(This column by John Bolton, who is under secretary of state for Arms Control and International Security, appeared in The Financial Times on September 7 and is in the public domain. There are no republication restrictions.)

An All-Out War on Proliferation
By John R. Bolton

Some supporters of "multilateralism" prefer to talk about its glories in the abstract rather than take action in the here and now. The Bush administration's nonproliferation policies fall into the latter category. Rather than rely on cumbersome treaty-based bureaucracies, this administration has launched initiatives that involve cooperative action with other sovereign states to deny rogue nations and terrorists access to the materials and know-how needed to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Our policies show that robust use of the sovereign authorities we and our allies possess can produce real results.

The Bush administration is reinventing the nonproliferation regime it inherited, crafting policies to fill gaping holes, reinforcing earlier patchwork fixes, assembling allies, creating precedents and changing perceived realities and stilted legal thinking. The front lines in our nonproliferation strategy must extend beyond the well-known rogue states to the trade routes and entities engaged in supplying proliferant countries. This can properly be described not as "nonproliferation," but as "counterproliferation." To accomplish this, we are making more robust use of existing authorities, including sanctions, interdiction and credible export controls. Most importantly, we have taken significant steps to improve coordination between sovereign states to act against proliferators.

As we learned from the unraveling of the clandestine nuclear weapons network run by [Pakistani nuclear engineer] A.Q. Khan, and from the Libyan WMD program, proliferators employ increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures to obtain WMD or missile-related materials. They rely heavily on front companies and illicit brokers in their quest for arms, equipment, sensitive technology and dual-use goods.

In his September 2003 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, George W. Bush proposed that the Security Council pass a resolution calling on member states to criminalize WMD proliferation, enact export controls and secure sensitive materials within their borders. The resulting Security Council Resolution 1540, unanimously adopted, achieved the president's goals. Rather than requiring years negotiating treaties and creating elaborate institutions, Resolution 1540 rests on the notion that sovereign states are responsible for writing and implementing laws closing the loopholes exploited by black market WMD networks.

Among the most prominent of this administration's counterproliferation innovations is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). We say that PSI is "an activity, not an organization," in this case an activity designed to halt trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems and related materials. In developing PSI, our main goal has been a simple one: to enable practical cooperation among states to help navigate this increasingly challenging arena. The initiative focuses on enhancing states' operational capabilities in the intelligence, military and law enforcement arenas. More than 60 countries gathered in Poland just over a month ago to mark PSI's one-year anniversary -- and some notable successes. The interception, in cooperation with the U.K., Germany, and Italy, of the BBC China, a vessel loaded with nuclear-related components, helped convince Libya that the days of undisturbed accumulation of WMD were over, and helped unravel A.Q. Khan's network.

Another important administration initiative is the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched by the Group of Eight [G8] at its June 2002 summit. Here again, this effort relies on the commitments of sovereign states acting separately and in concert to secure sensitive materials. Like PSI, the Global Partnership is an activity, not an organization. The G8 leaders and 13 additional partners have pledged to raise up to $20 billion (£11.3bn) over 10 years for projects to prevent dangerous weapons and materials from falling into the wrong hands.

The U.S. already has nonproliferation projects under way not only in Russia but in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and other former Soviet states, as do other Global Partnership countries. We recently began assistance in Iraq and Libya, and are encouraging our partners to undertake their own projects in such states. At Sea Island this year, the G8 agreed to use the Global Partnership to coordinate activities in these areas.

This administration is working to make up for decades of stillborn plans, wishful thinking and irresponsible passivity. We're already late, but we are no longer bystanders wringing our hands and hoping that somehow we will find shelter from gathering threats. We are no longer lost in endless international negotiations whose point seems to be negotiation rather than decision, and no longer waiting beneath the empty protection of a reluctant international body while seeking grudging permission to take measures to protect ourselves.

President Bush has begun laying the foundation for a comprehensive, root-and-branch approach to the mortal danger of the proliferation of instruments intended for our destruction. We are determined to use every resource at our disposal -- using diplomacy regularly, economic pressure when it makes a difference, active law enforcement when appropriate and military force when we must.

We are just at the beginning, but it is an extraordinary beginning. Not only are we meeting this ultimate of threats on the field, we are advancing on it, battling not only aggressively, but successfully. And so we must, for the outcome of this battle may hold nothing less than the chance to survive.