

## HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF UNIT MANNING INITIATIVES

Title	Description	Reason for Failure	Remarks	Source	Expectation
Gyroscope (1955-1959) EUROPE	Rotation of entire divisions, regiments, and battalions (with family members) from stateside to FRG.	Expected results not realized, increased cost flow, combat effectiveness fluctuation too large across 3 phases (initial, mid-tour, end). Administrative burden and resource costs were high during time of major budget reductions	Most ambitious unit manning ever attempted. Morale increased, delta in effectiveness documented across 3 phases. Importance of unit cohesion as a combat multiplier learned by future leaders Thurman, Wagner and Foss	Trefry/ Elton	Increase in morale, combat effectiveness with decrease in support and facility costs and provide mass movement experiences
OVUREP (1961-1962) KOREA	Rotation of combat units (without family members) to Korea for one year timeframes	Berlin Crisis ('62) - could not handle contingencies. Test program rushed without implementation of plans and policies needed for success. Focus was on rotation - not cohesion.	7 Brigade Groups deployed, all expectations met, draft supported, 12 month tour, "combat zone". Extremely successful compared to individual replacements. Departure from Gyroscope - no family members moved and units were smaller. Achieved degree of cohesion and bonding despite policies	Trefry/ Elton	Support Korea with lower turbulence, lower transportation costs while increasing morale and esprit. Leverage two-year tours of selective service personnel.
Long Thrust (1962-1963) EUROPE	Test of strategic mobility (3 Bdes) to Europe - 3 month TDY, no family members	Increased costs, reduced readiness of units	Completed 7 exercises	Trefry	
ROTAPLAN (1962-1963) EUROPE	Rotation of battle groups from CONUS to Europe, without dependents, for a six month tour	Personnel turbulence, decreased readiness, did not achieve reduced B-P deficits actually increased and increased costs. Test program rushed without implementation of plans and policies needed for success. Focus was on rotation - not cohesion.	Congress directed, no dependents, 3 Brigade Group per rotation (2Yr) 1-Berlin, 1-trng, 1-CONUS. Achieved degree of cohesion and bonding despite policies	Trefry/ Elton	Reduce dependents overseas, reduce gold flow (US citizens abroad), increase combat readiness, reduce turnover and turbulence, increase training proficiency and reduce B-P deficits
UN rotation plan (1974) Brigade 75-76	Exercise AF - Army joint mobility & POMCUS; show support for NATO, tie US Div to Europe	Increased cost, decreased Europe total readiness, MACOM pressure	FORSCOM, Europe, CSA against it, Approved by SECDEF after CSA death (1974). 1 example reassigned 3081 EM to deploy 2742 in Bde	Trefry	
Cohesive Unit Program (CUP) 1982	Platoon level program started by GEN Shoemaker at FORSCOM.		CUP proved successful - easily handled by all Theaters and by FORSCOM - Led to Company COHORT; if platoons were good, then companies and battalions must be better	Elton	
Regimental Concept (1982)	Career long affiliation recurring battalion level assignments CONUS & OCONUS	Never fully implemented or evaluated		Thurman	
Company Replacement Model (18/18) (Project COHORT) (1981) EUROPE	Unit formed in FORSCOM, trained for 18 months then group moved to Europe with families for 18 months then disestablished	Unsupportable in USAREUR as cycles for individual tour length and OCONUS life cycle did not coincide, local installations could not absorb residual soldiers, higher intra-CONUS turbulence	Terminated due to unsupportable	Thurman	
Company Replacement Model (24/12) (Project COHORT) KOREA	Unit formed in WESTCOM or FORSCOM for 24 months then deploys to Korea for 12	Sustainable, but EUSA, FORSCOM and WESTCOM all expressed different reservations.		Thurman	

Battalion Rotation Model (36/36) (1984-1986)	Units are linked in CONUS-OCONUS pairs on same cycle. Each unit spends 3 yrs in MACOM and rotates at mid-point in unit's tour	Field evaluation and chain of command indicated model unacceptable to USAREUR as local installations and communities could not accept impacts of rotating battalions		Thurman	
Traditional Non-deploying Battalion Model (36mo)	Unit has fixed 3 yr cycle with soldiers and leaders stabilized for full time. Annual "top off" for unprogrammed attrition. Unit forms, trains, disestablishes at same location	Total of 27 battalions established on this model (18 activated, 9 converted) to facilitate change of infantry forces to ID(L) design	COHORT concept seems to operate most effectively when entire division is COHORT. Not fully evaluated	Thurman	
Sustained COHORT Model (PRS4) 1986	Similar to non-deploying model with a continuous lifecycle in which assignment windows every 4 months, everyone only stabilized between windows	Implemented in 1986 following termination of Battalion Rotation Model - 141 companies on this model with 177 projected at time of report. Not evaluated or analyzed	WRAIR assessment is that 4 month stability will not provide enhanced cohesion	Thurman	
Sustained COHORT Model (PRS12)	Similar to non-deploying model with a continuous lifecycle in which assignment windows every 12 months, everyone stabilized between windows	Not intended for fielding, was applied to the 7th and 10th ID(L) as a compromise. Currently 60 companies on the model and 88 projected at time of report. Not evaluated or analyzed	12 month stability is minimum acceptable to WRAIR to provide enhanced cohesion	Thurman	