ American Institute in Taiwan, cable A-002, Jan. 10, 1985, p. 16.
    $\underline{2} /$ The EC accounted for 9 percent of Taiwan's exports and supplied 8.7 percent of its imports in 1984. Japan took 10.5 percent of Taiwan's exports and supplied 29.3 percent of its imports. (Data supplied by the Coordination Council for North American Affairs).

[^69]:    Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
    Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.

[^70]:    1/ Taiwan Economic News, Feb. 1985, p. 1.
    2/ Ibid.

[^71]:    1/ Also see "GSP renewal" in Chap. I and in the Korea sec.
    2/"Toyota-Taiwan joint venture plan scrapped," The Oriental Economist, October 1984, pp. 14-15.

    3/ When the United States normalized relations with China in 1979, all official trade relations with Taiwan were broken off. However, the United States-Taiwan relationship continues through quasi-diplomatic means. For details on the framework for conducting United States-Taiwan trade relations, see Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report, 1983, p. 315.

[^72]:    1/ United States International Trade Commission, Foreign Industrial Targeting, Phase III: Brazil, Canada, The Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan, USITC Publication 1632, 1985, p. 241.

    2/ "Korea's economy grows," Korea Herald, Mar. 24, 1985, p. 1.

[^73]:    1/ For a detailed discussion of Korea's foreign investment procedures, see U.S. International Trade Commission, Foreign Industrial Targeting and its Effects on U.S. Industries, Phase III: Brazil, Canada, The Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan, USITC Publication 1632, January 1985, pp. 135-139.

[^74]:    1/ Paul Ensor, "An emotional divide," Far Eastern Economic Review, Apr. 19, 1984, pp. 58 and 59; and Stuart Auerbach, "South Korea asks lid on trade complaints," The Washington Post, Mar. 8, 1984.

    2/ U.S. Embassy, Seoul, "Economic Trends Report," April 1984.
    3/ Paul Ensor, op. cil.

[^75]:    1/ In February 1985, the IMF suspended the release of $\$ 1.5$ billion in credits to Brazil for missing certain economic goals.

[^76]:    1/ The Paris Club is an international group of government representatives from creditor nations.

    2/ Brazil's program of phasing out wheat subsidies gradually will have the effect of reducing consumption and imports.

    3/ For leading U.S. items exported to and imported from Brazil see tables $\mathrm{B}-13$ and $\mathrm{B}-14$.

[^77]:    I/ U.S. International Trade Commission, Foreign Industrial Targeting and its Effects on the U.S. Industries: Brazil, Canada, The Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan, USITC Publication 1632, January 1985, p. 37.
    $\underline{2 /}$ See also section on "GSP Review" in chapter V.
    3/ Brazil has used import restrictions since the 1960's as part of its industrial policy of import substitution. Restrictions were tightened in the 1970's following the oil crisis, and once again in the $1980^{\prime}$ s, in response to the debt crisis.

    生/ Only firms registered with CACEX can obtain import licenses.

[^78]:    1/ See "Regulation of informatics" earlier in this sec.
    2/ In early 1985, officials of the two countries met to discuss the possibilities of reviving U.S. direct investment in Brazil.

    3/ Under current agreements, Brazil's repayment obligations on foreign debt are tied to U.S. interest rales.

[^79]:    1/ In the past, the two countries signed several bilateral textile accords, the first one in 1970. The last three were under the MFA. The current agreement is the first to cover manmade lextile products in addition to cotton textiles.

    2/ Nonrubber Footwear, USITC Publicaiion 1545, July 1984.
    3/ In 1983, the Commission conducted an investigation under Sec. 104(b) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 at the Brazilian Government's request. The investigation was to determine the likely effects of revoking the countervailing duty orders in effect on Brazilian footwear. Based on the Comission's findings, the countervailing duties in question were subsequently removed.

[^80]:    1/ Quantitative restrictions of U.S. imports are based on sec. 22 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1933, as amended, which aims to prevent interference with price support programs operated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. While there were no support programs for the 1980 and 1981 crops, such programs were reinstituted for the 1982-85 crops.

[^81]:    1/ Chairwoman Stern and Commissioner Rhor recommended an increase in tariffs. Commissioners Eckes and Lodwick recommended the imposition of quotas. Vice Chairman Liebeler voted in the negative. Commissioner Haggart did not participate.

    2/ Memorandum from the President to the USTR on Sept. 6, 1984, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 20, No. 36, p. 1240.

    3/ Proclamation 5074 of July 19, 1983 (Federal Register, Vol. 48, No. 141).
    4/ OMA's were recognized as a form of import relief under section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 and have been used frequently to provide import relief to U.S. industries.

    5/ For more information see the sec. entitled "U.S.-EC Bilateral Trade Issues" in chap. IV.

[^82]:    1/ An antidumping investigation can be terminated through a suspension agreement prior to a final determination by the Department of Commerce, if exporters accounting for substantially all of the imports of the merchandise under investigation agree to either eliminate the dumping or to cease exports of the merchandise to the United States within 6 months after suspension of the investigation or if extraordinary circumstances are present and the exporters agree to revise prices to completely eliminate the injurious effect of the imports. The investigation is reinstituted at the same stage as suspended should less-than-fair-value sales recur.

    2/ The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 amended the Tariff Act of 1930 to establish, under sec. 751 (19 U.S.C. 1675), a statutory procedure for the review of outstanding antidumping determinations or suspension agreements. Under sec. 751(a), periodic reviews are conducted by the Department of Commerce to adjust the amount of duty. (The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 amended this provision such that the periodic review will be conducted upon request rather than annually. Under sec. 751 (b), a review of a final determination or of a suspension agreement shall be conducted by the Department of Commerce (to determine if the unfair practice still exists) or the Commission (to determine if injury still exists) whenever it receives information or a request showing changed circumstances sufficient to warrant such review. Without good cause shown, however, no final determination or suspension agreement can be reviewed within 24 months of its notice. The party seeking revocation of an antidumping order has the burden of persuasion as to whether there are changed circumstances sufficient to warrant revocation.

[^83]:    1/ Administrative reviews under sec. 104 of the 1979 Trade Agreements Act apply only to countervailing duty orders issued prior to Jan. 1, 1980 when an injury test on dutiable products was not required. The statutory deadline for foreign governments or exporters of merchandise to the United States to request a review investigation under ses. 104 was Jan. 1, 1983. The investigations mentioned above represent the remaining outstanding cases.

[^84]:    1/ Inv. no. 301-46.
    2/ Inv. no. 301-47.
    3/ Inv. no. 301-13.
    4/ For further information on the panei report, see the Dispute Settlement sec. of chap. II.

[^85]:    1/ Inv. no. 301-15.
    2/ This new provision is contained in sec. 232 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 .

    3/ Inv. no. 301-43.
    4/ Inv. no. 301-44.
    5/ Inv. no. 301-6.

[^86]:    1/ Inv. no. 301-25.
    2/ For further information, see the sec. of chap. II entitled "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties".

    3/ Inv. no. 301-26.
    4/ For further information, see the "Dispute Settlement" sec. of chap. II.
    5/ Inv. no. 301-34.
    6/ Inv. no. 301-35.

[^87]:    1/ Inv. no. 301-45.

[^88]:    1/ For a more complete discussion of the MFA and the MFA bilateral agreements, see The Multifiber Arrangement, 1980-1984, (U.S.International Trade Commission Publication No. 1693, May 1985).

    2/ The United States operates bilateral textile agreements with the following 25 MFA signatories: Brazil, China, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Haiti, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Macau, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. The MFA nonsignatories with which the United States has bilateral agreements are Costa Rica, Mauritius, Panama, and Taiwan.

    3/ The Office of Textiles, U.S. Department of Commerce, has the responsibility for monitoring the agreements. In this capacity, it acts on behalf of the interagency Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements (CITA).

    4/ For additional discussion of the new U.S. country-of-origin regulations, see chap. II sec. entitled "Textiles".

[^89]:    1/ Revised CBI Customs regulations were published in the Federal Register, (19 CFR 10) Dec. 7, 1984, and went into effect Jan. 7, 1985.

    2/ Business America, Jan. 7, 1985, p. 3.
    3/ Under the original GSP, the list of items eligible for GSP duty-free treatment had been subject to an annual review by the interagency Trade Policy Staff Comittee, chaired by a representative of the USTR. In the review, products were added to or deleted from the list of eligible articles; also, products of certain beneficiary countries were excluded from or reinstated to eligibility for GSP treatment on the basis of competitive-need limits or by the President's discretionary authority to "graduate" countries for particularproducts.

    4/ Major changes include provisions that favor the least-developed countries versus the more affluent ones and give the President greater authority in determining country eligibility and product-specific benefit levels.

    5/ The original U.S. GSP scheme was established under the Trade Act of 1974 for a period of 10 years. The program expired on Jan. 4, 1985. For more details, see "GSP Renewal" in chap. I.

[^90]:    2/ For cases in which the final action was taken by ITA, the date shown is the Federal Register notice date of that decision. Source: Casis Database, Office of Economics, U.S. International Trade Commission.

[^91]:    the investigation by the Department of Commerce is listed.
    $\frac{3}{3} /$ For cases in which the final action was taken by ITA, the date shown is of the Federal Register notice date of that decision. test Cases involving imports from countries that are not entitled, under U.S. countervailing duty statutes, to a material injury test do not come before the Commission and therefore have no USITC case numbers or determinations.
    $5 /$ The Commission does conduct an "injury test," on imports from countries not otherwise entitled imports enter the United States duty free. The legislative basis for these determinations is contained in certain provisions of under section 303 ( 19 U.S.C. 1303).

    Czechoslovakia, based upon their investigation in which they determined that bounties or grants cannot be found in nonmarket economies. The final determination appears in the Federal Register, Vol. 49, p.19370, May 7, 1984.
    based upon their investigation in which they determined that bounties or grants cannot be found in nonmarket economies. Final determination appears in the Federal Register, Vol. 49, p. 19374, May 7, 1984.

[^92]:    Source: Cases Database, Office of Economics, U.S. International Trade Commission.

[^93]:    See footnotes at end of table.

[^94]:    See footnotes at end of table.

[^95]:    Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U. S. Department of Commerce.
    Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.

[^96]:    Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.

[^97]:    1/ Prior to Mar. 31,1982 , this item was classified under the now-deleted item 706.28 .
    2/ Prior to Apr. 1984 , this item was classified under the now-deleted and more comprehensive item 685.19 .
    Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U. S. Department of Commerce.
    Note.--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.

[^98]:    Note,--Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown.

