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Funding OpportunitiesCorporate Environmental Behavior and the Effectiveness of Government Interventions FY 2004 Science to Achieve Results (STAR) Program Opening Date: November 5, 2003 Technical Contact: Matthew Clark, 202-343-9807, clark.matthew@epa.gov Introduction SUMMARY OF PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS Program Title: Corporate Environmental Behavior and the Effectiveness of Government Interventions Synopsis of Program: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Research and Development, National Center for Environmental Research (NCER), announces the fourth annual extramural grants competition supporting research in the area of Corporate Environmental Behavior (CEB). The solicitation will focus on research to understand the decision making behavior of regulated entities in order to comply or avoid compliance with regulations, and improving the understanding of how regulated and non-regulated entities consider environmental costs. Contact Persons: Matthew Clark, 202-343-9807, clark.matthew@epa.gov Applicable Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) Number(s): 66.509 Eligibility Information: Award Information: Sorting Code(s): Deadline/Target Dates: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Research and Development, National Center for Environmental Research (NCER), announces the fourth grants competition supporting research in the area of Corporate Environmental Behavior (CEB) [Note: In this RFA, “Corporate” refers broadly to all regulated or potentially regulated entities, whether private, public or individuals]. The solicitation will focus on research to understand the decision making behavior of regulated entities in order to comply or avoid compliance with regulations, and improving the understanding of how regulated and non-regulated entities consider environmental costs. Note to prospective researchers: EPA has supported
similar socioeconomic research in FY 2000, 2001 and 2002 through
the Corporate Environmental
Performance and
Effectiveness of Government Interventions, and Market Mechanisms and Incentives
solicitations, and in prior years through the EPA/NSF joint program on Decision-making
and Valuation for Environmental Policy. This year, subject to available funding,
in addition to this solicitation, EPA is also advertising several economics
and decision sciences solicitations addressing: valuation of health and ecological
benefits; and market mechanisms and incentives. Information on announcements
made in these competitions may be found on the Internet at: http://www.epa.gov/ncer/rfa/.
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has sponsored similar competitions
with respect to compliance with other areas of the law. Information on NIJ
competitions may be found on the Internet through: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/funding.htm The following are definitions of some of the terms used in this solicitation, which are intended only to clarify the present use of these terms.
Various authors have noted the importance of a number of motivators of corporate environmental behavior, including costs, firm profitability, corporate or industry culture, geography, competitive environment, technological capability, and government interventions. However, motivations are not the same for all firms and facilities that generate or discharge pollutants into the Nation’s water, land, and air. Fundamental behavioral, economic, management science, legal, and other social science research is needed to better understand how different individual operators, companies, and facilities respond to various influences and combinations of influences, including governmental interventions. RESEARCH QUESTIONS OF INTEREST For this year’s CEB solicitation, EPA is interested in supporting theoretical and empirical (media-specific or cross-media) research that: (1) explains regulated and non-regulated entities’ environmental decision-making, behavior and related performance in response to local, state, tribal or federal environmental regulations or policies; (2) investigates the concepts of “environmental” costs among different regulated or non-regulated entities. To be eligible for funding, empirical research must be based demonstrably on sound theoretical models or frameworks. Understanding of these issues is hampered by a lack of theoretical and empirical research on the factors determining corporate and other entities’ decision making in response to environmental regulations, initiatives or policies. Regulated (or non-regulated entities trying to avoid regulation) have a variety of options for meeting or evading public policy-induced environmental performance or behavioral targets. Some of these are relatively well understood by environmental managers and others are not. Behavior (and resulting performance) in response to environmental policy may diverge in unexpected ways from that predicted by analysts or policy-makers. This implies that a different set of incentives may be more cost-effective in achieving environmental goals than those analysts and policy-makers have considered. An important factor influencing environmental decision-making is the cost of complying with, avoiding, or evading environmental requirements. However, the notions of costs actually held by businesses, farmers, or other decision-makers may differ from those typically predicted by analysts estimating compliance costs, or academics estimating social costs. For example, most rule analyses use financial costs (capital and O&M) associated with proven technologies available to meet environmental objectives. Economists have compared these financial costs with the probabilities of being detected and having to pay fines and penalties, in order to predict how frequently compliance will take place. Others have suggested that individuals or firms (entities) affected by environmental policies may consider a much broader array of costs in making compliance decisions, such as market share, legal and regulatory transaction costs, community reputation, and consistency across facilities in different jurisdictions. Desired investigations include both theoretical research to explain
decision-making behavior and empirical research that will create data
sources and improve the
understanding of why and how environmental actors comply with regulations,
and how they perceive environmental costs. The principal topic areas: (1) regulated
(and non-regulated) entities’ environmental compliance (or avoidance)
decision-making, behavior and related; and (2) differing concepts of “environmental” costs
among different regulated or non-regulated entities and their implications
for behavior are addressed in separate sections below, although there are significant
overlaps between the two. (1) Why do regulated or non-regulated entities make the decisions they do to comply or avoid compliance with environmental mandates? Environmental scholars and analysts have developed models that predict corporate behavior, and resulting costs, in response to environmental policy initiatives. Careful observation has concluded that although these models are useful, they could be extended in a number of directions to answer some important questions. Stated simply, why do affected entities do what they do to comply or avoid environmental regulation? Are the responses systematically related to type of enterprise, management structure, size, profitability, corporate policies, etc.? The answers to these questions could inform environmental managers at all levels, and suggest improved incentives and resources allocation. Examples of related research questions include:
(2) What do "environmental costs” mean to regulated entities’ decision-makers? Regulated entities are obviously concerned with the costs of meeting environmental standards. However, how firms calculate “environmental” costs is not as obvious. Firms are also concerned with the consequences of not meeting environmental standards, including legal and monetary penalties. Some may be concerned with liability issues related to pollution damages. Other firms or facilities may reduce emissions because pollution represents a waste of resources and preventing it saves some money on production factors (reduced operations costs). Others may consider the likelihood of community pressure resulting from publication of information on plant emissions. Still others may have determined that corporate environmental stewardship pays in terms of consistent management of operations across jurisdictions and international boundaries, that is, there my be some economies of scale associated with environmentally beneficial behavior. This solicitation anticipates research that will identify how prevalent these differing concepts of environmental costs are and how significantly they affect environmental performance. Examples of related research questions include:
In summary, EPA has a particular interest in two basic research questions: (1) Why do regulated or non-regulated
entities make the decisions they do
to comply or
avoid compliance with
environmental mandates? DESIRABLE RESEARCH CHARACTERISTICS The competition encourages proposals from researchers from all legal, behavioral, social, organizational, and economic sciences. It encourages collaborations with non-social science disciplines when needed to answer social science-based questions. It supports both research conducted within a single disciplinary tradition, as well as novel, collaborative, and interdisciplinary scientific efforts. Preference will be given to research projects that result in findings that are transferable from actual experiences with existing CEB to novel situations and can be utilized for future analysis of similar research questions. The ability to generalize the research findings in order to apply the approaches or results across media types or scales of operation is highly desirable. DATABASES AND DATA QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS Several federal agencies possess large data sets with national scope that have been used to evaluate corporate environmental behavior. These datasets include: EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), Aerometric Information Reporting System, (water pollution) Permit Compliance System (PCS), Envirofacts, Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO), Online Tracking Information System (OTIS), Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis (IDEA) and others (see at: http://www.epa.gov/compliance/planning/data/multimedia/idea/datasources.html); the Bureau of Census’ Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), the Pollution Abatement Control Expenditures Survey (PACE), the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM), the Energy Information Agency’s Database, databases at the Departments of Transportation, Labor, Commerce and Treasury, and at several other agencies. These databases, alone or combined, provide unique and large sources of data for conducting empirical analyses. However, alone or in combination, they are constrained by reporting methods, temporal limitations, missing observations, privacy requirements and the legal context for which they were developed. Investigators who choose to use these databases in their research must demonstrate that they thoroughly understand the constraints and context of their chosen data sources and have developed sound analytical procedures to address these constraints, and that the data they propose to use can actually answer the questions of interest. RELATED EPA INFORMATION SOURCES Applicants are encouraged to avail themselves of information from the following sources during preparation of proposals. The CEB research effort relates to several EPA programs, including:
EPA anticipates making approximately three to five awards. The projected range is from $50,000 to $200,000 per award per year, with durations from one to three years. Field experiments, survey research, and multi-investigator projects may justify the higher funding level. Awards made through this competition will depend on the availability of funds. Requests for amounts in excess of a total of $400,000, including both direct and indirect costs, will not be considered. Institutions of higher education and not-for-profit institutions located in the U.S., and Tribal, state and local governments are eligible to apply. Profit-making firms are not eligible to receive grants from EPA under this program. National laboratories funded by federal agencies (Federally-funded Research and Development Centers, “FFRDCs”) may not apply. FFRDC employees may cooperate or collaborate with eligible applicants within the limits imposed by applicable legislation and regulations. They may participate in planning, conducting, and analyzing the research directed by the principal investigator, but may not direct projects on behalf of the applicant organization or principal investigator. The principal investigator's institution, organization, or governance may provide funds through its grant from EPA to a FFRDC for research personnel, supplies, equipment, and other expenses directly related to the research. However, salaries for permanent FFRDC employees may not be provided through this mechanism. Federal agencies may not apply. Federal employees are not eligible to serve in a principal leadership role on a grant, and may not receive salaries or in other ways augment their agency's appropriations through grants made by this program. However, federal employees may interact with grantees so long as their involvement is not essential to achieving the basic goals of the grant. EPA encourages interaction between its own laboratory scientists and grant principal investigators for the sole purpose of exchanging information in research areas of common interest that may add value to their respective research activities. This interaction must be incidental to achieving the goals of the research under a grant. Interaction that is “incidental” does not involve resource commitments. The principal investigator’s institution may enter into an agreement with a federal agency to purchase or utilize unique supplies or services unavailable in the private sector. Examples are purchase of satellite data, census data tapes, chemical reference standards, analyses, or use of instrumentation or other facilities not available elsewhere. A written justification for federal involvement must be included in the application, along with an assurance from the federal agency involved which commits it to supply the specified service. Potential applicants who are uncertain of their eligibility should contact Thomas Barnwell in NCER, phone 202-343-9862, barnwell.thomas@epa.gov STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBMITTING AN APPLICATION The Standard Instructions for Submitting a STAR Application including the necessary forms will be found on the NCER web site: http://es.epa.gov/ncer/rfa/forms/. The need for a sorting code to be used in the application
and for mailing is described in the Standard Instructions for Submitting
a STAR Application. The sorting code for applications submitted
in response to this solicitation is 2004-STAR-E1 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS: Data and Model Availability The application must include a plan to make available all data (including primary and secondary data) from observations, analyses, or model development under a grant awarded in this program in a format and with documentation such that others in the scientific community may readily use them. The data must be made available to the project officer in a standard exchange format without restriction and be accompanied by comprehensive meta-data documentation adequate for specialists and non-specialists alike to be able to understand how and where the data were obtained and to evaluate the quality of the data. Applicants who develop databases containing proprietary or restricted information should provide a strategy, not to exceed two pages, to make the data widely available, while protecting privacy or property rights. These pages are in addition to the 15 pages permitted for the project description. Further information, if needed, may be obtained from the EPA official indicated below. Email inquiries are preferred. Matthew Clark
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