Head United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix reported to the U.N. Security Council February 14 that inspectors have found no banned chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in Iraq, but he said there are continuing doubts about Iraqi's intentions to disarm. More cooperation from Iraq, he said, would speed up the inspectors' work.

Blix, executive chairman of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) said that "if Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991" as required by resolution 687, the disarmament phase could have been short and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided.

Blix, along with Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, reported on their two-day visit to Baghdad February 8 and 9, and on their inspection activities since their last report to the council on January 27.

Blix said that, so far, UNMOVIC has not found any banned weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions, which should have been declared and destroyed. But a matter of "great significance" is that "many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted for," he said.

The "most important" problems the inspectors are facing, Blix said, are anthrax and the nerve agent VX. He said Iraq missed the opportunity to provide fresh material to answer the open questions on those weapons in its December declaration.

"Although I can understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it. Iraq itself must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions," Blix said.

The UNMOVIC chief also said that Iraqi documents suggest that "some 1,000 tons of chemical agent were 'unaccounted for.' One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded. If they exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not exist credible evidence to that effect should be
presented."

During the recent meeting in Baghdad, Iraq suggested that the inspectors could use technical and analytical methods to account for the anthrax and two VX-precursors that Iraq said it had destroyed without U.N. supervision, he said.

But U.N. weapons inspectors, Blix said, "are not very hopeful that it could prove possible to assess the quantities of material poured into the ground years ago. Documentary evidence and testimony by staff that dealt with the items still appears to be needed."

On ballistic missiles, Blix said that Iraq had reconstituted casting chambers that previous U.N. weapons inspectors had ordered destroyed, rebuilt a missile engine test stand, and imported rocket engines that have resulted in missiles whose range is greater than the allowed 150 kilometers.

Blix welcomed Iraq's announcement that it was expanding the commission it set up after UNMOVIC found empty chemical weapons warheads. And he said a second commission to search all over the country for more documents "could be a useful tool."

He said that UNMOVIC planned to start using U-2 surveillance aircraft early the following week and is working on arrangements to use French Mirage aircraft and German drones.

BRIEFING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 14 FEBRUARY 2003
Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix

Introduction

Mr. President,

Since I reported to the Security Council on 27 January, UNMOVIC has
had two further weeks of operational and analytical work in New York
and active inspections in Iraq. This brings the total period of
inspections so far to 11 weeks. Since then, we have also listened on 5
February to the presentation to the Council by the U.S. Secretary of
State and the discussion that followed. Lastly, Dr. ElBaradei and I
have held another round of talks in Baghdad with our counterparts and
with Vice President Ramadan on 8 and 9 February.

Work in Iraq

Let me begin today's briefing with a short account of the work being
performed by UNMOVIC in Iraq.

We have continued to build up our capabilities. The regional office in
Mosul is now fully operational at its temporary headquarters. Plans
for a regional office at Basra are being developed. Our Hercules L-100
aircraft continues to operate routine flights between Baghdad and
Larnaca. The eight helicopters are fully operational. With the
resolution of the problems raised by Iraq for the transportation of
minders into the no-fly zones, our mobility in these zones has
improved. We expect to increase utilization of the helicopters. The
number of Iraqi minders during inspections had often reached a ratio
as high as five per inspector. During the talks in January in Baghdad,
the Iraqi side agreed to keep the ratio to about one to one. The
situation has improved.

Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections
covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without
notice, and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case
have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance
that the inspectors were coming.

The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites,
ammunition depots, research centres, universities, presidential sites,
mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities,
military camps and agricultural sites. At all sites which had been
inspected before 1998, re-baselining activities were performed. This
included the identification of the function and contents of each
building, new or old, at a site. It also included verification of
previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags, taking
samples and discussions with the site personnel regarding past and
present activities. At certain sites, ground-penetrating radar was
used to look for underground structures or buried equipment.

Through the inspections conducted so far, we have obtained a good
knowledge of the industrial and scientific landscape of Iraq, as well
as of its missile capability but, as before, we do not know every cave
and corner. Inspections are effectively helping to bridge the gap in
knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections between
December 1998 and November 2002.

More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been
collected at different sites. Three-quarters of these have been
screened using our own analytical laboratory capabilities at the
Baghdad Centre (BOMVIC). The results to date have been consistent with
Iraq's declarations.

We have now commenced the process of destroying approximately 50
litres of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being kept under
UNMOVIC seal at the Muthanna site. One-third of the quantity has
already been destroyed. The laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a
mustard gas precursor, which we found at another site, has also been
destroyed.

The total number of staff in Iraq now exceeds 250 from 60 countries.
This includes about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 15 IAEA inspectors, 50
aircrew, and 65 support staff.

Mr. President,

In my 27 January update to the Council, I said that it seemed from our
experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation
on process, most importantly prompt access to all sites and assistance
to UNMOVIC in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure. This
impression remains, and we note that access to sites has so far been
without problems, including those that had never been declared or
inspected, as well as to presidential sites and private residences.

In my last updating, I also said that a decision to cooperate on
substance was indispensable in order to bring, through inspection, the
disarmament task to completion and to set the monitoring system on a
firm course. Such cooperation, as I have noted, requires more than the
opening of doors. In the words of resolution 1441 (2002) -- it
requires immediate, unconditional and active efforts by Iraq to
resolve existing questions of disarmament -- either by presenting
remaining proscribed items and programmes for elimination or by
presenting convincing evidence that they have been eliminated. In the
current situation, one would expect Iraq to be eager to comply. While
we were in Baghdad, we met a delegation from the government of South
Africa. It was there to explain how South Africa gained the confidence
of the world in its dismantling of the nuclear weapons programme, by a
wholehearted cooperation over two years with IAEA inspectors. I have
just learned that Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa to send a
group of experts for further talks.

How much, if any, is left of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and
related proscribed items and programmes? So far, UNMOVIC has not found
any such weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions,
which should have been declared and destroyed. Another matter -- and
one of great significance -- is that many proscribed weapons and items
are not accounted for. To take an example, a document, which Iraq
provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent
were "unaccounted for." One must not jump to the conclusion that they
exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded. If they exist,
they should be presented for destruction. If they do not exist,
credible evidence to that effect should be presented.

We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence organizations
are convinced and assert that proscribed weapons, items and programmes
continue to exist. The U.S. Secretary of State presented material in
support of this conclusion. Governments have many sources of
information that are not available to inspectors. Inspectors, for
their part, must base their reports only on evidence, which they can,
themselves, examine and present publicly. Without evidence, confidence
cannot arise.

Mr. President,

In my earlier briefings, I have noted that significant outstanding
issues of substance were listed in two Security Council documents from
early 1999 (S/1999/94 and S/1999/356) and should be well known, to
Iraq. I referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax, the nerve
agent VX and long-range missiles, and said that such issues "deserve
to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside...." The
declaration submitted by Iraq on 7 December last year, despite its
large volume, missed the opportunity to provide the fresh material and
evidence needed to respond to the open questions. This is perhaps the
most important problem we are facing. Although I can understand that
it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence
needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it. Iraq itself
must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions.

Work in New York

In my January update to the Council, I referred to the Al Samoud 2 and
the Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting chambers, construction of
a missile engine test stand and the import of rocket engines, which
were all declared to UNMOVIC by Iraq. I noted that the Al Samoud 2 and
the Al Fatah could very well represent prima facie cases of proscribed
missile systems, as they had been tested to ranges exceeding the
150-kilometre limit set by the Security Council. I also noted that
Iraq had been requested to cease flight tests of these missiles until
UNMOVIC completed a technical review.

Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two days with
experts from a number of member states to discuss these items. The
experts concluded unanimously that, based on the data provided by
Iraq, the two declared variants of the Al Samoud 2 missile were
capable of exceeding 150 kilometres in range. This missile system is
therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) and
the monitoring plan adopted by resolution 715 (1991).

As for the Al Fatah, the experts found that clarification of the
missile data supplied by Iraq was required before the capability of
the missile system could be fully assessed.

With respect to the casting chambers, I note the following: UNSCOM
ordered and supervised the destruction of the casting chambers, which
had been intended for use in the production of the proscribed
Badr-2000 missile system. Iraq has declared that it has reconstituted
these chambers. The experts have confirmed that the reconstituted
casting chambers could still be used to produce motors for missiles
capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometres.
Accordingly, these chambers remain proscribed.

The experts also studied the data on the missile engine test stand
that is nearing completion and have assessed it to be capable of
testing missile engines with thrusts greater than that of the SA-2
engine. So far, the test stand has not been associated with a
proscribed activity.

On the matter of the 380 SA-2 missile engines imported outside of the
export/import mechanism and in contravention of paragraph 24 of
resolution 687 (1991), UNMOVIC inspectors were informed by Iraq during
an official briefing that these engines were intended for use in the
Al Samoud 2 missile system, which has now been assessed to be
proscribed. Any such engines configured for use in this missile system
would also be proscribed.

I intend to communicate these findings to the Government of Iraq.

Meeting in Baghdad

At the meeting in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February, the Iraqi side
addressed some of the important outstanding disarmament issues and
gave us a number of papers, e.g. regarding anthrax and growth
material, the nerve agent VX and missile production. Experts who were
present from our side studied the papers during the evening of 8
February and met with Iraqi experts in the morning of 9 February for
further clarifications. Although no new evidence was provided in the
papers and no open issues were closed through them or the expert
discussions, the presentation of the papers could be indicative of a
more active attitude focusing on important open issues.

The Iraqi side suggested that the problem of verifying the quantities
of anthrax and two VX-precursors, which had been declared unilaterally
destroyed, might be tackled through certain technical and analytical
methods. Although our experts are still assessing the suggestions,
they are not very hopeful that it could prove possible to assess the
quantities of material poured into the ground years ago. Documentary
evidence and testimony by staff that dealt with the items still
appears to be needed.

Not least against this background, a letter of 12 February from Iraq's
National Monitoring Directorate may be of relevance. It presents a
list of 83 names of participants "in the unilateral destruction in the
chemical field, which took place in the summer of 1991." As the
absence of adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains
an important reason why quantities of chemicals have been deemed
"unaccounted for," the presentation of a list of persons who can be
interviewed about the actions appears useful and pertains to
cooperation on substance. I trust that the Iraqi side will put
together a similar list of names of persons who participated in the
unilateral destruction of other proscribed items, notably icy the
biological field.

The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission, which had been
appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty chemical weapons
warheads, had had its mandate expanded to look for any still existing
proscribed items. This was welcomed.

A second commission, we learnt, has now been appointed with the task
of searching all over Iraq for more documents relevant to the
elimination of proscribed items and programmes. It is headed by the
former Minister of Oil, General Amer Rashid, and is to have very
extensive powers of search in industry, administration and even
private houses.

The two commissions could be useful tools to come up with proscribed
items to be destroyed and with new documentary evidence. They
evidently need to work fast and effectively to convince us, and the
world, that it is a serious effort.

The matter of private interviews was discussed at length during our
meeting in Baghdad. The Iraqi side confirmed the commitment, which it
made to us on 20 January, to encourage persons asked to accept such
interviews, whether in or out of Iraq. So far, we have only had
interviews in Baghdad. A number of persons have declined to be
interviewed, unless they were allowed to have an official present or
were allowed to tape the interview. Three persons that had previously
refused interviews on UNMOVIC's terms, subsequently accepted such
interviews just prior to our talks in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February.
These interviews proved informative. No further interviews have since
been accepted on our terms. I hope this will change. We feel that
interviews conducted without any third party present and without tape
recording would provide the greatest credibility.

At the recent meeting in Baghdad, as on several earlier occasions, my
colleague Dr. ElBaradei and I have urged the Iraqi side to enact
legislation implementing the UN prohibitions regarding weapons of mass
destruction. This morning we had a message that a presidential decree
has now been issued containing prohibitions with regard to importation
and production of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. We have
not yet had time to study the details of the text of the decree.

Intelligence

Mr. President, I should like to make some comments on the role of
intelligence in connection with inspections in Iraq.

A credible inspection regime requires that Iraq provide full
cooperation on "process" -- granting immediate access everywhere to
inspectors -- and on substance, providing full declarations supported
by relevant information and material and evidence. However, with the
closed society in Iraq of today and the history of inspections there,
other sources of information, such as defectors and government
intelligence agencies are required to aid the inspection process.

I remember myself how, in 1991, several inspections in Iraq, which
were based on information received from a government, helped to
disclose important parts of the nuclear weapons programme. It was
realized that an international organization authorized to perform
inspections anywhere on the ground could make good use of information
obtained from governments with eyes in the sky, ears in the ether,
access to defectors, and both eyes and ears on the market for
weapons-related material. It was understood that the information
residing in the intelligence services of governments could come to
very active use in the international effort to prevent proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. This remains true and we have by now a
good deal of experience in the matter.

International organizations need to analyze such information
critically and especially benefit when it comes from more than one
source. The intelligence agencies, for their part, must protect their
sources and methods. Those who provide such information must know that
it will be kept in strict confidence and be known to very few people.
UNMOVIC has achieved good working, relations with intelligence
agencies and the amount of information provided has been gradually
increasing. However, we must recognize that there are limitations and
that misinterpretations can occur.

Intelligence information has been useful for UNMOVIC. In one case, it
led us to a private home where documents mainly relating to laser
enrichment of uranium were found. In other cases, intelligence has led
to sites where no proscribed items were found. Even in such cases,
however, inspection of these sites were useful in proving the absence
of such items and in some cases the presence of other items --
conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being
moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily
related to weapons of mass destruction.

The presentation of intelligence information by the U.S. Secretary of
State suggested that Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up
sites and removing evidence of proscribed weapons programmes. I would
like to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with, namely,
the trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical
decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it
was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect.
We have noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken
several weeks apart. The reported movement of munitions at the site
could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of
proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection. Our
reservation on this point does not detract from our appreciation of
the briefing.

Plans for the immediate future

Yesterday, UNMOVIC informed the Iraqi authorities of its intention to
start using the U-2 surveillance aircraft early next week under
arrangements similar to those UNSCOM had followed. We are also in the
process of working out modalities for the use of the French Mirage
aircraft starting late next week and for the drones supplied by the
German government. The offer from Russia of an Antonov aircraft, with
night vision capabilities, is a welcome one and is next on our agenda
for further improving UNMOVIC's and IAEA's technical capabilities.
These developments are in line with suggestions made in a non-paper
recently circulated by France, suggesting a further strengthening, of
the inspection capabilities.

It is our intention to examine the possibilities for surveying ground
movements, notably by trucks. In the face of persistent intelligence
reports for instance about mobile biological weapons production units,
such measures could well increase the effectiveness of inspections.

UNMOVIC is still expanding its capabilities, both in terms of numbers
of staff and technical resources. On my way to the recent Baghdad
meeting, I stopped in Vienna to meet 60 experts, who had just
completed our general training course for inspectors. They came from
22 countries, including Arab countries.

Time lines

Mr. President,

UNMOVIC is not infrequently asked how much more time it needs to
complete its task in Iraq. The answer depends upon which task one has
in mind -- the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and related
items and programmes, which were prohibited in 1991 -- the disarmament
task -- or the monitoring that no new proscribed activities occur. The
latter task, though not often focused upon, is highly significant --
and not controversial. It will require monitoring, which is "ongoing,"
that is, open-ended until the Council decides otherwise.

By contrast, the task of "disarmament" foreseen in resolution 687
(1991) and the progress on "key remaining disarmament tasks" foreseen
in resolution 1284 (1999) as well as the "disarmament obligations,"
which Iraq was given a "final opportunity to comply with" under
resolution 1441 (2002), were always required to be fulfilled in a
shorter time span. Regrettably, the high degree of cooperation
required of Iraq for disarmament through inspection was not
forthcoming in 1991. Despite the elimination, under UNSCOM and IAEA
supervision, of large amounts of weapons, weapons-related items and
installations over the years, the task remained incomplete, when
inspectors were withdrawn almost 8 years later at the end of 1998.

If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the phase of
disarmament -- under resolution 687 (1991) -- could have been short
and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided. Today, three months
after the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002), the period of
disarmament through inspection could still be short, if "immediate,
active and unconditional cooperation" with UNMOVIC and the IAEA were
to be forthcoming.