Motivating Soldiers: The Example of the Israeli
Defense Forces
As early as 400 BCE, Xenophon had stated that
"not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but whichever
army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally
cannot withstand them."1 A strong
soul, in modern times, is equivalent to high combat motivation.
Likewise, combat motivation's centrality to a successful outcome
in military operations, from patrolling to full-scale wars, cannot
be overstated. Given the historical asymmetry of forces between
Israel and its enemies, the way in which
Israel has managed to parry significant conventional and nonconventional
attacks-often in the face of substantial quantitative inferiority-has
been due mostly to its superior qualitative edge based on its armed
forces' professionalism, superior training methods, and combat morale.
Combat motivation is a key factor in enabling
conventional armies to win conflicts; in Israel's case, it has been
"referred to as the 'secret weapon' of the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF)."2 On numerous occasions,
quantitatively inferior armies have been able to have the upper
hand because of their fighting spirit, aggressiveness, and relatively
buoyant high morale. Indeed, research has demonstrated time after
time that there is a "strong relationship between cohesion,
soldiers' level of morale, and combat efficiency."3
This article looks at the key factors that
can enhance the combat motivation of soldiers. Given the IDF's many
operational successes throughout its 56 years of existence, the
article provides particular historical references to the IDF's experiences
in building and maintaining high levels of combat motivation throughout
its combat arms. It also will point to recent negative trends that
have weakened in part the IDF soldier's combat motivation. Its purpose
is to instill in the reader an appreciation of the necessity for
armed forces to continually focus on and build upon the human element
of battle in spite of the technological developments brought about
over the last decade by the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs.
Such a focus is especially imperative for the
US armed forces, as well as for other modern Western armies, where
the search for technological solutions often has been pursued at
the expense of personnel. The need to focus on the human element
of battle is also due to the increasing probability that most armies
will be involved in urban warfare battlegrounds, where the technological
edge of conventional armies is significantly reduced by the complex
terrain and human elements involved within it.
However, in spite of the fact that combat motivation
is such a key ingredient to winning battles, most military and academic
establishments have found quite some difficulty in measuring and
regarding combat motivation when, for example, analyzing an army's
overall power capabilities or when giving a threat assessment of
an army's enemies. Their problem often has been the labelling of
intangibles-such as combat motivation-correctly, because "an
idea that is not observable and measurable (strength of will) is
hard to compare against one that is (physical strength)."4
Yet, if "war is . . . an act of force to compel our enemy to
do our will,"5 as Clausewitz wrote,
then it is important to take account of an army's combat morale,
because "will" in the context of a battlefield can be
equated to combat motivation. This shall principally be the case
on the future battlefield where, as argued by numerous military
analysts, "the focus of decision and control will shift downward
toward the squad and the platoon."6
Furthermore, despite all the technological
advances in warfare and the continuous debate on the extent to which
there has been a revolution in military affairs, the nature of man
has not changed. Regardless of the vast technological advances that
warfare will undergo, its conduct always will be in the hands of
human beings. "This means that individual actions, human imperfections,
performance thresholds, and varying personalities will still influence
and determine a conflict's outcome."7
As Ardant du Picq argued, "The human heart
in the supreme moment of battle is the basic factor."8
Thus it is important to look at the human element of the battlefield,
particularly combat motivation and morale. Indeed, taking account
of the human element is even more compelling in the future battlefield,
which in the author's opinion will be for the most part the urban
arena. There, because "a battlefield filled with buildings,
tight streets, underground tunnels, and the other obstacles of a
built-up area takes away the range of many of today's most highly
developed weapon systems,"9 the
importance of the individual soldier's initiative and capabilities
will be magnified.
Defining Combat Motivation
What is meant by morale in the military context?
Among the numerous definitions of morale, the one provided by John
Baynes offers a good starting point. He defines morale as "the
enthusiasm and persistence with which a member of a group engages
in the prescribed activities of that group."10
In the military milieu, "morale" and "motivation"
are frequently used interchangeably. However, morale highlights
the condition of the group (or the unit), while motivation describes
principally the attribute of an individual.11
Frederick Manning defines morale as "a
function of cohesion and esprit de corps."12
Unit cohesion always has been necessary in combat, because each
member of the unit relies on the other in order to survive and to
carry out successful combat operations. Cohesion has been defined
as "the bonding together of members of an organization/unit
in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other,
their unit, and the mission."13
The IDF, since its establishment, has had the
reputation of high combat motivation and effectiveness, which have
been developed and maintained by its customary emphasis on professionalism
and realistic combat training. Nevertheless, unit cohesion and esprit
de corps also have been deciding factors of high morale and combat
motivation, and in the IDF's case they actually have been considered
"the most important source of combat motivation."14
In the IDF, efforts to develop unit cohesion
and strong esprit de corps have traditionally taken place at the
start of a soldier's military service or career with the administration
of an oath to him, "a ritual which goes back at least to the
sacramentum, the Roman military oath."15
In the IDF's case, for example, armored corps and 55th Paratroop
Brigade recruits are sworn into the IDF at Latrun and at the Western
Wall, respectively, two highly symbolic and militarily significant
places where each fought gruelling, victorious battles in 1948 and
1967. Moreover, the differences in uniform between the various brigades
help foster esprit de corps, because they enable the soldier to
"promote the soldier's status in the eyes of comrades, civilians,
and the enemy." They also help remind the soldier of his regiment's
achievements as well as the unit's past near-mythical battlefield
successes.16
The recruit's successful conclusion of training
is customarily celebrated by the handing out of a piece of uniform,
normally the beret, which not only distinguishes that specific brigade
from others, but also creates an atmosphere of competition between
them, consequently raising the operational standards across the
whole army. Moreover, the end of training is usually marked by some
arduous task such as the stretcher march or a gruelling final route
march, which are perceived as necessary rites-of-passage. Lectures
on the history of the infantry and armored brigades' and of the
Special Forces units' military history also create a great degree
of esprit de corps. The IDF has extensive training programs that
educate recruits and in particular officers about their brigade's
heritage. Such programs include trips to Jewish heritage sites,
former battlefields, military or regimental museums, and military
gravesites.
Another crucial esprit de corps factor affecting
combat motivation is the institutional value system a particular
army embodies; values which are most relevant to the unit member
are especially important. In the IDF's case, these are: "(1)
Tenacity of purpose in performing missions and drive to victory;
(2) Responsibility; (3) Credibility; (4) Personal Example; (5) Human
Life; (6) Purity of Arms; (7) Professionalism; (8) Discipline; (9)
Comradeship; and (10) Sense of Mission."17
One of the most important institutional values
of the IDF has been encapsulated in the concept of achavatt lochameem
(combatant's brotherhood), which fulfills the IDF's tenet of comradeship.18
Indeed, "if the soldier trusts his comrades, he will probably
perceive more safety in continuing to fight alongside them, than
in rearward flight away from them and the enemy which they face."19
Such trust is developed through shared experiences of mutual support
found in a characteristic family unit. Likewise, such comradeship
is crucial, because it satisfies another factor impinging on combat
motivation, the soldier's need to belong and to feel that he is
part of something significant and to which he can personally contribute.20
In the IDF, such a family unit is found in
the structure of the battalion and is described as "a yechida
organit (organic unit). Organizationally this involves (1) a framework
characterized by a permanent membership and structure of roles,
and (2) that upon mobilization the whole battalion (as one complete
organizational unit) is recruited" for up to 25 years after
regular military service.21 Such cohesion,
thus, not only has developed in peacetime training, but even more
so during combat operations.
Furthermore, according to Anthony Kellett,
"Israelis regard fighting as very much a social act based on
collective activity, cooperation, and mutual support," whereby
every soldier depends on the other and particularly on the professionalism
and leadership capabilities of the unit commander.22
According to the IDF, for example, the company commander should
possess several specific attributes and values, such as "face-to-face
leadership quality, personal integrity, and the ability to create
mutual trust between the sub-commanders and the soldier and to [instill]
trust in the weapon and fighting systems."23
Indeed, a Combat Readiness Questionnaire survey
of over 1,200 Israeli combat soldiers conducted by the IDF Department
of Behavioral Sciences in May 1981 showed that the soldier's trust
in his immediate leaders contributed positively in boosting his
combat motivation and his unit's combat morale. Such trust in their
commanders was shown to depend "upon the commander's professional
capability, his credibility as a source of information, and the
amount of care and attention that he pays to his men."24
Competency and Communication
"A leader's professional competency is
the primary leadership factor that soldiers say decreases their
stress."25 Lower levels of combat
stress and demoralization associated with professional leadership
can be explained by the fact that quite often the unit leader is
able to show bravery in the face of adversity and set a personal
example, becoming a model of inspiration.
For example, the importance of the professional
competency of noncommissioned officers (NCOs)-particularly at the
hulia (team), kita (squad) and tzevet (crew) levels-was clearly
underlined by current Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon when recently
celebrating their role in the IDF. He noted, "NCOs provide
IDF units with experience and a professional backbone. By carrying
out your duty and striving for excellence, a positive statement
is made to the soldiers that serve under you."26
To be sure, NCOs and junior officers play a fundamental part in
setting the standards and values of excellence and professionalism,
which are needed even in a "people's army" such as the
IDF.
Another important role that the leader must
take on is that of information provider for his subordinates. Communication
and trust between the provider and recipient are crucial, because
informing soldiers during combat of the real state of affairs will
help lessen the fear caused by the unknown. Reuven Gal's "Golan
Heights" study showed that the assessment and awareness of
the expected combat zone and of the adversary's power and ability
not only improved the soldier's self-confidence as a fighter, but
also further developed his combat motivation.27
Such knowledge, in fact, regularly reduces the uncertainty factor,
which often plays on the imaginary fears of a combat soldier in
action.
Personnel Downsizing
Other circumstances of uncertainty that negatively
affect the soldier's combat motivation or the unit's combat morale
are related to his time of service both at the operational level
and at the professional level. At the operational level, soldiers
will often deploy and serve willingly, "but when their redeployment
date is uncertain, trust with the institution is strained."28
At the professional level, uncertainty often comes in the form of
personnel downsizing.
Research has shown that "downsizing severely
damages the psychological contract between an organization and its
downsizing survivors," because it raises the soldier's level
of uncertainty in terms of if or when the downsizing will affect
him, both in regard to his tenure and in regard to the increased
workload he will be taking on.29 Consequently,
extensive budgetary cutbacks and personnel downsizing in the IDF
over the last few years may have had a deleterious effect on combat
motivation as well as on the general esprit de corps.
Indeed, current plans aim to reduce the number
of professional IDF personnel-particularly those belonging to the
ground forces-by 20 percent over the next year, and this also will
include General Staff members. Although some have argued that such
cuts will improve the IDF's efficiency and reduce its bloated rear-echelon
support and administrative branches, one senior IDF officer has
argued, "There is a fear that, instead of becoming a smaller,
cleverer army, we will merely become smaller."30
As a result of such downsizing, IDF Ombudsman Lieutenant General
Uzi Levtzur has reported a rise in complaints by officers who refuse
to be discharged due to economic reasons. Such official complaints
appear to be a new phenomenon in the IDF.31
The Leader as Protector
The leader is also the crucial link between
the higher echelons that are geographically removed from the frontline
of the battlefield and his subordinates who must accomplish the
tasks assigned to them. The unit leader must make sure that such
tasks do not recklessly endanger his men, but at the same time are
accomplished.32 To do so, a field commander
needs to gain his subordinates' trust before he can exert any influence,
which is best achieved when his soldiers are able to identify with
their commander, with the organizational values that he embodies,
and with the missions that he is ordering them to accomplish. Frequently,
the soldier's identification with the unit leader and with the army's
values and missions that the unit leader must promote occurs when
the leader is involved directly with, if not leading, his subordinates
during actual combat, because status differences become blurred
when such officers live with their men, sharing their discomfort
and their fears.33 Nonetheless, such
identification can take place even when training together.
The unit leader quite often must also demonstrate
to his subordinates that he genuinely cares about them by taking
care of their physical- and emotional-needs. When leaders take adequate
care of their soldiers, then their soldiers will more diligently
carry out their duties, typically without the need for much supervision.
This is particularly the case when a unit leader is able to provide
the best equipment for his unit, because it demonstrates that the
leader is making sure that his soldiers have the best chance of
surviving combat due to their real or perceived technological superiority
over the enemy. Too often, IDF soldiers have had trouble perceiving
the importance of their unit's assignment-and their own duties-because
they have not been given the supplies they require.
The inadequate equipping of IDF reservists
for urban warfare has been a particular problem over the last three
years of the al-Aqsa (or Second) Intifada. The Israeli state comptroller's
2003 report, for example, stated in October 2003 that the IDF currently
lacks half the ceramic vests needed to protect soldiers in the occupied
territories. The report also pointed to the fact that the IDF's
primary patrol vehicle, the Sufa (Storm) jeep, does not meet basic
protection requirements.34 The IDF's
main armored personnel carrier, the M113, still requires infantry
soldiers to surround their M113s with sandbags for better protection
during urban operations.
Thus, quite often, the unit leader's reassurances
about having provided adequate equipment for his soldiers have been
insufficient, because "regardless of how logical and well-meaning
the explanations may be for the unit's shortages, soldiers will
evaluate their role and their unit's mission on the basis of their
own perceptions and no one else's."35
Moreover, taking care of soldiers does not
simply mean providing for their comfort and protecting them from
uncalled-for orders by higher command echelons. It also entails
"training them to become seasoned soldiers who could survive
on a battlefield, because they are technically, physically, and
mentally proficient."36 However,
due to the economic crisis and the increasing use of both reservists
and regular soldiers, according to the chief officer of the IDF
Ground Forces, Major General Yiftah Ron-Tal, over the last year
"reservists have not trained at all . . . and the standing
army only set aside four weeks out of six months to train."37
Soldiers may become embittered with their military
leadership due to training restrictions that are often justified
by politically motivated budget cuts or continuous operational assignments,
because they know that such restrictions could rapidly get them
killed in battle due to their lack of expertise in certain combat
scenarios and operations. However, it has not been only the lack
of training that has endangered inexperienced soldiers while carrying
out operational duties. There also has been a series of IDF training
accidents recently due to negligence on the part of both the instructors
and commanders involved in their preparation and execution. Such
negligence has led to a number of fatalities and other casualties
and consequently to the dismissal and, in certain cases, indictment
of some platoon, company, and battalion commanders.38
Survey research of Israeli veterans from the
Lebanon War showed that the feeling of loneliness (i.e., lack of
support given by a tightly-knit combat unit) was the best single
predictor of combat stress reaction and that the best predictor
of loneliness was low officer support.39
Thus, combat leadership, particularly at the unit level, has become
even more important due to the fact that modern warfare, particularly
urban warfare, requires the dispersal of numerous physically isolated
units requiring small and autonomous actions based on tactical ingenuity.
The legitimacy of the leader within the specific unit and trust
in his capabilities can develop only on a continuous face-to-face
relational basis with all soldiers of his particular unit; hence,
it is more likely possible to develop at squad, platoon, and company
levels.
Such trust and mutual support have been ultimately
articulated in the IDF's absolute standard of retrieving casualties
from the battlefield at whatever price-that is, even at theprice
of suffering more casualties. Such loyalty throughout Israel's wars
has been a powerful inducement for heroic acts on behalf of many
soldiers. Indeed, "the normative power of the cohesive group
causes the strong personal commitment on the part of the soldier
that he ought to conform to group expectations," which in the
IDF has often tended to emphasize the spirit of initiative and heroism.40
Unit Cohesion
Various studies have shown that unit cohesion
or esprit de corps not only strengthens a unit's level of morale,
but also acts as "a powerful preventive measure against psychiatric
breakdown in battle and as a 'generator' of heroic behavior among
the unit's members."41 This was
particularly substantiated for the IDF during the early stages of
the Yom Kippur War in the Golan Heights theater of operations: "Members
of IDF tank crews who were well acquainted with one another and
had trained together were more combat effective, and, despite equally
intense battle, had fewer psychiatric casualties than members of
tank crews who were not well acquainted, and, though equally well
trained, had not trained together."42
Whereas such cohesion tends to develop mostly
during military service in other Western armies, in Israel such
solidarity also has been a result of the collectivistic character
of Israeli society. Thus, such cohesion is already in part present
before conscription takes place. In effect, Israeli society has
been socialized into a cohesive society based on the principle of
gibush (crystallization).43 According
to Eyal Ben-Ari,
The gibush metaphor implies . . . [that]
the internal strength and solidity of both the individual and
the group flow from the unifying sense of belonging, of being
securely together "in place." The social ideal of gibush
involves an emphasis . . . on joint endeavours, on cooperation
and shared sentiments, on solidarity and a sense of togetherness.44
This process of crystallization is reinforced
as the members of a unit meet up yearly for their reserve service
and often becomes the source of strong friendships, if not brotherliness.45
Such unit cohesion in turn creates strong incentives to continue
fighting when engaged in combat, because the combatant ultimately
will fight in order to not let the other members of his unit down.
Another social aspect enhancing unit cohesion is "linked directly
to broad, societal agreement about the citizen's duty to serve in
defense of the nation. . . . Soldiers must be aware that their society
will exact penalties for being AWOL and for deserting" and
will exact considerable social penalties for dereliction of duty.46
Hence, according to J. Glenn Gray, author of
The Warriors, "Soldiers have died more or less willingly not
. . . for any abstract good but because they realize that by fleeing
their post . . . they would expose companions to grave danger. Such
loyalty to the group is the essence of fighting morale."47
It is essential to strengthen unit cohesion
because during combat, isolation and loneliness assault the cohesive
power of a unit. Consequently, the enemy will always try to "target
the human bonds that the commander has so diligently prepared."48
If the commander has not developed unit cohesion beforehand, then
the unit's combat effectiveness will crumble under the pressure
of attack.
S. L. A. Marshall's study of World War II US
infantrymen led him to conclude that "men do not fight for
a cause but because they do not want to let their comrades down."49
Due to the principle of gibush, this tendency is even greater in
Israel. Indeed, most Israeli reservists who report for reserve duty
not only do so because they feel a duty to protect Israeli citizens,
but also because they do not want let their comrades down and face
their criticism the next time they report for reserve duty. After
having missed only one tour of reserve duty with his usual unit
during Operation Defensive Shield in April 2004, reserve Staff Sergeant
Amos Harel explained how his unit comrades reacted:
But once I got there this time, I got all
kinds of looks from commanders, soldiers who were under my command,
and so on. They kept saying, "Oh, we thought we would never
see you here again" and so on, and I was only absent for
one tour which I did, of course, serve somewhere else. . . . People
were a bit doubting for the first few minutes-"Where has
he been?"50
Mission Accomplishment
At the primary or individual level there are
other factors that provide IDF soldiers with high levels of morale
and combat motivation. These are, "for each soldier, a goal,
a role, and a reason for self-confidence."51
Rather than fighting for a very abstract purpose, the soldier needs
to achieve definite and tangible objectives in order to sustain
high combat motivation. This is why in the IDF's case the strategic
or operational objective takes precedence over the manner in which
operations are carried out. Indeed, the IDF's traditional emphasis
on directive control gives subordinates right down the chain of
command the greatest possible freedom of action.52
In combat operations, the criteria for judging
whether or not the goal has been obtained are often relatively unambiguous-"conquer
the objective and stop enemy troops fromadvancing. However, [in
operations other than war], it is often very difficult to understand
what constitutes mission success."53
This is particularly the case when hostilities continue during diplomatic
talks, negotiations, and even after interim agreements, as was the
case for the IDF during the whole Oslo era and during the first
Israeli-Palestinian Hudna (cease-fire) between the months of September
and October 2003.
Rules of Engagement
A soldier's certainty about his role in a combat
situation is also crucial in maintaining high combat motivation.
Such a role is normally outlined during pre-operation briefings
and by clear, albeit flexible, rules of engagement (ROE). To be
sure, such rules must be flexible enough to allow for tactical improvization
during military operations, particularly when soldiers have to deal
with guerrillas, terrorists, and civilians contemporaneously in
complex urban theaters.
For the Israeli soldier, such ROE have been
clear-cut and flexible enough when dealing with conventional forces
and tactics. Due to the sensitive nature in carrying out military
and other security-related operations in urban theaters and the
close domestic and international scrutiny that such operations receive,
however, Israeli ROE since the start of the first Intifada have
continuously changed and often restricted the Israeli soldier from
achieving his mission goals. Thus, not giving soldiers sufficient
personal control to accomplish their mission has negatively affected
their combat motivation on numerous occasions. As another writer
has noted, "restricting personal control psychologically disengages
soldiers from the mission, resulting in soldiers not feeling pride
in their work."54
Despite such limitations, the professionalism
and improvization of IDF officers and their unit members have often
helped limit the erosive effects of restrictive and sometimes shifting
rules of engagement. As one reserve infantry company commander pointed
out when asked about the difficulty of operating in civilian-populated
areas under shifting ROE, "I consider myself a professional
officer and I do what I do from a professional point of view. I
have no other considerations. . . . You deal with the situation
as it is and if you are trained and you have common sense then you
know how to deal with it."55
Self-Confidence
A soldier's role and self-confidence are both
developed through the extensive training he or she is put through,
as well as the combat experience gained through battles or military
operations, which in the Israeli soldier's case has been a life-long
and extensive endeavor. Training is a key ingredient to increasing
or maintaining the soldier's combat morale both at the individual
and unit levels, because it is in training that unit cohesion is
built before combat troops go on any military operation. Indeed,
as S. L. A. Marshall noted, the "tactical unity of men working
in combat will be in the ratio of their knowledge and sympathetic
understanding of one another."56
Extensive training also averts the soldier
from losing control of his martial faculties and duties when the
extensive chaos created by the fog of war ensues, because "training
is habituation" and he can, thus, execute "by rote . .
. under stresses of shot and shell, confusion, uncertainty and the
infectious fear of his comrades."57
He basically will have developed during training the necessary combat
skill to make the kill. However, no matter how much energy is put
into training the soldier, if he is not adequately motivated, the
outcome will constantly be low combat performance, because ultimately
"performance equals knowledge times motivation."58
Building Cohesion is Today's Task
The nature of warfare is changing dramatically,
especially in terms of its actual duration-that is, it is becoming
shorter and shorter. Consequently it very important that unit cohesion
is created in advance. Short spurts of low-intensity operations
simply do not have the same coalescing effect as prolonged or even
relatively brief high-intensity conflicts. Nonetheless, peacetime
cohesion is not just cultivated in training alone. As revealed in
a recent study of US combat soldiers in Iraq, "Much of the
cohesion in units is developed simply because there is nothing else
to do except talk."59 It is essential
to form in peacetime the friendship ties crucial in time of war,
because "in high-performance units, leaders and followers are
friends off duty as well as on."60
Thus, for example, it is easy to understand that the motivation
behind Staff Sergeant Sean Sachs' and his friend's decision to join
the Nahal Infantry Brigade was that "we all wanted to go there,
because our friends were there. . . . That's why we all volunteered;
we asked to be in that unit."61
Training needs are becoming more difficult
to satisfy for reservist-intensive armies, such as the IDF, which
train one month a year, if at all. This is because the technical
and interpersonal skills needed by the 21st-century soldier to carry
out sub-conventional military operations in urban or other smaller
civilian scenarios are much greater. And unless reservists are thoroughly
trained, not only will they lack the necessary military skills to
tackle such scenarios, they also will lack the necessary cohesion,
which is so vital when coming to grips with the moral dilemmas of
operating in civilian settings.
Because of extensive budget cuts and the concurrent
growing need for reservists and regular soldiers in carrying out
military operations as well as tedious garrison duties, training
has dramatically diminished in most IDF combat units since the beginning
of the al-Aqsa Intifada. For example, such budget cuts have reduced
the time set aside to train an IDF recruit to qualify as an infantry
soldier from 14 to 10 months, whereas the course training for elite
units has been shortened to just one year, instead of the one and
a half or two years it traditionally took. The effects on unit cohesion
and individual morale are not yet known.62
Despite such reduced training opportunities,
and regardless of the reduced threat of conventional warfare, it
remains important to heed Ardant du Picq's warnings on the need
to maintain cohesion even during times of relative quiet: "A
wise organization ensures that the personnel of combat groups changes
as little as possible, so that comrades in peace time manoeuvres
shall be comrades in war."63
NOTES
The author would like to thank Professor Lawrence
Freedman and additional reviewers for their helpful comments.
1. Frederick J. Manning,
"Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps," in Handbook of
Military Psychology, ed. Reuven Gal and David A. Mangelsdorff (Chichester,
Eng.: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), pp. 453-54.
2. Reuven Gal, A Portrait
of the Israeli Soldier (London: Greenwood, 1986), p. 151.
3. Nora K. Stewart,
"Military Cohesion," in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford,
Eng.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), p. 148.
4. Daniel E. Liddell,
"Operational Art and the Influence of Will," Marine Corps
Gazette, February 1998, p. 52.
5. Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 75.
6. Robert L. Maginnis,
"Combat Motivation," Infantry, May-June 1985, p. 15.
7. Brian R. Reinwald,
"Retaining the Moral Element of War," Military Review,
58 (January-February 1988), 69.
8. Ardant du Picq, "Battle
Studies," in Roots of Strategy: Book II, ed. John N. Greely
and Robert C. Cotton (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1989), p.
135.
9. William J. Harkins,
"Honing All Marines' Psychological Edge for Combat," Marine
Corps Gazette, October 1999, p. 27.
10. Manning, "Morale,"
p. 455.
11. See: Reuven Gal,
"Unit Morale: From a Theoretical Puzzle to an Empirical Illustration
- An Israeli Example," Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
Vol. 6, No. 6 (1986), p. 550.
12. Manning, "Morale,"
p. 454.
13. William D. Henderson,
Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat (Washington: National Defense
Univ. Press, 1985), p. 4.
14. Gal, A Portrait,
p. 235.
15. John Keegan and
Richard Holmes, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle (London: Sphere
Books, 1985), p. 42.
16. Ibid., p. 43.
17. See IDF Spokesperson's
Unit, www.idf.il/english/doctrine/doctrine.stm.
18. Gal, A Portrait,
p. 235.
19. William L. Hauser,
"The Will to Fight" in Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion,
Stress, and the Volunteer Military, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (London:
Sage, 1980), p. 190.
20. See Roy F. Baumeister
and Mark R. Leary, "The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal
Attachments as A Fundamental Human Motivation," Psychology
Bulletin, 117 (No. 3, 1985), 497-529.
21. Eyal Ben-Ari,
"Masks and Soldiering: The Israeli Army and the Palestinian
Uprising," in The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society,
ed. Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari (Albany: State Univ. of New
York Press, 1999), p. 172.
22. Anthony Kellett,
Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle (London: Kluwer
Publishing, 1984), p. 250.
23. Soldiers' Rights
Commissioner, IDF Spokesperson's Unit, "The Human Being's Human
Doctrine," http://www.idf.il/english/organization/nakhal/kavod.stm.
24. Gal, "Unit
Morale," p. 558.
25. Donald M. Bradshaw,
"Combat Stress Casualties: A Commander's Influence," Military
Review, 75 (July-August 1995), 20.
26. IDF Spokesperson's
Unit, "Only the Daring and Brave Lead the IDF," http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/0429-2.stm.
27. See Gal, "Unit
Morale," p. 560.
28. Leonard Wong et
al., Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in The Iraq War (Carlisle,
Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003),
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/whyfight/whyfight.pdf,
pp. 24, 28.
29. Ibid., p. 24.
30. "IDF Plans
to Slash Personnel by 20 Percent," Ha'aretz, 8 June 2003.
31. See Aryeh Bender,
"Career Soldiers Don't Want to be Discharged-Because of the
Economy," Maariv, 25 March 2003.
32. See Frederick
J. Manning et al., "An Investigation into the Value of Unit
Cohesion in Peacetime" in Contemporary Studies in Combat Psychiatry,
ed. Gregory Belenky (London: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 49.
33. Stewart, p. 147.
34. See "Half
of the Soldiers Haven't Protection," Ha'aretz, 1 October 2003.
35. Clark Brown, "Cohesion,"
Infantry, March-April 1982, p. 10.
36. Daniel F. Sullivan,
"The Platoon Leader: Keys to Success," Infantry, May-June
1989, p. 14.
37. Arieh O'Sullivan,
"Army Warns Cuts Have Harmed Training," The Jerusalem
Post, 2 October 2003.
38. For an account
of recent IDF negligent training practices, see "Three Soldiers
Wounded in Training Exercise Near Hebron," The Jerusalem Post,
20 February 2004; "Elite IDF Officers Charged with Causing
Soldier's Death by Negligence," Maariv, 1 March 2004; and "Two
IDF Officers Dismissed Over Fatal Accident," Ha'aretz, 15 March
2004.
39. "Combat stress
reaction is a condition in which soldiers are unable to perform
their duty because of extreme situational psychological disturbance,"
as quoted in Zahava Solomon et al., "Effects of Social Support
and Battle Intensity on Loneliness and Breakdown During Combat,"
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51 (December 1986),
1269, 1273.
40. Henderson, p.
23.
41. Gal, A Portrait,
p. 154. For an account of battle stress and combat reactions see
also pp. 207-30.
42. Gregory Belenky
et al., "Battle Stress, Morale, Cohesion, Combat Effectiveness,
Heroism and Psychiatric Casualties: The Israeli Experience,"
in Contemporary Studies in Combat Psychiatry, ed. Gregory Belenky
(London: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 15.
43. Eyal Ben-Ari,
Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli
Military Unit (Oxford, Eng.: Berghahn Books, 1998), p. 98.
44. Ibid., p. 98.
45. See my chapter,
"The Israeli Defense Forces' Strategic and Tactical Adaptation
to Intercommunal Warfare and Its Effects on Troop Morale,"
in Perspectives on War: New Views on Historical and Contemporary
Security Issues, ed. David J. Bercuson and Rob Huebert (Calgary,
Canada: Society for Military and Strategic Studies, 2003).
46. Henderson, p.
17.
47. Robert J. Rielly,
"Confronting the Tiger: Small Unit Cohesion in Battle,"
Military Review, 80 (November-December 2000), 63.
48. Mark H. Gerner,
"Leadership at the Operational Level," Military Review,
67 (June 1987), 30.
49. S. L. A. Marshall,
Men Against Fire (New York: William Morrow, 1947), p. 161.
50. Staff Sergeant
(Res.) Amos Harel (Defense Correspondent, Ha'aretz), interview with
the author, Tel Aviv, 22 June 2003.
51. Manning, "Morale,"
p. 460.
52. For a detailed
account of the concept of "directive control" or "mission-oriented"
control see Richard E. Simpkin, "Command from the Bottom,"
Infantry (March-April 1985).
53. Thomas W. Britt,
"Responsibility, Commitment and Morale," Military Review,
78 (January-February 1998), 79.
54. Ibid., p. 80.
55. Captain (Res.)
Ely Peretz (Nahal Infantry Brigade), interview with the author,
Hadera, 12 August 2003.
56. Keegan and Holmes,
p. 52.
57. Hauser, p. 189.
58. Geoffrey G. Prosch,
"Soldier Readiness: Some Thoughts on Leadership," Infantry,
November-December 1987, p. 15.
59. Wong, p. 12.
60. Paul T. Bartone
and Faris R. Kirkland, "Optimal Leadership in Small Army Units,"
in Handbook of Military Psychology, ed. Reuven Gal (Chichester,
Eng.: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), p. 406.
61. Staff Sergeant
(Res.) Sean Sachs (Nahal 50 Infantry Brigade), interview by the
author, Tel Aviv, 11 August 2003.
62. See Amos Harel,
"IDF Cuts Infantry Basic Training from 14 to 10 Months,"
Ha'aretz, 30 October 2002.
63. Andrew T. Home, "Unit
Cohesion?" Marine Corps Gazette, February 2001, p. 45.
Also available online at:
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