GTRI Partners Conference Opening Keynote Address

Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Energy Secretary Abraham

On behalf of Director Rumyantsev, and the Russian and American governments, allow me to welcome all of you to Vienna this week for the inaugural Global Threat Reduction Initiative Partners Conference.

Before going any further, I would first like to offer to Director Rumyantsev, to the Russian delegation, and to the Russian people, profound condolences from the United States over the tragedies in recent weeks in Beslan, in Moscow, and in the Russian skies.

As with September 11, 2001, in my country … as with the atrocities in Bali in 2002 … as with the bombing of the railcars in Madrid … as with the bombing of the Australian Embassy last week in Jakarta … the barbaric acts witnessed recently in Russia place in stark relief the challenge faced by every civilized nation on the planet.

They make clear that the challenge we face in the 21^st century, which we will discuss at this forum and at the IAEA General Conference, is not just a challenge related to securing dangerous materials.

That, I would submit, is too abstract a concept.

Rather, the challenge that confronts us is directed at thwarting the aims of senseless killers, killers always searching for more treacherous means to sow terror and death.

Let us keep that in mind as we go about our business in the coming days, and in the coming weeks and months when we go back to our respective countries to implement methods and strategies that we discuss here in Vienna.

Yesterday marked the third anniversary of my address to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the week following the horrors of 9/11.

Reflecting on the tragedy that had befallen my nation, I told the delegates that our nonproliferation work “will become much more important as we move into the 21^st century.”

I said that our collective role in preventing the spread of dangerous nuclear materials, providing physical security over these materials, verifying the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, advancing science, and monitoring technology transfer – each of these functions would become more central to international security in the days and years ahead.

Let me assure everyone here that the United States of America is more firmly committed than ever to these ideals.

During President Bush’s tenure in office, we have taken significant steps to demonstrate the seriousness of our commitment, actions which have intensified and accelerated vital nonproliferation efforts.

• To reduce stockpiles and available quantities of nuclear materials, we have worked closely with Russia to irreversibly blend-down at least 500 metric tons of its surplus high enriched uranium (HEU).   By the end of June, more than 216 metric tons had been eliminated.
• We have accelerated our efforts to secure 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material in Russia. To date, we have upgraded security on over 43 percent of this material. By accelerating the speed at which we are doing this, we are now on track to finish securing Russia’s weapons-usable material two years earlier than previously planned.
• We have accelerated our work with the Russian Navy to secure its fuel and nuclear warhead sites, and all these sites will be secured by the end of 2006. We also began a new program with Russia to upgrade security for its Strategic Rocket Forces sites. By the end of this year we will have secured two sites, and are working to secure the remaining 15 by the end of 2008.
• We have worked to further reduce quantities of weapons-usable HEU by converting research reactors in the United States and other nations to use low-enriched uranium (LEU), and we are working to eliminate 174 metric tons of HEU in the United States.
• We have worked proactively and cooperatively with Libya, the IAEA, and international partners to dismantle Libya’s weapons of mass destruction infrastructure.
• We have coordinated with our counterparts in Moscow to return Russian-origin HEU fuel to Russia. In 2003, in cooperation with the IAEA and with Minatom, we removed 17 kilograms of Russian-origin fresh HEU from Bulgaria and returned it to Russia for safe storage.
• We also have returned to Russia approximately 14 kilograms of fresh Russian-origin HEU from Romania to be down-blended and used for civil nuclear purposes; 48 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU from a research reactor near Belgrade, Serbia; and 17 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU from Libya’s research reactor.
• Under the U.S.-origin spent fuel return program, we have returned 1,179 kilograms of HEU spent fuel to the United States for final disposition.
• And, working with the IAEA, Russia, and many of the countries represented here today, we have developed a comprehensive international effort to improve the security and controls of high-risk radiological materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty bomb.”

These efforts have been highly successful. They have made the world safer. Every instance in which we have worked to secure and remove dangerous materials has meant less opportunity for terrorists to acquire them.

But as successful as such efforts have been, over the last several years it became apparent to us that we could – that we must – do even more.

Given the constantly evolving threat environment … given the resolve of terrorists constantly thinking up new ways to do the unthinkable … given the need to focus not just on rogue nations but on shadowy, stateless networks … it is clear that we must find ways to further improve, further enhance, and further accelerate our nonproliferation work.

So in May of this year, in this city, I introduced President Bush’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative and proposed this Partners Conference.

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative contains new measures to provide international support for countries’ national programs to identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the disposition of vulnerable nuclear and other radiological materials and equipment around the world – as quickly and expeditiously as possible – that pose a threat to the international community.

We are doing this because we are dedicated to securing dangerous, unsecured materials, and because we are equally dedicated to ensuring the continued peaceful use of nuclear power.

In the intervening four months since we introduced this plan, the response from nations all around the world has been immensely gratifying.

Some of you have contacted us to get more information.

Others have contacted us to lend varying levels of support.

Still others have let us know that, like us, they are intensifying efforts in their own nations to secure and remove materials that terrorists might seek.

The large numbers gathered for this first Partners Conference indicate a clear desire to work together and to speed up international nonproliferation efforts.

We believe GTRI can do that.

There are four elements that comprise this Initiative.

First, we will work in partnership to repatriate all Russian-origin fresh HEU fuel by the end of next year. We will also work with Russia to accelerate and complete the repatriation of all Russian-origin spent fuel by 2010. 

Second, we will likewise take all steps necessary to accelerate and complete the repatriation of all U.S.-origin research reactor spent fuel under our existing program from locations around the world within a decade.

Our aim is to undertake these on a priority basis, with priority given to cases involving the greatest security threats and situations in which diplomatic and cooperative opportunities present themselves.

And third, we will work to convert the cores of targeted civilian research reactors that use HEU to use low enriched uranium fuel instead.

We will do this not just in the United States, but throughout the entire world.

Indeed, let me stress that we are not urging nations to take up any work – whether securing materials or converting reactor cores – that we are not committed to doing at home in the United States.

These steps I have just laid out acknowledge the massive amount of work ahead of us. We face a great challenge, but not too great for those with the will and commitment to succeed.

The accelerated pace at which we have labored the past few years demonstrates we have that will and that commitment.

Before 9/11 the deadlines for this work stretched far, far into the future. But our Administration and the Russian Federation have moved those targets significantly closer. The progress of our efforts on a variety of fronts is now being measured in months, not decades.

In every one of the programs I have just mentioned, we are committed to working as fast as possible within the boundaries of technological, scientific, and diplomatic feasibility – meaning the overwhelming majority of these projects will be completed before this decade is out.

As for those that won’t be completed within the next four or five years, the reason is not lack of political will. Rather it’s because our scientists and engineers are still working to develop the technological means to accomplish them, as with several of the nuclear reactor core conversions we plan.

Or, alternatively, it is because certain cases involve more complex circumstances that require a broader international focus, which is one of the main reasons we developed GTRI. 

Indeed, the accelerated pace we have brought to all of our nonproliferation activities has quickened since we introduced the GTRI in May. In that time, we have taken a number of critical steps toward accomplishing the goals of GTRI’s first three legs.

• On May 27 – just one day after GTRI was launched – Director Rumyantsev and I signed a Government-to-Government Agreement on the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return program.  Under this Agreement, more than a dozen countries are eligible to receive financial and technical assistance from the United States and others to ship their fresh and spent research reactor fuel to Russia for safe and secure management.
• On June 14, the Department of Energy officially established within the National Nuclear Security Administration the Office of Global Threat Reduction to consolidate existing programs and focus exclusively on implementing this initiative.
• On July 19, the United States and Romania signed an implementing agreement to facilitate the return of spent HEU fuel to Russia.
• On August 5, we worked with Germany to return U.S.-origin material from three research reactors in Germany to the United States. This shipment included 126 spent nuclear fuel assemblies of U.S.-origin.   The material included highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium and took place in the framework of the U.S. Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program.   This material has now been removed from international civilian commerce and I commend Germany for its efforts under this program. 
• And most recently, on the 9th of this month, weapons-usable fresh highly enriched uranium from Uzbekistan was repatriated to Russia. In addition, we are working with Uzbekistan to implement the first pilot shipment of spent HEU fuel to Russia, which we expect to take place in early 2005.  We applaud the leadership role that the Government of Uzbekistan has taken under this initiative.

Each of these accomplishments reflects a serious desire, on the part of many nations, to counter the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.

But that threat is changing, evolving. To counter it will require a reaffirmation of our international commitment. Moreover, we must take concrete steps to re-evaluate and improve existing programs in order to identify and address the gaps in our layered approach.

Which leads me to the fourth and final leg of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative: working to identify and secure other nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment not yet covered by existing threat reduction efforts.

The first task we must undertake involves creating an official inventory of high risk materials worldwide, which includes, but is not limited to, material located at enrichment plants, conversion facilities, reprocessing plants, research reactor sites, fuel fabrication plants, and temporary storage facilities. It also includes the kinds of materials that could be used in an RDD.

This fourth element is absolutely critical to this concept of GTRI, because it is, arguably, the most challenging aspect of the Initiative.

The challenge of this portion of GTRI lies in the fact it is so open-ended. It requires us to think creatively, to predict the unforeseen, and to stay several steps ahead of a determined and imaginative enemy.

And it requires much greater international participation.

We have been working in this vein to address the challenge of RDDs, starting with our conference in March 2003. That conference and its aftermath have been very successful, as we have witnessed in recent months in Greece, Lithuania, Estonia, and Moldova.

But the remaining areas, as I noted in May, require the same kind of focus.

That means greater international collaboration, finding ways to enhance existing work in all of our countries, and discussing future activities.

It means breaking new ground on the diplomatic front, and coordinating activities in regions all over the world.

It means sharing the latest technological and scientific expertise.

And it means joining together to co-finance these activities.

For our part, I am pleased to announce that the U.S. Department of Energy will contribute 3 million dollars to the International Atomic Energy Agency to help implement GTRI.   This contribution will support important technical cooperation efforts under GTRI.

We are pleased that other member states are committing resources to enhance security over nuclear and other radioactive materials. The Australian Government recently established a new program to secure radioactive sources in the Asia Pacific Region and committed approximately 3.1 million dollars (American) to this effort. 

We welcome this important financial commitment by Australia and encourage other countries to make similar commitments to the extent possible.

CONCLUSION

Fifty years ago President Eisenhower laid out the vision of Atoms for Peace, a vision the civilized world has successfully embraced for a half century. We come together at this time each year to affirm our commitment to the peaceful uses of the atom in energy, medicine, agriculture, industry, and basic research.

But we also come because we understand we must shoulder the special responsibilities that the peaceful use of nuclear power entails.

In these first few years of a new millennium, confronted with the specter of global terrorism, it is clear that each of us shares an obligation to work together to reduce the threat of a nuclear or radiological attack.

After all, each of us has a stake in this outcome. And so, each of us shares an obligation to address this challenge on an urgent, accelerated basis. The events of September 11^th … of Bali … Madrid … Beslan … and elsewhere have shown us that time is of the essence.

I have challenged the people in our own Department – and I challenge everyone here – not just to take up this important cause, but to take it up with the real commitment to accomplishing it, to doing the hard work, to getting it done sooner rather than later.

With the stakes as high as they are, every day lost is a precious day. Every day we put off acting is one more day of opportunity for those working non-stop to inflict grave damage on our countries and our citizens.

So I hope that we will not only emerge from this conference with a clear pathway forward and with a broad commitment to the goals of GTRI, but also with a common agreement that the goals mean little if we don’t pursue them with a proper urgency.

The great British historian Arnold Toynbee remarked that civilizations “come to birth and proceed to grow by successfully responding to successive challenges.” But, he noted, “They break down and go to pieces if and when a challenge confronts them which they fail to meet.”

The current crisis in which we find ourselves embroiled is, indeed, the latest test of civilization.

On one side are those whose aim is little more than destruction, death, suffering, and barbarism.

On the other side stand all of us – the guardians of progress, modernity, peace, hope, and civilization.

When tested throughout the 20^th century, the civilized world responded with distinction.

In the graveyard of history lie the corpses of fascism, Nazism, and Soviet totalitarianism – testament not just to these ideologies’ own failures, but to the fact that committed men and women around the world stood down the threats they posed.

The question before us in the 21^st century is whether we, the present-day custodians of civilization, will respond in like fashion.

I am confident that we can, and that we will.

The participation of so many at this conference, the willingness to take up the task, instead of leaving it to others, and the determination of so many to take the necessary action, give every indication that we will indeed meet this first great challenge of the 21^st century.

Because of the steps we choose to take – together, in partnership – I know that we will secure the blessings of civilization for generations to come.

Media contact:  Jeanne Lopatto, 202/586-4940