Since its inception in 2002, the G-8 Global Partnership has represented a major milestone in the world-wide effort to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow said in Moscow April 23.

Addressing the conference "The G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction," Vershbow discussed several key non-proliferation efforts in Russia including downsizing of that nation's nuclear weapons complex and down-blending highly enriched uranium (HEU) stocks of weapons-usable fissile material for use in civilian reactors.

While non-proliferation in Russia will remain the priority for the Global Partnership, Vershbow said now is time to expand to key states of the former Soviet Union.

"Ukraine is a natural choice as the next recipient nation," Vershbow said, but he stressed that this expansion would not diminish Global Partnership efforts underway in Russia.

Vershbow said that despite numerous success stories, there are also numerous signs of weaknesses in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The cases of Iran and North Korea, he said, "have all-too-clearly demonstrated that the non-proliferation regime is under strain," and he went on to describe Iran's 18-year clandestine effort to develop a nuclear weapons program and North Korea's prohibited development of nuclear technologies while still being party to the NPT.

Vershbow outlined several of President Bush's proposals to prevent further abuses by strengthening non-proliferation activities around the world, including calling on the UN to pass a resolution "requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders."

The ambassador also called for the expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) saying it "has created the practical basis for cooperation among states in disrupting the trade in WMD, delivery systems, and related material" and was instrumental in "convincing Colonel Qadhafi to give up his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and rejoin the community of nations."

In addition to fighting nuclear proliferation, Vershbow said the United States is working closely with Russia to combat the risks of a bio-terrorism attack.

"If terrorists were able to harness infectious pathogens, the impact of the attack could be felt around the world - on the life and well-being of our citizens, on trade and travel, on national and international security," he said.

Vershbow said the United States has proposed a plan of action to other G-8 members to combat the threat by cooperating in enhanced surveillance of infectious diseases, identifying emergency health response assets, and strengthening the protection of the food supply chain.

NEXT STEPS IN NON-PROLIFERATION

Remarks at the Conference "The G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction"

Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to Russia

PIR Center, Moscow, April 23, 2004

I am honored to speak to you today. I would like to thank the PIR Center for bringing us together so that we can focus our collective energy, creativity, and intellect on the challenge of stemming the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Just as we have come together here today - representatives from many nations brought together by a common purpose - so too have our governments come together, committing substantial resources to making tangible progress in reducing the threat we all face from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our joint project, the Global Partnership, is a major milestone in post-Cold-War efforts to stop proliferation. Twelve years ago, Nunn-Lugar, or the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) initiative, redefined the relationship between the great powers and set us on a new course, leaving behind our destructive antagonism in exchange for a collective approach to reducing a common threat. Today, our multi-national partnership expands and intensifies that commitment.

To be sure, the path has not always been smooth, as the inevitable complications of implementation have slowed progress in some areas. But these are resolvable issues, which should not deter us from our broader goal. Regarding the pace of implementation and the flow of funds for Global Partnership projects, nothing breeds success like success; as we clear away obstacles, our pace will quicken. And we must remember: it is concrete results that matter. Spending money fast is easy if you don't particularly care whether it is properly spent. But the money is there, pledges are increasing, and our diligence will ensure that we employ our resources wisely to achieve our ends.

Since other sessions of the conference will delve into the details of specific projects, I'd like to step back a bit to consider our achievement and our challenges from a broader perspective. It is in stepping back that we are reminded of how far we have come and, more importantly, of what remains to be done.

We should be encouraged that the Global Partnership, given birth by the G-8, has been adopted by Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, and Sweden, which already have committed over $200 million. Moreover, more nations have expressed an interest in joining the cause, making our partnership even more truly global. This reflects a growing international consensus, supported by resources and institutional arrangements, that will prove critical in maintaining the momentum of our non-proliferation efforts. I have great confidence that we will meet or exceed the $20-billion-over-ten-years pledge we made at Kananaskis, and that our efforts will go far toward securing or destroying materials of concern.

Nonetheless, even assuming our Global Partnership projects hit all of their targets, we must not grow complacent. I believe we should keep in mind Winston Churchill's dictum, "It is no use saying, 'We are doing our best.' You have got to succeed in doing what is necessary." And the fullest measure of our success is not dollars spent, or chemical weapons neutralized, or nuclear submarines dismantled, but whether we are effectively preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, we must judge our efforts by that criterion. And where we are at risk of falling short, we must, as Churchill said, do no less than what is necessary, for the stakes are that high.

While we have worked closely with Russia to address the risks of bio-terrorism, we must do more. As the recent SARS epidemic and other outbreaks have demonstrated, exotic diseases can wreak immense havoc even without any guiding hand. If terrorists were able to harness infectious pathogens, the impact of the attack could be felt around the world - on the life and well-being of our citizens, on trade and travel, on national and international security.

In recognition of this threat, my government has proposed a plan of action to other G-8 members. As a starting point, we believe that we need to cooperate in enhanced surveillance of infectious diseases. We need a clearinghouse of emergency health response assets so we can quickly identify the tools available to us in the case of a bioterror attack. We need to strengthen the protection of the food supply chain. And Russia, with its vast reservoir of scientific talent, has the potential to be an important partner in this effort.

In the nuclear sphere, we have seen great progress here in Russia. Just last month, I visited the closed city of Novouralsk, where I was greatly impressed by U.S.-Russian cooperation not only in safeguarding nuclear materials, but also in downblending highly enriched uranium (HEU) for sale to the United States for use in civilian reactors. The HEU recovered from demobilized Russian warheads will generate enough electricity to meet all the needs of the United States for three years. This remarkable program is fittingly called "Megatons to Megawatts."

Despite this stirring success story and progress on other critical programs here in Russia, events elsewhere have all-too-clearly demonstrated that the non-proliferation regime is under strain.

While we've been moving ahead here, albeit slowly, with plans to halt the production of weapons-grade plutonium, the North Koreans have declared they are reprocessing spent fuel rods, using many technologies acquired or developed while the country was still a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and explicitly prohibited from such actions.

While our governments have expended over $150 million since 1999 here in Russia through the International Science and Technology Center to ensure there is no leakage of WMD technology or expertise to rogue nations, Iran has been cynically manipulating the NPT to continue its 18-year clandestine effort to develop its own nuclear weapons program. Despite pressure from the United States, the European Union, Russia and other members of the IAEA Board of Governors, continued Iranian deception clearly demonstrates that Iran has not changed its ways, and there is no evidence it has decided to abandon its weapons program. Iran's failure to include information about advanced centrifuges in the so-called "complete centrifuge R&D; chronology" that was part of its purportedly "full" disclosure in October, and its incomprehensible suspension of inspections in response to the IAEA Board of Governors' call for greater cooperation, are but two of the latest examples of continued Iranian deceit.

While we have worked closely with Russia to develop material protection and control systems to guard against smuggling, we've uncovered a frighteningly sophisticated international smuggling network coordinated by Pakistan's A. Q. Khan. Now that the demand of rogue states for weapons technologies has given rise to such supply networks, unless we eradicate them, it may be only a matter of time before they seek out new pockets of demand, offering their services directly to terrorist organizations.

So let us take pride in what we have done and will do under the Global Partnership, but let us also take stock of what we must do differently to meet the evolving threat.

On February 11, President Bush spoke before our National Defense University outlining proposals for bolstering our non-proliferation regime. I would like to touch upon those ideas today.

First of all, as President Bush said, we need to expand the reach of the Global Partnership. From the outset, our commitment was to begin in Russia, but to expand to include key states of the former Soviet Union. We believe that the time has come to do that, and that Ukraine is a natural choice as the next recipient nation. Russia will remain our priority, and widening the circle of recipient countries will not diminish or dilute Global Partnership efforts underway in Russia. Yet we believe that a global problem requires an appropriately global approach.

We believe that the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should be expanded. PSI has created the practical basis for cooperation among states in disrupting the trade in WMD, delivery systems, and related material. We have had productive conversations with Russia about its possible role in the initiative, and are hopeful that Russia will soon join. Already such interdiction activities have proven their worth - for example, by halting a shipment of enrichment equipment to Libya. This was an important step in convincing Colonel Qadhafi to give up his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and rejoin the community of nations. Yet PSI can do more. We should extend its reach to include cooperation between law enforcement agencies to take direct action against proliferation networks and thereby prevent, not just disrupt, proliferation.

President Bush called upon the UN Security Council to pass a resolution requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders. We are working closely with Russia and other Security Council members to pass this resolution swiftly. Once the resolution is passed, we will stand ready to help other governments to draft and enforce effective laws to combat proliferation.

Furthermore, we need to strengthen the hand of the IAEA in three ways:

First, by the end of 2005, any state wishing to import equipment for civilian nuclear programs should have signed the Additional Protocol and be moving to ratify and implement its measures, with a view toward granting the IAEA the essential access to verify peaceful intentions. (I am pleased to note that the U.S. Senate ratified the Additional Protocol on March 31.)

Second, we should create a special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors that focuses intensively on safeguards and verification, ensuring that the Agency is prepared to take action to address possible violations whenever necessary.

Third, we need to eliminate a flaw in IAEA procedures that allows states under investigation for safeguards violations to serve on the Board of Governors, as Iran did last year. While all states would retain the right to present their cases in full detail, no state whose conduct of its safeguards commitments has been found deficient by the Board and Director General should be allowed to sit in judgment of itself in an organization that relies so heavily on decision by consensus.

President Bush's final proposal was that we must close a loophole in the NPT that has allowed states such as Iran and North Korea to develop weapons capabilities under the cover of civilian nuclear programs. The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants.

This is a key proposal, and one that has raised some questions. The proposal draws long-overdue attention to the fact that the NPT does not specifically prohibit the supply of technologies or materials that bring a country dangerously close to bomb-making. And regrettably as we have seen, there are countries which are all too willing to exploit this ambiguity by claiming a "right" to engage in activity that is completely unnecessary for a civilian nuclear program, but critical to weapons development.

According to the central bargain implicit in the NPT, states willing to renounce permanently any intention of developing nuclear weapons will receive access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This proposal maintains that bargain: it would commit the world's leading nuclear exporters to ensuring that states have reliable access, at reasonable cost, to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. By circumscribing the sale of enrichment and reprocessing technology, we in no way hinder states interested in the truly peaceful benefits of nuclear energy, and take an important step toward thwarting the ambitions of those with overt or covert military motives.

Let us avoid getting tangled in unhelpful distinctions between the nuclear "haves" and the "have-nots." For such distinctions miss the larger and more important point - that we all share an overriding common interest in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Disagreements over details may divide us, but let us step back from time to time to remember what has brought us together to form a Global Partnership in a united effort to create a world secure and free.

And if we must speak of "haves" and "have-nots," let us remember that the critical line lies between those of us who "have" a respect for order, international obligations, and the sanctity of human life, and those who "have not." We have seen what horrors such nihilists can unleash with a bomb in a Moscow metro, with explosive-filled backpacks in a Madrid railway, with commercial airliners in the skies over Pennsylvania, Washington, and New York. Let us do what is necessary to ensure that they and those who support them never acquire the means of annihilation that they seek. Let that goal be our guide.

I thank you for your attention, and look forward to our continued cooperation, during this conference, and in the years ahead.