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TRANSCRIPT
Army Describes Steps to Protect Iraq's Cultural Heritage
Care for religious, cultural sites integrated into military planning

The U.S. military has integrated measures to identify and protect sites of religious, cultural, and historical importance in Iraq into every phase of its planning and operation, according to U.S. Army civil affairs officers who briefed reporters in Kuwait on April 5.

Protection of cultural and religious sites is part of high-level planning, all the way down to unit cultural affairs officers who implement the measures to protect such sites, said Major Christopher Varhola, a civil affairs reservist who is a cultural anthropologist.

Iraq's religious and cultural heritage is priceless, Varhola said. "It's beyond rating."

Varhola said that he is in constant contact with the archeological and anthropological communities to gain assistance and insight. With this information, "We refine target lists and adjust military plans to incorporate cultural and archaeological considerations," Varhola said. As an example, he cited the great care with which the military has operated near Mosque of Ali in Najaf.

Damage from bombs are only one threat to religious and cultural sites, Varhola pointed out. Military construction and the threat of looting are also concerns that the military tries to address in its planning.

"The U.S. military is eager to coordinate with any organization dedicated to the task of preservation, which transcends military and operational necessity," Varhola said.

By contrast, the regime of Saddam Hussein has demonstrated an utter disregard for protecting Iraq's heritage, according to Lieutenant Colonel John Kuttas. "Obviously we are aware that they will use schools, and mosques and hospitals and museums. Our biggest concern is that someone will take advantage of our cultural sensitivity and try to use that as a weapon."

Varhola recalled how, in the 1991 Gulf War, coalition forces refrained from attacking combat aircraft parked in the vicinity of the ancient city of Ur.

When asked about his assessment of the value of the cultural and religious sites in Iraq, Varhola said, "It is absolutely priceless. From the smallest excavation from a tiny, tiny village which lead to agricultural patterns started thousands of years ago to whole social structures. And we aren't just concerned with ancient Mesopotamia structures but also those from the Golden Age of Islam, the 800's, 900's up until the medieval period. There are a number of priceless structures as well. I can emphasize this all day. It's beyond rating."


Following is the transcript of a U.S. Army civil affairs briefing on protection of Iraq's cultural and religious heritage, held in Kuwait on April 5

By U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officers,
Lieutenant Colonel John Kuttas and Major Christopher Varhola

Major Varhola:

I am a Major in the United States Army, a civil affairs reservist, and a cultural anthropologist. I first became acquainted with the complex nature of this situation in Iraq concerning arts and monuments when I was a tank platoon leader in 1991 with the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Our fighting positions were in and around Nasiriyah, which is also in and around the vicinity of the ancient city of Ur. I personally observed how Iraqi jets were parked around the ziggurat, obviously so we would not hit the jets. I personally observed how the Iraqi military forces moved jet fighters from the nearby Talil airbase to the immediate proximity of the great ziggurat, which dates to approximately 2000 BC.

This was purposely done because the Iraqi military knows that we take extreme measures to protect cultural, religious, and archaeological sites. This is something that I firmly believe in, and that members of the U.S. military firmly believe in. This is also in accordance with the 4th Geneva Convention, as well as with common decency and respect.

In the case of Ur in 1991, for instance, our assessment was that the long-term damage to world culture was clearly not worth the short-term military gains that would have been made by destroying the Iraqi jets. As a result the Iraqi jets were not hit. They were later towed away, when we took that area, and towed away by tractors and then blown up in place. Our missiles and our jets intentionally let those jets survive because we did not want to hit that ziggurat.

That's how I became acquainted with the need for the protection of monuments, particularly in Iraq, which has literally tens of thousands of known archaeological sites -- not just the big, known ones, but also many smaller ones, some dating back more than 10,000 years.

We're here to talk about historical protection and the institutional measures by which the U.S. Army is taking steps to protect historical sites. Concerning archaeological preservation, there are multiple levels. At the highest level, as you may know, Pentagon planners have worked closely with members of the academic community to identify, not only locations of concern, but also to identify the kinds of military activity that might adversely affect these areas.

More than just bombing can cause damage. Digging ditches, in southern Iraq for instance, or erecting earthworks, can damage the multiple soil layers that show the temporal and social context of a given site, so critical to understanding the longer-term cultural and archaeological significance of the site.

High-level planning is only one part of the equation, obviously. All high-level planning is useless if there is not a way to get the plans down to the combat soldiers. Part of what we want to stress here is that there are institutional mechanisms by which information is diffused to the combat soldiers on the ground. One mechanism for that is integrating targeting information, which Lieutenant Colonel Kuttas will talk to you about.

On the tactical level, Army civil affairs assets work closely with ground commanders to advise them of archaeological and cultural sites in their areas of operation. The institutional mechanism for this is the cultural affairs officer. This is an actual position in civil affairs, the cultural affairs officer, whose responsibility is to do the research, on his own and with higher headquarters, so that he is aware or she is aware of the targets that need to be protected. The institutional mechanism is the cultural affairs officer present in the civil affairs units.

A key point of civil affairs is that we are predominantly Reservists. As such, we capitalize on the civilian career fields of soldiers and on translate these skills in support of military operations -- in the case of protected targets, for instance.

I'm a cultural anthropologist. I am not an archaeologist; but, prior to deployment, and via e-mail now, I am in constant contact with members of the archaeological and anthropological communities in order to gain their assistance and insights with refining target lists. The target lists that Lieutenant Colonel Kuttas will talk about are really big documents, which are constantly refined. We refine target lists and adjust military plans to incorporate cultural and archaeological considerations.

In the cases of both Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, I work closely with anthropologists and archaeologists from Catholic University, George Washington University, and the University of Chicago. I worked with many of them on our Afghanistan operations, as we put together lists that were incorporated into our overall scope of operation there for protected targets.

A couple of key points to mention here: how the U.S. Army respects archaeological and cultural sites and how the Iraqi military uses these same sites for protection. Consider the recent activities in and around the Mosque of Ali in Najaf. I cannot speak for the ground commanders, but I can assure you that, because of civil affairs soldiers, the ground commanders are aware of the importance of preserving sites and of not letting short-term military necessity override that importance.

Another concern is looting -- especially in the absence of law and order and the economic uncertainty that is inherent to any military operation of this magnitude. All around Iraq, there are a number of museums, in particularly the National Museum of Baghdad, that hold priceless materials. The U.S. Military is eager to coordinate with any organization dedicated to the task of preservation, which transcends military and operational necessity.

As far as key organizations, we do not usually comment on which organizations we work with, but I will say that UNESCO is an important one. The Swedish "Cultural Heritage Without Borders" is another one that has the same mandate. I am not saying that we are working with these people now, but we might well deal with them.

Lt. Col. Kuttas:

I am going to take the piece out of the middle, and try to explain how we protect the cultural heritage of Iraq. We do all we can to prevent unnecessary damage. We only target what is a military necessity. We draw on a wide variety sources to ensure that we don't cause any unnecessary damage. We always insist on positive identification. We do not shoot into the dark. We make sure that we know what's out there with our powers of observation so we know what's on the ground.

I'm not a cultural anthropologist, just a cannoneer; but we use all the information that people like Chris give us. We put it in our manual of operations to make sure our targeting information is extremely accurate and constantly updated. People all the way up the chain have this information. It's a field document that is refined continually, and it really does reflect our general sensitivity and respect for culture.

We've seen Saddam Hussein's thugs taking advantage of our respect for their culture and hiding in mosques. It doesn't work for him, but it's not something you're going to see us doing. In the event that we do have a situation, such as aircraft parked alongside a site, or snipers in a minaret, the coalition response is going to be measured; it's going to be proportional. If we do have to take action, it is only going to be if there is a military necessity and with full respect and understanding of the cultural and social implications of what we are doing.

Q: (CBS Radio) What are your particular concerns as troops move into Baghdad as far as preserving what is there?

A: We are probably more concerned about the actions the Iraqis may take -- that Saddam Hussein and his thugs might do -- and how he might take advantage of our respect. We're seeing constantly hospitals used for military actions and schools being turned into barracks. That's a major concern for us. Obviously we are aware that they will use schools, and mosques and hospitals and museums. Our biggest concern is that someone will take advantage of our cultural sensitivity and try to use that as a weapon.

Q: What buildings have you helped preserve in Nasiriyah?

A: I'm not going to answer that. It's operational and I really can't tell you where we have drawn the lines for a no-fire zone because they will become points for the regime's death squads. But I can tell you that it is a fairly extensive list that has been vetted by not just people like me.

Q: You paint a very rosy picture. But what can you say about the extensive damage done to Saddam Hussein's palaces?

A. I'm not going to comment on things on the ground where we have control. We are trying to bring down this regime and if this regime chooses to position itself in front of monuments and artifacts, it's a real problem. But I can't comment on Najaf because I haven't been there.

Q: Have you done any counter assessment? Are you planning any remodeling?

A. We have not received a comprehensive assessment. There will be Civil Affairs people with all units and the assessment survey will be forthcoming. As far as reconstruction and renovation, we don't do that. We are focusing on mitigating military damage. That's our focus. Renovation is a sensitive issue but that will be something for the Iraqis to undertake with their academics and experts, perhaps with the international community of archeologists and academics. The ideal though is to end the hostilities with as much as possible intact.

Q: Can you explain the process of how you decide what to put on the list?

Everyone has the information up the chain. Obviously when you are on the ground you need to know this. The information systems work in our favor in this respect. Now obviously we don't expect our soldiers to die while they wait for an answer. The commander in the field is going to make the final call and analysis whether he wants to put his soldiers at risk. However, he also understands what is at stake. He's got a bigger picture than the next two minutes. We haven't seen too much of this so far. Afghanistan was probably a better example. And as a result of this kind of information other options were used to bring about the outcome.

Q: You have good intentions but how can you prevent things from happening?

A: Yes. We have a process and it's worked on continually. It's not something we just put on a shelf. It's not just me doing it but hundreds of people up and down the chain from a cannoneer up to full colonels. This is a continual process. It's not a one-shot deal. It's not perfect but if I knew a way to do it better, we would be doing it.

Q: Have there been disagreements between field captains and higher-ups?

A: I can't really comment on that. In the final analysis it doesn't come up very often.

Q: Weren't American soldiers trying to going into shrines in Najaf?

A: We don't comment what is on or not on the target list but it is a fairly safe assumption that tombs of Hussein and tomb and mosque of Ali are very, very near the top. And general orders prohibit soldiers from going into mosques.

There are rare exceptions where if we have Muslim soldiers they can coordinate with the locals for worship purposes but our soldiers do not go into mosques. And again, without saying what is or is not on the target list, it's a pretty safe assumption that we recognize the importance of those shrines and you will not see American soldiers going in there despite the reports that there have been hostile Iraqi operating out of those mosques. It's a very tricky situation, which is why we want to address it. But let me just stress that we hold the mosque of Hussein in very, very high regard. And we recognize how important they are. I cannot stress that enough.

Q: Do you have an indication of number of sensitive sites?

A: Thousands. An unprecedented amount.

Q: Where do you rate Iraq in terms of its archeological treasures?

A: Priceless. It's the cradle of civilization. The source of so much that we owe our culture to. It is absolutely priceless. From the smallest excavation from a tiny, tiny village which lead to agricultural patterns started thousands of years ago to whole social structures. And we aren't just concerned with ancient Mesopotamia structures but also those from the Golden Age of Islam, the 800's, 900's up until the medieval period. There are a number of priceless structures as well. I can emphasize this all day. It's beyond rating.


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