Following is the transcript of the television conference:

STATE DEPARTMENT INTERACTIVE DIALOGUE
Friday, January 12, 2001

TOPIC: TALIBAN SANCTIONS

HOST: NATHAN ROBERTS

GUESTS: KARL INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS STEPHEN SESTANOVICH, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE AND SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NIS

MR. ROBERTS: Good afternoon, and welcome to American Embassy Network. I'm Nathan Roberts.

On this edition of Dialogue, we'll discuss the Taliban sanctions. And joining us to discuss this issue are Stephen Sestanovich, ambassador at large and special advisor to the secretary for New Independent States, and Karl Inderfurth, assistant secretary of State for South Asian Affairs.

Gentlemen, welcome back to Dialogue to both of you. Both of you have some opening statements. Ambassador Inderfurth, let's begin with yours.

AMB. INDERFURTH: Well, thank you very much. I very much appreciate this opportunity to discuss the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333 and what it will do and what it will not do. This resolution will be implemented on January 19th unless the Taliban agrees to the demand of the international community to end its support for terrorists.

The sanctions imposed by this resolution target the Taliban leadership and certainly not Afghanistan itself, and certainly not the Afghan people. It is wrong when the Taliban assert that these sanctions are an attack on Islam. That is not the case, and we honor and respect Islam.

The international community has agreed to take this action for one reason, and one reason only: To end the Taliban leadership's support for international terrorism. The Taliban continue to harbor indicted terrorist Osama bin Laden and his organization and maintain training camps for other terrorist groups. If the Taliban expel bin Laden to a place where he can be brought to justice and if they close the terrorist training camps in the area they control, these sanctions will be lifted.

I want to emphasize also that these new sanctions are designed to influence the Taliban, not to cause economic hardship to Afghanistan or its people. They will be lifted when the Taliban comply.

The people of Afghanistan are suffering greatly, and we know that. But it is not because of U.N. sanctions. They are suffering because of 20 years of conflict and warfare. They are suffering because of the worst drought in a generation, and now a very severe winter. And they are suffering as a result of the Taliban's continuing pursuit of a military solution, not a political settlement, to end Afghanistan's civil war, rather than governing responsibly and providing education and health care and other basic necessities for the people of Afghanistan.

Now, the world community continues to respond generously to the needs of the Afghan people, because it does care about their welfare. The United States is the single largest provider of humanitarian assistance for Afghans. In this past year alone, we donated over $100 million for this purpose. And I am convinced that the new administration, which will be taking office shortly here in Washington, will continue this vital support.

But it is in the power of the Taliban to bring this ongoing tragedy to an end by complying with the U.N. resolutions, negotiating a peaceful settlement to the war, and beginning to meet the needs of the Afghan nation and the people they claim to represent.

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Ambassador Inderfurth. Ambassador Sestanovich, your opening remarks, please

AMB. SESTANOVICH: Thank you very much. I want to echo what my friend Rick Inderfurth has said about this problem, focusing in particular on the way in which the states of the international community deal with an increasing new threat to the security of us all, and that is international terrorism.

We recognize that this is a new threat and it requires new mechanisms and new forms of cooperation if we're going to deal with it effectively. Let me mention five ways in which we try to deal with this threat cooperatively, working with states in this region.

The first is through very intense ongoing consultations to make sure we understand the threat in the same way, to develop the common mechanisms, to share information, and to benefit from the special insights that different governments may have. We learn a lot from those consultations.

Secondly is diplomatic cooperation. We have worked with the states represented in the Six Plus Two process in the U.N. to try to formulate a common approach that can convey effectively our concerns about instability in the region and can contribute to the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan.

Third, the United States works together with the states of the region to enhance their capability to deal with terrorist threats as they materialize. And Secretary Albright, when she visited Central Asia last spring, announced new forms of support in order to help the states in the region deal more effectively with threats of this kind.

Fourth, we work with the states of the region in order to limit the humanitarian consequences of war, of drought. And the United States has, over many years, been the largest donor to such humanitarian relief efforts.

And finally, we try to work with other states within the United Nations to impose sanctions where they are necessary to convey a unified message to the Taliban that the kind of support that they offer for international terrorist organizations is unacceptable and contrary to international norms and has to be answered.

I think that operating in this way, using various diplomatic channels, close consultation, support for the states of the region and delivering a clear message through the United Nations, we've been able to effectively isolate a movement that has tried to -- that has offered support for international terrorist organizations.

Our goal, of course, has to be to get a change in those policies. And that is what we're all working on together. That's the ultimate purpose of the U.N. resolution that we voted for last month and that we hope will come into force this month. We're working with states of the region to accomplish that goal and are hopeful that we'll get there.

Thank you.

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you very much, Ambassador Sestanovich. Our participants are standing by now in Tashkent, Islamabad and Peshawar. We're going to begin with Islamabad. Please go ahead with your first question.

Q: Hello. My name is -- (inaudible). I'm an executive editor at the News, which is one of Pakistan's leading English dailies. Thank you very much for giving us the opportunity to have this exchange and discourse.

Before I issue my very brief question, let me give you two lines on what happened before I came to participate in this program. I was visiting a friend in the hospital because he has taken ill. And there a baby was born to a fairly moderate educated Pakistani family. And Mr. Karl Inderfurth, you will be dismayed to know that the baby has been named Osama.

Now my question. My question is that the whole object of U.S. policy, as you articulated in a recent statement that appeared in Pakistan newspapers, is to encourage a spirit of moderation and democracy and those values that are anti-extremism. There's a perception in Pakistan, as elsewhere in the region, that your punitive policy against the Taliban is actually proving to be counterproductive. It is pushing social groups, political groups and religious groups into the lap of extremism and it is defeating the very aim for which you are pursuing this policy. Your response, please?

AMB. INDERFURTH: Well, first of all, part of my response is that I am certainly not pleased but not surprised that another child has been named after Osama bin Laden. That, as you know, is not something that is the first time.

We believe that bin Laden is not a hero. We believe that he has not been an appropriate guest of the Afghan people. In fact, he has dishonored Afghanistan because of his actions. And we believe that he should be brought to justice. But we recognize that many people see him in a different light, and we believe the best way to clear that up would be for him to stand trial and to make his case and to see how that would unfold.

On the question of our policies, we have tried very hard to communicate directly with the Taliban our concerns. We've been doing that for the last number of years to express concerns about its support for international terrorism and, of course, for Osama bin Laden.

The Taliban have not listened. And so last year the U.N. Security Council, by unanimous vote, adopted Resolution 1267. It has been yet another year in which the Taliban have refused to comply with this expression of international concern, so yet another resolution has been adopted.

We do not want to have a punitive approach. We are concerned about Afghanistan. We consider ourselves longstanding friends of the country and its people, going back to the Soviet era, when we worked together to see Afghanistan become free. We do not want to take a punitive approach. But right now we have few options that are available to the international community to deal with this.

So if the Taliban, as I said in my statement, if it will comply with these demands of the international community, then I think that we can get on to other issues of far more importance, quite frankly, to the Afghan people than what we see now.

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you very much, Islamabad. We're now going to go to Tashkent for our next question. Go ahead, please.

Q: Good morning. Mr. Karin Baker (sp), political commentator, of Uzbek Television. My question: There are sanctions that are going to be on for a whole month from 19 December to 18 January. Are there going to be similar sanctions laid on Pakistan, since Pakistan openly supported and continues to support the Talibs in various ways and gives them military support as well? Thank you.

AMB. INDERFURTH: These sanctions are directed to the Taliban, and the steps that the international community have agreed to relate to bringing pressure and influence to bear on the Taliban itself. It will, of course, be the responsibility of all members of the international community, including Pakistan, to enforce the resolution, Resolution 1333. And we believe that Pakistan will do this.

We recognize that Pakistan has been one of three countries to recognize the Taliban, and we recognize that Pakistan, probably more than any other country, has a direct interest in what transpires in Afghanistan. Pakistan has geography, a national interest, and an important historic role with respect to Afghanistan.

But we do believe that Pakistan will comply with this resolution and that it will take the appropriate steps calling for an end to all forms of assistance to the Taliban. And hopefully Pakistan will use its influence with the Taliban to encourage it to comply so that these sanctions can be lifted.

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you very much, Tashkent. Our participants now are standing by in Peshawar.

Q: I'm Jalud Sadid (ph), executive editor of Daily Osaf (ph). It's an Urdu newspaper from Islamabad. My question is that when Taliban had started emerging in Afghanistan, America was supporting them, with the impression that they would be gaining strength there and they would bring stability in Afghanistan.

But we want to know, what went wrong? And since when you begin to realize that Taliban were harboring terrorism and they were supporting the terrorists and they were running the terrorist camps inside Afghanistan? The impression here is that you started -- you turned against Taliban because they were actually an Islamic group and they were trying to establish an Islamic government in Afghanistan. I want your response on that. Thank you.

AMB. INDERFURTH: Well, the United States never supported the Taliban. The United States, as well as the international community, watched the growth of the Taliban movement and what it professed to wish to do, which was to bring order and peace to Afghanistan. We did not know a great deal about the Taliban. Then it took Kabul. And there was, I think, a willingness by the international community to have an open mind to what the Taliban was and what it intended to do with respect to Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, any hopes that were there in the international community have been dashed as a result of the rule of the Taliban in those areas that it controls. The Taliban has not been forthcoming in terms of finding a political settlement to the war. It has continued to pursue a military solution. And we think that that is impossible, that that will not take place.

We have seen evidence clearly with the residence of Osama bin Laden there and other terrorist training groups that Afghanistan has become a base for international terrorism. We think that this dishonors Afghanistan. It has also become the world's leading supplier of opium and narcotics, and this is something that has developed over the last several years during the period in which the Taliban have been in control of much of the country. And the Taliban's own interpretation of treatment on human rights, and particularly the treatment of women and girls, has been repugnant to the international community.

None of this, however, is a statement against Islam. It is a statement against the Taliban and its interpretation of one of the world's great religions. And it is simply not agreed to by many other Islamic nations. So we are not anti-Islamic in the least. Islam is one of the fastest-growing religions in the United States, and we honor that. But the Taliban itself, because of its actions, has basically turned the international community against it and is now resulting in resolutions being adopted in the U.N. Security Council.

MR. ROBERTS: Ambassador Sestanovich has some comments as well.

AMB. SESTANOVICH: Let me add one point to this. I mentioned in my opening remarks that our starting point in responding to the kinds of problems that we see emanating from Afghanistan is consultation with the states of the region and a dialogue to share information and assessments to make sure we've got our assessment of the problem right.

Over the past several years, as I have discussed these regional issues with the governments of Central Asia, I've noticed a rising concern about Afghanistan in all of those consultations, a concern about the spillover effect into Central Asia of first the unresolved war in Afghanistan, the support given by the Taliban for extremists, armed insurgencies that have a base in Afghanistan, the support for expansion of the international drug trade from the Taliban.

These are strong impressions that we receive from other governments, who experience them first-hand, who live on Afghanistan's doorstep, and who do not have to form their impressions from long distance. They're very strong expressions of concern, ones that we take seriously, and are the starting point of our policy.

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Peshawar. We're going to return now for our next round of questioning from Islamabad. So go ahead, please, Islamabad.

Q: Hi. My name is Zafrabas (ph), and I write for a Pakistani magazine called the Herald. My question -- any of you two can take my question, and it is about the effect of the sanctions and its religious impact in the region. Ambassador Sestanovich talked about the spillover effect into Central Asia and the fears that are emanating from it.

You must have heard that two days ago in Pakistan, there was a gathering of almost all prominent religious parties, and they all condemned these sanctions against the Taliban, the policies. And these included several of the religious Islamic groups, which, until now, were not supporters of the Taliban. So don't you see or don't you fear that this kind of a decision or action is going to encourage Islamic fundamentalism in the region?

AMB. INDERFURTH: Well, part of the reason that we are doing this broadcast today is to try to make it clear what these sanctions are about and what they're not about. We think that there is a great deal of misinformation about these sanctions.

We're trying to make the point that these are directed on the Taliban to get it to do something that the international community, the U.N. Security Council, is asking, and that these are targeted specifically on the Taliban and that the entire effort that we made in New York was to avoid any negative impact on the Afghan people.

But we believe that there is a great deal of misinformation out there, and we hope that this program will serve to correct some of that and to make it very clear that international terrorism is a concern that we all have. It's shared by the countries in the region itself, including by Pakistan. We believe that Pakistan is also at risk by the presence in Afghanistan of terrorists that are training and that all the countries in the region should support what is being done in New York.

AMB. SESTANOVICH: Let me add to this. As we consulted with a variety of countries last fall in the preparation of the resolution that the Security Council passed in December, we found wide agreement that it was important to limit any negative humanitarian consequences of a resolution. And that's why the resolution was formulated in the way that it was, precisely to avoid negative humanitarian consequences.

As you probably know, the U.N.'s own sanctions committee has reviewed the issue of humanitarian impact and found that the previous resolution had not had a negative humanitarian impact, but we've been very eager to avoid any such negative humanitarian impact in the future.

The reasons for it are obvious. The states surrounding Afghanistan would bear some of the brunt of this if there were an increase in refugees. There already is a flow of refugees because of drought, because of war. And the states of the region have had to bear the burden. They don't want to bear an increased burden.

The point of this effort is not to ask states of the region to shoulder a large burden. It is to send a message to the Taliban about the need for a change in their policy. So I think we've found a rather strong consensus about the kind of resolution that would be appropriate to send that message.

Q: (Off mike) -- sanctions deadline expires on the 19th of January, [the Taliban] refused to mend their ways and change their attitude. What will be the next step followed by the international community? We ask this question because the United States of America arbitrarily has already taken the most extreme step of striking in Afghanistan. And as we discovered, as they are discovering, that event had the opposite effect and the spillover was -- (inaudible) -- in countries like Pakistan and even in Bangladesh. You've already struck in Afghanistan. You have imposed maximum sanctions. If the Taliban do not mend their ways, what will come next?

AMB. INDERFURTH: Well, first of all, our strike was not arbitrary. It was a strike to hopefully head off further terrorist activities, as we saw in the East Africa bombings of two American embassies where American lives and African lives were lost. So this was not an arbitrary action. And hopefully it would serve the purpose of saying that future actions would not take place.

In terms of maximum sanctions, these are not maximum sanctions. There will be no economic cutoff, commercial cutoff with respect to trade and commerce for Afghanistan. We are not trying to impose a quarantine around Afghanistan, because that would have a significant humanitarian effect.

So we have done everything we can in this resolution to see the humanitarian conditions met, to allow international agencies and relief organizations to continue providing the assistance they are to the people of Afghanistan. That is all in the resolution itself.

Now, in terms of what occurs next, we are only just beginning this latest resolution on January 19th. I would prefer not to begin discussing at this point what further measures would be considered by the international community. I would hope that no further measures would be needed because we would hope the Taliban would now comply with this yet again expression of concern by the international community.

So we are looking for compliance, not further consideration of additional measures. But we will be, in the months following January 19th, after this goes into effect, working very hard to make sure that countries in the region and around the world do everything they can to enforce this resolution. So we will be focusing, at least in the initial months ahead, on the implementation of this resolution. And we hope again that not only will we not need to consider additional measures, but that these can be lifted.

I'm Jamid Subik (ph) again from Islamabad. You and your -- (inaudible) -- have been holding dialogue with Taliban leadership for the expulsion of Osama bin Laden and bringing him to justice. Do you think that the course of dialogue is closed now and this option has been given up and sanctions and military action is the only option left for you? Thank you.

AMB. INDERFURTH: No, emphatically I do not believe that the course of dialogue has been closed and that the only options that remain are sanctions and, as you put it, military action. That is not our view. We have tried very hard in a variety of locations, whether it be Islamabad or in Kabul itself, when we traveled there with Ambassador Bill Richardson and met Bula Rubani (ph) and others. We have met with Taliban officials in New York and in Washington and various locations around the world to try to get on the same frequency so that the Taliban would understand why our concerns are as strong as they are.

We have prevented -- I'm sorry. We have presented information on Osama bin Laden to the Taliban on the indictment of him for the actions that we believe were taken with respect to the bombings of our embassies in East Africa, a very detailed presentation contained in that indictment. And we have offered additional information on that.

So we have tried to bring our concerns and the concerns of the international community directly to the Taliban, and we will continue to do that. But the fact is we have not been able to reach an understanding with the Taliban about the nature of this threat and what we believe that they should do. We hope and we will continue that effort to make some connection so that we're fully understood.

AMB. SESTANOVICH: Let me just add two points to this. Rick is absolutely right about dialogue. We're not the only ones who conduct a dialogue of sorts with the Taliban. The states of the region, who have the kinds of concerns that we've been talking about here today, also maintain close contact so as to be able to keep channels of communication open and express our concerns about what the Taliban is doing that threatens us and that threatens these other states.

But there's an important distinction between a dialogue to convey those concerns, to convey a consistent message, and a dialogue that confers legitimacy. And our position has been that we want a dialogue that allows open channels of communication, that conveys the message that we want, without creating an impression of normalization, of recognition of the Taliban, because the kinds of policies that they have followed, I think, are, in the judgment of most states and certainly the ones that we talk to, really incompatible with good citizenship in the international community.

I find -- this is the second point -- there is a rather strong consensus about what it is that's actually happening in the relationship between the Taliban and the international terrorist organizations. There was a time when some people had doubts about whether it was really the kind of relationship that we have alleged. But I find that -- and I hear in your question an implicit acceptance that, in fact, there is a harboring of international terrorists, and the question is how we deal with it.

I think international experience suggests that there's not a lot of progress made when you're dealing with that kind of problem except by sending a very consistent message that no good will come of support for international terrorist organizations.

MR. ROBERTS: Islamabad, thank you very much. We want to return now to Peshawar for our next question. Go ahead, please.

Q: (Inaudible.)

MR. ROBERTS: Peshawar, could you turn your speakers down? We have some interference here and we are unable to hear your question unless you turn your speakers down.

Q: Hello. Can you hear?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Go ahead.

Q: This is -- (inaudible) -- Peshawar. This is a question about the arms embargo against Taliban. I think majority of -- (inaudible) -- an arms embargo. I think most people here in Pakistan also are in support of the arms embargo, but it should be on both sides. There's a feeling that the U.S. is obliging the Shiah by exempting the anti-Taliban alliance from the arms embargo. In fact, there's a feeling that you are supporting the Russian ambitions in the region. And I read an article in Washington Post which said that you're also exposing the -- (inaudible) -- to suffering because of the sanctions. What is your answer?

AMB. INDERFURTH: Could I just first say on this, and then turn to Ambassador Sestanovich, that on the question of a one-sided arms embargo, there is a reason for that. It is not because the United States or the international community are taking sides. This resolution is about terrorism and support for terrorism and it is about the continuing presence in Afghanistan of Osama bin Laden. Therefore, the sanctions contained in this resolution are directed against the party where this is taking place; namely, in the Taliban-controlled territory.

So this is not, again, a choice of one side versus the other. It is directed against the Taliban because they are the party in this conflict that control the territory where these camps, terrorist camps, are located. And they have made the decision to provide bin Laden with safe haven. That is the reason why this is a one-sided arms embargo.

Steve.

AMB. SESTANOVICH: You asked about Russian policy. Our approach in formulating this resolution, one year after the initial resolution in the Security Council calling on the Taliban to cease support for international terrorists, our support was, as I said, consultative with interested parties. We consulted with the Russians, as we have over the years on this issue.

We consulted with other members of the U.N. Security Council, and on that basis found a strong consensus; 13 out of 15 members of the Security Council voted in favor of this resolution and none voted against. And we consulted with the states of the region, as I said, in order to find a resolution that would express a consensus of interested states, especially the ones most directly affected by Taliban policies.

We tried to limit the humanitarian consequences. I think we've very successfully done that, but have also, because of, on the basis of our consultations with states in the region, wanted to send a very strong and consistent message to the Taliban. That's not a reflection of the preferences of one country, but of 13 out of 15 in the U.N. Security Council and most of the states of the region.

MR. ROBERTS: We're going to return now for our next round of questioning to Tashkent. Go ahead, please.

Q: The National Agency of Pakistan. Mr. Sestanovich mentioned about the Central Asian republics and the situation in Afghanistan. I just wanted to say that the growth in Afghanistan of all the problems in narcotics, et cetera, represents a threat to the immediate neighbors of Afghanistan, those who are about to become narco-transiting zones. Now, all the fear from the terrorists and their activities, as we see from all the bloody activities -- the bandits have been operating south of Tashkent and in many of our different districts.

Now, what steps have been taken, in your opinion, in order to settle this in a joint way, in other words, to take joint measures together with our countries in the region? Thank you.

AMB. SESTANOVICH: Let me mention one initiative here, and that has been to put to the Taliban very strongly the concern of regional states and states all around the world that Afghanistan has become a major source of narcotics, reaching markets very, very far from Afghanistan. And I believe President Kamirov (ph) said recently that as long as Afghanistan is the leading supplier of drugs, that it represents a threat to stability in the Central Asian region.

There have been strong efforts to persuade the Taliban to end opium production, and there have been assurances from the Taliban that that is their goal. They can't do anything other than state that this is the goal because around the world there is a demand for this. But at the same time, we've seen an increase in production.

The Six Plus Two effort within the U.N. formulated an action plan to counter narcotics production. But the crucial ingredient of this, as in all other counternarcotics efforts, is the cooperation of authorities in the country in question. And without that, I don't think there can be an effective counternarcotics effort that deals with this problem that affects so many states.

Q: (Inaudible) -- Independent TV in Samerkant (ph). The question to Ambassador Sestanovich. The government of Uzbekistan supports these sanctions against the Talibs and supports even a more severe policy. But recently they've been talking about opening the border with Afghanistan and establishing better relations. What do you think about Uzbekistan's policy that's changing vis-a-vis the Talibs and Afghanistan in general? And what is the U.S. attitude towards this? Thank you.

AMB. SESTANOVICH: Let me just say it's a pleasure to continue a friendly relationship with Independent TV in Samerkant. I've been in your studios in the past and look forward to being there again in the future.

The subject of Afghanistan is one of the prominent ones in our dialogue with the government of Uzbekistan; has been for a number of years and has only become more deeply discussed over time. And we, I think, have a core agreement about the nature of this problem and about how to deal with it, and it's on that basis that the government of Uzbekistan supported the U.N. resolution last month and has spoken out about the difficulties created for it and other states of the region by the policies of the Taliban.

Now, there are at different times steps taken to deal with particular problems. No country likes to have a closed border with a neighbor, so that it is easy to understand the initiative, the desire to open a border. But I think on the core question, are the policies of the Taliban a threat to neighbors? Are sanctions and an arms embargo against the Taliban an important element of sending a message to the Taliban? I think on those issues we continue to have an agreement. And it is on the basis of -- that agreement gives us stronger confidence that we're moving in the right direction.

Q: The head editor of Turkish -- (inaudible) -- Press. In the recent past we've heard news reports that Osama bin Laden has left or is preparing to leave Afghanistan. How would you comment on such reports? Thank you.

AMB. INDERFURTH: Unfortunately, we have seen such reports in the past. They have not proved to be the case. We have no reason to believe that this latest report is accurate, although we would certainly welcome Osama bin Laden's leaving Afghanistan. I think that would be the best thing for the Afghan nation and the people. But again, we have seen no evidence to suggest that he has left, and we have seen no evidence that he has stopped his planning and the various activities that are of such concern to the international community.

We do not believe that he has been placed under any effective control. And indeed, an investigation continues into the terrorist attack on the U.S. naval vessel, the USS Cole. There is information pointing back to Afghanistan, although no final determination has been made for who was responsible for that attack. But again, we believe that bin Laden continues to reside and operate inside Afghanistan, in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

Q: Marina Kozlova (ph) speaking, United Press International. Tell me, please, how strong are the relations between the Talibs and the Islam Movement of Uzbekistan? What specific proof is there that they are friends? And what measures will be taken against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan by the U.S., in addition to just placing their names on the terrorist list?

AMB. SESTANOVICH: As you know, the United States government designated the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan a foreign terrorist organization last fall, and this has certain legal consequences within our laws. It means that it is easier for our authorities to interrupt contact between the IMU and its representatives, who might be trying to get financial benefits from any contacts that they might have in the United States.

We think it's the kind of example that other countries might follow because, as with other international terrorist organizations, we believe that it's one of the most effective means of countering their activities is for other governments to unite and to sort of choke off their activities beyond the borders where they may have sanctuary, as in this case in Afghanistan.

I don't find that anybody really disputes the idea that there is a kind of sanctuary for IMU training in Afghanistan. And, in fact, you know, the only issue really is how to eliminate that sanctuary and persuade the Taliban that that is, as I said earlier, inconsistent with international good citizenship.

I haven't heard anyone really challenge the proposition that they have a base of operations, and all the states of the region want to limit the impact of their activities. An armed insurgency that can move across borders with significant numbers of men and sophisticated arms is, of course, a threat to all states in the region.

MR. ROBERTS: We're going to return now to Peshawar for the next question. Go ahead, please.

Q: Can you hear me?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes.

Q: Hello. My name is Hanas (ph) from Peshawar. My question is that it was -- (inaudible) -- meant to result in a further -- (inaudible) -- isolation of the Taliban. Don't do you think that such isolation makes the Taliban more dependent on their foreign supporters? And won't the Taliban become more extreme through the process, especially keeping in view that nowadays what some people call extremism or anti-Americanism has -- (inaudible) -- mainly because of your policy vis-a-vis the Middle East, namely Palestinian refugees in Iraq? (Inaudible) -- the so-called moderate Arab regimes also shifted to the hard line. And at the end, sanctions on countries like Iran and Iraq didn't prove effective.

AMB. INDERFURTH: Well, we certainly hope that these sanctions will not push the Taliban to become more extremist or rely on those who are practicing terrorism. That is certainly not the intention. We believe that the Taliban, if they indeed have the welfare of the Afghan people at heart, that the Taliban will recognize that these sanctions will further isolate them as a movement, making it more difficult for them to operate, and that the international community stands ready to assist Afghanistan in the reconstruction of that country if they can move toward peace and reconciliation in dealing with these concerns of narcotics and terrorism and the treatment of people there, including women and children.

There is a great deal of concern in the international community, which can be translated into assistance for Afghanistan, not only additional humanitarian assistance, which is already being done, but reconstruction assistance. And it's also important to recognize that as long as Afghanistan is at war, it will not be able to become economically moving forward.

There are possibilities that exist for opening up trade and commerce and pipelines, all of these things that could benefit Afghanistan enormously. None of these things will take place as long as the war continues and as long as the Taliban continues to practice a very strict regime and allowing terrorists to train there.

So our hope is that the Taliban will recognize and the Afghan people will recognize that it must turn away from these policies and turn toward the international community, which does want to have relations with Afghanistan that are positive, constructive, and that will be helpful and prosperous to the Afghan people.

Q: In Peshawar, this question concerns the effect on the -- (inaudible). And you have been saying these are Taliban-specific. But I will give you an example that the flights between Kabul and -- (inaudible) -- also used by the -- (inaudible) -- who are working in the Gulf countries. There was some private trade also going on, which has now stopped. And the -- (inaudible) -- used to be sent by these flights. Now all -- (inaudible) -- have to fly to Pakistan and then go to Afghanistan, which costs more and takes more time. And then there have been U.N. reservations and also by the western NGOs, and they fear that the sanctions will also affect the common Afghan people.

AMB. INDERFURTH: Well, we recognize that when Resolution 1267 went into effect, there were some initial disruptions. But we believe that those have been addressed over time, that a great deal of the commercial traffic in the West that you're referring to is now taking place over land as opposed to by air, because we have seen the sanctions targeted on (our?) airlines. But we believe that those things which you mentioned are being addressed in other ways. It is not something that we want to see any disruption in commerce or those things which will help the Afghan people.

So we hope that with Resolution 1333, that there will be no further disruptions. And we believe the Taliban can do a great deal to ensure that humanitarian assistance continues to flow to the Afghan people by providing assurances for the international organizations and the relief organizations that are working there. And the Taliban has done that, and we commend that.

MR. ROBERTS: And with that, I'm afraid that our time is up. Our discussion must come to an end. But our thanks to both Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich and Ambassador Karl Inderfurth for joining us here on Dialogue, as well as to all of you, our participants in Tashkent, Islamabad and Peshawar.

For more information, we have a Web site address that is on your screen right now. If you would like more information, you can just get on the Internet at that address and that will help you get any other information that you were not able to obtain during this time that we were able to spend with you.

From Washington, I'm Nathan Roberts. Thanks for joining us.