Sustaining and supporting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is the top priority for the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), says Admiral Thomas Fargo.

Fargo, PACOM's commander, outlined U.S. efforts in the Asia-Pacific region in testimony delivered June 26 before the House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.

According to Fargo, there are no government-supported sanctuaries for terrorists in the Pacific. Nonetheless, "terrorist cells and organizations that operate in the region provide unique challenges to USPACOM and to the countries in which they proliferate."

"Regional and local terrorist groups with ties to al-Qaida pose the most dangerous threat to U.S., allied, and friendly interests in the USPACOM Area of Responsibility," Fargo said. He noted that, "[b]olstered by financial and technical support from al-Qaida, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the southern Philippines have demonstrated their capability to attack U.S. and Western interests."

"Our task, in coordination with other agencies, is to ensure these terrorists do not destabilize governments in the region or threaten Americans or our friends," the admiral said. "Regional alliances and partnerships are critical to achieving both our short-term goal of eradicating regional terrorist groups and our long-term goal of establishing a security environment throughout the Asia-Pacific region that rejects terrorism and addresses the underlying factors that breed terrorists."

Southeast Asia witnessed a number of terrorist acts in 2002, Fargo said, adding: "We have credible information that al-Qaida has long sought to expand its movement in Southeast Asia. By leveraging its connections with sympathetic groups and individuals, some previously trained in Afghanistan, al-Qaida seeks to expand its network and obtain the support of local proponents in establishing a regional pan-Islamic state supportive of radical Islamic ideology."

To meet this challenge, USPACOM and regional governments have strengthened counterterrorism cooperation over the past year, the admiral said. "Regional governments have made progress achieving counterterrorism goals through legislation that combats terrorism and its resource methods, by capturing and detaining terrorists, and through interagency coordination and intelligence sharing."

More than 130 suspected members of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah have been arrested or detained, primarily in Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Indonesia, the PACOM commander said.

Fargo said the United States "continues to support the efforts of these nations to strengthen the rule of law, improve the effectiveness of regional armed forces, and promote democratic ideals of pluralism and religious tolerance. Our long-term effort is to use international, regional, and local relationships to defeat terrorism through coordinated diplomacy, education, information operations, and the use of force when necessary."

The full text of Fargo's testimony is available online here.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

On behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, I thank you for this opportunity to testify on security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Having served as Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) over the past year, and previously serving as Commander, United States Pacific Fleet for 30 months, has fortified my belief that a secure, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region is of paramount importance to our country and the world. In contrast, an Asia that is uncertain presents grave dangers to our nation and to the security of our friends and allies in the region.

We have a number of security concerns, and they are addressed clearly in our national military strategy and supporting guidance:

Conflict on the Korean Peninsula

Miscalculation over the Taiwan Strait or in Kashmir

Transnational threats like terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and illegal drug trade

Instability associated with a failing nation-state or humanitarian crisis, and

Ensuring the readiness of our forward-deployed forces in the region.

We are not facing these concerns alone. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September and in the intervening months, we have had unprecedented regional cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism and in efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have continued to build on the longstanding bilateral alliances and friendships necessary to deter regional aggression and coercion, dissuade military competition, and assure our allies and friends of our commitment to them and the region. We've accomplished this by our forward presence in the theater and by the actions of our forces as they execute tasks and operations in support of our nation's security. In short, we have begun a journey to "operationalize" the strategic guidance we have received. Our destination is a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.

Last year during my confirmation hearing, I provided five broad priorities for Pacific Command. Since then, I've used the priorities as a roadmap for focusing the command, directing operational initiatives and assessing progress. Today, my intent is to provide you an update on these priorities as they pertain to the defense posture of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).

Sustaining and Supporting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)

Our highest USPACOM priority is sustaining and supporting the GWOT. This includes not only operations in the Pacific, but also as a force provider to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM- Afghanistan (OEF-A), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or wherever international terrorism might threaten our interests worldwide. Although we don't have any government-supported sanctuaries for terrorists in the Pacific, terrorist cells and organizations that operate in the region provide unique challenges to USPACOM and to the countries in which they proliferate.

GWOT Update. Regional and local terrorist groups with ties to al-Qaida pose the most dangerous threat to U.S., allied, and friendly interests in the USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Bolstered by financial and technical support from al-Qaida, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the southern Philippines have demonstrated their capability to attack U.S. and Western interests. Our task, in coordination with other agencies, is to ensure these terrorists do not destabilize governments in the region or threaten Americans or our friends. Regional alliances and partnerships are critical to achieving both our short-term goal of eradicating regional terrorist groups and our long-term goal of establishing a security environment throughout the Asia-Pacific region that rejects terrorism and addresses the underlying factors that breed terrorists.

Southeast Asia witnessed a number of terrorist acts in 2002, including the bombings of tourist nightclubs on the Indonesian island of Bali on 12 October that killed more than 200 civilians, including seven Americans. The Philippines have also experienced a series of terrorist bombings, including an October 2002 attack in Zamboanga that killed one U.S. serviceman and a March bombing at Davao airport on Mindanao that killed 23 people and injured over 100 others. Coincident investigations and arrests in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia have revealed an extensive, sophisticated network, centered on the Jemaah Islamiyah, that continues to plan attacks against U.S. and Western diplomatic interests and less defendable commercial or tourist venues across the region. We have credible information that al-Qaida has long sought to expand its movement in Southeast Asia. By leveraging its connections with sympathetic groups and individuals, some previously trained in Afghanistan, al-Qaida seeks to expand its network and obtain the support of local proponents in establishing a regional pan-Islamic state supportive of radical Islamic ideology.

To meet this challenge, USPACOM and regional governments have strengthened counterterrorism cooperation over the past year. Regional governments have made progress achieving counterterrorism goals through legislation that combats terrorism and its resource methods, by capturing and detaining terrorists, and through interagency coordination and intelligence sharing. To date, over 130 Jemaah Islamiyah suspects have been arrested or detained, primarily in Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Indonesia. The U.S. government has designated JI, the ASG, and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This action enables us to identify and freeze the financial assets of these groups and sets the conditions for their isolation. Governments in the region are also increasing their cooperation with regional counterparts - forming bilateral and multilateral alliances to combat terrorist activity. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plan to establish a regional Counterterrorism Training Center in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia is a noteworthy example. USPACOM continues to support the efforts of these nations to strengthen the rule of law, improve the effectiveness of regional armed forces, and promote democratic ideals of pluralism and religious tolerance. Our long-term effort is to use international, regional, and local relationships to defeat terrorism through coordinated diplomacy, education, information operations, and the use of force when necessary.

We've learned a great deal about terrorism in Southeast Asia over the past year: how these entities organize, how they operate, and what they seek to achieve. We realize we have much more to learn and to accomplish. I am convinced that our best approach is to disrupt terrorist activities where we can while helping build our regional partners' capabilities to do the same. It is a team effort.

To better synchronize our efforts in combating terrorism in the Pacific, we have assumed the offensive while putting in place an "active defense." Offensively, we established a full time Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter Terrorism (JIACG-CT) at USPACOM Headquarters. Defensively, we designated our Army component, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), as our joint commander for Homeland Defense/ Civil Support/ Consequence Management. His area of responsibility includes Hawaii and all U.S. territories in the Pacific, as well as the Marshall Islands, Mariana Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia. Commander, Alaska Command (ALCOM) executes these responsibilities as Joint Task Force-Alaska. These command and control constructs are successfully prosecuting the War on Terror while protecting our forces and critical infrastructure.

JIACG-CT. We have established a Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter Terrorism (JIACG/CT) to coordinate DoD and other government agency (OGA) activities in USPACOM AOR, develop targets for future military or OGA operations, plan USPACOM regional and country counterterrorism (CT) campaigns, and enhance U.S. and partner nation CT capabilities in support of national objectives in the GWOT. It is an all-encompassing and focused effort, where we are now integrating our Theater Country Teams to assess host-nation concerns and necessary conditions to proceed with our CT campaign. This team endeavor has been extremely successful as demonstrated by the actions of regional countries that are supporting U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan and regional operations, like those in the Philippines, while conducting CT operations in their own countries - all in the past year.

Forward and Deployed Forces. Within the last 15 months, the USS KITTY HAWK, JOHN C. STENNIS, CARL VINSON, CONSTELLATION, and ABRAHAM LINCOLN battlegroups; maritime patrol aircraft; USS PELELIU, BONHOMME-RICHARD, BELLEAU WOOD, and TARAWA Amphibious Ready Groups with the 11th, 13th and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units; 5th, 11th, and 13th Air Forces; and the 509th Bomber and 40th Air Expeditionary Wings have deployed in support of major roles in OEF-A and OIF. Further, many USPACOM countries continue to provide tangible support to both operations within their means. Australia, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have all contributed support ranging from overflight, access and basing to escort, logistics, and troops on the ground. Many are actively participating in the reconstruction of Iraq. We appreciate their many contributions and valuable cooperation.

Regional Counterterrorism. Information sharing between countries in the Pacific has provided unprecedented insights into the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al-Qaida networks in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, Singapore and Malaysia have arrested dozens of members of JI, the primary transnational terrorist organization in the Pacific with links to al-Qaida. And Indonesia has arrested and is prosecuting suspected terrorist leaders and bombing suspects since the October bombings in Bali. However, Indonesia faces a difficult situation, including factions that do not want to aggressively investigate domestic groups sympathetic to al-Qaida. We need to cooperate more effectively at all levels with Indonesia on terrorism. An International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Indonesia remains key to our engagement effort.

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) continues to attack terrorist infrastructure and capabilities in the Philippines and throughout the region. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is firmly on our side in the GWOT - strongly supporting the effort. Our advice and assistance, including our maintenance and training packages provided under security assistance authorities, are improving the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) CT capabilities. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) serves as the ideal vehicle for U.S. forces to advise and assist the AFP in the development of skills necessary to fight terrorists. Additionally, the infrastructure improvements to roads, hospitals, and schools and the construction of water wells on Basilan Island under DoD's humanitarian and civic assistance program provide positive impacts on local communities - highlighting America's positive role while assisting the Philippines in dealing with the socio-economic causes that entice disenfranchised Filipinos to support terrorist activities. As a result of this well integrated operation, the ASG is on the run on Basilan and its influence with the local populace there has been dampened.

We also continue our active Security Assistance program to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines build both the capabilities and capacity necessary to continue the courageous struggle against terrorism. Following this SA effort later this year, we will evaluate the effectiveness of our training, and feed back those results into our planning.

USPACOM's Antiterrorism Program is proactive and dynamic in its approach to protect our people and resources throughout the Pacific. It is an "active defense" because it has offensive qualities. Since 11 September, we have come a long way in better protecting DoD personnel and critical infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region.

Our joint commanders for HLD/CS/CM in Hawaii and Alaska and Joint Area Coordinators in Korea and Japan are the focal points for force protection, coordinating security measures and intelligence fusion among the different services in their AORs. They provide the command and control construct to synchronize our DoD anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) efforts for military installations and property with federal, state, and local agencies and with the host nations in the cases of Japan and Korea. We are working continuously with US Northern Command to standardize and synchronize our efforts and procedures.

USPACOM has an aggressive vulnerability assessment program that covers DoD bases, ports, airfields, and training areas in the AOR that are not under U.S. control. We use assessment teams from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the services, and our components to ensure our facilities have current assessments and proactive antiterrorism plans. USPACOM personnel work closely with their Department of State counterparts to ensure host-nation support is adequate to protect our deployed forces and that all are employing the latest AT/FP procedures.

Force protection is "operationalized" in USPACOM. Our staff continually monitors threat information and the environment in which our forces are based. Theater and country specific Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) are continually reviewed and upgraded as necessary. Random Antiterrorism Measures are employed to complicate terrorist planning. USPACOM also has a travel restriction program, providing a tool to declare entire countries or portions thereof "off-limits" to DoD members, thus keeping them out of harm's way. In addition, Force Protection plans are required for all travel in our AOR, from major unit deployments to individuals on leave. The resource drain from increased FPCONs is a formidable challenge to both manpower limitations and Force Protection Technology initiatives. Your continued support is necessary to sustain the progress we are making in this area.

Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) program and Homeland Security. Currently, we support Homeland Security and Forward Base security efforts primarily through Information Analysis, Infrastructure/Personnel Protection, and Quick Reaction Forces. The Critical Infrastructure Program is our operational initiative to improve security in the AOR. The program is on track in developing processes and methodologies. The first CIP Appendix to one of our theater Operational Plans (OPLAN) was submitted to the Joint Staff on 30 April 2003. Additionally, a comprehensive USPACOM CIP Operation Order (OPORD), our Theater Infrastructure Assurance Plan, is in final staffing. Notably, the program has resulted in a partnership with the Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures to develop and field a prototype Combatant Command CIP Database.

Homeland Defense and Civil Support (HLD/CS). With the recent direction to consolidate the security, defense, and support for the homeland, we are working to integrate existing functions as well as expanded mission requirements to enhance our protection of the USPACOM Homeland AOR that includes the State of Hawaii, the Territories of Guam and American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Missions such as HLD/CS/CM, CIP, Homeland Air Security (HAS), Consequence Management for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosive (CBRNE), and Domestic Support Operations are but a few of those being combined into one plan to maximize our capabilities and still refine the use of our resources. USPACOM's HAS mission deters, prevents or interdicts aerial threats and aggression directed toward Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and U.S. territories within USPACOM's AOR. The HAS air threat spectrum ranges from ballistic missiles and aircraft to future low-altitude cruise missiles and radio controlled sub-scale aircraft. The potential for a terrorist to gain this capability is rising. USPACOM has addressed this challenge with close integration, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration among international, federal, state, local agencies, and governments. This fusion of individual agency capabilities, including our military, into an integrated, multi-layered response is key to our collective success.

USPACOM also supports other non-Homeland Security functions. Civil Support operations will be an enhancement of our existing Domestic Support Operations to the Homeland. Although not directly related to securing the homeland against terrorism, this support affects the impact of terrorist action. With Secretary of Defense direction, we quickly support the Department of Homeland in mitigation and recovery efforts relating to natural disasters. Typhoon Pongsona in Guam is a good example. The USPACOM HLD/CS program has taken on a renewed effort with great scope and responsibilities. Our Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) will build on our processes for intelligence sharing, AT/FP, CIP, CBRNE and natural disasters as well as other requested support to the civilian sector, providing a comprehensive program for Hawaii, Guam, and all our territories in the AOR.

Information fusion. USPACOM's Counterintelligence Program remains the key link between DoD and Law Enforcement Agency efforts in the Pacific Theater. We are committed to furthering the integration efforts of the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group-Counter-Terrorism (JIACG-CT) and counterintelligence missions with the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces and with allied international agencies. Along these lines, we are pioneering efforts to promulgate all-source intelligence fusion to connect local, state, national, and DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agencies. These efforts, coupled with a joint international training regimen encompassing asymmetric warfare and analysis from multiple perspectives, hold great promise in developing an "actionable intelligence" capability.

Personnel Requirements. Legislation mandates reductions in Higher Headquarters (HHQ) staffs by 15 percent. USPACOM and our sub-unified commands are executing these reductions in ways that will minimize the impact on our missions. The need for intelligence gathering, analysis, production, coordination, dissemination, campaign planning, and capabilities testing in exercises and coalition building is greater than ever. Adequate personnel resources are essential to mission planning to counter emerging asymmetric threats. Achieving synergy of forces launched from around the globe during conflicts while providing effective reach-back for those forces creates high mission demand on our combatant headquarters (HQ) staff.

The GWOT has created additional personnel requirements. Increased security patrols, both shore-based and waterside, in response to enhanced FPCONs; non-U.S. controlled port and airfield assessment teams; 24/7 coverage for Crisis Action Teams; and the already expanding Homeland Defense, Civil Support and CT missions are a few examples of personnel generating tasks. Additional AT/FP billets are needed to address the full range of force protection, antiterrorism, and CT missions throughout USPACOM. As we continue to develop the Homeland Defense and Civil Support plan, we already see the need for enhanced information analysis capabilities and consequence management resources for CBRNE events....

Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CbT RIF). USPACOM received $4 million in CbT RIF funding in FY02. The FY03 worldwide allocation stands at $47 million. This initiative provides the Geographic and Functional Commanders additional avenues for resourcing against emergent and emergency terrorist threats. USPACOM received $4 million (10 projects) of the $32 million available in the first allocation of FY03 funding, not including $2.5 million (14 projects) for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). USPACOM funded CbT RIF projects include emergency Explosive Ordnance Disposal responder gear for USARPAC; a perimeter wall for the new USPACOM Headquarters; vehicle gates and barriers for Tripler Army Hospital; mass notification system for Misawa Air Base (AB), Japan; closed circuit television for Fort Buckner; gates for Yokota AB, Japan flight line; barrier gates for Fort Shafter; crash barriers for Camp Zama, Japan; and a standoff initiative with HQs security upgrades for Yokota AB.

Special Operation Forces (SOF). Through Special Operations Command-Pacific and JTF-510, USPACOM maintains the ability to deploy SOF under the command of a general officer to any location to combat terrorism. We have used this capability in Operation Enduring Freedom - Philippines and continue to refine it to support the GWOT. This capability, however, depends on building and maintaining relations with supporting allies and friendly nations. We build and maintain these relationships through our Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and other Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs. We look forward to working with the Congress to ensure these activities continue to receive future resource consideration....

Reinforcing the "Constants" in the Pacific Region

Our long-standing bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, our friendships and the presence of our forward-deployed combat forces continue to be the foundation of the region's peace and stability. One of my goals is to build on these relationships while nurturing multinational efforts that support the region's mutual interests. Our forward posture is fundamental and our combat capability essential to deter regional threats. We look for initiatives that help shape our overseas posture.

Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). Dramatic events of the past 2 years have brought into focus new and challenging national security demands for the 21st century. A mix of traditional and non-traditional threats jeopardizes the unprecedented levels of Asia-Pacific security and prosperity of the last 50 years. These threats are reminders that evolving challenges require more prompt and effective responses to ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. At USPACOM, we "operationalize," national and defense security strategy with regional emphasis. Attaining national security and defense objectives in the Asia-Pacific region requires a broad understanding of threat capabilities, a frank assessment of political-military realities, and a well-charted course supported by meaningful and mutually beneficial security cooperation.

Our acute theater security concerns include conflict on the Korean Peninsula (where although the likelihood of war is low, the stakes are high); miscalculation in places such as the Taiwan Strait or Kashmir; transnational threats such as terrorism, proliferation, drug-associated violence; and instability from failed nation-states. Although we anticipate peaceful resolution of longstanding security concerns in places like the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and Kashmir, the strategic situation in these potential flashpoints and elsewhere mandates vigilance and preparedness. We are strengthening our current security relationships and military capabilities while developing new relationships and capabilities to deter conflict and dissuade would-be regional competitors.

The USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plan supports the overall mission by enhancing U.S. influence, expanding U.S. operational access to train (and deploy) forward-deployed and forward-based combat forces, and increasing interoperability with our coalition partners to support potential efforts across the spectrum of military operations. Every TSC activity we undertake enhances our joint/combined capabilities and communicates our intent to assure friends, or dissuade, deter, or defeat potential enemies. Security Cooperation is an engine of change that, along with our Joint Training and Experimentation Plans and our operational focus, solidifies the link between national strategy and focused, enduring regional security.

The dividends of a relevant, adaptive TSC plan are clear - our treaty allies and friends have provided incomparable support to OEF, OIF, and the GWOT. Every day, our TSC planners, exercise planners, security assistance personnel, and forward-deployed forces coordinate, plan, and execute meaningful security cooperation activities that strengthen military-to-military cooperation and prepare U.S. forces and their prospective Coalition partners for the next challenge. We appreciate your continued interest and support of our Asia-Pacific Regional initiatives.

Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance has never been stronger. From the outstanding rapport at the highest levels of our governments to the action officers, our two countries are moving forward in strengthening ties and resolving problems. Nearly 38,000 U.S. armed forces personnel are stationed in Japan, which also serves as a forward-deployed site for about 14,000 U.S. naval personnel. Japan provides over $4.5 billion in annual host-nation support, the most generous of any U.S. ally. Without these forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces, it would be much more difficult for the U.S. to meet commitments and defend American interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is fundamental to security and peaceful development in the region.

Since becoming Prime Minister (PM) nearly two years ago, PM Koizumi has stressed the importance of the alliance and has sought to move Japan's security policies forward. He exerted exceptional leadership in response to the 11 September terrorist attacks, pushing support for the GWOT. After 11 September, the Government of Japan (GOJ) rapidly passed legislation and obtained Cabinet approval of a Basic Plan that provides the framework for significant Japan Self-Defense Force contributions to the war on terrorism. The speed with which Japan reacted is unprecedented in the 50-year history of the Japan-U.S. security relationship. GOJ contributions to the GWOT include the provision of over 80 million gallons of fuel oil to coalition ships by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force has provided over 1700 flight hours moving tons of important cargo and passengers throughout the theater. We take every opportunity to express our appreciation to the GOJ for its support following 11 September.

The significant progress in building national support against terrorism does not eliminate concerns, however, about U.S. military activities in Japan. Although Japanese public support for the alliance remains high, about 70 percent -- a majority of Japanese citizens -- would like to see a reduction in the burden of our presence. The normal range of base-related issues, including constraints on training and concerns about crime and the environment require continued careful management.

Efforts continue to implement the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report. While 15 of 27 SACO initiatives have been completed, 12 (2 of 5 noise reduction and 10 of 11 land release initiatives) are still in progress. The cornerstone of the Japan-U.S. SACO Final Report is the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). GOJ approval of a Basic Plan for the off-shore portion of the FRF highlights the progress in the SACO process. However, we continue to emphasize to the GOJ that our requirements have not changed, and a complete replacement facility is required before returning Futenma.

The U.S.-Japan alliance requires our proper attention. At the same time, significant growth opportunities exist for advancing U.S. interests. U.S. forces' presence here, from the country team perspective, is secure, and careful management of the issues will ensure it remains so. My hope for the coming year is that our security dialogue with Japan will continue to advance beyond the discussion of current issues related to bases and training to address our longer-term interests in sustaining our vital alliance. We also look to expand and improve U.S.-Japan coordination with other countries within the region to address regional security issues.

Republic of Korea (ROK). The ROK remains one of our strongest allies. The new Korean government is committed to the alliance. Unfortunate incidents marred the relationship this past year - the most tragic was the June 2002 death of two young Korean girls in an accident involving a U.S. Forces Korea vehicle. In this regard, the U.S. has at every level offered our profound sympathy and condolences.

The late Fall protests indicate the depth of emotion the Korean people feel on issues related to perceived inequalities in the ROK-U.S. relationship. However, they are not indicative of the solution sought by most Koreans or the Korean government. The Korean people in general recognize the great contributions made by the United States to their nation's security and believe the relationship is in their interest, as it is in ours.

In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we continue to review our Northeast Asian force presence with both Japan and the Republic of Korea. We seek an enduring force posture that takes into account the changing threat, our enhanced capabilities, and the improving contributions of our friends and allies.

As a partner, the ROK has been steadily increasing its regional security role. USPACOM is working with the ROK Joint Staff to ensure our regional security cooperation efforts are in consonance with one another and integrated where appropriate. In particular, the ROK supports USPACOM exercises and seminars aimed at increasing regional cooperation and interoperability among U.S. friends and allies. Korea's contributions to regional peace and stability were clearly demonstrated this past year in Timor-Leste, where ROK Army troops participated in UN peacekeeping efforts to support the region's newest nation. This growing regional role for Korea contributes to the security of the region while not detracting from its peninsular defense responsibilities.

The ROK continues steadfast support to anti-terrorism efforts. The Korean Armed Forces are with us in the GWOT, from Guam to Central Asia and on the ground in Afghanistan, supporting our efforts with transportation and medical support. In the USPACOM area, the ROK Air Force has flown over 2000 hours moving tons of important cargo and passengers throughout the AOR. Similarly, the ROK Navy has provided important sealift to bolster our efforts in South Asia, moving 3500 tons of material. In the aftermath of Typhoon Cha'taan, the ROK Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) provided emergency sealift of over 350 tons of bottled water and other disaster relief supplies and materials to Guam. The ROK Army deployed a Mobile Surgical Hospital initially to Manas, Kyrgyzstan, and subsequently to Bagram, Afghanistan. A civil engineering battalion will soon join these forces to assist in rebuilding the infrastructure of that emerging nation. Similar contributions have been provided for the reconstruction of Iraq. These contributions have been, and will continue to be, important to the success of OEF and OIF, and we thank the Korean people for their support.

The events of 2002 remind us of the dangers posed by the Kim Jong-Il regime and the threat our ROK-U.S. combined team faces on the peninsula. The conventional threat from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains unabated, illustrated by the unprovoked naval attack on 29 June 2002 on an ROK Navy vessel that resulted in the loss of five young ROK sailors. The DPRK maintains more than 60 percent of its forces within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and the Kim regime persists in its "military first" policy, providing sufficient resources to keep its large force fed, equipped, and exercised, while its citizens face deprivation and starvation. The DPRK has so far not broken its self-imposed moratorium on conducting ballistic missile test flights, it continues development efforts including static engine tests. Additionally, the DPRK exports missiles and missile technology, posing a grave counter-proliferation concern. Finally, the Kim regime continues to engage in nuclear brinkmanship, with the disclosure of its Highly Enriched Uranium program and recent announcement on the resumption of their plutonium production and reprocessing programs. These actions are in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, DPRK pledges to the IAEA, and the 1992 North-South Basic Agreement calling for denuclearization of the Peninsula. The DPRK is not above precipitating a crisis to strengthen its bargaining position. Now more than ever it is critical our ROK-U.S. partnership stand firm.

The Korean people are looking for ways to foster reconciliation with the DPRK. We recognize the importance of these efforts to the Korean people and their government. Moreover, we agree on the crucial role of the Armistice Agreement in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula, and we are committed to ensuring that efforts at reconciliation do not increase risk for the security of the ROK or the United States.

In sum, through continuing support to the coalition to combat global terrorism and efforts to participate fully in regional security, the ROK plays a very positive role in the region. U.S. and ROK forces remain prepared, and we are looking for ways to strengthen the alliance to deal with current and future challenges.

Australia. Our strong ally and partner, Australia has demonstrated steadfast commitment and bold leadership in the GWOT and in essentially every other security endeavor in the region. Its military contributions to the coalition against terror are substantial and include Combat Air Patrols (CAP), tankers, Special Air Service (SAS) troops, guided missile frigates and, most recently, support for Sea Swap, our USN initiative to exchange crews of select vessels forward in theater. Additionally, Australia has become a regional leader in pursuing multilateral counter-terrorism initiatives in Southeast Asia by signing counter-terrorism MOUs with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand while pursuing others. USPACOM remains focused on maintaining strong levels of interoperability with the Australian Defence Forces across the full spectrum of contingency operations including counter-terrorism. Support for legislation to improve the arms export process will improve interoperability with this important ally. Australia continues to lead international support for the struggling nations of the Oceania region, providing humanitarian assistance and training. Australia is the southern anchor of our security architecture in the region, and we will maintain the vibrancy of this strategic relationship.

Republic of the Philippines. Our relationship with the Government and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) developed and matured throughout the last year. Through comprehensive security assistance packages and focused security cooperation, the AFP has improved its ability to fight terrorism on its homeland as demonstrated by the AFP Southern Command's effective neutralizing of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on Basilan Island and the continuing fight in Jolo. This has not come without cost. Both American citizens and service members have been wounded, or lost their lives to the terrorists in the Southern Philippines.

Despite these losses, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM - Philippines (OEF-P) has produced tremendous successes. The Joint Task Force advised and assisted AFP forces in their mission to rid ASG terrorists from Basilan Island. As a result, the ASG threat declined significantly on Basilan Island. Although the road that circled Basilan was repaired to support AFP/U.S. tactical mobility, it will also help the people of Basilan in their economic livelihood as will the new water wells, repairs to school buildings, critical hospitals, and other medical treatment areas throughout the island. These humanitarian and civic assistance program successes acted as force multipliers for U.S. and AFP operations because the programs separated the citizens of Basilan from supporting the terrorist threat.

To ensure the AFP can successfully respond to the terrorist threat, the U.S developed a Security Assistance (SA) Program that will provide the AFP with additional counter-terrorism training and equipment. This program is well underway, including light infantry battalion, light reaction company, night-vision, intelligence fusion, Non-commissioned Officer, and Civil Military Operations training. These five SA modules, funded through $25 million dollars in FY 2002 supplemental appropriations, are occurring at various locations in the Philippines to benefit the AFP beyond its Southern Command units.

When this first series of SA modules is complete later this year, we will conduct a combined exercise (Balikatan 03-1) to evaluate our progress and to inform of our plans for the next round of assistance modules. This feedback mechanism is crucial to making rapid and efficient progress in the AFP's CT capabilities.

Additionally, USPACOM is implementing a Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Maintenance Assistance Plan that will sustain AFP critical tactical mobility platforms, including UH-1H helicopters, C-130 transport aircraft, two-and-a-half ton trucks, and 78-foot patrol craft. We seek your continued assistance in ensuring funding for this program in the future. through the next 3 years. This will give the AFP an opportunity to address current equipment maintenance shortfalls.

Action has not been limited to the southern Philippines. We have completed various large-scale exercises in Luzon and continue to plan for security cooperation events in 2003. On 21 November 2002, the AFP signed a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement with USPACOM - a positive sign of reciprocity and an improving relationship. We have already used the agreement by leasing 500 pieces of body armor to the AFP. This small gesture will improve the AFP force protection posture and support Philippine efforts to combat terrorism.

The Philippines plays a strategic role in the USPACOM AOR. As training areas for U.S. forces dwindle, excellent training facilities in the Philippines remain available, though repairs are required.

We have accomplished a lot in the GWOT and in securing our strategic objectives with the unwavering support of the Philippine Government. The security situation in the Philippines needs continued improvement to attract investments and promote economic stability. Continued U.S. support through comprehensive, focused and timely SA funding is one way we can influence the situation in the Philippines. Supporting the GRP in their fight against the ASG is another way. A sustained GRP counterterrorism capability is the goal.

Thailand. The Kingdom of Thailand is a treaty ally that continues to have an outstanding military-to-military relationship with the U.S. Exercise COBRA GOLD (CG) is a centerpiece of this relationship. CG-2003 was our 22nd joint/combined bilateral exercise with Thailand, and the 4th of the expanded observer program - making it USPACOM's premier multilateral event. By adding this multinational exercise dimension in an environment that trains for transnational issues, Thailand is assuming an active role in promoting South East Asia security.

Military-to-military policy with Thailand is managed through annual Thai-American Consultations. Benefits to Thailand include U.S. counterdrug/border security support, demining training, peace operations training and support, and an extensive security assistance program with a robust International Military Education and Training (IMET) component. Thailand's contributions as a regional leader include a peacekeeping troop presence in Timor-Leste, a commitment to providing engineering support in Afghanistan to support the GWOT, and an intent to contribute to the peace process in Aceh, Indonesia.

As a result of our strong relationship with Thailand, we have received access to training facilities, ports, and airfields, and the granting of overflight clearances in support of operational requirements. Our ongoing security cooperation program, including exercises such as COBRA GOLD, helps to address the security interests of both countries and serves as a catalyst for enhancing our regional security posture.

Singapore. Our relationship with Singapore is one of the strongest in the region. Following the 11 September terrorist attacks, Singapore provided access to airfields and naval facilities to U.S. forces, detained 31 suspected terrorists, froze terrorist financial assets, increased protection to shipping in the Strait of Malacca, and was the first Asian nation to implement the U.S. Container Security Initiative. Singapore's recently published White Paper on the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists and announcement to launch a terrorism research center in 2003/2004 testifies to its comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. Our efforts with Singapore focus on reinforcing our already strong foundation through improved interoperability and cooperation.

Malaysia. Some of the most aggressive action against terrorism in Southeast Asia has occurred in Malaysia. To date, Malaysian security forces have arrested more than 70 suspected terrorists and have taken the lead in several initiatives aimed at increasing cooperation in combating terrorism and other areas of mutual interest. The proposed Regional Counter Terrorism Training Center in Kuala Lumpur is one such initiative and represents an important opportunity to enhance regional efforts at combating terrorism. By providing expertise, information, and funding when appropriate, we can assist Malaysia and other nations of Southeast Asia in developing the skills necessary to defeat terrorism. As a moderate Muslim nation with a secular democratic government, Malaysia's influence extends beyond the region. Its January announcement to discontinue funding for private religious schools is an example of a government taking action against the root causes of terrorism by not supporting deviant extremist teachings that breed hatred. Currently, Malaysia holds the chairmanship of the Organization of Islamic Conference and remains influential in the Non-Aligned Movement. Malaysia's Armed Forces are professional and committed. Together, we are cooperating in areas of mutual interest and improving our ability to operate in combined regional efforts.

India. Based on the policy direction provided by the Indo-U.S. Defense Policy Group, USPACOM embarked on an aggressive security cooperation program with India over the past year. To date, our forces have conducted a number of successful exercises - ranging from airborne operations to surface warfare naval exercises - that have improved the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces. Over the past 10 months, USPACOM and its components have met with their Indian counterparts and established a long-range plan outlining mutually beneficial activities. These programs will increase our interoperability with, and access to, Indian forces. Our growing military cooperation supports the transformation of our relationship with India and serves to further this strategic partnership. This partnership was evident in India's strong support for the GWOT, most notably its naval escorts of U.S. ships transiting the Strait of Malacca last summer. As my recent trip to the troubled state of Kashmir confirmed, terrorists also menace India. Our improved relationships with India and Pakistan were invaluable as we helped these rivals step back last year from the brink of war. Recent overtures between the two countries give us renewed optimism.

Indonesia. The government of Indonesia responded admirably to the terrorist bombings in Bali on 12 October 2002, arresting many key operatives and developing information on the domestic and regional terrorist threat. Globally, radical Islam continues to destabilize Muslim countries and threaten the interests of tolerant, democratic nations. Indonesia is a key battleground in the struggle against terrorism and radicalism. In the face of economic turmoil, separatist and communal violence, and political transition, the world's most populous Muslim nation is struggling to maintain its secular, democratic character, and to cooperate with the international community in eliminating transnational security threats. The Indonesian military (TNI) is also going through a difficult transition from protector of an autocratic regime to defender of a popularly elected government. This significant cultural and institutional transition will not happen by itself, and is experiencing an immediate test following the breakdown of peace negotiations in Aceh.

Accountability, essential to democratic civil-military relations, must improve. Critical to the success of this effort is Professional Military Education that exposes TNI officers to democratic norms and modern defense management techniques while building personal bonds of trust and goodwill. Particularly important is influencing the younger generation of officers to support the struggle against terrorism. International Military Education and Training (IMET) is another important tool.

East Timor. This past May, Timor-Leste became the world's newest democracy following 20 plus years of occupation and over 200,000 deaths. Though the greatest credit for this achievement goes to the Timorese people, the U.S. military provided significant assistance in Timor-Leste's transition to a democratic state. Our U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET) and Australia played a vital role in providing a stabilizing military presence during Timor-Leste's transition to independence. We conducted monthly ship visits, built schools and roads, repaired water and electrical systems, and provided medical and dental treatment for thousands of Timorese. We are proud of USGET and our military forces that contributed to Timor-Leste independence.

Although USGET deactivated on 17 December 2002, USPACOM continues to play a positive role in Timor-Leste's development as a democratic state. Through IMET and Foreign Military Sales (FMS), we are funding English language training, helping develop the Timor-Leste Defense Force (ETDF) logistics system, purchasing basic equipment, and designing training programs to help develop Timor's Defense Secretariat and the ETDF. My key goals are to support the development of a civil/military defense establishment subordinate to civilian authority and the rule of law and help develop the ETDF as a credible self-defense force.

China. We have a modest but constructive military-to-military relationship with China. Our relationship is guided by PL 106-65 (NDAA 2000), which limits us to the areas of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) and other non-warfighting venues. Our activities are part of ongoing DoD efforts to place such contacts with China on a new footing since the April 2001 aircraft collision incident. The USS PAUL FOSTER port visit to Qingdao in November 2002 and my visit to China from 13-17 December 2002 were the first USPACOM bilateral military-to-military contacts with China since March 2001. One objective of these exchanges is to demonstrate the quality of our forces and our values by developing personnel exchanges between the younger generation of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and U.S. military personnel.

Taiwan. For Taiwan, our actions are guided by the Taiwan Relations Act. We have worked this past year to support self defense improvements that can best meet Taiwan's identified defense needs. We want Taiwan to remain stable, democratic, and economically prosperous while it develops a professional, civilian-controlled defense establishment with a modernized, joint operations-oriented military....

Promoting "Change" and Improving the Asia-Pacific Defense Posture

Our country is undergoing the most fundamental transformation of its defense strategy and Armed Forces since the Second World War. Guidance for this transformation is clear and starts with the National Security Strategy. At USPACOM, we are putting that guidance into action, operationalizing it with Asia-Pacific emphasis. Our efforts include strengthening command and control constructs, updating plans, improving force posture, diversifying access and enroute logistics, improving capabilities for immediate employment, and developing new operating patterns and concepts.

Our progress toward successful transformation of our force is the result of a deliberate, iterative process of innovation and experimentation. This process requires that we collaborate and stay in close touch with service initiatives - ensuring they are synchronized into the joint team. Likewise, we continue to build a collaborative bridge between our experimental efforts and the experimentation underway in U.S. Joint Forces Command, the lead command for joint experimentation.

Consistent with Secretary Rumsfeld's Transformation Planning Guidance, USPACOM has a multifaceted program covering a broad range of technological, organizational, and conceptual initiatives. It is a focused effort to explore and integrate innovative concepts and mature technologies to address our toughest challenges to effective joint operations.

Forward stationed or deployed military presence provides the leading edge of U.S. combat power and forms the cornerstone of deterrence. Within the Asia-Pacific region this equates to roughly 100,000 forward-deployed personnel located primarily in the Republic of Korea and Japan. These forces deter conflict, dissuade competition, respond to crisis, man the infrastructure to receive follow-on forces, and fight if necessary. USPACOM is committed to developing the most effective regional command and control constructs to maximize the employment of our forward-deployed forces. In conjunction with ongoing DoD restructuring initiatives, we are reviewing these command and control structures and our force posture to ensure they are consistent with today's operational requirements and geo-political realities. The goal is to consolidate and transform our headquarters in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and throughout the region to provide immediately employable forces capable of decisive operational effects. Of course, these improvements will be undertaken in close consultation with our allies.

Prototype command and control constructs such as the Joint Mission Force or Standing Joint Force Headquarters leverage both enhanced joint warfighting equities and transformation dividends. Along with our efforts to improve our command structure, we will continue to develop diversified access throughout the region. We foresee ongoing requirements to consolidate and improve our facilities in Korea, Japan, and other locations in the region. We also expect to enhance our access to facilities in Southeast Asia (SEA) and the South Asia Indian Ocean (SAIO) area to meet regional and global requirements and support the GWOT and other operational or contingency demands.

Our transformation and experimentation efforts are necessary steps in advancing improvements to the speed of action and effectiveness of joint operations across strategic, operational, and tactical force levels. To date, our new standing operating procedures and enhancements to collaboration have yielded as much as two weeks' reduction in time to stand up and deploy a Joint Task Force (JTF) in response to a contingency. By experimenting with and fielding mature technologies and prototype decision tools - placing them in the hands of operators well within the traditional acquisition cycle time - we have established information superiority and enhanced efficiency for theater command and control. With continued support, we can zero-in on even greater improvements to JTF effectiveness, such as integration and synchronization of operational fire and maneuver, surpassing information superiority with decision superiority, and expediting the fielding of mature technologies and concept prototypes to forward-deployed JTF commanders.

Within USPACOM, our Joint Mission Force (JMF) initiative provides the coherent framework for experimentation and transformation to enhance JTF operations across the spectrum of missions from forcible entry through humanitarian assistance. This mature initiative has allowed us to focus our transformational efforts toward a specific end-objective: seamless joint operations. The JMF concept will serve as USPACOM's segue to implementing the Standing Joint Force Headquarters as directed by current DoD plans.

Each year during exercises such as COBRA GOLD, our multilateral exercise co-hosted with Thailand, and TANDEM THRUST, our theater-wide biennial joint exercise with Australia, we experiment with JMF initiatives that address our "Top Ten Challenges" to enhancing JTF speed of action and effectiveness. By experimenting while we exercise, we can accurately assess the military utility of new technologies and procedures. As a direct result of success during exercises, JMF has fielded several key technologies within USPACOM's designated JTFs. Over the past year, Bandwidth Monitoring and Control devices have given our JTFs dynamic control of limited bandwidth for critical communications. The Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) now provides USPACOM Headquarters Joint Operations Center and our JTFs an interoperable tool for sharing a common operational picture for dynamic tracking and targeting and for conducting personnel recovery operations. JMF has provided our designated JTFs with a suite of collaborative tools and the training required for planning, executing, and assessing joint operations. Our design and implementation of a standard JMF web tool provides an internet "one-stop shop" for JTF real-time information sharing, planning, and execution.

Additionally, JMF has operationalized other important command-wide capabilities such as our Combined Operations Wide Area Network (COWAN) for secure operations with our coalition partners, the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) for civil-military and non-government organization operations with coalition forces, telemedicine for joint medical operations (JMO-T), and language translation capability such as DARPA's "Phraselators."

To bridge the gap between our major joint exercises, hone readiness, and provide periodic spiral development opportunities, USPACOM conducts routine command and control exercises (C2X). These short duration, vignette-driven exercises not only test our JTF command and control procedures, they also provide an important venue for spiral technology and procedural development and fielding. This JMF initiative has proven effective in USPACOM as a readiness-enhancer.

Over the next 2 years, with your support, USPACOM's Joint Mission Force will integrate emerging technologies into information operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance management. Our transformation and experimentation initiatives include our coalition partners.

In Korea, we have worked Integrated Total Asset Visibility and language translators during exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS. USFK has the lead for the Theater Precision Strike Operations ACTD and this year is sponsoring the Theater Effects-Based Operations ACTD.

We have installed our JMF Web tool on the Japan Self-Defense Force bilateral secure wide-area network. We also have an information sharing agreement with Japan, and Japan has used Coalition Rear Area Security Command and Control in exercises such as KEEN EDGE and YAMA SAKURA.

As COBRA GOLD 2002 participants, Singapore Armed Forces and Royal Supreme Thai Command members were directly involved with our initiatives for collaboration tools, virtual Civil Military Operations Center, and COWAN. Additionally, Singapore is participating in the SPARTAN ACTD and is pursuing involvement in other ACTDs, such as RESTOPS and JTF WARNET (Wide Area Relay Network).

The JTF WARNET initiative approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) on 25 April 2002 provides organic, wireless secure Internet Protocol-based connectivity among tactical components of a JTF. WARNET applications, interfaces, and procedures enhance JTF command and control by sharing tactical situational awareness data among service command and control systems, enabling joint fires and collaborative planning and execution. JTF WARNET provided tactical-level force integration during MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002. We will conduct WARNET regional tests and a pre-deployment exercise in Hawaii and Japan in FY03 before WARNET becomes a JTF operational capability in FY04, culminating in COBRA GOLD 2004.

USPACOM served as the host Combatant Command for the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (JWID) 2002 and recently hosted JWID 2003 this June. For the first time, Japan, Korea, and Singapore were invited to sit on the Coalition Task Force (CTF) staff. Their inclusion in the traditional mix of U.S., NATO, U.K., Canada, and Australia participants successfully pushed the envelope on coalition interoperability, demonstrating challenges and developing solutions.

The Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program complements the IMET program. DoD funding has sent foreign military officers to U.S. military institutions and selected regional centers for non-lethal education. This program has provided regional combatant commands with additional flexibility in executing our security cooperation strategies and has had an immediate and positive impact in encouraging reform, professionalism, and regional cooperation in addressing counter-terrorism and other transnational threats.

The fellowship focus for USPACOM has been toward educational programs that encourage these advancements among Asia-Pacific nations addressing transnational threats with a focus on counter-terrorism. Specific courses have assisted in minimizing terrorist threats in the Asia-Pacific region, severing links between indigenous terrorist groups and global terrorist networks, allowing the establishment of a more professional military, developing stronger mutual security partnerships, and enhancing theater security cooperation. We are using the program to provide non-lethal training to Indonesian, Malaysian, and Philippine military officers at U.S. military educational institutions. U.S. military courses provide the basics for success in any military operation. A secondary benefit is the exposure students receive to the higher standards of ethics and behavior associated with a professional military under competent civilian control. Your continued support in providing this flexible funding alternative is appreciated.

C2 for Coalitions. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) Program involves a group of military planners from the U.S. and many nations in USPACOM's Area of Interest. The purpose of MPAT is to increase operational interoperability among participating countries' interoperable planners who can rapidly augment a multinational force headquarters in response to a regional crisis. Using multinational but standardized skills and procedures, MPAT planners would plan and execute coalition operations to support a multinational and interagency response to a small-scale contingency. Through a series of workshops and information exchange events, including four major crisis action planning exercises, MPAT members have developed a knowledge base of the various national crisis action planning procedures in the Asia-Pacific region. They have also developed a strong working relationship with each other. Military planners from over 25 countries and representatives from the UN and various non-governmental and international organizations have attended these workshops.

As part of the MPAT initiative, we and other nations in the region are developing multinational force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) that any nation leading a coalition crisis response relief effort can use. This MNF SOP has coalition/combined task force activation, forming, and planning procedures focused on military operations other than war (MOOTW), from humanitarian assistance through peace operations, and includes counter-terrorism aspects. Planners from 30 nations practice and validate the MNF SOP during MPAT and other multinational exercises each year.

Since the Asia-Pacific region does not have a regional NATO-like organization, the MPAT and MNF SOP efforts represent the major regional program aimed at developing multinational procedures and maintaining a cadre of multinational military planners using common planning and operating procedures for coalition operations. USPACOM's Internet-based Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) enables the working-level communications required to develop these procedures. APAN's easily accessible collaborative capability enables us to extend regional dialogues begun in functional forums such as CHOD conferences into exercises and operations that improve our regional response to the growing range of military missions we face today. The ability to place instructional material on APAN for mutual benefit of the U.S. and Asia-Pacific partners would enhance the USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation program and U.S. national security interests. The provision of internet-based training and education should include such programs as Advanced Distributed Learning and similar internet tools. USPACOM could thereby more effectively use focused military education programs to develop regional skills required to accomplish cooperative security missions, improve civil-military relations, increase respect for human rights, and strengthen democratic principles....

Land Partnership Plan (LPP). The Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has reached agreement with the ROK government on an LPP that will consolidate U.S. force presence. The plan will reduce the number of major U.S. bases in Korea from 41 to 23 while significantly enhancing training and combined warfighting capability - better supporting our long-term regional strategy. The LPP will also have a significant positive affect on the quality of life of our servicemen and women and their families assigned to our forces on the peninsula. Our partner is committed - the LPP has received the full backing of the Korean government and its National Assembly. Further enhancements and efficiencies are being discussed as part of the Future of the Alliance Initiative. We are working closely with U.S. Forces Korea to ensure our efforts result in enduring footprint improvements that meet both peninsular and regional security goals....