Carl M. Marcy

Chief of Staff
Foreign Relations Committee, 1955-1973

Interview #3
Walter George and Theodore Green
(Wednesday, October 5, 1983)
Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie

Senator Theodore Francis Green (D-RI) arrives at the Russell Senate Office Building, then known as the "Old Senate Office Building."

RITCHIE: You said you had a point that you wanted to bring up?

MARCY: Yes, in the first volume I mentioned Senator Taft as one of those typical senators who voted against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and subsequently, because it was as he said the law of the land, supported appropriations for United States participation in the organization.
Here is another example of a senator's influence which is not often recognized. I was with Senator George on the floor of the Senate one day when he was chairman of the Committee. Some issue was before the Senate, which I don't remember precisely, but it came to a crucial vote on an amendment. Senator Mansfield, who was then majority whip, came to Senator George and said, "Walter, how do we vote on this?" Walter said, "Well, Mike, I'm going to have to vote aye, but I hope it's defeated." So Mansfield spoke to different senators and presumably said, "Don't follow Walter George on this vote." George voted aye, but the majority rejected the leadership of Walter George, the chairman of the Committee. I recall a day or two later the *Washington Post* had a blistering editorial attacking George for having voted as he did on this particular measure. It excoriated

him, yet I know that the very thing that Walter George had said to Mike Mansfield was what got the amendment defeated. I suspect that that occurs quite often--a senator knows he must vote one way to represent his constituents or a special interest, yet at the same time he conceives the national interest must prevail. This is one instance when I was in on the conversation.

RITCHIE: That's sort of a nice introduction to the person I really wanted to know about. When Walter George died, his papers were destroyed, and there is so little evidence other than his public utterances left. No one has ever written a biography of Walter George, and I don't know if anyone will tackle one under the circumstances. What sort of a person was he? Could you tell me a little bit about him?

MARCY: I would say he did not have a commanding presence, but he had a commanding voice. When Walter spoke, senators listened. They came to the floor to hear what he had to say. I did not have much experience with him in the way of drafting statements or making suggestions. George was his own man. He commanded the respect of other senators. He was chairman only for two years. It was Senator George who appointed me as chief of staff, to succeed Francis Wilcox. I had great admiration for him, but was never close to him. He had an able assistant, Jake Carlton, with whom I had a good relationship. In fact, our relationship was such that he came to me

one time and said, "Carl, Walter is not going to run for reelection next time." I asked, "How come?" Jake said, "The businessmen," and I think that he referred specifically to Coca-Cola, "have decided that it was time for a change." And I believe that change was that they then supported Herman Talmadge, and Walter George retired gracefully, no longer having the support of the people he needed in his home state.

RITCHIE: That's interesting. When he was chairman of the Finance Committee he was sometimes called "the Senator from CocaCola."

MARCY: I think that was probably the key. I just don't know. It was just that I happened to get that message from Senator George's right-hand man, prior to the announcement that he was not going to run again.

RITCHIE: Your comment also reminded me of when I interviewed "Doc" Riddick [former Senate Parliamentarian]. This is a quote from his interview:

> On another occasion (Carl Marcy was the staff director of the Foreign Relations Committee at that time), the Senate was considering a reciprocal tax treaty with Canada. As you know, the practice is for someone, some

staff director or aide, to sit next to the chairman to supply him with data and with details that he might forget while he's speaking. Well, on this particular occasion, Senator George took the floor on this reciprocal tax agreement, and I notice Carl Marcy in the back of the chamber instead of sitting next to Senator George.

Nobody was sitting next to Senator George to assist him, but he was standing again without notes speaking. I walked around to the back of the chamber and encountered Carl Marcy and I said: "Carl, why aren't you down there next to Senator George, assisting him?" He said, "Hell, he knows more about the treaty than I do, why should I be there?" And that was the attitude that those who worked closely with Senator George had towards the senator. He was very competent and made very brilliant speeches on the floor, and was considered one of the most informed senators.

MARCY: Well, that's fully consistent with my view then and now. Of course, having been chairman of the Finance Committee on that particular subject . . . . But then that was true with respect to Senator George on all of these issues, he was his own man. It was rather remarkable, because Senator George's eyesight was not good. How he ever absorbed all the knowledge and had the capacity and ability that he exhibited I still marvel.

RITCHIE: I've heard stories that the Eisenhower administration, the Eisenhower-Dulles team, really urged Senator George to become chairman as a means of preventing Theodore Green from becoming chairman in 1955. George could have become chairman of the Finance Committee again. Did you ever hear anything along that line?

MARCY: No, I did not hear anything that would support that or negate it.

RITCHIE: I was just wondering in the sense that Senator George had been for so many years the chairman of the Finance Committee, I wondered how really interested he was in foreign relations and international affairs by comparison.

MARCY: I really don't know. I don't know why the Eisenhower administration would not want Senator Green, unless it was because Green was getting along in years. In the area of foreign policy, as I recall, Green didn't exhibit any great antagonism towards positions of the executive branch.

RITCHIE: The same time that Senator George became chairman, in 1955, Francis Wilcox went to the State Department. How did that happen?

MARCY: Francis Wilcox was close to John Foster Dulles. They had a good relationship, and Francis had always been interested in United Nations affairs. In f act, he and I wrote a book together on contract with Brookings--which I mentioned earlier--on proposals to change the UN. Francis had become quite an authority in that area since he had been involved in UN affairs during the war years. Francis always seemed to me to be intrigued with the executive branch. He came from the University of Louisville originally, and then was in the Library of Congress, and doing work for the Foreign Relations Committee. And as the Foreign Relations Committee became more involved in the potential creation of the United Nations,


Senator Walter George (D-GA)

Francis became the full-time assistant to Senator Vandenberg. But Vandenberg and Connally worked so closely together during that period that whatever Francis did was done for both Connally and Vandenberg.

RITCHIE: Well, when he moved to the State Department, did you assume that you would be moving up or did it come as a surprise that you became chief of staff?

MARCY: I don't remember that it was a great surprise. I was gratified, let's say. I suspect Francis recommended me to Senator George. But I don't remember that I was smacking my lips to have Francis leave and take over. It was one of those things that happened. I'm trying to recall the other people who were on the staff at the time. I guess I was more or less the natural person to move into the position of "chief of staff," a title created by Francis. Also I had been there longer than any other staff member, which, of course, is a significant factor in the Senate environment. Pat Holt, who was close to Tom Connally, came to the Committee at the same time I did. Pat was a newspaper type. I think probably the fact that I had been in the Department of State before I came to the Foreign Relations

Committee may have been a factor in Francis making a recommendation, and George going along.

RITCHIE: That was pretty good for someone who came up for a one-year stint in the Senate to wind up as chief of staff just a few years later.

MARCY: It came as a surprise to me. I didn't mind it!

RITCHIE: Did you intend to make any changes in the way things were done when you became chief of staff?

MARCY: There were some things that I thought we needed to be a little more careful about. It seemed to me, as I look back on it now, that I was not quite as close to the Department of State and wanting to satisfy them as Francis had been. My tendency was to keep them at arms length. I think Francis' tendency was to think that most of the things the Department of State suggested were absolutely right, and tended to support them. It was almost natural that the Department would look to him, that Secretary Dulles would look to him, as a possible replacement, or to fill a post in the Department of State. I guess maybe my reputation in the Department of State is evidenced by the fact that in all of the years that I was on the Hill I was never offered any position in the Department of State.

I did have an experience one time with Henry Kissinger. At the time his nomination was before the Foreign Relations Committee to be Secretary of State, he invited me to the White House one day, and asked me if I would like to be an ambassador. He thought I was well-qualified to be an ambassador. What would I like? This took me by surprise. I guess I took it seriously at the time and I said, "Well, the only place I think I would like to go as an ambassador would be Sweden. It was left there and no offer ever came through.

So I never had a chance to accept or reject this quasi offer. Whether to relate that to Mr. Kissinger's concerns, or to some of the incidents that are described in Sy Hersh's book [*The Price of Power*], I don't know.

RITCHIE: That's very interesting. Did you feel that there was any impropriety in somebody who had a nomination up before the Committee making an offer to you like that?

MARCY: No, I didn't relate the two at that time. It didn't occur to me that he was suggesting that this would make it easier for him to be confirmed as Secretary of State. Actually, I don't think it would have had any effect whatsoever.

Senator Fulbright was a great admirer of Mr. Kissinger. As a matter of fact, I think most of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee thought the Kissinger appointment was very good. The reason I suspect was that there was a feeling that Secretary [William P.] Rogers wasn't quite up to the job, maybe that's not as fair as to say that Kissinger was actually Secretary of State even while he was National Security Advisor. There wasn't very much for Secretary Rogers to do, so it seemed like a perfectly natural shift to make. The place where the policy was being made was in the White House. The Committee always objected, believing foreign policy should have been made in the Department of State. So when Mr. Kissinger moved to the Department of State

governmental organization was back into the framework which seemed natural. Let the State Department run the foreign policy.

RITCHIE: Thinking about the State Department in the earlier period when you became chief of staff, it was 1955, the Democrats had regained the majority in the Congress but the Republicans were still the party in the executive branch. What was the relationship between the Democratic Foreign Relations Committee and the Republican State Department and White House?

MARCY: I think it was very good. One of the reasons was that if the executive branch is in the hands of one party and the Congress is in the hands of the other party, there is a certain inducement for the executive branch to pay more attention to Congress than is otherwise the case. When the Congress and the Executive are of the same political party, the White House expects members of its own party to go along, whereas if the Congress is in the hands of the other party, the Executive has to worry a little bit about it. And as a consequence there is a lot more cozying up to the Congress.

RITCHIE: Now, I don't think of John Foster Dulles as a person who "cozied." What was your impression of Dulles in those days?

MARCY: I dealt at that time mostly with William B. Macomber, "Butz" we called him, who had been Secretary Dulles' aide for some years. As a matter of fact, I think he married Secretary Dulles'

principal secretary. Bill and I got along very well. We had our ups and downs. Bill grumbled many times about the Foreign Relations Committee and things that were not doing right, or that he was questioning. But I had very little to do with Dulles. Members of the Committee found Dulles a forthright witness. I don't recall any significant clashes.

Dulles was very good during that period in consulting the Foreign Relations Committee in connection with the negotiation of SEATO, and several other conventions of that kind. He would come to the Committee and consult with them during the negotiation process. I think that was pretty much the case during the time when Francis was staff director and the consultations that went on in connection with the creation of the United Nations. There was much more in the way then of bringing the senators in while the process was still going on.

I remember, for example, at one point there was an issue about how the United States would react in the event of an attack on one of its treaty allies, and how one would spell out in the treaty itself how the United States would respond. I recall handing Senator George a note saying, "Why don't you say the United States will respond in accordance with its constitutional processes," which of course mucked everything up. But I think you will find that that phrase is now pretty well embedded in some of those treaties. Confusing as the

phrase is, it avoids that issue of who declares war, what the commander-in-chief is going to do. The phrase "in accordance with our constitutional processes" ducked the issue, as you can see. I'lI have to go back and take a look at the treaties and make sure it's still there! Illustrative of the way in which Senator George, in that particular instance, and Dulles worked together, Dulles said, "Well, that's a good idea, let's try it." They were still in the negotiating process and that phrase survived.

RITCHIE: Were there regular contacts between George and Dulles? Were they people who consulted frequently?

MARCY: My recollection is that they did not consult very frequently. When Dulles had a problem he appeared before the Committee. Senator George was a senatorial person. He conducted business within the framework of the Committee. Now I can't speak to private conversations, of course. Dulles may have called George many times. But my recollection is that most of those meetings with Secretary Dulles were in the environment of the Committee.

RITCHIE: There's another Dulles in the 1950s who is interesting and that's Allen Dulles, who also testified, although, it appears, a little more reluctantly than John Foster Dulles, before the Committee. Did the Committee have any difficulty in getting Allen Dulles to come to give executive session testimony and to provide information in general?

MARCY: Yes, it was always difficult to get anyone from the CIA to testify, and that was especially true with respect to Allen Dulles. The few times he did come, I

don't think the Committee members were very impressed with his testimony. He was not forthright. He tended to act like he was the man who knew what was going on; he had the intelligence and seemed to feel no particular need to communicate with the senators. I don't recall that the senators ever went after Dulles very vigorously. I recall at one point, one of the members on the Committee--somehow the name Senator [Leverett] Saltonstall sticks in my mind, but I don't think he was a member of the Committee, but the remark came out that: "Well, the kinds of things that the CIA is doing, I don't want to know." That was much the attitude, and I think that Allen Dulles approached the Committee very much that way.

RITCHIE: Looking back, as historians look back, we realize how much of a role the CIA was playing in foreign policy in events like Iran and Guatemala. Do you think that the members of the Foreign Relations Committee were aware of the role of the CIA in foreign policy in those days, or was it just this "I don't want to know" attitude, or they just flat didn't know?

MARCY: I think the main view was that they did not want to know and did not know what was going on. Perhaps if they had known what was going on they would have been more critical of CIA

operations. I think it was Jack Peurifoy who was ambassador to some Central American country, it was Nicaragua or Guatemala, pulled off a coup, knocked off one government and brought in another government more favorable to the United States, and he was admired for that. Peurifoy was clearly acting in cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency. He was proud of that. I knew him slightly. But the CIA was not thought of as a bad, bad thing, which I think now many senators tend to--not say it's a bad thing--but tend to question many of the things that it has done.

RITCHIE: Do you think it was the general air of anti-communism in the early 1950s, that basically any method that worked was okay?

MARCY: It's hard for me to answer that. Certainly it was a factor. It's hard to go back and reconstruct the attitudes at that time. But it was clear, I guess, that communism was the enemy. But I don't recall that the Central American incident that I've just mentioned was related particularly to the fear of communism in Central America.

RITCHIE: From reading back through the executive session transcripts I'm surprised at how little reference there is to the CIA in the early 1950s, and I guess my suspicion is that it was more that people just didn't know what was going on. There just don't seem to be that many connections between events to say that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved for sure, in Guatemala, let's say.

MARCY: I think that's right. They didn't know. They didn't particularly care. And a few of those who might have cared tended to say, "I don't want to know about it."

RITCHIE: The big turning point, or at least one of the biggest events of your first two years as staff director was the Suez crisis. It seems in many respects to have called into question a lot of policy decisions by the State Department, and there were a whole series of joint meetings between the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee (by the way, Saltonstall was involved in those joint meetings, which is possibly where he made that comment).

MARCY: That may be.

RITCHIE: How did the Suez incident affect the Senate and the Committee's relationship with the Eisenhower administration and with John Foster Dulles?

MARCY: Don, I haven't thought about that for so long, and my memory is very, very fuzzy.

RITCHIE: One of the reasons why I brought it up was that Senator Fulbright made quite a few significant speeches on the floor about consultation. This was a case where I think that he believed the White House had called them in at the very eve of the decision and it was more of an announcement of what was happening than a consultation, and I wondered how significant it was in terms of his

later beliefs. He also made a lot of demands for information from the State Department, and they were shipping down cartons of documents on the whole history of the Aswan Damn, and all sorts of stuff. So if you do want to think about it, I would like to follow it up at a later time, if there is anything else you'd like to say.

MARCY: Now you're refreshing my recollection. The best person to discuss that with you and the Committee attitudes was Pat Holt. When we got the documents from State--and they were very forthcoming--with many file cabinets marked classified, Pat hid himself away in a small room in the Capitol and worked those documents over for many weeks. Pat produced whatever was finally produced. As I recall Pat's product was in the form of a Fulbright speech.

Many times when a committee staff gets involved in an issue of this kind, the regular committee business has to go on while someone is tied up doing the

research or getting particular kinds of information. During that period of time I was delighted to have Pat do the job, and as I recall Pat was under a great deal of pressure to get it done. I was probably worrying about the next Committee meeting, which would involve the confirmation of an ambassador or some item of legislation. But that is one of the things where Pat took the burden, and the Committee then looked to Pat for information.

RITCHIE: That brings up another point: how did your role change from going from professional staff to staff director? Did you continue to specialize in any areas, or work with any subcommittees or were you basically supervising the work of the other professional staff members and the areas that they covered?

MARCY: My role did change. The management of the Committee and the staff is a time consuming job, and a lot of it is managerial work. So to the extent that I could give a staff person the responsibility for a particular area or a particular problem, I did. I expected to be kept informed when significant things were happening, so that if Pat, for example, were going to draft a speech for a senator or make some particular request of the administration, he would check it out with me. The staff we had was very competent. I had very few problems of individual members of the staff going off on wing-dings of their own. I don't mean "on their own" in the sense of behind my back. But within a committee framework there needs to be somebody who knows what the right hand is doing and what the left hand is doing. So a staff member who becomes completely immersed in one aspect of a problem, which may interest a particular senator, may also find that there's a problem developing from another quarter, from another senator. So I sort of--I was going to say "rode herd," but that's too tight. I tried to keep my fingers enough in every stew so that I knew how it was cooking.

RITCHIE: Did you have any difficulties with the problem of the professional staff serving both the minority as well as the majority?

MARCY: No, we were very fortunate in that we all viewed our . . . . One concept I tried to convey to all of the staff members, and to the senators as well, was that we were professional staff members and our responsibility was to provide the senators with whatever information they requested or whatever information we thought they might need. What they did with it was obviously up to the senator, whether it was a Republican or a Democrat. I tended to view us as a law firm, in a sense. One day we might take a case for a plaintiff and another day a case for a defendant. In both cases we would do our level best to make the best arguments we could. My theory was that ultimately the arguments which were put forth on each side of an issue would be resolved where they should be resolved and that was on the floor of the Senate by elected senators.

In one instance a new senator came on the Committee, Senator [Karl] Mundt, who didn't much like the idea of having a "nonpartisan staff." He wanted to have someone who would prepare his minority views. I recall one instance when Senator Mundt came to me and said, in effect, "I want to get someone who is not on the staff to do the minority report." I said, "Well, why don't you try us." I think the staff member responsible for the issue was Jim Lowenstein. Jim wrote both the majority report and the minority report. Senator Mundt came

to me later saying, "I thought that minority report was great, it was much better than the majority report." So I asked Jim about it, and he said, "Well, I did the best I could for both the majority and the minority, but it was much more fun and easier to write the minority report than the majority report." And I think that is generally true. It is much easier to be vitriolic and use strong language if writing on behalf of a minority than on behalf of a majority, where the responsibility for the ultimate action is more likely to rest.

RITCHIE: I suppose it helped in the sense that there was still a bipartisan feeling about foreign policy and a relative consensus about what the foreign policy ought to be. You didn't really have that many members who were off on a fringe.

MARCY: That's correct. I think that came in part from the fact that at that time the Foreign Relations Committee operated very much as a unit. As we discussed earlier, there wasn't a tendency to have a subcommittee with a particular area of legislative responsibility that would lead to a report or action which would have tended to fragment the group. If you look at the *Congressional Record* today, especially on the House side where they have a much larger committee, very seldom do you see that the full committee is meeting. There may be two or three subcommittee meetings a day. The result is that the full committee seldom comes together to exchange views on a particular issue. During the Green, the Fulbright, and

the George period a factor that tended to keep the Committee in a nonpartisan mode was that the full Committee acted as a unit, and they enjoyed that.

RITCHIE: The one thing that the Committee seemed to spend most all of its time with was foreign aid. The Mutual Security Acts must have taken months every year to get them organized and reported, and it looked like to me as if the full Committee was sitting on that and fighting it out paragraph by paragraph.

MARCY: You're absolutely right. It was a very tedious exercise. But it was the biggest bill that came before the Foreign Relations Committee every year. Unless

there was some big treaty or some unusual event, it was the foreign aid bill that involved foreign relations more than anything else we were doing.

RITCHIE: The executive branch was always arguing for multiple year appropriations, and the legislative branch was always arguing for a year-by-year review. Why was there such resistence to long-term foreign aid?

MARCY: I think it was the feeling that the Committee had to keep reins on the Department of State. Another very important factor was that if an authorization were for several years the Foreign Relations Committee would lose jurisdiction over that subject matter. But since appropriations are always yearly, some jurisdiction of

the Foreign Relations Commi ttee would be surrendered to the Appropriations Committee on the years when there was no authorization process. There was some of this internal Senate jurisdictional problem, although I think the most compelling factor was the feeling on the part of the Committee that it needed to keep a close rein on the administration.

RITCHIE: One author that I was reading recently said that it was because of foreign aid that the House finally got a role in foreign affairs, because that was the only real foreign policy issue that constitutionally the House could take a big share in. Did you find that the Committee was beginning to work more closely with the Foreign Affairs Committee, or at least take them more into account as a result of the foreign aid bills?

MARCY: Yes, I think that's a fair description. In many instances it seemed to me that the House Foreign Affairs Committee came to conferences, when we were trying to work out the differences between the House authorization and the Senate authorization, better prepared than the senators. I think this was partly due to the fact that senators tend to have more things on their plate, whereas House members can concentrate on specific issues. I think if you checked out the amount of time that was spent by the House Foreign Affairs

Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a foreign aid bill you would probably find that the House spent more time on the bill.

RITCHIE: There seemed to be a general pattern that the House would cut the president's request rather severely, and the Senate would inflate it a little bit, and they would split the difference, at least dollarwise.

MARCY: I don't remember that the House always came in with less than the Senate, but it was true that in conference that's the way to do it. I shouldn't say that's the way to do it, but that is the way it is done. If there is a difference the easiest way to reach a conference agreement is to split the dollar difference in half, unless there is some real vital issue that's involved.

RITCHIE: Did you feel that there was a lot of domestic pressure on the Committee in terms of where American money was allocated internationally? Let's say from various business groups, and labor groups, and senators representing states that had concentrations in sugar or any other commodity or product. Did you see any strong ties between domestic issues and foreign issues like that?

MARCY: No, I didn't, with one exception. Some of the members of the Committee always wanted to give more money to Israel than the administration asked. I recall one incident that stuck in my mind.

Senator Humphrey would almost automatically move to double the Israeli authorization. I remember one time the administration had asked for something like let's say $100 million. Humphrey said, "I move we make it $200 million." And Senator [Jacob] Javits, who we always thought of as representing the Jewish constituency more than other senators, said to Senator Humphrey something like, "Oh, no, Hubert, no Hubert, that's too much. Make it $150 million." Senator Humphrey was very excitable about anything. He never did anything halfway. But on this issue to have Senator Javits impose a restraint on Humphrey was rather interesting.

The only other lobbyist that I remember as very effective was a woman named Virginia Gray. She represented the children's fund, UNICEF. She was, I swear, one of the most effective lobbyists I have ever seen on the Hill. She would go from office to office to office. No matter what the administration asked for children she always wanted twice as much for the children's fund. She was a gentle woman, grey-haired. She would get in and sit in an office until she got to see the senator. I remember one mark-up session when we came to the authorization for the children's fund, and Senator Lausche of Ohio, who was always very hard and tough on aid programs, as soon as we came to the children's fund he said, "I move we give Gray what she asked for. Let's not spend any time on it. She came to my office, we're going to do it anyway, so put it in.', So they did! So there's a certain kind of lobbying, maybe it's not a

certain kind of lobbying but certain kinds of issues that are very hard for senators to oppose. You can't be against children especially if their cause is promoted by a nice person who feels very strongly and is persistent.

RITCHIE: Did you have to deal with lobbyists as a regular part of your functions?

MARCY: Very little. That's about the only instance that I can recall. Mostly on aid bills we dealt with the Department of State and AID. AID had a very competent man who handled aid bills for a number of years. C. Tyler Wood had absolutely the confidence of the Committee members. He represented the executive branch, but he was one of the few representatives who participated on a rather continuous basis in executive session mark-ups.

Many times when a foreign aid bill was being marked-up in private sessions, there would be maybe half a dozen people from the Department of State or AID, as the case might be, waiting to be called on. So if somebody had a question, "How come we've got this amount for Indonesia this year and we only had that much last year?" there would be a witness close by. But it got to the point where Tyler Wood, who was the most competent and the senators trusted him implicitly, participated in most mark-up sessions. I don't think he ever breached a confidence. He was a better resource than anyone on the staff, understandably, because he would spend the whole year on

an aid program. Thus, when the foreign aid authorization was before the Committee he obviously knew more about it than any staff member.

RITCHIE: Down at the Archives I've seen those huge mark-up books that fold out and have the House version, the president's version, the Senate version, and blank spaces, and reading the transcripts it seems like you were constantly telling them, "Well, now we're on page 69, it's paragraph 3, in column 4." It struck me that your job was to keep the Committee straight in what must have been an incredibly complicated task.

MARCY: It was a complicated task to keep the Committee straight. But in the process there wasn't much time left for me to argue about the substance of some of the issues. But usually on those mark-up sessions one of our staff people would be the principal substantive person, and I would try to keep the Committee on track and moving.

RITCHIE: There are a lot of plaintive "Carl, where are we?" questions that appear in the transcripts.

MARCY: Well, *somebody* had to know where we were!

RITCHIE: One other person who was a member of the Committee at that time who interested me, and I wondered if you had any dealings with him, was William Knowland. He was the Republican leader as well

as a member of the Committee, but in some respects was more out of step with the administration on foreign policy than the Democrats were. What type of person was he?

MARCY: He was physically a fullback, not only in build but in manner. Bulldoggish, the way he'd speak, a hard driver. He didn't spend too much time with the Committee because he was usually involved in broader Senate business. I knew him reasonably well, liked him very much. He was democratic and authoritarian at the same time. Sometimes a senator's attitude is that he's the senator and you're the staff. Knowland was never that way. To Knowland all people were equal as far as he was concerned, and he would beat another senator up as quickly as he would beat up a staff member--I don't mean to imply that he would, or did it as a general practice, but that was the impression that he gave.

RITCHIE: He always appeared like the bull in the china shop.

MARCY: Now that I look back, he always looked like he was about ready to have a heart attack. He committed suicide, didn't he?

RITCHIE: Eventually, yes, in 1975. In terms of the general unanimity of the Committee he seems to have been one of those people who was furthest away from the general consensus.

MARCY: That's correct. He always seemed skeptical about foreign aid. Of course, the skepticism of the Committee, during that period of time, continued to grow. I think the Committee originally rather reluctantly entered into the concept of foreign aid. Then it seemed to go along and accept it pretty well, cut a bit here, add a little there, but over a period of time, and more after Senator Fulbright became chairman, there was increasing skepticism of what was foreign aid accomplishing. Was it creating dependence? Too much dependence? Getting to be a habitual kind of thing? Nations relied on the United States more than their own efforts.

Fulbright had an illustration that he would often use. He felt that handouts might be necessary but they were demeaning to the recipient. He frequently asked rhetorically how one might feel if he were a banker and a person asked for a loan.

When the loan was paid back the borrower would be grateful, but was not subservient to the banker who made money out of the operation. On the other hand if a banker gave a quarter or a dime to a bum on the street, a person who really needed it, who couldn't borrow money on his own credit, that person might be forever grateful but would feel he had demeaned himself. He would take his hat off to the banker when they met on the street. Well, this is a rough illustration of the way Senator Fulbright began to feel about foreign aid--that if aid was an outright gift, it was demeaning to the recipient, so he came out more and more for loans, not grants.

RITCHIE: There also seemed to be a lot of criticism in the '50s that money was being concentrated in a few countries where the objective was more military than economic. More money went to Korea than to all of Latin America, and a lot of other Third World countries. That issue seemed to have been boiling in the pot during the '50s.

MARCY: Yes, I think the senators felt that we were buying allies, not helping them economically. It is a little incongruous to talk about an aid program when in fact the principal money went to nations where we were trying to get their good will so we could establish a base, or keep a contingent of Americans in the country. It would take an analysis of the administration's attitude toward foreign aid, but I do think aid tended to become more militarily oriented than an eleemosynary activity.

RITCHIE: Senator George's term as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, as you mentioned, last just two years. He did not run for reelection in 1956, and in 1957 Theodore Francis Green became chairman. He had been a member for years, but was just about ninety years old when he became chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Is it possible for a ninety year old person to really be a functionally effective chairman of a Senate committee?

MARCY: I don't think so. Senator Green was a perfect gentleman. He could always make appropriate remarks at a dinner or when called upon. He was of the old, old school in many respects. I traveled abroad with him several times. I remember two incidents in Paris.

One morning before breakfast I bought some French newspapers and gave them to Senator Green. He asked if I had paid for the papers. When I said yes, he said, "Well don't forget to charge the Committee." It was a nickel or a dime, or the equivalent in francs. On another occasion, he looked out of the window one day and he pointed out the Eiffel Tower and said, "The first time I was here that hadn't been built." Then he had some story about elephants marching down the

street, I don't know why that sticks in my mind. In any event he could not keep track of things. Do you want me to go on and discuss Senator Green?

RITCHIE: Yes.

MARCY: During the years he was chairman he depended upon me a great deal in all kinds of ways. That quickly became apparent to a number of people. For example, after an executive session of the Committee, it was the custom for the press to come into the Committee room to learn what had been done. I am not referring to secret briefings of the Committee but to mark-up sessions which were always held out of the public eye, at that time. But the decisions were

always immediately made public. Senator Green loved to have the press come storming into the room so he could tell them what happened. Reporters might ask a question or two and then thank the senator and leave. Senator Green would leave, and then the press would come back and ask me to straighten it out, tell them what happened as distinct from what Senator Green remembered. That was a bit embarrassing, but the press and I had that informal understanding. I don't remember for how long that went on. But it became more and more apparent that, with all due respect, I was acting as chairman of the Committee because he wasn't. And no other member would take over. Again, this seniority, "he's the chairman" kind of business.

At one point we wanted to start an elaborate study of foreign policy. I think we called the product *A Decade of Foreign Policy*. In order to do that we had to have a committee or some kind of device other than expecting Senator Green to be in charge. So we set up an executive committee. Essentially it was Senator Fulbright and Senator Hickenlooper. They ran it, while Senator Green was chairman of the Committee. But this is leading up to a final development.

I recall during one Senate debate, probably on a foreign aid bill, Senator Green was managing the bill and I was sitting beside him. An amendment was proposed and Green turned to me and said, "Well, what do we do?" And I said, "Well, that's up to you. If you

oppose the amendment it will be defeated, and if you support it, it will probably pass." And he said, "But I don't know what to do." I said, "Well, Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Fulbright are on the floor, let's ask them." And Senator Green said, "But we can't, the Senate's in session." I said, "Senator, you do just what I tell you to do. Stand up and interrupt the proceedings and say, 'I suggest the absence of a quorum,"' which he did. Under the rules of the Senate, the Senate cannot continue business until a quorum has been established or there is

unanimous consent that the quorum call be canceled. So Senator Green and Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Fulbright and I grouped together on the floor of the Senate and I told them what the issue was--well, they knew what the issue was--and I said, "Do you want the chairman to oppose this amendment or support it?" We talked about it a while, and then as we went back to our seats I turned to Hickenlooper and Fulbright and said, "What do you want to do?" And they said, "It's up to the chairman." I said, "But the chairman will do whatever you tell him to do." "It's up to the chairman," they repeated. So we sat down and I said to Senator Green, "We'll oppose it. Read this paper." We'd had these papers in advance of positions that might be taken, so he stood up; read the paper opposing the amendment and it was defeated.

Sometime about that period of time I talked with a couple of press people. I remember particularly Carroll Kilpatrick who was then with the *Washington Post* and I told him of this incident on an

off-the-record basis. I said, "You fellows are all absolutely wonderful. You treat Senator Green just beautifully all the time, but he's not with it."
Sometime after that there were a couple of blistering editorials written in the *Providence Journal*, as I recall, calling Senator Green too old to serve and suggesting he ought to be replaced. The senator was terribly hurt by these editorials. But the first inkling I had that something was going on was when I got from Lyndon Johnson one day, saying, "I want every member of the Foreign Relations Committee present tomorrow morning. Senator Green has resigned" or "I have a letter from him resigning." So we got all the members there. Lyndon was not a member of the Committee, but he sat in as chairman. The Committee was in executive session, and Lyndon read Senator Green's letter of resignation. Then Lyndon took charge: "Theodore, you can't do this, it's the goddam press that's picking on you, you know they're a bunch of so-and-so, and you're the greatest chairman that the Committee has ever had, and you mustn't let these people get under your skin. I plead with you to reconsider." That theme was picked up and went right around the table with everyone saying in effect that Senator Green had to stay. It soon became apparent that Green was beginning to have some second thoughts himself. Senator Johnson turned around to me and whispered: "Carl, I'm going to get him out of the room, you go out with him." Johnson put his arm around Theodore and said, "Theodore you're feeling very strongly

about this, I wish you'd go outside and think about it a little bit. It's a very important decision that you're making." So Senator Green and I went into the back room, where Eddy Higgins, Green's administrative assistant, was waiting. Johnson hadn't told me what he wanted so I had to guess. I talked with Green

and reminded him that he had submitted his resignation and ought to stick with it. I referred to some other very distinguished people who had resigned at appropriate times. I think I mentioned [Konrad] Adenauer. I also suggested Senator Green could set an example. I said, "You will be more honored in sticking with this decision than if you change your mind now." We went back to the Committee room shortly and Green said, "I'm going to stay with my decision." The senators went around the table again telling Senator Green what a wonderful man he was and complimenting him for the right decision. Then Senator Johnson proposed that Senator Green be made chairman emeritus. After a chorus of approval, Johnson turned to Senator Fulbright saying: "Bill, you're the chairman." That was it, the meeting broke up.

Subsequently, I learned from Pat Holt--who had stayed in the Committee room while I was outside with Senator Green--he told me, as I now recollect, that Johnson, as soon as Theodore left the room, changed his tone and told members that Senator Green was sick and tired. He said he had been told that if Green were not relieved of

this responsibility "he may not be with us for very long, so I think it would be a great thing for the old man if we accepted his resignation."
Sometime later I checked with Carroll Kilpatrick of the Washington Post to see if he remembered my saying to him that Senator Green was getting so confused that in effect I was becoming chairman of the Committee and that something ought to be done about it. Carroll remembered the conversation very well, and said he had made the age point to a friend on the Providence Journal. That is the round-about way Green, hurt terribly, was removed from the Committee. I don't know if it was good or bad, but it happened.

RITCHIE: I'm delighted to hear your version of this because we printed in the 1959 volume of the Foreign Relations Committee's "Historical Series" the transcript of that incredible meeting, with Lyndon Johnson there, with Johnson and the members saying "You can't resign," and Theodore Green responding, "Well, if you really want me to stay . . . . " At that point suddenly Johnson's tone clearly changes and there's a parenthesis "the chairman and Mr. Marcy left the room. And I've always wanted to know what happened when you left.

MARCY: I had forgotten there was a transcript of that meeting.

RITCHIE: It's a very interesting piece, and it seemed to me in a lot of ways a wonderful example of Lyndon Johnson's technique, that he exerted so much overkill that he . . . .

MARCY: He almost succeeded!

RITCHIE: In doing just the opposite of what he wanted.

MARCY: That's right.

RITCHIE: Can you think of any other example where the majority leader imposed himself on the Foreign Relations Committee or any other committee like that?

MARCY: No, I can It. Johnson was such a leader, nobody would have thought of questioning his role in this instance.

RITCHIE: It's certainly a remarkable story.

MARCY: I recall another incident illustrating how Johnson ran that Senate with an iron hand. I believe it was Prime Minister [Harold] Macmillan who came to lunch with the Foreign Relations Committee. During the lunch Lyndon said, "I think you ought to come to the floor of the Senate and make some remarks." Under Senate rules foreigners are not supposed to speak to the United States Senate when it's in session. But Lyndon grabbed the Prime Minister by the arm and hauled him up to the Senate chamber and moved the Senate stand in recess. So Macmillan made the speech. While this was going on,

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Darrell St. Claire, who was the Committee clerk, came to me as I was sitting in the back of the Senate chamber and handed me a piece of paper saying: "You better give this back to the Prime Minister." I asked what it was. He said, "Well, the PM dropped it when he was at lunch. When he left, I picked it up."
After I returned the paper to Macmillan and he had left I said to Darrell, "Well did you make a copy of it?" And he said, "Of course!" What the paper turned out to be was the British Embassy sketch of every member of the Foreign Relations Committee, what they were like. It had been prepared for the benefit of the Minister, so he would know how to deal with them. I showed that paper to only one person--I don't know where it is now--and that was to Senator Fulbright. Fulbright was the only person who came off clean. The British thought he was great, a wonderful chairman, intelligent, articulate, all of those things. And I remember particularly they had an analysis of Senator Wiley, who had married a British citizen, and it was not very flattering.

RITCHIE: When Lyndon Johnson was the majority leader, how did it work in terms of getting your legislation from the Committee out to the floor. Did he strong-arm the Committee to get legislation out when he wanted? Or vest pocket it until he wanted?

MARCY: Oh, no. Johnson's attitude toward Fulbright was: Fulbright's in charge of foreign policy and whatever Bill wants, Bill gets. So we never had any problem in getting legislation before the Senate at any time.
I remember one time, however, when Johnson was holding up a foreign aid bill and I asked him when the bill was to come up. Johnson went to some length to explain to me that he was holding the bill up until the last days of the session for negotiating purposes with the White House. Johnson usually wanted to speed things up, "Let's get going, let's get going, let's go." That was his whole role. He seldom participated in the debate on foreign aid, but it was "let's go, let's go, let's get it through tonight," that kind of pressure.

I remember one item Johnson muscled in a bill. I can't identify the period, but I remember at one point Bobby Baker called me up and said, "Lyndon wants X millions of dollars in the foreign aid bill for the East-West Center in Hawaii." I protested no hearings, no background. "The leader wants the money in the bill," was repeated, and it was up to me to work the thing out, get the language. The reason he wanted the money in the bill, I learned, was the [John A.] Burns who was then Democratic governor of Hawaii was in a tough race, and Lyndon thought money for an East-West Center was one way to help him. And so the East-West Center in Hawaii was established by Lyndon Johnson. Now, where he got the idea for the East-West Center, I

don't have the slightest idea. All I know is Lyndon wanted it, Bobby told me, and the Committee jumped. Lyndon got what Lyndon wanted, and the East-West Center still operates in Hawaii and is, as I understand it, a very successful operation, well-financed. And I think Senator Fulbright's on the board of directors!

RITCHIE: How do you explain someone like Lyndon Johnson? How was he able to break through what is basically a pretty tradition-ridden and slow-moving institution and exert such incredible pressure and dominating influence and personality?

MARCY: That's hard to say. He was a very hard-driving person. Lyndon, in a way, was the same kind of majority leader that a Bill Knowland would have been. They were in charge. They were clearly leaders in that sense, whereas say a Connally, or a Vandenberg, or a George were not leaders in the sense of being hard-driving individuals. They led by experience, the way in which they talked, their general low-key demeanor, argumentation they would make, whereas the other two, but especially Lyndon, would just drive it in. That's the only way to describe him, he was a driver. There are different kinds of leadership. You can lead by getting people to follow you, which would be say what a George, or a

Connally, or a Vandenberg might do, but Lyndon never got people to follow him . . . how would I describe it? He would drive them as if senators were rowers on a galley.

RITCHIE: I've talked to other people who found themselves on the other end of Johnson's wrath at times. Did you ever have any run-ins with him when he was majority leader?

MARCY: Not while he was in the Senate. I felt his wrath, indirectly, after he became president and after he and Senator Fulbright had broken. I remember I went to the White House several times before they broke and it was always, "Carl, how are you?" first name basis. But after the break between President Johnson and Senator Fulbright I went to the White House one other time, and as I sought to shake hands Lyndon looked at me, looked right through me, and said: "What are you doing here?" I was never invited back, and I don't think Fulbright ever was. But to answer your question specifically, no, I never felt his wrath while he was majority leader.

RITCHIE: It sounds like you were one of the lucky ones.

MARCY: Maybe so! I think one of the reasons was that during that period of time when he was majority leader, Lyndon never rode roughshod over Fulbright. I think that Fulbright's intellect, background, education, whatever it was, cowed Lyndon a bit, or made him hesitant to take Fulbright on. That may be one reason why when he did finally break with Fulbright it was a complete break. In a sense I was protected by Fulbright.
[End of Interview #3]