This document is a report to the United States Congress on the impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) on the administration of elections for federal office during the preceding two-year period, 1999 through 2000.

States reported a total of 149,476,705 active registered voters for the 2000 federal general election. Active voter registration in those States covered by the NVRA rose very slightly to 73.80% of the Voting Age Population in 2000 compared to 73.45% in 1996 while active voter registration nationwide (including those States not covered by the NVRA) declined very slightly to 72.63% in 2000 from the all-time high of 72.77% in 1996.

According to the highlights of the report, during 1999 and 2000:

The numbers reported by covered States for confirmation notices sent, responses received, deletions made, and number of "inactive" voters during 1999-2000 suggest an increasing effort by States to maintain up-to-date lists. Several States reported that they had made adjustments to improve their list maintenance program. The most commonly reported changes involved the use of computerized voter registries and computer-assisted techniques to update the voter registration file, and the States’ increasing role in the dissemination to local jurisdictions of information necessary to maintain accurate lists. A handful of States reported successes in implementing list maintenance requirements. Two of these focused on improvements made to their statewide computerized database to help track and remove registrants who may have moved from the voter registrar’s jurisdiction. Several States reported challenges in maintaining accurate voter registration lists that were similar to those reported for 1997-1998. More than one State focused on the high costs of list maintenance programs, the inability to quickly remove deadwood, inaccurate Postal Service change of address information used to identify registrants who may have moved, lack of responses to confirmation mailings, faulty felony conviction notifications or death notices that resulted in the erroneous removal of individuals from the voter registry, increased duplicate registrations, and local election officials’ trouble mastering complicated list maintenance requirements. Most of the recommendations reported by the States focused on alleviating the high costs of list maintenance programs, on obtaining accurate and timely information from the U.S. Postal Service change of address information program, and on reducing inflated lists.

The Federal Election Commission’s survey of the 45 jurisdictions covered by the NVRA invited them to describe any problems they may have encountered and any ideas or recommendations they might have for improving the administration of the Act. The bulk of their responses focused on some of the more technical procedures associated with list maintenance, fail-safe voting, and the agency declination procedure. Many of these technical recommendations depend upon how individual States have chosen to implement various provisions of the Act. Since this report is directed to the United States Congress and not to individual State legislatures, we limit our recommendations to those universal enough to be applicable to all States covered by the Act.

The most significant problems reported by the States continue to group into three broad categories. Accordingly, the FEC reiterates the three core recommendations offered in the last two reports:

• that States which do not require all or part of the applicant’s social security number voluntarily (1) amend their election codes to require only the last four digits from all new voter registration applicants, and (2) endeavor to obtain that same item of information from all current registered voters;

• that States which have not yet done so voluntarily (1) develop and implement a statewide computerized voter registration database; (2) ensure that all local registration offices are computerized; and (3) link their statewide computerized system, where feasible, with the computerized systems of the collateral public agencies relevant to the NVRA (motor vehicle offices, public assistance offices, etc.); and

• that the U.S. Postal Service (1) create a new class of mail for "official election material" that encompasses all mail items requisite to the NVRA and provides the most favorable reduced rates affordable for the first class treatment of such mailings; and (2) provide space in their postal lobbies free of charge to State and local election officials for voter registration material.

In addition to these three general recommendations, the experience of the 2000 general election suggests four specific recommendations:

• that States develop and implement an on-going, periodic training program for relevant motor vehicle and agency personnel regarding their duties and responsibilities under the NVRA as implemented by the State’s law.

• that States require motor vehicle and agency offices to promptly transmit information regarding voter registration applicants electronically to the appropriate election office with documentation to follow.

• that States devise a procedure whereby voters may cast a provisional ballot at the polls on election day under circumstances prescribed in State law but at least for the purposes of the fail-safe provisions of the NVRA.

• that States adopt the practice of mailing a forwardable notice to all persons who are removed from the voter registration list whose mail has not previously been returned as undeliverable.

 

Several election officials expressed their concerns about the problem of identifying multiple registrations by the same individual from different addresses. Others had problems identifying applications that were duplicates of registrants on file. Still others reported problems with changes of address when the applicant neglected to provide a former address. These problems are exacerbated when applicants provide incomplete names (such as using nicknames or initials instead of full names, providing no middle name or initial, or failing to indicate the appropriate suffix of "Jr." or "Sr."). There has also been some concern about the prospect of undocumented aliens registering to vote. And finally, there have been some concerns about the possibility of persons voting in the name of others.

All of these problems have in common the issue of accurately ascertaining a registrant’s identity. To this end, the Federal Election Commission recommends the use of just the last four digits of each registrant’s social security number. There are at least four significant advantages to this strategy: (1) the combination of name, date of birth, and last four social security digits is about as close to a practical, unique personal identifier as we are likely to get in the foreseeable future; (2) requiring just the last four digits would not necessitate a change in federal law; (3) requiring just the last four digits protects registrants against the inadvertent or illegal disclosure of their full social security number; and (4) the universal use of the last four digits would greatly facilitate intrastate and even interstate communications regarding registered voters. These four advantages warrant some further explanation.

There has for years been a search for some unobtrusive, inexpensive way of ascertaining individual identities. Yet none are at hand. Fingerprints, voice prints, retinal prints, and even DNA prints, though technically possible, are far too intrusive and expensive for all but the rarest applications. And none suit the election environment. Even photo IDs entail major expenses, both initially and in maintenance, and seem an undue and potentially discriminatory burden on citizens in exercising their basic right. Moreover, the opportunity to register to vote by mail imposes severe limitations on what can be practically required of the citizenry.

Some have suggested that "place of birth" might be a reasonable choice. Yet "place of birth" has some serious drawbacks. First, it is not as precise as the last four digits of the social security number since, as a practical matter, it is far more likely that there will be more John Smiths (or whatever) born on the same day in the same large jurisdiction than there will be John Smiths born on the same day with the same last four digits of their social security numbers. Second, "place of birth" (especially if that place of birth is outside the United States) could in some circumstances be used for discriminatory purposes -- subjecting applications from foreign born citizens to a greater scrutiny that those from citizens born inside the country. It should be noted, however, that undocumented aliens are unlikely to have a social security number and might thus be deterred from inadvertently or intentionally registering to vote. And finally, "place of birth" is a far more difficult data element to encode in a computer than is the straightforward last four digits of the social security number.

The Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits States from using the full social security number for voter registration purposes unless they did so prior to January of 1975. Today, seven States can and do require the full social security number. Two States require the last four digits of the social security number. Seventeen other States request the full social security number, and three States request the last four digits. The remainder employ alternatives (such as the State drivers license number) or require nothing at all. Reverting to a requirement for the entire social security number would necessitate a change in federal law in the face of all the arguments supporting the Privacy Act in the first place. Requiring only the last four digits of that number accomplishes the same objective without necessitating a change in federal law.

Related to that legislative issue is the advantage that requiring only the last four digits of the social security number protects registrants from the inadvertent or illegal disclosure of their full social security number. The public disclosure of social security numbers is a growing problem. Unscrupulous people have used them to pry into other people’s employment records, manipulate their financial records, and even ruin their credit ratings. It is therefore incumbent on public offices to guard against such abuses; and requiring only the last four digits of registrants’ social security numbers seems, for voter registration purposes, the easiest way to do that.

The complex issue of divulging such numbers, while somewhat less sensitive than the full social security number, should be examined by the individual States themselves, with emphasis on the risks and benefits and the degree of automation present in their local jurisdictions.

The final advantage to requiring the last four digits of each registrant’s social security number is that, if universally employed, such a feature would facilitate intrastate and even interstate communications regarding registered voters. In combination with Recommendation 2 below, using the last four digits would enable States to check for multiple registrations by the same person not only within local jurisdictions, but also between local jurisdictions within the State -- an especially useful capability around large metropolitan areas. Further, it would facilitate the cancellation of a new registrant’s prior registration -- not only between local jurisdictions within the same State, but also among all local jurisdictions across all States.

A number of States reported problems in the timely transmittal of voter registration applications to their offices from motor vehicle and public assistance offices. Others, as noted, had difficulties in readily determining whether incoming applications were new or merely duplicative or else changes in name or address.

All of these problems have in common the issue of information transmittal, storage, and retrieval. In order to resolve these problems, as well as to gain a host of other benefits, the Federal Election Commission recommends that all States computerize their voter registration files both locally and statewide and further, that these computerized voter registration systems be linked where feasible with the collateral public agencies that are appropriate under the NVRA. In order to hasten this process, the Congress may want to consider providing some sort of financial assistance to the States -- perhaps in the form of a matching-fund grant program for them to develop or enhance such systems.

Possibly the most important role that a statewide computerized voter registration database can play in facilitating compliance with the NVRA lies in that Act’s intake provisions -- specifically in the requirement that drivers license and public assistance offices offer their clients an opportunity to register to vote simultaneous with their other services. If these agencies are also computerized and are linked to the voter registration database, they can transmit new registration applications instantly to the appropriate registration official. Moreover, they can immediately ascertain whether applicants are already registered at their current address. Such a capability virtually eliminates duplicate applications from those agencies -- thereby easing a burden on voter registrars.

A statewide voter registration database can also greatly facilitate the list maintenance provisions of the NVRA in at least five ways. First, it can handily accomplish the otherwise messy business of removing names by reason of death, felony conviction, or legal declaration of non compos mentis. Second, it can readily run the statewide list against the NCOA files to identify persons who have moved and left a forwarding address with the postal service. Third, it can serve as the point of contact for receiving cancellation notices from their State motor vehicle files or from election jurisdictions throughout the nation. Fourth, it can perform internal checks to guard against multiple or improper registrations. And fifth, it could even handle any or all the mailings required under the NVRA including acknowledgment notices, confirmation notices, and verification mailings.

Finally, a statewide computerized voter registration database could easily generate much of the data required by the FEC under regulations pursuant to the NVRA -- thereby easing the data collection and reporting burden on local registrars.

Such systems are by no means new. In fact, over a dozen States already maintain some form of statewide computerized voter registration list. Whether their level of computerization is "state of the art" (such as the Kentucky system of direct on-line access between the election offices, the motor vehicle offices, and the public agency offices), or whether their computerization has been more modestly developed to include only a portion or even one of these offices, States such as Arkansas, Kansas, Massachusetts, and Missouri report that their initial investment in a computerized system has proven worthwhile.

The development of a completely integrated Statewide voter registration database is neither quick nor easy. It requires time, effort, and dedication by all the agencies involved at all levels of government -- from the State legislature, the State election office, other agency offices, and the local registration offices. Nor can the product or its benefits be expected overnight. Depending on the complexity of the environment, the model chosen, the frequency of intervening elections, and the resources and skills available, the project can take two to four years (or even longer if fundamental changes to the design occur during the development cycle).

Quite a number of State and local registration officials have remarked (either in response to our survey, in professional meetings, or in personal communications with Commission staff) on the costs attendant on the mailings required by the NVRA.

The NVRA requires that local election officials employ at least four kinds of mailings:

incoming mail registration forms (as single items coming in)

outgoing acknowledgment forms (in response to each registration application)

outgoing confirmation notices (which the Act requires be "forwardable"), and

incoming confirmation postcards (as single items in response to the outgoing confirmation notices)

In addition, some jurisdictions may employ

"non-forwardable" mailings as a means of periodically verifying their registration lists as required by the Act.

At the same time, Section 8(h)(1) of the Act amends 39 U.S.C. 3629 to read "The Postal Service shall make available to a State or local voting registration official the rate for any class of mail that is available to a qualified nonprofit organization under section 3626 for the purpose of making a mailing that the official certifies is required or authorized by the National Voter Registration Act of 1993."

Accordingly, the Postal Service revised its Domestic Mail Manual to read, in part "As with all matters authorized to mail at the special rates, only third-class matter, deposited in prescribed minimum quantities and prepared in accordance with postal regulations, is eligible for these rates."

After consultations with various postal authorities, it is the Commission’s understanding that:

the rates available to qualified nonprofit organizations apply only to outgoing mailings of at least 200 items or more that are sorted by zip code or other order convenient to the Postal Service and that are delivered to a special officer at the Post Office

such items would have to be generic and devoid of references to personal or unique information (the very sort of information that a confirmation mailing would have to contain), and

the rate applies only to the original outgoing mailing and would not pertain to any "forwardable" or "address correction" services. Such services would cause a surcharge for each piece of mail so treated to be assessed to the original mailer on top of the nonprofit rate.

It would appear, then, that the "Reduced Postal Rate" offered in Section 8(h)(1) of the NVRA would not pertain, either for technical or practical reasons, to most of the mailings required or authorized by the Act. And the volume of all mailings required by the Act results in substantial costs to local jurisdictions (see Section 5 above "Regarding Costs") which are, in most cases, borne by local property taxes.

In view of these matters, the Federal Election Commission recommends that the U.S. Postal Service create a new class of mail for items containing the new "Official Election Mail" logo; that this new class of mail encompass at a minimum all mail items requisite to the NVRA; and that the USPS provide the most favorable reduced rates affordable for the first class treatment of such mailings regardless of their number or point of origin.

Recommendation 4: that States develop and implement an on-going, periodic training program for relevant motor vehicle and agency personnel regarding their duties and responsibilities under the NVRA as implemented by the State’s law.

and

Several States reported that motor vehicle offices in some areas failed to transmit voter registration applications or changes of address to the appropriate election authorities in a timely manner. The result, unfortunately, was the effective disenfranchisement of those citizens who had duly applied but whose registrations were not processed by election day. Because we heard more of this in the 2000 election than in any election previous, it seems reasonable to suspect that it may have resulted both from personnel turnover in the motor vehicle offices and simple inattention now that the novelty of the process in motor vehicle offices has worn off. A few States are considering some form of "receipt" system for persons who register at motor vehicle or agency offices. But we feel (as noted in our proposed recommendations below) that at a minimum the problem needs to be addressed by an ongoing, periodic training program geared to new motor vehicle and agency employees.

Recommendation 6: that States devise a procedure whereby voters may cast a provisional ballot at the polls on election day under circumstances prescribed in State law but at least for the purposes of the fail-safe provisions of the NVRA.

and

The 2000 federal election drew attention to a few of the more subtle aspects of election administration. Significant among these was the failure of some States to offer provisional ballots to persons who claim to be registered voters but whose registration status could not be confirmed at the polling place. The result was reports of some people being turned away from the polls and thus disenfranchised without ready recourse. Although this is part of a larger issue, it involves the NVRA insofar as it relates to the Act’s fail-safe voting provisions affecting persons whose address has changed or is mistakenly thought to have changed. While the Act does not specifically require States to provide provisional ballots to persons voting under its fail-safe provisions, the House Report on the Act does note that "Under certain circumstances it would be appropriate, and in compliance with the requirements of this Act, to require that such a person vote by some form of provisional ballot." [Hse. Rpt., Section 8, page 18]. About half of the States covered by the NVRA already employ provisional ballots for this and sometimes other purposes. And we recommend that all States do so.