Preface

A military career took Joseph Stanley Kimmitt through the Second World War and the Korean War, and eventually brought him to Capitol Hill, where he became Secretary for the Majority during the Vietnam War. In uniform and as a civilian, he served his nation in the halls of the Senate and helped bring some order to a notoriously intractable institution. Kimmitt's progress from Army liaison officer to Secretary for the Majority was facilitated by a Senate majority leader from his home state, Mike Mansfield, but he won the post of Secretary of the Senate in 1976 on his own. He held that post for four years during the majority leadership of Robert C. Byrd and the presidency of Jimmy Carter. When the Republican victory in the election of 1980 ended the Democrats' 26-year majority in the Senate, it also brought an end to his term as Secretary. In the following decades, Stan Kimmitt remained a prominent figure on Capitol Hill as Washington representative for major defense industries.

Born on April 5, 1918 in Lewistown, Montana, he attended grade school in Great Falls and the University of Montana before being drafted into the U.S. Army in June 1941. He served in the Mule Pack Artillery at Fort Lewis, Washington and then attended Officers Candidate School and the Naval War College. Commissioned a second lieutenant, he commanded the 155th battery in Europe, and later commanded a 405 battalion in Korea. He received the Silver Star and Bronze Star. In 1946, he accepted a regular Army commission and over the years rose to the rank of Colonel. He attended Utah State University, where he received a B.S. in political science, did graduate studies in international relations at George Washington University, and also attended the Command and General Staff College. He married Eunice Wegener, a Red Cross nurse he met in Berlin; they had seven children.

In 1955, Kimmitt became liaison officer to the Senate for the Secretary of the Army. He did three tours as liaison officer, from 1955 to 1958, 1959 to 1960, and 1964 to 1965. In 1965 he left the Army at the request of Senator Mike Mansfield (within whom he had once taken a course on Far Eastern history at the University of Montana) and initially served as Mansfield's administrative assistant. In 1966, Democrats elected him Secretary for the Majority. In that post he served as the principal floor assistant to the Majority Leader and was responsible for facilitating the work of Democratic senators, keeping them informed of the floor schedule and anticipated

votes, and reporting to the leadership on the prospects of important votes. He served a party whose membership ranged widely from Hubert Humphrey on the political left to James Eastland on the right, during the rush of Great Society legislation and the divisive debate over the Vietnam War. The Majority Secretary's office became a neutral meeting place for senators from both parties to relax at the end of the day and at times to conduct legislative business informally.

When Senator Mansfield retired from the Senate in 1976, Kimmitt challenged the incumbent Secretary of the Senate, Francis R.Valeo, and was elected by the Democratic Conference to replace him. At the same time, Senator Robert C. Byrd was elected as Majority Leader, and Senator Howard Baker was elected Minority Leader. Over the next four years, Kimmitt was the Senate's chief administrative officer, supervising the staff on the Senate floor, including the parliamentarians, legislative clerks, executive clerks, and reporters of debate. As the Senate's chief financial officer, he was responsible for a budget which in fiscal year 1980 topped $218 million, including the salaries of all senators and staff. He supervised a myriad of other offices ranging from the Stationery Store to the Senate Library. He worked closely with the leadership and senators of both parties, and his office remained a familiar off-hours meeting place for senior senators.

The Republican victory in the 1980 elections ended Stan Kimmitt's term as Secretary of the Senate. Senators rose in a bipartisan tribute before he left. Senate Democratic leader Robert C. Byrd said that he had served with "distinction, integrity, and dedication," while Republican leader Howard Baker called him "the embodiment of dedication and untiring service." The conservative Virginia Senator Harry Byrd, Jr. recalled that Kimmitt had "consistently displayed an unfailing courtesy, a great talent for organization and a total dedication to duty," and the liberal Californian Alan Cranston gave him credit for "keeping the Senate running smoothly and efficiently." Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson described him as an institution man: "He knows and understands the history and traditions of the Senate as few people do."

Afterwards, Kimmitt became vice president for government affairs of Hughes Helicopters, Inc and a Washington representative for McDonald-Douglas, Boeing and other defense-related industries. His interviews therefore offer observations from both inside and outside the Senate, and focus especially on the Senate Armed Services Committee under the chairmanships of Richard Russell, John Stennis, John Tower, Barry Goldwater, and Sam Nunn.

About the Interviewer: Donald A. Ritchie is associate historian of the Senate Historical Office. A graduate of the City College of New York, he received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Maryland. His books include *James M. Landis: Dean of the Regulators* (Harvard Press, 1980), *Press Gallery: Congress and the Washington Correspondents* (Harvard Press, 1991), and *The Oxford Guide to the United States Government* (Oxford, 2001). He served as president of the Oral History Association and of Oral History in the Mid-Atlantic Region (OHMAR), and received OHMAR's Forrest C. Pogue Award for distinguished contributions to the field of oral history.

MONTANA ROOTS

Interview #1

Thursday, February 15, 2001

KIMMITT: The minutes of the Democratic Conference were always unavailable to scholars, historians, and everyone else. I had in my office in big leather bond folders, old scripture. Time and again, I got requests from scholars, historians, and so, to look at the minutes. They would never release them. Then we made a recommendation to [Majority Leader Mike] Mansfield, which was never carried out. It may have been carried out later. That's the purpose of my comment, to put in a policy that would permit any record being made available to selective scholars or legitimate people up to the point of the last senator deceased. Let's say hypothetically that there were no more senators of the class of '56. Well, anything up to '56 should go. I don't know whatever happened to that.

RITCHIE: Well, they finally got around to following your recommendation, although not quite the same way. Both the Republican and the Democratic Conferences have opened up their records prior to 1964. While there are a couple of senators, like Senator Thurmond who came in the '50s and Senator [Robert C.] Byrd who came at the very end of the '50s–

KIMMITT: I was here for both of them.

RITCHIE: –neither of the them felt that there was anything that would bother them by opening them up. So they're now available until 1964, finally. After that, scholars will have to wait for a little while.

KIMMITT: That's good. I'm glad you made a breakthrough on that.

RITCHIE: It took a long time.

KIMMITT: I bet it did, because, as I said, when I started making the recommendation as Secretary for the Majority, and I think I stepped into that job in '65-'66, that time frame. So here it is now 2001, that's thirty-some odd years. I'm glad you made a breakthrough.

RITCHIE: Yes, people are finding it very useful. With the Senate being divided 50-50 this year, one of the things the senators wanted to do was to go back to see how they apportioned committees in 1953, since that was a very similar situation.

KIMMITT: I remember. That's when [Robert] Taft was majority leader and died. [William] Knowland took over. Wayne Morse sat in the middle for a while, then he opted to go with the Democrats. [Lyndon] Johnson was the minority leader, but he had a majority. It was in one of those crazy situations.

RITCHIE: Exactly. We're very close to that situation right now. People are spending a lot of time looking back over those minutes.

KIMMITT: A lot of people are getting up every morning and wondering whether Jesse [Helms] or Strom [Thurmond] are alive. If it flips, what a turmoil that would provoke!

RITCHIE: I'd like to go back to your roots in Montana. I understand that you grew up on a wheat ranch near Denton, Montana. How did your family get to Montana and what was life like on that wheat ranch?

KIMMITT: Some of this is from memory and fact, some of it is from family lore, but I am confident that I am pretty accurate in this. My brother, who was eleven years older than I, was more of a family historian. Of course, he lived in the part of the era I will tell you about. Both my father and my mother were (in two different families, of course) part of the great migration west in the late 1800s and the early 1900s. My grandparents and their antecedents came over from Ireland. I think they got off in the Baltimore area and gradually moved into Illinois and then went into Wisconsin. My mother was born in Wisconsin and then moved into Iowa. My dad was born in Clarion, Iowa. She was born in a place called Veroqua, Wisconsin, which probably no longer exists. These two families and others moved as groups. In other words, as opportunities opened. They went on from Iowa into South Dakota.

My maternal grandfather was pretty much a businessman. He opened mercantile stores, hotels, etc. My father's side of the family was agrarian, farmers per se. In about 1910 or 1911, up in Alberta, Canada, they opened up a homesteading policy. Both of my grandparents' families,

one Kimmitt and one Bowe (on my mother's side) moved to Alberta. My dad was one of the first up there on a reconnaissance. My maternal grandfather was in a position to have several cars of a train loaded with machinery, livestock, furnishing, etcetera, and they moved to Canada.

My dad and his family went up coincidentally at about the same time. They didn't have the same affluent circumstances. My dad became a well driller, which was fairly common in those days, and a surveyor, not as we view surveying technically today, but it was very important to establish markers, surveying sections. Everything out in the West was in sections, which was really a square mile, 640 acres. You'd have to place the survey markers for the municipality up there, which he did.

They opened up the land, and my dad and his brothers and his father and my mother's family all filed on quarter sections of land, usually contiguous to each other. Homesteading rules required that an applicant had to live on the land. Well, living on the land in 1910 consisted–on my mother's side of the family and I think my father's side of the family, too–of a general main home for the family. Then the sons or daughters would go out on their quarter section of land and put up a very small shack. They would spend some nights out there, maybe a certain number of nights to confirm the residency, but they'd always come back to the home place, which was within riding distance on a horse or walking distance. Everything domestic was done in the home place.

World War I was approaching, and they were breaking virgin land. There was nothing up there but the railroads. The CPR, Canadian Pacific Railroad came through from the east through Medicine Hat and then on off to the Pacific coast. Then in the north there was another railroad, just as there similarly was in the United States. You had the Great Northern along the northern tier of America, and then down south a few hundred miles, you had the Union Pacific, and they were running competitive and contiguous lines. Everything else was just virgin land. So it was just strike out and establish a farm, form small towns and so on.

My dad was a tall, active, leader-type individual. Well, in about 1913, he got into some kind of fracas with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. I know the story, but I'm not going to put it down, historically. It was not bad. It was not a felony. It was actually an affront to the mounted policemen. My mother was there in Canada. She was a school teacher. My older brother and older sister and another brother who died before I was born in 1918 were there. All

this occurred around 1914-‘16, in that area. My Dad immediately took off and headed due south as rapidly as conditions would permit, and came into Montana. He went down to the Judith Basin, which is a very fertile, very fine farming area around Lewistown, Montana. He went to the bank. A little bank in a town called Windham. He wanted to make a loan to buy a quarter section of land to get started Well, at that time, if I’m informed correctly, money from all over the East was flooding out there. They wanted to loan it. They wanted to get it out. They wanted to get earnings on their return and land as collateral. They made the loan.

World War I came along. He, again, was breaking virgin ground in that area and using horses and men. It is a derogative term in today’s culture, but we used to call them “Bohunks.” They were middle Europeans who just migrated across the country and worked on farms. When I was born in 1918, Dad had built a home. My mother was teaching school. They had a big bunk house, and he had acquired, under cultivation with horses, seven sections of land. That’s seven square miles of wheat land. It was the golden time with money coming in. Then, of course, things always end and along came the crash of 1921. I was three years old, maybe three going on four. The banks started going under. Well, he had become a director of the bank. At that time, unlike now, under our banking laws of modern times, directors became personally responsible for the banks’ liabilities. So one of my earliest memories was my mother outside this home, which had only been built four or five years. It was a farm home, of course, with machinery all around it. There was a big copper pot in which she made doughnuts and a big thing of coffee. For lack of a better term, it was a sheriff’s sale for everything we owned, for which he got nothing. It all went to fulfill the bank’s debts. So that ended that particular era.

I was born in Lewistown. Our home was between Denton and Stanford, which are small towns in the vicinity of Lewistown, but removed by maybe ten, twelve, fifteen miles, something like that. So we then moved to Great Falls, which is a larger community about eighty miles up the road. It was the home of the Anaconda Company. It had a smelter and a big smokestack. Incidently, Great Falls was also the beginning of Mike Mansfield’s Montana roots. He came up from New York and lived with his relatives in Great Falls. Of course, you know that story.

We moved into town, but my dad did not move into town. He never worked for anybody in his life. He went north of town, up towards the Canadian border, and again started over, leasing a piece of ground. Then came not only the recession, but the drought. My mother was cooking

in one of the better restaurants in town. I remember very well. She would work a split shift. She would go to work early enough to cook for the lunch period and then she would have to take off in the afternoon to come again to prepare for the dinner menu until seven, eight o'clock at night, and then she'd come home. She would work six days a week on that shift. I remember very well her salary was eighteen dollars a week. My brother was in high school at that time and he worked in a service station, then he left high school to help support the family, because my dad wasn't getting anything north of town, there was no income there. My brother leased a service station, the H. Earl Clack Service Station.

By this time, the Depression was on in 1931 and '32. In 1932, I was a freshman in high school and I worked for him, pro bono, of course. Our goal, every day, was to sell a hundred gallons of gas, because the markup on a gallon of gas was 3 cents. If we sold a hundred gallons, his income was three dollars a day. Many days we didn't make it. Then we picked up additional money on grease jobs, as we used to call them. Tire repair, that kind of thing. I didn't draw any money from it. It went into supporting the family, which was his task at the time along with my mother. My sister was still in high school. My other brother died in the flu epidemic of '17, something like that.

I remember a U.S. Department of Agriculture agent in Great Falls would roll in with his stripped down Ford coupe, no chrome or anything. It was a government car and he had a government credit card. He would always give those magic words, "Fill it up." He was traveling all over the region. He was one of our best customers. Man, I'd go out there when he came in and I'd brush out the floor boards, check the radiator, check the battery, check the tires, clean the windshield, do everything for that fill up. One day he was driving out, and I said to my brother, "I wonder what that fellow makes." He said, "Well, it's a matter of public record. He makes $1800 a year. That's $150 a month." I remember thinking to myself at the time, and I've thought about this many times, if they had put a contract in front of me for life, just a flat indentured contract for life, for $150 a month, I would have signed it and been on top of the world. Well, time went on. That was '32.

I graduated from high school and I went to work first as a waiter. By that time, liquor had come back in '36. Beer came back first, then liquor later on, during Roosevelt's era. Cocktail lounges were breaking out all over. I worked in the historical, oldest, and best-known bar in town

called the Mint. You'd go in and there was a cigar counter and a cash register and then a long bar for standing and beyond that a long bar for a lunch counter. On the right would be cabinets of western mementoes, primarily almost all Charles M. Russell. Up on the walls all around were his original paintings. This place was known not only nationally but worldwide. In the back, they had gambling. As time went on, probably after I left, I don't know what the year was, the Mint got in financial difficulty. The bank had loans on all the Russell paintings. So they called the loan and took ownership of the paintings. A movement started to have a public donation subscription to keep the Russell paintings in Montana. A man, I think Charlie Bovey was his name, was trying to raise two dollars apiece from Montanans and failed, couldn't do it. Later on Amon Carter from Dallas came and bought the whole damn outfit for practically a song. I'm rambling now.

RITCHIE: That's okay. This is very interesting.

KIMMITT: He couldn't raise the money, so Amon Carter went in and bought them all. Then to show you how times have changed, two years ago, I think, the University of Montana had a fund raising drive, obviously not all in Montana, and they raised $40,000,000. They could have had those paintings, originals, for probably $60,000.

RITCHIE: Did you bartend for a while?

KIMMITT: I later joined the bartenders and I'm a member emeritus of the Cooks, Waiters, and the Bartenders Union. I went over to the University of Montana, and I had this bartending union card. I didn't have any money. I spent all the money every damned night because in the Mint they paid you in cash every night. A waiter's salary was $4.50 for eight hours, which was fine, but no tips. I'd go out at the end of the shift, usually at two o'clock in the morning. They rolled out four silver dollars and a half and that was it. Then I'd go out for the next couple hours and spend all but about forty cents of it. That went on for a couple years, then I decided I better get to the university. So I borrowed on a one thousand dollar insurance policy that my mother had taken out on me in 1931, (which I still have as a matter of fact, Metropolitan Life Insurance.) I borrowed sixty dollars on that policy and enrolled at the University of Montana. I got a job at one of the newer cocktail lounges there. I would work Friday night, Saturday night, and a Sunday day shift. That would give me eighteen dollars a week, which put me in a very advantageous position for a student at that time.

Of course, it was there that I first had contact with Mike Mansfield. Now I knew his father and family in Great Falls. I knew his half brothers, who were contemporaries of mine in school and everything else. I went to grade school with them. But I had never met him.

RITCHIE: He was out around the world in the service, I guess, before that time.

KIMMITT: Oh, yes, as you know, he had been in the Navy, the Army, and the Marine Corps. He came back to Butte and went to Montana School of Mines now Montana Tech, and finally the university and got his degree and married there. Then he earned his master's degree and ended up teaching at the University of Montana. Well, when he was teaching, I took a couple courses from him. I was not a very good student, which he will now usually volunteer with any group who may be around. But it was my first contact with him. It was not a warm, personal contact at that time, other than my relationship with his family. His family would be, of course, half brothers and sisters, and his father and his father's new wife. I went over there I guess in 1940, played football, and then I was drafted being one of the first names out of the box but they deferred me until June of '41. I had only five quarters of ROTC. I was doing very well in basic ROTC, but you needed six quarters to go into advanced ROTC. If you went into advanced ROTC, you were then deferred for a couple years until you got your commission. Well, I didn't qualify on the advanced ROTC because of time. When I finished the school year in '41, I immediately went into the Army.

RITCHIE: Before that, Mansfield ran for Congress that first time in 1940. Did you have anything to do with that campaign?

KIMMITT: No, did he run in '40?.

RITCHIE: He lost the primary.

KIMMITT: He lost and came back.

RITCHIE: He came back and won in '42.

KIMMITT: No, I did not have anything to do with that campaign in 1940. I wasn't even

politically interested at that time. Who the hell knew who was running for Congress? We all knew we were going into the war. Our college days were more an interlude than a profession. We were very distracted students.

I went first to Fort Lewis, Washington, for induction for two or three days, and then sent south to a new camp that was just opened, Camp Roberts, California. It was basic training. They put you through a screening test. I was assigned to a radio school. The radio school consisted of Morse Code primarily and what today would be considered antiquated voice-activated radio. When the training started, the battery commander came out in front in formation and said, "It's going to be very competitive. We run this on tables. People are assigned on a weekly basis to different tables based on their proficiency. If you get to the top table, which should be the goal of all of you, you will be assigned to one of these new motorized divisions." Keep in mind, this is the transition from the cavalry and the horse artillery to motorized divisions. His criteria was: work up to the top table and you'll be assigned accordingly. So I worked my ass off and I did get up to the top table. I was sending and receiving fifteen to eighteen words a minute on Morse Code and I was learning. I had three months at eighteen dollars a month. After three months, it automatically went to twenty-one dollars a month. That wasn't enough to do anything. We were a hell of a long ways from anywhere. Los Angeles was a couple or more hours south. San Francisco was about the same distance north. So I stayed on post and I was hoping I'd get up to the top table. It came time for graduation and reassignment. We were all lined up in formation when the first sergeant comes out to announce the first assignments. This was an old horse artilleryman from Louisiana, named Guidry. He had that deep southern Louisiana dialect. He'd call off: "The following personnel are going to. . . ." About two thirds of the way through, he said, "The following personnel are going to the 98th Field Artillery Pack." He stopped and he said, "These men are going to a mule outfit! Field artillery Pack at Fort Lewis, Washington." I laughed. I thought, "Those poor bastards." He called off twelve names and I was right in with them.

When formation was over, I went in to see the battery commander. I said, "Lieutenant, you said . . ." "Well, you know, assignments are all made at higher headquarters. I'm sure they tried and so on, but you're going to have to go." I finished training, went up to Fort Lewis, arrived on a Sunday morning. It was raining about like today here. In Fort Lewis, it's always that way in the winter time. The sergeant picked us up. I still remember his name, Jack Clifford, even though that's a long time ago. He took us from the train to the barracks and said, "Get in your

fatigues." Then he marched us right down on the line to groom mules. There were somewhere between five and seven hundred mules in the battalion. We had to curry the mules, clean them up. It would rain constantly on those goddamn mules. At least I grew up in Montana and knew a little about animals, but they had kids from the Bronx and everywhere else. They were hesitant and wouldn't get up close. Those mules would kick them and knock them off the line and an NCO would order them back..

Anyway, this would have been in September or October of '41. Then, boom, Pearl Harbor was hit, in December, 1941. I remember being out on that Sunday–it occurred on a Sunday–on what was called herd guard. We take the horses, not the mules, officers' horses, and we'd ride one and lead one. We'd get out there, take the saddles off and let them graze for several hours and then we'd ride back in. I heard this on the radio about Pearl Harbor. They closed the camp and blacked out the windows just like the goddamn Japanese were coming over the hill or something. Then, after days, maybe a couple weeks, sometime during January and February we moved into the field. The Olympic Peninsula above Fort Lewis, back in the very early twenties, had a hell of a hurricane-type wind come through there knocking trees down. There were no roads around the peninsula. There was no access. You could come ashore from the beach, of course, or you could go overland by foot. They understandably decided they would take the pack artillery with mules and we would go up and around this peninsula, which we did.

Prior to that, in January, they had interviewed people for the ski troops. I was interviewed and was selected. We went up to Mount Rainier, about twenty of us from the artillery. We took ski training from some of the best skiers in America at that time, Olympic skiers, tournament skiers and everything else. From there, that group—many of them—went to Oregon and Mount Hood and formed the Tenth Mountain Division. That was the division that later Bob Dole was in. But I stayed at Fort Lewis with the mules.

Now I'll revert back to going around the Olympic Peninsula. While I was out there, because of the casualties at Anzio and Kasserine Pass there was a shortage of young officers. An order came out that anyone with an AGCT score high enough would go before a selection board. This score was an educational qualification. You took the test and they came up with a number on your AGCT. It's like an aptitude test. The order said that anybody with an AGCT over 120 would be interviewed for Officer Candidate School. Well, I think I had 141, but I didn't apply for

Officer Candidate School. By direction I went to an interview by four or five World War I-type colonels. I remember sitting outside before this interview next to a couple other soldiers going through the same thing. One of them had gone in and I was second in line after him. He came back out. As he went by, I said, "What sort of stuff are they asking you in there?" "Oh, they're asking the darnedest things. One colonel asked me what eleven times twenty three was." He said, "I blew it." OK, and away he went. So I thought, well, hell that's relatively easy. It's ten times the number plus the number. So that would be 230 and another 23, that's 253. I went in and sure enough, bingo, the sum of the number popped up. "What's eleven times something?" I gave them the answer right away.

Anyway, while we out on this march around the peninsula, I got orders to come back to Fort Lewis to report for Officer Candidate School. Now the 98th Field Artillery Pack was a regular Army outfit out of Panama, and the only thing lower in their estimation and status than the National Guard, was a draftee. There were twelve of us draftees. I had been there just almost a year and had never made PFC, just couldn't make PFC. They had the old Army system where if somebody screwed up during the month, they'd bust him down, but they wouldn't fill the vacancy, and after the next payday, they'd promote the same man back again. It was a common practice. I could never make Private First Class. I was leading a mule for miles and miles every goddamn week and living out in the field. No gas stoves for the cooks. We had what they called buzzy cots, large rectangular pots. You'd gather wood to burn underneath. Everything we took with us, we loaded on mules and moved along.

I came in and reported to this second lieutenant—he became a two-star general later on in the war—his name was Andy Pribnow. I reported to him for orders. "Kimmitt," he said, "you've been selected to go to Officer Candidate School." I enthusiastically said, "Yes, sir." He said, "Now, before you go, I have a favor to ask of you." I said, "Yes, sir." He said, "Under Army regulation, anyone selected for OCS has to be promoted to corporal before they leave their station. I'm going to promote you to corporal according to Army regulation. But, you know this battalion pretty well." "Yes, sir." He said, "Would you wait before you leave the battalion area before you put on your stripes?" [laughs]

I went to downtown Tacoma and got a couple of corporal stripes, of course, which I had authority for. Then, the old Army drab uniform didn't seem to have enough pizzaz to it even with

the stripes. These were civilian stores. I had them cross-stitch a bright golden thread around them so it would stand out a little bit more. I looked in the mirror and it still didn't quite have the elan that I was looking for, because I was going home to Montana on the way to OCS and I would have forty-eight hours at home. So I looked around and got a solid brass whistle and a chain. I hung the whistle over the left breast pocket and the chain up around the epaulet and that just sort of set things off. Here were my neon stripes and a shiny brass whistle. I was ready to go to OCS, which I did, of course.

I went to Fort Sill, where we lived in tents. In July 1942, I graduated from OCS and went to Camp Butner in North Carolina as a second lieutenant. I arrived at camp about ten o'clock in the morning in mid July, 1942. The 78th Division was just being formed. The cadre of about 300 stood out in front of the Headquarters building on 15 August. The whole camp was under construction at that time. Coming out of the northwest and into North Carolina, that heat was torturous and a lot of men were falling down and fainting. We went through combat training, as we should, but at the same time, we were building the camp. We were doing this while getting water out of Lister bags and eating unsavory rations. It was a real test. We would be doing road marches, twenty-five mile marches. They'd be experimenting on different things. On march they were experimenting with D-bars, which is nothing more than five or six ounces of very rich chocolate, and milk. So all you had was the D-bar and milk at lunch on the road during the twenty-five mile march on one of these miserably hot days. Before long, the stomach cramps else took over. Then we'd have the speed marches in the heat. We went to Louisiana maneuvers, which you hear about now from George Marshall's days. In the meantime, as a lieutenant, I became a Battery commander. Everything was turbulent. My battery would compete for everything within the battalion, and within the division. It was very competitive. We won more than our share of those events.

We went to Europe. Got over there not early, not at D-Day, but later on, before Thanksgiving of '44. We went to Germany, first into Belgium, then into Germany. We went into position on the 11th of December '44, right near a little town called Monchau, which was not far from another town, Roetgen. On the 13th of December, two days later the "Bulge" hit. We could hear the rumblings of tanks ahead of us by maybe two or three thousand yards. We didn't know what the hell was going on. When they hit, they went right around our shoulder about five hundred yards to our right.

Otto Scorzene's people—he was the dirty tricks guy—were dropping by parachute all over the area. We captured one of them. We'd get strafing from the German fighters. My battery, and the group around us, knocked one of them down. We had fifty calibers. He crashed about a quarter mile from us. It was a real mixed up mess. Of course, then came the cold and the snow and all the stories you've seen about the "Bulge." We drove it back and it stabilized. In the meantime, we were poised to take what was called the Schwammenal Dam. The Schwammenal Dam was that big dam on the Roer River, which was near the town of Schmidt. Now Schmidt is significant because prior to the Bulge, by a number of months, the Pennsylvania 28th Division, which had a red keystone patch and became known as the bloody bucket division, fought there. They tried to take Schmidt on a frontal assault down through a deep ravine and up through a little village at Simonskall, and they just got decimated. Their bodies were still down there. They were still lying in a no man's land between the lines. There were many destroyed vehicles. The reason I know this is because when we finally took Schmidt, I came down through there and there were many blackened corpses and burned vehicles all over the area.

Our job was to take the dam, and we had significant engagements in little towns of Kesternich, Lammersdorf, and others all through there. We finally did take the dam. The significance of taking the dam was, had they been able to retain it, if our forces (not our division so much, but the main force) would try to go across the Roer River to the Rhine, they could have flooded that whole area, by letting the dam waters loose. By getting the dam we protected that area. We took the town of Schmidt, crossed the Roer River, and we were moving over the plain towards the Rhine. One day at about ten o'clock in the morning (I was by this time a captain), I was riding in the back seat of the brigadier general of our division, our artillery commander named Frank Camm. He heard over the radio that our people had taken or were engaged at the Remagen Bridge. We raced down there and all hell was breaking loose. We went down to the bridge site, and there was probably thirty or forty people across the bridge by that time. The first jet aircraft I ever saw in my life was here. There was a German jet coming down stream on the Rhine trying to destroy the bridge. It never hit it. We got out of there, and I got my battery moving forward, closer to the Rhine. Two or three days later the bridge fell, I think, but by that time we had ponton bridges below Remagen. I took my battery across there and then we got involved in the Ruhr pocket, or as it was named, "the Rose pocket," for General Maurice Rose who was killed there. It was April and then came the end of the war. FDR died around this time.

We moved to a town of Kassel. It was primarily security guard duty and screening displaced persons coming out of what became East Germany, coming back into the western zone. We'd screen those refugees and guard the art museums and everything else. We were there for a while and then went on to Berlin. The first American unit into Berlin was the 2nd Armored Division. It was there between two and three weeks. Then the 82nd Airborne Division under M.G. Jim Gavin went in for about a month. Then we were sent in, the 78th Division, to take over Berlin when they moved out. In Berlin, I left the battery and went up to division headquarters and became chief of training. I have a lot of original Berlin stories which are not terribly relevant at the moment. I stayed in Berlin and met my wife there. She was a Red Cross girl. We were married in Berlin in 1947 and came home that fall and went to Logan, Utah.

But reverting to Berlin for a minute, it's a story unto itself. The occupying forces after having fought the Germans came into this big city. The cold caused terrible conditions for the Germans. The Russians had come in earlier and they were just atrociously cruel to them. Those who had any party affiliation—of course, the Germans were so well organized, everybody and every little community knew everybody and had records of those who had any party affiliation. Party members were authorized only 800 calories a day. That's bare survival. The winter of '45-'46 (or possibly '46-'47) was one of the worst winters that they've ever had in modern times in Berlin. These people, many of them, were just walking around like zombies.

We took over a Kaserne area, which was a facility like Fort Myer over here. Everything had been pretty much been destroyed. I had the job of going up on the advance party and getting glass, which was hard to find, to fix the windows and other materials to renovate the place. We would call on the local civilian officials to send us laborers. All of these people were of this 800 calorie a day group. They had a party affiliation. They'd send maybe a couple hundred in the morning, and we'd assign them to do different things. Right in the middle of the Kaserne was where they had bulldozed all of the debris from the destruction. They bulldozed a big pile of it. Obviously, we had to move it out of there. So I'd go down and tell the supervisor to start loading that stuff on dump trucks and get it out of there. It was just going excruciatingly slow. They were slow; they were malnourished. At the same time, over in our mess hall for the battalion, which was about six to eight hundred men, we were getting full rations. We would throw a hell of a lot food out, wasted food. The war was over, and there was a hell of a lot of food just going in the trash and to the dump. Down in the basement of this mess hall was a large kitchen. They had these

huge—about the size of this desk around—stainless steel pots with gas heat under them for cooking.

We had a non-fraternization policy at that time, which was very severe. You were not to associate with or fraternize with the Germans. So it was a significant risk, but I went to the mess sergeant and said, "Instead of throwing that damn food out, I want you to separate anything that has a fat content, the meats, the butter, the bread, anything. Take down one of those pots, throw it all together, and keep a stew going. Then I went out to the supervisor and said, "Tell your people that if they will work a little harder and show more progress in getting this debris out of here, at noon today, you will take them over there to that basement and they'll have a hot meal of some sort." Well, when he spread that word, because they were so hungry, they really went to work. I mean, they loaded those damn trucks a lot more quickly. So for several weeks, that became standard. The food that we would be throwing away, we were feeding to them for their work and in order to keep them alive, and productive.

Anyway, we stayed on until the summer of '47. An interesting comment there, my son Bob, my oldest son, later became Ambassador to Germany. Whereas he had a big home in Bonn, he also had a residence in Berlin. Our fortieth wedding anniversary, my wife and I and some of our family went to Berlin. We stayed with them. It happened that my wife and I were married on the twentieth of March in '47, and he was born on the nineteenth of December in '47 in Logan, Utah. Now if you count those days, it is just barely nine months. As a matter of fact, she came from a very strict Methodist family, and thank God, converted to Catholicism before I married her. Her mother wrote later and said, "I hope you don't mind, I've been telling all our friends that Bob was born on the twentieth, because you were in Logan and it was the twentieth in Berlin." We were in the embassy quarters when Bob called a press conference on some official business. Two or three reporters were there. He happened to mention that his family was visiting from the states, his parents and siblings, and that we were married in Berlin. They wanted to talk to us about it. My wife and I chatted with them a little while. The next day on the second or third page of a major newspaper there, the headline in German was: "American Ambassador to Germany made in Berlin." [laughs]

Next we were in Logan, Utah. I was in National Guard duty there.

RITCHIE: I was just going to ask you, when the war was over, did you think about

whether or not to leave the military or stay in?

KIMMITT: Oh, well, I skipped something there. While in Berlin, at the end of the war, they initiated a very competitive program called the integration program, that was integration into the regular Army. By this time I was a major. You made an application. You went before a board and competed. I didn't really have a great desire to do it or was really interested in it, because I thought I was going back to Montana. By that time, I secretly had the thought, like about every other returning veteran, of maybe running for governor or something. Anyway, I went through this process not very excited about it, and came home one day, and there was a telegram, "You have been selected to be a first lieutenant regular Army. Reply within 48 hours." I don't know the specific ratio, but it was one selected out of several thousand applicants. It was a very tight selection. I let the damn thing lay on my desk. I couldn't make up my mind. I didn't hurry about it at all. Then I figured, "I'll take it. I can always resign." So I accepted and was integrated into the regular Army, and that pretty well closed the door of thinking of the question that you asked, was I thinking about getting out? Yes, I thought about it but I didn't follow through. I stayed in. We had two more children besides Bob born in Logan. We had three more, when we went from there to Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

RITCHIE: So the Army assigned you to train the National Guard?

KIMMITT: Yes, the Utah National Guard. From there, we went back to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where I had gone to OCS. I became an instructor in the artillery school there. Then Korea came along and I was sent to Korea. I took the family back to Logan and left them and went to Korea for fifteen months. I was a battalion commander and had a good combat tour in Korea under the circumstances. We were there at the end of the hostilities. We had significant actions at Old Baldy, Porkchop Hill, and Triangle Hill. I was very much involved in all of that.

In the meantime, we had these four children and I was gone for fifteen months. I came back. My wife met me in San Francisco, and again, almost nine months to the day, we had twins. So we made up for that year I was gone. Then we had another child born here in Virginia after we came back. After Korea, I came back to Fort Sill again as an instructor. Went to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the command and general staff school. Then I was assigned, much against my will and bitterly protesting, to legislative liaison in Washington, D.C.

RITCHIE: That was around 1958?

KIMMITT: That would have been '55. I bitched about it and complained about it. They said, "Just do as you're told." "Yes sir, no sir, three bags full." Legislative liaison sent me over here to the Senate. At that time, they had 96 senators. That was 1955. Hawaii and Alaska hadn't yet been brought in. There were three of us assigned here. One was Guy McConnell who later worked on the Appropriations Committee for quite a while. He is no longer here. The other was a man named Ed Hathaway.

We split the Senate up three ways. Each of us had 32 senators. We didn't have an office over here. We'd come over from the Pentagon on a kind of a shuttle as they have now. Down at the Russell Office Building nearest to the Supreme Court there was a desk belonging to a policeman named Murray. We would leave our uniform hats there and he would be our contact point. If anybody needing us from my office they called there, we'd check in with Murray to see if there were any messages. Then we'd just walk around all day and hit different offices. In those days, of course, the senators included Bush's grandfather, [Prescott Bush], [Leverett] Saltonstall, [Richard] Russell, [John] Stennis, [Henry] Jackson. I could go down a whole list. [James] Duff of Pennsylvania, Denny Chavez. Whoever was in the Senate in 1955. Of course, in the 32 that I carved out, I took Mansfield and [James] Murray, the Montana senators. That's where I reestablished my contact with Mansfield. I had three years there and got to know a lot of the senators and traveled with many of them, particularly from the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations committees.

In 1958, they sent me to the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island for a year. I left the family here and graduated there. During this period I studied for a Master's degree off duty at GeorgeWashington, but did not have the time to graduate. I was supposed to go to Europe, but they brought me back because I knew most of the key senators, and as always, even as today, the Army was having a hell of a time getting "modernization money." So they brought me back. I worked for a year. We were quite successful that year in getting modernization money. I remember Senator [John] McCain's father, "Junior" McCain, was later a three-star naval admiral. He was the head of Navy Liaison. He'd walk around with the stub of a cigar in his mouth. He was similar in appearance to his son, but a little more aggressive. One day he came down the hall by the Armed Services Committee, and he saw me, and said, "Kimmitt, goddamn it, you beat me

again. But I'm going to get your ass yet." He kept walking along. Apparently, some of the money the Army got the Navy was hoping to get.

Anyway, I went to Naval War College, was brought back for a year, then went to Europe. I had two years in Heidelberg and was selected below the zone for colonel. Baumholder had a division artillery there and I became the first colonel to command it. In 1964, I came back to Washington, and again, they put me back heading the Senate liaison. You remember those times. The records will show that, of course, that Kennedy had been elected in '60, then was assassinated. Johnson went to the White House.

Bobby Baker was a real player in those days. He had the big office down in the basement of the Capitol. He was very influential, but he couldn't stand prosperity. He got involved in the Carousel motel at the shore, and Coke machines, and bags full of campaign contributions. He became an embarrassment to the party and Mansfield had to get rid of him, although Johnson was down in the White House and Bobby was the one of his very brightest proteges. Mansfield moved him along. Eventually, I think Baker was indicted, convicted and served time.

Then, they put Frank Valeo in as Secretary for the Majority. Frank was a cerebral individual, a good writer, but pretty well introspective. He had practically zero political sense. He didn't seem to really know who worked for him. He didn't seem to care. All he did was write speeches for Mansfield. They would travel together. He was his foreign policy guru. Frank was good. He knew his business well, but he was a square peg in the round hole as Secretary for the Majority. One day Mansfield called me in. Vietnam was going on. He asked if I ever thought about getting out of the Army. I said, "No, I haven't." He said, "Well, would you think about it?" I said, "For what reason, senator?" He said, "Well, I'd like to go to work for me, and after a reasonable period of time, you'd become Secretary for the Majority. Not right away. Frank's in there now. Initially, you'll be the administrative assistant to the Majority Leader."

It's amazing. I kept him waiting for two or three weeks for an answer. You didn't do that with Mansfield. But I went back to my boss at the Pentagon and made out my retirement papers. I said, "I'm going to Vietnam with Scoop Jackson on a tour. If I can find a job in 'Nam where I can command, or as a chief of staff of a division, I'll tear these up when I come back. If not–." In meantime before leaving, I told Senator Mansfield, yes, I would do it. I went to 'Nam with

Jackson. Everywhere I went, they'd say, "Look, you've had your command. You had your war college. You're going to get a star. Let somebody else have a chance."

So I came back and went to work for Mansfield. Administrative assistant to the majority leader was kind of a title without a function. I was in his Leader's office. It was a difficult transition for him and for me. When you come out of the Army and you go to work for a senator, it's two different worlds. I made my share of mistakes. We didn't have a terribly warm relationship for quite a while. Frank was the favored fellow, of course, and my friend Charlie Ferris was on the policy end. I was usually excluded from most of that action. That bothered me a little bit, at that time.

I went on and I was finally elected Secretary for the Majority on October of '65, if I'm not mistaken. I had eleven continuous years in that job through some of the most turbulent times here, highlighted by Vietnam. Then, it came time for Mansfield to say, "There is a time to come and a time to go," and that he was going to retire. Well, Valeo was Secretary of the Senate, I was Secretary for the Majority, and our patron was leaving. I was always viewed, understandably and correctly, I might say, as being conservative and military-minded, but, forgive me, certainly not a liberal in the true sense of the word. Most of the senators recognized that. I knew Jack Kennedy quite well and I knew Bobby Kennedy well. I never got to know Ted Kennedy. I mean, I know him very well, but I was never on his frequency. He was in the process of trying to stack committees his way with liberals. It was in his heyday. I was there during the Long-Kennedy contest for whip. I know all about that one, which perhaps we'll get to, but not today. I was there during the [Robert] Byrd-Kennedy fight for whip. I was very close to that one. I may give you some insight into that period later.

Anyway, Mansfield was leaving. Of all people, with me being considered as a conservative, Gaylord Nelson, who was about as liberal as anybody in the Senate, and Dee Huddleston from Kentucky, urged me to run for Secretary. Now, Frank, as Secretary of the Senate, had made a mistake with Huddleston in authorizing an investigation in campaign finances in Kentucky. Instead of doing the right thing by going to the senator off the record and saying, "I've got these allegations and I'll stall them as long as I can, but if I have to do it, I have to do it." He never let him know. He did the same thing to a couple of other senators. He referred them to the Justice Department. So Huddleston had an ax to grind. Nelson, I don't know what his

motivation was. But they more or less became my campaign managers. When they talked me into it, I said, "Well, all right, I'll do it, but not until both Valeo and Mansfield are told. I'm not going to move out until they're told first." Well, it fell to poor Charlie Ferris to tell Mansfield, and for Mansfield to tell Valeo, that I was going to run against him. Frank had Harry Byrd, Jr. as his campaign manager, and I had these other two, and we had a good spirited elective campaign unlike these days when they're almost anointed. I won handily, almost two to one, I think. Then, I had the four years as Secretary of the Senate under Senators Byrd and Baker.

Now, those fifteen years are really the heart of what you want to talk about. Since I'm going out to Ken BeLieu's memorial service now, we're going to defer that. I would suggest, but I'm open to your suggestions, that when we come back, we start with the election as the Secretary for the Majority.

RITCHIE: Okay. Actually, I'd like to go back a little bit further and talk about those liaison days and work our way up from that. It's interesting, just in general of your impressions of back then.

KIMMITT: That's fine. I'd be happy to do that, because they were of a different time, as you know. As a matter of fact, two things have happened in the Senate in the intervening times that significantly changed the Senate operations. One was Lawton Chiles' government in the sunshine act. He, being young "Walkin' Lawton," a bright fellow coming in, and Mansfield being of a nature that if any young senator, a junior senator, made a proposal, he'd get behind it if it made any sense at all. This one was government in the sunshine, called for no closed committee hearings unless members voted to close the hearing. Well, you and I both know when you get twelve senators around a committee table with the press there, it takes a gutsy man to move to close the committee hearing and throw the press out. They very seldom do. However, for security matters they could and sometimes did.

So that was one of the ice breakers in changing the tone in the Senate. Prior to that time, Ken BeLieu, whom we were talking about, Bill Darden, Ed Braswell, were staffers on the Armed Services Committee—now keep in mind, this is all through the Vietnam War, Vernon Mudge was there before BeLieu. Dick Russell and his committee ran that whole national defense with four principal staffers and one political appointee. Darden was the chief of staff, BeLieu handled

military construction, Braswell handled personnel. Charles Kirbo was Chief Clerk. They would usually have closed committee hearings. Everything was deferential and dignified. It was a genteel senatorial condition until they had "government in the sunshine," which opened nearly all hearings to the press, television, radio and the general public.

The second was Mike Gravel urging and passing I think it was S. Res. 41, which, in effect, said every member of the committee would have a staff member on the committee payroll who would have access to committee files and attend all hearings. Well, between government in the sunshine, which opened up the press and the public to all the hearings, and then adding a staffer for every member, the room was totally jammed. The members didn't have to be there all the time. [Jacob] Javits would usually go to three committee hearings a morning. He'd have his staffers come in, sit down, and observe, come up and whisper in his ear and hand him a piece of paper. He'd get recognized, speak, then bam, he'd get up and go to another committee and leave a staffer behind. That changed the whole tenor of the Senate.

RITCHIE: Yes, it was really a different world at that point. We'd like to get your recounting of it.

KIMMITT: It was a different world in many, many ways.

End of First Interview

ARMY LIAISON OFFICER

Interview #2

Tuesday, February 20, 2001

KIMMITT: I mentioned to you that I had come here in 1955 as an army liaison officer from the Office of the Secretary to the Army to the Senate. There were three of us. There were ninety-six senators then. We each took thirty-two, and I picked up Mansfield and Jim Murray of Montana for parochial reasons as well as others. Early on I didn't get to know closely many of the members of the Armed Services Committee or the Appropriations Committee, because my boss, a man named Lieutenant Colonel Ed Hathaway (he was the same rank as me, but he was the head of the office) carved that domain out for himself, understandably. That's where the military action was. I told you before that we didn't have an office in the building. We came in the [Russell Senate Office Building] door nearest to the Supreme Court and would leave our hats (we wore uniforms all the time then) at the desk at the entrance at that corner with an officer who's name was Murray. Murray became our ex-officio or unseen message center. If anybody wanted to find us, they'd call Murray, he'd write it down and hold it. We'd just keep walking around the buildings and drop in on each of our senators, offices, stopping by Officer Murray at times for our messages.

In those days, President George Bush's grandfather was a senator on the Armed Services Committee. [There was also] Leverett Saltonstall, [James] Duff of Pennsylvania, Tom Kuchel of California, and a lot of the real old timers, including Lyndon Johnson and Scoop Jackson and [Stuart] Symington. Styles Bridges of New Hampshire had just finished chairing the Appropriations Committee. There was quite a group as I remember them.

Now this was an era of '55—keep in mind that World War II had ended, the Korean War had ended, and it was before Vietnam. Style, procedures, civility, if you will, comradery, dignity, were paramount in the Senate in those days. One of the men who preserved that tradition and taught others, including Robert C. Byrd and John Stennis, was Richard Brevard Russell of Georgia. Dick Russell was a bachelor, deep thinker, an avid reader, a gentleman from the tip of his toes to the top of his head. He believed in the old southern traditions. When he ran for governor of Georgia some years before that he was considered very liberal. But a liberal in the south in 1955 would be a right-wing conservative today, so you can imagine what the conservative of that day was.

Norris Cotton of New Hampshire was an interesting person. Several times a week, I would have breakfast at his table in the senators' dining room. Occasionally, [William] Hildenbrand would join us. We'd just rap around. I remember him telling me once that he had been here at that time more than twenty years—I'm switching out of the '55 era into later, but the anecdote is apropos vis a vis liberal-conservative. He said that when he was elected in New Hampshire some twenty or more years before that, he was viewed as a wild-eyed liberal. He ran on that plank. This was in the '70s. Now he was viewed in the current Senate as almost a right-wing conservative. He said, "The fact is, I didn't move. I didn't move. Everything moved to the left of me." He's an interesting person in that he was here twenty-six years in the minority. When he decided voluntarily to step down, the Republicans took the Senate in '80. He would have been chairman of the Commerce Committee, which was his dream, because [Warren] Magnuson was the defeated chairman. Although they were good friends, Maggie was a pretty heavy-handed operator.

To switch back to the Dick Russell times, Johnson was Majority Leader and he was on the Preparedness Subcommittee. As a matter of fact, he had the chair of the Preparedness Subcommittee of Armed Services. During this era, the army still had maneuvers–there were the Louisiana maneuvers in World War II–but anyway, there were still maneuvers. They required a lot of territory, because they were running tank divisions and infantry divisions. Most of these maneuvers were conducted in Texas. Before that, my memory tells me, they paid the ranchers and farmers maybe a dollar per acre per year for maneuver rights. Somebody in Texas decided they would raise the maneuver fees to three, four, five dollars. I have no idea how much, but they were raising them. Wilbur Brucker was the first Secretary of the Army after they formed the Department of Defense. [James] Forrestal was Secretary of Defense. Wilbur Brucker was a former governor of Michigan. When they came along with this raising the rates, they caused him a significant problem. The Louisiana delegation, Russell Long and [Allen] Ellender, learned of this potential impasse. They went over (I was not there, but I can believe it) and went to Brucker and said, "Look, you need maneuver rights. If you'll come to Louisiana and open Camp Polk, put more than a division in there, and make it a permanent facility, we'll give you all the maneuver rights you need at no cost. No cost at all." This was taken into consideration, obviously. It was a very attractive offer. Brucker made the decision to move to Louisiana, open Camp Polk, which later became Fort Polk (it is still there), and move a division out of Fort Hood, Texas.

Well, Lyndon heard about this. I was called to his Senate office and went into his personal office. In a minute, he came in. I was sitting in the chair and just happened to be in a corner, which is where I think he kept it most of the time for effect. I was seated and started to stand up. He said, "No, sit down." He stood about six-foot-four over the top of me and right up close, which was his style, similar to that famous picture of him with Theodore Francis Green. "What's this about moving a division out of Texas?" "Sir, I'm sorry. I'm not at liberty. I don't know all the–." "Don't give me any of that. What's this about, boy?" He was leaning on me and leaning on me, but I was under wraps not to tell him anything. So I finally said, "Mr. Leader, you're the chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, and you've got a good staff over there. (They had Gerry Siegel.) I'd send them down to Fort Hood and let them run their own investigations." I said, "One thing I know, if they ask the right questions, no one will lie to them. They may try to evade the question, but that's what your people understand." Anyway, I got out of there. As it turned out, Brucker held his ground. He did move a division out of Texas. He opened up Camp Polk, later made it Fort Polk. Not very long after that, the maneuver concept ended. They didn't have them much after that. They run them now in very limited areas out in California.

Johnson was really a piece of work. Did I tell you last time about my conversation with Stennis about how Johnson was able to pass legislation?

RITCHIE: No.

KIMMITT: Well, I traveled with Senator Stennis. On this particular occasion, we were in Germany and in Garmisch. It was a beautiful alpine day. The snow was coming down softly. The Zugspitze was in the background. We were walking down the street and we stopped in a little konditorei to get a hot chocolate. We went in and I said, "Senator, how is it that Senator Johnson, as leader, can pass so much legislation so quickly and so effectively? I just don't understand it." (This was a common question in the news. Johnson was able to roll out legislation just like a popcorn machine.)

Stennis said, "Lord, now let me tell you. I'll be sitting at my desk and Mildred will come in and say, 'the Majority Leader is on the line.' 'Good Lord, what's the Majority Leader want? I don't have anything working with him. I wonder what he wants?' I'll pick up the phone, and he'll say, 'John, I'm coming up to see you.' 'You don't have to come up and see me. You're the

leader. I'll come down to see you.' 'No, I'm coming up.' So I hang up the phone. I'm wondering, 'Good Lord, what in the world is the leader coming to see me about? I'm not doing anything at this particular time that's come to his attention that I'm aware of.' The door opens, there he is. Well over six feet. We howdy. I say, 'Sit down, Mr. Leader.' 'No, I'm not going to sit down, John. I just want to tell you about this. We're going to have a bill this afternoon and I want to bring that bill up around two o'clock and there's immediately going to be an amendment to that bill. Then, Clinton Anderson's going to bring up an amendment in the second degree, and we're going to defeat that one, and then we're going to have another amendment, and we're going to table that one. That's going to close off all amendments.' He said, 'Then we're going to pass the bill, and I need your vote–unless you've got a better idea!" Stennis said, "Good Lord, how can I have a better idea? I never heard anything about it, didn't know what he was talking about. Out of there he goes with my vote. I go over in the afternoon and vote for his bill. He did that with everybody. That's the way he moved the legislation." I said, "Well, that's as good an explanation as any."

Johnson was tyrannical. He had techniques which used to irritate the hell out of me. For example, maybe about five thirty or five forty-five in the afternoon all the business was over, everything done. He might have a fund raiser or a reception or something downtown. He would get ready to go and go up the desk and say, "Keep a quorum going on. I'll be back." He'd keep the Senate in session, the staff at the desk, the doorkeepers and everybody else working for maybe an hour, an hour and a half until he came back up. He just couldn't let them go early or close the Senate. He just had to show that power. Of course, he had Bobby Baker as his tool to keep these things running the way they were. Johnson was a real piece of work. The only man that he always wanted on his side was Dick Russell, because Russell was the one who picked him to be majority leader. Senator Russell told me this himself. The Republicans won the majority in '52, then in '54, the Democrats got the majority back. In the election of '52, [Ernest] McFarland, the Democratic leader, lost his seat.

In those days, there was a club. It had been referred to many, many times correctly, but it was greatly misunderstood. It was not a club of partisan Democrats or partisan Republicans, it was a bipartisan group, usually committee chairmen with a few trusted additions. That club ruled the legislation. They ruled everything. All the deals, it seemed to me, were worked out in advance. Up until 1964, there were very, very few cloture votes and very few real filibusters. It was run on

an orderly, club-like basis and quite effectively. Russell was certainly one of the leaders, if not the main leader, of the club.

Carl Hayden was President Pro Tem and the senior Democrat. Senator Stennis told me that when Stennis first came here (this was back in the '40s, I think) it was then the custom to call on your peers, leave them a card, pay your respects. Hayden was the dean of the Democrats at that time. Stennis went in to see him. This was right after Stennis had been elected. Hayden said, "Sit down, John." He said, "No, I don't want to bother you. I don't want to take your time now. You're busy." "No, sit down. I want to talk to you." So he sat down. Stennis said to me, "We chatted a while, then he told me something that I've never forgotten. He said, 'John, you're going to be here a long time. I know that because I know your state. They're careful who they elect and once you're elected, short of malfeasance or fraud, which you're not going to participate in, they keep you here to maintain that seniority status. You're going to be here a long time.' He said, 'I just want you to remember and watch—when men (there were no women then), come to the Senate some swell and some grow.'"

I said there were no women. Hattie Caraway had been there before, I think. Margaret Chase Smith came soon after, along with Maureen Neuberger.

RITCHIE: Smith came two years after Stennis, yes.

KIMMITT: Those were days of thoughtful legislation. They adhered to the rules regarding how many committees they could have—two major committees and a minor committee. Nothing like the '60s and '70s when they had two or three or four. I think Javits had five of them. They didn't have the habit of my mentor, Mike Mansfield. Every idea [for a new committee] that a young senator had he'd bring it up in caucus and help pass it and then appoint that senator the chairman. That's how George McGovern became the chairman of the Hunger Committee. They started spreading out and spreading out and spreading out. Hildenbrand and I, before I left, we whittled down—he had the committee assignments for the Republicans and I had them for the Democrats. We took all those extra committees, major committees these people had, and whittled away at them by recommendation, of course, until we got it down to only three or four senators who had more committees than they deserved and we wiped the others out through our recommendations.

One of the most memorable times I remember as an army liaison officer, I would often travel as an escort with senators. I traveled with Dick Russell to Portugal, and Spain, and Greece one year. It was a delightful experience. Bill Darden was along and Charlie Kirbo was along. Russell would always go for these old style British hotels, not the new Hiltons. I carried these little ounce-and-a-quarter bottles of Jack Daniels black bourbon. He would always have two of those a night. He would just have it on ice and he would talk and tell stories and clink the ice. Then we'd go out and have dinner.

In Greece, one evening, just sitting around, I recall asking him, "Senator, you must have an awful lot of constituents call on you. It's not like being in Montana or Idaho where it's a long way to come. You're busy enough, and I know it must be trying to spend a lot of time greeting constituents." He said, "No, my staff does a very good job." Marge Warren, his secretary, took care of them. Leeman Anderson, the old man who was administrative assistant, and all his staff, would take care of them. Not too many would get in to see him. Of course, if they made an appointment and if there was a good reason—he'd see anybody if there was a good reason. But just dropping in was not his style. He said, "Now, of course, some people you just have to see. I have a man down in Georgia. He was on my first campaign for governor. He supported me all these years. He's been my main man in his area ever since before I was governor. He's comes to Washington about twice a year." He said, "Of course, I see him. But I have to tell you, he's a man who will rob you of your time and deprive you of companionship." [laughs]

Russell was a wonderful person to travel with. We went to Portugal specifically to drive down the length of Portugal to follow the route and the campaign of Lord Nelson, who fought through there. During the Peninsula campaign Russell knew about every location. He was an avid military historical reader. He knew every damn thing about it. He was great to travel with.

I traveled with old Theodore Francis Green. I went to fifteen NATO countries with him one time. He was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I have lots of anecdotes. With a man like Green, you could have five hundred and never get caught up if you had traveled with him. We stopped in Denmark and Sweden. He had an audience with King Olaf. There were just a few of us in the room—Green, the King, the King's aide and I. They rapped back and forth. I remember King Olaf made a very sage comment. He said, "The problem of today is that communications are too good. My grandfather and his father before him had territories and lands

all over the world. They were our days of glory. We would send ambassadors out, but if a really serious problem occurred, the ambassadors would send a messenger down to a dock, and he'd get on the ship with the message for the king. It would take weeks coming across the oceans. He would get off the ship and come running up to the palace and pay his respects and give the king the message. The King would read it and he would hand it to his court to make a recommendation. 'What are we going to do about this very serious problem?' They might take two or three weeks studying this situation and finally they would develop the instructions, get the king's approval, and the messenger would race back down and get on the ship, and several weeks later, he'd get back to his post. Now in the meantime, the problem was either solved or it was worse or we lost the territory, but that's the only way that they did it. Now, today," he said, "your president," who happened to be Johnson, "can be sound asleep at three o'clock in the morning and the phone will ring right by his bed, and they'll say, 'The Chinese have invaded Korea,' and they want a decision now, right now. He can't duck it. He can't say, 'Well, I'm going back to sleep, let me think about it.' Communications are too good, and that is one of the problems today. There is no time to think. There is no time to strategize. There's no time. You have to give an answer."

On the same trip, I had one of my most pleasurable experiences. Winston Churchill had been thrown out as prime minister several years before that. But because he was Churchill and he was a former prime minister, he had an office in the Parliament building. I was in uniform. I went with Green at the appointed time down to that office. Churchill had a British major aide, also in uniform, and one secretary at the front desk. We were ushered into the great man's presence and we sat down there. It was like Elizabethan days, because Green was well into his late eighties and Churchill was Churchill, and they rapped for about fifteen or twenty minutes.

It came time to leave, and we stood up. There was only the four of us in the room. Churchill, Green, Churchill's aide, and myself. Churchill reached into his pocket and opened his cigar humidor. Now I had always assumed, not knowing anything about it, that Churchill smoked a favorite cigar. As it turned out, the humidor was four different sizes and he had four different cigars in there. He offered me a cigar. Now I knew in my heart and mind and soul that under no circumstances should I take a cigar from Winston Churchill, but being the graspy, greedy son-of-a-bitch that I was, I reached in, thanked him very much and took the biggest cigar he had in his humidor. Out the door I went in the aura of having been in the presence of Winston Churchill.

I went down in London to a tobacco shop and bought a cigar in an aluminum tube, carefully unwrapped the tube, took out the cheap cigar and very carefully put Churchill's cigar in there and sealed it up. I sent it to my brother in Montana, who was a devotee of Churchill. He was eleven years older than I. I wrote, "When you have your first grandson, smoke that cigar," and I gave him the circumstances. Well, time went on. My brother died maybe ten or fifteen years later. As they were going through his effects, this thing had never been opened, so they gave it back to me. I have it at the house now. It's still sealed. I've written out the circumstances of the cigar. I don't think there are many people in the world who have a cigar handed to them by the former prime minister of England, Winston Churchill.

RITCHIE: When you would go as an escort on these trips, what exactly were your responsibilities?

KIMMITT: Well, you handled all the logistical responsibilities. You took care of everything. Green, like Lyndon Johnson and MacArthur, would take a nap every afternoon. I'd go through all the mail. I would make all the hotel reservations. I'd handle all the transportation. I'd keep his schedule. You're just like a chief of staff for him. You just had to keep things moving whether it was an individual like Green or a North Atlantic Assembly or a NATO parliamentarians' group like Lyndon Johnson headed once with Russell and others. It's a lot of work with a lot of responsibility, but a great experience.

One time, around 1958, Lyndon Johnson headed a North Atlantic Assembly group to Paris. It was a NATO parliamentarian conference. He had a lot of heavy hitters, including Dick Russell and Kuchel and the rest of them. But I went over separately to meet Green. I flew commercially. They had their VIP plane. The Air Force was running that trip, and they didn't want me on the plane. [laughs]. Green flew over with the group. I flew commercially and met him when they got off the plane.

Two of the things I remember. The meetings were being held at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, which is not far from the Eiffel Tower, but a good walking distance. You get out of a car and then you walk maybe half a block up to the entrance to the building with the Eiffel Tower behind you. I took him to this meeting this day, and as we were walking up the walk, Scoop Jackson was walking with him. Jackson turned around and glanced at the Eiffel Tower and said, "That's an

imposing structure. I wonder when that was built." Green says, "1888" or something like that. Jackson said, "Theodore, how did you know that so quickly?" He said, "I was here when they dedicated it." [laughs]

We were staying at the Hotel Continental down near the Louvre. We had a corner suite. The phone rang one day. I picked it up and said, "Senator Green's room" He said, "Is Theodore there?" I said, "No, sir, I'm sorry. He's resting right now. May I take a message?" He said, "This is Claiborne Pell, an old friend." He said, "I wish you would give him the message that I would like to have him have lunch with me on Wednesday. If you would get back to me with his reply, I would appreciate it." I said, "Well, I certainly will, sir." I had never laid eyes on him. He was over there in Austria doing some kind of a refugee thing. I said, "I have to mention, sir, that the senator has to chair a committee meeting at the Palais de Chaillot promptly at two o'clock. Since he's chairing, it's important that he be back. So when you make your plans, if he accepts, I hope you will have him back." "Oh, yes, I'll do that."

Green woke up and we were going through things. I said, "You had a call here from a Mr. Pell, an old friend, and he would like you to have lunch with him on Wednesday." Green said, "Oh, yes, Claiborne. I knew his father very well. Yes, perhaps I should do it." I said, "Fine, but remember you have to chair," and I went through the litany. Well, on Wednesday, promptly at about 11:45, there was a knock on the door. I opened the door and here is this tall, skinny gentleman with a belt (his dad's belt, as it turned out) going halfway around his waist. I let him in, and they gave the Rhode Island embrace. They were going out to lunch. I said again, "Mr. Pell, you recall what I said, you must be back." "Oh, yes."

He had him back. Everything went smoothly. Well, a number of years later, in 1964, I came back and the Army put me as chief of liaison here in the Senate. In the meantime, Pell had replaced Green. He still had most of Green's staff, Marie Flanagan and Eddie Higgins, during that transition. He had Green's office. I went around renewing acquaintances. I went into Pell's office, and Marie said, "Oh, you must come in and see the senator." I said, "No, I don't want to bother him now. I'm going to be here for quite a while." "No, you must come in." She ushered me in. Here's Pell behind Green's old desk. I said, "Senator, I just want to pay my respects." He said, "Oh, yes. I remember you." I said, "Yes, we have met, and I'll be around." Marie had, of course, moved out. It was just the two of us in the room. He said, "I remember you in Paris. I

wanted to have lunch with Theodore Green and I had to go through you." I said, "Yes, I remember that." He said, "I remember you cautioning me that I must have him back at a certain time." I said, "Yes, and I appreciated it very much that you had him back, and everything worked well." He said, "Now isn't it interesting?" Well, that's kind of a hard question to answer if you don't know what the hell is in his mind. "Isn't it interesting?" I just stood there. "Now I'm a senator and you're still a colonel." [laughs] Can't you see Claiborne Pell, that Yankee Brahmin, savoring that moment? I thought that was one of the highlights of my years in the Senate.

RITCHIE: When you're traveling with the senators, I would assume that gives you some advantages as a liaison person. Don't you get to build personal relationships?

KIMMITT: Oh, yes, certainly. That's probably the only reason why Mansfield asked me about getting out of the Army. I think I told you about the Bobby Baker thing. Bobby couldn't stand prosperity. Lyndon went to the White House and left Bobby behind. Mansfield inherited him. It got so bad that Mansfield had to get rid of him. Mansfield never had any male assistants. They were all female. Peggy deMichele and everybody in his office, they were all women. He had this one alter ego in committee staffer Frank Valeo, so he threw Frank into the breach as secretary for the majority during this turbulent period. But as I mentioned the last time, and I say this respectfully, Frank had no political common sense. He was more of a cerebral, foreign policy, writer type of person. But he put him in as Secretary for the Majority, and a young man named John Graves, who is now dead, was his assistant.

When Mansfield asked me about getting out, I know that he had been aware that I was quite close to Jackson, and Russell, and Stennis, and a lot on the other side, too, in addition to being a Montanan, and in addition to being knowledgeable from an observation standpoint of the Senate. Apparently, I had credibility with these other people, because of my travel with them, and of my legislative liaison. I don't think he would have, in a hundred years, reached out and offered me the job if I was just in the Pentagon or somewhere else and just saw him infrequently. There's a reason for everything. Yes, it gave me a significant advantage. The greatest advantage it gave me, and you can understand this, if you develop a rapport and a compatibility with a member, particularly a chairman, all the staff fall in line. You don't have to fight the staff bureaucracy. You don't have to wrestle with the staff intrigue and the turf and everything else. That is by far the greatest advantage that I had and that others in my position had.

When you travel with a large group, you spread that same compatibility over both sides of the aisle. For example, I took a group to the Soviet Union years ago, whether as a liaison officer or a secretary, I'm not sure. It was a bipartisan group and it was headed by, on one hand, [Abraham] Ribicoff and his co-chairman was Henry Bellmon. We had about twelve. It was during the Cold War. They had meetings in the Kremlin. Everything was at a fever pitch.

You asked me what the escort officer does. When a congressional group leaves a country (the United States or particularly a foreign country), you usually have a special plane and you usually have a take-off at eight or nine o'clock in the morning. In order for that to work well, all the luggage has to be outside the doors by about five-thirty in the morning. The luggage can go out and be loaded on the plane and put away and everything, so that when the delegation comes out, the official local luminaries can shake hands before the delegation gets aboard. You're never held up. Everything is loaded. You get on, you close the door, taxi out, and both sides are happy to see the back of the necks of the others. That means that whoever is running the thing, like I was doing, has to be up by about four-thirty.

I had one rule that I practiced. Before I left a country, I always wanted to clear all accounts with the State Department, the hotel, everything involved, and I'd get the receipts, so that when I came back here, there wouldn't be weeks of trying to catch up with the correspondence. I'd pay off everything and close everything out before we left the country, which caused a lot of extra work and scrambling, but I would do it.

Well, on this particular morning in Moscow, the control room (which is sort of a headquarters suite, the nerve center of the group), was bustling. I was packing stuff. Gail Martin, my administrative assistant, was along with me. There was a lot of fussing around. Suddenly in the door of the control room appears Jacob Javits, impeccably attired, as he always was, with a Burberry topcoat and a tie. He had everything on except, below the coat, was socks and garters. He had packed his trousers in the luggage and they were already on the plane. He had that fixed Javits-New York-style smile on his face, which was saying, "I got myself into this. There is no sense in blaming anybody else." He asked, "Does anyone have an extra pair of trousers?" Well, everybody had sent their luggage. A mild panic ensued. My wife was along on that trip. She was out in the hall and observed all this. The State Department had hired a translator to go with us. His name was something like Yuri. He was going to leave us in Warsaw. (We were going from

Moscow to Warsaw and then on.) He hadn't sent his bag out. He was coming down the hall, carrying his luggage. My wife stopped him and said, "Yuri, do you have an extra pair of pants in your bag?" He looked at her like, "What the hell kind of a question is that?" Anyway, Yuri gave Javits a pair of pants and we went out to the airport to board the plane.

This leads to another humorous story. We go to Warsaw. Now, Javits had a wife who was a real terror, Marian. She had never moved to Washington. She was in the society of New York City and she thought everybody in Washington was a bunch of hicks. She never liked it. One example, in the hotel in Moscow, this big hotel, she wanted to take a sauna. Before she took one, she insisted, and got away with it, that everybody else had to be cleared out of the sauna, Russians, other tourists, everybody. She had to have the sauna all to herself, which became a talking point. Anyway, we get to Warsaw, and it is a fairly nice day. Out in the ambassador's gardens, he had a little reception. The members were going to meet with the Polish counterparts for a protocol meeting. They were getting ready to go, and Marian said, "I want to go with them." The ladies were lined up to take a shopping tour. We had to tell her, "I'm sorry, Mrs. Javits." She said, "I know as much as they do. I want to go. I'm not any damn dummy." She didn't go, thank God. So they went and came back. They were having the wrap-up discussion in the garden before we took off again. It became known that the next stop was going to be Copenhagen. The Javitses were going to leave us in Copenhagen and go on to Switzerland. One of the senators brought that up. "I understand the Javitses are going to leave us in Copenhagen and go to Switzerland." Somebody said, "Yes, that's true." He said, "Well, how are they going?" (We had this special plane). Somebody spoke up and said, "Well, Jack will take a plane and Marian will ride her broom." [laughs]

Anyway, I could bring up some more incidents of the legislative liaison days.

RITCHIE: I would like to talk more about it, because that whole time period from the '50s, early '60s was a big time for the military. After World War II, Eisenhower was trying to pare down the military budget. I was wondering, is it the military liaison's job to go around the President a bit and try to get a little more money into the military than Eisenhower wanted?

KIMMITT: Let me put it this way, it was my job. I told you that I was here from '55 to '58 and then I was sent to the Naval War College in Newport with follow-on orders to go to

Europe into Heidelberg and the headquarters there. I had those orders in hand. While I was at the Naval War College in the spring, I got a call from I think it was Mike Michaelis. He said, "Would you object to coming back to Legislative Liaison this spring rather than going to Europe? We'll send you a year later." I said, "Well, I just do what I'm told." So anyway, I came back. The reason they brought me back was because of this rapport and knowledge that I'd had with particularly the Armed Services Committee people, and the Army needed, as they always do, "modernization money." I told you about the Admiral Jack McCain encounter.

You asked about the President. How did we play that? He sends up the budget. Orders are "Don't tamper with the budget." Well, you go around. Hypothetically, you know that you need more money for tanks. You use your friendship, contacts, and anything else with the member. You'd say, "Senator, they just haven't provided enough money this year for tanks for the army. Now, you're going to have a hearing next week. . . ." I'd have a couple of cards in my pocket, anonymous white cards, with questions on them. I would say, "Would you be good enough to ask these questions of the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Secretary," because they were under wraps, too. Now, keep in mind, a witness from the Pentagon cannot volunteer information which contravenes their official position, but no witness can fail to truthfully answer a question. Therefore, if you phrase a question which the witness would like to answer, and you get a senator to ask it, that permits the Army chief of staff or somebody to give the answer that contravenes the official position. He had to answer it and he wasn't volunteering and he wasn't breaking faith. Most of the time, they didn't know that I or a few others were planting the questions. We would give them a heads up. "You may get questioned on x, y, or z, so be prepared."

Well, over weeks, months, several years, the fact that you had contact with all of the members, that you had the confidence of on the Appropriations Committee would have an effect. First of all, you'd have to understand that after you'd been working that for two or three years, you almost become an adjunct to the members' staff. Every day, we would just walk around the thirty-two offices that I had.

Take Bobby Kennedy's office—I didn't have Jack Kennedy, but I handled Bobby's office. He had a young lady Margo Higdon, now deceased, back there who handled all the military cases. Mail would come in, and Kennedy being from New York, there would be a big stack of it. I'd just walk back to her desk. I knew her very well. I'd say, "Margo, can I see the Army cases today?"

She'd have a stack of army cases, letters from everything, like, "I want my son reassigned," or this or that, whatever the hell it was. In those days, I could take a dozen letters and say to her, "Tell them this." She'd take down some shorthand, and they'd immediately go back out as a reply. We'd give them very fast service. It was an answer that was probably not entirely satisfactory, but it was an answer. I'd say, "I'll take the others with me and I'll bring them back in the next couple days." She'd just give them all to me. I'd go back to the Pentagon. I had a dedicated secretary. I would separate the mail into two groups. One was direct reply, which means I would send it out on behalf of the Secretary of the Army to a subordinate commander, maybe at Fort Knox, Kentucky. "Here's the letter. Please reply directly to Senator Kennedy not later than. . ." That would be gone. When I'd go back a couple days later, I'd give her the original letter back (we made Xeroxes of the letters) and tell her that she'd be hearing directly from them, and if she didn't hear by a certain time, let me know. The others, I would call around the building or across the country or Europe and get the facts, then I'd dictate a reply and get it right back to her, sign it myself as a representative of the Secretary of the Army. It made the senator look good, the constituent got a rapid response, and it protected the Army. That was one function.

Other functions: it was not unusual to get called in by a senator. I'll give you two conditions. A good condition, Clifford Case of New Jersey. I handled his office. He sent for me one day. There were two or three New Jersey businessmen, constituents there. He started out his discussion with, "Colonel, these gentlemen are from my state and they have an issue they'd like to take up with you. But let me make clear, before we ever start discussing, I don't want any political emphasis placed on this. I want them to be able to have their story heard. I want the answer to stand on the facts." One of the nicest conditions that you could ask for. I set them up for an appointment with somebody, and they went away happy. The obverse, senators call you in (I won't name who they are in this instance, but I had two or three of them this way), and the constituents would be sitting there, and he'd say, "Colonel, you haven't kept me informed about a condition in the Army, and goddamn it I want to tell you it's got to stop." They'd rip the hell out of you and embarrass the Army, embarrass you. The constituents were really impressed. Maybe an hour later, you'd get a call to come back to see the senator. He'd say, "I know you have to understand. I had to do that. I just had to do that. You know I didn't mean a lot of that stuff." Well, there are the two sides of the spectrum.

Another man, Bourke Hickenlooper, I always admired him for many reasons, but this one

in particular. He had a son on the front lines in Korea. He had been there for ten months or more. I didn't know that. One day he called me in and he said, "Stan, is there some way to find out when a soldier is coming home? What his schedule is or when he will arrive and where?" I said, "Yes, I think we can find that out if his tour is up." "Yes, he's finished up." I said, "If your people will give me the name." He said, "I'll give you the name." He named his son. I went out, of course, and found out he was coming into San Francisco. For ten or months, here was a man who had a son in danger and never once mentioned it, never asked anything, never did a thing. I admired him so much for that.

Others. . . Margaret Chase Smith had an AA, Bill Lewis. She would just excoriate the Air Force on some matters. She finally got Lewis promoted to general. Bill had an almost Svengali control over Margaret Chase Smith. She was a great lady. The only time I ever got in a bind with her was when she discovered they were selling Idaho potatoes in the commissaries in Maine. [laughs] That caused a big fight for a while.

Most of the time, that period of legislative liaison was probably the greatest learning experience that a person can ever have. People can get master's degrees in political science in academia, and it has no resemblance to the facts. But if you're just around here, you observe the ebb and flow of personalities and attitudes and give and take. "You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours. You give me this, I'll give you that." You see democracy at work. I'm happy to say that democracy works well ninety-eight percent of the time, but the two percent is a pain in the ass. [laughs]

RITCHIE: Did it ever work that the White House liaison, someone like Bryce Harlow or Larry O'Brien, did they ever call on the military liaison people to help out with what the White House was trying to get through?

KIMMITT. Yes, when it was necessary. For example, Mike Manatos was Lyndon's legislative liaison. He used to be a staffer up here. He worked for a Wyoming senator named [Lester] Hunt. Hunt committed suicide in the Russell Office Building. As I understand it, I can't verify this, Hunt and his wife (who was very ill at that time, cancer, I believe) had a son. It turned out the son was gay, which in those days was a serious no-no. It was a significant political liability. Out in Wyoming, they ginned up an opponent to run against Hunt. They had the coach of the

University of Wyoming football team, the name escapes me now, but he was a highly respected man—they gave him the mission of telling Hunt that if he ran, they were going to expose his son. It was the California Senator Clair Engle who chaired the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee at that time. He started to put the squeeze on. This so disturbed Hunt, not so much from the political standpoint, not so much for himself, but he knew what it would do to his wife if she learned that her son was gay. Now we're talking the late fifties. He apparently put a .22 rifle under his coat one day and came into the office and killed himself. Mike was there at that time. Well, Mike later went down to the White House. He was a great legislative liaison person.

I knew Bryce Harlow very well. Bryce tried to hire me away once to be the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs under [Henry] Kissinger, which in itself, is an interesting story. I was then Secretary for the Majority, been working for Mansfield for five or six years, maybe more. I was there eleven years in all as Secretary for the Majority. One day, Bryce called and said, "Come down and have lunch. I want to talk to you about something." Well, I knew Bryce from the Pentagon, so I went down. He said that Kissinger was moving to be Secretary of the State and he was looking for a good legislative liaison person. He, Harlow, had recommended me and what did I think about it? About that time, Kissinger, himself, opened the door and comes walking in. He sits down. We rapped a little bit there and he as much offered me the job. I said, "Well, let me think about, but I'll be back to you tomorrow with a final answer."

I came back up here. Mansfield knew nothing about this. I went to see him. I told him about the call and the lunch and the offer. I said, "I really like to know, what do you think about it?" Mansfield said, "Well, do what you want." Typical Mansfield. I said, "No, Senator, that isn't what I asked you." I said, "What do you think about it?" "You can do whatever you want. It's your life." I said, "Senator, please, help me out on this. I just want to know how you feel about it." He said, "Well, I'd like you stay, but that's up to you." Well, that made up my mind. I called back down and told Bryce and he told Kissinger that I deeply appreciated being considered but I was going to pass up that opportunity.

Now, about a year later, the International Monetary Fund was having a big reception at the Smithsonian. Kissinger was in the receiving line. As I went through, I shook hands with him. Kissinger had become Secretary of State. He had the usual honeymoon, but by then they were shooting at him from every direction on the Hill and in the media. He was having a hell of time

up here. He looked at me and he said in that signature guttural voice of his, "You knew something." [laughs]

Your question was about the White House liaison. They would use, understandably, anything they could to further their aims. Manatos called me one day. You remember from a historical standpoint that Russell and Johnson were very close until the Vietnam War and, particularly when civil rights came along, they drifted apart. Johnson had his Great Society and Russell was the patrician from Georgia. Manatos came to me and said, "The President is really bothered. I need your help on something. He doesn't think that he is communicating well with Dick Russell. It bugs him. If you get any ideas, I'll let him know."

Well, not long after that, Hayden stepped down. He didn't die in office, he went voluntarily. Russell had been Chairman of the Armed Services Committee for sixteen years. Hayden had been Chairman of Appropriations. With Hayden gone, Russell would take the chairmanship of Appropriations and Stennis would take the chairmanship of the Armed Services. Carl Hayden had, as the staff director of the Appropriations Committee, probably one of the finest staffers the Senate has ever had in Tom Scott. Tom came up from the FBI very early and stayed. He was just the epitome of professional staff. Some things really impressed me. For example, in today's world, I don't give a damn whom you call, eighty percent of the time, you're going to get an answering machine. In those days, Tom, as the top man on the Appropriations Committee, would answer his own phone. No secretaries or anything else. It was so refreshing. If he was not at his desk, of course, it would just ring and maybe kick over to his secretary, but if he was there, he'd answer his own phone. He was very highly respected. Well, Russell also had a man equally highly respected in Bill Darden. Darden had been Russell's staff director of the Armed Services Committee for years. Tom Scott had Appropriations. I could see a very awkward situation developing during this transition, because I knew that Russell was not going to leave Darden behind, because he was his right-hand man. And I knew that Russell was not going to force Tom Scott out, but they would do some shuffling around. Anyway, it had an awkward potential.

So I called Manatos and I said, "Mike, I've got an idea. It may not work. I don't know. But there is an opening on the U.S. Court of Military Appeals. Now, when Dick Russell goes to Appropriations, it's going to provide this awkward situation." I said, "There is one way out, if the president would consider appointing Bill Darden to the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, I know that

would please Russell. It would solve a potential problem for him. I think it would please Bill Darden and it would certainly protect Tom Scott." He went back down and put this thing in motion.

Later I was traveling with Senator Stennis, and we were in Wiesbaden, Germany one night with the commander in chief, air force command in Europe. We were at dinner and the phone rang. They took me away from the table. It was Bill Darden. He said, "Stan, would you be good enough to give Senator Stennis a message for me, please. President Johnson called me and offered me a place on the U.S. Court of Military Appeals and I intend to accept it, but I want Senator Stennis," who was the potential chairman, "to know about it first." I went back in and at the appropriate time, I told Stennis about this. Stennis said, "Oh, my Lord, what am I going to do without Bill Darden? He's a mighty, mighty fine man. Good Lord, what am I going do?" Well, anyway, Bill went to the U.S. Court of Military Appeals. Tom stayed where he was. Everything went smoothly. Except that eventually Bill became somewhat dissatisfied with the court, for whatever reasons, and stepped down, and I think went with Reynolds Aluminum or somebody. He's still around. He's a good man. But that was an example of White House liaison working with staff on the Hill.

Bryce Harlow had been in Army legislative liaison. When he went down to the White House, he had Ken BeLieu there with him. BeLieu just died the other day. I told you I went out to his services. It was very nice out there at a place called Falcon's Rest, which I had never heard of. It's a new Air Force retirement home, a beautiful place.

I've told you about taking over as secretary for the majority and sticking with it until the election to Secretary of the Senate. We haven't talked much during that period or the Secretary of the Senate years before as I have said "the government fell," and I had to leave. We can continue it for a while or do it another time.

RITCHIE: You've been here for an hour and a half, maybe I should give you a break. This is really what we're looking for, especially the vignettes of the individuals. It makes them come alive.

KIMMITT: Oh, yes, there are vignettes and vignettes, many stories. Some of the

greatest stories are [James] Eastland and Stennis stories. I'm sure that I've told you or you've heard–[Tom] Korologos probably told you himself about the visits to Nixon during the impeachment time when Jim Eastland kept interrupting the President and Stennis reached across and said, "Jeem, Jeem, let the boy talk." [laughs]

I'm sure this is apocryphal, but it may not be. A delegation came up from Mississippi and they went by to see Senator Stennis. They were good, solid, successful Mississippi constituents. C.P.H. Cresswell [Stennis' administrative assistant] was there. They ushered them right into Stennis' office and they sat down, and he was just so pleasant and helpful, chatted, got up when they left, walked out, told his people, "Now, you take my friends out, anything they want, you take them over to the dining room, and they can have lunch. Be sure you take care of these people. These are my friends from down in Mississippi." Their next call was over at Eastland's office. Courtney Pace was at the desk. They said "We don't want to bother the chairman. We know how busy he is. We just want to pay our respects." They sat down for about ten minutes. Courtney just kept working. Finally, he gets up and goes into the office, closes the door, and a minute later, opens the door. "Come on in." Eastland was sitting back there, a cigar in his mouth, his feet up on the desk. The spokesman said, "Mr. Chairman, we know how busy you are. We don't want to bother you, because we know how important it is up here." They went through that routine for about two minutes. Eastland never said anything, he just mumbled replies. "Well, we don't want to take your time. We're going to move along now, Mr. Chairman." He never got up. He never did anything but nod and mumble. They went out the door. They were walking down the hall. One turned to the other and said, "Wasn't that Senator Stennis just the absolute greatest southern gentleman you ever saw, how he took care of us and how they greeted us? He was just the finest southern gentleman I guess there is in the world–but that Jim Eastland, he's our kind of guy." [laughs]

Eastland and [John] Pastore were very close friends, but they could never vote together, and really if either constituency knew about their comradery, it would cost them votes every time. They'd be on the floor (I was up where the Secretary for the Majority is now, in S-309) and one of them would look over at the other one, and one would go out one door, and the other. They'd come out, and I had a little bar set up, and they'd have a drink. (Not just those two, but a number of senators, bipartisan.) They'd come in and go out. They were just the greatest of friends, but nobody ever knew that. Just like Eastland and Gaylord Nelson were very close friends. One ultra

liberal, the other conservative. Very close friends.

RITCHIE: How do you explain a friendship like that?

KIMMITT: Well, I'll give an example. There was a man named Glenn Davis in Wisconsin, a former member of Congress, who, I think, ran against Nelson for governor or something very early. But anyway, it was not a happy relationship. During, I think, Nixon's tenure, three of us were in my office, Eastland, Nelson, and myself. Gaylord Nelson said, "Jim, I just hate to ask a favor of any of my colleagues, but I'm going to." Eastland said, "Awright." Nelson said, "The President is going to nominate a man for a judgeship, and he shouldn't be a judge." Eastland said, "Well, just don't send his card back." If the senator from the state [of the nominee] doesn't return the card, it just stayed in limbo. He said, "I know, Jim, that's the procedure. But I can't, not in Wisconsin, that will never fly. I'll have to answer the question, 'Why didn't the senator–?' That's not going to do any good. But he just shouldn't be a federal judge." Eastland said, "Why?" Nelson said, "Let me tell you. Labor is opposed to him. B'nai B'rith is opposed to him. The NAACP is opposed to him. All the environmentalists are opposed to him." Eastland interrupted and said, "Gaylord, you're giving me all the reasons I should vote for him." [laughs] "Now, what do you want?" He said, "I don't want the nomination to come to the Senate, then there won't be any question raised." Understandably, the nomination never came up.

I think there is not the appreciation of the bond between senators now that there should be. They can disagree violently on the floor. They can vote against each other. Well, take [Edward] Kennedy and [Orrin] Hatch. How do you justify their relationship? There is an anointing, if you will, once you become a senator, which is recognized by every other senator. I think they work hard (or did work hard) at developing friendships which superimposed over philosophy. Keep in mind, there is only a hundred of them in the world. I don't know how many of them are still alive, a hundred and fifty or sixty still alive. That's a pretty damn exclusive group. There are some, even yet, who won't speak to each other, but that's rare.

And there are little activities that go on that people never know anything about. For example, when I was here, it was normal for senators to entertain other senators in their homes. They would rotate among various homes. I don't know if that is still going on or not, but probably not as much as it used to. The bond between senators was stronger than partisanship and

ideology. It's really hard to explain. I guess a family is about as close as you can come to it. If you belong to a family and you are an ethical, honorable member of that family, there is a close bond. I think that's the way with senators, too.

For instance, Roman Hruska would come up to my office. He was about as thick as they come—but a decent guy. He'd come up with these other members. Some never came up, but only because they didn't drink. I don't think I ever had Scoop Jackson in the office, but I had just about everybody else. One night, Tom Foley was then the House Democratic whip, and we were having an evening session, and I was then secretary of the Senate. I walked out of the room and walked down the hall, and saw Foley coming in from some sort of the meeting in the Senate, and I knew that there were five or six senators in my office having a drink. There were two chairs that other senators wouldn't take. One was Eastland's chair and the other was [Warren] Magnuson's chair. They had a little coffee table between. They always sat there. So I saw Foley, who I knew was staffer for Jackson long before he ran for office. I said, "Tom, why don't you come into the office and have a drink. There are some senators here." He said, "I'd like to. I appreciate the invitation." He came in, and they "howdied" around. Foley was having a drink, and Eastland was sitting in his chair. After about fifteen minutes, Tom said, "Mr. Chairman, I didn't expect to be in here tonight. Stan asked me to come in and share a drink. I really appreciate it, but I didn't expect to be running in to you, but now that you're here, I'm going to ask a favor." Eastland said, "All right." Foley said, "I've been trying to get a judge out in the Spokane area for two years, and Manny Celler keeps brushing me off, and I'm just not getting anywhere." (Emanuel Celler was Eastland's counterpart on the House side. He was not directly in on the nomination process, but he was a big player in the judicial area.) He said, "It's very important to me. I just need some help getting that judge through." Eastland said, "All right." Foley continued, "Would you consider, if I got the information to you, possibly taking a favorable look at this and helping me out? And who on your staff should I get in touch with?" Eastland said, "Why?" "Well, I thought I better get you the information." He said, "I told you 'all right,' didn't I?" That was the end of that. The judge moved through. [laughs]

There are so many of those little incidents. Russell Long was almost a raconteur at those meetings. He had stories after stories after stories after stories. Uncle Earl stories particularly were absolutely hysterical. [Senator John] Culver had a prankster streak—I think I told you the last time about he and [Jennings] Randolph, didn't I?

RITCHIE: I don't think so.

KIMMITT: Well, at one of those rare, all-night sessions we had (they had them very rarely), in the Democratic cloakroom, the lights are all dimmed. Randolph was lying out on one of the couches. He had a newspaper over his face. It's about two o'clock in the morning. His shoes are off, the coat is off. He's sound asleep. Culver was in his playful mood. He came in and saw him. He went over and shook him and said, "Jennings! Jennings! There's a high school group from West Virginia out on the steps, waiting to have their picture taken with you!" Randolph jumped up, no shoes, no coat, went out through the Senate chamber, crossed the Senate chamber, and headed for the steps. That can be verified by a number of people.

RITCHIE: This has been outstanding. We can get together next time and start to talk about when you were the Democratic Secretary.

KIMMITT: Those days, when I was Democratic Secretary, were some of the most turbulent, philosophical times in this Senate. There was Vietnam. I watched Stuart Symington go from an avowed hawk to a supreme dove, almost. I watched the personalities play so much. I'll tell you one very quickly and then I'm getting out of here.

Coinciding with Russell going to Appropriations and Stennis going to Armed Services–I mentioned that Lyndon Johnson had been chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee, and I think Harry Truman had been back in his day, too. But anyway, prior to that change, Stennis and Symington started drifting apart. Symington was a pretty acerbic individual. Symington became less and less a supporter of the defense plans. It worried some of the old timers. It was noticeable by his statements, and in caucuses, he was hammering heads with the hawks. He didn't take on Dick Russell much—very few people did—but he used to like to mimic Stennis. Stennis succeeded to be chairman of Armed Services. He also was holding the chairmanship of the Preparedness Subcommittee, and Symington was right behind him. It was probable that Stu Symington was going to become the chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee of Armed Services. That bugged Stennis. The end result, without going through all the machinations, Stennis kept that subcommittee in addition to the full committee chairmanship, which blocked Symington. Symington went to Fulbright because he was on Foreign Relations, too, and had [J. William] Fulbright form a subcommittee of Foreign Relations to get into more and more defense business. We jokingly

referred to it as a subcommittee on Foreign Relations to Oversee the Armed Services Committee.

Symington was in many ways a tragic story because he was also number three just behind Clint Anderson, when Johnson was the first chairman of the Space Committee. Then, he left. Symington was in line to succeed to the space chair since Anderson already had Interior as a full committee chairman. Anyway, Symington was due to take over the Space Committee until they, the "club," prevailed on Anderson, who had the seniority, to give up Interior to take the Space Committee, which blocked Symington and coincidentally, promoted Jackson to chairman of Interior. Here he had lost, not necessarily in this order, but he had lost the chairmanship of the Preparedness Subcommittee, he was blocked from the chairmanship of the Space Committee, and he was here all those years, and he never had a chairmanship. Even when he left, he had never been a chairman, because of his fractiousness with the other members.

RITCHIE: He was sort of hot tempered?

KIMMITT: Yes. He had a hot temper and he would blurt out things. He had a bit of [Ernest] Hollings in him. Remember when Hollings referred to Senator Howard Metzenbaum as the senator from B'nai B'rith? But Symington just had a rasping attitude. It was like fingernails on a blackboard with the other members. That blocked him and blocked him. When he left, he had never had a chairmanship.

RITCHIE: He was almost the vice presidential candidate in 1960. Kennedy was considering him seriously.

KIMMITT: Oh, yes, very seriously considering him. He was reaching his apogee at that time. He was a great friend of the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal. He was Mr. Air Force and he was leader of the hawks early on, but then he started changing. People started rethinking. Some never changed, but he did. It was interesting. Of course, as you looked around that caucus–they used to have some spirited debates which are not releasable until, as you say, forty years or something. How many years did you say?

RITCHIE: Well, right now, they're open through 1964, so we're running about forty years behind.

KIMMITT: '64, that's right in the Vietnam era.

RITCHIE: In a few years we'll get them open.

KIMMITT: Something else when I was Secretary for the Majority. When I took the job over, you just scratched down a few minutes in your longhand and filed them. Gail [Martin] would write them up. It became apparent to me that I was not doing justice, from a historical standpoint, so I finally got Mansfield's permission to bring in one of the official reporters. I started that process. Now, from that time on, you have a verbatim. You start reading those and you'll see the [James] Abourezks of the world and the Symingtons, Phil Hart, and all who participated.

You'll get to a point where you'll probably read one of the most poignant episodes that I can recall when [John] McClellan died, and Eastland was in line to become President Pro Tempore. It was more or less a pro forma election. But when Eastland was nominated to be President Pro Tem, Phil Hart stood up and said that he couldn't in good conscience vote for Jim Eastland to be President Pro Tempore. He gave a fairly lengthy speech on the premise that he was in line for the presidency. Eastland would have been in the line for the presidency and Hart just couldn't abide that based on civil rights. Eastland just sat there stoic just like, as Lyndon Johnson used to say, a jackass in a hail storm, just hunker down and take it. He never said a word. Nobody else said a word. Of course, they voted him in, and he became the President Pro Tem. It was a "profile in courage" on Hart's part to do that in front of all those people, as he felt it deeply. But some of those debates in caucus on issues are going to become significant in history much more than what happened on the floor of the Senate.

RITCHIE: You're probably right. With the minutes, you have to read between the lines to figure out what is going on.

KIMMITT: Sure you do. Thank God I started recording the caucuses verbatim, just like I started another practice, what I hope has become a tradition. I had been here during a number of State of the Union addresses. They always occurred at eight or nine o'clock at night. The senators' wives always come down. I noticed that between five o'clock and nine o'clock, there was no place for senators and their wives to go. Some would go in the senators' dining room, but that is pretty bland or they would just wait in their offices. They go to restaurants. So right after

I became Secretary of the Senate, I initiated the Secretary's reception (I think it's now called a dinner) at the State of the Union for all the members and their wives. I was pleased later when Joe Stewart and [William] Hildenbrand followed through in different forms. Somebody asked Joe where he got the idea of doing that. He said, "My staff came up with it. They did a great job." Well, Jim Ketchum and I put that one on, the very first one, and started the tradition. It's been a very, very worthwhile thing for the Secretary to do every year. Do you ever hear from Jim?

RITCHIE: I saw Jim not too long ago. He's retired in Gettysburg now.

KIMMITT: Well, if you're ever talking to him, just don't just take my word for it, regarding the event. Please check, because it's important, for historical purposes, how the Secretary's dinner got started. Jim was the chef. You can't do it anymore—but I would ask a few lobbyists for contributions for refreshments and food, since the Secretary had no funds provided for that purpose. That has been changed now. My wife would fix a roast, and Jim would do the other things. One time, I remember, [John] Warner when he was married to Elizabeth Taylor and she showed up. That really caused a stir in the place. He was just like a puppy dog around her. She called him, "the Senator" in a humorous sort of way.

Well, I'm out of here. We'll do it again whenever you say.

End of the Second Interview

SECRETARY FOR THE MAJORITY

Interview #3

Monday, September 9, 2002

KIMMITT: When I was watching the [Walter] Mondale speech the other night in the Leaders' Lecture series, [Trent] Lott, [Tom] Daschle, and Mondale all mentioned the "historic" move when the Vice President moved from the Old Executive Office Building to the West Wing of the White House. It occurred to me that I knew exactly how and when that happened, but to refresh my memory I called my son Bob the other evening. Here is generally what he remembers—and his memory is far sharper than mine:

"In November of 1977 1 was living at 6004 Copely, which is our home with you and Mom, while in my third year of law school and concurrently my first year as a member of the National Security Council staff." (Later he became executive secretary of the National Security Council.) "The Thursday or Friday after the presidential election, I arrived home as usual around 7:00 p.m. and came back to your bedroom." (That's where Eunice, my wife, and I usually sit and watch television). "You got a call soon thereafter from Vice President-elect Mondale. He mentioned that he was leaving the next day to meet with President-elect Carter on an island off the coast of Georgia and asked if you had any suggestions. You responded that you did not, but your son who worked at the White House and whose office was actually in the Old Executive Office Building across West Executive Avenue was with you and you asked me if I had any advice. I responded that the Vice President would only really be in the full rhythm of the White House if he had an office there, and West Executive Avenue sometimes felt like a chasm between the two buildings. I also noted that then Vice President Rockefeller said that 'being in the OEOB is like being in Baltimore.' You passed these comments on to Senator Mondale, who said it was an excellent point that he would raise with Governor Carter the next day."

So that was the origin, it seems to me. I am sure others wondered and hoped and desired to be in the White House before that, but Mondale took advantage of the moment, which is very important. Here is the new President-elect Jimmy Carter, coming out of Georgia with no Washington experience of any sort, having a team around him who didn't have a great deal of Washington expertise, and who, in fact, made it quite clear that one of his missions was to straighten out Washington. When he arrived in Washington that became very apparent.

I remember going to Blair House with Senator Mansfield and other senators when President-elect Carter was there and he acted almost like a conquering hero. He came down the stairs at a deliberate gait. He gave me the impression, maybe not the others, that this is something he just had to go through with this Washington crowd. And even after that Hamilton Jordan his top man on the liaison and with Frank Moore was working the Hill, and they were not warmly received. You remember that Speaker Tip O'Neill referred to Jordan as "Hannibal Jerkin." There were not good relations initially between the Carter Administration and the Hill. So reverting back to the timing Fritz Mondale was able to present this idea when there was a wide open invitation for new ideas in Washington. I am sure without any further staffing—I am guessing—Carter said "why certainly, that makes sense," and the deal was done.

It did make a great deal of difference. Even though today Vice President [Richard] Cheney is viewed as one of the most influential vice presidents in history, I think Fritz Mondale broke the code on that one, primarily because he was in the White House and in the flow of things. Perception is everything. If the staff perceives a man in an office a block away, and they are in the inner circle geographically, it is entirely natural that they view him as the term is "Auslander," somebody out of the net. So when he came to the White House and established his office there, the staff automatically had to show more deference and pay more attention to him.

As you know, the office of the Vice President over history has been not a terribly important office except for the one constitutional requirement that they would succeed the President in case of death or disability. I remember [Alben] Barkley when he was Vice President. He would spend more than 50 percent of his time presiding over the Senate. Most Vice Presidents of his era and before did that. It was their only constitutional duty. That was all they had to do.

I think [Dwight] Eisenhower broke the pattern when he used [Richard] Nixon, for want of a better term, as a "roving ambassador." Nixon would fulfill the job of White House representation at civic events around the country. Nixon would go overseas for meetings. Nixon would attend funerals of foreign dignitaries and Heads of State. He would attend political gatherings. And that pretty well set the trend for future actions of Vice Presidents.

Now, why this comes to my mind is as Secretary for the Majority, which, as you know, I was for eleven years, one of the most vexing duties we had—and when I say "we," I refer to

Patrick Hynes who was working for me at that time running the [Democratic] Cloakroom—was getting presiding officers for the Senate. Whereas before in the Barkley era, when the Vice President handled that job, this was not a problem. But it became a problem for us. And then, of course, you have the protocol of the President Pro Tem sitting in if the Vice President isn't there. But then the norm became that the President Pro Tem would designate an Acting President Pro Tem to open the proceedings and preside over the proceedings.

During a session there is an absolute requirement that there be a senator in the chair. While I was here we worked on a cooperative and bipartisan basis. We had 68 Democratic senators at that time. We established a procedure in cooperation with Mark Trice, who was Secretary for the Minority, that the Democrats would open the Senate, regardless of the time of day and preside until approximately two o'clock in the afternoon. Then the Republicans would take over and preside between 2:00 and 4:00 or sometimes 5:00. It gave a little flexibility and took some of the pressure off. But finding senators to commit in advance to sit in that chair when they had all of their state responsibilities in their home office, here in the Senate office buildings, when they had their committee responsibilities, their subcommittees and other requirements, speaking at luncheons, breakfasts and so on, was a somewhat vexing problem.

Now we used several gimmicks to help with that. One, if you remember, was the Golden Gavel Award. We started it with Patrick Hynes and I think it was Patrick's idea that the first senator to spend a hundred hours in the chair would win the Golden Gavel. We would have a little ceremony, and it worked well. The other more rational explanation for a senator sitting in the chair was there is no better place to learn the rules by observation and advice from the Parliamentarian, learning other members by faces, desk locations, and their states. They learn procedures, not only the rules, but particularly the legislative procedures of the Senate while presiding over the session. So it was not entirely an unrewarding task they had. It was really an educational task. As a result, normally junior senators fulfilled the duty. Newly elected senators would be called when the Vice President was absent or after the President Pro Tem had delegated the duty. So you would usually get either the President Pro Tem or a senior senator to open the Senate with the Chaplain and initiate the procedures. But then within a relative short period a junior senator would relieve him.

I can think of two first-person episodes that had to do with presiding officers. One was when a serious debate was going on and there were, which is unusual, maybe sixty or seventy

senators on the floor. There was a critical vote coming and the Leader, Senator Mansfield, waved to me to come down and said, "I'd like to get a Democrat in the chair, because of the expected rulings." Well, the presiding officer at that time was a Republican from Connecticut, who left to become its governor.

RITCHIE: Weicker?

KIMMITT: Lowell Weicker. I went up to him and said, "Senator, Senator so-and-so," possibly [Lee] Metcalf, who as a good parliamentarian, possibly [Joseph] Montoya, who was another one, possibly others, "would be relieving you from the chair." He said, "Why?" Well, I said because the Leader said so, and he got furious. Didn't show it, but as he left the chair he was somewhat seething over this. I think he was anticipating the drama of this very tight vote, too. I am not sure he never forgave me for that. He probably always thought it was my idea.

Another time Senator Mansfield asked me to get a Democrat in the chair and I knew there was no doubt that Dick Russell was the expert on rules of procedure, but you would never ask Senator Russell to take the chair. So as situations developed over months and years, you pretty well identified those who were good. Montoya was good, as I mentioned Lee Metcalf was good and there were others. So this time, unrelated to the Lowell Weicker incident, Senator Mansfield said to get a Democrat and I looked around and I thought, "Well, Lee Metcalf is about as good as the rest." I went over said, "Senator, would you take the chair?" What I didn't realize because of the pressing time and situation, was that Senator Metcalf had a little more of his morning vodka than he should have.

He had a great mind, a great legislator, but he had a penchant for alcohol. I didn't realize this at this time. So he took the chair and the debate went on for a little while. Pretty soon three or four members were on their feet. Some senator, I don't know who, but on the Republican side called for the regular order, which meant, as I remember, that everything should stop and they should go directly to the vote on the bill or amendment. "Regular order, regular order." And Metcalf sort of gazed around a little bit while these senators were still standing. He looked over at the senator calling for regular order and said, "No I want to hear what senator so-and-so has to say." I mean, it was totally out of order, totally out of procedure, which brought the house down. We finally got order and got him out of the chair and put somebody else in there.

But the importance of the presiding officer of the Senate is critical. The third instance, maybe I have told you before, was one of these afternoons when Patrick just couldn't get anybody to preside between 5:00 and 6:00. He finally prevailed upon Senator Danny Brewster of Maryland to take the chair. Brewster apparently told him, "Patrick, I will do it for you, but I have got to be out of that chair by 6:00." He actually was in black tie attire. He had an event to attend. "All right, all right, I will get you out of the chair." Well, Patrick scurried and scurried to get another senator and was unsuccessful. At ten minutes to six, five minutes to six, three minutes to six, still nobody to relieve Brewster.

There weren't many people there. Wayne Morse was speaking. To digress a moment, the staff used to call Wayne Morse the "five o'clock shadow" because he would let the morning business go through, he would let the main legislation proceed, and he would never interfere. But at or near five o'clock he usually had these long, thoughtful speeches. When he spoke, he spoke in more distinct sentences than anyone in the Senate, but he spoke for a long time. Usually his wife would be in the family gallery. He'd be seemingly talking to her. Most of this was all extemporaneous. He had the floor and six o'clock came and 6:01 and 6:02 and finally Brewster just banged the gavel and said, "The Senate is adjourned," got up and walked off.

Well, that left a significant hiatus because only the Majority Leader or his designee can adjourn the Senate. I headed out towards S-207, the Majority Leader's Office, but Mansfield had apparently already heard this on the speaker. This is the first time, probably the only time, I ever saw him run. He came out of his office and was running to the floor. He and Frank Valeo, who was then Secretary of the Senate, huddled and Mansfield vitiated the order. He did something procedurally and then got Wayne Morris back speaking. But for Brewster protocol didn't mean a hell of a lot to him at that time. He had an engagement, a black tie event, he had a promise and like most senators, they live by commitment. So he just adjourned the Senate!

When you have a President Pro Tem, he would not preside long, but he would do his best every day to show up to open the Senate, which is in itself was a ritual. Today, I suppose, Senator Robert C. Byrd seldom spends much time in the chair. Although he does once in awhile. Here again the President Pro Tem picks his spots, just like the Vice President can pick his spots. When there is a vote planned which is expected to be a cliffhanger, whether it ends up being one or not, it is of significant importance to an administration, they will invariably send the Vice president

up to preside. Because in addition to having the only constitutional duty of being President of the Senate presiding over the body, his most important authority really comes to play on a tie vote. He can cast the deciding vote. I have seen that happen, though it has been quite rare. Your records will show how many there were. The Vice President can always, of course, "bump" a senator from the chair as can the President Pro Tem. Senator Byrd picks his spots. But Senator Byrd is such a Senate traditionalist that he carries with him, as other senators have in the past, just a very slight annoyance regarding the functions and authority of the Vice President.

For example, Mondale mentioned in his speech the other night that as Vice President-elect he was installed in the Lyndon Johnson Room, and then he got a call from Senator Byrd, who said, "I want you out of there by January 2nd." Byrd wasn't the originator of that idea. It was Mike Mansfield with Lyndon Johnson. If you remember, there was a movement when Johnson went down to be Vice President, that he should come back to chair the Democratic caucus. I think the record will show that originally under pressure, Mansfield was inclined to go along with that. But then it he switched and became very adamant that there be that division between the Senate and the vice president in administrative functions. They named the room the Lyndon Baines Johnson Room, it was not the "Vice President's" room anymore. If you remember, there was a small office adjunct to the LBJ Room and then he had his ceremonial office. Those were the only two rooms the Vice President had in the Capitol at the time.

It was interesting to me to watch the joint session in New York the other day. Cheney was there and presiding. That's not unusual. That's protocol. But Senator Byrd the President Pro Tempore wasn't even there. In joint sessions in the House, if the vice president isn't going to be there, for any reason or perhaps traveling, Byrd will be there. If the vice president attends, Byrd seldom goes to the joint sessions. I want to be careful how I say this, it's not an intentional pique situation. It's just another demonstration of his independence from the administration, the vice president and the president.

This whole discussion this morning started with the idea of how Vice President Mondale was allocated space in the West Wing of the White House, and I thought it was important to get for the record the actual circumstances of how that came about. It has made a great deal of difference. As I have said to you over the phone, one of the rarest things in the world is original thought. Now, it may not have been an original thought on Bob's part, but it was certainly a timely thought that came at an opportune time.

Speaking of Carter, and this is just a very, very short vignette—on his inauguration day, after all the hoopla out on the steps where he was sworn in, he came in and immediately went into [Allen] Ellender's office hideaway. If you come out of S-207, that's the Mansfield Room, and turn right and just jog around the comer on the left is a large room, a large hideaway suite in which Ellender had put a little kitchen. That's where they brought Carter following the inauguration in preparation for the inaugural lunch. At the desk they had prepared his first official documents. I think they were appointments. There weren't many, I think two or three. But when he sat down, I was standing maybe six feet away, he looked around and there was no pen on the desk. I reached in my pocket where I had one of these gold Cross pens and handed it to him. He signed his first official document with that pen and handed it back to me. I put it in my pocket. Later I told Bob about it as I still had the pen.

I gave it to him as sort of a memento and he later said, "I kept that pen and gave it to President Carter in the spring of 1989 in the hope that he would put it in his library." Well, he may have. I don't know. It was a very unimportant thing. But most history that you deal with is made up of lots of little unimportant things. And that's one.

So, there Don, is the saga of the Vice President's office in the West Wing of the White House from my standpoint. Now let's go to the other business which is a continuation of our previous discussions. I don't know where we left off.

RITCHIE: We had taken you to the time when you were Army Liaison and then when your first came up here first as Administrative Assistant to Senator Mansfield and then became Democratic Secretary. What I would like to do is get you to reflect on the job of the Democratic Secretary, the Majority Secretary, because I am not sure that people outside the Senate understand or appreciate what the party Secretaries do. I wonder if you could just describe the functions of that office.

KIMMITT: I will try to describe the functions during my time because things change and procedures, personnel and personalities change. But they don't seem to change basically or significantly.

When I became Secretary for the Majority, as you know, it was probably within a year or less after the former Secretary for the Majority Bobby Baker of South Carolina had the job. During that transition period between administrations, when Kennedy and Johnson had gone to the White House and Bobby stayed behind, Mansfield was elected Majority Leader and he inherited Bobby.

For all the time of the Lyndon Johnson majority leadership, Bobby Baker was a very influential staffer. I don't think I am overstating it by saying he was probably the most influential staff person in the Senate during the Johnson majority leader era. Following are my words, not somebody else's. Apparently, Bobby just couldn't stand prosperity. He was involved with a lot of our friends who were still *de rigueur.* They had a couple of rooms or suites put together in the Congressional Hotel named The Quorum Club. Bobby was one of the original founders of the Quorum Club which later became the 116 Club which is still in existence and still of that very selective membership, very hard to get into, almost impossible and still run by a lot of way old curmudgeons who remember the "good old days."

At any rate, Bobby fell into disrepute, not only because of his antics on the Eastern Shore, with the Carousel Motel, the girls, the lobbying, and the partying. But he also—and I have no idea of the details—got involved with the soft drink machine business and was either taking kickbacks or getting money in some manner. Just getting carried away with his freedom of action which was going on in the Lyndon Johnson years. I don't know what started the house of cards tumbling down, but he was in deep trouble.

I was not here at that time. I was in Europe still in the Army. We came home in '64 and I think it was in '64 that this took place. I remember traveling with Senator Richard Russell one time and discussing this incident with him. At this time I was still in the Army. In that interim between July of '64 and January of '66 when I got out and went to work for Mansfield. I traveled with Russell over in Europe and we were discussing this. I just brought the matter up. He said, "Well, Bobby came to me" (meaning Russell) "and asked for my help because he felt he was getting a bad deal from whoever was attempting to prosecute him. I said I just had one question for him after he told me his story. I said 'Do you have any Internal Revenue problems?'" Bobby said, "No." He said, "Of course, that turned out to be untrue. There was nothing I could do or wanted to do." That dropped the Russell conversation.

In 1964, I came back from New York in ’64 and the Army put me back over here to head the Army Liaison Office in the Senate where I served twice before. This time I was to be the chief. In the meantime Mansfield had gotten rid of Bobby and had moved in his alter ego at that time, Frank Valeo, who was not really on the Senate staff. He might have been on the Senate staff by that time, but he had been on loan from the Library of Congress. He was a speech writer and a think tank person for Mansfield. They could sit in a room and never say a word and be communicating because their minds went in the same direction. It was Asia, Vietnam, world politics, and Johnson, and the whole damn thing.

Mike Mansfield never had a male staffer that he leaned on. He did have one when he was first elected to the House. He brought back with him a man named Jimmy Sullivan from Butte. He was with him as AA in the House and came over here for awhile. Then Peggy DeMichele took over and she was with him all the time. His whole staff were women, women, and women. He had one exception, a young man named Ray Dockstader. When Mansfield left we put him over in the Library of Congress at the Folklife Center. But he never had a male staffer, AA or anything else. He looked upon Valeo as certainly one of the closest, and later Charlie Ferris later became even closer to him. He would rely on Charlie for policy as director of the Policy Committee.

He had a young man Harry McPherson who went to the White House during the Johnson era who is now down with Verner, Liipfert, McPherson, Hand. He first ran the Policy Committee and Charlie took over along with Dan Leach. Mansfield had Valeo and Ferris, and a young man in the cloakroom working for Bobby named John Graves. When Bobby fell out, Mansfield had nowhere to go in a hurry to fill the Secretary of the Majority, so he nominated Frank Valeo, who was elected. I digress here for a moment. In those days the officers of the Senate were elected. They are still elected pro forma, but they seem to be anointed before they are elected. Frank had no political acumen. He had no political sensitivity. He was apolitical. He would get in his office with those long legal pads and write speeches for Mansfield and write memos, and write, write, write. He hardly knew who worked for him. When he became Secretary for the Majority he just didn't fit with the members. He was a square peg in a round hole. Skeeter Johnson was Secretary of the Senate. I give that as background and Skeeter had as his deputy a man from Georgia, Emory Frazier.

Mansfield called me in around November, December and said “Did you ever think about

getting out of the Army?" I really never had. I was happy in the Army. I knew I was going to go to Vietnam which was the breeding ground for new generals and I was a colonel at the time. I said "no," and he said, "Would you think about it?" I said, "For what purpose?" He said, "Not immediately, but after awhile I would like you to become Secretary of the Majority. Frank is in there now." I said, "Let me think about it." It was a hell of a big decision on my part. In retrospect I kept him waiting for ten days or two weeks for an answer. In that interim, Scoop Jackson, Senator Jackson of Washington, was going to Vietnam and I was going as an army officer at his request to escort him. But I filled out my retirement papers and then said to my chief liaison, I think it was General Weyand who later became Chief of Staff, "I am going to Vietnam if I can find a job over there that I like, when I come back I will tear these up, but if I can't find the right spot, I am going to put them in."

I went to Vietnam, went all over Nam. Every time I asked about getting a command as a colonel or to become Chief of Staff of a division or one of those high-profile spots, I would get the same response: "Relax, you had your War College, you had your division artillery, you've punched all the tickets, give somebody else a chance, you are going to be a general." These were general officers who told this. So I came back and put the papers in. I think I retired the last day of January in '66 and went to work the next day for Senator Mansfield as Administrative Assistant to the Majority Leader. Now that was domiciled in S-208 in the Capitol. He had his little office about the size of this one, as a matter of fact, with his larger room where we would have Policy Committee meetings. Out in front we had Salpee Sahagian and Beth Shotwell, who later became Frank Valeo's wife, and then a desk for me.

I had no specific duties. I was in a holding pattern. Coming out of the Army it was a hell of a transition. I couldn't just sit there and do nothing. I didn't feel comfortable about going on the floor and trying to do anything because I was not in the policy area or was the Secretary for the Majority. I was just kind of floating along. In that interim, Senator Mansfield became somewhat disenchanted with me for reasons best known to him and it doesn't make any difference now. But I was getting a little tenuous about the job and whether or not I had made the right decision.

Then came the time when the new Congress started. This was January. There was a caucus. Skeeter Johnston had stepped down, probably under gentle nudging by Mansfield, as Secretary of the Senate. The recommendation was made, I am sure by Senator Metcalf,

nominating Frank Valeo to be Secretary of the Senate. I was in there at that time as an observer on the back row. Before action was taken on the nomination Senator Russell spoke up and said "Well, this is somewhat of a surprise to me," in that genteel Georgian manner. He said, "Where does that leave Emory Frazier?" Well, Mansfield immediately knew that he got himself crosswise with Russell, and immediately called off the election of the Secretary of the Senate and very shortly adjourned the caucus. There were other matters, but that won out.

They came back again in a caucus in a day or two. At that time, he had reached a compromise with Russell (I am surmising this now) and that was to elect Emory Frazier as Secretary of the Senate for a six-month period, after which Frank Valeo would become Secretary of the Senate. There was still nothing said about the Secretary of the Majority. Then it came close to the time to face who was going to become Secretary for the Majority.

Now John Graves who was there, and was running the cloakroom, had been very close to Valeo. He was being considered as was I. Mansfield called me in before the caucus—the caucus was usually at 9:30, 10:00—he called me in about eight o'clock. In that very stern manner, he said, "Well, I have decided to have you nominated as Secretary for the Majority." There was all this nervous tension up to this point. I said, "Thank you very much, sir." He said, "Well, it wasn't an easy choice and I have given it a lot of thought. John Graves has done a good job out there." Well, that indicated to me that between the time that he encouraged me to get out for this job and he actually had to make the decision, that I had pissed him off somewhere. But I didn't know what it was. At any rate, I took over as Secretary for the Majority and John Graves was my assistant. I moved down to where the Democratic Whip now is on the first floor [SB-141], Bobby's office, which is a large ornate office. It looked right down the Mall at the monuments. It was beautiful. Far above what I thought a staffer should have. But I was there for months.

I took over the job, not really knowing what the hell it was all about. I soon learned that everything on the floor of the Senate, pretty much the administrative details, come under the Secretary of the Senate—everything about the arranging the desks, the papers on the desks and all of the procedural matters, that was the Secretary of the Senate. Secretary for the Majority had another job. One of the first jobs was to assign desks to senators when there was a death, election, or change of party by a member.

This became a very interesting process. We had 68 senators, and when the election came the question was the order of precedence among the senators. There was no doubt that Majority Leader's desk and the Whip's desk were fixed, regardless of who the person was who occupied them. But seated right behind the Majority Leader was the most senior and influential Democratic senator, and that was Richard Russell. All senators tried to move more towards the center and the front. Concurrently, on the Republican side Mark Trice and his people, their senators were moving more to the center aisle and to the front. But in order to arrange those, you had to go to every senator and give them an option before you could move anyone else.

Obviously, the first one I went to was Senator Russell and understandably, he didn't want to change his desk. Then I would go to the next senior Democratic senator and show a chart of the open desks that were available. The one rule had to be that you get one bite at the apple. Whatever seats are open at that moment if it is your turn to make a choice, you as a senator can choose one of those seats and then moves on. If he didn't choose to move, the senator remains where he is and you go to the next member. Well, in this process those open seats sort of float around.

Steve Young of Ohio was an acerbic little individual. When I came to him one time, there were three or four seats open and I offered him a chance to change his seat. He indicated no, he didn't want any of those, he wanted to be somewhere else. I said, "Senator, I am sorry they are taken, but you have to make a decision as to what the seats are available now." Which was true. He said, "Well then, I'll stay here." I went down the line to the others and suddenly one of the seats opened over there that was more in an area where he wanted to be. Well, I couldn't go back to him and say, "You get a second chance." So he went to Mansfield and just raised hell saying, "I want to be over there" and so on. Well, the Leader, of course, backed me up. But I was never in good graces with Steve Young thereafter.

It takes weeks to complete this process until you get everybody assigned their desks. Invariably the most junior senators end up in the rear at the farthest comer near the desk of the Secretary for the Majority, an old desk that sits in the comer and is seldom used. However, if a senator such as a Kennedy or a [Russell] Long, or up in New Hampshire Norris Cotton wanted a certain a desk from one of the original senators from their state's predecessors. He got it and we moved the desk. So, the Kennedys, as I recall, Ted Kennedy had the desk that Jack and

maybe even Bobby had. The desk could be moved, but the location could not. That is long discussion of one of the duties of the Secretary for the Majority. We have already covered getting the presiding officer.

One of the duties which was practiced by Bobby Baker and which I practiced when I was there with Mansfield, was that when a vote came, I would stand just inside the center door of the Senate on the Democratic side and *if asked* by a senator coming in what the issue was or what the situation was, I would explain it. I would never under Mansfield's direction suggest to a senator how he should vote. I say "he" because in those days there were no women on the Democratic side. Margaret Chase Smith was on the Republican side. But if they asked usually I would say, "This is an amendment proposed by Senator X and the opposition is Senator Y" and a brief, very brief description of the amendment. Usually most senators only want to know who was for it and who against and they immediately know which way they are going. I would stand there at every vote and just be prepared to pass that on.

There are several little vignettes and anecdotes on that one. Right in front of me at that time, on the back row nearest to me was Senator [William] Proxmire. Proxmire, of course, was somewhat contentious in his ideas and he proposed many, many things and lost votes on them. So it was critical for me on any issue, to be very accurate and fair. I felt like I was in the confessional with a priest in there and when I would make these descriptions, I knew Proxmire would be listening. He complimented me several times on the way I handled it even though he may not have agreed with issue at the time.

Another time I remember, Bobby Kennedy came in the side door of the Senate and walked around behind the Republicans coming in our direction. It was some social welfare program, I am sure, a Kennedy-like issue, and Bobby stopped and asked what was going on. I started to explain and his staffer came up from a corner and said, "No, no, no, Senator, don't listen to him." To his credit Bobby Kennedy said to him, "Go over and sit down. He is just doing his job," which made me feel pretty good.

Dick Russell told me a story that when Bobby [Baker] had that location and position and practiced that procedure, Russell walked in the back center door and started down towards his seat and Baker said "Your vote is no." Johnson was in the Majority Leader's chair and it was

perceived by everybody that when Baker said your vote is this and that, that it was Johnson's desire. Russell said he got four steps down the aisle and he turned around and came back and said, "Bobby, don't you ever again suggest how I should vote. The people of Georgia have that privilege." He turned around and sat down. It was an effective way for Lyndon Johnson to let his Democrats know what his position with the Leadership was as they went by Bobby. He didn't live by the rule unless they asked. He would just spit it out.

The only time I would do that would be under the direction of Mansfield himself who would tell me, and this was very rare—I can't think of more than ten times in eleven years, maybe—"The Leadership position is X." When he would tell me that, then I would freely say, "The Leadership position is x,y,z."

One of the most important functions of the Secretary for the Majority was to be the only staffer in the Steering Committee. I hope I can explain this in an intelligent manner. The Steering Committee is a committee of around twelve members to assign committee seats to senators. The Senate Rules at that time required that a senator have two major committee seats on the thirteen major committees. He must have two. There have been occasions where senators only wanted one, but they had to take another one. They could have one minor committee, under the Senate Rules. The minor committee being Aging, Veterans Affairs, Small Business, Indian Affairs, Ethics, Aging, Intelligence, and others. Then there are special committees and select committees. The steering committee brings to a vote every new assignment.

The Chairman of the Steering Committee was Mansfield. I was the only staffer, although I did bring Gail Martin in, my assistant, to keep notes. All requests for committees would have to be in writing, understandably, and they would be addressed to the Majority Leader as chairman of the Steering Committee. They would all be referred to me. I would have to place these requests in order of date of receipt. Then I would have to research the senator's seniority in the Senate and if there were two of them sworn in at the same time, was he a former Senator, House member, a former governor, and you finally got down to the population of the state. There were four or five or six categories. Seniority is very important, especially on committees.

Then one must determine what committee seats have become open through resignation, defeat, or death and what committee seats are available. Then you try to match up slates.

Obviously, the big four, as we called them were the two A's and the two F's. They were Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Finance. They were always the four most sought after committees, always, in the Senate. I think the original rules of the Senate called for an Appropriations Committee of fifteen members, I think now it is twenty-eight. The Steering Committee can adjust the size of committees as they go through this process. So the Appropriations Committee might have one or two vacancies and you would have a list of maybe a dozen applicants. After going through this sieve of qualifications, in order of priority, only meant that they had that priority, but it did not ensure in any way their acceding to the position. Seniority was only one factor.

Then we got even more complicated than that in my tenure in that there were murmurings and disenchantment with the allocation of committee seats by regions of the country. We worked at the staff level very hard with a big map and we analyzed how many Democrats there were in the western region and then in the Midwest and the East and the South. There were four regions. Then we would study, manipulate and find out by percentage what each region was entitled on that committee. So if you get the combination of individual, seniority, individual precedence, individual desires, compare that with openings and then superimpose on this the requirement that each region of the country was entitled to its percentage, it became complicated. For example, if there were 12.4 percent of the Democratic senators from the Midwest and there were 12.8 percent from the West, and a contest ensued with a senator from the West and a senator from the Midwest, it would enter into play and the seat may well go to the Western senator even though the Midwestern senator was senior. So it got very complicated. It was a very dynamic action to be involved in.

Invariably when new senators came to the Senate, Democratic senators, I would be called, as I was one day from Senator Byrd, saying that a new senator from Texas, Lloyd Bentsen, wanted to see me. He was down in the very room I talked to you about where Carter signed his first appointments. I went down to see him and met him for the first time. He was interested in committee assignments. Above all because Johnson had been there, and because of Texas, he wanted to get on the Armed Services Committee. Instinctively I knew why he wanted to go on there. But I also knew he wouldn't be very happy there because John C. Stennis was the chairman, or about to become chairman, and his style of running a committee was pretty much frustrating for many members. But that is beside the point. To Bentsen, like with every other senator who I talked to who wanted advice, I'd say, “Now you’ve just come through one election.

This is another election and you've got to campaign with members of the Steering Committee and they make the decision." So I would give them a list of all of the Steering Committee and recommend that they go around and see each one of them, literally campaign for that committee seat. So that campaign was going on all the time.

In the Steering Committee meeting itself sometimes it got quite contentious over a seat. I'll skip around about two or three different vignettes about that. I'll take as an example, John Melcher of Montana, who succeeded Mansfield. Melcher was in the House and I went over to see him primarily because of being from Montana, and offered my assistance. He is not the most pleasant person to deal with. He never looked me in the eye. He said, "When I go over there I'll expect you to do the same thing for me that you did for Mike all these years." I said, "Senator, I am Secretary for the Majority and I have to work for all the Democrats." I said, "What I would like to talk to you about are the committee assignments and give you a little heads up on the procedures and so on." I started to explain to him, "I recommend to you" (I knew there were two or three seats coming up on Appropriations) "to make an application for the Appropriations Committee early and campaign for that." "I don't want to be on the Appropriations Committee. If I wanted to be on the Appropriations Committee, I'd be on the Appropriations Committee here. I want to get on the Interior Committee."

I said, "Senator, you can't go on the Interior Committee."

He said, "What do you mean?"

I said, "Lee Metcalf is already on the Interior Committee."

He said, "What difference does that make?"

I said, "Because there is an unwritten rule that no two senators of the same party from the same state can be on the same committee. And Lee is already there."

"Well, is that a Senate rule or a party rule."

I said, "It's a party rule."

"Well I'll have that changed."

He started a campaign to go on the Interior Committee, even though I told him he couldn't do it. Over the course of several weeks, word got back to Lee Metcalf, and as an exception to policy, when the Steering Committee met for the first time to decide, Lee asked to come into the committee meeting. He made a very impassioned, angry speech that his colleague was trying to get on the Interior Committee. He considered that an insult as he represented Montana there.

Even without that appearance, Melcher could not have gone on the Interior Committee. But as we went through the assignments (and there were quite a few changes that year), Scoop Jackson called me over at the table and said, "What are we going to do for Melcher?" I said, "Well, it is coming down to very few chances here. There is a seat on Commerce. Commerce takes care of Transportation. Montana's got railroads, trucks, aviation and trade with Canada. He hasn't asked for it, but it seems to me that would be place to put him." So he proposed Melcher to go on Commerce Committee and one other relatively unimportant one, I don't know what it was. And that's where he ended up. That was one example of committee manipulations.

Another was, senators became grandfathered into seats on committees. Once they got on the committee in the first place, there was probably very good reason for it. But when you try to solve this problem where everybody has got too many seats, you are trying to cut back, but nobody ever wants to give up a seat. There was the Johnson rule, which was every new senator should get a committee of his choice. Johnson started that for his own purposes. But he had already left. Mansfield continued that and it became an unwritten precedent. Well, there were some new senators coming in, and I don't recall them by name at this time, but one of the seated senators who had fought the seniority system ferociously all the time he was here was Joe Clark of Pennsylvania. He had three major committee seats. With this discussion about where to place a new senator and give him a committee of his choice, it became an absolute impasse. Mansfield turned to Clark and said, "Joe, you've always fought this seniority system. Why don't you give up one of your seats?" Clark said, "Oh, no, no. I am there now. I am not giving up any seat. I am going to ride with the system." That was another factor that came into play on the thing.

Another example; Adlai Stevenson, the Senator, was on two committees because he was relatively junior and then before his next election there was a situation having to do with

changing committees. He asked, as an exception, to be given a third committee and told Mansfield and the Steering Committee that he really needed it to be reelected and after he was elected he would give it up. Well, they acquiesced, because this is where the politics comes in. Like right now, they play those committee seats. So they gave him the seat. Then he was reelected. When we next met, I recommended he fulfill the commitment, thus taking that seat away from him. All hell broke loose, he accused me above all. Then, as usual, they acquiesced and let him keep his third seat.

But committee assignments, committee seats, are one of the most exacting and sensitive areas for the Secretary for the Majority. Bill Hildenbrand and I did our best as people frittered away to back the Senate rule of every senator having two majors and one minor seat. We nearly got it down, Bill was the Secretary for the Minority, in the last year of Mansfield's reign, we only had three or four grandfathered senators left. They, of course, would be moving on in time. If they had stuck with the program they would have gotten back to what the rules called for. A senator doesn't have time for all of the things he has to do if he has more than two committees. But they wanted them. Why? Because it gives him additional staff. It gives him additional money. It gives him additional influence. They are all, I say this respectfully, greedy for all those things. Then when Mansfield left and Byrd became Majority Leader and running for his position, he obviously used the committee seat assignment as an incentive. They started building back up again and then Mitchell built them up and so on, but that is none of my business. But as I say, committee assignments are very important.

RITCHIE: You mentioned that Senator Johnson and Senator Byrd both used committee assignments as a way to build up the leadership authority. What about Senator Mansfield? Was he passive in this or did he take an active role?

KIMMITT: He was passive. Although when Mansfield served in the Senate as Whip and in his very first days, first years as Majority Leader, there was, in fact, in the Senate what was referred to as the Club. The Club was a collection of senior bipartisan, not just Democrats, senior senators, committee chairmen, ranking minority members who legislated off the floor. They would make deals among themselves. The Club ran the Senate.

Mansfield, in my opinion, never liked that system and resented it. He also resented the stranglehold the South had on the committee chairmanships. Whereas, all the time I was there,

they never violated the practice that a senior Democrat would become chairman of a committee. But any time through his appointive powers, and he had many, Mansfield could appoint senators to certain committees, investigative committees or any committees that were formed under the leadership. He would always appoint junior, newer, and more liberal senators to those committees. It irritated the senior chairmen, particularly Russell, but Mansfield was held in such respect for fairness that never would accost him. If a senator, hypothetically, George McGovern, an extreme liberal, came up with an idea for a committee, in this case Hunger, and would propose it in the caucus, if Mansfield agreed with it they would form this temporary committee and made McGovern chairman. They would plan to form them for one Congress. But they would go on and on. He would give junior members chairmanships. He would shy away from the old guard and as a result, he destroyed the Club in the Senate. Because for years that term was synonymous with the power brokers and was very accurate.

And that came from your question did he ever get involved. No, but one of the most effective tools when you are running a contest, and Byrd has run many a contest, he ran against [Ted] Kennedy, and he ran for leader a couple of times, was with the door closed, telling a senator, "If I am elected, I will see that you get on such and such a committee." It is a tool, an elective tool, it is like running an election and making campaign promises. Now, where were we?

RITCHIE: The duties of the Secretary. Did you get involved at all in head counting, in anticipating votes?

KIMMITT: Oh yeah, but again, only when directed by the leader. One of the best head counters in the Senate was Bill Hildenbrand. But he could operate with a great deal more freedom. He could go up and ask a senator on the Republican side how he was going to vote even though he had no instructions to do so. I always checked with him because he got so that he could read our side. Instinctively on most issues, you can pretty well come within two or three votes because after you been there for years, you know the senators and their patterns. But only when the Majority Leader asked me to take a head count would I do it. Sometimes it would surprise you.

One of the wiliest persons on the head count was Howard Cannon of Nevada. That's because he had an administrative assistant, Jack Conlon, who advised him to—always—never commit. "If you are uncommitted, they are going to come to you." Because once you commit,

they are through. And that's very true. If a senator has a project that he wants very badly in his state and all the other factors involved and then he comes to getting a commitment on a vote, the Panama Canal Treaty is probably an example. Once you commit, they don't come back to you again and you've lost all your bargaining power. But if you're uncommitted, even though you know how you are going to vote, but if you say, well, I just haven't made up my mind, then they are coming after you. The administration will send an emissary.

The Panama Canal, as I say, was very tight for Carter and Mondale and this became very apparent that it was going to be tight. Any uncommitted senators on the Democratic side were approached and many, many deals were made because they didn't commit early. So, yes, I would take head counts. Cannon would say, "I'm still thinking about that, Stan." A lot of them it was just pro forma because everyone knew how they were going to vote anyway. But the swing votes, and there are always swing votes on any issue, there are the conservative and the liberals and the moderates and most all of the swing votes are nailed down to a small group of moderates.

I know I have told you this story, but I am going to repeat it. It was told to me by Senator Richard Russell at a hotel room in Athens one night, just the two of us sitting there. We were talking about the Senate and so on and got on the civil rights fights and so on and he told me this anecdote: One day they were debating, this was early on before the big '64 civil rights bill, there were quite a number of senators on the floor, particularly the southerners because it was an important bill and a debate was going on. Senator [William] Langer of North Dakota came in the back door. They called him "Bull" Langer. He always had an unlit cigar in his mouth and he was a brawler. He was a picturesque individual. He stopped at the back door and listened for maybe about ten or fifteen seconds. Civil rights in North Dakota didn't mean a damn thing except when it came to the American Indians and they hadn't gotten much recognition yet. There were very few blacks out there. He walked down the center of the aisle and stopped next to Russell and said, "Dick, want me to vote with you today?" Russell said, "Senator, that would be very nice. We need all the help we can get on these matters." "All right, I am with you," and he went over and sat down.

Russell turned around to Lister Hill and said Langer is with us and Hill passed onto Sparkman and old Harry Byrd and all of the Stennis and the rest of them. The debate went on and on. During the debate very innocently one and more of these Democratic senators would get up and go to Langer's desk and shake hand with him. So about 4:30 or 5:00 in the afternoon, the

vote came up and boom, he voted against them. Russell said, "You know it didn't faze him a bit. He came down in the well and walked past me and said, 'Dick, I didn't vote with you today, did I?'" Russell said, "No, Senator, you didn't. That surprised me after what you told me. But I am sure you had your reasons." He said, "Well, that's one thing you've got to learn about me. I can change my mind faster than any son of a bitch you have ever seen." And walked off the floor.

The only reasons these stories are important are the sources. There are lots of stories, but when you get them directly from the member, it is important.

RITCHIE: Would most people keep their pledge if they said yes or no?

KIMMITT: Oh yes, that is the one thing in the Senate that is, in my opinion, inviolate, i.e., you do not break your word to another senator. Now it is perfectly all right and acceptable to make a commitment by saying, "Don, I am voting with you today." It is perfectly acceptable if two hours later before the vote I come back to you and say, "Don, I gave my word, but I have to take that back, because I have this, that, and the other thing." That is permissible and understandable. The cardinal sin is to commit and not keep your word. There are people who may break their word, but in a open vote they are identified. In a secret ballot like in the caucus, they are not and lots of people can back out on their vote there and not be known.

One of my classic memories is Russell Long when he was being challenged by Kennedy for Whip, I was in his office and we went down the list and the phone rang and it was Johnson in the White House, the President. He asked Long how his campaign was going. "Well, we're coming along," you know how Russell Long talks. Apparently Johnson said, "Well, go down the list and tell me who's with you, tell me what you got." So Russell Long started going down the list, telling him who was for him and who was doing that. Johnson said, "How about Mansfield?" Long said, "Oh, Mike is with me." Johnson said, "What did he say to you?" Long said, "I asked him and he said I didn't have to worry about his vote." Johnson said, "He's against you. That is not a commitment." I am paraphrasing now, because I didn't hear it. He said, "He would never vote against a Kennedy and he's going to vote against you and he did not make a commitment." Well, that is the way it turned out.

Now I brought this up to Mansfield years later, probably within the last eight years. I told

him about this anecdote and he just chuckled, not denying, just chuckled. Going back to your point, you never break a commitment on a vote. Going back to the comment that I made that the officers used to be elected, rather than anointed, even though they are elected, if the Majority Leader wants somebody it is just a pro forma action.

When Mansfield stepped down and Byrd was running for Majority Leader and I had been talked to by Gaylord Nelson and Dee Huddleston to run against Valeo to be Secretary of the Senate. This was a couple of months before Mansfield left, they became kind of my campaign managers and Frank's campaign manager was Harry Byrd of Virginia. I ended up winning that thing about two to one for which I was grateful. But the interesting thing I want to tell you was that Byrd was running for Majority Leader. He called me into his state office one day and sat down and said, "Now how is your campaign going?" I said, "Well, I think it is going all right, sir. I don't know. You never know until it's over." He said, "Well, you know I've got my own race on. I am not going to get involved in yours. As a matter of fact, I am not even going to tell you how I am going to vote. But I wish you well."

Well, that was wonderful. The beauty of that was in final analysis is that when I was elected in a contested election by the majority of the Democrats, I worked for both Byrd and Baker but Senator Byrd never directed me, there was no direct partisan subordinate relationship, although it was certainly clear that even though you work for the leaders, but give priority to the Majority Leader.

In those four years that I was Secretary of the Senate I was almost a free agent working for both of them and they never bothered me, except I'll bring up another case where that wasn't true and you'll understand the reason why. Once the Republicans took the Senate in November, but they didn't take office until January, Howard Baker was obviously going to be the Majority Leader. He was the Minority Leader and I was going to be out of a job, which was understandable. He sent word to me through Hildenbrand that Murray Zweben, the Parliamentarian, had to go and he wanted me to take care of that before he became Majority Leader, because it was going to happen anyway.

So I called Murray and gave him the bad news. He had made some rulings, you know that whole mess which the Republicans didn't like, and so I had to ask for his resignation. I did not

go to Byrd for advice on this, which may have been a mistake, but this was between Baker and me and Murray. Then Byrd said, "I wish you had come to me and advised me before you took that action." I said, "Well, sir, perhaps I should have, but that was a directive, a request from the Minority Leader about to be the Majority Leader and I had to honor it." So that may have put a little dent in my relationship with Byrd.

That is one of the only times when either Byrd or Baker directed me to do something. It was the most wonderful thing in the world. Because had Byrd influenced the nomination and elected me then—you know Byrd, like Terry Sauvain who can't get out of his chair—the senator wants people around him night and day. I was fortunately spared that crucible. But Byrd was always wonderful to me. We never had a problem officially, of any kind that I could think of.

RITCHIE: Did you have a sense, though, that if he had been elected Majority Leader in 1976, that he would have wanted somebody different as Democratic Secretary? Do you think he would have wanted his own person in that job?

KIMMITT: Oh yes, I think so. Because, I know this is true, I stepped down in '81, January, and the Democrats took it back—

RITCHIE: Eighty-six, they came back. Republicans were in the majority for six years then. Byrd was Majority Leader when they came back.

KIMMITT: Well, anyway when the Democrats took the Senate back over. First of all, when the Republicans took the Senate, there was precedent for Secretary of the Senate—I think it was Mark Trice—reverting to be Secretary for the Minority. I was in effect hoping or trying to rationalize how that could happen. Anyway, that didn't happen because either my sense or something else indicated that Byrd would not support that.

Then when they took the Senate back, I had visions of running again for Secretary of the Senate, having been disposed involuntarily and for no reason. I even went so far as to write a letter to a few senators saying I was going to run. Then I ran into Senator Byrd in the hall while this was going on and he said, "I'd like to talk to you. I understand you were thinking of running for Secretary of the Senate again." I said, "Well, yes, I am thinking of the idea, but I certainly

want to come talk to you about it." He said, "Well, I don't think my colleagues would deny me the opportunity to place my own man in there." So I wrote these people back quickly and said I wasn't going to get involved.

When he became Majority Leader, he didn't put Joe [Stewart] in as Secretary for the Majority right away. He put a young fellow from Rhode Island, Jim Duffy, and he left, and even Terry Sauvain was in there as Secretary for the Majority for a short while. Joe didn't want it, I think, this is just my theory, because he had been so close to Bobby Baker that he didn't want to have Baker's former title. But he became, of course, the power behind the throne. As Byrd went on he had another young man, Pat Griffin, and a lady, Abbey Saffold. Then Joe became Secretary of the Senate and he was a great one, a good one. But Joe had tools as Secretary of the Senate that I never had in that Byrd would support him on anything he unilaterally wanted to do. With Mansfield, I wouldn't propose anything because the old man kept everything so close. But Joe was a good Secretary. He achieved a lot. But we achieved a lot while we were in there, too.

Well, we've been rambling again, Don. I don't know where the hell we are now.

RITCHIE: This is great.

KIMMITT: Just rummaging through the past and seeing where we're going. I don't think this should terminate it.

RITCHIE: No. What I would like to do is to talk a little bit more about this period and a little bit more about when you were Secretary in that period and also your connections with the Senate since then, because you have been here pretty regularly. I see you in the Hart atrium on a regular basis.

KIMMITT: Oh, I wander through. I should have done this a long time ago, but I belong to the three biggest clubs in the world. You know what they are? The woulda's, the shoulda's, and the coulda's.

End of the Third Interview

THE MANSFIELD LEADERSHIP

Interview #4

Monday, September 16, 2002

RITCHIE: I want to go back again to the days when you were Democratic Secretary. You talked briefly in passing about the Democratic Policy Committee and Charlie Ferris. I wondered if you could tell me, what is the relationship between the Democratic Floor Secretary and the Policy Committee?

KIMMITT: Well, I will try. Keep in mind it all could have changed in the last twenty years. But, as I observe the current Secretary for the Majority, he seems to be much more involved with the Majority Leader in planning floor actions than I ever was with Mansfield. Mansfield, I can speak with knowledge in that arena, almost had a troika in that he had Frank Valeo who was then Secretary of the Senate as his in- house speech writer. Even though he was Secretary of the Senate, he was far more focused on Mansfield personally than I ever was later, and for reasons I will go into in a few moments, and even as Hildenbrand was or Mark Trice or any of the former secretaries of the party. Because as I related to you the last time, when Bobby Baker blew out and Mansfield put Valeo in that position it soon became obvious that Valeo was not synergistic, not politically minded, he was a foreign relations student, expert. So Mansfield put him in one point of the troika. His function was primarily to be Secretary of the Senate, but even there when he became that, he had very little direct control in the Secretary's office. As I mentioned last time, perhaps unfairly, I am confident he didn't even know many of the people who worked for him. He never got out and cruised around the offices. He signed papers that were put in front of him. He did the "pro forma" work of the Secretary, but his focus was on Mansfield as the leader and as the foreign relations guru particularly with reference to Asia.

It later got Frank in trouble and it had quite a bit to do with my winning the race [for Secretary of the Senate]. As the procedures and rules and all changed, members such as [Howard] Metzenbaum, [Dee] Huddleston, and maybe one or two others were accused, probably wrongfully, with campaign chicanery or actions. Now in the one case that got him in trouble an allegation was made against a senator that his campaign tactics in his state violated the FEC rules or something. Frank had a man working for him then in the Secretary's office. He was very bright,

very capable, mature. He was handling these cases. The procedures correctly said it had to be referred to Justice, which Frank did. No question it was legal; no question it was required; but he never told the senator before he referred it to Justice. The first the senator ever knew of it was when Justice came to him with the allegation which had been transmitted to them by the Secretary of the Senate. Well since the Secretary works for all senators, or should, that obviously was a faux pas on Frank's part. But we will set Valeo aside now other than to say he was the foreign policy, speech writing, etc. adviser for Mansfield.

Now coming directly to your question, under Mansfield the Policy Committee staff headed first by Harry McPherson, who went to the White House, and later by Charlie Ferris. Charlie came up through the Kennedy Administration having come down from Massachusetts and into the Justice Department with Bobby Kennedy and being very close to the Kennedy scene. He was very liberal and very much involved in civil rights. Charlie was brought up here on loan to Hubert Humphrey and the civil rights advocates to staff the '64 Civil Rights Act and did a wonderful job. Then he stayed as Democratic Policy Committee staff director.

They would handle the calendar. They would handle the scheduling of legislation on the floor. They would recommend when to pigeonhole a bill, when to move it, the same things that go on all the time now. It was very obvious to conservatives and moderates that Charlie was tilted towards the liberal wing of the Democratic Party of which there were more then than there are now, and a more active, domineering group than there are now. He was, and his staffing was, very careful to protect information from the conservatives or from anybody that didn't fit the ultra-liberal mold and his own mold. Charlie is a friend of mine. I am saying this just as a matter of history, not as a matter of complaint.

Dick Russell knew this, Bob Byrd knew it, Stennis knew it. Again, out of respect for Mansfield they didn't raise the issue of Charlie. So, in effect, Charlie was in charge of all legislative actions on the floor of the Senate by recommending to the Majority Leader the schedule, and other legislative procedures. Mansfield, being the type of person that he was, was a very broad-viewed person and he didn't like to get into details. He trusted his people to prepare the details and make a recommendation. It was a very successful operation.

Therefore, Charlie was the second point of the troika, the triangle. Then there was the

office of the Secretary for the Majority which I held, which was the third corner. My functions were only, as I probably described them to you before, to see that the Chamber was ready for operations; see that the presiding officers were there; that the pages were well-trained and disciplined; that the members were well-informed, if they wanted to be, without reference to ideology or philosophy. I advised them, as I told you the last time at the back door, if asked, what the issue was (who was for, who was against); taking the rare poll that Mansfield would have me take and extremely rarely, giving information as to the leadership position, because Senator Mansfield did not want leadership positions to be known, because it smacked of pressure and arm-twisting. He did not do that. I have probably not explained this well, but I have tried to describe that era.

Now, we switch to today. And I might add that when Bill Hildenbrand took over from I think Mark Trice, he performed the same functions as I did for Hugh Scott and then Baker, as Minority Leader. But Bill was enough of a politician at heart that he would get involved, not by being delegated, but just by involving himself in discussions and policy matters. But he had a different world. He was in the minority, at least in the period we are talking about. The minority didn't control any legislation. The minority didn't do any scheduling. The minority didn't have the problems of moving bills. That was all a decision of the majority. So Bill's duties were primarily as Secretary for the Minority as mine were on his side, but he would also lap over on his side with the residual policy matters that pertain to the minority.

Then we skip to the Leader Bob Byrd. If you check directly, once Mansfield left and once Byrd was scheduled to take over, Charlie Ferris immediately found other pastures, specifically the office of the Speaker Tip O'Neill on the House side. The handwriting was on the wall, not so much by Byrd, but instinctively by Charlie. He knew that because he was withholding from Byrd and the rest of them, too. He was doing his job as he saw it, but it was irritating and frustrating to them. So, Charlie Ferris and Byrd never would have been able to work together and he knew that so he went over with Tip O'Neill.

Then, who did it for Byrd? The first Secretary for the Majority when Byrd became Majority Leader was Jimmy Duffy from Rhode Island, who had worked on the Rules Committee for [Theodore Francis] Green, bright, attractive, smiling, and coming from the Rules Committee, knew the rules. So Byrd put him in there. During the interim while I remained as Secretary for

the Majority, but having been elected for Secretary of the Senate, Byrd had then selected his own Secretary for the Majority, Duffy, who would not take office until I left, but he had him in the Majority Leader's office, strangely enough at two desks, not even side by side, facing each other. Byrd was on one side and Jimmy was on the other. It appeared to be a marriage made in heaven, because they appeared to be so close.

But it turned out that Jimmy was a sipper. He was addicted to alcohol during the day and that was an anathema to Byrd. Of all people to tip Senator Byrd off that Jimmy was drinking, it was Jim Eastland who was, if nothing else, certainly an authority on the subject. So he left and I think then he put in Terry Sauvain who I think was a staffer on the Appropriations Committee and suddenly he became Secretary for the Majority.

In the background, of course, was Joe Stewart who is also on his staff. But Joe, most of this is my opinion, because of his close relationship with Bobby Baker during the Baker era, did not want to be identified as Secretary for the Majority or Bobby's successor, for good and sufficient reasons, it may have raised the press speculation. So Joe very wisely at that time stayed out of the limelight. Then Terry, who is now staff director of the Appropriations Committee, I guess all of this is relatively confidential for now, he started traveling overseas with delegations. 'Lo and beyond, if Terry didn't start having a little more wine than usual and made a few little mistakes. Again, alienating Byrd, not so much that he got rid of him, but just but just to take him out of that office. (The chronology of Secretary of the Majority sequence needs to be researched and noted.) Finally, Joe Stewart took the job. After he left, I've forgotten who took over.

RITCHIE: In the 80's Abby Saffold held that position.

KIMMITT: Well, Abby came later.

RITCHIE: Pat Griffin?

KIMMITT: Pat Griffin, right. And Pat did a great job. I guess the Republicans were in the majority, and Pat left. Then when the Democrats came back in the majority, Joe Stewart took the position of Secretary of the Senate and Abby Saffold was Secretary for the Majority.

That is really a tangled, rambling answer to the question you asked which was very simple, which was "What is the relationship and duties between the Secretary for the Majority and the Policy Committee." I don't even know off the top of my head, although it might have been that Pat Griffin was heading Byrd's Policy Committee before he made him Secretary for the Majority or Minority. He used the Policy staff very similar to the way Mansfield did. I don't know how [Howard] Baker handled his. He had his own style. But I don't even know if [Tom] Daschle has a Policy Committee staff of any size. I know Byrd expanded that staff considerably.

But Marty [Paone, Secretary for the Majority] seems to be more personally involved with Daschle in and out of his Leader's office. When I observe him in the cloakroom (I go in and out of there occasionally), he seems to be far more aware of the minute by minute, hour by hour legislative pace than I was. It didn't bother me. I didn't want it. I was not in that ball game and I didn't get in their ball game. Therefore, I didn't care what bill was coming up or not, or what amendments. But Marty is very much involved. So I don't know how they are relating to it now.

RITCHIE: The interesting difference between the Republicans and the Democrats is that the Republicans have compartmentalized their leadership. They have a separate Policy Committee chairman, separate Conference chair, separate floor leader, who all have their own separate staffs and seem to work at their own purposes. Whereas the Democrats have usually had everything under the Majority Leader.

KIMMITT: It started with Lyndon Johnson, I think, continued under Mansfield that the Majority Leader was chairman of everything. I think Byrd spread it out a little by designating the Whip as Assistant Majority Leader. But then he started naming the assistant whips. But he never gave up the total control of chairmanships of the sinews of the party. It would have been unthinkable that a Democratic senator other than the leader be chairman of the Policy Committee. It may have changed by now, Daschle may have a different chairman of the Policy Committee, I don't know, but it would be unthinkable for the chairman of the Policy Committee to challenge the Majority Leader or not follow the Majority Leader's dictum and the steering committee and everything else. Daschle may have, and [George] Mitchell even before that may have given up the sole chairmanship and appointed other senators to be titular heads of those committees, but again the leaders are the ones who control them.

The Republicans used to have disagreements and tensions within their own party because of this. I remember [Carl] Curtis was the head of one their senior committees and he and either Dirksen or Baker would often get into disagreements. They were not nearly as homogenous as the Democrats.

RITCHIE: I wonder, if since you were all working for Mansfield, did that blur some of the lines as to the distinctions between the different offices, like Policy Committee, Majority Leader, where you were essentially all working together on policy?

KIMMITT: In Mansfield's mind, and in his actions, he was bending all of the procedures. If you check the record, Mansfield had very few caucuses. There was a flurry of Democratic caucuses at the organization of a new Congress because you have a lot of things to do. Then he would just let caucuses fade away. Only if a very important issue came up. There was no such thing as a weekly Democratic luncheon for all members. There was no such thing as a scheduled caucus. It was all in his hip pocket and he would call a caucus meeting when he felt there was a need for it. He didn't like them because it was always risky that somebody might bring something up that would rock the boat. He liked his boat to be on a calm lake most of the time.

But now, every Wednesday both the Democrats and the Republican have their caucus meetings. As I think I have told you and you have seen it yourself in looking over the old minutes of the Democratic Caucuses, they actually legislated. There was no such thing as continued lengthy debates on the floor, except on rare occasions. There were, no doubt, issues and occasions where there were serious lengthy debates, but they wouldn't be over little bills like we do now. They would take that vote in caucus and rubberstamp it on the floor. So that is a change from the old days.

Now, I don't know what they do. Some of the things that go on now puzzle me. One thing that puzzles me—and I admire him for it—is how Daschle is able to keep his people solid on a vote. Now, certainly with the one-vote difference that enhances the appeal by the Majority Leader that "I want you all to stick with me on this, we've got stick together, because if one of you leaves, the Republicans win." Now that's sort of like crazy glue that does work.

But in Mansfield's time and even in Byrd's time, it was rare, in my memory, that you would

get an absolutely solid partisan vote. On a procedural issue, yes. On election of the Secretary of the Senate or the Sergeant at Arms, yes. The minority would put up a candidate and they would propose him and there would be a vote on the floor of the Senate, but the majority always voted entirely together. That was done more on procedurals. But on issues if was different. Right now, for example, if you look ahead to the Iraq issue, it's not going to be a solid vote on that one. If you go back to the tax bill of Bush that many are trying to criticize now, there were Democrats that defected there. If you watch this man from Georgia now–

RITCHIE: Zell Miller.

KIMMITT: Zell Miller. He stays conservative and is comfortable with staying there, but if he's not, it doesn't bother him to jump ship on an issue. Then, of course, take the prime example, the Jeffords move. And even Bob Smith. Now Smith got his comeuppance and if Republicans take the Senate back, which could happen in a couple of months, I am not saying they are going to, Jeffords is going to be a very low man on a separate totem pole.

But I do admire the way Daschle has been able to hold them together. It still puzzles me, how they can do it. Because all of those men have a constituency that they are representing and all constituencies don't agree. The constituents in North Carolina generally do not concur with the constituents in New York. And yet, Daschle is able to coalesce the North Carolina and the New York senators on these issues. So it is a puzzling thing.

RITCHIE: There's one other figure in this leadership equation who is somewhat outside the circle and that's the Democratic Whip. Mansfield never actually officially endorsed the Whip. You pointed out that he probably was leaning towards Kennedy and maybe voted for him, but he always allowed the conference to elect the three different whips while he was the Majority Leader. How did the whip fit into the scheme of things? Did the whip actually have a function on the floor? Did you consult with the whips on any kind of regular basis?

KIMMITT: Well, there are whips and there are whips. And there are leaders and there are leaders. Let's take the beginning of the Mansfield ascendency to the Majority Leader.

One: when Lyndon Johnson was Majority Leader, his whip Earle Clements was defeated

for reelection, which left the job of whip open. There was a move, and again it was related to me, not in these words, but in words by Senator Russell, to make George Smathers the whip. That's whom Johnson wanted to be his whip, and Smathers was coming out of Florida. Russell took the position that no, they're not going to have two Southerners. It wouldn't work to have two Southerners there. Then they kicked a number of names around and finally settled on Mansfield from Montana, which was about as neutral a position as they could have.

Certainly it appeared that he would be the most adaptable to Lyndon Johnson's style. Mansfield, quiet, patient, would sit on the floor for hours and hours, never show any movement toward ambition or wanting to go forward. As a matter of fact, he would normally try to avoid promotion and never would there be self-promotion. Once he was promoted, however, he was tenacious in hanging onto that. He was not going to be the man who let the position fall into disrepute when he had it.

Well, then Johnson went to the White House. Here again, it's the influence of the Southerners and they elected Russell Long as whip. I related to you the last time that Mansfield had an antipathy toward Southern chairmen as a group and the club as a group. Russell Long was considered, even though he wasn't chairman of the Finance Committee then, old Harry Byrd was, he was considered part of that group. So, Mansfield delegated very little to Long. Plus Russell Long, at that time, was drinking during the day and he was bombastic, he was fun-loving, he was humorous, he was this, that and the other, but he was not in the Mansfield mold. As a result, Mansfield gave Long relatively few opportunities to act, not only as Assistant Majority Leader or leadership or whip or anything else. He just let him have the title, but kept him out of the influential posturing on the floor.

This irritated Long, of course, so they drifted farther apart. Under that circumstance, I think that was probably the lowest point of influence for a whip because there was no empathy between the leader and the whip. There was no empathy in the philosophy between the two of them. There was little to bring them together. While they spoke civilly, Long was never brought into the inner circle.

Well, then along comes the famous challenge by [Ted] Kennedy. Kennedy beats Long as whip, still under Mansfield. That was a new game for Mansfield. He let Kennedy pretty much

have his way, acting as the whip and appearing to climb the ladder. But Kennedy, for whatever reason, wasn't wise enough, in my opinion, to recognize the opportunity. He wasn't wise enough to stay on the floor when Mansfield wasn't on the floor and run the legislation. He, like Kennedy are of course, took the title, took the position, took the perks, took the office, took everything else and then delegated to whom but the Secretary of the Conference who was Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia.

Now you see the picture. Whereas Mike Mansfield before would stay on the floor practically the whole day, he wasn't going to do that if Kennedy was the whip, because that would deprive Kennedy of the opportunity to share in the limelight. So Mansfield as a general rule would stay in his office. But always back on the second or third tier was Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia.

If Mansfield would leave his chair to go to his office and Kennedy wasn't on the floor, Byrd was the next in line and he would take the duty, long, tortuous, time-consuming duty of being on the floor, covering for the Majority Leader and actually for the whip. He never complained about this. As a matter of fact, he saw the opportunity of being apparent on the floor, running the procedures and putting in the quorum calls and scheduling speakers and doing all the things that either the Majority Leader or the whip or the secretary or whoever does when there is not an active issue on the floor.

But while he never complained, there was one procedure that just irritated him no end, in that Kennedy would come on the floor for the opening of the session with Mansfield and they would hold what used to call it, the "dugout chatter," where the press come in about ten minutes before the session and answer questions from the leadership, just a routine thing, which gave Kennedy his opportunity to be part of the leadership. Then Mansfield would leave and Kennedy would leave the floor and Byrd would take over.

Hypothetically, now it is 10:00 in the morning when this takes place. Hypothetically, it is 5:30 at night before things wrap up. Byrd is still on the floor. He has been plowing the furrow all day long. He has been running things. I saw this happen a couple of times—just as it came time to close the Senate, a young man named Wayne Owens would approach Byrd. He was from Utah, later ran for Congress and was elected and later ran for the Senate and was beaten, I think by the

astronaut.

RITCHIE: Jake Garn.

KIMMITT: Garn. Wallace Bennett, the father of Robert Bennett, stepped down and left that seat open and had been Wallace Bennett and Moss for a long time. I think when Wallace Bennett stepped down, I think that's when Garn and Owens ran against each other. Anyway, he blew out and didn't get into the Senate. But reverting to when he was a staffer for Kennedy just when everything is supposed to be wrapped up, Wayne Owens would go up to Senator Byrd and say "Senator, would you put in a quorum call? Senator Kennedy would like to make a statement." Okay, Byrd would put in a quorum call. That quorum may go on for about ten minutes while Byrd is there. Then in would come Ted Kennedy and walk up in front and do nothing more than adjourn the Senate.

This gives the appearance of the lord and the serf. That went on time and time again. Then time rolls on, as you remember, Don, and 'lo and behold Chappaquiddick comes along, bad times for Kennedy come along, and Byrd announces that he was going to challenge Kennedy for the whip job, which he did and which he won. That blew Kennedy into the back benches again, out of a position of leadership. Then, of course, Byrd catapulted from that to Majority Leader, which Kennedy could have done except for two things: one was Chappaquiddick and the other was his imperial manner about being anointed. It was a very hard job to beat Russell Long. It was a lot tougher job not to be beaten by Bob Byrd.

Now that's a screwed up answer to where did the whip fit in all these things. If one could diagram or define or write a job description which would be followed, you could teach political science in college stating the whip is the number two and does this, that and the other thing. But it is meaningless unless you know the characters, the relationships, the attitudes, the abilities. When you know those, it fits.

On the other side, of course, you had Howard Baker who was the whip for a long time. He was an affable whip and so on, but Hugh Scott and before him under Dirksen–I am trying to think who Dirksen's whip was–

RITCHIE: Leverett Saltonstall at first and then Hugh Scott.

KIMMITT: I guess it was Scott. But they spent a lot of time on the floor because Dirksen would stay in his office. He was a master in that on an important debate on any given subject and it would go on, not as a filibuster, but as a contentious, unlimited debate under the normal circumstances. He'd stay in his office. Mansfield would sit in his chair and the debate would go on and on. Mansfield would seldom ever enter into the issue between two opposing views, not partisan position, but bipartisan opposition and advocacy. He usually would stay out of that unless they dealt with something important to Montana or civil rights or foreign affairs.

Dirksen would stay back in his office. After a couple of days or so, if it appeared like they were not getting anywhere, late in the afternoon he would come on the floor in that typical Dirksen style and would start in those mellifluous tones of speaking and orating. He was orating in a stylistic manner, but with a purpose. He was trying to bring the two sides together. Then they would pass the legislation.

There is no doubt that there would not have been a Civil Rights Bill in '64 if it hadn't been for Dirksen—Democratic liberals couldn't have done it alone. Mansfield on several occasions mentioned this. They never could have achieved that bill at that time in that form if ever Dirksen hadn't brought his own small band, but first of all his own personal support. I think that was brought about because of Lyndon Johnson as the President communicating directly with Dirksen. They had served together. Even though Dirksen knew it was the right thing to do in his mind, it was not the political thing to do for Republicans. So I am sure he resisted. But I think Lyndon Johnson finally convinced him that it was the right thing to do and that it was important. So Dirksen more than anyone else, certainly as much as anyone else, must be credited with passing the Civil Rights Bill of '64.

RITCHIE: Speaking of Lyndon Johnson, it strikes me that he was also part of Senate Democratic Leadership in the 1960's even after he was no longer Majority Leader or Vice President but was down at the White House. I don't think there has been any other President who has been that much involved in what was going on in Congress. Did you have any direct dealings with Johnson when he was President and you were a Democratic Majority Secretary?

KIMMITT: I think the answer has to be yes and no. On the floor in my duties, my work around here, no. But I would be invited, strangely enough, by him and with a small group of senators, usually conservatives and moderates, down at the White House up on the second floor to have a kind of little stag dinner and a general bull session. He and I were never close in any way and I never professed to be close to him, but he was generous enough to include me in a lot of things a normal staffer would not be. Now why, I don't know, except that he knew that Dick Russell considered me a good friend of his. He knew that a lot of his old timers that I had developed a rapport with and, I don't know if anybody else had ever suggested, but in that sense socially and/or in a very private social circle of members he would often include me.

But I would never get a call from him on, to do anything, although he had, of course Mike Manatos, who was his liaison then. Mike would come up often in my office, but he would first go to the Leader's office, where he had a carte blanche invitation to do his job. I would, at Mike Manatos' request on behalf of the President, be doing things that they wanted to have done and it worked very well. Manatos was an old hand up here. He knew the Senate very well. I am sure I told you the Lester Hunt story when he was there and I don't want to get into that. I have told you that Bill Darden story and I don't want to get into that. But to answer your question, no.

If you listen to the Johnson tapes now, and I hear them occasionally during morning broadcasts. It is very apparent that he was acutely sensitive to and aware of who was doing what in the Senate. He was finely attuned to who was on his team and who was not up here. It is also very apparent by his words, I have heard him on a couple of broadcasts not consecutively, "Well, I can't do anything with Mike Mansfield. You are going to have to talk to him." Mansfield kept his independence very clear.

There is a classic anecdote which I am sure is true, one that I will repeat now. This one had to do with Mansfield being in the Oval Office on an issue that was important to Johnson and Mansfield indicated that he couldn't go along with it. When he got up to leave, Johnson was highly irritated and said something to the effect, "Well, I thought I could at least count on my Majority Leader." Mansfield stopped and turned around and said, "Mr. President, I am not your Majority Leader. I am the Senate's Majority Leader," and walked out.

The other anecdote was observed several times by members who would tell me that when

Mansfield would go to the White House with other members of the leadership. This particularly applied during the Vietnam years, he would either have been forewarned or fore-informed what the meeting was going to be about. He would have Valeo prepare a statement on the issue. He would fold it and put it in his pocket. On at least a couple of occasions, I am told, he would sit there while Johnson was working the crowd and Mansfield wouldn't say anything. Before the meeting was over, the President would turn to Mansfield and say "Well, Mike, what do you have to say?" Mike would reach in and pull out his prepared statement. I am told that Johnson would just get red in the face and turn his chair around and look out the window, because he knew that whatever the hell Mansfield was going to say, it was not going to be supportive and that Mansfield was doing it for the record and it would be in the record, and "God damn," it would just make him furious.

We talked before about the fact that he wanted to be chairman of the caucus even as Vice President and they shot him out of that one. Although I think it was in Caro's book, somewhere it says that Mansfield initially supported that, but got so much fire back from the members that he changed.

But there were always people that Johnson could count on in that Senate. Some of them were near the end of their tolerance, but still loyal, Russell being one. Russell and Lyndon Johnson were very close when Johnson was here in the Senate. In his early days as Vice President, he was very close to most of the Southerners. But two things, Johnson's turn on civil rights and initiation of his Great Society didn't totally alienate Russell, but it certainly moved him out on the periphery in his admiration and his respect for Johnson.

Then Vietnam came along and the situation there drove them farther apart. That's when I told you before about when Manatos came to me and we came up with the idea of putting Bill Darden on the Military Court of Appeals. Even beyond that Dick Russell and Johnson had drifted apart, but Russell in the typical old style of Southern gentleman, never broke the string. It was always there, and he would take the calls, and have the dialogue. But he was–in my opinion only–no longer on Johnson's first team. There were others like that. As I said about Stennis, it wouldn't make any difference who was President, his reverence for the office of the presidency caused him to support the President, including Nixon in his worst times. Not because of the man, unless malfeasance could be proved, but because he did not want to weaken the office of the

President by any of his actions. Then there were the constant supporters like Russell Long. If you go back to the Tom Dodd case, years before that, it was Russell Long who defended Dodd. As a matter of fact, I think it was from Russell Long that I first heard the phrase which is descriptive of what I am trying to explain and the phrase goes: "If I have a friend, I have a friend. I will stick with him until hell freezes over and then stay around to fight on the ice." That's the way Russell Long was with Tom Dodd, and I think with Lyndon Johnson and I think with everyone else. If he believed in somebody he just stuck with them until hell froze over and then stayed around to fight on the ice, which cost him in many ways.

RITCHIE: Vietnam had to be the single most divisive issue in the 1960's when you were Democratic Secretary. You had a big party. There were sixty-eight Democrats at one point, but obviously Vietnam was beginning to create a wedge in the party.

KIMMITT: It was.

RITCHIE: Were you involved in trying to keep the party together? Or did you tend side with those who–

KIMMITT: No, that was considerably above my pay grade. But having spent twenty-five years in the military, having a son over there in Nam and two others in the military, I think I can be excused for my bias toward winning the goddamned thing and getting it over with. Therefore, I should be excused my anguish at the actions in Washington of trying to micro-manage the war from here instead of letting the troops in the field do their job.

So I was in a obviously precarious position with people like Gene McCarthy. He even stated once to me in the cloakroom with other members around that everybody knew I was a spy for the Pentagon, which a typical Eugene McCarthy thing. But I never got involved in those things, couldn't get involved because I knew where Mansfield stood and if I had made even the slightest pro-military comment, it would certainly be considered in his mind an act of disloyalty, and it probably would have been. I didn't want that to happen. No, I didn't get involved.

But I observed how these factions split up. As I explained earlier in the first interview or two, it was particularly interested in watching the transformation of Stu Symington the ultra hawk,

Secretary of the Air Force in the [James] Forrestal days, versus his anti-Vietnam concept towards the end. Everything changed. I guess [Ernest] Gruening and Nelson put in the resolution cutting off the funds which really was the finale. I don't know, I get fuzzy there. But the [Democratic Conference] minutes will tell the story. Thank God, as I said before, that by that time I was able to get permission to accurately transcribe the minutes and they are in existence now for you people. When they are released and available they will show the severe tensions between Symington, Stennis and Scoop Jackson and others in the Democratic party. Now you can get the rest of it from the Record as public knowledge on the floor of the Senate.

There were significant debates in the caucus, there had to be, because of Vietnam. It was tearing the country apart. You had things like Kent State and then you get into the lack of appreciation on the part of the American people for any troops that were coming back, getting off the plane after they had served in Vietnam, have people calling them "baby killers" and spitting on them. It was the antithesis of what happened in World War II. In World War II we all came home to a wonderful homecoming. Korea we came home but it was as if we were failures. But the frenzy hadn't started yet, the anti-military frenzy, it hadn't really gotten into the psyche of the American people to where it became so overt. Keep in mind about Korea, there weren't many National Guard outfits or reservists, they were all regular army, so the hometowns weren't affected as much. We came home from there and you got the feeling that you couldn't wait to get your uniform off because people no longer seemed to respect it. But then the poor bastards that came home from Viet Nam were ridiculed from the moment they got off the boat until they got home. That continued for a long time.

My oldest son graduated from West Point in '69. Of course, Nam had been going on for some time by then. In his last year at West Point during a home leave, being a senior they could wear civilian clothes. This was almost at the height of the student rebellion. He got a plane in New York and a young coed also going home for Christmas from one of the Ivy League girl schools, Smith or something, sat down alongside of him. They chatted a little bit. He asked her where she went to school. She told him and she said "Where do you go." He said "I'm at West Point." She got up and moved. There was an example of the intensity of emotions at that time which are hard to understand now.

Now we're flipping back again. People coming home from Afghanistan are heroes.

People that come home from Yugoslavia, Bosnia, they're heroes. I don't know what the hell is going to happen in Iraq. At the moment there is a fervent patriotic attitude. But that's a precarious attitude because there are no body bags yet. I don't know. I think the President has got himself in very, very tight winch here and I don't know how it's going to come out. In answer to your question: No, I did not get involved in any overt actions vis-a-vis Vietnam.

RITCHIE: When Vietnam started, the Senate was all in favor of the war and they voted in favor of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with just the two negative votes. You can see the opposition increase steadily along the way. There was that point in the later '60s when you brought stenographers into the caucus. Up to that point, there had just been the minutes, which were a general outline. Now you had the Reporters of Debate in there. Was that because the debate was becoming so furious?

KIMMITT: Yes, I think that was primarily my motivation. Plus the feeling in my heart that I could not do justice to this scene. Writing in long hand after you leave the meeting and go upstairs and try to recall, it just got beyond what I felt was adequate. I am no historian, but I had a sense of this situation was such that it should be reported better than I was able to report it. Maybe there was a little laziness there, too, in not having to write the damn things, but at least we got it done. Before that, as you say, there were just fragmentary notes of what went on. Senator so-and-so discussed his opposition to Vietnam, period. But that didn't capture the thing.

RITCHIE: Well, you mentioned that people were really getting angry, that people were changing positions, like Symington, that there was a lot of tension. Did that affect the relationships between the senators? Did it break up friendships?

KIMMITT: Yes, to a degree. I can't specifically give examples of it. But I think on the part of the old timers who had been through the World War II and Korean periods, there probably was a residual attitude of patriotism to support the flag, support the troops, support the President. When the others, I can't name them for sure, Symington, maybe [James] Abourezk, and others, Gene McCarthy and people like that, started pressing their position, it changed. I think there was a feeling on the part of the older and the more patriotic members that the others were becoming even more than less patriotic. I am certainly not going to use the word "traitor," but in this time of severe stress that it was unpatriotic of them to be raising these issues and blaming the

military.

Times have changed so much. I remember when Russell was chairman of the Armed Services Committee. If there would be hearing and a four-star general would appear, for example, there would be some public in the back, some members already seated and the generals would be at the other end of the table. Russell would invariably walk down to the end of the table and shake hands with him and say, in effect, how much he appreciated his coming over and doing his duty. Then he would go back, and then there would be a civilized hearing with questions being answered. As contrasted with later, and I won't name the members, but you can imagine who they were. They would come in, grab the gavel and coldly state: "Everybody will come to order. We have general so-and-so with us today. All right, general, we will take your statement." It was two different worlds. These men, regardless of what you think of the military per se, they don't get to be four-star generals like George Marshall and Eisenhower and [Omar] Bradley and all the rest of them without having character and ability. They didn't deserve to be treated like some of these members treated them, particularly when the members who are treating them that way are obviously not as experienced or knowledgeable as the witnesses. Members of Congress are totally political in their approach, it is a political maneuver, it is a political opportunity to berate a witness and attract media attention. I am probably overstating it, of course, but times and procedures have changed in that regard.

RITCHIE: One difference is that back in the 1960s about 70% of the Senate actually served in uniform. Now it has been far less than a majority. In the future it will be even fewer.

KIMMITT: Yes, and much younger. Many of them are so much younger. Same thing in the House. I don't know, but I think in the House of Representatives less than 30% percent have had any military service.

RITCHIE: For a brief time the House dropped the term Armed Services Committee and turned it into the National Security—they have since gone back to Armed Services—but it was suggested that the reason was because so few members had served in uniform.

KIMMITT: Well, have you had enough?

RITCHIE: Well, thank you. Can you come back next week?

KIMMITT: I'll come back some time. By coincidence, this weekend, on Friday I drove to Pittsburgh for a reunion, 57 years after I started commanding a battery in World War II. A division at that time was about 12,000 men. All of us now are certainly over 75 and most of us over 80. We had about 360 actual members and their wives, and of my little battery of 98 men and four officers, I still had sixteen men there. A lot from the unit have died. Every two years we get together and tell our usual lies. But it was a nice experience.

End of the Fourth Interview

KIMMITT: This is not connected with anything, but I am just passing it along as a comment, those wonderful four volume of Senator Byrd's, where he delivered all those speeches in the Senate, I think I've told Dick this—very early on. If you remember, Byrd would give what we used to call his "history lessons," pretty much extemporaneously. After a few of them, I stopped him the back door of the chamber as he was going out one day and said, "Senator, these have become pretty much traditional for you and the members like them. We have a historian up there that can really prepare this information for you, even though a lot of it is in your head." At that time I was Secretary. I said "I know they would be pleased to give you any help you want on this." Now I think, selfishly, that was the genesis of getting the Historical Office involved in preparing what turned out to be that four- volume book, which is a very, very valuable item. I have all four volumes. Three of them I am confident that Byrd has written a note and autographed. The fourth one, I don't think he has, but I am going to get it to him.

RITCHIE: Well, that is interesting, because at first if he was giving a speech about the parliamentarian, he would ask the parliamentarian to provide him some background material and the parliamentarian would call us. We would send material to the parliamentarian and the parliamentarian would take it Senator Byrd. Then he did the same with the chaplain. So we were involved indirectly at first, but then he started calling us directly.

KIMMITT: I believe that came after I suggested it to him and it turned out to be a marriage made in heaven. Another thing, apropos of nothing, but it just occurred to me, we never hear or see any more the term "pairing"—live pairs and dead pairs. If you look at the records of my era, if I can refer to it as that, it was a very common practice that when a Senator had to be absent from the floor, necessarily or in some cases unnecessarily, we would get a call either from his staff and sometimes from the member himself who would say "I can't make that vote. You know what my position would be, but if you didn't it would be 'no' and I hope you would be able to find me a pair." Well, the first thing we would do, obviously, was look at the anticipated absentees who would probably be voting "yes." This was a judgment call. You would call their

chief of staff and legislative person and say "Is it all right to pair Senator X with your senator?" If they would say fine or good, that was a "dead pair." It got a little more sticky when it was a "live pair," because it was more valuable to the absent member.

Hypothetically, we'll say [Quentin] Burdick would be in North Dakota and there would be a vote coming up that he just couldn't make, but he would have a hard time explaining it in North Dakota if he missed the vote. He would say can you get either a specific Senator that he would name or a Senator to give me a "live pair" on this. So we would get it. Now that would require that the Senator who was present would stand and in effect say (these are not the exact words): "If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "aye," however, I withhold my vote and pair with the Senator from North Dakota, Senator Burdick who would vote "no." Then in the *Record* it was covered. In campaigns or otherwise, Burdick could use that to explain to his people that, "Even though I wasn't there, I didn't hurt the bill, because in fact, an opponent of the bill would have voted 'no,' and Senator so-and-so withheld his vote, so my missing that vote really didn't have any impact on the bill at all and the *Record* shows how I would have voted." Which is a cover story, but valuable.

Well, I have noticed that pairing seems all to be gone anymore. Sometimes you would have to get a "live pair" with two Senators. I think that was under the conditions where a two-thirds vote was required and somebody had to try to get one vote and two others to pair with and wipe them out. I don't know what brought this change about. It was an archaic procedure anyway. But on the other hand, I don't know when it came about that they just stopped doing it. Maybe you know. Do you have any idea?

RITCHIE: I think Senator Byrd stopped it, but I'm not sure exactly when. It has been a long time, probably twenty years since they have had any pairs. But I remember that you would always see the pairs at the end of the voting tally.

KIMMITT: Well, it would be an interesting aside for one of your people to track back when that practice went out and why.

RITCHIE: My sense is that when Senator Byrd was Whip, there were a lot of things he wanted to do that he couldn't, because they had always been done that way. He came in as leader

with the intention of making some changes in the operations.

KIMMITT: That is as good an explanation as any. But those two things out of left field just occurred to me and thought you might want to get them on the record. Anyway, you said the last time you wanted to follow up on what happened after I left the Senate.

RITCHIE: Before that, I would like to talk about when you were Secretary of the Senate. We spent most of our time talking about when you were Secretary of the Majority. I thought we could go back to that '77 election when Senator Byrd was running against Senator Humphrey for leader, and you ran in one of the few contested elections we have for Secretary of the Senate.

KIMMITT: I don't know if it happened before that, other than the anecdote I related to you about Valeo being pulled back for six months to let Emery Frazier come in, you might describe that as a contest. But it was a contest, more or less, a very benign contest between Dick Russell and Mike Mansfield. There is no doubt in my mind that if Russell had nominated Frazier and that had brought it to a vote as a contested matter that Frazier would have won. Mansfield would have been embarrassed and Valeo would have lost. Then whether he would ever have been proposed again or not, I don't know.

But I know there have been no elections since mine. The unique thing about that, I think I related it previously, was that it was generated by my challenging a seated officer. I am sure Frank thought, like I did when I became Secretary for the Majority. I couldn't see the Democrats would ever lose the majority. So it came as a rude shock to me in 1980 when, as I say, the "government fell" and I had to leave. But going back to Frank, I am sure he, with the Democrats in power, was fully anticipating in a traditional sense to continue on as Secretary of the Senate until he retired or until the parties changed, which looked very unlikely. So when I deliberately, actively challenged Frank to an election, it generated a campaign which required soliciting votes, getting supporters, and the same thing on his side.

As I mentioned, he had as his campaign manager Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia, not the old, old Harry Byrd, but the younger one. It was interesting, Harry Byrd said to me after the election was over that when he realized that I was the other candidate, he immediately regretted that he had made the commitment. But when he made a commitment, he had to do it.

So I think from that election forward, it has all become an anointing process, although they do go through the pro forma, at least on the Democratic side, in caucus, of nominating. I am sure there was a caucus where Daschle had Jeri Thomson nominated. Then they brought her nomination to the floor. It was also traditional at that time that even though you knew who would be elected, that the minority would propose another name. Then there would be a voice vote by the full Senate for election of the leadership and the Secretary. As I say, I think that even though they go through the pro forma motions, it would be very unusual if any staff person of the same party would challenge a Secretary or a Sergeant at Arms or a Secretary for the Majority or a Secretary for the Minority. Or even if, hypothetically, a chaplain came along who wanted to challenge the chaplain, it is so extremely unlikely that would occur. I don't think it ever will occur again, which rather pompously I look back with a degree with propriety on that event.

It may not be too long, as I tell the incumbent, until I will be knocked out of the box on longest serving Secretary for the Majority. I had it for eleven plus years. I think Marty is up now to seven, eight, nine. I keep telling him, you are going to break my record. And he will, if he is here, if the Democrats stay in.

Just by coincidence, I had breakfast with Jeri Thompson this morning, just the two of us for no purpose, just rapping back and forth. We went into the prospects for November 4. Of course, she has her finger right on the pulse of what is going on. I was interested to have her say to me that she could make a very logical case, right now today, for the Democrats picking up five seats. "But," very wisely she said, "I could make an equally positive case for the Republicans picking up five seats." She said that Charlie Cook recently, maybe last week, said that less than 20,000 votes nationwide, could decide which party is going to control the Senate when you start looking at these razor-thin races. Now, if the Democrats, God forbid, lose the Senate in November, then Marty's string would be broken as Secretary and I would retain my exalted position.

RITCHIE: Because that election was so unusual, I wondered about how the outgoing and incoming majority leaders feel about it. Did you get any sense from Senator Mansfield and Senator Byrd what their reaction was to the fact that there was a challenge?

KIMMITT: I maybe didn't make this clear. Maybe didn't even mention it in the earlier

interviews and this may be redundant, but I will give it again. We can knock it out later. I think I pointed out earlier in the interview that Frank Valeo was kind of a square peg in a round hole. He was apolitical. He had very little political sense, nuance or political understanding. Whereas, as an individual he could be excused, as primarily and almost totally loyal to Mike Mansfield, the Majority Leader. Once he became Secretary of the Senate, that loyalty had to be broadened to the entire Senate and every Senator on a bipartisan basis in order to perform the functions and the duties of Secretary of the Senate.

I don't think Frank transitioned into that mode well enough, as was later demonstrated when the Federal Elections Commission came into being. Elections came under more scrutiny and campaign tactics, financial, came under more scrutiny. One of the provisions of law, was that when an allegation was developed, it would be addressed to the Secretary of the Senate, who in turn would review the situation and if it merited further action, it would be referred to the Justice Department.

I wish I could remember the man who was working for Frank at that time, very astute, well-known name on the Secretary's staff, good writer, had a lot to do with changes procedures in the Secretary's office at that time. Potter's allegation came in on one or two Democratic Senators, as a matter of fact one of them was Dee Huddleston. It is just common sense that if you are of the same party as a staff person of a Senator who had an allegation referred to him, that even though you are not legally required to do it, or directed to do it, that you would quietly let that Senator know personally that this allegation had been received and after study, may have to be referred to the Justice Department. That is the way this institution works.

Frank didn't do that. He received the allegations, reviewed them and referred them to the Justice Department without the Senators being aware of it. The first time they knew that there was an allegation, it had already been at Justice and that cast certain doubts on Frank, not his loyalty, but his political judgment.

So while being Secretary for the Majority, the catalyst for my actions was when Mansfield announced that he was not going to run again. It was well-known that both Valeo and I were proteges of Mansfield. I imagine the question in some Senators' mind was who if either was going to remain. I was approached, as I related before, and it was not my idea, it was Senator Gaylord

Nelson's of Wisconsin and Dee Huddleston's. They suggested that I run for Secretary of the Senate against Valeo, which was a new and unthought concept for me.

I didn't give them an immediate answer, because Mansfield was still seated and he was not leaving until the next January when this event would take place. So after a few days and a few more conversations, I said all right, I will announce that I am going to run for Secretary of the Senate but only after Senator Mansfield and Valeo have been told. I wasn't going to tell him. That would be a sort of self-aggrandizement of walking into your boss and saying "Well, you are leaving, now I am going to try to grab the brass ring and knock Frank out of his job." That was just unseemly.

Then the question was, who was going to tell Mansfield? They asked my advice and I said, "I'm not going to do it." They, being Senators, didn't want to identify with the effort, necessarily. I said, "Why don't you ask Charlie Ferris (who I called the third leg of the troika as head of the Policy Committee) to give Mansfield the word?" Mansfield would then, of course, be compelled to tell Valeo, because they were so close. So that's what they did. Charlie told me later it was a thankless task for him, but when he went in and told Mansfield, he said the old man looked down in his Mansfield mode and said, "Oh, good Lord." It was another thorn in his crown of thorns. It was done. That kicked it off. Obviously, Mansfield had nothing to do with the preliminaries or the campaign. He was not going to bless either one of us, because he was leaving. And certainly it was a distasteful moment for him that he would like to avoid.

Now, more importantly, who were the potential leaders? Well, it was either Byrd or Humphrey. On the other side, Howard Baker and Bob Griffin. Of course, Baker didn't really play in it at that time because it was not anticipated that the Republicans were going to take the Senate. It seemed natural that the next Secretary of the Senate was going to be a Democrat. So Baker really didn't get involved.

But interestingly enough, and I think I related this in an earlier episode, if not, I will clarify it now. Senator Byrd called me in after several weeks of this campaign and asked me how my effort was going. He was down in his state office. I said, "Well, I think pretty well, Senator. I don't know how it will turn out, but I am fairly confident." He said, "Well, you know I am running," (meaning Byrd for leader) "and I have my own campaign to run. I don't intend to get

involved in yours at all. As a matter of fact, I won't even tell you how I am going to vote." I said, "No, and I haven't asked you, Senator."

Well, this conversation turned out to be a great blessing. Because when I was elected, and you remember the case when I was elected, Frank was given ninety days to clear out, sort of a transition period. Once I took office and was sworn in, Senator Byrd never directed me, and Senator Baker never directed me in a daily sense. I didn't report to them daily like they do now. I am sure Jeri is in Daschle's office two or three times a day, as she should be because he anointed her. As Hildenbrand was with Baker.

But I was permitted because of that circumstance to be the Secretary for the entire Senate, knowing that I would report, first of all to the Majority Leader, unwritten and understandable. But at the same time, I would be equally responsible to the minority leader and through them to the whole one hundred Senators.

So for four years I had without question in my mind the best political job in Washington. I didn't think the Democrats would ever lose the Senate. I was going to retire here. I didn't have to run for reelection. I didn't think I was going to be challenged. I didn't have all the problems of a Senator, with constituents and issues. My turf was a comfortable turf and I was permitted to run it, redesign it, work it and keep it going. On very few occasions, once in a great while, either leader would ask me to do something, which I would do, of course.

One of them, which I think I related, if not, I will now. Murray Zweben the Parliamentarian, I think I told you, fell into disfavor because of some of his rulings, vis a vis the Republicans. Between the time that the Republicans were voted into the Senate which was November and when they took over the Senate, which was in January, it was obvious that Baker would be the Majority Leader. He sent word to me through Hildenbrand that Murray needed to go, and would go, but Baker wanted to make it as smooth as possible. He would rather that I move him out before the Republicans took over, when he would have to do it and it would be more of a cause celebre type affair. Well, when I got the message I called Murray in and Murray, of course, ended up resigning which was inevitable.

During that whole process I did not go to Senator Byrd and tell him, which probably was a mistake at the time. My sense was that Baker was making the decisions. He had asked me as Secretary of the Senate to take an action which was within his purview. It really affected what would happen after January and Byrd would not have a voice in that. Perhaps I even thought at the time that I didn't want to put Byrd in a position of trying to thwart something that had been foreordained. I don't know what my motivation was. Anyway, I did not tell Byrd. Then when Murray resigned, Byrd called me in and said he understood this has happened. In his inimitable Robert C. Byrd style, he said, "Well, I wish you had come to me first." Meaning come to him before I gave Murray the word, which implied that he might have been able to influence and change Baker's mind. So I apologized to him.

Now that is a very long answer about your questions about reactions of Mansfield, Baker and Byrd to the election.

RITCHIE: Well, you said that because you weren't beholden to any one Senator you had a lot more free rein, and that you had intentions to redesign the office. What changes did you want to make or did you make in the Secretary's office when you became Secretary?

KIMMITT: Well, I think, without going off the top of my head, Don, I would refer you to the publication that came out right after I stepped down which was a compilation of floor statements. I think it was [John] Melcher or somebody else put in a document as an addendum which outlined everything that I had done while Secretary of the Senate. Now when I said "I had done," I mean recommendations that had been made to me by staff from everywhere from the financial clerk to Marilyn Courtot, later Assistant Secretary of the Senate. They compiled a list of accomplishments not for the purpose of this last publication, just for the record. I think rather than dwelling on it, you might want to, or I can get you a copy, of what we did. They were mostly administrative things, changes, I wanted to do. Just as Jeri is doing now.

Think what she has had to do since 9/11 and anthrax. Think of the new security provisions that normally fall under the Sergeant at Arms and do, but had to be led by Jeri because the Sergeant at Arms [Al Lenhardt] was new. The Senate was a whole foreign culture to him and she has such a wonderful background of working in the Senate from every aspect; majority, minority, Sergeant at Arms, Deputy Sergeant at Arms. She was in that office and then she was in

the Secretary's office. Jeri Thomson has brought about and is bringing about changes that she hadn't even planned on making. Things happen.

I didn't come into the job with the idea of making a lot of changes. Now Jo-Anne Coe died back about two weeks ago. I went to her funeral. Dick [Baker] was there. When she became Secretary as I had with each succeeding Secretary, I asked to see her and only for the purpose of offering my congratulations and any assistance that I could give. Well, Jo-Anne was an Amazon in many ways and she didn't need a lot of guidance. She had been with Senator Dole all these years. I remember her comment when I said "if there is anything I can do for you or to help you get started in this new job." She gave me the damnedest answer. She said, "Well, if you would help me clean up that snake pit over there, I would appreciate it." That was her partisan imagery of the Secretary's office, that it was all Democrats, a snake pit of partisanship. That is the way Jo-Anne felt. Now she came in, obviously by that comment, with a preordained agenda to make changes. I don't know if she made many or not; it is not important. But I had no preconceived idea of what I wanted to do. I was just so happy to be the Secretary of the Senate.

Over the course of the first year, I continued a practice, which I had some twenty some years before that. In the military, if you are a successful commander—and the Secretary is in a sense a commander—you get out with the troops and listen to them and ask the questions, then often visit their units. They aren't always having meeting in their office with other commanders and subordinates. They go out and learn for themselves. It was kind of ingrained with me, that practice.

When I took over, I followed that by getting around to every sub-element of the Secretary's office, which I think at that time I had about sixteen. Now I did it selfishly to learn what the hell they did and what it was all about. I would go in the office of Public Records and I would drop in there every six weeks, two months, just to see how they were doing. The Historian's Office then was just a little cubicle up in the Capitol and it wasn't really as significant a player as it is today. The Historian's Office of that day gave me the impression of a couple of people with green eye-shades looking up history. Well, it is far beyond that now.

I would drop around and see them. I would go up to the Printer's, even though it wasn't in my purview, upstairs in the Capitol where your office was co-located with them for a while. I

would get around the Disbursing Office. That was one area Marilyn Courtot just was infuriated with me. The Disbursing Office was the one place that I would let no other staff person have any jurisdiction at all. Art Kuhl, who was my first Assistant Secretary, understood that. When he died I picked up the former financial clerk Bill Ridgeley. But when Marilyn got working for me she wanted to get into—using a "Jo-Anne Coeism"—that pit. I just kept everybody's hands off because if there is ever a location in the Senate where a Senator's personal affairs are concentrated it is in the financial clerk's office. How he spends his money, officially and otherwise. What personal documents he has and his retirement. It was between me and the financial clerk. I would go over there from time to time and just chat with them, and all around to all the others.

So in that sense I learned on the job and at the same time, I made changes as I went along. One example which I initiated—there weren't many times, but there were times when the Senate would stay in session for twenty-four, forty-eight or seventy-two hours. Prior to my being Secretary, the procedure was everybody stayed here—all the staff, all through the night. On the floor, people would rotate and relieve each other. The first couple of times that happened I said "Hell, that just doesn't make sense." After about forty-eight hours you get rummy, weak, and grimy. So I initiated a practice and had the chief clerk design a system where a round-the-clock session was anticipated to run a roster of who should be here during what period of time and then the others could go home. I think the man who put it together for me was the one who was killed.

RITCHIE: Scott Bates.

KIMMITT: Scott Bates. He came up with a plan for everybody, the Secretary's office too, for offices that had to be open during that period. It took the requirement off people to just be here for no damn particular purpose. That worked very well and we finally refined that down to where I think it has now become probably standing operating procedure. There were other little things. Nothing momentous, that I can think of.

I can't think of any big disagreements that I ever had with Nordy Hoffmann, who was the Sergeant at Arms, over jurisdiction. We worked very well together and deferred to each other. Actually, it was probably the best four years of my life. Even though my early military years were more exciting, more challenging. But this was kind of a capstone.

RITCHIE: You mentioned Art Kuhl. Darrell St.Claire had retired as Assistant Secretary and Art became Assistant Secretary.

KIMMITT: There were two people Frank had when he was Secretary. One was a lady named Dorothye Scott. She had been in that office with Skeeter Johnson. She was almost a grande dame of the Secretary's office. She was a tough nut to deal with, too. I remember she used to call me. A couple of times she called when I was Secretary for the Majority and she said, "The boss would like to see you."

And I said, "Who, Senator Mansfield?"

"No, Mr. Valeo."

"Oh, I thought you meant the boss." That used to irritate the hell out of her. When she left, I put Gail Martin in there [as Administrative Assistant]. She had been in Mansfield's office. Art was Chief Clerk of the Foreign Relations Committee. Darrell was the Assistant Secretary of the Senate. I never had any problems with Darrell. I guess he just retired. Anyway I brought Art up and put him in there. He was a nice stabilizing influence on people. Of course, he knew a hell of a lot. I don't think Bill Ridgely was ever happy in that job. He seemed kind of tense. He finally left. Did he leave coincident with me?

RITCHIE: He left when you left. And then Marilyn Courtot took the job when Bill Hildenbrand became Secretary. I think Bill Ridgely most enjoyed the International Parliamentary Union part of the job.

KIMMITT: Which one?

RITCHIE: Bill Ridgely loved going on those IPU meetings. But Darrell St. Clair had turned that position into an administrative officer, a sort nuts-and-bolts person. I wondered about your relationship with the Assistant Secretary. Did you essentially delegate to him the day-to-day administration, or how else did you divide the job up?

KIMMITT: I think in fairness, because of my style which was perhaps was resented, I

delegated in principle everything to the people to whom it should have been delegated. But at the same time, I was so personally involved that I would not, for example, go through the Assistant Secretary and say "Tell Dick Baker to do this and so on." I would go over and do that; I would bypass, because I have never been much of a believer in the ivory tower complex.

Frank was an ivory tower man and as a result, he delegated everything to everybody in the office. In many cases he didn't even know who he was delegating to. I can't recall Frank walking into the full office, which is Senator Daschle's office now. He would go in and out his side door—I am sure I am overstating it—but he did not get involved. That's where Dorothye Scott and the others were empowered to run things. That in my mind causes dysfunctional activities. Particularly with Marilyn Courtot. I liked her as a person, but she was very ambitious, and all the control she could get she would take. I gave her very little and it used to irritate the hell out of her. But I didn't inhibit any of them. Now this is looking at it from my perspective. Other people might give you a different viewpoint. But as I recall I would delegate all the functions through the supervisors in their area. I would come around and double check that their areas were being administered properly without going through the channels. That is a very convoluted answer.

RITCHIE: In those days the Secretary had a beautiful suite of offices right off the Senate floor on the second floor. I remember it was redecorated while you were there.

KIMMITT: It's the office Senator Daschle has now.

RITCHIE: Was it a meeting place for Senators during the day?

KIMMITT: Oh yes. I carried that practice from S-309, which was a small office. All the old-time Senators now will say "Why those were the good old days," because there was just an open invitation on a bipartisan basis—repeat bipartisan—that they could come in any time late in the afternoon, particularly if there were going to be an evening session. Only Senators. They knew they should not bring staffers or anyone else. I would have kind of a buffet bar and they would fix their own drinks. I would not use the administrative staff, messengers as waiters.

Even if a staffer wanted to see a Senator who was in there, Gail would call me out and I would talk to the staffer. "Is Magnuson in there? Can I see him?" I would say, "I don't know."

I would go back in and tell Magnuson that such and such a staffer was out there and predictably sometimes he would say, "Well, tell him I will see him later." Or he might say in some cases, "All right, tell him in to come in." Then he would be very quick and out he would go. Very few staff there with the members. It was a common meeting place for members of both parties.

I did it in my office and for the Republicans it was done down in the Republican Leader's office, [Everett] Dirksen's office. He had a similar setup there. It was normal and very well frequented by those who liked to relax and have a drink. Now many of them didn't come in, for good reasons. Scoop Jackson, I don't think, ever came in there. Old Al Gore, I don't think he ever came in and others. But people like [Roman] Hruska? Oh, I can think of all kinds. Sometimes we would have as many as ten, twelve, fourteen in there at a time. But to answer your earlier question, the answer is "yes."

RITCHIE: Just to relax and tell stories? Did they ever do any business in there while they were sitting around?

KIMMITT: It was intended to relax and tell stories, but just by the very nature of the conversation and interplay deals would be struck. I told you the one about Tom Foley and the judge: "Jim, I have this judge" type of affair. That just cut through all of the procedural morass of staff and committees and everything else. If two Senators agreed in there, or three Senators, on something, they would go back out and tell their people "this is what we are going to do."

They would expedite a hell of a lot of things. Very, very infrequently there would a discussion where there would be significant disagreement between them. But once in a while there would. But it would be a healthful, respectful Senator-to-Senator disagreement. There was never anything tension-filled. Everything just seemed to go well. I was so privileged because I had my desk in the corner, one of those big old Senate desks. I would just sit back there and watch all this go on between occasionally going on the floor.

I have said this and will still state it again. One of the things of which I am most proud is that in fifteen years, now that's a long time, eleven years as Secretary for the Majority, four years as Secretary, there was never a quote or leak to the press out of the office from one of those evening sessions. Primarily, because there were only Senators and if there was a comment, it could

only be from a Senator or Senators. There was no staff, there were no servants, per se.

All the members of the media knew there was this gathering. They used to call it the "pump." None of them was ever able to get anything significant out of there. Although there were one or two exceptions, I think I have told you this before, one reporter was in a true sense, a reporter, not an editorial writer. Most reporters today are editorial writers. But this was Spencer Rich of the *Washington Post*. Spencer would write a story and it would be straight news. He was highly respected and I got to know Spencer pretty well. Not down in the big office, but up in 309 on at least two occasions, I said to the Senators in there, there would only be two or three, Spencer Rich is out here, "Do you mind if I let him come in and have a drink?" "No, bring him on in." So he came in and joined in the discussion, but he never wrote anything out of there.

Interestingly enough, Spencer covered the Senate for a long time and he had the respect of the members, in my opinion. Then one day, reportedly, he was called in by the *Post* hierarchy, and was told he was getting too close too the members up there and they were taking him off the Hill and putting him downtown writing Social Security, etc. So they took him off the Hill, because they considered that he was too, I would say, understanding of all positions, but in the *Post's* view, he wasn't being critical enough. Spencer was a good reporter.

No, deals per se were never designed and struck in there, but the ebb and flow of human relations caused events to come about that would not have occurred in a timely fashion if they hadn't had that opportunity to discuss things quietly off the record and relaxed. Sometimes you get a little more relaxed and agreeable when you have a drink, some become disagreeable, but most become more agreeable.

RITCHIE: You had spent eleven years essentially on the floor and in the cloakrooms as the Majority Secretary. When you became Secretary of the Senate, did you spend as much time, or much time at all on the floor?

KIMMITT: I would always be there when they opened, every day. I would usually be there when they closed. The rest of the time I would amble in and out and around, but I would have no directing purpose in being there. Sometimes I would just come in, go up to where the Secretary's chair is next to the presiding officer, and just sit and listen to the debate for a while.

But I didn't get into the Secretary for the Majority's business. Which, again, made it a very comfortable position to have. It was just a wonderful opportunity to do as I pleased or as I felt was appropriate to do under the circumstances. But I had that great opportunity to just walk around the floor, to talk to Senators at their desks or just ramble, no purpose, but always learning something new every day. Soon you become confident in what you are doing.

RITCHIE: Jimmy Carter was President for all four years that you were Secretary. The Democrats held the majority for that whole period. But it was still a rough time. There were filibusters over gas and oil. There was the Panama Canal debate. Did people come to you about questions about strategies and how to deal with the administration and the Democrats on the Hill?

KIMMITT: Yes, I recall, for example on the Panama Canal Treaty. Because of its importance, Mondale would preside a lot more than usual. I had him call me up several times at the desk, saying "How is Paul Hatfield going to vote on this Panama Canal? It is getting tight and we need his vote." Hatfield hadn't committed. I said, "I don't know. I will try to get an indication, but I'm not going to just ask him how is going to vote." And Mondale said "Well, do what you can to tip him over. We really need him." Then I alluded, jokingly but somewhat seriously, "Well, if he knew what may be in store for him if he leaves here, it might help." "We're not going to make any deals. But you know damn well we're going to take care of all the people where we can."

It turned out later, as know you, that Paul Hatfield was a federal judge. First of all, he voted for the Panama Canal Treaty which was very unpopular in Montana. He was beaten by Max Baucus who never who never had to vote for the Panama Canal Treaty because he was in the House. Had he had to vote on the Panama Canal Treaty and had he voted for the treaty, he might not have beaten Hatfield. But Baucus has been one of the luckiest members in the Senate in many ways. That was one of them. He never had to vote for the Treaty and Montana turned against Hatfield because it is a conservative state. Now, here we have Baucus Chairman of the Finance Committee and practically unopposed for reelection.

RITCHIE: Was there a sense of missed opportunities with the Carter Administration? Jimmy Carter came in with substantial majorities in both Houses.

KIMMITT: Well, he came in as I pointed out in my earlier discussions with you, with

an anti-Washington attitude and he came in having made allusions that he was going to clean up Washington. If you think Bush reflecting on the Senate now is pretty acerbic, Carter and his people, Ham Jordan and that group, were all very disdainful. Remember those were the days when those people were coming to work as Chief of Staff to the President, in jeans and open shirt and tennis shoes, with feet on the desk. You can imagine how Robert C. Byrd and his colleagues viewed that.

Carter and his people had to learn that the Congress, particularly the Senate, was not an adjunct of the administration to just do what they were told. So the going was rough for awhile. He pontificated too much. It is hard for me to recall that era clearly, but I don't recall any real devotees of Carter in the Senate at that time on either side of the aisle.

RITCHIE: That's really the last time a President has enjoyed substantial majorities of his party in both the Senate and the House for his entire presidency.

KIMMITT: And then to end up with, in my opinion, achieving as little as he did. People are remembering Carter now more for what he has done since he left the presidency than what he had done when he was in the presidency. He did have Camp David and he did have a few coups, but it is hard to point out like Lyndon Johnson and his great society or Eisenhower and the interstate highways, it is hard to point to Carter's accomplishments of a significant nature, in my mind.

RITCHIE: You mentioned how unexpected the results of the 1980 election were for the Senate in particular. I think people thought Carter was going to lose, but not necessarily that thirteen Democratic senators were going to lose the election. Was there some sense in the Senate that Carter was responsible for that time?

KIMMITT: Early in the evening even before California had voted, he was criticized for conceding even before the elections in the country were over. Now there was a great deal of resentment about that particularly by the West Coast members.

RITCHIE: Senator Magnuson and Senator Church lost by, I think, only one percent of the votes in their states.

KIMMITT: When anybody loses they look for a reason and Carter was certainly a good enough reason to fall back on if they didn't have any real legitimate reasons. He lost and he took the rest of us out with him.

RITCHIE: Bill Hildenbrand posted a note on your door the night before door saying "closed, open under new management." Everybody took it as a joke, but the next morning when we woke up, the Republicans were in the majority.

KIMMITT: As I told you, I never expected Democrats to lose the Senate. On that election night I was in Montana, because we had a gubernatorial election out there. Keep in mind it is two hours earlier out there and I was at the governor's campaign headquarters and watching the results come in. "Boom" it became apparent that the Republicans had taken the Senate. So I called back to Bill who was in Baker's office, this was 11:00 at night, and at that time Bill liked a little red wine and this was a wonderful night to have it. I congratulated him. Then he uncharacteristically started almost crying and saying "I don't want to be Secretary of the Senate." Bill and I remained good friends.

Even after the election Baker wanted him to be Secretary of the Senate and Bill didn't want it. Jim Cannon who was with the Vice President at that time, but he was working for Baker, too, came to me one day, after the election and everything was all over, and he said "The Leader would like you to talk to Hildenbrand. He says he doesn't want to be Secretary of the Senate." I knew why. He missed the floor action. He liked running things on the floor. "He wants you to talk to him because he has other plans for Howard Greene to become Secretary for the Majority." So I called Bill, he came in the office and I said "God damn it. Get off that kick about not becoming Secretary of the Senate. Baker wants you to be Secretary of the Senate and you owe him. You are not making your own decisions on these things. You owe that man to do what he wants you to do. Now just knock that crap off." Well, time went on and he did. We remained good friends and we still are good friends.

RITCHIE: That December the *Washington Star* published a list of pretty much everybody who worked for the Secretary of the Senate, a whole page they called the "plum list." It contained everybody's name, job title, and salary. The implication was that everybody in the Secretary's office was a political appointment. I remember Bill Hildenbrand calling to say Senator

Baker did not consider them political appointments. Did you have any sense about the Republicans coming in after twenty-six years in the minority that they intended to make a drastic change?

KIMMITT: That was a concern, I'm sure. But I didn't have any preconceived ideas. I had enough faith in the character of Howard Baker to know that he wasn't going to cause a tsunami. And you can't do it. You can't replace all those legislative clerks. You can't turn this place upside down and fill them with political appointees who have no idea what they are doing. Those people at the desk, the official reporters, the historians, these are all professionals who know what they are doing.

Can you imagine if say Senator Daschle were to call up and say "I've got a friend out at the University of South Dakota who I would like to put in as Senate Historian, so I want you to submit your resignation within thirty days." And if you were to ask "Is he a historian?" "No, but he is a great supporter type of guy." To have someone like that come in and take this job. I think it would be ridiculous.

RITCHIE: It's what Newt Gingrich did in the House in '94.

KIMMITT: What are you plans this afternoon?

RITCHIE: Would you like to break for lunch and then pick it up again and talk about what you have done since then?

KIMMITT: I don't know. Sometimes when I leave I think what a ridiculous episode that was.

RITCHIE: Well you know, I came in at the beginning of that history because I was sitting in the gallery the day they announced your election. I watched from the start, so it's really nice to hear it from you.

KIMMITT: In those days I smoked cigars. We were up in S-309, the Secretary for the Majority's office, and it was an unwritten rule that anything that what went on in the caucus you would never speak about until the Majority Leader had made an announcement. Before I went

down for that vote that morning, not knowing what was going to happen, I told Gail that "When I come back, I am not going to be able to tell you what happened, whether I win or lose." But if I have a cigar on the right side of my mouth, I've won. If I have it on the left side, I've lost. So I came upstairs and had my cigar on the right side.

End of the Fifth Interview

WASHINGTON REP

Interview #6

Wednesday Afternoon, October 9, 2002

RITCHIE: You spent eleven years as Secretary for the Majority and four years as Secretary of the Senate, and then in 1980–

KIMMITT: The government fell.

RITCHIE: –the Democrats lost the majority. What did you think you would do next?

KIMMITT: Well, to step back and reconstruct from the 27th of June, 1941, until January whatever in 1981, which was between forty and forty-one years, I was employed by the United States government in one form or another without one day's break. I was in the Army for twenty-five years from '41 until '65. So cumulatively that came up to about forty years and then in that interim in November when I knew that the Republicans had taken over and I wouldn't be leaving until January, it was plenty of time for me to consider in a futuristic sense the answer to your question, "What am I going to do?" "How am I going to go about it?" I gave it a lot of thought and there were three basic avenues. One, was to retire and do nothing, which after forty years a lot of people might have opted for. But my income per se balanced against my requirements at that time wouldn't have really permitted that, plus in a natural sense, I still couldn't think of retirement as a goal.

So, if you set retirement aside, then it was a question of are you going to work for yourself or are you going to work for somebody else. I pondered that a number of times. I was being approached by associations and companies, not with specific offers, but expressions of interest in when you leave, if you are interested, come and talk to us, that sort of thing. On the other hand, I had friends who had just struck out on their own and became a single consultant and had made a lot of money and had a lot of flexibility.

Normally, that would appeal to most everyone, particularly me, except that when I thought about that after having been in a structured environment for forty years with administrative support, facilities, telephones and fax machines, I couldn't envision—not knowing enough about it at that

time—going out and setting up an office, getting an assistant, buying equipment, setting up bookkeeping, and all the administrative factors that had been provided for me in the past. That just didn't appeal to me. The idea appealed to me if I could have had everything provided, but there was no way to do that. It did not appeal to me when I had to consider having to locate, collect bills, and put together everything. I was still considerably viable as a Washington representative because I knew everyone in the Senate and many, many, on the House side. The other society in Washington that I was very familiar with, was that of Washington reps. I don't like to use the word lobbyist, I prefer to use the word rep, but all the lobbyists in town.

I finally came down with the idea that I would like to go back into a cocoon, have somebody else worry about the light bulbs, the desks and all that minutia, and get a reasonable income. So I sort of let the word out that I was going to do something. I hadn't signed up with anybody yet, though I had several overtures. One of them was Hughes Helicopters which was the Howard Hughes estate company. There were two Hughes Companies. Hughes Aircraft was a very big company, very profitable at that time, very high-paying jobs. Howard Hughes had directed that all of its profits should go to a medical foundation, the Howard Hughes Foundation.

The other one was Hughes Helicopters, which was totally separate and independent. Then he had all these other interests, primarily properties in Las Vegas, mines, and airplanes. But this was a little niche company that had once been referred to as Howard Hughes's sandbox. In Los Angeles, the Hughes Helicopter company had an airstrip, right just below St. Mary's College, out there where *Wings,* the movie, was made. That's where they built the flying boat, the huge plane that he flew for two or three minutes and put back down. It is now a relic in a museum–it was in California, but they moved it up to Oregon where it is a museum piece. All they were into then was building helicopters. Actually they had built two types of helicopters: civilian and military. The military helicopter during the Vietnam War and the Korean War was a bubble type, single engine helicopter, which was both medivac and combat and very successful.

At the same time they were bidding and competing with Bell Aircraft and a couple of other companies on an attack helicopter which became the Apache which it is today. It is the backbone of the attack helicopter fleet for the United States and it is all over the world now. It is without a doubt the most capable attack helicopter in the world. But this is 1980 and they had just won the contract through competition. There were only two of them built at that time. They were in an

experimental mode, a test mode, and then on a flight one day out over the ocean one of them crashed in the ocean. It was then in a production mode. That was one aspect. But the other practical and political aspect was to sell the helicopter to the United States Army.

Now, today that sounds sort of ridiculous in that it is the backbone of the Army attack helicopter fleet, but at that time it is the same old story—modernization, money, appropriations, competition, test and evaluation, all the usual start-up problems of any system. They needed political help. When I say they needed political help, they didn't have a top man in Washington running the legislative effort. So they offered me this spot. Now as it turned out Hughes had, of course, been very much involved personally in Washington for years. He had appeared before Congress many times. He was irascible, arrogant, and combative, had a lot of money for those days, and he had an office on Connecticut Avenue, on the eleventh floor, I think, at 1040 Connecticut Avenue, which is just diagonally across from the Mayflower Hotel. It was a combined office and a small live-in suite. When he came to town, he would stay there. When he was out of town, the live-in suite portion was unused, but he had his Washington office people, three or four, working there.

They were not a highly conspicuous group at that time. They were only representing Howard Hughes and his many interests, rather than representing a helicopter company. Anyway, the bottom line is, after evaluating several other possibilities, I decided to go with them. One of the factors that caused me to join Hughes Helicopters was that I understood the legislative representative's tools in this town. In addition to campaign contributions, in those days, unlike now. You also had to have other avenues for face time and bringing them on your turf. Rockwell? for example had a place out in Wye Island where they had a nice goose-hunting lodge. That was a very attractive lure and many senators would go out, hunt geese and have a great time. That turned into a political embarrassment for many because the media finally gets on you and you are entertaining members of Congress for senators. They in turn are supporting ethically and honestly Rockwell programs. That was for Rockwell, not us.

Other people had similar inducements. Hughes owned the Desert Inn Hotel, where he lived, in Las Vegas with a big golf course and he also owned many other properties in Las Vegas. This was in the heyday of the Desert Inn with outstanding shows, entertainers and great restaurants. What a great inducement to get members to come out to the plant in California and

then whip over to Las Vegas and spend the weekend and play golf. There was nothing wrong with it because that was the practice at the time. So I signed on with Hughes Helicopters. The day after I stepped out of here and went down and moved into the office on Connecticut Avenue.

Then, of course, came fulfilling the task at hand, which was not easy in that this was the Vietnam era, and after Korea, the anti-military move was somewhat prevalent. Program money was hard to get. Services were being cut back and there was a very skeptical Congress not only regarding the Apache, but on many weapons systems. I'd have to lobby the Armed Services Committee and Appropriations Committee on both sides of the aisle, the members, get their support, and sell the program politically. That was what the hell they were paying me for. It was a rocky road. I didn't realize it at that time, but I do now. You start out with an estimate of what a program is going to cost and then it starts getting out of hand for a number of reasons and everybody starts attacking it. Or you might have a set back on the testing and evaluation and, of course, you always have the competition.

Bell Helicopters in Texas was building the Cobra and the Apache was in direct competition. Well, of course, Bell had the Texas delegation supporting their operation. California always has been a dilemma concerning military support, particularly when you get away from San Diego and the Navy. California always has plenty of Barbara Boxers and Diane Feinsteins. You could never get much real support. In the Los Angeles area they were pacifistic. It was not a big thing for a member of Congress to support military programs. Time went on and we kept the Apache on the resuscitator for several years. One of my greatest supporters, out of friendship more than anything else, was Senator Stennis of Mississippi. Every time we would get in a precarious position, I would go to him and his staff and we would keep it going until the next year.

Then we decided to move the plant from the Los Angeles area to Arizona for a number of reasons. I was not involved in the negotiations, but I think one of the reasons was labor. No labor problems in Arizona, lots of labor problems in California, costs, everything else. So the decision was made and eventually carried out to move it to Mesa, Arizona, which is a suburb of Phoenix. We built a whole new plant there. By this time it was becoming a little more and a little more stable. Whereas we started out building four Apaches a year, then it went to six or eight. Finally we got it up to build a hundred and twenty of them in a year.

It was about this time that Barry Goldwater became chairman of the Armed Services Committee. [Dennis] DeConcini was the other senator there at that time. Goldwater was Air Force oriented and he didn't like the Apache. The Air Force was competing for funds. One time the press asked him, "Senator, why do you oppose the Apache? It is built right in your state." He answered publicly, "I wouldn't give a damn if they built it in my basement. I am opposed to it." Well, that was a tough thing to overcome, but we overcame it with the help of people like Scoop Jackson, Stennis and others. Over on the House side Bob Stump, who is retiring this year and now is Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, was a very junior member then. But he fought for the program and kept it going.

The plant was running, good payroll, things were going along pretty well—then McDonald Douglas bought Hughes Helicopters. McDonald Douglas was the leading defense contractor in the country at that time, based in St. Louis. Of course, I was part of the deal. So I moved out of Connecticut Avenue and over to Arlington and became an executive over there under the aegis of McDonald Douglas Helicopters. Then Boeing comes along and buys McDonald Douglas, so I moved again with them and stayed there.

After ten years of that from the time I left the Senate and went to Hughes Helicopters, then went to McDonald Douglas Helicopters, and then to Boeing Helicopters, I retired from that work. Then the question was, "What are you going to do now?" I was faced with the same situation, although I had by this time more retirement equity than before, so I could have just stacked arms and done nothing.

But a couple of friends of mine, one from Montana and one from Massachusetts, had a little Washington firm called Brown, Coates and McCarthy. Dave Brown was from Montana, George McCarthy was from Montana, Vinnie Coates was from Massachusetts. They wanted me to come in with them. I considered for a while and finally agreed. Later Dave Brown went out on his own and went back to Montana. Then it became Kimmitt, Coates & McCarthy, which it is now. Now as the independent consultant, I was in the mode that I thought I would have liked in the first place. They already had the administrative structure set up.

Since then, which is I guess another ten years, we represent a few defense companies, some non-defense. For example, I represent the Mansfield Foundation in Missoula that you and

Dick are familiar with because you provided photographs to them. Montana Energy & Research Development Institute in Butte which is a high-tech, for Montana, an R&D outfit. I represent Alliant Technologies over here across the river, because they have an interest in Montana on Indian reservation. And, hell, I guess we got one other one, I have forgotten what it is.

We are not large affluent or wealthy. We're not like a big law firm, we're not anything like that. We just represent people and what we really offer, above all, is integrity and honesty, and no embarrassing entanglements of any kind. Also, our fee is very reasonable comparatively and we still have many contacts with the people on the Hill. We don't have to ask them for much. But the biggest personal value is it gets me out of the house. It is an advantage for my wife to get me out of the house. It provides expenses and it gives me an opportunity to do what I like when I walk around this place. Still contacting many of the same people, many new people, but not as aggressively nor as involved as I was with helicopters. So here I am today, talking to the oral historian of the Senate and all I can say it has been sixty-one years without one day's break of being employed somewhere. I hope it stays that way for a little while longer.

RITCHIE: Washington is full of reps of one type or another. Did your forty years of experience on Capitol Hill and connections with the government give you an advantage over other reps in Washington when you got started?

KIMMITT: Certainly. As you probably know or should know, the Secretary of the Senate has lifetime privileges on the floor, but I have never gone on the floor even once since I have retired. I made that rule for myself when I left here because I observed retired senators come on the floor–Frank Moss of Utah, being a prime example, and Joe Clark and others. Once or twice it was all right and there was a little collegiality with that. But when it became more frequent visits, I could just see the frigidity setting in by the members. They didn't like it. There you are in the front of the whole press gallery and the public and you go up and sit down, which you are entitled to do, not the Secretary, but a member, next to a senator during a piece of legislation that that senator is very active in debating and you as a former senator are representing one side or the other of the issue. Well, you are just leaving the seated member totally exposed to criticism by the press particularly who know the institution and know the personalities and you do him a great injustice. So, I have never stepped on the floor.

I do go into the cloakroom occasionally like I did this morning between the time I had breakfast with Jeri Thomson and coming over with you. I went in the cloakroom, read the paper, used the telephone. In committee hearings, because I know all the policemen and because I wear the Senate officer pin, when there is a long line of people waiting to go in, I am not at all reticent to go up front and they let me into a committee hearing, if I want. I don't go to many of them any more. Parking is another privilege.

Yes, there are significant advantages. You hope they remain inconspicuous, but they are recognized by all of the other representatives in town. They can't do that. They have to stand in line. They can't go in the cloakroom. They have to take a cab up here because of difficulty in parking. It's a significant advantage that one has to constantly be careful not abuse. Once you abuse that privilege, and they are privileges, they have every right to kick your ass off the Hill.

There is an article today in *The Hill* about retiring members being recruited downtown on K Street. Well that is normal and they go out and they are commonly referred to as "rainmakers." They don't do a damn thing, like George Mitchell, who is with Verner Liipfert. Bob Dole is down there too. Other former members are all over town. Some of them set up their own shop. Now what they do there, of course, is they are of sufficient stature and background and recognition, that they will name the company with their name and associates. Then they will get maybe their former AA or somebody else to set things up, handle all the administration, handle all the bookkeeping, recruit or entertain the proposals for employment and run the whole thing, and you are still acting like a member of Congress in the lifestyle. But you are getting more money, because you are getting your retirement plus what you are making down there. So, it is a nice thing–until they wear out their welcome with their colleagues. There again, you know what the turnover in the Senate and House has been in the last ten years. A lot of those new people they don't know, they don't know them at all. So it gets tougher as they shrink and shrink, it gets tougher for a potential client to consider hiring them because the question is "What can they do? Who can they talk to?" "Well, he is a very good friend of Bob Stump, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee." Yeah, but Stump is leaving. It just wears out. But that is the nature of the beast.

Lobbying, of course, is so greatly misunderstood in the minds of the American people. Lobbying is always portrayed by cartoonists in the most unfavorable light. The facts are that I don't care what issue you want to bring up, smoking, abortion, taxes, automobile safety, farm bill,

anything you want to bring up, there are opposing sides and opposing views and opposing facts. There is never a clear cut, everybody votes for this because it is so clear cut who could vote against it. There is always on any issue reasons not to vote for a bill or an amendment or an issue, and reasons to vote. That is what democracy is all about.

A member will get from the hearings, the committee hearings and from their staff and from everything that is usually available to them, they will get lots of information usually on one side of the issue. If you are a Kennedy and its health or education or welfare, you will be saturated with interests groups who are providing him with information to sustain his position. That's normal. Even they are lobbyists. But without lobbyists for the other side of an issue, being permitted to have a meeting with him and his staff to present the other side, he won't have available to him in the time frame all the sides of the issue and the reasons for and the reasons against to make a judgment. That is where the Washington reps come in. They provide a service to the member. In providing that member with information, very carefully thought out, very carefully documented, very carefully, absolutely to be successful, has to be absolutely correct, and to have access to be able to get that side of the issue explained to the member before the actual vote comes.

As I say, popular imagery is they are in there twisting his arm and saying, "By God, you vote for this or else!" In the old days there was a lot of that. But we are far more sophisticated on that now. Without lobbyists, without Washington reps to present an issue that has not been provided to that member and/or his staff before, or her staff, there is a void there. Then you get distorted legislation. So Washington reps perform a valuable democratic function.

Now they need tools to do it. That brings us to another phase of imagery and controversy, campaign contributions. Why should a member, and you know because you are here every day, how compressed their time is, how full their schedule is from morning 'til night, it is like being in a pressure cooker, why should a member see a rep on an issue if one, that rep is only vaguely known to him, the company or institution or association he represents is known by name, and they have never attended a fund-raiser for him, they have never made a contribution for him or her, they have never shown any interest in him or her, except on this issue, why would you even see him? Who would? I don't think he would.

Therefore, the tools that I am talking about that a good Washington rep needs are not many

but few. First of all, the individual, him or herself, has to be totally credible. They have to be believable. The have to be trustworthy. They have to be knowledgeable. They have to be respectable. There have been violations on all those attributes, but people haven't lasted unless they have them, particularly honesty, integrity and reliability. You've got to have that to start with.

Then, for example, another added inducement might be the Desert Inn and the golf course. But you also need face time out of the office, face time away from the Hill with his people and equally important, their key staff people. Those opportunities are developed through fund-raising events, not just here in Washington, but usually out in the state. All of these members have a fund-raising event like Conrad Burns has two a year that I am aware of. One is a golf classic in August near Glacier Park and the other is an early spring ski affair at Big Sky in Montana where people from Washington and all around the country, come there. They have a great weekend and they contribute a thousand dollars a head or something like that. You get that face time. You get that recognition. Then after you establish all these entrees, then it is a question of how much of a bother are you to him.

First of all let me interject an absolute. You can't buy a vote. Public opinion will say that is wrong, that goes on all the time. I can tell you from forty some years, you cannot buy a vote. Now you could maybe in the '40s, in the '30s, and certainly way back, you could pass a member privately ten thousand dollars or twenty thousand dollars and get an absolute commitment to vote with you. That I would call buying a vote. But today, in today's world, in my opinion, you can't even make an overture to a member about quid pro quo, money for this, that and the other. And yet popular opinion would say that I am misstating, that it goes on all the time. Well, it doesn't.

So the whole panorama of Washington representation or lobbying has to fit, in my opinion, all those factors; starting with the individual, starting with his organization, starting with his tools, starting with the financial backing and probably ending with the ability of the individual to use all those things and get a return to the enterprise for what they came for. At the same time, in my case, I feel very proud of being able to fight the apache battle for fifteen years. Every year they tried to kill it and kill it. Just like this year they killed the Crusader, which I have nothing to do with, but it is an example of putting millions of dollars into a system and then the Congress kills it. Well, I was always threatened with that. As it turned out, they were never able to kill it. It did stay alive and now it is a great success. So I get personal satisfaction out of that one.

RITCHIE: You mentioned Senator Goldwater, when he was chairman. The first six years that you were representing Hughes you had a Republican majority in the Senate. You had John Tower and Barry Goldwater as chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Was that a disadvantage for you given that you had come out of the Democratic ranks?

KIMMITT: Yeah, I was always viewed, correctly, as a Democrat. But you see that is the flip side of this thing. Popular opinion might say because you are a Democrat, those Republican chairmen aren't going to give you a damn thing. They are going to close the door and you're out. Well, that's not true either because of all the other factors I mentioned to you. They knew I was a Democrat, but they also knew that I obviously had something to have been Secretary of the Senate while they were there and observed. They also knew, I think, that I was fair which is very important in this institution. They also knew that I had a right to present the case for the apache and the company. Now, they also had the right to adjust the numbers, the dollars and everything else. But it never became and should never become a vindictive, personal campaign one way or the other on a system.

Now on a broad issue, very broad issue, no one individual is going to impact it anyway—like health care which is a big one this year. No matter what a member thinks of you as an individual or as a partisan. He or she is not going to vote for or against health care because of a Washington rep. Now, if you get down to a very narrow issue, I can't think of one right off hand, but say it's a, I wouldn't even put gun control in that category. That's a broad issue. On a rare, rare, rare circumstance you might find somebody who will vote against an issue because of the person who is presenting one side or the other.

But was I at a disadvantage with the Republican majority? The answer is yes. I could always go to Stennis, who was a good friend of mine and in a position of power, and feel comfortable coming away with presenting a legitimate case and knowing that he would follow through. I never had the privilege of being comfortable going to Goldwater particularly. Tower and I got along pretty well, but Goldwater was a pretty irascible guy. When I would leave him, I was never comfortable with how it was going to turn out. But, he was a senator, a fair senator, reasonable-minded. To answer your question, was I at a disadvantage with the Republican Senate having been Secretary, the answer is yes, but not a compelling disadvantage.

RITCHIE: I was going to ask you about Senator Tower, who was here for twenty years, served as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and then was rejected by the Senate when he was nominated for Secretary of Defense. Did he get a bum rap or was that a fair assessment of him when they turned him down?

KIMMITT: Well, Senator Tower had a little bit of Symington in him in that he, as you remember, was a little powder pigeon guy, acerbic, irritating at times with his comments, like [John] McCain is. Even though he was chairman of the committee and had been ranking minority member, I don't think he developed a Sam Nunn-like image where people believed him. Not that they disbelieved Tower, but they were less likely to listen to and believe Tower than they were Sam Nunn. Also, Tower was known to have a drink or two once in a while, nothing terribly outrageous, but known. And he was known to be a ladies' man. There was always fringe nervousness about Tower on his own side of the aisle. On the other side of the aisle his arrogant attitude as a chairman irritated people, so just as Symington never got to be a full committee chairman for reasons I gave you before, Tower was–I'm trying to think what it was during the hearings and why he wasn't confirmed as Secretary of Defense.

RITCHIE: It was mostly allegations about his personal behavior.

KIMMITT: Yeah, I guess they just were not willing to entrust John Tower based on his previous personal activities with the tremendous responsibility of being Secretary of Defense. That gave many of them an opportunity, just by voting, to demonstrate their displeasure, no matter how they wanted to rationalize it. "Well, he's just not qualified to be Secretary of Defense." The second tier, rather than the first tier, was: "I just don't like the son of a bitch. This gives me a good reason not to vote for him."

But I always got along well with him. He never bothered me. We could joke a lot back and forth. We both knew where we stood on various issues. He was much easier to get along with than Goldwater. Goldwater was always a snarly bastard. I could see that mushroom crowd like in his presidential campaign behind him all the time. He was that type of guy. But, there was a place for Goldwater and a time for Goldwater. He filled a mold.

RITCHIE: You mentioned just in passing Sam Nunn and I wondered what you thought

about Nunn. You haven't talked too much about him.

KIMMITT: Sam Nunn was very close to the stature of Dick Russell of Georgia. Russell was his mentor. Nunn was always a gentleman under any circumstance, not just on the Senate floor, even now. Nunn had humility and ability. Sam Nunn was a student of government, a student of human events.

Let me give you an example, when I went with Hughes Helicopters their board of directors had a meeting here in Washington, the first time they ever had a board meeting here. The chairman of the board of directors was a cousin or nephew of Howard Hughes who was administrator of the estate. It was important, because it was the first time–he had been to Washington many times for other purposes—but first time as a chairman of the board of Hughes Helicopters. He came here while I was a Washington rep. We would get around to see certain members, just courtesy calls, not long, just courtesy calls, meet, greet, etc. I called up Nunn's office. I had been away from the Senate for a long time, and because of my relationship and everything else I was able to get an appointment almost immediately because the window of their being here was only a couple of days. But it wasn't going to be in his office. There was a hearing going on over in the space the committee used to be, Commerce is there now. When the morning came, they said "Take your chairman over to the side room of the hearing and Senator Nunn will come out." It was a very active hearing, not one of these droning events. So I took him over there and we went into the side room. Nunn came in and gave us five to eight minutes, most gracious. He had no reason to do that type of affair. Then back into the hearing.

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His wife is a lovely lady. He just projected, portrayed and acted what he was, which was a very knowledgeable, professional, competent, United States Senator. Wonderful person. That was demonstrated by how he got along with everybody. There was the Nunn/Lugar bill. Later on there was a Nunn/Warner bill. See, [Ted] Kennedy has taken up that technique very nicely. You notice when Kennedy has a bill now, unlike the early days, before he ever gets it elevated up to a point of hearings, he will get a Republican co-sponsor, and it will be Kennedy and so and so. That brings a whole new group in. Nunn was very good at that. He brought [John] Warner along from a kind of youthful, Middleburg riding type guy into the senator he is now, which is very responsible. John Warner has epitomized that saying that I told you that Carl Hayden said to Stennis "some swell and some grow." Well, Warner has never swelled, but he has grown. But

Nunn is very good.

RITCHIE: Well, you have a fifty-year view of Capitol Hill. I wonder if you could compare the Senate that you see today when you come up to the Senate that you first encountered back in the 1950s.

KIMMITT: Well, I could, but I am afraid I would be so—I am always looking for the right adjective—derisive of today's Senate by comparison that I just get myself in trouble. But I can tell you, and it is not only my opinion, it is the opinion of hundreds, if not more, of people who have been around here for we will say hypothetically thirty years. I would doubt if there is one of them, male, female, anything else, that won't subscribe to the fact, not the impression, but the fact that the Senate of today is more partisan, more personal in a negative, more divisive, more fractured than they can remember.

When I first started up here there was an institutional discipline. There was a committee discipline. There was an individual discipline. And by "discipline" I am suggesting orderliness, procedures, courtesies, formalities, customs, precedents, all the things that go along with an orderly, functioning prestigious institution. If you apply all of those standards to today's Senate, there is less institutional discipline. There is certainly less committee discipline. In many cases there are individuals who lack discipline in a senatorial sense. The whole foundation of the Senate seems to be developing termites. I hope it doesn't go on in future generations. I won't name names but you know who they are, but there are senators on that floor today, some of them recently arrived, who have already decided they want to be President of the United States and nothing is going to get in their way in that. I don't give a damn what the hell the procedures are here. I am not going to follow those. I don't care about the committee position. I am going to do this. And as far as the chairman, the hell with him. He is a has-been. It is just demonstrated there.

In the *Post* this morning there is a little vignette about yesterday. Strom Thurmond had a low-level judge in South Carolina. Here is a man ninety-nine years old, forty some years here in the Senate, he just wanted that one little thing and he was denied by the Democrats and by [Patrick] Leahy. So he will leave the Senate without having achieved that. He demonstrated yesterday that he was offended, deeply offended, as I think he should have been. Forty years ago that never would have happened, never would have happened with a Senator of that stature. They

would at least have given him a hearing.

What's happening in the Judiciary Committee today I think is scandalous, scandalous. I am a Democrat of course, but what they are doing to these nominees is scandalous. I wouldn't want my good friend Pat Leahy to hear that—I knew him when he came here as a young kid as a senator, a young thirty-five. There is just no excuse except one, fear, and that is the only thing behind the whole damn affair and that is if they pass and put on the Court of Appeals judges who are in the Bush philosophical mode, they greatly widen the chances of the next one or two Supreme Court Justices being that mode. So whatever they say about qualifications or motivations, whatever else they say it is a stranglehold on the President of the United States limiting his ability to nominate a Supreme Court judge. If there is any more "politics" than that, I don't know what it could be. And now they are going to have any more hearings until the next Congress and you start all over again. Do I see a change in the Senate then and the Senate now? Yes, significantly.

RITCHIE: To what to do you account for all this, the increased partisanship and the frictions that have developed in the institution?

KIMMITT: Oh well, I would have my own ideas. One, interests groups and causes. Forty years there was no National Organization of Women. Forty years ago there was no outcry pro or con on abortions. Forty years there was never an outright statement of a woman's right to choose. Forty years ago smoking was the norm. The environment. Labor unions vis-a-vis the longshoreman strike in California at the present time. Trial lawyers. Jury awards.

Ten days ago, a woman who had been smoking since she was seventeen years old (my wife has been smoking since she was fourteen), when her children tried to get this woman to stop smoking she said, "I am adult. I am going to do it. Get off my tail. I am going to smoke." Fine, I don't think anything could quite demonstrate willingness like that. Then she gets older and then she gets lung cancer, which she had been warned about and warned about. Then she sues the tobacco company for giving her cancer and the jury awards her $28 *billion*. She will never see a cent of that because of all the appeals and everything else. She was instrumental in running Phillip Morris stock down and all its stock holders significantly in the last week or ten days. She was instrumental in fattening the wallets of the trial lawyers who are just even more encouraged now.

Everybody on the floor out there will either not say anything about it or will, if they say anything, it will be in defense of the trial lawyers when their issues come up. Because the trial lawyers contribute so much. Now, I may violate my own prediction. You can buy a vote. The trial lawyers contribute so much. I don't know, but would that have happened forty years ago? Not a prayer. They have been talking about tort reform for years. It is even worse now.

But your question was why do I account for the diminishment of the Senate. I think all of those interests groups, money supporting those interests groups and then without question the media. Forty years ago you had the *Washington Post* and the *Washington Star* and you had the *Atlantic Constitution* and you had radio and some basic television. A member would read the papers, and *Time* magazine, and *Newsweek,* and the hometown newspapers and he or she would be influenced pretty much by the ebbs and flows, but no volcanic reactions.

Today they are coming at them from all directions on momentary notice demanding answers to this, demanding that, portraying this, portraying that, building up the issues, slanting the issues, banning the issues, hammering, hammering to where they all run for cover and do their own thing to protect their own ass. That's my impression of what's going on. How do you bring that one hundred bodies over there back to a semblance of civility, comity, sagacity, humor, seriousness, concern for the general welfare for the country as contrasted with concern for narrow segment of the Congress? I don't know.

I think of one other thing in all of this miasma, that Vietnam and its aftermath changed the culture of this country. What I am seeing on the Senate floor today is the Vietnam demonstrators, still fairly cohesive on their post-Vietnam issues, war and peace and military. Then I am seeing the post-Vietnam people, the Evan Bayhs are demonstrating a more responsible, open-minded, fair-minded view than that element of Vietnam. On the House side, for example, in Nam we had Hanoi Jane—Jane Fonda. There was a big, Goddamn national uproar over what she did. Yet [James] McDermott and [David] Bonior went over there to Iraq and in my opinion did worse because she was just talking to the soldiers. These people were talking to the world and as much as telling the world that Bush was a liar, that he was a manipulator, that he is a danger. Now the young people, younger than McDermott, it seems to be are disowning him and criticizing him as they should.

Then you go back to the old-timers, they represented their constituency. I have always felt that when you look at a senator and study him for an hour you could look right through him and see his constituents. If he came from Montana—[Max] Baucus may be an exception—agriculture was important, mining was important, roads were important, gun control was tantamount, abortion, generally speaking they are more pro-life out there. Then you go look at another person from we'll say Connecticut or New Jersey. Take New Jersey, for example, and you look through a [Robert] Torricelli in the Democratic party in New Jersey and you see the makeup of the Democratic party in New Jersey. There is human corruption; there is party corruption. So he is a figurehead for the people he represents.

You go down to, I don't care, take any state you want and look at an individual elected by the people of the state or that district and you can pretty well get an instinctive viewpoint of what those people are, who they are, what they're like, what they want. Because that's what they sent. They elected who they wanted to represent them. Therefore, whatever he or she is doing here and whatever he or she is demonstrating, he or she is reflecting what the people who voted for them wanted them to do or they wouldn't be here or they wouldn't stay here. I haven't given you any good answers. If you want me, I have to ramble.

RITCHIE: No, no, they are very pertinent answers about the political system. Because you have been so interested in the military issues both inside and outside the Senate, back in the 1950s there was a very large percentage of the members of Congress who had served in the military. Today, it's a small percentage.

KIMMITT: And getting smaller.

RITCHIE: Does that affect policy, do you think, in the two chambers?

KIMMITT: I think you could go either way, Don. One, you could take the view that people who have not served in the military and have come since the '50s, they can be somewhat intimidated by the military because they inherently have a right to have a little guilt feeling that they didn't serve, even though it was beyond their control. Now, if it is people who deliberately stayed out of the military and fought to stay out of the military like for example, Phil Gramm, or people who went to Canada, or even Bill Clinton, a good example, then I think the military has a right to

be intimidated to a degree by them. They can dislike them, in many cases hate them. But there isn't anything they can do about them. They are there.

So, we always come back, Don, to the middle on any issue. There are the leftists, the rightists and the centrists. Nearly all decisions are ultimately made by the centrists. The leftists, they probably were at one time, but are never going to be in a position of influencing the final decisions. Nor are the ultra-conservatives. You've got to get some of them and some of them and a lot of these and they are all shades of gray. Out of that comes a consensus of what to send to the President of the United States. Then, of course, you have that final act of signature or no signature. But this causes a great ebb and flow of history and attitudes.

I am astounded today at the support, projected to get, on this Iraq resolution. To my mind, that resolution is projected to pass overwhelmingly by the Congress is almost an open-ended authority for a president to order our forces into a combat situation. I don't think that was ever intended by the framers of the Constitution. I think that's what Senator Byrd is raising so much hell about. You take on the Constitution in a way, the separation of powers. At a minimum, equal power, between the administration and the legislators. Now, of course, with the other branch of government that just comes to play when there is a legal situation.

I believe that Byrd today is absolutely right, but I don't agree with the way he is going about it, but I think he's right. I am astounded that they are going to give Bush this authority. Then it's going to be very interesting to watch what he does with it. I don't think he's going to do a damn thing with it before the fourth of November. And yet, by March it's going to be too hot over there to effect anything. So, the temperature zone of emotion, not natural heat or cold, the emotional temperature zone is going to take place between 15 November and 15 April. Or even before the 1st of March. If he stays controlled enough, if he can get the cooperation out of the United Nations, and if he can avoid under any circumstances going to war, he is going to be a big, big winner. If on the other hand, in my opinion, he takes this authority and puts into play and things start going bad and the body bags start coming home and the setbacks come along, then I think we are right back to the demonstrations on campuses and in the streets in America during Vietnam. I hope neither of those comes about.

But right now I think the military is relatively comfortable with their position. They certainly

have been given a lot in the last few years under Republicans and the Congress to satisfy their basic needs and desires. Their respect, God knows, since 9/11 has been just a drumbeat of patriotism for our boys in uniform, and our firemen, and our police. They are finished with the trauma of coming home from Nam to a populace that cries "How many babies did you kill today?" That's out of the way. They are being equipped with the best weaponry available and even better to come. I think the military can be excused for being pro-Bush, pro-Republican, starting with Reagan and on through. They can be excused for being anti-Clinton for a variety of reasons. But I don't know where we're going, Don. Neither do you. I think that's about all the bullshit I can give you unless you have a question.

RITCHIE: Well, thank you. You know it was twenty years ago that I asked you to come do an oral history and I want to thank you for coming 'round today.

KIMMITT: I wish I had done it then, except I wouldn't have been able to comment on recent history.

RITCHIE: Having a retrospective view has a value; it puts things in perspective.

KIMMITT: I am very confident that in all these words that you and I have passed back and forth there are going to be misstatements, there's going to be faulty memory, convoluted reasoning, but what the hell. That's what it's all about.

RITCHIE: Well, the difference between you and most researchers is you were there. They are looking to you because they want to know what this institution was like from your perspective.

End of the Sixth Interview

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