ADM FARGO: Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and distinguished
members of the Committee,
Thank you for this opportunity to address U.S. Pacific
Command planning to strengthen our global and theater defense posture. Let me
add first my thanks for your outstanding support of our men and women in the Armed
Forces.
Two and a half years ago, I testified before this committee on our
priorities for the Pacific Command. Two of these; "reinforcing the constants
in Asia-Pacific security" and "promoting the change necessary for improving
our defense posture" are key to our larger Global strategy.
Together,
these priorities reinforce the foundation of regional stability - our long-standing
bilateral alliances, our friendships both old and new, and the presence of our
forward-deployed combat forces - while optimizing capabilities of Pacific Command
to tackle the challenges of the evolving security environment. The new threat
context demands profound and enduring improvements in the way we command, equip,
employ, and station our forces.
Strengthening and rebalancing our security
relationships with Japan and South Korea is vital to stability in Northeast Asia.
Each is working closely with us to secure peace and effect enduring solutions
to mutual challenges associated with basing our forces, while maintaining a strong
deterrence posture.
Our other Asian treaty allies -- Australia, Thailand,
Philippines, along with good friends such as Singapore, Malaysia, India, Indonesia,
Mongolia, and many others have also worked side-by-side with us to advance efforts
in the War on Terror.
During my service in the Pacific over the past five
years the pace of change has been stunning, certainly since the end of the Cold
War, and also since 9/11. Globalization has added a dimension of speed to nearly
every aspect of life. Crises clearly affect more people, faster.
Cyber,
biological, and terrorist threats are present along with more traditional concerns
like the Korean Peninsula, the potential for miscalculation across the Taiwan
Strait or in Kashmir, and a host of transnational threats. I mentioned terrorism
but there is also proliferation and the trafficking in humans and drugs. We require
a changed approach to meet these complex security challenges.
In Asia
and the Pacific, vibrant economies, burgeoning populations, maturing democracies,
and military modernization only serve to add momentum to regional transformation
and increase the need for new security strategies.
OPERATIONALIZING
THE STRATEGY
In response to this changing environment, Pacific Command
undertook efforts -- with the direction of the Secretary and Chairman -- to "operationalize"
our National Security Strategy in the Pacific Command's area of responsibility
and in support of other combatant commands worldwide.
For U.S. Pacific
Command, those efforts include
updating plans, strengthening command and control,
increasing capabilities for immediate employment, creating new operating patterns
and concepts, improving force posture, and diversifying access and enroute logistics.
Forward
and Expeditionary ground, sea and air forces have enhanced our ability to immediately
employ tailored power on short notice and in new ways. For example, we are
.
· collocating Stryker with high-speed vessels and C-17 airlift in Hawaii
and Alaska
· deploying rotational bomber elements to Guam
·
stationing submarines in Guam
· and we have proposed homeporting an
additional Carrier Strike Group forward in the Pacific.
Optimizing these
immediately employable forces requires an appropriate footprint with more reachback,
less infrastructure, and less burden on hosts. For instance, as part of the Defense
Policy Review Initiative, we are working closely with our ally Japan to reduce
the overall number of United States troops there, remove long-standing noise and
encroachment concerns, and adjust force posture in Okinawa. As part of this process
we will mature and strengthen the US-Japan security alliance while assuring an
enduring presence of critical forward forces and warfighting capability.
In
the Future of the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance initiative, we are
consolidating our footprint into two enduring hubs south of the Han River which
leverages improved capabilities to enhance power projection, readiness, and deterrence
both on the Peninsula and regionally. The United States will also redeploy troops
from South Korea as combined forces are modernized and the Republic of Korea assumes
a greater role in its own defense.
Finally, we're looking for access and
logistic prepositioning opportunities throughout the theater that allow us to
move forces quickly to the location of greatest need. A network of Cooperative
Security Locations (CSLs), places not bases, will provide avenues of critical
access for contingency operations, expand Special Operations Forces presence,
and continue, through our security cooperation efforts, to strengthen the capacity
of our allies and partners in the region.
CONCLUSION
I am proud
to represent the men and women of U.S. Pacific Command who work tirelessly on
behalf of our nation to put in place credible, flexible, and ready forces to secure
our national interests at home and abroad. I thank you for the opportunity to
testify today, and I look forward to your questions.