SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT
Interview #1
Tuesday, August 2, 2005

RITCHIE: I noticed that you went to school in Illinois but I wasn't sure, is Illinois your home? Is that where you grew up?

BREZINA: I grew up in northeastern Illinois and southeastern Wisconsin. I was very close to the border there, so a little bit of both. I graduated from high school as valedictorian in a small town called Fox Lake, Illinois. Coincidentally, the class of '55 is coming up on its 50th reunion in October. Whether I'll make it out there or not, since my wife passed away, I'm not excited about being a single person going to a reunion, at least at this stage. But time does fly. Half a century ago.

RITCHIE: What did your family do?

BREZINA: Now?

RITCHIE: Back then, when you were growing up.

BREZINA: Well it was sort of one of those small-scale success stories. My parents were sort of lower-middle class. My father was a small-business man and my mother was, mostly, a homemaker. There was a divorce early on, and that was traumatic in those days because people didn't get divorced. I even lived with my grandparents for a few years, sort of bounced around a little bit, but I identified with scholastics and kept on getting good grades.

I had an eighth grade schoolteacher who introduced me to bird-watching. That, also, was pretty subversive out in Illinois in the '50s. This was a time of McCarthyism and General [Douglas] MacArthur's triumphant return after being booted by Harry Truman in the Korean War. Bird-watching and reading books like *Animal Farm*, and things like that, when you are in eighth grade and ninth grade, was really radical. Looking back on that, I had no idea how big the world was. It was the world within fifty miles of where I lived. I graduated valedictorian of my high school class of 102, of which maybe 10 of us went on to

college. My ticket out of that sort of humble origin was an appointment to the Naval Academy.

RITCHIE: How did you decide to go to the Naval Academy?

BREZINA: My uncle, my mother's brother, was a pilot in World War II. He was a Thunderbolt pilot, who unfortunately, on one of his missions about a month before the end of the war, crashed into a mountain in Italy. He was sort of the family hero. It was very sad. After that, there popped up on the horizon, the year I was graduating from high school, the first class of the U.S. Air Force Academy. A very small class. It would have been the class of '59, and I graduated from high school in '55. There were maybe 10 or 12 people being selected from the state of Illinois. So that was what I was pushing for. Whether I was going to make a good pilot or not, that was always untested.

I came in as the first alternate in the selection for the Air Force Academy, so I guess out of twelve, I was the thirteenth. But in the process, I discovered that congressmen—in this case it was a congresswoman—had appointment capabilities to the other military academies, and applied through the process, which included taking a civil service exam, for the Naval Academy. I came in second or third and didn't get an appointment directly, but through a friend of a friend who knew a Captain Mott at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center (who later became the Judge Advocate General of the navy) there was a convincing case made that I was a bright kid that deserved consideration, and I got a superintendent's appointment. Evidently, for the people that had done real well but didn't get in through congressional appointments, there were a couple hundred more slots. So at the last minute, I found out that I was going to the Naval Academy, and that last minute was like a month after I graduated from high school.

Not unlike Houdini, whose supposedly greatest escape was Appleton, Wisconsin, mine was out of that environment, where I probably wouldn't have gone very far, because I wasn't automatically going to college. My appointment to the Naval Academy came five days late, and that was like July 4th or 5th in 1955. It was five days after everybody else got their plebe class. So I was on a five-day routine, and we tried to milk that for the rest of the summer, because we were just a few days behind everybody. It happened to be the hottest summer in Maryland history until recently, and boy was that another world. We don't have to get into that too much, but it was—

RITCHIE: Very physical?

BREZINA: Physical it was, yes. Officer and gentleman, by act of Congress, and during plebe year they came at you from every direction. There was a lot of hazing in those days. A recent conversation I had with the classmate from high school was about that eighth grade school teacher who was able to, at times, impose physical penalties on people. She's a retired teacher now and she says, "but you can't do that anymore." You can't haze like they did at the Academy anymore. A lot of physical activity. A lot of plebe knowledge to put under your belt. A lot of do's and don't's and should's and shouldn't's, and it was incredible, but it kept you busy.

RITCHIE: You came from the inland, and suddenly, you were on the water. Did you have to get adjusted to the sailing and all the other things?

BREZINA: Well, I guess it would have been as much of an adjustment if I had gotten out to Colorado and had to learn how to fly. Yes, right at the beginning of plebe summer there were the knockabouts, the smaller sailboats, and the yawls, seaman knowledge, port and starboard—I'll get into that later, as I've always had trouble reminding myself which was which, very basic but obviously very nautical. Right there in Crab Town on the Bay. The Academy was located in Annapolis back in the mid-nineteenth century because the powers-that-be decided that the midshipmen would get into too much trouble if it were located in Philadelphia. So they put the Academy in this little burg of a town. It was still pretty much pristine, even in the '50s. No railroad, no airport or anything. It took a lot of people to figure out how to keep midshipmen out of trouble, and that sort of was the way it went. There were about a thousand in our class when we came in.

RITCHIE: Did you find that you adjusted well to this? Or was it a difficult transition?

BREZINA: I was in the same boat with hundreds of other people. We shared the same gripes and resentments and difficulties and concerns. I guess I surprised some people back home who thought I'd never make it. I did quite well. I never really thought about why it might have been hard for me. I just did what I was supposed to do. I guess I got pretty good at that, and I ended up graduating fourth in my class. If you get into sort of the subtext, if I hadn't had this one English professor two times in the last year, who didn't think engineers

knew much about English and didn't know how to write anyway, and always graded low, I probably could have graduated first, which, maybe at the time, was a big deal. Graduating was great, and graduating that high was quite a surprise to me. I just sort of competed with myself and I guess I found out I could do pretty well.

RITCHIE: So your course of study was primarily engineering?

BREZINA: Primarily engineering. Now the Academy, at one time, graduated diplomats around the turn of the last century, graduated people who, when they achieved command at sea, also served a foreign service function as well. There even was a Nobel Laureate who did physics research there, by the name of Albert Michelson, on the speed of light. So there was an intellectual tradition at the time. I call our class of '59 the last of the pre-renaissance classes because the curriculum was totally frozen. If you came in, not like me, but like my roommate, who had a year of Penn State under his belt, it didn't count for anything. So people that had college, many of them, had a really easy first year and that didn't always serve them well when they had to get into things they hadn't had before. So it was pretty much nuts and bolts. The bull department, English, history and government, was off on the side there. It's sort of ironic because that's where I ended up sort of focusing later in life.

RITCHIE: Did you think that you'd have a career in the navy?

BREZINA: I didn't discount it. There's a little bit of cockiness in me that perhaps didn't serve me well at times, because, 20 or 30 years in the navy with a lot of support and a lot of predictability isn't the worst thing in the world, particularly if you're out of the Academy. But I started getting more intellectually interested in what the world was about. At that time there wasn't a lot of such opportunity, unlike now. Naval officers have much more flexibility in graduate work preferences and things like that, but not back in the '50s.

I found out that there was a field called "history of science," and I really thrilled to that. I loved the science courses at the Academy. I had a good science background from there. And, of course, history of science and the navy just didn't fit. I could have gone to MIT, engineering follow on, and things like that. But if I wanted to go into something a little more exotic and culturally enhancing, I needed to get out of the service. That's what I did. Even though I had the opportunity, and I probably should have thought about it more, of going to

the Sorbonne if I stayed in. My mentor, the Judge Advocate General, found out that he could get me in there. I don't know whether I could have gotten over the language barrier and all that, but there were some opportunities. I was just oriented towards going to Harvard or Wisconsin or Indiana, in their history of science program. I ended up at Harvard.

RITCHIE: You were still in the navy at the time you went to Harvard, right?

BREZINA: No, I left after four years.

RITCHIE: Did you have to do any active service after you came out of the Academy?

BREZINA: Yes, I served four years of active duty. It was going to be entirely at sea. "Go to sea, young man. That's where you go." During those four years, there were about six Mediterranean cruises and about 10 Caribbean cruises. Every once in a while you'll get into your home port and see your wife and family. Again, you're in the same boat with everybody else. I was on the USS *Boston*, out of Boston, which was sort of a neat place because there were only a couple of ships stationed there at the time. I got to know a little bit about Boston. And then I spent the other two years down in Norfolk. After four years, I was a full lieutenant and had a scholarship to Harvard, where, I found out, they were interested to see whether anybody from the Naval Academy really knew anything. You know, "We never had a Naval Academy graduate." They mentioned Albert Michelson and that connection and, of course, I didn't know much about that. I soon discovered that without a liberal arts background at the undergraduate level, going into the history of science, or most of those areas, was quite difficult.

But there was Harvard. I'm going to footnote—my wife, who recently passed away, is from Duxbury, Massachusetts, and this weekend there is going to be a memorial service for her up there. She lived in Duxbury for the first 52 years of her life, on the same street. Then we'd been married about 11 years. But one of the movies that really caught me, although the ending was not one I ever dreamed would happen, was *Love Story*. I'm watching *Love Story* this week—I just couldn't watch it for the last three or four weeks—but that Harvard atmosphere, it was something really to behold. I was awestruck by it. So erudite, so intellectual, so "lofty-premise," "ultimate hypothesis," fascinating, just totally fascinating, when I was there.

I was there including the day that JFK was assassinated, and that whole campus just shut down. You could hear a pin drop, outside even. But, this was the cream of the cream, and during that year-and-a-half to two years that I was there, I was going for a PhD, but that was just not working out too well because of the length of time and the cost and so forth. I got fascinated in government classes there. You could audit anything you wanted to. That was a time when science and government were starting to click in, and the precursors of the Kennedy School of Government and policy studies groups, and so forth, that are so well known now, were starting up there. I just got interested in the contemporary history of science. Post-World War II's science had grown so much and gotten so much more recognition. So I was auditing the classes that, looking back, really should have been my major. Taking these time-count classes of Mayan calendar construction, which were rather esoteric, and what Newton was all about, was fascinating stuff, but you really needed Latin. You needed Greek. You didn't need a lot of Latin and Greek for post-World War II. I'm embellishing. I'm really happy to be doing this.

RITCHIE: Oh, that's good.

BREZINA: You tell me if I'm going off too much.

RITCHIE: No, no, I'm very interested about that, about how somebody figures out what their niche is, in a sense. How often it's not what we set out to do, but it's what we discovered along the way.

BREZINA: Life is what happens when you have other plans. Another subtext here. You got a masters automatically if you got through the first year, and everybody got through their first year. So that was nice, but a history of science masters, you didn't go anywhere with that. So to earn some money, I got back on active duty that first summer and went down to the Pentagon in one of those offices where a captain and a commander were sitting and revamping some training program or something like that. I became aware—I mean, here's the Pentagon, with 30,000 people, and commanders and captains were whining and complaining about how little authority they had, "I can't wait to go back to sea," and of course, sea duty wasn't exactly my cup of tea. I mean, it's hard to be at sea. So I was starting to get an introduction into the bureaucracies, although I didn't quite call it that.

For some reason, when I ended up here in the Senate, and that was via the Science Policy Research Division of the Legislative Reference Service, I just felt comfortable here, even though it was a mission impossible and all the difficulties. Because working in a bureaucratic, highly hierarchical, structured organization like the military, like almost any other agency these days, just wasn't my cup of tea. And I didn't know that until I started listening in the Pentagon to what they were saying. The reinforcement was so negative, I thought.

RITCHIE: And the Pentagon, in particular, with all of those rings and all of those corridors of people in little offices doing little things, I suppose you could get very frustrated there.

BREZINA: The E Ring is where you wanted to be, and supposedly the joke was if you drove around the Pentagon at nighttime and you just looked where the lights were on, you could tell what part of the world was having a problem. If you were a commander or a captain, unless you were in some kind of fast track, you were in the D, C, B Ring, and you had 15 layers above you, for example, coming off command at sea, where you were in charge of a 10,000-ton cruiser. Yes, that was drilled home. I guess you make trade-offs, and I went more on my own. There's the high-wire act at times, and I've had problems with that. But that's been my preference.

RITCHIE: Well, now, how did you get from the Pentagon to the Library of Congress?

BREZINA: Well, that was just for a summer. I came back to Harvard and I faced three or four more years of study before I could get a PhD. I got through another semester and then there were pressures from my wife and a son about four years old. I was working in the history of science library within Widener, for $1.10 an hour. There wasn't much work. You could study while you were in the history of science library. But I could only put so many part-time jobs together to make a go of it. I had the masters and I got more and more interested in the science in government, and decided that maybe a PhD just couldn't be done, at least at that time.

The kind of thing to do then included being a historian or working in a historian's office in one of the agencies down here, like the Atomic Energy Commission. That was what

it was called in those days. So I had some entrees to that kind of position, and after two years at Harvard, I came down to Washington. To an extent, my good friend who had been my eighth grade school teacher was down here already. He had an interesting job. Of course, he always sort of slanted it in cloak-and-dagger terms, but he had come back from the Foreign Service to active duty in the Pentagon. He was a navy JG. There were only three or four lieutenant junior grades in the Pentagon. He was essentially keeping an eye on the air force, and seeing how much they were leaking to the press in terms of things that had doctrinal impact.

Well, that kind of sophistication appealed to me very much. That's when I had a conversation with the admiral he was working under, who was the oceanographer of the navy, who made no bones about it: "Go to sea, young man. Go to sea." This was before I got out of the service. Anyway, he was down in Washington, my friend George Lowe. He was essentially spying on the air force. Well, the air force was doing a lot of spying on the navy, and the navy was always way behind in this kind of thing. They were more of the gentleman's service, and things would just work out, tradition-laden and so forth. The air force's 10 or 15 years of history at that time was very technology-oriented and pushing the envelope all the time. But they were also pushing the envelope up here on the Hill. That was, as much as anything, an inducement to coming down to Washington. Getting the right job or knowing where to look and all that was a whole other matter.

I had some good jobs, but they were in the bureaucracies. One was at the Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center, which had the perk of being located on the Naval Observatory grounds. This was before the vice president lived there. That was where the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] used to live. And that was the old Naval Observatory. There's where history of science kicked in again. In the old days, the military really spearheaded scientific effort back in the 19th century, with things like the Naval Observatory. So right behind the Naval Observatory was this little, small organization known as the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center. I was there for six months, and I was, you know, sitting in my cubicle and it was like, oh, my. I don't know, people adjust to this, but it was so *boring*! I had to be looking at photographs, and it was okay, but it was so sort-of cloistered and confining.

Then I went from there to the Public Information Office of the National Bureau of Standards, which was okay. That was when Standards was downtown, and they had that

campus-type of environment in northwest, D.C. It was incredible, it was like a college campus. Then they moved out to the Gaithersburg area and I was there for that move. Also, I was just stultified by the lack of excitement and energy. Then, lo and behold, somehow there was a lecture I stumbled on and somebody was talking about science and government at the bureau, and they had just met with Ed Wenk, who was the head of the new Science Policy Research Division in the Legislative Reference Service in the Library of Congress. I just can't tell you how excited I was. I didn't even know there was such a thing, and of course, it just had gotten started, this Science Policy Division. That was in '65, and they were looking for people. I was just in the right place at the right time with that background and interest and all that. I got an interview with him, and he couldn't believe it. "We want you, really." I was excited as hell.

I really don't know where the congressional interest in my life comes in. This morning, though, I got up to the Hill and I've always been so impressed that two-thirds of the federal government is located up here, in this small little area. And these two-thirds work quite well without all the trimmings and trappings of bureaucracy, although some would say there's too many staff and stuff like that. So, even today, I just get a thrill that I have been able to be associated with the U.S. Congress. When I started, it was at ground-level, although, with the background I had—they had these special categories, a physical science analyst, and so forth—that jumped you several grades. So the pay was also quite good. The next couple of years I spent learning the ropes of how to interact with congressional aides, and respond to requests, and to learn the old pro-and-con of presenting an issue, which to this day survives in me. It's been very effective in my work, mostly with state legislatures, and on the Hill here, where you're not an advocate so much as—well, you're an advocate, but you're giving the pluses and minuses and making it easier for the person who is in a highly politically sensitive area to make sound judgements and decisions.

RITCHIE: You're responsible for giving a balanced view of what the issues are.

BREZINA: That was drilled into me at LRS. Nobody really complained about that, it was just the way things were done. You had to learn how to do that, but it was part of the indoctrination. There were tensions there. Wenk was a protege of Jerry Weisner, who I believe was the first science advisor to President Kennedy. He came out of the executive, an engineering background, and when you take a subject like science and plop it down in an organization like LRS, or if you do it up here in the committee structure, you're stepping on

toes. At least the perception is there. So the education people were whining a little bit, and the public health people over there, because we had sort of carved out this area. And I'm not sure where the pushes and pulls came in LRS, but the science budget was growing after World War II. There was a growing need to figure out how do you incorporate this budget into the political democratic process of the federal government, not just in funding and the needs, but also accountability and oversight. That was one of the early responses on the Hill. So there was that tension there, and it was also sort of like we were the crack troops. We were the Green Berets or something, and we're getting the higher grades and better pay. So if you had to interact with another division, it wasn't always the easiest thing to do.

There was also the tension between LRS and the stalwarts of the library. It would be over things like the books that were loaned out to the Congress, that may never get returned. There was a presumption that this was not a good thing, if you were on the librarian side. It wouldn't go very far if you reminded them that this was the Library of Congress! It was like, "No, we want our books here." So you had that kind of tension, too. The third tension was that there wasn't enough room for everybody, so they started partitioning off that beautiful building. That, as you know I'm sure, was built by the Corps of Engineers in its Italian renaissance style. It has to be one of their finer moments.

RITCHIE: When I came to Washington, the Great Hall was divided into all those little cubicles up there.

BREZINA: And blocking off the light. We didn't like that either, of course.

RITCHIE: I'm sure the librarians hated it, too.

BREZINA: This beautiful building was being carved up into a huge ice cube tray. And so, of course, we were seen as the hot shots, insensitive to all the aesthetics. I remember some of the conversations when I first got there about things such as what we take for granted today, like air conditioning. The year before I got to the Science Policy Research Division was the year that air conditioning came into the Library of Congress. That was a major engineering feat. Probably for the U.S. Capitol, too. But those who had been there before had these stories about how *awful* it was working there in August of '63 or '64. I guess there were some windows you could open. I didn't know that, but you barely made it through the summer. I believe, at least at one time, Foreign Service people from other

countries who were stationed here considered this a “hardship post” as far as the weather was concerned.

RITCHIE: Tropical duty, right?

BREZINA: Tropical duty, pith helmets.

RITCHIE: When you were at the Legislative Reference Service, did you work more with the House or the Senate, or was it evenly divided?

BREZINA: Probably more with the House, because of the Daddario Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development. Science seemed to originate in the Congress in committees that also were dealing with NASA. It was like Science and Astronautics, I think was the rubric in the House side. The Daddario Subcommittee, Congressman [Emilio Q.] Daddario from Connecticut was the chair, and was the first standing science subcommittee in the House. He found the Science Policy Research Division very useful and tasked us a lot of times. Of course, some of the senior people there were very active in sort of inculcating relationships that would be mutually beneficial. Maybe 20 people were working in our division, and there were a lot of senior people that I was working with, seasoned, senior specialists in LRS, which gave me a chance to be around some very savvy people. That included, although I didn’t work with her too much, Eileen Galloway, who was the wife of George Galloway, who I think had passed away by then, who was the architect of the ’46 legislative reorganization plan. So history, politics, science, government, I was in seventh heaven there. It was all that I ever wanted it to be.

The Senate side was a couple of years behind in getting something going in the science policy area. That became, eventually, the Senate Subcommittee on Government Research, an oversight committee on the Government Operations Committee in the Senate, which I later went to work for, chaired by Senator [Fred] Harris. The House version was more of a legislative committee. So you had those two, and then you had people like Senator [Warren] Magnuson, who was very much concerned about maritime and oceanic affairs. There was the push to create a council on marine science and engineering, which would be a presidential-level, White House-level council. That did get formed eventually and Wenk became the first executive director of it. I believe Senator Magnuson was chair of the Commerce Committee at the time. So there were other committees, but mostly it was those

two subcommittees, and then a smattering of others. Henry Reuss had some subcommittee in the House Government Operations Committee.

I think it was pretty much split 50-50 between House and Senate requests. There were a lot of routine things. Somebody's master's was being helped by some research over here. But there were some heady things, too. I'm going to meet with him today, and maybe I can talk about this later. There were the computers coming to the Hill, and the person that got that started was named Robert Chartrand. He came to the Science Policy Research Division from business, which was like it had never happened before. These (LRS) were all more academically-oriented people. So he had not only to deal with something totally new called computers on the Hill, or he had the opportunity to do that, but he also had to live up to a lot of skepticism as somebody who was coming from IBM. I had the chance to sit in on some of those early meetings, and they were mainly over in the Legislative Reference Service, to get the Library of Congress started. Payroll, you know, the nitty-gritty stuff. But there was a lot of political skepticism about moving into research and how well computers would do versus the, sort of, textured, nuanced, experiential style of present-day research. I'm going to ask him about that this afternoon, and maybe if another meeting is possible, I could mention a little bit about that. They had a profound impact. I haven't followed the curve. Obviously, they are profoundly influential now. I wish I knew more about this, because I'd like to make some comments about what may have been lost from all this. I'll get into that a little bit down the road, talking about staffers now and then. I have some strong feelings about it.

But computers was one thing, and another thing that I had the chance to work in from the ground floor was the Office of Technology Assessment. Well, it wasn't really an office when it started. It was the concept of technology assessment. Daddario was interested in this, and I had the opportunity, working with one of the senior people, of putting together essentially the first draft of what technology assessment might be. It was really just a concept and didn't have much precedent, particularly on the congressional side. So the idea was to get more insight before big decisions are made by Congress on the implications of moving ahead in certain technological areas, not only the pluses but the minuses. The unwanted consequences and that kind of thing. I had a chance to talk with Dan Greenberg, who's now a guest scholar at Brookings, and had been a one-of-a-kind, really aggressive reporter for *Science* magazine in those days and then later developed his own news service called "Science and Government." He was constantly probing into the depth of things, which was

not always popular with people, but would raise questions about how well the system was working.

Office of Technology Assessment later got lopped off when Speaker [Newt] Gingrich came in with "Contract of America." Evidently the reason was that they were looking for something with high visibility that could be terminated. It was their show. I think the one-third reduction in committee staff of the House side and so forth, perhaps, wasn't quite as visible as this $30 million a year office that had sort of become—Greenberg's term was that it had gotten a "Democratic pedigree." I believe the head of that office went over and became Clinton's science advisor. So there are a couple of reasons there, and it finally got lopped off. The whole question about what kind of advice Congress should get on scientific and technical issues constantly comes up and is reborn and different things are tried. Some work and some don't.

RITCHIE: It seems to me that most members of Congress probably encountered science more through military issues than through civilian issues, at least at that point. You mentioned the committees you were dealing with, but how about the Armed Services Committees? Did they ever turn to the LRS for advice, or did they rely on the Pentagon for that kind of advice?

BREZINA: That's a good question. I want to say not so much, but I'm not sure. I don't recall that. Yes, post-World War II, much of the science, initially, was still being supported by the Pentagon, and their R&D budget was quite substantial. It wasn't until entities like the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health, under Lister Hill's concerns, really expanded in areas of domestic scientific research. I don't remember any kind of interaction with the Armed Services Committees having happened with regards to the Science Policy Research Division. I know I didn't do any work there. And that became a concern in science policy circles as well, that maybe there was too much research being supported by the Pentagon, that had too much secrecy surrounding it, that some of that could or should be moved into the domestic side.

In fact, one of the major concerns of Senator Harris in the Senate Subcommittee on Government Research, one of the things that got that whole thing started, was concern about how the social sciences were being supported. I wish I had more time to go into this, but there were projects called "Simpatico" and "Camelot" that were defense-supported social

science research that evidently were tied into some of the more nefarious things that the CIA had thought about doing in South America, and sort of exploded in the face of the Pentagon, and became a justification for some senators and congressmen up here to take another look at how that whole thing was being done and to try to move that research out of the Pentagon into domestic agencies. The National Social Science Foundation concept that was introduced by Senator Harris that became the political platform for his hearings on social science research came out of the concern about DOD's involvement in many things that they maybe not necessarily need to be involved in any longer. They picked up a lot of the slack after World War II, I guess, and there came a time in the '60s when politically there was a decision to start sorting some of this out. None of that was, I'm sure, done in a very neat way. There wasn't one person saying, "We need to do this."

But your question about the Armed Services committees, I don't remember ever being asked to help them. They may well have depended highly on the Pentagon, and of course, that sort of closed the loop for much debate. But if I remember correctly, some of the Armed Services Committee chairmen were not extraordinarily excited about opening things up to wide-scale debate.

RITCHIE: Yes, it was pretty closed. That was still when the CIA only reported to Senator Richard Russell and to Senator Leverett Saltonstall and to nobody else. Most of the rest of the Senate didn't want to know about some of those things.

BREZINA: Right. When I got into the Senate, I happened to work for a very liberal senator, in fact two of them, for whom this kind of thing was not very palatable. The only thing, this is an area I don't know a lot about or don't recall as much as I'd like to, but there was always a testing for me because I came out of the military and I had no real background in high school of being a fiery liberal or anything like that. I had a great degree of respect for people I was working for, and working for Senator Harris was mainly working for his Subcommittee on Government Research. Then later, Gaylord Nelson, well he was a senator from Wisconsin as well as being a very liberal senator. So I was tested at times because the liberal slant on things, too, has its limitations, à la gadfly, à la maverick, à la Wayne Morse. Although reading about him, particularly in your oral histories, I have found no one that had anything really not nice to say about him, although he was always one of a kind.

But there was some stretching because the military has a role and there's secrecy and inattention to a lot of niceties by virtue of having to get the job done. At the same time, I had some opportunities to take some shots at the military on things that I thought, because my boss was concerned about them, that were appropriate to do. That get's into a little bit later with the Nelson work and the herbicide issue.

RITCHIE: While you were at LRS, what kinds of projects did you work on and how did you go about researching it? You were sitting in the biggest library in the world, but did you have time to actually study issues to present, or were you working under a lot of deadlines?

BREZINA: There were always deadlines and there were people who would remind you of those deadlines, and if the deadline looked like it didn't need to be quite so far in advance, they might suggest you move it up a little bit. There was that side. There was the side of working with senior people, who had very good research skills and knew the library system pretty well. There was the "hunt and peck" style of going out into the stacks and getting things that you were looking up, and a combination of those. Then there were a number of levels of sophistication of what you were doing. If it was just a list of books on such-and-such or so-and-so, that was one level. If you were going to help a committee put a report together where there was considerable research involved, such as a report I helped a senior person do for, I believe, the Reuss subcommittee, was a much higher level. I forget the name of that subcommittee.

Henry Reuss from Wisconsin, although he was a Democrat and a liberal, made a name for himself with regard to government oversight. He was very concerned about how well we were doing things, and in that process, he became interested in how other countries, particularly European countries and maybe Japan, were dealing with their science issues. We had a chance to sort of look at Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union to a certain extent—a lot of it was not known—and Japan, into their superstructure and to what extent they were dealing with science and public policy and how did they come by it and so forth and so on. So that required a lot of research and a lot of digging and talking to people and so forth. I was not on a short leash, but I wasn't really able to just go my own way when I was at a middle-level position there.

RITCHIE: Would you go to hearings or other events on Capitol Hill, or did you pretty much work out of the library?

BREZINA: Some hearings. There was a lot of encouragement that you had to fertilize the territory by reaching out, and meeting, and experiencing what's going on, and not just sitting in a cubicle. One of the people that was there that I should mention was Charles Sheldon, who later became the staff director for the Bolling committee on reorganization, the Committee on Committees, I think it was called. So there was a lot of sophistication, not just in science. Sheldon's specialty was NASA and aerospace. But the political science side of things, although Wenk was an engineer, he also understood that one needed to understand oversight, legislation, appropriations and the functions of Congress. Get out and meet and do things. And in that process, myself and another colleague at the Science Policy Research Division put together a training program for people like us and got the blessings of the senior people and brought people in to talk with us from outside of the LRS.

We were quite eclectic. I don't know where all the time came, and we weren't constantly at committee hearings, but it was important to do that to get a sense of the rhythms, the types of questions to ask, the decorum, the givens, so that we understood better when we were interacting with a congressman or staff where they were coming from. That wasn't easy, but now I can look back on it and say that when I hear some people go on and on about Congress or staffers and how they don't know anything, it's just not the case most of the time. They just have a different context that one has to appreciate. At least that's my point of view.

RITCHIE: How would you describe that context?

BREZINA: Well, timing. Timing is incredibly important, and I'll give you later a couple of my anecdotes. When you're in the right place at the right time, some things can just whoosh right through. They're aware of the pushes and pulls and where timing would be a relevant thing, although they may not let that be known to you because that's hardly political. Trade-offs. There's timing and trade-offs. To get where you want to go, it may be the half-a-loaf and not the whole loaf that's feasible. So the feasibility of things, in terms of timing, in terms of the cast of characters. One friend of mine who later became staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that his job was mostly massaging egos. I think

[John] Sparkman was the chair at that time.

RITCHIE: Was that Bill Bader?

BREZINA: It was Norville Jones. Norville Jones had this incredible story, I almost forgot. This is an anecdote that's interesting, though. The last time I met with him on the Hill, he was a staff director, ensconced over in the Capitol. He said one of the perks that he never questioned was that this old man would come and deliver firewood for the fireplace. Nothing was ever said. Nobody ever knew where he came from. "One of these days," he said to me, sort of on the side, "he's going to be gone because someone's going to discover that it's not economical." I just laughed at that one.

You have to know your clientele, those senators, and they go a mile a minute. So trade-offs, timing, compromise. You need to have that flexibility, maybe you get just a little bit of something now, and then maybe later you'll get more. People outside the system often don't understand that context. They're "all or nothing at all," or they want to educate the congressmen or the staff person. I'm trying to work these days with people who want to interact with legislatures, and I do all my work pro bono. The first thing, when I get into it I say, "Don't try to educate them. You sound too arrogant." Even I've had to learn a lot of these lessons hard, but anecdotes seem to be much more appropriate than tons of data. They get inundated with data. I started to learn up here that studies and scientific research, in some areas, not necessarily physics, but in the social sciences, can be essentially political counters. Politicians and their aides are extraordinarily sensitive to that.

RITCHIE: I was wondering about constituencies. They have to worry about their state and also interests in their state. Does that play into it? In other words would they say, "I'd really like to see this scientific project as long as it's located in my state."

BREZINA: Well, you know, one of the set of hearings that the Harris subcommittee held was on the subject of equitable distribution of R&D funds. There was an attempt in the '60s to try to spread the wealth and realize that although the centers of excellence, the Ivy League and the West Coast, were certainly deserving of support, there was a self-perpetuating thing to that. When you had a senator from Oklahoma as chair of that subcommittee, and then the senior ranking senator was Karl Mundt from South Dakota, there was a need to look at trying to get a fair share per state of the budget on science and research

and development. I believe LBJ got into it with a statement made about expanding the centers of excellence around the country.

RITCHIE: This was the LBJ who brought the Space Center to Houston.

BREZINA: Texas has done pretty well in terms of all that, yes. And that's the kind of thing that isn't too popular with the upper echelon of science, science politicians or science citizens that like to think they're making policy out at the National Academy. Yet somehow, long term, that seems to be beneficial to everyone, because that does strengthen support up here. What's always been in question to me is that while these perspectives from up here are fairly recognizable and you can talk like we're talking right now about the need to spread the wealth for the purpose of spreading the constituency, even to this day it doesn't seem to be something that catches on very well with groups that, for lack of a better word, tend to be a little bit elitist. I've run into that in my present work. I mean, it's hard to make the case. You want more money for something? You've got to get more political support. You've got to expand that support. Now you may have to make some compromises while you do that. You start talking compromise, trade-offs and timing with elitist kinds of people, and it doesn't settle too well, even if it's in their best interest, because you're talking to people that know it all. And "know-it-alls" don't tend to go over too well on the Hill, unless they're a powerful "know-it-all" like the president's science advisor. But I don't think that's too fashionable anymore.

They were talking down to the Harris subcommittee when it first got started, and Harris said, "I would appreciate it if you would stop talking down to this subcommittee and making these points that are very obvious." That rocked the science establishment. That was an Oklahoma senator. You would not have heard a Massachusetts senator saying that, I don't think. They started taking us more seriously then. But, of course, you've got to be more serious and you've got to have more ability to say things that will appeal to them. So it's not always easy to make progress.

There was an incredible amount of arrogance. There probably still is. The National Institutes of Health have been off the political map for 20 years. If there ever is a time that they get scrutinized thoroughly, there's going to be a lot of feathers flying and a lot of upset people over that, because they're not used to it. I'm not sure why they've always led such a charmed life. Maybe you have some ideas?

RITCHIE: They've had some powerful patrons up here. Some senators have taken a special interest in health and science, while a lot of the other members don't seem to get as involved. That gives an advantage to the advocate, especially if it's chairman of the committee, to have exclusive domain over some issue.

BREZINA: That's a very good point. Science is a big deal, in a way, but it has not always been a big political deal. Greenberg, in my interview with him, made the point that Harris, and later John Glenn, to an extent, evidently, and I don't know too much about the latter, had an idea that they might ride science almost into the White House, but it didn't quite have the political pop that maybe some other issues might have had. So at that time the patron at NIH was Lister Hill and our jurisdiction of that Subcommittee on Government Research was the R&D budget, with the exception of NIH and the military budget.

I asked Harris about the NIH thing, because we got into biomedical areas incredibly in great detail over that time. A couple of things happened. One, even though if Hill had said that, that doesn't mean you don't sort of sneak around. Plus Hill retired in '68. He decided not to run again, I guess because he thought he might not win. That was part of it. And so by '67–'68, when it looked like Hill's influence was starting to ebb, it became a little easier for our subcommittee to get into some of the broader health-related issues that did impact on the NIH, by virtue of the fact that their clout was so pervasive.

RITCHIE: Of course, then Magnuson took up the slack for Hill and took special care of the NIH.

BREZINA: Yes, that happened, I guess, after I left.

RITCHIE: How did you make the transition from the Library of Congress to the Senate? Did you come as a temporary? I know that the LRS often lent staff to the Senate and some of those loans turned out to be long-term loans.

BREZINA: That I was aware of from other people going and coming and going. I'm only smiling because there was this chant you get out of places like the Library of Congress, or if you're an academic person going to work on a campaign or something: "Don't do it! It's too political. There's no job security. You'll ruin your skills." You know, all of this stuff that comes out. All well-intended and a lot of it probably very good advice. There are reasons to

not leave an area that has Civil Service standards and job security. By that time, I had gone through my three years and going into a situation that had risks, you know, if the senator gets defeated, you're gone. If the senator doesn't like you, you're gone. If the staff director and you get into a tussle over something, you're probably gone.

This little kid inside was still amazed at the aura. This was a big deal going over to the Senate Subcommittee on Government Research. There was a person who had been there who went over to the executive branch. I went over on loan to sort of see how it works. I was stacked away in a little cubicle down in the Russell Building, the Old Senate Office Building. Senator [A.S. Mike] Monroney was the other Oklahoma senator, and it was an old storeroom of his, right near the Delaware and C Street entrance. Ventilation wasn't something to write home about [laughs], but it was the Subcommittee on Government Research and this was the epitome of what you could do on the Hill. I became a permanent professional staff member after about a half-a-year. There were this chorus about, "You gotta be careful." A lot of stuff that was predicted happened. It was very difficult at times, very political.

I came into the subcommittee about halfway through its existence. Senator Harris gave me an hour and a half interview with him a couple of weeks ago. He's out in New Mexico, at the University of New Mexico, teaching political science. He's written about a dozen books since he's left the Senate, and he's writing novels now, as well as a book that updated a book about the Senate that came out in the '50s [*Deadlock or Decision: The U.S. Senate and the Rise of National Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)]. It's sort of an "is the Senate up to the challenge of the '90s?" kind of book. The subcommittee got started about two years before I came there. Of course, I was over in the Science Policy Research Division and knew of it from afar. There were tales about this subcommittee. You know, the staff director was an impossible person to work for, but he was a great guy. He came off Mansfield's floor staff and when Harris got the subcommittee, he got the plum of being the staff director. I don't think Harris found him on his own.

RITCHIE: Who was this?

BREZINA: Dr. Steve Ebbin. He had a political science PhD. It was very unusual for a Hill person to have a PhD. He had worked for Mansfield on his floor staff. I came in in mid-stream. I would really love to go on and on about what all they did, but for the first part I wasn't there directly. Harris said that the idea came to him when he was presiding over the

Senate and you're not allowed to do much of anything except read the *Congressional Record*. He was reading about what essentially was the Daddario subcommittee, about the House Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development. He made a note and said, "This is a great idea. Maybe we can do this over here."

One thing led to another, and he was on Government Operations already, and on pretty good terms with its chairman, John McClellan, from the neighboring state of Arkansas. I believe Harris came in when Senator [Robert] Kerr died and either he got an appointment or was elected to a two year term, and then reelected in '64. But anyway, he was an active member of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee and even presided over it a couple of times, he said. So when he went to McClellan with this idea, it was almost a done deal, and that's how it got started. And then six months later, I think it was the Rules and Administration Committee that Senator [Robert C.] Byrd of West Virginia presided over then, Harris requested staff and space. Staff was meager. Space was a tiny little room on the second floor of Russell off in a corner. It was like a large clothes closet. I think Senator [John] Warner uses it as an extra room now. And the Monroney storeroom, which came from Monroney and not from Senator Byrd. So there was virtually no space. $75,000 budget a year, and that included the salaries of three professionals. That was a minority staff person, who did nothing but try to get money for South Dakota, which was always interesting, and two clerk/secretaries.

I came in in the middle of that, in '68. I was there in '68 and '69, and in that year I went from feast to famine. Harris was—well, I'm going on and on about it. I wanted to say in the beginning that if you get me going, I'm going to go all over the place. I'm not a linear person.

RITCHIE: That's fine. It's interesting to see where you go. Could you, at this point tell me a little bit about Fred Harris as a person, and as a boss.

BREZINA: Well, the first thing I wanted to say, and I sort of bit my tongue, because I don't want to just come off in a negative way, but I had always had great affection for Will Rogers, and in Harris I saw a lot of Will Rogers. He came from very—you know, I came from meager background, but he came from a very, very meager background! Poor dirt farmers from western Oklahoma in the '30s, Depression, dust bowl. What always impressed me was the way, in terms of some of the hearings we held were not with the Harvard people

and the Daniel Moynihans, particularly after he got into the riots commission, the so-called Kerner Commission after the King riots in '68. We held hearings on the impact of deprivation on the personality and how do you get people who are unemployed employable, not only with job skills but with social skills as well. Here you've got a U.S. senator rapping with a black lady from Columbus, Ohio, about how she had to learn English as a second language, and he says, "I know what you mean." He says, "I'd read a lot of books, but I couldn't speak it when I got started." That always impressed me about him. He had a firm grasp of the basics. His wife, LaDonna, was a full-blooded Comanche. That also was rather interesting and they were quite a couple on the Hill.

The other thing that always impressed me, and I mentioned it to him, this was a minor little thing, but senators, like anybody, when they're up there presiding, don't always just listen to what is being said, but also have ways of focusing. He did the most incredible doodles that you could ever, ever imagine. I have a couple stuffed away somewhere. I can't find them now, but he would take a word like "civil disobedience," a phrase like that, and with his black and red pens, do virtually Native American designs around them. They would just leap out at you. After a hearing, when I was cleaning up, his yellow pad was like a treasure. I've always been amazed at that. They weren't even just doodles, they leaped out at you: "civil disobedience," "justice," "racism." Those were some of the things that were being discussed. And you almost knew, if you took a step back, that there was going to be a clash sometime down the road with McClellan, and there was a big one.

But I was impressed with him. I have a little more context and would say that he didn't always seem to have the best staff around, and this was his choice. But when I worked with the [Jimmy] Carter campaign and I worked for Gaylord Nelson, there were similarities that differed from Harris' style. He sort of thrived on "yes" people. When we talked for an hour and a half, he never mentioned staff. I was one of his staff and he didn't mention it. I wasn't really looking for a complement or anything. It was like he didn't even acknowledge I was staff. Anytime a question came up in the interview, it was, "Oh yeah, I did this, I did that." Well, I can't imagine he did all of this stuff. But he probably didn't choose his staff as well as he might have and given them a little bit more leash. But as a person who was vividly concerned about basic causes of problems, and this gets into the whole Great Society kick, he was super.

He was a seat-mate with Fritz Mondale and that's why they got along so well together. And he lived right next door, virtually, to Bobby Kennedy in McLean, and when Kennedy became a senator, they were real close. So he identified with those kinds of senators. At that time I thought that was the greatest thing in the world. But there isn't a senator like that up here now, hardly. I don't know, Kennedy maybe.

RITCHIE: It's interesting that he was a senator from Oklahoma, which is a conservative state, and he moved pretty much to the left as a senator.

BREZINA: In those days, there were populist senators like [Ralph] Yarborough and Harris that could get elected and reelected, and I don't think that's possible anymore. Populism has just sort of dissipated in America, at least for now. That used to be the center of populism, the southwestern states like that.

RITCHIE: What was his grasp of science, someone like Fred Harris?

BREZINA: He had, like many senators, been in the state legislature before he came to the Senate. He had good debating skills. He had good back-and-forth questioning, and so he had the ability to sort of be part of the debate and to keep it away from the highly technical issues, into policy-oriented discussions, and maybe broaden the circle of concern and even educate some of the witnesses, perhaps unintentionally. But one of the things that he mentioned and I should mention, there were some things done by that subcommittee that hadn't been done before. One was a conference out in Oklahoma State University at Stillwater on "Rural to Urban Population Shift: A National Problem." The subcommittee got into co-sponsorship of that conference with the Ford Foundation, which was unheard of. There was a lot of negotiation that went on, and this is where the staff director, with his savvy, was able to pull in money from the Ford Foundation to do this conference as a co-partner with a Senate subcommittee and Oklahoma State University.

When Harris started the subcommittee, the first activities were seminars. I believe Mondale sat in on them. It was a roundtable. There wasn't any chair, and he made the point about how unprecedented that was. He did not want to be presiding, initially for sure, where people would speak to him. He wanted to just be a participant, which again was sort of a gutsy thing to do. Those seminars really set a tone for the subcommittee, that it was going to do things a little bit differently and maybe reach out for some of the broader issues.

McClellan wanted you to be counting toilet paper rolls. I'm overstating it, but we got dubbed by some people as the "egghead subcommittee of the Senate." We were very intellectual. There were pluses to that and the people out there sort of liked us, but some of the powers-that-be, the [Karl] Mundts and McClellans, were not too happy with it. It gets into what philosophy lay behind oversight. We were overseeing an area that hadn't been overseen before, very thoroughly anyway, and we were raising some very interesting questions, I thought.

Heart transplants—we had Christian Barnard and [Norman] Shumway and [Adrian] Kantowitz, the original heart transplant surgeons, one from South Africa, who later dated Sophia Loren. I don't know how you did that easily in those days, getting somebody from South Africa. In between his hearings that night when he was here, I took him for a ride around Washington and showed him the sights. He marveled at all the things. But the question was, "Okay, we can do heart transplants, who's going to pay for this? Who gets it? Whom do you get the hearts from?" Not that those are questions that nobody was asking, but those weren't questions that they were asking in the Bureau of the Budget in those days. And we had some responses: "Wow, yeah we need to do it, but what's gonna happen? Where's this money gonna come from? Is it gonna come out of another pot somewhere? Are we gonna do less kidney dialysis now?"

There was a rhythm to do that kind of thing where you weren't legislating so much but you were raising the visibility on the complexities of the economics and the ethics and the political wherewithal of how you were going to do some of these things. It was essentially technology assessment but in a more political context that you just don't do a study on it. You get a dynamic going and you get some debate going on out there. So in that case, he did that real well, but it wasn't always appreciated, I guess. I guess not.

RITCHIE: Did you get a sense that he was hungry for information? Was this an area that intrigued him enough that he wanted to know more about it?

BREZINA: Well, yes, but with the qualification that most of the concern was in the social sciences and human resource development and things that would make it meaningful to have Daniel Patrick Moynihan testify on, more so than nuclear accelerators and that kind of big science. We didn't get into the physics too much. We got into something that still pertains to this day, and that is how we support social science research, and whether the

mechanisms out there in the government like the National Science Foundation, and so forth, are adequate.

There was an incredible amount of arrogance in the science establishment at that time because they were mostly physicists that had been elevated, thanks to all the nuclear research we had done. They were calling the shots, and the social sciences just didn't measure up, period. But when they did measure up it was highly behavioral and highly data-related. And Mondale and Harris were saying that we needed better research to prevent the Detroit riots, Watts, et cetera. And that would tend to get into the more policy-related research, which the agencies have always shied away from because they're controversial. To this day, in an area that I'm in, the social dynamic of teenage risk taking, the preference is for soloing and categorical, and "thou shalt not connect the dots" kind of stuff. Although I get passionate about it, Harris' preference was to stay on the soft sciences and maybe a little bit into the biomedical area, but not into the hard, hard sciences, other than to say that maybe they're getting the disproportionate share of interests, which was controversial.

His main focus was on people all the time, and a lot of it was on poor people, and how might research make for better policies to deal better with the poverty program or things like that. He stayed away from DOD, and physics, and chemistry, and so forth. When he had the National Social Science Foundation proposal, his point was that we don't have enough research in sociology, anthropology, political science, non-behavioral political science, those kinds of fields. It was hard to get the professions to do much about that. They were interested, but it was still sort of like, "We'll take care of it. Don't bother us too much." He wrote a series of articles for several professional journals: the *American Political Science Association Review*, *American Sociological Association Journal*.

RITCHIE: Excuse me, I need to change the tape. I have to remind myself there's no third side to a cassette tape.

BREZINA: That reminds me, one of our witnesses in the area of genetic engineering, his lead-in was, "On the one hand, on the other hand, and on the third hand." But usually it was just two.

That is, there's not enough sociology and anthropology, looking at these issues. Well, this is true to this day. And this is just the way it is, I guess, and it's going to be—I don't

know, I don't want to say it's inexorable, but it hasn't been expanded. In the area that I'm in, in terms of alcohol and drugs, there's only a handful of sociologists in the country that deal with it. And when you listen to them, they really have a lot to say. But they run into this highly focused, channeled thinking about programs, where most of the money still is. Harris was interested in getting some of those issues more visible, and getting things better scrutinized that hadn't been scrutinized too well, for the long-term benefits of science. Those were highly political kinds of concerns. We had 350 different witnesses, so he certainly learned a lot from all of those witnesses, and many of them were scientists, but he was always pretty able to keep a balance as the chairman in charge because of political instincts and insights he had as to how to frame those questions that he would ask.

RITCHIE: My other question was about the ranking member, Karl Mundt. He doesn't really strike me as a scientifically-oriented person, or oriented to a lot of these social science issues that you're referring to. Did he contribute anything, or was he there just to keep an eye on Senator Harris?

BREZINA: I don't think he was there very much, period. He was there in the sense that there was a minority staff person, who virtually refused to work with us. He just kept on the phone—he was in the Monroney storeroom with me—and he was always on the phone to NIH, trying to get this grant, and that was going on and on and on, with some University of South Dakota. That's all he did. The subcommittee was mostly Harris. A little bit of Mondale. Mondale was there, although he wasn't a member of the subcommittee. Mondale introduced the Social Accounting Act, where he and Harris tried to parallel the Economic Full Employment Act mechanism that created the Council of Economic Advisors and was trying to do something similar for a Council of Social Advisors and make some measurements on the social status of issues, and things like that.

Ted Stevens was on our subcommittee. He came. He was probably very junior then. He never said anything. Just sat there and never said anything. Gene McCarthy was on our subcommittee, and he never came, period. So it was mostly Harris. Mostly Harris, and maybe Mondale once in a while. Mundt probably came for the "equitable distribution of R&D funds" hearings. Mundt's influence was just indirect. You tried to keep his staff member happy, but he was always playing games. That's what you were warned about at the Library of Congress, that there would be personality clashes, and there would be politics, and the office politics, and so forth. Something that just hardly ever happened over at LRS. So to

justify his existence, the minority staff person was always finding some fault somewhere. That was getting up to Mundt and then Mundt would take it to Harris. It was all very petty.

There was a clash I had with one of my secretaries at one time, who just virtually refused to do anything I wanted unless she felt like it. And, you know, you're under the gun and it was constantly, "Well, I've got to go upstairs." There was a split office. Finally, I got into the rotunda outside the second floor office with the staff director and went mano a mano. I said, "Either she goes or I go." Well, I had never said that before to anybody, but it was just a deep feeling, it was just so bad. She was just so good at manipulating people.

So that was another problem, and then Harris started finding the staff director not in favor as much as he might. I'm not sure of all the reasons for that. I just stayed away from that question when I talked with him, and he started going directly to me for some things, like research for a book he was doing called *Alarms and Hopes*, that he published back in the late '60s [*Alarms and Hopes: A Personal Journey, A Personal View* (New York, Harper & Row, 1968)] taking a look at poverty, racism, adolescence. That didn't go over well with the staff director, although this was not substantive input that I was making. So there was that kind of clash.

And then, finally, the only real overt clash that Harris had with anybody was during an executive session of the Government Operations Committee, going for the year's budget. Out of the blue, [Edmund] Muskie shot up. I happened to be there and I was just horrified. Muskie was about three inches from Harris, and started shouting at him that our subcommittee was infringing on his jurisdiction. I think he had Government Reorganization. This was all under Government Ops. McClellan was presiding, of course, and they shouted. Their faces got red. I mean, this was two senators shouting at one another, within a few inches. There was like three minutes of this—you could hardly call it back and forth—and then there was just total silence. Nobody said anything. McClellan—Harris later said—"McClellan, evidently, didn't know what to say," Harris said, "I was shocked." Now, there may have been something that happened before then, I don't know, but McClellan just then sort of tiptoed into the next item on the agenda and didn't even deal with it.

Now, this was in a period when Harris and Mondale and Muskie were all getting close to [Hubert] Humphrey in the presidential campaign. I think Harris and Mondale became co-chairs of the Humphrey campaign, and Muskie became the vice president

nominee. It was one of those times, again, that LRS said, "We told you so." There were just all sorts of things going on that made it hard to know where you stood on the subcommittee. I suspect that when the subcommittee's demise became known, and McClellan, on the floor as in my article quotes, saying, "We're going to cut back on subcommittees," that possibly could have been that Muskie, by virtue of his success as a nominee, may have gotten his way and said, "This has got to go." Ostensibly, it was a clash between McClellan's views of the riots, he called them "civil disturbances," and Harris's view that you needed to get down to what the causes were. McClellan was making the point that one of the causes was we put a lot of money through the anti-poverty program that built up a lot of expectations out there, and part of the problem was the government's involvement. Harris said to that the other week, that, "You know, partly he was right. It did create some new power centers out there."

But whether Muskie got into our demise, I don't know. One thing I will say, and this is an anecdote that, again, I was out of character when I did this, but in 1969, the budget was two-thirds of the regular budget. By that time, the staff director had been moved out, and an AA of Harris' became the staff director. He was not going to rock the boat no matter what because he was looking for an administrative position in one of the universities in Oklahoma. So we just did virtually nothing. I mean, we were going from '68—this is the Hill—we were all ahead full-throttle, to the totally sexless subject of indirect costs and cost sharing. There it was highly technical. There it was boring. There you couldn't ask the big questions. I don't know if anybody knows any big questions about cost sharing and how the government sort of strikes a balance between what costs occur when you support research in universities.

After the new staff director left for this position out in Oklahoma or Texas or wherever it was, I became acting staff director. And there was nothing to do. We put the subcommittee to sleep. This was where the archives and all that came in. What was happening, though, with our diminished budget, there was now just myself and the clerk. Harris' office started putting people temporarily on our payroll, but doing work for them. So we had hoped for some predictability of phasing this thing out by the end of the year, and they were chipping away and mucking up our effort when we were sincerely trying to get all the records straight and so forth.

One day, the clerk and I were sitting up in the second floor office, which was the big telephone booth office, and I said, "This has got to stop." And I said, "What if we could make it look like you've been crying?" (She went up to Harris' immediate office two or three

times a day for xeroxing and stuff like that.) "Why don't you wear sunglasses when you go up there and blow your nose a couple times? Then I'll come up later and meet with his AA, who's out in the middle of the office, and try to make a big deal of this." This was high-wire. This was where you jump in the river to find out how deep it is. This was not something I've ever wanted to do again in my life. So she went up there and sort of got the little bit of buzz that something was going on. And then I came up an hour later. I had called and said, "I've got to see Jim Monroe. I've got to see him!" You know, make it sort of emphatic, "I've got to see Jim Monroe." That was the AA. Jim was there, and there were people around him, and I went through this: "Do you know what you're doing? When are you going to stop kicking us in the teeth?!" Very loud. "She's been crying. I've got a secretary that can't stop crying! This just is awful!" It stopped. I never heard another thing about that again. They never put anybody else on the payroll and we got a chance to finish our work by November or whatever it was. I don't recommend you do this, and even telling the story, I get a little bit nervous because it's out of character for me to do that. But it was just so blatant. It wasn't just once or twice. It was happening every week and it was: "You're not supposed to be giving us orders." That was happening all the time. It was sad.

RITCHIE: Well I still have a lot more questions to ask, but this might be a good place for us to take a break.

BREZINA: Yes, I have to be across town in an hour.

End of the First Interview