Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I call attention to a report prepared at my request by the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service entitled `China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis.' As ranking member of the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I have been keenly interested in the implications of Chinese conventional force modernization on Asian stability.

I am providing copies of this excellent analysis, which was authorized by Shirley Kan, Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O'Rourke, to all Senators. I believe my colleagues will find the report useful and insightful as we assess American policy towards China.

The report examines the major foreign conventional weapon systems that China has acquired or has committed to acquire since 1990, with particular attention to implications for U.S. security concerns. It pays special attention to Chinese air and naval acquisitions and describes how Chinese leaders began to pay greater attention to modernizing the People's Liberation Army, PLA, in the early 1990s, transforming it from a force mainly oriented towards domestic security to one focused on modern warfare. Since then, China has ranked among the top 10 leading arms buyers among developing nations.

According to the analysis, the catalyst for PLA modernization, including the procurement of advanced foreign military equipment, was China's view that its top security problem was preventing Taiwan's permanent separation and securing unification as `one China.' However, additional security goals may be precluding Japan's rise as the strongest Asian power, ensuring Chinese influence over the Korean Peninsula, supporting Chinese claims to territory in the East and South China Seas, subduing India's quest for power, and countering American power in the region.

As China modernizes its forces, it is clear that arms sales from Russia are essential, providing advance aircraft, including Su-27 fighters, missile systems, submarines, and surface ships. The report is unclear as to the strategic advantage derived by Russia in selling such advanced systems to a country with which it historically has had difficulty along a shared border.

The report concludes that the operational significance of these major qualitative upgrades through foreign arms acquisitions remains to be seen and will depend in large measure on the PLA's ability to demonstrate an ability to conduct effective joint military operations.

The report also does an excellent job of comparing Chinese new conventional weapons to American capabilities, suggesting that in most cases--with some critical exceptions--American forces still retain a tactical and strategic edge. For example, the report mentions the potential threat from a nuclear armed SS-N-22, an anti-ship cruise missile, and the superior capabilities of the Su-27 fighter aircraft. Obviously, the United States should not be complacent. The Chinese are, for the first time in modern history, developing a capability to project air and naval forces beyond their coastal areas. The United States needs to seek ways to address any threat to American interests as a result of that capability not only through pursuing our own military modernization program but also through a strategic dialogue with China which reassures China that we have a shared desire in regional stability. Indeed, in many ways, initiating a productive diplomatic dialogue with China on Asian security may be more difficult than maintaining our qualitative edge on power projection.

Again, I commend this excellent report by the Congressional Research Service which was coordinated by Shirley Kan, a specialist in National Security Policy. It is one of the most comprehensive, unclassified assessments currently available on Chinese conventional arms acquisitions.