

## **THE 1964 ELECTIONS**

### **Interview #1**

**November 5, 2010**

**Conducted by Michael Birkner  
Professor of History, Gettysburg College**

**BIRKNER:** This is November 5, 2010. I'm Michael Birkner. I'm sitting in a quiet room in the basement of Musselman Library with Richard W. Murphy, a former aide to Senator Hugh Scott in the 1960s when Scott was in the United States Senate. We are joined by George Silvestri, a professor of American History at Montgomery College, who will be an observer. We're going to talk about Mr. Murphy's career and specifically his reminiscences of working for Senator Scott. Mr. Murphy, I wanted to get some background about you, because you did some interesting things before 1964, so why don't you just tell me a little bit about yourself.

**MURPHY:** OK, well, I was born and raised in Elmira, New York and was educated partly there. After two years of public high school in Elmira, I went to a boarding school in Connecticut, now known as Loomis Chaffee, but it was the Loomis School in Windsor, Connecticut. And then I went on to Yale and got my undergraduate degree with a major in history. I'd been commissioned through the ROTC and I was in the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps for two years and was trained in Fort Holabird, Baltimore, Maryland. I also took an intensive eight-week course in spoken Japanese and then I went to the Far East, and I served in Tokyo for about five to six months in 1955 where I wrote a history of the 441st Counterintelligence Corps Detachment. And then I went on to Korea where among other things I was head of the Counter Subversive Branch [of the 308th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment] and I had nine American enlisted agents. Our main focus was on the political scene in South Korea because of our job, of course, was to gather intelligence on anything which affected the security of the Army command [Eighth United States Army].

I originally wanted to go into law because I was interested in politics. My political hero, starting as a seventh grader, was Thomas E. Dewey, the governor of New York. I worked very hard for his election against [President] Franklin Roosevelt in 1944, and I fought, bled, and died for him in 1948 when Harry Truman won the election, and I thought that was about the blackest day in American history. I was about ready to move to

Canada except that I was in school at the time in Connecticut. Well, I got over that and so that's where my interest in politics dated from. I met Governor Dewey when I was almost thirteen years old in Elmira, New York—spent twenty minutes with him and after we talked about family and our dogs I asked him for his advice on how to go into politics.

**BIRKNER:** How old were you when you had that meeting?

**MURPHY:** Almost thirteen. And the governor told me how he got into politics because originally he was a singer. He had a marvelous baritone voice and I think originally he had planned to go into opera, but he went on to law school. He was a native of Michigan and he went on to law school and he advised me in effect to do what he did. He went to law school. He became a very prominent lawyer and of course District Attorney in New York and from then on first a candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination in 1940 and then he was elected governor of New York in 1942. Anyway, he was my hero, but I didn't go to law school. I decided instead to go to graduate school and get a master's degree in international relations, which I got in 1958 from the [Paul H. Nitze] School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington. And I had a very good assignment when I was in the Counterintelligence Corps in both Japan and Korea. I was interested in going into the intelligence business. I wasn't interested in the CIA, although I interviewed for it. I wasn't interested in becoming a Foreign Service Officer. I liked the Army and so I was hoping to get a job in the Pentagon as an intelligence analyst in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence there, but there wasn't any opening and so I went with an outfit called the Ordnance Technical Intelligence Agency in Arlington Hall Station in Arlington, Virginia. And I stayed in long enough—three years—to get tenure or whatever the status in the civil service is called, but I decided that I didn't want to spend the rest of my life in doing basically strategic intelligence research. If you like the tedious work of intelligence research, [the job] is good.

I wanted to be where the action was and I wanted to get up on the Hill, Capitol Hill, and I started networking, and there just weren't any jobs available. The staffs were considerably smaller in those days, but I landed a job with the American Enterprise Association, as it was then known—it changed its name to the American Enterprise Institute—doing public policy research where I was in effect a one man mini-Congressional Research Service dealing with requests from congressional offices for background research—for example, help in writing speeches. And I started writing

speeches for different senators. Mostly they were Republicans. Most of our clientele on the Hill were Republicans although [Senator] Hubert Humphrey [of Minnesota] was one [Democrat] who would call on AEI. He'd call on any source he could find. The man was completely inquisitive, but, as I said, I wrote speeches for a number of Republican senators, one of whom was Hugh Scott. His legislative assistant was a fellow by the name of Jack MacKenzie. He used to call me all the time on stuff, particularly on foreign policy or foreign affairs, NATO and things like that. Scott wasn't on any of the committees that were involved with foreign policy or security policy but I would put together stuff for Jack and, you know, it would go into the *Congressional Record* and things like that. So I did stuff for Scott indirectly.

Anyway, I may have met the Senator once, just casually. I met Bob Kunzig once casually. Bob was his administrative assistant. And in November of 1963 shortly after Jack Kennedy's assassination, I remember one Friday I got a call from Bob Kunzig, and he said, "Dick, can you come up and see me at eleven o'clock?" I was downtown with AEI and I said, "Sure." I got in a taxi and it dawned on me about halfway up there that Bob may want to talk to me about a job. And he told me that Jack MacKenzie was leaving the senator. Jack was from upstate New York and Jack took a job with Mobil Oil as a lobbyist in Albany and Jack highly recommended me as his replacement. And so Bob asked me if I'd be interested. And I said, "Sure." And he said, "If you're really interested in it, I'll get you in to see the Senator." Well, this being a Friday, I said "Well, let me think about it over the weekend and I'll be back with you on Monday." Well, I spent several hours over the weekend talking to various people whose political judgment I trusted. One of whom was Evron Kirkpatrick who had been one of my professors at Georgetown. I was working part-time towards a Ph.D. and he was Jean Kirkpatrick's husband.

**BIRKNER:** What was his first name?

**MURPHY:** Evron. Anyway, everybody agreed. I had two questions: Number one, who do you think the Republican presidential nominee will be in 1964? And number two, what are Hugh Scott's chances for re-election? Because he was running for his second term, planning to run for a second term. Everybody agreed that it would not be Barry Goldwater and Scott's re-election would be a piece of cake. So I called up Bob Kunzig Monday morning and said, "I want the job." And so he said "OK." He said, "Come on up. You'll see the senator at 5:00." And so I went in to see the senator and I was well aware

that he had a good sense of humor. He told me, "I'm going to be running for reelection." He said, "One of the big issues of the campaign is going to be healthcare for the elderly." He said, "I can't vote for the Medicare bill [King-Anderson] because I'm opposed to financing healthcare with payroll taxes." He said, "I'm a cosponsor of a Federal-State healthcare for the elderly bill that was introduced by Senator [Leverett] Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts, and several of us Republicans are on that." And he said, "None of us understands the bill, let alone can explain it." He said, "I want something that is simple and straightforward and can be explained." Well, I didn't know any more about healthcare [than he did] but I quickly learned. And I saw a model in the Federal Employee's Health Insurance Program—but that's jumping ahead a little bit. He said, "If you don't do anything else for me next year, if you come up with a great healthcare bill I'll be immensely grateful." And so he said, "Well, do you have any problems or concerns?" I said, "Well, not really Senator." I said, "But I should point out first of all I'm not from Pennsylvania. I'm from Elmira, New York." He said "Well, I'm not from Pennsylvania either." He said, "I'm from Virginia and I'm proud of it." And then I said, "Well, I'm not a lawyer." And he said, "Well, do you know how to read?" And I said, "Yes sir." And he said, "Well, you won't have any problems." He said, "We have the legislative counsel's office here." He said, "You just tell them what you want and they can draft the language, bills and amendments." And he said, "We have good lawyers on my committee staffs." He was on Judiciary and Commerce. Those were his two big committees and some other committees. And then he said, "And you can go to them. And then if you're in a real pinch," he said, "come to me." He said "I'm a lawyer."

**BIRKNER:** Your description of your time in his office suggests someone who was straightforward and unpretentious. Is that a fair characterization?

**MURPHY:** It sure is; it sure is. He could laugh at himself and he had a marvelous sense of humor and he also had interests outside politics. His main interest outside of politics was oriental art and particularly Chinese art. And I can tell you more about that later.

**BIRKNER:** We might get into that later a bit. The meeting that you had with Scott again leads to the premise that you were going to be on his staff. Is that the idea?

**MURPHY:** Yeah.

**BIRKNER:** It was a pretty done deal that you were going to work with him that year?

**MURPHY:** Yeah.

**BIRKNER:** What kind of notice did you have to give at the American Enterprise Institute?

**MURPHY:** Oh Lord, I think I gave them a month's notice.

**BIRKNER:** OK and then you moved over to work with Scott?

**MURPHY:** I started working in Scott's office I think on the second of January, 1964.

**BIRKNER:** So you would have a great interest in what was going on in the Republican presidential nomination contest?

**MURPHY:** Absolutely. I had met Goldwater. I wrote a speech for Goldwater in 1962 on the Geneva Agreements on Laos which had been negotiated by Undersecretary of State Averill Harriman. And I knew something about the Far East because that was my primary focus in graduate school. And I wrote this speech. I was concerned about the Geneva Accords and Goldwater was against it. And I wrote this speech and I went up to deliver it to him and I went with Dave Abshire who was the guy that hired me at AEI. Dave and Admiral Arleigh Burke founded the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University, which later became the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Anyway, we went up to see the senator. Nice fellow. Very nice guy. But just in conversing with him it became evident to me that the guy didn't know where Laos was. Didn't know a thing about it and, what really shocked me, he seemed very casual about the whole thing. I gave him the draft. It was going to be a floor statement and we walked out. As we walked out of the [Old, now Russell] Senate Office Building, I said to Dave, "Is this guy serious about running for President?" And he said, "Yeah I think he is." I said, "I don't think he's fit for the office." I said, "He struck me as being a real ignoramus." Well, he ended up being our nominee.

**BIRKNER:** Right. Well, now I'm just curious. As a presumptive candidate for re-election in '64 Scott obviously had even more interest than you in who's going to be at the top of the ticket. Did he express to the staff his preferences about the Republican nomination in '64? Did he say he was going to support Rockefeller? Was he going to support Scranton? Was he going to stay neutral? What was he going to do?

**MURPHY:** No, no. He supported Nelson Rockefeller that year. As you know, he was from the [progressive] wing of the party. He was the guy who organized the "We want Willkie" demonstrations at the Republican convention in Philadelphia in 1940.

**BIRKNER:** Not many people know what an important role he played for Eisenhower in '52 in the early going in the southern states and the western states.

**MURPHY:** [In 1964] He supported Nelson Rockefeller.

**BIRKNER:** And of course Rockefeller never made enough of a connection with voters. His marriage to Happy Rockefeller probably didn't help any. But he just never really got the momentum with the voters in '64 or in any other year. [However] it wasn't clear in your first months on the job who the nominee was going to be. You had the [Henry Cabot] Lodge factor. You had the potential Scranton factor, so things were very fluid in the first six months of '64.

**MURPHY:** Yeah they were. That's correct.

**BIRKNER:** Could you just focus on the tasks that you had assigned to you by Scott in the realm of policies such as this potential healthcare bill or did you also get yourself sucked into any of the political stuff?

**MURPHY:** I was sucked into it during the campaign.

**BIRKNER:** Let's talk about January to June, when Scott was out on the hustings for Rockefeller.

**MURPHY:** I was on the legislative side.

**BIRKNER:** And tell me what you were working on.

**MURPHY:** The important thing I was working on initially was that healthcare bill.

**BIRKNER:** This was in '64, so you were still dealing with the Congress with 176 or 177 Republicans in the House and I don't know, maybe 42 or 43 in the Senate. You've still got a fairly decent contingent so the Democrats do need to pay attention to the Republican position in '64 on this healthcare issue. In '65 they may not need to. Were you talking to aides across the aisle or were you strictly working with Republicans?

**MURPHY:** Oh no, I was talking with everybody.

**BIRKNER:** So tell me some of the people you were talking with and some of the conversations you were having?

**MURPHY:** Well, first of all, I came up with a healthcare bill and the reason why that was a top priority was because the senator knew that we were going to have a vote in the Senate before the election and the Anderson bill was going to come up in the Senate and he was against the Anderson bill, so I came up with a bill which was cheaper and better than Medicare. When I came up with a package about this and a financing mechanism which was basically like the Federal Employee Health Insurance Program and the government shared the cost of the premium fifty-fifty except for people below the poverty line, which was then \$3000 a year, but the Feds picked that up. It came from the general revenue. So then I needed to get a price tag on it. My friend, Paul Hawkins, who was working for the Health Insurance Association, put me in touch with Ed Pettingill, who was chief actuary at Aetna Life. He said, "He's the best actuary in the business." So I sent the stuff up to Pettingill and I'd be talking to him on the phone. We didn't have faxes in those days and Pettingill looked over the bill and called me back and he said—Christ, I can't remember the exact price tag—it might have been something like \$180 premium for this thing. So with a little arithmetic, you know, we came up with an estimate of the cost, which was lower than the estimate for Medicare, and we had a more generous package of benefits. And so another friend of mine arranged to have printed a one-page summary of the bill and he arranged to have it put in every doctor's office in Pennsylvania in the waiting rooms. And we [Senator Scott] didn't talk about the bill much. It didn't become an issue until the vote came in the Senate. And this was in September and it was right before Labor Day. We offered our bill as a substitute, knowing full well it would be

defeated. It was defeated on a voice vote. There might have been three or four senators on the floor. We asked for a division vote [where senators favoring and opposing the measure stand and are counted]. We might have had ten senators on the floor [for that]. It was defeated. So the Senator [Scott] voted against the Anderson bill.

**BIRKNER:** Is the Anderson bill a Clinton Anderson bill or some other Anderson bill?

**MURPHY:** It was—what was his name? He was from New Mexico.

**BIRKNER:** That was Clinton Anderson.

**MURPHY:** So we voted against that bill. Right away Genevieve Blatt—Hugh Scott's opponent—issued a statement blasting the senator.

**BIRKNER:** Wait a minute, the Anderson bill came forward and Scott voted no.

**MURPHY:** After offering his [alternative as a substitute].

**BIRKNER:** And then the Anderson bill carried.

**MURPHY:** Oh yes.

**BIRKNER:** So Scott voted against the Anderson bill. That became a campaign issue against him?

**MURPHY:** Right. She [Blatt] blasted him within hours after the vote and we fired back with a statement accusing her of misrepresenting his position on healthcare and exploiting the aspirations of the elderly and all that and that shut her up because the two candidates had joint appearances throughout the state and during the course of the campaign the health bill was never mentioned.

**BIRKNER:** Without getting us tangled up with this at any length, it needs to be said that getting Blatt to that nomination was not a simple matter because of her very messy [Democratic primary] fight with Judge Musmanno, who essentially would not



accept the results and gave her a lot of grief and made it a lot harder for her that fall than she might have otherwise have had it.

**MURPHY:** That's true. A manna from heaven for Scott for sure; but let's back up. You wanted to ask me about other things I've worked on and people that I've worked with.

**BIRKNER:** Yes, and I wanted to just get a sense of how your days are going as you're getting your footing as an aide to Scott. Let's start by giving you a title. What was your title when you started working for Scott?

**MURPHY:** Legislative assistant.

**BIRKNER:** OK, now you're legislative assistant. You're full time. He has given you some very substantial responsibilities. How are you getting your footing? Did you have any particular mentor who is going to enable you to do your work better or do you simply find your own way?

**MURPHY:** Pretty much finding my own way in getting to know people, people that I could look to, to give me advice outside of the Scott office. One was Bill Hildenbrand who at the time was legislative assistant to Senator Caleb Boggs of Delaware. Bill and I became good friends. He was very helpful to me on coming up with this healthcare bill. Fred Arner of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress [now the Congressional Research Service]. He was helpful of course with the Library—that's strictly a non-partisan position. Fred was the guy who helped work up the Saltonstall bill, which nobody could understand. And there were others, you know, in Republican offices, such as Charlie Clapp who was Saltonstall's legislative assistant.

**BIRKNER:** He was the guy who was writing the book about the legislative process. [Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1963)]

**MURPHY:** That's correct; and Steve Horn, who later became a congressman. He was legislative assistant to Senator Tom Kuchel of California. In that year I did not have too much contact with Democrats except guys I'd see over at the Senate floor like Mark Shields. Mark was the legislative assistant to Senator [William] Proxmire of Wisconsin.

He would write a daily speech for Proxmire, urging ratification of the Genocide Treaty. I used to kid Mark. I'd say, "What are we coming up with today Mark?" And things like that, but the main legislation that was before us for a good part of that first half of 1964 was the Civil Rights bill.

**BIRKNER:** So, are you spending any time on that?

**MURPHY:** A lot of time.

**BIRKNER:** This is an issue that actually does matter to Hugh Scott personally and politically. Is that correct?

**MURPHY:** Absolutely, because he was an advocate for civil rights legislation going back to his first year in the House of Representatives in 1941. And so he was a strong advocate of Civil Rights. And we had a bipartisan coalition whose leaders were Hubert Humphrey on the Democratic side and Tom Kuchel on the Republican side. And these were the people who were the sponsors and co-sponsors of the Civil Rights bill. And Jack [Jacob] Javits on the Republican side and a whole bunch of the Democrats on the Democratic side, but we had regular strategy meetings. And I think Kuchel's and Humphrey's guys—they used to put out kind of a little newsletter to keep everybody informed as to who was doing what and all of that sort of thing.

**BIRKNER:** Now were these strategy meetings among staffers or were they among senators?

**MURPHY:** Mostly staffers, but senators, too, on occasion. And so then of course over here you had [Everett McKinley] Dirksen [from Illinois, the minority leader]. And Dirksen in one of his classical maneuvers did a 180-degree turn. And he had three guys on his staff. They were on the Judiciary Committee payroll. And they were known as "the bombers." And Clyde Flynn and Bernie Waters, both Illinoisans, and Neil Kennedy who was a Yale graduate, as a matter of fact, class of '48. Those guys—they kept in touch with us but eventually it was Dirksen who came up. He was working with Mike Mansfield [from Montana], the Democratic leader, drawing upon what the others were doing to come up with the final version. But it was a fascinating period.

**BIRKNER:** You were a part of a major episode in American history. What was your role in all of this? Did you go to some of these strategy meetings among staffers? Were you yourself doing any kind of research or organizing? What were you doing?

**MURPHY:** I was mostly attending meetings. When it came to the actual debate we had different assignments. Hugh Scott was a captain. I can't remember who his Democratic counterpart was [Murphy subsequently recalled that it was Sen. Edward V. Long of Missouri] but again these were among the co-sponsors. They were the captains for Title Five of the bill which had to do with the extension of the life of the Civil Rights Commission. So I was involved in drafting his [Scott's] floor statement, which you know was aimed toward the legislative history of that part of the bill.

**BIRKNER:** You obviously had to have learned something about the 1957 Civil Rights Act, which helped create that commission.

**MURPHY:** That's correct, and I was working with a guy, a lawyer who had been in the Justice Department in the Eisenhower administration and who was really familiar with the 1957 Act.

**BIRKNER:** Do you happen to remember which lawyer that was?

**MURPHY:** I can't remember his name.

**BIRKNER:** OK, it wasn't John Lindsay, or you'd remember that.

**MURPHY:** No, I can't remember the guy's name.

**BIRKNER:** That's OK. What was your own personal feeling about the work you were doing? Were you feeling like this is something more than a job for you, were you energized in some way?

**MURPHY:** Oh I was energized completely. The beauty of working for Hugh Scott was that we had a complete identity of views on everything. You know he himself was not a legislator most of the time. He could be one on occasion. He was one of these guys who quickly grasped something, particularly in a committee session. He could really pick up on something and be right in the middle of it all in a committee. I think Hugh

Scott always looked upon this as his role. He was interested in the national leadership of the Republican Party. And he was very much concerned about who was going to be the standard bearer in the presidential elections and he was also of course in effect a titular leader of the Pennsylvania Republican Party. Of course when I was there the leader was [Governor] Bill Scranton and later [Governor] Ray Shafer.

**BIRKNER:** But he was in sync with Bill Scranton right? I mean, Shafer, Scranton and Scott had policy views in congruence with each other.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, and knowing Scott's political background I had no problem ever disagreeing with the man. I was just in complete sync with him. I just loved working for him as a consequence.

**BIRKNER:** That's a good thing to get up in the morning knowing that you like what you're doing.

**MURPHY:** Absolutely, absolutely.

**BIRKNER:** Now I need to ask you a question that you may or may not want or be able to comment on but I think it's useful to ask it. Can you give me your take on the basis as you see it for Scott's strong advocacy of Civil Rights? He is a southerner. I think he's born in 1900. He grows up in a period in southern history where white people's attitudes toward black people were essentially the attitude of people in South Africa toward black people. And yet as you say from the get-go as a congressional candidate he is an advocate of civil rights. To what extent do you think this is simply practical politics in a district that has many black voters? To what extent does conviction play into it?

**MURPHY:** Well, I think there probably were some political considerations. Obviously I can't get inside the mind of the man in 1941 so I really can't answer that question as to how much of it was political and how much of it was conviction. But really by the time I worked for him it was conviction.

**BIRKNER:** It was conviction.

**MURPHY:** It was conviction.

**BIRKNER:** Did you ever notice Scott in terms of his interactions with African Americans?

**MURPHY:** Oh yes.

**BIRKNER:** And was he very at ease and so forth?

**MURPHY:** Absolutely and of course he was very, very close to Clarence Mitchell.

**BIRKNER:** From the NAACP.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, he was the Washington Director of the NAACP. And Clarence, people referred to him often as the 101st Senator.

**BIRKNER:** Right. So Mitchell could pick up the phone and talk to Scott?

**MURPHY:** Oh absolutely, absolutely and I talked to Clarence too, many times.

**BIRKNER:** I assume that Mitchell had a big stake in what was brewing in '64?

**MURPHY:** Absolutely.

**BIRKNER:** And he wants to be sure that the Republican supporters and the Democratic supporters are on the same page because there is a very determined opposition obviously coming from the southern wing of the [Democratic] party.

**MURPHY:** Absolutely.

**BIRKNER:** You could see something developing.

**MURPHY:** Sure. I met Clarence Mitchell. I met Roy Wilkins, the head of the NAACP. I met some of the other leaders. I also, of course, got to know Nick Katzenbach who was the deputy attorney general. And Nick was really the point person for the administration on the civil rights bill. And, you know, I knew these guys pretty well. They were involved in some of the meetings too.

**BIRKNER:** Now what about the business of the southern filibuster? Do you have remembrances of that?

**MURPHY:** Oh absolutely. We had a schedule worked out where we always had one or two civil rights senators on the floor at all times and we had a regular roster. I remember one day going in on a Saturday and I think there were three senators on the floor and one was holding forth at great length—John Sparkman of Alabama. And he was holding forth at great length. The senator [Scott] and I came in and the senator sat down at his desk and as he sat down John Sparkman said, “I see my good friend from Pennsylvania who’s just entered the chamber.” And he said, “And I know that he is a native of the Old Dominion.” He said, “One thing I’ve never understood about my good friend from Pennsylvania was why he is a Republican. When did he become a Republican?” And Senator Scott said, “Back in Virginia.” He said, “I became a Republican as soon as I learned how to walk.” And then the senator crossed his legs, folded his hands and in two minutes he was sound asleep. The people up in the gallery looking down probably thought that Hugh Scott was hanging on every word that Sparkman was uttering. And he was obviously asleep.

**BIRKNER:** A lovely story. But it does sound like Scott was not at all sound asleep either on the legislative or political side in ‘64. My perception is that in many ways you could call ‘64 the apex for Hugh Scott in politics because he is engaged in two of these major legislative battles and he’s doing it at the height of his powers. And then of course he’s engaged in a political struggle for survival when the odds, as you have already talked about, are against him.

**MURPHY:** Yes.

**BIRKNER:** So you’ve got to be a front row spectator and participant in some pretty interesting history.

**MURPHY:** Yeah.

**BIRKNER:** Now do you want to say anything more about getting this civil rights measure through or have you said what you know? Is there one story that we should put on the tape?

**MURPHY:** No, you know it was a matter of waiting out the [filibustering] senators and getting enough votes to impose cloture. And of course that's where Dirksen was the key.

**BIRKNER:** Did he lean on some particular Republican senators—is that what you're referring to?

**MURPHY:** No, I don't think he leaned on people. I remember—this had nothing to do with the Civil Rights bill—I can remember only one occasion where Dirksen came up to Hugh Scott on the Senate floor and he said to Scott, "I need you on this." I can't remember what the issue was.

**BIRKNER:** You're saying that Dirksen didn't do that on a regular basis.

**MURPHY:** Not on a regular basis.

**BIRKNER:** Why not?

**MURPHY:** Because he knew that Scott and he didn't see eye-to-eye on a number of issues. There was also a personal thing. I learned that from Hugh Scott. We were talking one time about the [failed] 1948 presidential campaign and he said, "Dick, you know who was the advisor on agricultural policy in that campaign?" I said "Who?" He said, "Congressman Everett McKinley Dirksen."

**BIRKNER:** So why do you think that Dirksen was the key on the cloture vote?

**MURPHY:** Well, because he brought with him some conservative Republicans.

**BIRKNER:** He might not want a larger federal role in society but could still feel this is the right vote at the right time.

**MURPHY:** You see Goldwater was against it and he [Dirksen] brought people like Roman Hruska [of Nebraska].

**BIRKNER:** So Hruska actually voted for the Civil Rights bill?

**MURPHY:** Yes.

**BIRKNER:** That would be one vote that I wouldn't expect. If he got Hruska's vote then he did some pretty good work in '64.

**MURPHY:** Hruska and Dirksen were very close. And I think Hruska went along with Dirksen. I don't honestly remember. But there were others you know, guys like Milton Young [of North Dakota] and [inaudible] probably went with him.

**BIRKNER:** –Scott was working beside him and the bill gets passed.

**MURPHY:** Yeah. We get the cloture. I remember the day after cloture we had I don't know how many roll-call votes that day because Sam Ervin of North Carolina had a whole slew of amendments because, of course, they were operating under the time limitations of cloture. And Ervin was offering amendments to cut different titles out of the bill and so we had to stay right close to the chamber. The senator would be over there at the senators' private room. I'd be on the Senate floor you know and he'd say, "Call me when you need me, Dick." You know the bells were ringing right and left and everything like that. Ervin would be demanding a live quorum, you know, getting all the senators out and then calling for a roll-call vote. On one Ervin amendment to strike a crucial title from the bill, Scott entered the chamber just as his name was called and the senator said, "aye." Amid the din caused by senators milling around talking, I shouted, "No!" The presiding officer asked Scott how he wished to be recorded and the senator said, "No." The senator then turned to me and said, "You earned your pay for the year, Dick."

You know, basically I was following the course of other bills that came before the Senate because the senator didn't spend much time on the Senate floor. He was there basically for votes and he expected me to tell him how to vote, and you know I had to be ready. If we had time I'd give him a short explanation of what it was he was voting on. We had a major tax bill in '64 and I was relying on staff people from the Senate Finance Committee. I'd ask them to tell me what was going on. One person that I relied heavily on throughout my time with Senator Scott was Larry Woodworth who was the staff director of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation which was strictly non-partisan. Larry and I became good friends. And you know Larry had the ability to explain some highly technical stuff in plain English. He was a straight shooter and I trusted him completely. So when Scott would come bursting into the chamber I could tell him quickly



what it was he was voting on. Sometimes when he didn't have time to hear what it was he was voting on he would say, "Just tell me how to vote."

**BIRKNER:** I guess given how busy these people were, this was essential for almost all senators.

**MURPHY:** That's right. And also, you know, he told me when I first started working for him [that] "I follow other people sometimes." He said, "On agricultural bills I generally will be with George Aiken of Vermont." [Aiken] was ranking Republican on [the Committee on] Agriculture. He said, "On defense matters I rely pretty much on Dick Russell of Georgia." Russell was chairman of the Armed Services Committee. About civil rights they were poles apart, but on national security matters [Scott] agreed with Russell. And this is true I think with members of Congress generally. They follow certain colleagues whose judgment they trust. And that's what I did with staff people. And I would read *Congressional Quarterly*. *Congressional Quarterly* would come to the office and it would go to the senator. And the senator would read *Congressional Quarterly*. That I would say was his major source of information for following the whole Congress. He read that thing. I'd see underscoring in it and little notations on it so I knew he read that because I'd get it after he did. And so that's how we kept ourselves informed.

**BIRKNER:** Did Scott's staff members have working lunches on a regular basis with like-minded staffers from other comparable senators, or did you eat your lunch at your desk? How did it generally work?

**MURPHY:** I often ate lunch at my desk. Usually when I'd come in I would be in the office by eight o'clock. And I would take a look at the newspaper headlines. I would quickly go through the *Congressional Record* and then I'd go down to the cafeteria and I'd have coffee with some of the staffers, including Bill Hildenbrand. And there'd be senators down there too, but not Hugh Scott. He wasn't in that early in the morning. [Mike] Mansfield [of Montana] and Aiken had coffee together every morning. John Williams of Delaware was down there, but we didn't sit with the senators. We'd just have coffee among ourselves. And I usually would be back in the office by nine o'clock.

**BIRKNER:** Where was it that you had this coffee? What building?

**MURPHY:** In the Dirksen Building [known then as the New Senate Office Building].

**BIRKNER:** In the Dirksen Building.

**MURPHY:** Our office was in the Russell Building [known then as the Old Senate Office Building], at the time on the fourth floor, room 451. But that was my routine. Within an hour I quickly looked at the *Daily Digest* and the *Congressional Record*, take a look at the headlines in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* and go down and have coffee with the boys and then come back and start to work.

**BIRKNER:** But lunch was at your desk on more occasions than not?

**MURPHY:** More occasions than not. Sometimes I'd have time to go down to the Dirksen Building cafeteria and have a grilled cheese sandwich or something like that.

**BIRKNER:** You've mentioned the name Hildenbrand three times so I'm guessing that he is probably the person you felt closest to on the Hill?

**MURPHY:** Yeah, and we were two entirely different personalities.

**BIRKNER:** You should probably spell his name for the transcriber.

**MURPHY:** H-i-l-d-e-n-b-r-a-n-d, William F. Hildenbrand. A native of Pennsylvania and a sports announcer for a radio station up in Philadelphia before [coming to Washington] and then he had a job in the Eisenhower administration. The last couple years of the Eisenhower administration he was HEW's [Department of Health, Education and Welfare] legislative liaison. And then he went with Cale Boggs.

**BIRKNER:** Caleb Boggs [Republican from Delaware].

**MURPHY:** First he went with Congressman Haskell [Harry Haskell] of Delaware and then he went with Caleb Boggs and that's when I knew him.

**BIRKNER:** For the transcriber—it's Caleb Boggs, not to be confused with Hale Boggs of Louisiana. You were in the middle of saying that you were two people who were very different. I think that's what you were just saying.

**MURPHY:** Oh, Bill and I were entirely different. You know, he could be kind of crude but he had a heart of gold. And he just had a lot of good common sense. I'm not sure whether he ever went to college but Bill and I were together for a long time, from the time I arrived till Hugh Scott was elected minority whip [in January 1969]—he beat Hruska to be minority whip. This was after Kuchel lost the California [Republican] primary. And as soon as Kuchel lost the California primary in [June] 1968 to Max Rafferty, Hugh Scott jumped in as did Roman Hruska, but Scott was in there "firstest with the mostest" and he ended up winning that thing, so he was Dirksen's deputy for a few months.

**BIRKNER:** Right.

**MURPHY:** Dirksen died in September 1969. I worked for the senator until the end of January so I was there when he was elected minority whip and I would have become his administrative assistant had I chosen to stay. The only reason I left Hugh Scott, it had nothing to do with him. [I left] because the hours were horrendous. I was in his office as long as the Senate was in session and so sometimes I wouldn't get home 'till after midnight. And I had a young daughter at that point, a baby daughter, and I wanted to have more time with my wife and her.

**BIRKNER:** Working as a staffer is very much a young man's or woman's game.

**MURPHY:** It's absolutely so. So what I was going to say, Hildenbrand became Hugh Scott's administrative assistant [in the whip's office]. And later he became secretary to the minority working for all the Republican senators. I remember when Howard Baker [from Tennessee] became the [majority] leader [in 1981], he [Hildenbrand] became secretary of the Senate.

**BIRKNER:** That sounds right. Now I want to get back to the staff role in '64 working for Scott. Is Bob Kunzig back working for Scott 'by '64?

**MURPHY:** Oh yes. Kunzig came in '62 or '63, I don't remember.

**BIRKNER:** He had worked in the Eisenhower administration.

**MURPHY:** Kunzig ran for attorney general of Minnesota in 1962 I believe. He was defeated and then he went with Hugh Scott I guess in the beginning of '63. So he was the administrative assistant until Ray Shafer was elected governor of Pennsylvania in 1966. And then Bob left to become head of the General Services Administration up here in Pennsylvania under Shafer. Bob's relationship with me was very straightforward. Bob said to me at the very beginning—he said, "Dick, you are the one that's legislative assistant. You deal directly with Hugh Scott." He said, "I'm really not interested in legislation. But keep me informed." He said, "But you don't have to inform me on everything." He said, "I'll call you now and then and ask you what's going on." And Bob would call me sometimes and of course our offices were right next door to each other. He'd say, "Dick, what's going on?" I said, "Give me a couple of minutes Bob." And I'd take the *Congressional Quarterly* in. It had the whole rundown of what was going on. I'd say, "Here, read this article. And then if you have any questions I'll be happy to answer them."

**BIRKNER:** I'm assuming you were involved but occasionally he would get questions or even demands from key constituents and he would need to get filled in on what the issue was and where Scott was on it so he could give a better answer.

**MURPHY:** That's right. I would keep him in informed on that because Bob was dealing with Pennsylvania. Bob was dealing with Pennsylvania politics and that was his bailiwick and of course Bob became the campaign manager [in 1964] once we got into the campaign. And Bob went off the Senate payroll as did Edith Skinner who was the senator's executive assistant and Gene Cowen, Eugene Cowen, who was the press secretary—those three along with Barbara Sweeney and Margie Lynch, who were the Senator's secretaries. They went up to Harrisburg, affectionately known among the staff in those days as "Saigon on the Susquehanna." And that was where the campaign headquarters was. I remained in Washington because the Senate was still in session until well into October that year. And Hugh Scott always wanted to be recorded on how he would have voted had he been present. And he left that entirely up to me.

**BIRKNER:** Would you pair him?

**MURPHY:** Occasionally I'd pair him. Sometimes in the live pairing, more often than not it was a dead pair but his position was always recorded. And then during the session after that period of time when he was away I would send him a report on what his position was on each of these issues—whether it was amendments or bills, final passage, and he never questioned my judgment on any of that. I was also acting administrative assistant. So while they were up in Pennsylvania which was really from Labor Day on with one exception—the Senator came down to cast a vote on the final passage of the Appalachian Regional Development bill. And he came down just for that purpose. And he said a few words about it. He didn't know what he was talking about and he turned to me after and he said, "Dick write a brief statement for the [*Congressional*] *Record*," which I did. I put out a statement for that.

**BIRKNER:** It's really impressive to me how versatile you had to be and how quick on your feet to do your job well. You're not dealing here with a high school social studies paper. You're dealing with high policy and you don't have a lot of leeway to just wing it. You could potentially get it really wrong [which would] make your boss look very bad.

**MURPHY:** Yeah.

**BIRKNER:** So you had to be very quick-witted it and you had to know how to get information fast in a pre-computer era.

**MURPHY:** Right.

**BIRKNER:** Everything you had done in your life to that point must have helped you: undergraduate education, post-graduate education, excellent experience in public policy business, writing working papers for AEI. It seems to me you are really the right kind of person in the job you were in. I don't think I could have done what you did.

**MURPHY:** You know the history major was so important to me and especially History 45 at Yale, "the Course of Chinese History," because in that course Dixie Walker [Professor Richard L. Walker], in addition to our term paper we had to write about a half dozen short papers each semester. And he gave us kind of a broad range of topics among which we could pick. And he said, "Those papers are not to exceed two pages double spaced in length." And he said, "I want you people to learn how to write

concisely." And he said, "Because President Eisenhower demands a one page memorandum." And let me tell you. Hugh Scott demanded it. You know sometimes I would send him something long and he'd say, "Dick, I want it in one page or less." And he said, "If you have attachments you can put them on; if I have time I'll look at them." And so—

**BIRKNER:** You're learning how to get to the core of something very fast as part of the job.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, absolutely, absolutely. And I was much less verbose with him than I am with you.

**BIRKNER:** Well that's alright. Tell me a little bit about your attitude about this tough political year of 1964. You watched some things unfold but you've already telegraphed that you couldn't have expected what happened at the national level. You say when you were originally thinking about this you know Goldwater didn't seem like the likely nominee but [Henry Cabot] Lodge gets in the race and briefly catches fire in '64. Rockefeller stumbles, Goldwater doesn't do particularly well but he has this extraordinary organization working for him.

**MURPHY:** And Scranton was procrastinating and they [his supporters] were kicking and screaming.

**BIRKNER:** Kicking and screaming. Eisenhower's role was ambiguous. It's very hard to even understand from the inside because clearly Eisenhower was sympathetic to Scranton as opposed to Rockefeller, but he was not willing to get involved in electioneering for Scranton or even endorse him. What are you talking about among your friends about the political situation for the Republican nomination [in 1964]? Obviously you are rooting for somebody.

**MURPHY:** I was rooting for Rockefeller. And I was absolutely appalled when just before the [June] California primary Happy Rockefeller conceived a baby.

**BIRKNER:** Well, she delivered a baby.

**MURPHY:** Delivered a baby and that killed them. And then Bill Scranton jumped in and of course we were all just rooting for Scranton. I didn't go to the convention in San Francisco. Scott of course went and Bob Kunzig and Gene Cowen and Edie Skinner went to San Francisco. And of course Scott was the point person on the platform for Scranton. And you know it was Hugh Scott who fought the Goldwater people. And the chairman of the platform committee was John Rhodes, Congressman John Rhodes of Arizona, and [Wisconsin Representative] Mel Laird. And I knew Laird from my time at AEI. And they were pretty mean, you know, the Goldwater people were actually very mean. I knew Karl Hess because Karl Hess started working for AEI when I was still there. Karl Hess was Goldwater's speechwriter. Karl had no education at all to speak of, he wasn't very bright and I can mention something about him later on, too. But so, you know, here we were just absolutely appalled by what transpired in San Francisco. And after the convention the senator and Mrs. Scott took a slow trip back east. They went up to Vancouver and they took a Canadian Pacific train across Canada. And went to Ottawa, and he sat up in the spectator's gallery in the House of Commons, the Canadian House of Commons. And then he came back to Washington. And I think it was in August of 1964 that he went up to Harrisburg for a meeting of the Republican State Committee and it was then that he very reluctantly endorsed Goldwater's candidacy. And I'm sure you've seen his statement or can get a hold of his statement where, in effect, he said that, "I support him as the standard bearer of my party." And he said, "I feel that the party has honored me by selecting me as its candidate for Congress and for the Senate." And so he felt obligated to support the party. And that was about all he had to say about Goldwater for the rest of the campaign.

**BIRKNER:** Well, I think if anything you need to accentuate the fact that you don't find any connection whatever to Goldwater in any of his literature and not even much emphasis on being a Republican . [Scott's] poll numbers told him that Goldwater was going to get crushed in Pennsylvania and he had to do something to get people to vote for him.

**MURPHY:** Well, in that connection you know I was involved in that campaign at long distance from Washington because one of the things we did in the campaign is we came out with Murphy Memos. And this was a leaf we took from Senator Kuchel's book when he ran for re-election in California in 1962 against a state senator by the name of Richard Richards, the Democratic candidate. Steve Horn, who was Kuchel's legislative assistant, would come out with these whenever Richards attacked Kuchel on some of

Kuchel's votes. Steve would come up with the Horn Memos [which were sent] to editors and political writers with newspapers and radio and television outlets [throughout California]. And we took a leaf from that. And so, you know, I'd get a call from Harrisburg and they'd say, "[Blatt] has attacked him on this vote and that vote." I remember one in particular that Scott had voted for. She had attacked him [he was a congressman then] for voting to override President Truman's veto in 1947 of the Reed-Bullwinkle Act which [she claimed] directly cost the jobs of three thousand railroad workers in Altoona, Pennsylvania. My job was to come up with an answer to that. I didn't know anything about the Reed-Bullwinkle Act. But I quickly got information. I looked at Scott's statement in the *Congressional Record* from that time. I called on a couple of railroad lobbyists and asked them about what the Reed-Bullwinkle Act was all about and anything like that. So I got the information and I came up with a hard-hitting response. And you know these things [memos] would be issued out of Harrisburg with my name on it. And they got to be a thorn on her side. [There] was an Associated Press dispatch from some town in Pennsylvania where she wanted to know who Murphy was. "Now what's his business in all of this thing?" you know. [Scott] just ignored all that. So that's one of the things I did. The other thing I remember from that campaign: Goldwater came into the state about six or seven times. One time I got a call from Karl Hess: He said, "The senator wants to go to the Philadelphia Navy Yard to say that he's going to fight to keep the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard open." And he wanted my advice. He said, "We're going have him come in by helicopter." He wanted my advice as to what Goldwater ought to say. "What can Goldwater say that would help Hugh Scott?" And I said, "Karl, the best thing Goldwater can do to help Hugh Scott is to stay the hell out of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."

**BIRKNER:** Well, that was very straightforward.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, and you know he came in six or seven times and Scott was always somewhere else as far away [as possible]. George Goodling, congressman from this district right here, he [brokered] a joint appearance by Goldwater and Scott in York. And when Scott heard about it he blasted Goodling and managed to find something [to do] up in Wilkes-Barre [instead].

**BIRKNER:** Scott proved to be more perceptive than Goodling because Goodling lost his seat that year in an otherwise safe district.



**MURPHY:** Absolutely—and anyway when Goldwater’s campaigning in the Philadelphia suburbs he made some remarks which I think could fairly be construed as anti-Semitic. I can’t remember exactly what he said but I was appalled when I saw it. A few days later we received a letter from the chaplain of Jewish students of the colleges and universities in the greater Pittsburgh area. It was a three-page letter, single spaced, telling Hugh Scott that he wanted to vote for Scott but he just couldn’t do it because of what Goldwater was saying and the type of people who were behind it and all of that. I was so upset. I called the man and charged it to my home phone number and I spent forty-five minutes on the phone pleading with him, begging with him. I told him all about Scott’s role in the presidential campaign, the pre-convention. I told him what he’d done out there [San Francisco]. I told him how he was running away from Goldwater whenever he came into the state. I don’t know if I convinced him but I sure gave it—

**BIRKNER:** You gave it the college try.

**MURPHY:** Absolutely, absolutely.

**BIRKNER:** So what are you hearing from your friends or from the senator himself about his chances of overcoming of what’s going to be a Johnson landslide.

**MURPHY:** I’ll tell you what his attitude was. During the campaign he was writing his book on Chinese art, *The Golden Age of Chinese Art* [Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1966].

**BIRKNER:** No, not during the campaign.

**MURPHY:** *During the campaign.* He would be writing.

**BIRKNER:** I don’t want to misunderstand you.

**MURPHY:** Yes.

**BIRKNER:** OK.

**MURPHY:** He was, in his spare time, working on his manuscript.

**BIRKNER:** Hard to believe.

**MURPHY:** Longhand, and then he would send the longhand thing into Harrisburg from wherever he was in Pennsylvania, to Barbara Sweeney his secretary, to type the [pages] up in draft form to send back to him. One day the thing came into Barbara Sweeney and Bob Kunzig happened to be right there. And he saw that thing and he picked up the phone and he called the senator and he said, "Hugh" he said, "Hugh, that goddamn book has got to stop," He said, "You're in a fight for your life."

**BIRKNER:** Well, somebody had to say it.

**MURPHY:** Well, Scott just said "Relax Bob." He said, "We're going to win this thing." And that was his attitude. And so anyway the news we got the weekend before election day was in Harrisburg—the Senator sat down with Governor Scranton and John Bucci. He was the pollster for the Pennsylvania Republicans and Bucci gave him the news. He said, "Lyndon Johnson is going to carry the state by five hundred thousand votes and Hugh Scott is going down the tubes." That was his assessment. Well, Lyndon Johnson carried the state by one million six hundred thousand votes.

**BIRKNER:** That's enormous.

**MURPHY:** It was staggering.

**BIRKNER:** I think that number may be exaggerated.

**MURPHY:** I think it was over a million, I'll tell you that. I think it was one million six hundred thousand and Scott's plurality, finally after the absentee ballots were counted, was about between seventy and seventy-one thousand and I was involved with the count of the absentee ballots. My wife Luda [and I] went up to Philadelphia on election day, in the evening. We took the train up to Philadelphia. I remember it was raining and we went to the Sheraton Hotel, the Philadelphia Sheraton Hotel which was the campaign headquarters, because that's where the senator was and we were up there in his suite for the returns. And I'll tell you we were all gloomy because I remember getting off the train and learning that Johnson had carried Connecticut by a landslide and it just looked horrible. We were watching on television. And the senator was in his private quarters and he was on the phone with Scranton. And Scranton was following certain key

precincts around the state and he was feeding the information to Scott. And you know the senator would be coming around trying to cheer us up. He'd say, "We going to make it," and things like that. But we went to bed that night after midnight and we were behind. Well, first thing in the morning the Scott forces went into court in Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties and got an injunction to impound the absentee ballots because we wanted to make sure there was going to be an honest count. And actually the Blatt people shared our view because of course they were reformers. And so I was involved in the recount in Philadelphia. Scott's attorney for that recount was a fellow by the name of Mort Witkin. And Mort was an old time Republican Party pol. He had been a ward leader in Philadelphia under the old Republican machine. And I remember when we walked into the City Council chambers Mort pointed toward down below to the Philadelphia election workers ready to start the count, and we started to work and he said, "Dick, you see those SOBs down there?" He said, "Every GD one of them was a Republican until Joe Clark was elected mayor [in 1951]." And he said, "The day after the election they all became Democrats." He said, "They've been here forever." He said, "I don't trust a one of them." He said, "Your job is to stand over their shoulders and watch them open up every ballot and make sure it's counted right." I said, "Yes sir."

**BIRKNER:** And did you do that?

**MURPHY:** For sixteen days. First of all I went back to Washington with Luda and then turned right around and came back to Philadelphia and I spent the next two weeks in the Ben Franklin Hotel. And every day I'd go over to City Hall for several hours overseeing, along with the Blatt people, the count of ballots. And sixteen days after the election Genevieve Blatt conceded.

**BIRKNER:** By rights she should have won the election.

**MURPHY:** She should have.

**BIRKNER:** But virtually everything that she did turned out bad and almost everything he did turned out right and that was the difference.

**MURPHY:** But you know what? Hugh Scott was very special. When he first became a senator—now of course this was before I started working for him, he was elected in 1958—Scott knew that he had a handicap. He was not known in western

Pennsylvania and he was very conscious of the fact that both Senators Joe Clark and Hugh Scott were from Philadelphia—in fact they were neighbors up there. Hugh Scott lived on Hillcrest Drive and Joe Clark lived nearby and they were also very close personal friends. They didn't agree on a lot of things but they worked very closely. The two offices worked beautifully together. But in 1964 because Joe Clark of course was a strong backer of Genevieve Blatt in the primary campaign and he questioned Musmanno's [Pennsylvania Supreme Court Judge Michael Musmanno] origins, as you may recall, and the spelling of his name and everything which brought the charge of bigotry. And I'm sure you've read the book entitled *Bigotry* by a political scientist [Maria Falco, *Bigotry* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980)].

**BIRKNER:** I know the book you're talking about.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, her name was Falco I believe.

**BIRKNER:** Right.

**MURPHY:** And it's a great book. Anyway that split redounded to Hugh Scott's benefit because you know whenever he was asked by a journalist or someone about bigotry, all Scott had to say is "I'm against it." But Joe Clark really threw himself into that campaign in the general election.

**BIRKNER:** Which is against the norm. Senators don't tend to campaign against their colleagues.

**MURPHY:** Back in those days, fortunately; that's changed now and I think that's a tragedy because then senators just didn't do that thing. In fact Gene McCarthy of Minnesota came into the state in 1960 campaigning for Kennedy and attacked Hugh Scott and Scott never forgot that. He told me about that because he could see McCarthy and I became good friends on the Senate floor. I've lost my train of thought.

**BIRKNER:** You were talking about Clark and Musmanno and Scott in 1964.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, and so after the election Joe Clark sort of congratulated Scott and then he and his wife went on a trip to Argentina. And the Scotts went to New

Zealand. It was Hugh Scott who originally came up with the idea of doing a joint [radio and television] program with Joe Clark.

**BIRKNER:** Right.

**MURPHY:** And his reason for doing it, his motivation for doing it was that it would give him exposure in western Pennsylvania and of course gave Clark exposure, too. The show ["Your Senators Report"] was on every other week. On Sundays it was a half-hour show and it was on every television station in Pennsylvania and every radio station in Pennsylvania and it always got news even nationally.

**BIRKNER:** And they were able to get the top people onto the show.

**MURPHY:** They'd get journalists on it. They'd get their colleagues on it. I remember the last show being filmed in the Senate [Recording] Studio—the last show before Scott announced his candidacy for re-election in '64. Hubert Humphrey was their guest and Scott and Clark were going at each other like this and poor Hubert was sitting there [as a spectator]. And he finally said, "Hey boys can you give me a chance to say something?" But so that was Scott's calculation. But Joe Clark did a slow burn down in Argentina and Hugh Scott did the same because Ralph Widner, my counterpart in Clark's office, he was writing speeches for Gen Blatt blasting Scott. Anyway they kissed and made up after the election. Joe Clark came to Hugh Scott and said, "Well, Hugh, why don't we start up the show again?" Well, that broke the ice and they did their show again until Clark was defeated in 1968.

**BIRKNER:** Did you have any personal opinion of Blatt in '64 or any personal opportunity to see her in action?

**MURPHY:** No, I never met the woman and I never saw her.

**BIRKNER:** Because you were in Washington primarily doing your thing.

**MURPHY:** I was in Washington.

**BIRKNER:** She wondered who you were but you knew who she was but you didn't spend any time with her.

**MURPHY:** That's right.

**BIRKNER:** And do you, looking back on it, consider it somewhat miraculous that Scott won the election?

**MURPHY:** Absolutely, absolutely. If it hadn't been for that Democratic primary, given the size of Lyndon Johnson's victory, I don't see how Hugh Scott could possibly have survived.

**BIRKNER:** Timing is everything in politics and that was an example where everything had to fall, fell into place for Scott. So that was a near death experience for Scott and yet he comes through it. And of course he's going to play a major role in the Senate for years to come. We don't have a whole lot of time left in the tape but I did want ask you about '65 which was the year of tremendous Democratic majorities in both houses and great ambitions on the part of Lyndon Johnson for a Great Society.

**MURPHY:** Absolutely.

**BIRKNER:** Tell me about Scott's attitude about Lyndon Johnson and about what Johnson was trying to do.

**MURPHY:** Well, he had a good relationship with Johnson. And the interesting thing was—and Scott co-sponsored quite a few of the Great Society bills, the education bills, both the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Higher Education Act. Of course he was very much involved in the Voting Rights Act, as was I. And Johnson, you know, had a very effective lobbying operation going. I often would get calls from Nick Katzenbach. You know when told that the senator was out of the office he would say, "Well, let me speak to Dick Murphy." And Mike Manatos, he was the White House liaison with the Senate. I had a good relationship with Mike. And the senator was invited down to the White House for signing ceremonies and of course later on you know for these briefings that Johnson would conduct on the Vietnam War. And he said to me one time, "You know, Dick, in eight years of Eisenhower's administration I was in the White House twice." And he said, "Every time I'm turning around I'm going down to the White House for this, that and another thing."

**BIRKNER:** I find that odd, because I've been studying the Eisenhower presidency and his relationship with Congress and Ike had plenty of interaction in the White House with congresspeople.

**MURPHY:** Can I have a copy of your paper?

**BIRKNER:** Sure, I'll send it to you but Eisenhower met with the Republican Senate and congressional leadership consistently and he met an awful lot with individual Republican congressmen so I find it very hard to imagine that Scott was telling it the way was, that he was only invited to the Eisenhower White House twice. Eisenhower's interactions with Republican Congresspeople were continual. It's interesting to me that Scott had a perception which he expressed to you that LBJ was more interested in his company than Eisenhower.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, I mean he was going down there all the time, it seemed. And one time he went down there and it was one of Johnson's briefings on the Vietnam War. You know he had a group of senators down there. And then after the briefing he invited Cliff Case, the Republican senator from New Jersey, and Hugh Scott up to the family quarters. Then he gave them the treatment up there. They went into the bathroom and Case sat on the toilet and Scott was leaning against the washbasin and Lyndon Johnson was moving in on them. You know that famous set of pictures of Johnson [when he was Senate majority leader] leaning on Senator Theodore Francis Green [of Rhode Island] [by George Tames of the *New York Times*].

**BIRKNER:** You're saying the relationship was a working relationship and not a relationship the way we see with Senator McConnell and Obama. And that's a sign of Johnson's shrewdness, to see that Scott could be helpful to him on many bills. Would you say that *your* sense of optimism or your sense of pleasure in your job diminished in '65 and '66 because the Republicans were so much in the minority or did it not matter because you were still in the game?

**MURPHY:** I was still in the game.

**BIRKNER:** So you were doing your job and working the same way you had been. The fact that the Republicans had fewer members was really not a problem to you.

**MURPHY:** No and they started coming back in '66.

**BIRKNER:** That's right.

**End of the First Interview**