Cases
that have been decided will be removed from this page at the end of the
term.
No. 03-0518/MC.
WHETHER THE
The decision of
the United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy for remand to that court for a new review
pursuant
to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §
866(c) (2000),
before a panel comprised of judges who have not previously participated
in this
case.
No. 03-0538/MC.
WHETHER THE
The decision of
the United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy for remand to that court for a new review
pursuant
to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §
866(c) (2000),
before a panel comprised of judges who have not previously participated
in this
case.
No. 03-0588/NA.
WHETHER THE
The decision of
the United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy for remand to that court for a new review
pursuant
to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §
866(c) (2000),
before a panel comprised of judges who have not previously participated
in this
case.
No. 03-0591/NA.
WHETHER THE
The decision of
the United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy for remand to that court for a new review
pursuant
to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §
866(c) (2000),
before a panel comprised of judges who have not previously participated
in this
case.
No. 04-0069/MC.
No. 04-0219/MC.
WHETHER THE
The decision of
the United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy for remand to that court for a new review
pursuant
to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §
866(c) (2000),
before a panel comprised of judges who have not previously participated
in this
case.
No. 04-0350/MC.
WHETHER THE
The decision of
the United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy for remand to that court for a new review
pursuant
to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §
866(c) (2000),
before a panel comprised of judges who have not previously participated
in this
case.
No. 04-0372/MC.
WHETHER THE
The decision of
the United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy for remand to that court for a new review
pursuant
to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §
866(c) (2000),
before a panel comprised of judges who have not previously participated
in this
case.
No. 04-0442/AF.
WHETHER
APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION FOR RECEIVING AND POSSESSING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY UNDER 18
U.S.C. §
2252A MUST BE SET ASIDE.
The decision of
the United
States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals as to Specifications 1 and 2
of the
Charge and the sentence is reversed, but is affirmed in all other
respects. The findings of guilty of
Specifications 1 and 2 of the Charge and the sentence are set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to the Court of Criminal
Appeals. That court may either dismiss
Specifications 1 and 2 of the Charge and reassess the sentence based on
the
affirmed guilty findings or order a rehearing.
CRAWFORD, Chief
Judge (dissenting): I dissent from the
order setting aside
Specifications 1 and 2 of the Charge for the reasons set forth in my
separate
opinion in United States v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450, 455
(C.A.A.F. 2003)
(Crawford, C.J., dissenting).
No. 04-0464/AF.
No. 04-0491/AR.
WHETHER THE
UNITED STATES
ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY UNDER ARTICLE
66(c),
UCMJ, BY AFFIRMING A SENTENCE THAT WAS NOT CORRECT IN LAW AND FACT AND
WAS
GREATER THAN THAT INTENDED TO BE APPROVED BY THE CONVENING AUTHORITY.
The decision of
the United
States Army Court of Criminal Appeals and the convening authority’s
action are
set aside. The record of trial is
returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for remand to a
convening authority
for a new action in light of this Court’s decision in United States
v.
Emminizer, 56 M.J. 441 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
CRAWFORD, Chief
Judge (dissenting): I dissent for the
reasons set forth in my
dissenting opinion in United States v. Lajaunie, ___ M.J. ___
(Daily
Journal July 21, 2004) (Crawford, C.J., dissenting).
No. 04-0509/AF.
The decision of
the United
States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals and the convening
authority’s action
are set aside. The record of trial is
returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to a
convening authority for a new action in light of this Court’s decision
in United
States v. Emminizer, 56 M.J. 441 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
CRAWFORD, Chief
Judge (dissenting): I dissent for the
reasons set forth in my
dissenting opinion in United States v. Lajaunie, ___ M.J. ___
(Daily
Journal July 21, 2004) (Crawford, C.J., dissenting).
APPEALS - SUMMARY
DISPOSITIONS
No. 03-0403/NA.
No. 03-0515/NA.
No. 03-0578/NA.
No. 03-0613/MC.
No. 04-0067/MC.
No. 04-0090/MC.
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 02-0065/AF.
WHETHER
PROSECUTION UNDER ARTICLE 125 VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS BY
UNFAIRLY
INFRINGING ON SERVICEMEMBERS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY.
ALSO WHETHER PROSECUTION UNDER ARTICLE 125
FOR PRIVATE CONSENSUAL NON-COMMERCIAL SODOMY VIOLATES A STATUTORILY
ESTABLISHED
ZONE OF PRIVACY WITHOUT A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST.
that had been transported in interstate commerce;
in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
that had
been
transported in interstate commerce; in violation of Title 18, United
States
Code, § 2252A(a)(2)(A).
The
decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is
affirmed
as to Charge III and its specifications as amended, as well as to the
remaining
Charges, specifications, and the sentence.
In that TECHNICAL SERGEANT
DALE P. KEYSER, United States Air Force, 93rd Maintenance Squadron,
Robins Air
Force Base, Georgia, did, at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, on or
about 16
April 1999, knowingly receive child pornography that had been
mailed,
shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means
including computer, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
§ 2252(a)(2)(A).
The
decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is
affirmed
as to the Charge and specification 1 as amended, as well as to the
sentence.
WHETHER THE FINDINGS OF
GUILTY IN THIS CASE CAN BE AFFIRMED IN LIGHT OF ASHCROFT v. FREE
SPEECH
COALITION, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
Specifications 1 and 2 of the Charge are amended to
read as follows:
In that AIRMAN FIRST CLASS
JASON PATRICK APPELDORN, United States Air Force, 90th Transportation
Squadron,
did, at or near Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, on divers
occasions
between on or about 1 July 2000 and on or about 31 August 2000,
knowingly
receive twenty-two computer images of child pornography that were
transported in interstate commerce, in violation of Title 18, United
States
Code, § 2252(a)(2)(A).
In that AIRMAN FIRST CLASS
JASON PATRICK APPELDORN, United States Air Force, 90th Transportation
Squadron,
did, at or near Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, on or about
4
January 2001, knowingly possess nineteen pages of printed computer
images of
child pornography that were transported in interstate commerce, in
violation
of Title 18, United States Code, § 2252(a)(5)(B).
WHETHER APPELLANT’S
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY UJNDER 18 U.S.C. §
2252A IS VOID
BECAUSE APPELLANT CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF POSSESSING IMAGES THAT “APPEAR
TO BE”
OR “CONVEY THE IMPRESSION OF BEING” MINORS AND BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT
DID NOT
PRESENT PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ALLEGED PERSONS
DEPICTED IN
THE IMAGES WERE ACTUAL CHILDREN.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
WHETHER
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF FACTUAL
AND
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IN LIGHT OF ITS DECISION TO REVERSE
ON AN
INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR TO THE MEMBERS.
It is
further ordered by the Court that the hearing notice dated
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 01-0786/AF.
In that Private First Class
Daniel C. Hague-Campbell, U.S. Army, Headquarters Company, United
States Army
Garrison, Ft. Wainwright, Alaska, did at Fort Wainwright, Alaska
knowingly
receive and distribute child pornography that has been mailed, or
shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce by means of a computer
on
divers occasions between 1 October 1999 and 31 March 2000 in
violation of
Title 18, United States Code, § 2252(a)(2)(A).
The
decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is
affirmed as to
Charge I and its specification as amended, as well as to the remaining
charge
and its specification and the sentence.
WHETHER THE ARMY COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING APPELLANT'S CONVICTION UNDER THE
CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 2251, et seq., DESPITE THE
SUPREME
COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENT THAT THE CPPA DEFINITION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, ASHCROFT v. FREE SPEECH COALITION, 535 U.S.
234
(2002), AND THIS COURT'S DECISION THAT ASHCROFT v. FREE SPEECH
COALITION
REQUIRES PROOF THAT ACTUAL MINORS WERE USED IN PRODUCING THE
PORNOGRAPHIC
IMAGES. See UNITED STATES v.
O'CONNOR, 58 M.J. 450 (2003).
The
decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals as to
specifications 7 and 8 of Charge II and the sentence is reversed, but
is
affirmed in all other respects.
WHETHER APPELLANT'S PLEA OF
GUILTY TO AN OFFENSE UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2252A WAS INVOLUNTARY
BECAUSE HE HAD AN
INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF THE OFFENSE WHEN THE MILITARY JUDGE
EXPLAINED THE
OFFENSE USING THE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERBROAD DEFINITIONS OF
CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY CONTAINED IN 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
Specification 9 of Charge II is amended to read as follows:
In that TECHNICAL SERGEANT
JAY C. JENSEN, United States Air Force, 319th Aircraft
Generation
Squadron, did, within the continental United States, on divers
occasions, between
on or about 20 August 1997 and on or about 2 April 2001, knowingly
possess
materials that contained an image of child pornography; that was
mailed,
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including computer, or were produced using materials mailed, shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including
computer,
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
The
decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is
affirmed
as to Charge II and Specification 9 as amended, as well as to the
remaining
charges and their specifications and the sentence.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
Thursday,
September 02, 2004
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0568/AR.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 04-0392/AF.
II. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION TO SPECIFICATIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE
CHARGE WHERE
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SUBSTANCE USED AND
DISTRIBUTED WAS
ILLEGAL.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 04-0359/AR.
I. WHETHER THE UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE
RULING OF THE MILITARY JUDGE THAT DENIED THE DEFENSE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
ANY
EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN APPELLANT AND
HIS PASTOR.
And the
following issue specified by the Court:
II. WHETHER THE
UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT
APPELLATE TEST
FOR DETERMINING MATERIALITY WITH RESPECT TO THE ERRONEOUS NONDISCLOSURE
OF
DISCOVERABLE EVIDENCE. SEE UNITED
STATES V. ROBERTS, 59 M.J. 323
(C.A.A.F. 2004).
No. 04-5002/AF.
No. 04-0178/AR.
I. WHETHER APPELLANT
WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO CONFLICT-FREE COUNSEL WHEN ALL FIVE OF HIS
COUNSEL
LABORED UNDER MENTALLY-COMPETING PERSONAL INTERESTS.
II. WHETHER APPELLANT
RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON THE MERITS WHEN HIS
COUNSEL
FAILED TO PREPARE AND EXECUTE A REASONABLE DEFENSE STRATEGY, INCLUDING
FAILURE
TO USE CRITICAL IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE, AND WHEN HIS MILITARY COUNSEL
FAILED TO
ADVISE APPELLANT THAT HE BELIEVED THAT CIVILIAN COUNSEL WAS
INCOMPETENT,
INEFFECTIVE, AND UNPROFESSIONAL.
No. 04-0480/AF.
No. 04-0433/AF.
No.
04-0291/AR.
WHETHER
THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE
MILITARY
JUDGE'S ERROR IN NOT DISCLOSING MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS OF A VICTIM DID
NOT
MATERIALLY PREJUDICE APPELLANT. SEE
UNITED STATES V. ROBERTS, 59 M.J. 323,
327
(C.A.A.F. 2004).
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR
REVIEW
No. 02-0060/MC.
APPEALS - SUMMARY
DISPOSITIONS
No. 04-0168/AF.
Appellant asserts that he is prejudiced by
the action’s irregularity because it subjects him to possible
recoupment of the
forfeitures that were paid to his wife.
Appellant cites a Defense Department regulation concerning
collection of
forfeitures that were erroneously paid. Dep’t of Defense, Directive 7000.14-R, Department of
Defense
Financial Management Regulation, at Volume 7A, chapter 48 (February
2001). The Government argues that
such recoupment is
discretionary and the possibility of any resulting prejudice is
“speculative,”
but nevertheless acknowledges that “the government has the authority to
recoup
the funds.” The Government, however,
maintains that “Appellant’s dependents,” rather than Appellant himself,
“would
be liable for any recoupment.”
We conclude that Appellant has made a
“colorable showing of possible prejudice” arising from the action’s
irregularity. See
Accordingly,
said petition is granted on the following issues:
I.
WHETHER
THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY UNDER
ARTICLE
66(c), UCMJ, BY AFFIRMING A SENTENCE THAT IT ACKNOWLEDGED WAS NOT
“TECHNICALLY”
CORRECT IN LAW AND FACT AND WAS GREATER THAN THAT INTENDED TO BE
APPROVED BY
THE CONVENING AUTHORITY.
II. WHETHER THE AIR
FORCE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED WHEN ASSESSING PREJUDICE UNDER ARTICLE 59, UCMJ,
WHERE
IT DID NOT CONSIDER PREJUDICE THAT WILL OCCUR BY OPERATION OF
REGULATION WHEN
APPELLANT RECEIVES HIS FINAL ACCOUNTING OF PAY.
That the decision of the United States Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals and the convening authority’s action
are set
aside; and,
That the record of trial
is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for remand
to a
convening authority for a new action consistent with this Court’s
decision in Emminizer.
CRAWFORD, Chief
Judge
(dissenting): Both the UCMJ and the
principle of judicial economy require me to dissent in this case. Article 60(c)(2),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(2) (2000), grants the convening authority
“sole
discretion” in deciding the appropriate action on sentences. Pursuant both to this statute and Article
58b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 858b (2000), the convening authority
permitted
Appellant’s dependents to be paid Appellant’s pay and allowances for
six months
after the action. Appellant now
complains that because the convening authority’s clemency action
contained a
technical deficiency that could theoretically work to Appellant’s
detriment
sometime in the future, he is entitled to a new action.
In agreeing, the Court not only takes an
overly technical view, but eschews a more efficient disposition,
ignores the
substantial prejudice test of Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
859(a) (2000),
and gratuitously applies an unnecessarily paternalistic standard that
will,
presumably, be applied henceforth to scrivener’s errors in the actions
of all
convening authorities.
For these
reasons, I respectfully dissent.
A. Theoretical Prejudice
The Court
is being overly technical when it requires the convening authority to
take
additional action on adjudged forfeitures before there may be a waiver
and the
payment of waived forfeitures to Appellant’s dependents.
There is no evidence that Appellant’s
dependents did not receive the waived forfeitures.
There is no prejudice to Appellant or his
family members based on the action taken in this case by the Court of
Criminal
Appeals. Even if, as Appellant alleges,
Department of Defense guidance permits recoupment of improperly waived
forfeitures from his dependents, such action is entirely speculative,
rendering
the Court’s “remedy” prospective, rather than curative.
In order for the possible prejudice alleged
by Appellant to exist, some parsimonious fiscal officer of the
government would
have to (1) scrutinize United States v. Emminizer, 56 M.J. 441
(C.A.A.F.
2002), apply it to these facts, and decide that, because the convening
authority didn’t say the magic words, the waived forfeitures were “an
erroneous
payment”;1
(2) disregard both the convening authority’s intention to
waive the mandatory forfeiture of pay and allowances . . . for the
benefit of
appellant’s dependents”;2
and (3) initiate an involuntary collection
of the “erroneous payment,” even though there was a perfectly lawful
basis for
the waived forfeitures to have been paid.
Emminizer
is not inconsistent with the view I take.
In Emminizer, the Court held that the appellant was
prejudiced
because the convening authority did not waive the adjudged forfeitures
because
of the misadvice by the staff judge advocate (SJA).
Appellant was clearly prejudiced in that case
by the SJA’s action in not spelling out the alternatives that would
have
allowed a waiver of the forfeitures and payments to the appellant’s
dependents. Here, there was no prejudice
because there was a waiver of forfeitures.
B. A Simpler Cure
Even assuming
error and prejudice, judicial economy demands that we cure the error in
our
decretal paragraph, or direct that a service court do so, rather than
burdening
SJAs and convening authorities with execution and review of new actions
to cure
trivial errors. The convening authority
plainly intended to direct payment of the full measure of Appellant’s
pay and
allowances to his dependents for six months.
To achieve that end, the convening authority could either have
disapproved or suspended adjudged forfeitures, with either action
having the
same effect today. Knowing that, and
assuming both error and prejudice, we should simply disapprove adjudged
forfeitures. We have not hesitated in
the past to cure errors arising from imposition of forfeitures pursuant
to
Article 58b, and we need not do so now.3
C. Unnecessary Legal Test
The order
unnecessarily and unwisely expands the applicability of a low threshold
test
for prejudice previously applied only to errors relating to fairness in
the
process of recommending and approving an appropriate, clement sentence. The majority’s application, without
explanation, of the “colorable showing of possible prejudice”4
test
to administrative or typographical errors in a convening authority’s
action,
ignores the Article 59(a) test that there must be error that
“materially
prejudices the substantial rights of the accused.”
The majority’s action is tantamount to
chumming for a fish that may be bigger than your boat.
-----------------------
1
DoD Financial Management Regulation, February 2001,
at Volume
7A, Chapter 48, paragraph 480105.
2
3
4
------------------------
No. 04-0113/AF.
I.
WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS
AUTHORITY UNDER ARTICLE 66(c), UCMJ, BY AFFIRMING A SENTENCE THAT IT
ACKNOWLEDGED WAS NOT "TECHNICALLY" CORRECT IN LAW AND FACT AND WAS
GREATER THAN THAT INTENDED TO BE APPROVED BY THE CONVENING AUTHORITY.
II. WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
ERRED WHEN ASSESSING
PREJUDICE UNDER ARTICLE 59, UCMJ, WHERE IT DID NOT CONSIDER PREJUDICE
THAT WILL
OCCUR BY OPERATION OF REGULATION WHEN APPELLANT RECEIVES HIS FINAL
ACCOUNTING
OF PAY.
That the decision
of the
United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals and the convening
authority’s
action are set aside; and
That the record
of trial is
returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to a
convening authority for a new action consistent with this Court’s
decision in United
States v. Emminizer, 56 M.J. 441 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
CRAWFORD, Chief
Judge
(dissenting): I dissent for the reasons
set forth in my dissenting opinion in United States v. Lajaunie,
___
M.J. ___ (C.A.A.F. 2004)(Crawford, C.J., dissenting).
No. 04-0169/AF.
I.
WHETHER
THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY UNDER
ARTICLE
66(c), UCMJ, BY AFFIRMING A SENTENCE THAT IT ACKNOWLEDGED WAS NOT
“TECHNICALLY”
CORRECT IN LAW AND FACT AND WAS GREATER THAN THAT INTENDED TO BE
APPROVED BY
THE CONVENING AUTHORITY.
II.
WHETHER
THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED WHEN ASSESSING PREJUDICE
UNDER
ARTICLE 59, UCMJ, WHERE IT DID NOT CONSIDER PREJUDICE THAT WILL OCCUR
BY
OPERATION OF REGULATION WHEN APPELLANT RECEIVES HIS FINAL ACCOUNTING OF
PAY.
That the decision of the Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals and the convening authority’s action are set aside; and
That the record of trial is returned to the
Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to a convening
authority for
a new action in light of this Court’s decision in United States v.
Emminizer,
56 M.J. 441 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
CRAWFORD, Chief
Judge
(dissenting): I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissenting
opinion in United
States v. Lajaunie, ___ M.J. ___ (C.A.A.F. 2004)(Crawford,
C. J., dissenting).
No. 04-0310/AF.
WHETHER
THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY UNDER
ARTICLE
66(c) UCMJ, BY AFFIRMING A SENTENCE THAT WAS NOT CORRECT IN LAW AND
FACT AND
WAS GREATER THAN THAT INTENDED TO BE APPROVED BY THE CONVENING
AUTHORITY.
That the decision of the Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals and the convening authority’s action are set aside; and
That the record of trial is returned to the
Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to a convening
authority for
a new action in light of this Court’s decision in United States v.
Emminizer,
56 M.J. 441 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
CRAWFORD, Chief
Judge (dissenting): I dissent for the
reasons set forth in my
dissenting opinion in United States v. Lajaunie, ___ M.J. ___
(C.A.A.F.
2004)(Crawford, C. J., dissenting).
No. 04-0311/AF.
WHETHER
THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY UNDER
ARTICLE
66(c) UCMJ, BY AFFIRMING A SENTENCE THAT WAS NOT CORRECT IN LAW AND
FACT AND
WAS GREATER THAN THAT INTENDED TO BE APPROVED BY THE CONVENING
AUTHORITY.
That the decision of the Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals and the convening authority’s action are set aside; and
That the record of trial is returned to the
Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to a convening
authority for
a new action in light of this Court’s decision in United States v.
Emminizer,
56 M.J. 441 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
CRAWFORD, Chief
Judge (dissenting): I dissent for the
reasons set forth in my
dissenting opinion in United States v. Lajaunie, ___ M.J. ___
(C.A.A.F.
2004)(Crawford, C. J., dissenting).
No. 04-0312/AF.
WHETHER
THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY UNDER
ARTICLE
66(c) UCMJ, BY AFFIRMING A SENTENCE THAT WAS NOT CORRECT IN LAW AND
FACT AND
WAS GREATER THAN THAT INTENDED TO BE APPROVED BY THE CONVENING
AUTHORITY.
That the decision of the Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals and the convening authority’s action are set aside; and
That the record of trial is returned to the
Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to a convening
authority for
a new action in light of this Court’s decision in United States v.
Emminizer,
56 M.J. 441 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
WHETHER FURTHER FACTFINDING IS NECESSARY WHERE:
(1) APPELLANT HAS
ALLEGED THAT HIS TRIAL DEFENSE
COUNSEL:
(A) DISCOURAGED
HIM FROM ENTERING INTO A PRETRIAL
AGREEMENT THAT INCLUDED A 24-MONTH CAP ON CONFINEMENT; (B) ENCOURAGED
HIM TO
INSTEAD PLEAD GUILTY WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A PRETRIAL AGREEMENT; AND
(C) GAVE
HIM A PERSONAL GUARANTEE THAT THE MILITARY JUDGE WOULD NOT IMPOSE MORE
THAN
EIGHT MONTHS OF CONFINEMENT;
(2) THE MILITARY
JUDGE SENTENCED APPELLANT TO
CONFINEMENT FOR THREE YEARS, A BAD-CONDUCT DISCHARGE, AND REDUCTION TO
PAY
GRADE E-1; AND
(3) THE CONVENING
AUTHORITY APPROVED THE SENTENCE AS
ADJUDGED.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
APPEALS - SUMMARY
DISPOSITIONS
No. 02-0593/AF. U.S. v.
Kenneth L. KNIGHT. CCA 34473. On
consideration of Appellant’s petition for
grant of review, and in light of this Court’s decision in United
States v.
O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450 (C.A.A.F. 2003), said petition is granted and
the
decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is
affirmed.
No. 02-0772/NA. U.S.
WHETHER THE
NAVY-MARINE
CORPS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY SUSTAINED APPELLANT’S
CONVICTIONS
UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2252 AS HIS PLEAS WERE IMPROVIDENT IN LIGHT OF
THE SUPREME
COURT’S RECENT HOLDING IN ASHCROFT v. FREE SPEECH COALITION.
WHETHER
THE MILITARY JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL LEGAL ERROR WHEN HE PROVIDED
AN
INCOMPLETE DEFINITION OF “CHILD PORNOGRAPHY” WHILE INSTRUCTING
APPELLANT ON THE
ELEMENTS TO THE OFFENSES AND WHETHER APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA TO
KNOWINGLY
POSSESSING AND TRANSPORTING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY MUST BE SET ASIDE.
Appellant pleaded
guilty to
violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2000), portions of which were
subsequently held to
be unconstitutional in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234
(2002). The military judge’s plea
inquiry made no reference to those portions, however, and focused
Appellant’s
attention on the portions of the statute subsequently held to be
constitutional. Appellant’s responses
were directed toward the portions of the statute subsequently held to
be
constitutional, and there is no basis in law and fact for questioning
the
providence of his guilty plea. O’Connor,
58 M.J. at 454.
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals is
affirmed.
No. 03-0255/MC.
No. 03-0465/AR. U.S.
v.
WHETHER
APPELLANT’S GUILTY
PLEA UNDER THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT CONSTITUTED A KNOWING AND
INTELLIGENT
WAIVER OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WHEN NEITHER THE APPELLANT NOR THE
MILITARY
JUDGE UNDERSTOOD WHAT BEHAVIOR WAS PROSCRIBED BY THE ACT.
No. 03-0605/NA. U.S. v. Allen
L. DOOLEY. CCA 99-1020.
On consideration of Appellant’s petition for grant of review,
and in
light of this Court’s decision in United States v. O’Connor, 58
M.J. 450
(C.A.A.F. 2003), it is ordered that said petition is granted on the
following
issue:
WHETHER THE
NAVY-MARINE
CORPS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING APPELLANT’S
CONVICTION BASED
ON OVERBROAD AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY.
The decision of
the United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the
findings
of guilty and the sentence are set aside.
The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of
the
Navy for further action consistent with this Court’s decision in United
States
v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450 (C.A.A.F. 2003)
A rehearing may be ordered.
WHETHER
APPELLANT’S PLEA OF
GUILTY TO OFFENSES UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2252A WAS IMPROVIDENT BECAUSE
HE HAD AN
INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF THE OFFENSES WHEN THE MILITARY JUDGE
EXPLAINED THE
OFFENSES USING THE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERBROAD DEFINITIONS
OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY CONTAINED IN 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
The decision of the United
States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the
findings of
guilty and the sentence are set aside.
The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of
the Air
Force for further action consistent with this Court’s decision in United
States v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450 (C.A.A.F. 2003)
A rehearing may be ordered.
CERTIFICATES FOR
REVIEW FILED
No. 98-0497/NA.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 04-0250/AR.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR
REVIEW
I.
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR APPROPRIATE RELIEF SEEKING A FULLY
COMPETENT
EXPERT CONSULTANT.
No. 04-0284/AF.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 04-0177/NA.
WHETHER THE
No. 04-0295/AR.
I. WHETHER THE
ARMY COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF
EXTRANEOUS
PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION IMPROPERLY BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE
SENTENCING
AUTHORITY AND NO BASIS FOR IMPEACHING APPELLANT'S SENTENCE UNDER
MIL.R.EVID. 606(b).
II. WHETHER THE
MILITARY
JUDGE ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE COLLATERAL ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECT OF THE
ARMY
REGIONAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES' POLICY OF GRANTING A SERVICE MEMBER
FIVE DAYS
OF CONFINEMENT CREDIT PER MONTH FOR SENTENCES WHICH INCLUDE LESS THAN
TWELVE
MONTHS OF CONFINEMENT IN ADJUDGING APPELLANT'S SENTENCE.
No. 04-0382/AF.
I. WHETHER
APPELLANT'S
ARTICLE 10, UCMJ, RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WAS WAIVED BY AN
UNCONDITIONAL GUILTY
PLEA IF THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT BRING APPELLANT TO TRIAL WITH REASONABLE
DILIGENCE, TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL LITIGATED THE MATTER AT TRIAL, AND
APPELLANT
DID NOT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 04-0217/AF.
WHETHER
APPELLANT WAS DENIED MEANINGFUL CROSS-EXAMINATION OF KEY GOVERNMENT
WITNESSES
IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT WHERE THE MILITARY JUDGE PREVENTED
TRIAL
DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM CONFRONTING THE WITNESSES WITH MATERIAL
IMPEACHMENT
EVIDENCE.
No. 04-0240/AR.
No. 04-0340/MC.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
I.
WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS IMPROPERLY CONDUCTED
ITS
APPELLATE REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE 66(C), UCMJ, BY CONSIDERING EVIDENCE
OUTSIDE THE
RECORD IN VIOLATION OF UNITED STATES v. HOLT, 58 M.J. 227
(C.A.A.F.
2003).
II.
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE IMPROPERLY DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HIS SIXTH
AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION BY ADMITTING AN ACCOMPLICE'S STATEMENTS WITHOUT
REQUIRING THAT ALL REFERNCES TO APPELLANT BE REDACTED.
III.
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION
UNDER ARTICLE 111, UCMJ, WHERE THE PROSECUTION DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE
THAT
APPELLANT PHYSICALLY CONTROLLED A VEHICLE WHILE IMPAIRED.
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR
REVIEW
No.
04-0208/AR.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0655/MC.
WHETHER
THE
No. 03-0694/AR.
I. WHETHER
APPELLANT'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO
COMPULSORY PROCESS WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE MILITARY JUDGE REFUSED TO
ORDER
PRODUCTION OF WITNESSES WHO WERE NECESSARY AND MATERIAL TO THE DEFENSE.
And the
following issue specified by the Court:
II. WHETHER THE
SPECIFICATION UNDER CHARGE I OF WHICH APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED,
CONSPIRACY TO
COMMIT UNPREMEDITATED MURDER, STATES AN OFFENSE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE
OF
MILITARY JUSTICE.
No. 04-0241/AF.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 04-0216/AF.
No.
03-0412/AF.
WHETHER APPELLANT'S GUILTY
PLEAS TO THE CHARGE AND ITS SPECIFICATION MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE HIS
PLEAS
TO POSSESSING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2252A WERE BASED
ON A
DEFINITION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY THAT HAS BEEN PARTIALLY INVALIDATED BY
THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
The decision
of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed
and the
findings of guilty and the sentence are set aside.
The record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force for further action consistent with
this Court's
decision in United States v. O'Connor, 58 M.J. 450 (C.A.A.F.
2003). A rehearing may be ordered. [See also ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
this date.]
CRAWFORD, Chief Judge (dissenting):
No.
03-0500/AR.
I. WHETHER THE FINDINGS OF GUILTY OF
SPECIFICATIONS 3, 4 AND 6 OF THE CHARGE CAN BE AFFIRMED IN LIGHT OF ASHCROFT
v. FREE SPEECH COALITION, 535
II. WHETHER THE
ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT EACH OF THE IMAGES IN QUESTION WAS A
"VISUAL DEPICTION OF A REAL MINOR ENGAGED IN SEXUALLY EXPLICIT CONDUCT
WITHIN THE MEANING OF 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A)" WHEN THERE WAS NO
FACTUAL
BASIS FOR ITS FINDING.
Regarding
Issue II, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in "find[ing]"
that any of the images at issue were visual depictions of a "real
minor" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A).
The scope of the lower court's factfinding
authority under Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 866(c), does not extend to making a "finding of fact" of that
nature in the context of a guilty plea, where no aspect of either the
plea
colloquy or the stipulation of fact is directed toward the character of
the
images as depicting "real" or "virtual" minors.
Therefore, the decision of the United States Army Court of
Criminal
Appeals is reversed as to Specifications 3, 4, and 6 of the Charge and
the
sentence, but is affirmed in all other respects. The
findings as to Specifications 3, 4, and 6
of the Charge and the sentence are set aside.
The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of
the
Army for remand to a convening authority for a rehearing on
Specifications 3,
4, and 6 of the Charge and the sentence.
If a rehearing on Specifications 3, 4, and 6 is deemed
impracticable,
the specifications may be dismissed and a rehearing on sentence alone
will be
conducted. Thereafter, Articles 66 and
67, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866 and 867, will apply.
[See also ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW this date.]
No. 04-0042/AR.
I.
WHETHER
THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S
REQUEST FOR
A NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND
I. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY
SUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE WHERE:
(1) APPELLANT HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN AN IMPROPER
RELATIONSHIP WITH A JUNIOR ENLISTED MEMBER; (2) APPELLANT ADVISED THE
JUNIOR
ENLISTED MEMBER NOT TO SPEAK WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL; (3)
ALTHOUGH NOT
ALLEGED IN THE SPECIFICATION, APPELLANT ALSO ADVISED THE JUNIOR
ENLISTED MEMBER
TO CONSULT WITH MILITARY DEFENSE COUNSEL; AND (4) ALTHOUGH NOT ALLEGED
IN THE
SPECIFICATION, APPELLANT SENT THE JUNIOR ENLISTED MEMBER $200 TO ASSIST
HER
WITH FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES.
No. 04-0191/AR.
No. 03-0582/NA.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0678/AR.
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 04-5004/AR.
I.
WHETHER THE UNITED
STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN GRANTING THIRTY-THREE
DAYS OF
CONFINEMENT CREDIT AS RELIEF UNDER THIS COURT’S DECISION IN UNITED
STATES v.
WHEELUS, 49 M.J. 283 (C.A.A.F. 1998), ABSENT A CONCESSION OR
FINDING OF
LEGAL ERROR, WHERE THE FACTS IN THE RECORD (TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL
FILINGS)
CLEARLY EVIDENCE APPELLANT’S MENDACITY, AND IN LIGHT OF THIS COURT’S
DECISION
IN UNITED STATES v. FAGAN, 59 M.J. 238 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
II.
WHETHER THE UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
ERRED IN
FAILING TO RESOLVE ALL OF APPELLANT’S CLAIMS OF UNLAWFUL PRETRIAL
PUNISHMENT
UNDER THE FIRST AND FOURTH GINN FACTORS.
III.
WHETHER THE UNITED
STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO RECONSIDER
THEIR
NOVEMBER 13, 2003 OPINION IN LIGHT OF AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY
APPELLANT’S TRIAL
DEFENSE TEAM, CAPTAIN OREN MCKNELLY AND CAPTAIN COLLEEN SWEENEY.
No. 03-0638/CG.
I.
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE IS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CHARGE OF RAPE
WHERE
THE VICTIM WAS AWAKE AND COHERENT YET TOTALLY PASSIVE, FAILED TO
REASONABLY
MANIFEST LACK OF CONSENT, AND THE ONLY
EVIDENCE OF
"FORCE" WAS MOVING HER LEG TO ACHIEVE PENETRATION.
No. 01-0738/AF.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 04-0252/AR.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 02-0938/AF.
I. WHETHER BRADY
v.
MARYLAND AND ARTICLE 46, UCMJ, REQUIRE THE GOVERNMENT TO DISCLOSE
EVIDENCE
OF A URINALYSIS “FALSE POSITIVE” FOR COCAINE WHERE APPELLANT WAS
CHARGED WITH
USE OF COCAINE; THE QUALITY CONTROL PROCESS COULD NOT DETERMINE THE
CAUSE OF
THE ERROR; THE LABORATORY MADE THE ERROR LESS THAN TWO MONTHS PRIOR TO
TESTING
APPELLANT'S SAMPLE; THE GOVERNMENT EXPERT WITNESS WORKED SUBSTANTIVELY
ON BOTH
TESTS; AND TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT EXERCISE DUE DILIGENCE IN DISCLOSING
THE
ERROR.
II. WHETHER, IN
VIEW OF THE
CONCLUSION OF THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS THAT TRIAL
DEFENSE
COUNSEL DID NOT EXERCISE REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN DISCOVERING THE
ERRONEOUS TEST
REPORT, APPELLANT WAS PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
III. WHETHER THE
MILITARY
JUDGE ERRED BY GRANTING IN PART THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION IN LIMINE. SEE UNITED STATES v. VAN HORN,
26 M.J. 434, 438 (C.M.A. 1988); AE VI; RECORD AT 66-69, 304-13.
No. 03-0645/AR.
No. 03-5004/CG.
We note
that upon remand, the Coast Guard Court purported to affirm “only so
much of
the sentence approved below as provides for a dishonorable discharge,
confinement for 19 months, with credit previously granted under United
States v. Allen, [17 M.J. 126 (C.M.A. 1984),] forfeiture of all pay
and
allowances, and reduction to paygrade E-1.” 58 M.J. at 715. While the members adjudged total forfeitures,
the convening authority limited his approval of the monetary portion of
the
sentence to “total forfeitures for 24 months.”
See Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, General
Court-Martial
Order No. 1-00 (
CRAWFORD,
Chief Judge (dissenting):
First, I dissent for
the reasons set forth
in my separate opinion in United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219,
225-28
(C.A.A.F. 2002)(Crawford, C.J., dissenting). In that dissent, I expressed my view that we
must read Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter
UCMJ],
10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2000), in conjunction with Article 59(a),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
859(a) (2000), and that such a reading indicates the improbability
that
“if Congress was asked, it would grant the authority to the Courts of
Criminal
Appeals to reduce sentences because of post-trial delay, even though an
appellant was not prejudiced.”
This Court
has affirmed the lower court’s
determination to grant Appellant sentence relief for “unexplained and
unreasonable” post-trial delay without requiring that Appellant
show
prejudice. On remand, the lower court
reduced the confinement portion of the sentence from 24 months to 19
months
otherwise approving the sentence. Thus,
I also write separately today to illustrate the danger of departing
from
statutory requirements and legal norms regarding the necessity of
demonstrating
prejudice. To that end, I ask: If we are
going to empower the lower courts to grant sentence relief for all
“unexplained
and unreasonable” delay, without regard to a showing of prejudice,
where do we
draw the line? What are the standards to determine that, first,
there has
been a “delay” in the post-trial processing of a case, and, second,
that the
delay has been “unreasonable and unexplained?”
If we leave that determination to each lower court, are we not
opening
the door to a non-uniform application across the services?
Do we apply those standards –- or any
standards –- to the appellate process as well?
The majority empowered the lower court to
grant Appellant sentence relief in the instant case based on the lower
court’s
determination that the time which elapsed between the end
of trial until the forwarding of the case for appellate review
constituted
“unexplained and unreasonable” post-trial delay.
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 04-0101/AR.
WHETHER
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED WHEN
THE MILITARY JUDGE ALLOWED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROCEED WITH A PROSECUTION
TRIGGERED BY A CONFESSION WHICH WAS UNLAWFULLY INDUCED BY A COMMANDER'S
PROMISE
THAT IF APPELLANT CONFESSED HE WOULD NOT BE COURT-MARTIALED.
No. 04-0120/AR.
WHETHER THE
MILITARY JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE FAILED TO REVIEW EACH PROVISION OF
APPELLANT’S
PRETRIAL AGREEMENT AS REQUIRED BY UNITED STATES v. GREEN, 1
M.J. 453
(C.M.A. 1976), AND UNITED STATES v. KING, 3 M.J. 458 (C.M.A.
1977).
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0613/MC.
I.
WHETHER THE MILITARY
JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
PERSONAL
E-MAIL MESSAGES THAT WERE DOWNLOADED FROM A GOVERNMENT SERVER AND HAD
BEEN SENT
TO ONE INTENDED RECIPIENT.
II.
WHETHER
SPECIFICATION 1 OF CHARGE II FAILS TO STATE AN OFFENSE BECAUSE THE
AGREEMENT OF
TWO PERSONS IS NECESSARY FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIME OF
DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA AND THERE IS NO INGREDIENT IN THE CONSPIRACY
TO
DISTRIBUTE WHICH IS NOT PRESENT IN THE COMPLETED CRIME.
III.
WHETHER THE
APPEALS – SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 02-0100/AF.
WHETHER THE
STATUTORY
LANGUAGE OF 18 U.S.C. 2252A IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD ON ITS FACE
AND AS
APPLIED TO APPELLANT.
CRAWFORD, Chief
Judge (dissenting): I dissent for the
reasons set forth in
Sections A and B of my separate opinion in United States v. O’Connor,
58
M.J. 450, 455-457 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (Crawford, C.J., dissenting).
No. 02-0257/AF.
WHETHER
APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE HIS PLEA WAS
EXPRESSLY
CONTINGENT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE DEFINITION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
CONTAINED
IN 18 U.S.C. 2256(8) WOULD BE UPHELD.
That the decision
of the
United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the
finding
of guilty and the sentence are set aside.
The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of
the Air
Force for further action consistent with this Court’s decision in United
States v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
A rehearing may be ordered.
CRAWFORD, Chief
Judge (dissenting): I dissent for the
reasons set forth in
Section B of my separate opinion in United States v. O’Connor,
58 M.J.
450, 456 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (Crawford, C.J., dissenting).
No. 02-0304/AR.
WHETHER
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF
GUILTY TO POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY UNDER THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
PREVENTION ACT MAY STAND WHEN THE MILITARY JUDGE'S DEFINITION OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY INCLUDED COMPUTER-GENERATED IMAGES, A DEFINITION THAT THE
SUPREME
COURT FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. ASHCROFT v. FREE SPEECH COALITION, 535
That the
decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is
reversed and
the finding of guilty and the sentence are set aside. The
record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Army for further action consistent with this
Court’s
decision in United States v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450 (C.A.A.F.
2003). A rehearing may be ordered.
CRAWFORD, Chief
Judge (dissenting): I dissent for the
reasons set forth in my
separate opinion in United States v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450, 455
(C.A.A.F. 2003) (Crawford, C.J., dissenting).
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 02-0617/AR.
CRAWFORD,
Chief Judge (dissenting): I dissent for
the reasons set forth in Sections A and B of my separate opinion in United
States v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450, 455-457 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (Crawford,
C.J.,
dissenting).
No. 03-0071/AF.
CRAWFORD,
Chief Judge (dissenting): I dissent for
the reasons set forth in my separate opinion in United States v.
Thompson,
57 M.J. 319 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (Crawford, C.J., dissenting), and Section A
of my
separate opinion in United States v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450, 455
(C.A.A.F. 2003) (Crawford, C.J., dissenting).
No. 01-0827/AR.
No. 04-0090/MC.
No. 04-0067/MC.
No. 04-0140/AR.
Article 66(c) provides
that a Court of
Criminal Appeals “may affirm only such findings of guilty and the
sentence or
such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and
fact and
determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved.” In our review, we observed that the lower
court’s opinion raised the possibility that the court had viewed state
court
proceedings in a separate, but related case against Appellee
as inappropriate. We further noted that
the lower court’s opinion raised the possibility that the court had
"sought to lessen the punishment from those [state court]
proceedings," as opposed to confining itself to its statutory
responsibility of "considering whether the military sentence is
inappropriate" in light of all the circumstances in the record,
including
the state court conviction. We
emphasized that the legal issue in the case was not what sentence we
would have
approved, but whether the lower court abused its discretion in
modifying the
sentence. In that context, we
"remand[ed] the case to the court below for a de novo review of
[Appellee's] military sentence under
Article
66(c)." 57 M.J.
at 234.
On remand,
the judges of the court below in various opinions speculated as to
whether our
Court had ordered that court to "clarif[y]"
its initial opinion, 58 M.J. 744, 745 (C.G. Ct. Crim.
App. 2003)(en banc); whether it was necessary, as a predicate to
conducting the
de novo review of Appellee's
sentence that we
had ordered, that the court on remand determine it had committed legal
error
during its initial review of the sentence, 58 M.J. at 746; and whether
a remand
for a de novo review requires a determination by our Court that
there
was a legal error in the case. In the
end, however, the court below conducted the required de novo
review, and
reinstated the full sentence approved by the convening authority,
including a
bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 28 months, and reduction to the
lowest
enlisted grade. 58
M.J. at 746-47.
I. whether
THIS COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
ii. WHETHER THIS COURT
HAS THE AUTHORITY
TO VACATE
III. WHETHER THIS COURT
HAS THE AUTHORITY
TO
CERTIFICATES FOR REVIEW FILED
No. 04-5002/AF. U.S. v. Mario L. CARTER. CCA 35027. The Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force, requests that action be taken with respect to the following issue:
Wednesday, December 17, 2003
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 03-0136/AR. U.S. v. Calvin N. GLOVER. CCA 9901132. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, said petition is hereby granted on the issues raised by appellate defense counsel, and the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
No. 03-0551/MC. U.S. v. Mark R. ELLIOTT. CCA 200201946. On consideration of Appellant’s petition for grant of review, and in light of the decisions of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals in United States v. Saylor, 40 M.J. 715 (N.M.C.M.R. 1994) and United States v. Perlman, 44 M.J. 615 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1996), aff’d, 48 M.J. 353 (C.A.A.F. 1997), we conclude that the convening authority’s attempt to order vacation of suspended punishment was a nullity prior to his acting to approve the sentence and ordering the suspension. Accordingly, it is ordered that the petition is granted on the following specified issue:
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 02-0060/MC. U.S. v. Anthony L. JONES. CCA 200100066. Review granted on the following issue specified by the Court:
II. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT'S VERBATIM REPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ANSWER BRIEF AS THAT COURT'S OPINION CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, NEGATES ANY APPEARANCE OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY AND SUBSTANTIALLY UNDERMINES THE INTEGRITY OF THE OPINION.
Thursday, December 04, 2003
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 03-0478/AR. U.S. v. Kenneth M. KERR. CCA 20021064. Review granted on the following issue specified by the Court:
Wednesday, December 03, 2003
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0578/NA. U.S. v. Jeffrey B. MAZER. CCA 200001655. Review granted on the following issue raised by appellate defense counsel:
Monday, December 01, 2003
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0589/AR. U.S. v. Errol P. BODIN. CCA 20000525. Review granted on the following issue:
Monday, November 24, 2003
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 02-0623/AR. U.S. v. Christopher P. MARTINELLI. CCA 20000311. Review granted on the following issue raised by appellate defense counsel:
Wednesday, November 19, 2003
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 02-0116/AF. U.S. v. Richard F. PERICAS. CCA 33825. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, said petition is hereby granted and the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
Monday, November 17, 2003
PETITIONS FOR GRANT OF REVIEW - OTHER SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 03-0139/MC. U.S. v. James L. SMITH. CCA 200100147. Appellee’s motion to remand granted.
CRAWFORD, Chief Judge (dissenting):
Rather than grant the Government’s motion to remand, I would require oral argument to address the following issues.
First, did Appellant waive the issue of improper vacation when he failed to object to the staff judge advocate’s recommendation, which was consistent with the one-step vacation procedure implemented by the convening authority (CA) in this case? See Rule for Courts-Martial [hereinafter R.C.M.] 1106(f)(6) ("Failure of counsel for the accused to comment on any matter in the recommendation in a timely manner shall waive later claim of error with regard to such matter in the absence of plain error.").
Second, did Appellant void the entire pretrial agreement when he made a false official statement prior to the CA’s action on the agreement? See United States v. Acevedo, 50 M.J. 169, 172 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (noting that a pretrial agreement is created through a bargaining process similar to that used to create a commercial contract); United States v. Koopman, 20 M.J. 106, 110 (C.M.A. 1985) (observing that an implied term of any pretrial agreement is that the parties act in good faith to achieve the agreement’s objectives).
Third, if Appellant did void the entire pretrial agreement before the CA acted, did Appellant thereby void the CA’s obligation under the agreement to suspend the sentence, and in so doing remove even the potential for vacation? See R.C.M. 705(d)(4)(B) (permitting the CA to withdraw from a pretrial agreement upon the failure of the accused to fulfill any material condition in the agreement); United States v. Perlman, 48 M.J. 353 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (summary disposition) (suggesting that a party to a pretrial agreement may "negotiate away" the normal two-step procedure for vacation); Koopman, 20 M.J. at 111 (noting that an accused who fails to act in good faith breaches the agreement and releases the government from performing its obligations thereunder)?
Finally, if the opportunity for suspension, and therefore vacation of that suspension, evaporated upon Appellant’s breach of the agreement, was the CA’s subsequent action to vacate the voided suspension meaningless, and therefore harmless? See United States v. Suzuki, 20 M.J. 248, 249-50 (C.M.A. 1985) (suggesting that meaningful relief for excess confinement should be "a []proportionate response to the errors that have been committed").
Because I would prefer oral argument to address these issues, I respectfully dissent from the grant of the Government’s motion.
Thursday, November 06, 2003
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 03-0355/MC. U.S. v. Josephus MOORE. CCA 200102053. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed a sentence greater than that approved by the convening authority in violation of Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2000). Accordingly, said petition is hereby granted; that the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals with respect to the portion of the sentence imposing restriction for 45 days is reversed; and that in all other respects, the decision of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
Thursday, October 30, 2003
CERTIFICATES FOR REVIEW FILED
No. 04-5001/AR. U.S. v. Ray T. LEAK. CCA 20000356. The Judge Advocate General, United States Army, requests that action be taken with respect to the following issue:
Wednesday, October 29, 2003
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 02-0056/AF. U.S. v. Kerry J. NAZARIO. CCA 34221. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, said petition is hereby granted and the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
Tuesday, October 14, 2003
PETITIONS FOR GRANT OF REVIEW - OTHER SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 03-0659/NA. U.S. v. James C. BISHOP. CCA 200202383. On consideration of Appellant’s motion to file the petition for grant of review out of time, we note the absence of record evidence indicating attempted service of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals decision on Appellant and the absence of a special power of attorney. Under these particular circumstances, we are not prepared to presume that appellate defense counsel has been authorized by appellant to file the petition in this case. Cf. United States v. Daly, 4 M.J. 145 (C.M.A. 1977)(memorandum opinion). We also note that under the circumstances, the 60-day period under Article 67(b) has neither been triggered nor expired. Accordingly, the motion is hereby dismissed without prejudice.
No. 03-0662/NA. U.S. v. Ronald E. SISTRUNK. CCA 200200314. On consideration of Appellant’s motion to file the petition for grant of review out of time, we note the absence of record evidence indicating attempted service of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals decision on Appellant and the absence of a special power of attorney. Under these particular circumstances, we are not prepared to presume that appellate defense counsel has been authorized by appellant to file the petition in this case. Cf. United States v. Daly, 4 M.J. 145 (C.M.A. 1977)(memorandum opinion). We also note that under the circumstances, the 60-day period under Article 67(b) has neither been triggered nor expired. Accordingly, the motion is hereby dismissed without prejudice.
Thursday, October 09, 2003
APPEALS - SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
No. 03-0394/AF. U.S. v. Hector R. GONZALEZ Jr. CCA 34691. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, said petition is granted on the following issue specified by the Court:
Tuesday, September 30, 2003
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0256/AR. U.S. v. Jacob M. BOWLEY. CCA 20000093. Review granted on the following issue:
Wednesday, July 09, 2003
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0255/MC. U.S. v. Christopher L. KITCHEN. CCA 200100456. Review granted on the following issue specified by the Court:
Friday, June 27, 2003
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0270/AF. U.S. v. Robert J. POLFLIET Jr. CCA 34652. Review granted on the following issue:
Thursday, June 26, 2003
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
CERTIFICATES FOR REVIEW FILED
No. 03-5004/CG. U.S. v. Sean M. TARDIF. CCA 1141. The Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Coast Guard requests that action be taken with respect to the following issue:
Thursday, June 05, 2003
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0382/AR. U.S. v. Scott R. BALDWIN. CCA 20020708. Review granted on the following issue:
Tuesday, May 06, 2003
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0139/MC. U.S. v. James L. SMITH. CCA 200100147. Review granted on the following issue:
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0223/AF. U.S. v. Edward D. DEES. CCA 34841. Review granted on the following issue:
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0092/AR. U.S. v. Daniel C. HAGUE-CAMPBELL. CCA 20000735. Review granted on the following issues:
II. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE SATISFIED HIS DUTY UNDER RULE FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 910(c)(1) TO ADVISE APPELLANT OF THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE WHEN THE ADVICE GIVEN WAS PATENTLY INCORRECT.
Friday, January 24, 2003
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 03-0071/AF. U.S. v. Joseph W. LEE. CCA S29894. Review granted on the following issue:
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 02-0617/AR. U.S. v. Martin C. DUNCAN II. CCA 20010182. Review granted on the following issue:
Friday, August 23, 2002
ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW
No. 02-0556/AF. U.S. v. Kimberly A. LALIBERTE. CCA 34745. Review granted on the following issue: