The United States is not alone in its concern over communist North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, according to State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher.

In a January 3 briefing at the State Department, Boucher noted that South Korea, Japan, Russia and China also wanted to see "an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, uranium enrichment programs."

Boucher told reporters that it was important that Pyongyang understand that there must be "a verifiable dismantlement of these programs."

He said the United States would be consulting with its allies Japan and the Republic of Korea on how to achieve a peaceful resolution to the situation the following week when representatives from Seoul and Tokyo arrive in the United States for a trilateral meeting to coordinate policy regarding North Korea.

In response to a reporter's question regarding Pyongyang's call for a non-aggression pact between the communist regime and the United States, Boucher said the issue was not one of non-aggression.

"The issue is whether North Korea will verifiably dismantle these nuclear enrichment programs, or this nuclear enrichment program," Boucher said.

Both President George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell, he observed, "have said on a number of occasions that we have no intention to invade North Korea, we have no hostile intent towards Pyongyang, and we are seeking, like others, a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issues."

However, Boucher added, the United States has made it clear that the Bush administration is not going "to enter into negotiations in response to threats or broken commitments and we are not going to bargain or offer inducements to North Korea to live up to the treaties and agreements that it has signed."

In the January 2 State Department briefing Boucher said the United States would continue to provide food aid for the North Korean people, and that the Bush administration doesn't intend "to curtail food for political reasons.

"The United States has been the largest donor of food aid to the programs that supply food to the North Korean people," Boucher said, "We would expect to continue to supply food for those programs."

When the United States has its new budget, he went on, "we'll consider what the amounts might be in the coming year."

The Bush administration, Boucher said, has made it clear that it does intend "to continue to provide food and we don't intend to curtail food for political reasons."

However, he added, the United States has also made it clear that it is "concerned about the monitoring" of shipments of food aid to the communist regime.

"Any food we provide, we would want to be able to work with the World Food Program and the North Koreans to make sure it gets to the people who deserve it and who need it," said Boucher, "And we've asked questions about the monitoring of food aid that have not been responded to by the North Koreans."

(January 3 briefing)


BRIEFER: Richard Boucher, Spokesman

NORTH KOREA
-- North Korean Nuclear Program/US Consultations with Allies
-- North Korea's Call for Talks/Non-Aggression Pact
-- Reported South Korean Offer to "Mediate" between US and DPRK

MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I don't have any statements or announcements. I would be glad to take your questions.

QUESTION: May we look at Korea again today where -- from where there were reports suggesting that the US has to compromise in order to stop North Korea's nuclear program? You have a meeting coming up. Are you entering it in a compromising or open-minded view or something?

MR. BOUCHER: First of all, the meeting is with our allies -- with Japan and South Korea. We coordinate with our allies. We coordinate very closely on all the various aspects of policy and things that we have to do together. I think it is clear from our consultations and from the statements that are being made that all the allies and other interested countries like China and Russia want to see an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, uranium enrichment programs, specifically, that they have admitted.

How to achieve this, how to proceed down this path peacefully -- because we are all committed to a peaceful resolution -- is the subject of our consultations. So we will be seeing the Japanese, the Koreans, next Monday and Tuesday in a trilateral meeting. We will have further discussions when Mr. Kelly goes out. I can also tell you that Under Secretary Bolton will be out there later this month, as well, to talk to the Japanese, the Koreans and the Chinese about this issue.

So it is a matter of ongoing consultation and coordination with a number of governments to try to achieve a peaceful resolution. But what is important is that North Korea understands that it all begins with a verifiable dismantlement of these programs.

QUESTION: Excuse me. Mr. Bolton is going to those three countries?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes, Mr. Bolton is going to those three countries after Assistant Secretary Kelly.

QUESTION: Right to South Korea and China?

MR. BOUCHER: And China. I am not exactly sure if I have -- I do not think I have Kelly's itinerary yet -- Assistant Secretary Kelly -- but he will be out in the region in the next week or so. Then after that, later in the month of January, Under Secretary Bolton will be in South Korea, Japan and China.

QUESTION: Someplace in this mix the South Korean president is coming here, I think next month. Let's see -- the president-elect.

MR. BOUCHER: The president-elect. Yes, I am not exactly sure when, frankly. They have talked on the phone, remember.

QUESTION: Bolton is this month?

MR. BOUCHER: January.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: Richard, two things that are both basically related. What does the US make, if anything, of the North Koreans' latest suggestion or statement that they are willing to talk if you guys are willing to sign a non-aggression pact? And two, what is your reaction, if you have any, to the South Korean president-elect's offer to mediate between the US and North Korea?

MR. BOUCHER: I think the reaction to both is pretty much what I just said. The issue is not non-aggression. The issue is whether North Korea will verifiably dismantle these nuclear enrichment programs, or this nuclear enrichment program. The President and the Secretary have said on a number of occasions that we have no intention to invade North Korea, we have no hostile intent towards Pyongyang, and we are seeking, like others, a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issues.

We have also made clear we are not going to enter into negotiations in response to threats or broken commitments and we are not going to bargain or offer inducements to North Korea to live up to the treaties and agreements that it has signed. So, as I said, the issue is whether North Korea will verifiably and visibly dismantle its nuclear weapons program that violates previous commitments.

QUESTION: It's hard to -- can I ask one thing quickly?

MR. BOUCHER: Now, the South Korean side of things -- we have been working very closely with the South Koreans. We have shared concerns regarding North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons. We have noted, in particular, South Korean Foreign Ministry statements that North Korea must scrap its nuclear weapons programs.

South Korea and others are making this point in their dialogues with North Korea. North Korea must understand that the international community is in an agreement that its actions are a challenge to all responsible nations. So that is the point that's being made by the South Koreans in their discussions, and we think that point should be made by them and others as they hold those discussions.

QUESTION: But are you guys willing to entertain their offer of -- is this something you will be discussing?

MR. BOUCHER: I do not think there has actually been a particular offer of that sort at this point. Certainly, to the extent that anyone has contact with North Korea as the South Koreans do, as the Japanese and others do, the Chinese and Russians, we believe it is important for them to make this point -- that as the South Korean Foreign Ministry has said, it all begins with North Korea ending these programs.

QUESTION: Just one quick clarification. It's hard to tell from here, from afar, and also I know if it went through translation, but there are accounts in which the South Korean News Agency is speaking of a swap and exchange of halting the program in exchange for a security agreement. I don't know if security is different from non-aggression, and I don't know, frankly, when the Secretary rules out a non-aggression treaty, being a very formal thing, and on the other hand, we've said a lot of words that sound like no intent to attack them, is there something in between that can be worked with?

MR. BOUCHER: I do not know. I do not want to speculate. There is -- I agree with you -- a lot of speculation in the press. Some of it by people named, some of it unnamed people, saying 'well, maybe this, maybe that, this idea, maybe that idea.' I am sure people are presenting ideas and we will discuss ideas with others in the next week or so and as we continue our consultations.

I think for the United States, it is very clear. This is, I think, a position that is held by others who are looking for a peaceful resolution. We are not willing to bargain or negotiate over commitments that have made before. We are looking for North Korea to visibly and verifiably dismantle its nuclear programs and we have no intent to invade the North. Those things are quite clear in terms of our policy. Now, how to achieve those goals is something that we will be discussing with these other governments.

QUESTION: But that commitment -- if you're referring to the '94 commitment -- was not a commitment to end all programs. Don't you want more than what the US got in '94? Are you just trying to restore the '94 commitment or do you want a broad statement --

MR. BOUCHER: No, the '94 commitment -- I mean, we -- first of all, there was a commitment in '94 that was to end its nuclear weapons programs. That is our view of the Agreed Framework. Certainly nothing in the '94 agreement would, in any way, permit the North Koreans to go ahead and find another way of making nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: Right.

MR. BOUCHER: And we have said very clearly that this program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons is a violation of the Agreed Framework, of the South Korea-North Korea Denuclearization Agreement, and of North Korea's commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency frameworks. So it is a violation of multiple commitments. And the point is that they have to respect those commitments.

QUESTION: Richard, please explain to us your objections to this non-aggression pact bit. I mean, I understand that you say it's irrelevant and redundant, but that isn't the same as saying -- that isn't, in itself, it seems to me, a reason to reject their request for one. It isn't -- I mean, since you're saying you have no hostile intent, it doesn't rule out a concession of any kind. So why do you not -- why are you so unwilling to go along with it?

MR. BOUCHER: I think, Jonathan, the question is: Is that the issue or not? And it is not the issue.

QUESTION: It's the issue to them, so --

MR. BOUCHER: Slow down. That is not the issue. The issue is not non-aggression. Our policy on that has been made clear. The President has made it clear. We and others have been seeking a peaceful solution. It does not start by saying 'well, let's go back, let's rush back to the bargaining table and start giving away things, whatever their value, whatever their importance, in exchange for North Korea agreeing to abide by commitments it's previously made.' Our intention is -- we have no intention to sit down and bargain again to pay for this horse again, as it has been put very bluntly by Jim Kelly and others. We are not entering into a negotiation on something extraneous or that is not the issue in order to get them to commit to something that they have already committed to.

QUESTION: Okay, can I just try again, then?

MR. BOUCHER: I will try again, too.

QUESTION: What is the difference between saying we have no hostile intent and coming to a non-aggression pact with North Korea? What is the difference? Why is one a concession, whereas the other is not?

MR. BOUCHER: The issue is not coming or not coming to a pact. The issue is whether or not you allow yourself to be -- whether you put yourself in a negotiation to get the North Koreans to agree to something that they have already agreed to and they have already violated. We have no intent to 're-bargain' this bargain. The North Koreans made a commitment and we want to see that commitment respected. That is where it all starts, that is what the South Korean Foreign Ministry has said where it all starts, and that is what various others have said as well.

Sir?

QUESTION: What is your reaction to Charles Krauthammer's suggestion that you go along with Japan's developing nuclear capacity if North Korea does not --

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any particular comment on that suggestion. I do not know that Japan has any particular program in that regard.

Sir?

QUESTION: Well, I just wanted to make sure I understood you in your answer to Jonathan. Is you have no intent to re-bargain the bargain, i.e. the Ninth, the Agreed Framework. That's what you're talking about there?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes, it is re-bargain --

QUESTION: Re-bargain the meeting.

MR. BOUCHER: -- to renegotiate the basic commitment that has already been negotiated that North Korea will not pursue nuclear weapons programs.

QUESTION: So, are you -- so, in other words you're not willing to give the North Koreans anything at all in exchange for them going back -- them returning to -- they have to point the ground, well, that's a bad word -- .

MR. BOUCHER: They have to verifiably and visibly dismantle these programs.

QUESTION: The starting point before you'll enter into any kind of discussion or --

MR. BOUCHER: Negotiation or -- yes.

QUESTION: Okay, that's all I needed.

MR. BOUCHER: That is what we have said again and again and again.

Back there?

QUESTION: A follow-up on the commentary and story. Is it being considered at all to either sell Japan or North -- South Korea nuclear weapons or technologies or they can do it themselves? Is that being considered?

MR. BOUCHER: No, no, no, and no to the follow-up, as well.

Sir?

QUESTION: You said that our policy is clearly stated, but another one that's been clearly stated in recent months is the preemption -- that the US will not allow threats to gather, but will take action to stop them. Why does that not particularly apply here with North Korea?

MR. BOUCHER: Preemption, and particularly military preemption, is not necessarily a first choice for policy makers. The first choice for policy makers is to deal with the issue and to deal with this issue peacefully with the help of others in the international community, to work together with the nations that have influence on North Korea and influence on North Korea's future aspirations. That is the policy choice that has been made, and that is the policy that's being pursued.

QUESTION: Richard, when you say you have no intention of attacking North Korea, what's the time frame on that commitment? I mean, is that (inaudible) --

MR. BOUCHER: When the President said it in South Korea, he did not make any --

QUESTION: -- or you might change your mind tomorrow?

MR. BOUCHER: When the President said it in South Korea, I do not think he put any time frame on it. You can look up his original words if you want.

QUESTION: Richard, you said the phrase "no hostile intent." Those same words are contained in the US-North Korean Joint Statement of October 12th, 2000, when Marshal Jo was here and met with Albright and others. Do you consider that document still to be valid?

MR. BOUCHER: I do not think this administration has ever tried to take a formal position on that document, but as I said, the Secretary and the President made clear we have no intention of attacking the North and no hostile intent as regards the North. That is the policy of this administration.

QUESTION: Sir, do you guys regard that the North's offer for talks in exchange for a non-aggression pact with the United States as an attempt by them to split the South Koreans from -- to deal directly with only the United States, as they have long wanted to do, and to take the South Koreans and also the Japanese out of the equation?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, you know, two days ago, the question was being asked: 'Are they trying to split South Korea off and deal only with the South Koreans and not with the United States?' And today, you're asking: 'Are they trying to split South Korea off and deal only with the United States and not with South Korea?'

The point is that we, the South Koreans, the Japanese, the Chinese and the Russians have been working very closely on this, particularly closely with those allies in the neighborhood -- the Japanese and the South Koreans. However you want to interpret one statement one day or another statement another day from the North Koreans, the fact is we coordinate very closely with our allies. We are all in this together, we are all working together, and we all have very similar and consistent points of view.

QUESTION: And that coordination, has it, in the last day or so, involved any secretarial-level discussions?

MR. BOUCHER: He has certainly been in close touch with our people and others who are interested in the situation out there, but he has not called --

QUESTION: He hasn't called the Russians, Tang or --

MR. BOUCHER: Well, he talked about it in his -- he talked to Foreign Minister Papandreou, new head of the European Union, and they talked about North Korea. And I can't remember to what extent it has come up, for example, in his conversations with Kofi Annan in the last day or two. But North Korea has certainly been a subject of discussion with a number of the foreign leaders that he has been in touch with. .