Remarks by U.S. Senator Jon Kyl
"DOD's Role in Pre-War Iraq Intelligence: Setting the Record Straight"
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When the history of 9/11 is written, one of the themes will be the failure of the intelligence community to "connect the dots" – to take data already collected and, where possible, link it to identify patterns of terrorist activity that might predict when, where, and what terrorists might do. The reasons for this failure are several, including legal impediments (like the "wall" between the FBI and CIA), risk aversion (the notion that one gets into less trouble doing nothing than thinking or acting "outside the box" and maybe being wrong), and the culture of bureaucratic institutions that had ingrained biases which discouraged different opinions within and circled the wagons against "outside views".

Criticism of the intelligence community for its lack of imagination and initiative has been withering. That's why it is so curious that some of these same critics have savagely attacked a small office in the Defense Department that appeared to exercise precisely the kind initiative and "outside the box" inquiry that all agree is so sorely needed. On examination, the attacks appear to have more to do with <u>who</u> the people are than what they did – because these are the people who supported toppling Saddam Hussein. These were the so-called neo-cons, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith and their ilk, like Richard Perle.

Now, never mind that official U.S. Government policy from the days of Bill Clinton was regime change in Iraq – remember the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act? – opponents of going to war in Iraq have constructed the mother of all conspiracy theories to denigrate Operation Iraqi Freedom.

It goes something like this: A "cabal" consisting of Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and others, conspired to manufacture a case to attack Iraq. They set up a shadow intelligence gathering operation, cherry-picked intelligence to bolster their case, and secretly manipulated the President of the United States to do their bidding.[1] (Of course, the "manipulation by cabal" hypothesis is inconsistent with another charge some of the same critics often levy against the President: that he had been all along so determined to attack Iraq that he was willing to deceive the American people. Any port in an electoral storm.)

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[1] Illustrative of the strangeness of this theory is one of its most oft-quoted sources, Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski. Lt. Col. Kwiatkowski, a former U.S. Air Force officer who served at the Pentagon during the buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom, contributes to Pat Buchanan's magazine, the *American Conservative* and writes for lewrockwell.com, an ultra-libertarian website. Though referred to often by Senator Ted Kennedy and others as an expert, a review of her writings, some of which were published while she was still in uniform, include many weird, extremist, and bigoted diatribes. She has said that America needs not change, but revolution and that President Bush belongs in the dock as a criminal alongside Saddam Hussein. Among her numerous internet-posted articles, she has written statements like the following: "Bremer, of course, is well connected, and as expected, a loyal member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He knows nothing about Iraq, but is well versed on Hezbollah, complementing nicely the security needs of the singular small state that helped guide and promote the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq." (http://www.lewrockwell.com/kwiatkowski/kwiatkowski13.html) Other samples of her writing can be viewed at: http://www.lewrockwell.com/kwiatkowski/kwiatkowski-arch.html.

Here's a short summary description of the conspiracy from a March 13 *Washington Post* article:

> "Congressional Democrats contend that two Pentagon shops -- the Office of Special Plans and the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCEG) -- were "established by Rumsfeld, Feith, and other defense hawks expressly to bypass the CIA and other intelligence agencies. They argue that the offices supplied the administration with information, most of it discredited by the regular intelligence community, which President Bush, Cheney, and others used to exaggerate the Iraqi threat."[2]

That's the charge. What are the facts? And why does it matter?

Conspiracy theories have always been with us. As with others, this one has its bigoted overtones: many of the neoconservatives are Jews; they are accused of having favored elimination of Saddam Hussein's regime because of the Iraqi threat to Israel rather than the threat to the United States; therefore, according to these theories, a way had to be found to get George W. Bush to do Israel's bidding.

In this political year, an "urban myth" like this is useful to the President's opponents. It might not be surprising for a Howard Dean to briefly entertain the prospect that the myth could be true, but it is shocking to see it perpetuated by Democrat elected officials and otherwise intelligent media personalities.

Because the American people need to know the facts to be expected to support what President Bush has accurately characterized as a long and costly effort, and because international opinion is easily swayed by even the most outlandish anti-Bush rhetoric, and because history must be accurate in its recording of events (especially pertaining to matters of war and peace), it is important that the truth be told.

While some recent more factual reporting[3] has begun to clear up some of the details of the controversy, I thought it important today to lay to rest the allegations by: 1) putting into context the role that intelligence played in our decision to remove Saddam Hussein, 2) discussing some of the specifics of what the Pentagon did and did not do with respect to intelligence prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom and 3) explaining why false accusations are harmful, not only because they undercut the real rationale for the war and call into question the integrity of very honorable U.S. Government officials, but also because they create a situation in which the core problems in the U.S. intelligence community, like culture and risk aversion, are only perpetuated.

Role of Intelligence in the Decision to Remove Saddam's Regime

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[2] Dana Priest, "Pentagon Shadow Loses Some Mystique," *Washington Post*, March 13, 2004. In the article, Priest describes the PCEG, referring to a January 2002 document sent to DIA, with its purpose to "study Al Qaeda worldwide suppliers, chokepoints, vulnerabilities, and recommend strategies for rendering terrorist networks ineffective."

[3] Dana Priest, "Pentagon Shadow Loses Some Mystique," *Washington Post*, March 13, 2004.
   James Risen, "How Pair's Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence," *New York Times*, April, 28, 2004.

It did not require an exaggeration of intelligence – in fact, it didn't even require any secret information -- to make the case that Saddam had to go. Consider the full picture, which includes indisputable facts agreed upon even by the war's opponents in the U.S. and elsewhere: Saddam Hussein's refusal to comply with the cease-fire agreement he signed in 1991 and his flagrant violation of the 16 other Security Council resolutions that followed, Saddam's repeated military attacks on U.S. and British planes enforcing the "no-fly" zones, his refusal to cooperate with U.N. inspectors, his deplorable treatment of the Iraqi people, his aggression against his neighbors, his aid to terrorists, his use of chemical weapons against Iran and against the Iraqi Kurds, his firing of ballistic missiles at four of his neighbors, his WMD programs, his attempt to assassinate former President Bush, and much more.

The key was the danger that Saddam might provide biological weapons, or, someday, nuclear weapons to terrorists for use against the United States. That was a danger whether or not Saddam maintained WMD stockpiles. He had used poison gas against his enemies; he had know-how, the materials and the programs to do it again. And he did not have to keep stockpiles of the stuff to have the capability.

As President Bush said in his 2003 State of the Union address:

"Before September 11, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans – this time armed by Saddam Hussein."

Prior to the President's 2002 speech to the United Nations insisting on the enforcement of the Iraq-related U.N. Security Council resolutions, it was clear that support for the sanctions against Iraq was crumbling and was not, in any event, constraining Saddam from spending as much money as he wanted. His regime was growing stronger, rather than weaker. Intelligence services around the world concluded he had active WMD programs. Indeed how else could one interpret his obstruction of inspections and his refusal – until confronted with a clear threat of military action – to readmit the inspectors – except as indicating he had something to hide? As my colleague, John McCain recently noted:

"Even those in Iraq who claim that all WMD were destroyed suggest that Saddam planned to restart his programs once the time was right – presumably, once sanctions had fallen apart, he had his hands on billions of dollars of oil revenues, and international attention was again distracted."

Senator McCain outlined our choices:

"We had three choices: deal with Saddam early, while we could; deal with Saddam later, after sanctions had lost force and he had furthered his weapons ambitions; or simply sit back and hope for the best. The 9/11 Commission has spent months investigating who

might be at fault for failing to connect disparate dots, and for inaction in the face of a grave threat. In Iraq, the dots were connected."[4]

The case for removing Saddam was based on far more than a few pieces of intelligence about links between Iraq and terrorists, or even WMD. It was a whole series of connected dots spanning a decade of aggression, use of weapons of mass destruction, violation of numerous U.N. Security Council resolution, and ties to terrorism, the entirety of which led to the conclusion that the festering threat could not be tolerated in the post-9/11 world. As James Risen reported, ". . . the Bush Administration ultimately decided that the terrorism link was not strong enough to use as the central justification for war with Iraq. Instead the administration focused on Mr. Hussein's illicit weapons, relying on assessments from the CIA and other intelligence agencies."[5] Ironically, the terrorism link which the Defense Department is criticized for examining turns out to have been more robust than the CIA thought,[6] and the CIA's estimation of WMD turned out to be less than the "slam dunk" allegedly asserted.

Department of Defense Activities

The myth probably had its beginning with an article in the American Prospect on December 16, 2002, which focused mainly on a small, important office at the Department of Defense, formerly called the Office of Special Plans (OSP). Because the roles of that office and another group – the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) -- are often confused (and, in fact, were confused in that article), I'll briefly review the background of both and explain why charge that there was any wrongdoing are false.

The Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group

First, the evaluation group, the PCTEG: Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Under Secretary Feith determined properly that it was important for the Defense Department to understand the nature of the enemy that the United States had to confront in the War on Terror. He asked two staff members to sift through *previously-collected* intelligence on terrorism and recommend a strategy for dealing with the threat. These two individuals, with the occasional support of a few others, were instructed to map out what the U.S. Government knew about how

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[4] Remarks by U.S. Senator John McCain, "Iraq: The Test of a Generation," Council on Foreign Relations, April 22, 2004.

[5] James Risen, "How Pair's Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence," *New York Times*, April, 28, 2004.

[6] An intercepted memo written by Al Qaeda operative Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi (and first reported in the *New York Times* on February 10, 2003), illustrates links between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Zarqawi was named by Secretary of State Colin Powell in his presentation to the U.N. Security Council prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom as a key Al Qaeda leader with ties to Saddam Hussein. His memo asked the Al Qaeda leadership for reinforcements in Iraq and expressed concern that the mujahidin might lose its foothold in the country. It stated, "There is no doubt that our field of movement is shrinking and the grip around the throat of the mujahidin has begun to tighten." Columnist William Safire has referred to the memo as a "smoking gun." The State Department's recently released (April 29, 2004) "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report also offers clear examples of the Saddam regime's ties to terrorism. In one instance, it describes how one foreign terrorist organization, the Mujahidin-e-Khalq, which had received military support from Saddam Hussein, was stripped of its weapons and placed in military detention. The report also discusses Coalition strikes on Ansar al-Islam's base in northern Iraq, noting Al Qaeda operative Zarqawi's alleged connections to the organization.

terrorist groups operated and related to each other and to their state supporters. This work was aimed at developing the best policy to deal with them.

Now, this evaluation work is exactly what one would expect the head of the Pentagon's policy shop to do. The forming of the group was nothing unusual, and indeed, given that the United States found itself suddenly in the midst of a war unlike any other it had ever previously fought, it was useful to explore what the battle would involve, starting with the sound advice to "know thy enemy."

Though the PCTEG began its work in October 2001 and looked broadly at many terrorist groups and many state supporters of terrorism, critics of the Administration began to circulate the story that the group was actually set up to collect intelligence (rather than just use existing intelligence) and undercut and circumvent intelligence community assessments regarding Iraq.

In fact, the group was never focused narrowly on Iraq or al Qaeda. Its mandate was to study a range of terrorist organizations and state sponsors. Second, its work-product was based on existing intelligence, not on any intelligence that it was supposed to collect on its own. Third, the group did not assess Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities. And, finally, the existence of the group was not a secret; indeed Under Secretary Feith asked the Defense Intelligence Agency itself to provide staff to assist in the effort. Following the departure of the original two PCTEG staff, DIA detailed to the Policy organization two people to replace them.

Here's what happened: In reviewing intelligence going back several years, the staffers had found that there was evidence of cooperation among various terrorist groups that crossed both ideological and sectarian lines – for example, Sunnis and Shias, Islamist and secular -- which ran counter to important assumptions in the intelligence community. The original PCTEG staffers produced a long briefing on terrorist networks generally.

Later, according to Under Secretary Feith, another handful of DOD staffers, together with one of the two replacement PCTEG staffers "came up with some interesting observations about the linkages between Iraq and Al Qaeda." These Al Qaeda-Iraq observations formed the basis of a second briefing, one that was presented to Secretary Rumsfeld in the summer of 2002, after, by the way, the PCTEG had disbanded. According to Feith,

> "This briefing presented intelligence information drawn exclusively from intelligence community reports related to links between Iraq and Al Qaeda, summarized the information, organized it (for instance, into categories such as harboring, training, financial support, etc.), and discussed the possible reasons. . . that each side might have to cooperate with the other."[7]

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[7] James Risen, "How Pair's Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence," *New York Times*, April 28, 2004. The briefing did not include any information provided outside normal intelligence channels by the Iraqi National Congress, as some have inferred. The factual points in the briefing, according to Feith, were footnoted to previously-generated reports that came from the intelligence community. DOD has provided the briefing itself and related materials to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee.

At Secretary Rumsfeld's suggestion, Feith (and some of his staff), accompanied by the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, presented the briefing in August 2002 to CIA Director George Tenet. A month later, it was also briefed to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Stephen Hadley. The Vice President's Chief of Staff, I. Lewis Libby, attended this latter briefing.

Now, how should one think about these actions in the face of charges that the Policy office was deliberately and improperly gathering and misrepresenting intelligence in an attempt to influence Administration policy?

Having served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for eight years, I know something about how intelligence is gathered, analyzed, and used. The intelligence community gathers factual information (some turns out to be correct; some not), it analyzes that information and provides assessments to policy makers. Policy makers generally have access to the information and the assessments.

In this case, in reviewing factual information generated by the intelligence community, a DOD Policy staffer concluded that current intelligence community analyses of Iraq- al Qaeda contacts did not take fully into account the intelligence community's own reports over the years of such contacts. This was hardly the first time policy officials criticized intelligence, and in view of the 9/11 commission work, it certainly won't (and shouldn't) be the last.

The substance of the criticism was that the intelligence community, in its assessments, was tending to ignore or underplay reports of links – contacts and cooperation – between al Qaeda and Iraq.

There seems to be a lot of confusion about this matter of links. First, no one in the Administration has alleged a conclusive link between Iraq and the specific 9/11 attacks. Nor has the Administration alleged that Iraq and al Qaeda were linked *operationally* – that is, that they carried out terrorist operations together. The Intelligence community has concluded, however, that Saddam Hussein's intelligence service met and cooperated with al Qaeda terrorists over the last decade or so.

I'll give you in a moment the precise language that CIA Director George Tenet has used to describe these Iraq-al Qaida links, but first I want to say a word about another distinction that produces a lot of confusion: the difference between evidence and proof. Evidence that something happened does not necessarily constitute proof that it happened. How much information – or evidence – does it take to convince us that something occurred? Well, it depends on circumstances. In courtrooms and scientific laboratories, standards of proof tend to be very high. Intelligence information, on the other hand, is often extremely hard to obtain and, when it deals with tyrannized, closed societies, it tends to be sketchy at best. National security risks can be grave and police makers can hardly afford to remain passive in the face of information about threats that falls short of courtroom-style proof. Then again, national security policy makers can't simply accept as true – or proved – every piece of uncorroborated information they receive from intelligence or other sources.

Thus, for example, though it has been noted there is "evidence" linking Iraq to the 9/11 attacks in that there is a report of at least one meeting in Prague between Mohammad Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, and Iraqi intelligence personnel, it just doesn't rise to the level of proof that would be necessary to allege an operational Iraq-al Qaeda linkage.

The DOD Policy office did not contend otherwise.

Now, let's go back to that briefing on Iraq-al Qaida links that the DOD Policy folks presented first to Secretary Rumsfeld and then to George Tenet. That briefing has been correctly characterized as "consumer feedback." The intelligence community's policy customers were openly and precisely providing criticism to the producers of intelligence assessments. That was an admirable thing, not anything improper.

Again, in view of the consensus of the Joint Intelligence Committee inquiry into pre-9/11 activities and the current work of the 9/11 commission that the intelligence community made a lot of mistakes, including failure to connect some key pieces of information, it is odd that the Policy office would be criticized for questioning the intelligence community's analysis of links between Iraq and terrorists.

Even more bizarre is the suggestion by some, including prominent Senators, that it is unusual, even <u>wrong</u>, for policy makers to discuss and criticize intelligence among themselves without the CIA being present. Senator Levin recently grilled George Tenet on this point in a public hearing. This relates to the fact that DOD shared with NSC personnel virtually the same briefing earlier given to George Tenet. It's as if there is a "priesthood" of intelligence under which only the anointed are trusted to analyze and discuss intelligence – that policy makers not only must get 100% of what they know from the intelligence community, they must also refrain from discussing it with each other unless a CIA "minder" is present.

The Administration's critics are here using an argument that they would reject emphatically in any other context. It is truly perplexing how critics can, on the one hand, assert that the agency was so wrong before 9/11 and, on the other, that the agency is the sole legitimate source of all thinking about intelligence relating to Iraq.

Yes, the critics charge, but didn't the DOD "cherry pick" the evidence to serve its agenda of making a case against Saddam? I've already discussed the fallacy that such additional evidence was needed, let alone how it could possibly have influenced the President.

But let's dig a little deeper into the notion of "cherry picking." The charge is sometimes tied to the list of intelligence reports about Iraq-al Qaeda links that DOD provided to the Senate Intelligence Committee[8] of which the *Weekly Standard* magazine purported to run lengthy verbatim portions. Some people have asserted that the list is one-sided, not a fair presentation of all the information on the subject. But the list was not written as an analysis and or a comprehensive treatment of the subject. It was a specific answer to a specific question posed by

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[8] The list of reports was provided in response to a question for the record in a September 26, 2003 letter from Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Pat Roberts and Ranking Member John Rockefeller to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith.

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the Senate Intelligence Committee. It was not written as a memo to be sent to other Executive Branch offices; it was an answer to a congressional question. That answer proves nothing about the briefing given to Tenet and Hadley and certainly nothing about "cherry picking."

In October 2002, Director Tenet wrote a letter to then-Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham that is, as Secretary Rumsfeld, Under Secretary Feith, and others have said publicly, an accurate unclassified summary of linkage between Iraq and Al Qaeda. He said:
- "Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information we have received comes from detainees, including some of high rank.
- "We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda going back a decade.
- "Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression.
- "Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad.
- "We have credible reporting that al-Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire W.M.D. capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs.
- "Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al-Qaeda, suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action."

Office of Special Plans
Now to the Office of Special Plans (OSP), which was formed after the PCTEG disbanded. Simply, the office was one of many regional offices in the DOD policy organization. It was designed to develop defense policy options for senior decision makers, coordinate those options within the Defense Department and across the various federal agencies, monitor the implementation of defense policy, and recommend course corrections to defense policy. That's it. That is what the Policy organization at the Department of Defense is supposed to do. And that is what the Policy organization did under Presidents Clinton, and Bush, and Reagan, and Carter. The Policy organization develops policy options for policymakers based on intelligence assessments, news reports, and facts on the ground.

The Office of Special Plans was an expansion of a section of the Near East and South Asia Bureau, which dealt with Iraq, Iran, and the overall strategy for the global War on Terrorism. What are some of the Iraq-related tasks on which it worked?
- It worked with the then-opposition to encourage it to unify and organize itself;
- It helped develop the U.N. resolution on inspections in Iraq (Resolution 1441);
- It worked on organizing the training of the Free Iraqi Force;
- It contributed to the interagency process that had begun planning for Iraq reconstruction.

And contrary to critics' charges, the Office of Special Plans was not involved in intelligence collection, intelligence creation, or operational war planning. Like the PCTEG, it

was a consumer, not a producer, of intelligence. Given the current criticism of "lack of planning" for the Iraq occupation, the DOD can hardly be faulted for anticipating the need for its planning office or for reading intelligence information to develop policy options for presentation to policy makers.

One myth about the Office of Special Plans is that it ran the Iraqi National Congress' Intelligence Collection Program (ICP), under which the Iraqi National Congress provides access to documents and to Iraqi defectors. More specifically, the Office of Special Plans is accused of acting as a conduit for intelligence reports from the Iraqi National Congress to the White House.

The fact is, the ICP has <u>never</u> been run by the Department of Defense Policy organization or any office under its control. Rather, it has been run since the summer of 2002 by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), and before that by the State Department. Relevant congressional committees were informed of the transfer, so there is no excuse for Members of those committees to continue to charge the contrary.[9]

<u>Broader Implications of the Criticism</u>
I'd like to conclude by addressing the broader implications of the claims that the DOD Office of Special Plans or the PCTEG improperly gathered and manipulated intelligence so the Administration could lie to the American people: First, in creating a false image of the role of the Pentagon in pre-war intelligence, the President's opponents have called into question the integrity and motivations of honorable individuals tirelessly serving our country during one of the most difficult times in our nation's history. This bad enough.

But it has also required offices at the Pentagon – which should be 100% focused on Iraq and the broader War on Terror – to spend countless hours answering charges not just once, but repeatedly.

Finally, false accusations targeting particular individuals and offices for honest, necessary, and good work have only served to perpetuate the risk averse environment in our intelligence community, in which analysts and others are deterred from questioning previously-accepted analysis for fear of being accused of circumventing the "regular" process. As Risen reported, the PCTEG was met with open hostility in the intelligence community – "You are not needed and not welcome," said one official.[10] This is characteristic of the culture of much of the intelligence community and it takes courage to challenge it. It serves our country's interests to

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[9] Parenthetically, some people, who do not have access to the intelligence from the ICP, have speculated that it is not useful. But open-source reviews of INC-provided intelligence are not available. The DIA director and U.S. military personnel in Iraq – the people actually using the information -- have evaluated the INC-provided intelligence as highly valuable. Everyone in the intelligence business knows that human intelligence programs produce a mix of good and bad information. Some of the press stories about the Information Collection Program have highlighted the bad information. But, according to the people who actually know, it is wildly off the mark for reporters or others to deny the benefits of the information the U.S. has received.

[10] James Risen, "How Pair's Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence," *New York Times*, April, 28, 2004.

<u>encourage</u> the intelligence community and policy officials to ask questions, offer alternative views, and "go against the grain." This should be glaringly obvious now, in light of 9/11 and the soul-searching of the 9/11 commission proceedings.

As a Member of the joint Senate-House inquiry into the September 11 terrorist attacks, I found this tendency to stick to entrenched views, and to worry about getting in trouble, was a significant contributing factor to the failure of U.S. intelligence to foresee the attacks on New York and Washington and take aggressive action on what we did know. Indeed, no intelligence or law-enforcement agency escaped, during that inquiry, from being described by its own officials as hampered by an aversion to think critically and boldly take risks.

Individuals in positions that require them to make policy decisions should be active, not passive, consumers of intelligence. Policymakers and intelligence officials should discuss and even debate with each other because the CIA is not, nor should it be, an "ivory tower." The bottom line is that no one has a monopoly on facts, let alone wisdom, not even the Intelligence Community. If one lesson can be learned from 9/11 it is that the Intelligence Community got some important things wrong. It would benefit from more questioning of its work by groups like the PCTEG. Opponents of the war should, therefore, find a different way to push their case than attacking people who dare to have some different interpretation of intelligence than the CIA.

Changing the intelligence culture is a major undertaking: It will require a consistent effort by the best minds in both political parties. We've worked together before; and we can work together now. The future security of our country literally depends on it.