Following is a transcript of the Wolf interview:

QUESTION: How have the events of September 11 and their aftermath created a new sense of urgency with respect to nonproliferation for those who deal with it in the State Department on a daily basis?

ANSWER: I think that is an important way to characterize it. It creates a new sense of urgency and a new sense of visibility for an issue that was very important before September 11. It reminds a wider audience of the continuum between terrorism and efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery mechanisms. The civilized world needs to combat, with every ounce of strength available to it, any efforts by terrorists to acquire such weapons -- because they have shown, time and again, that they will use them.

The old model of balance of power that existed during the Cold War does not apply for people who are prepared to be suicide bombers and to cause massive destruction; they are wanton killers. The seriousness of this effort certainly resonates with every person in the Bureau of Nonproliferation, and it registered with me even before I took this job. I went to a service for the military in September at Catholic University , which was attended by people from all over Washington, including some who were survivors or who had lost people during the Pentagon attack. So the events of September 11 underscored for me, and I think they underscored for all of us, our responsibility to that broad community, and you can even take it right down to our own community or even to a family level. The service I attended certainly did that for me.

Q: Recently President Bush requested a new comprehensive strategy to prevent proliferation. How are you involved in that, what are the elements of that strategy, and when might it be unveiled?

A: The elements are still being worked on but the strategy will deal with nonproliferation, counter-proliferation and consequence management and will look at a broad variety of tools that can be applied. In this administration, nonproliferation policy and coordination is being chaired at the White House. The National Security Council is taking the lead, but formulation is part of an interagency process.

A lot of elements will be wrapped up in a new broad strategy, but we are not waiting. We don't need the program to know who the players are. We don't need the cookbook to know what the recipes of success are, and we have been very active in international regimes like the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime), the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technology in terms of accelerating their work.

We're working on strengthening the IAEA's (International Atomic Energy Agency) capabilities on safeguards to prevent nuclear terrorism. We have a whole set of policies vis-a-vis the nuclear Materials, Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC & A) program in Russia, and we are working to compress the time needed to accomplish the program's objectives. We are going to do it faster, we hope, by a significant margin, depending on the Russians.

We have a series of things we are doing on plutonium disposition with Russian plutonium production reactors. We have a new fix to safeguard 300 tons of spent fuel including three tons of pure plutonium in Kazakhstan.

We have an aggressive set of initiatives under way on export controls, including in Central Asia where we are using supplemental funds for individual country plans. We have a bio-warfare initiative that will complement those that we previewed at the fifth Biological Weapons Review Conference (in November). We shortly will preview with allies a series of BW countermeasures dealing with some of the domestic and international trade issues both in terms of practices and equipment. These are things that are moving forward. And there will be more to come.

Then we will have to court Congress to provide the increased funds that the United States needs, and we will also expect our allies and friends to pony up more than they have heretofore. The countries where nonproliferation is a problem will also have to take on some of the burden-sharing responsibility.

Q: What are your top policy and program priorities as the newly installed assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation?

A: Getting a handle on plutonium -- what exists out there. We want to protect what exists and stop the production of weapons-grade material that is still being produced. We want to safeguard plutonium and highly enriched uranium. We want to move down the food chain.

We need to initiate and implement a rigorous set of measures aimed at biological and chemical weapons trafficking and capabilities. We need to pay close attention to issues in South Asia. We need to augment export controls. We need to strengthen some of the international regimes as well as measures that we do bilaterally.

Q: The U.S. and Russia passed a key milestone in December 2001 when the level of strategic nuclear weapons on both sides dropped to 6,000, fulfilling obligations imposed by the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. What does this say about America's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and do you think enough attention has been given to this milestone?

A: I think it is more important that Presidents Bush and Putin have signaled their intention to further cut the number of deployed strategic warheads and to do it in a concerted and quick fashion.

When countries look and ask whether the United States is upholding its part of the nuclear nonproliferation bargain, the answer is: we sure as heck are. We are dismantling warheads and we are cutting up delivery vehicles and we are now going to dramatically slash the number of strategic warheads.

It's good to achieve the December milestone, but the big news is the Bush-Putin announcements made in Crawford, Texas about what we intend to do. [The U.S. is planning to draw down its deployed weapons to a level of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads, and Russia to around 1,500 to 2,200.]

So if you are asking how does that reflect on our nonproliferation priorities - we are upholding our commitment under the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).

Q: Does the U.S. plan to reaffirm the importance of the NPT in any fundamental way in the coming year?

A: We have done it and we will continue to do so. It is a bedrock, fundamental part of U.S. national security policy. We are absolutely committed to it and to its full implementation.

Q: The U.S. has publicly identified Iraq and North Korea as proliferators. What are your particular concerns with each of them and what has the United States asked our allies and friends to do with respect to these two countries?

A: Well, they're not the only ones. While we often talk about Iraq and North Korea, the Central Intelligence Agency does a semi-annual report and you can look at that and see the concerns we have about Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, China, Russia, and probably some others as well, in different categories -- whether missiles or chemical or biological capabilities or in their nuclear weapons aspirations. There are clear worries out there about members of this subset, and we have made known to Russia and China our concerns about their contributions to the capabilities of various countries. In North Korea, we are worried about its WMD program as well as its exports to other countries that are developing WMD programs and their delivery capability.

Q: Do you think there will be any solution to Iraq's continued failure to adhere to United Nations resolutions allowing UN weapons inspectors unfettered access to suspect sites?

A: Our policy is very clear; it's not just our policy, it's the world's policy that dates back to 1991. UN Resolution 687 was unequivocal. I was there; I helped formulate it. Those obligations are not voluntary; they are mandatory. And the world is insistent. I think Resolution 1382 on the Iraqi Oil-For-Food program is a reaffirmation of a solid consensus of the UN Security Council that we want those monitors back; they should be back today.

Q: Is the absence of such inspections any indication of failed non-proliferation efforts?

A: No, it is a clear reflection of Iraq's flouting of international law. It reflects Iraqi efforts to reconstitute part or all of its weapons of mass destruction program. It is a challenge to the international community. It is a risk not only to the region but also to the broader international community.

Having said that, we think it is important for the UN Security Council to put into place the Goods Review List [indicating which goods imported by Iraq will still require UN review] because our concern is precisely about Iraq's violation of the military aspects of Resolution 687. We are determined to remove, for humanitarian reasons, the encumbrances that some believe affect the supply of goods to the Iraqi civil economy. They shouldn't be there. [Once the Goods Review List is in place, regular civilian commercial goods not on the list may be imported freely, without review.]

The onus is really on Saddam Hussein now. But there is a perception that somehow there is a blockage in the passage of the Goods Review List. It has to be made clear that any failure to get goods into the civil economy is the responsibility of the government of Iraq. That's the circumstance now, and the passage of the Goods Review List will make clear that that's the case.

Q: With President Bush's announced intention to withdraw from the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) by summer, some critics are accusing the U.S. of paving the way for the proliferat
ion of weapons in space. How can the U.S. act to defend itself, on the one hand, without raising the prospect of a race to weaponize space on the other?

A: The President has made clear that we need a defensive capability that is able to deal with the risk that comes from rogue states or terrorist groups possessing weapons of mass destruction and delivery vehicles. And frankly, after September 11 it should be clear that if they've got them, then they will use them. U.S. deployment of a missile defense system is like buying an insurance policy.

September 11 struck a blow against the world economy that can be measured in terms of hundreds of billions of dollars - maybe more. And actually the damage is most severe against those that are least capable of enduring it: the developing nations. Our economic problems turn into a tidal wave in the developing world -- not our doing, but as a consequence of the lack of demand within the developing economies.

So if you realize that four aircraft crashing into three buildings in New York and Virginia and the Pennsylvania woods can cause that - just think what would happen if a rogue state or a terrorist group were to attack with a weapon of mass destruction. That's why a defensive capability against such a circumstance is a pretty reasonable idea.

Q: The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has suggested that the administration's announced intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty may put pressure on China to produce additional nuclear weapons, and that in turn may place pressure on India and Pakistan to develop further weapons. What do you think will be the short and long-term effects?

A: In the absence of facts one can say a number of things. In point of fact, China is already building more missiles, but our defensive missile capability is not aimed at China and it's not aimed at Russia, it is aimed at rogue states.

And India and Pakistan have to understand that a race forward toward more missiles and better nuclear weapons is not the real answer to a stable equilibrium in South Asia. They are going to have to deal with their problems on a political level. That's what we hope will happen.

Q: One aspect of U.S. non-proliferation policy, as you mentioned earlier, has been to help Russia ensure physical security for its NBC (Nuclear, Chemical and Biological) systems and to assist in dismantling efforts. What is the status of that politically and fiscally, and where is it going?

A: We are accelerating our efforts. We are working on a variety things regarding plutonium disposition.

Q: Disposition in a new way?

A: We are working on plutonium disposition, with more news on that subject coming in the near future. We're working on closing down plutonium production reactors. We're increasing our efforts on material protection, control and accounting (the MPC & A program). We are increasing our efforts under the International Science and Technology Centers as well as bio-redirection programs. The Defense Department does a variety of things that are continuing to break up missiles for Russian weapons disposal.

Q: Is the subject of curbing nuclear smuggling on your agenda with Moscow?

A: Our hope with the MPC & A program is to consolidate things that go bang -- fissile material-- into safer storage areas. It's not the whole answer, but it's part of the answer, along with better export controls and better monitoring of borders, and better training of border officials. All those are part of an ongoing agenda.

As best we can tell, and you don't know what you don't know, a lot of the stories about nuclear smuggling really involve scams. People are selling depleted uranium cases or low enriched uranium and passing it off as weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. That's not to say that there is any room for complacency, quite the contrary. We need to do more and we need to do it better and faster with cooperation from the Russians as well as other neighboring countries.

Q: Are you seeing receptivity to the U.S. desire for better export controls?

A: Yes, especially in the area of export controls we've had good success with Russia and with the NIS (Newly Independent States) countries, and we are expanding this.

Q: With negotiations to strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) suspended for a year, how do you expect the U.S. will work with friends and allies to attempt to bridge the gap between the U.S. position on how to improve it and that of other delegations?

A: We are going to work with them. And we have a number of ideas that we expect to discuss with our friends and others on things relating to trafficking -- bilaterally and multilaterally. Some of those ideas will be a complement to the measures described at the BWC Review Conference in Geneva. So there is a whole package of ideas, and you may find that in all of that it creates a common international sense of purpose.

Meanwhile, you've got to get the substance right. So we're working on substance. Form ought to derive from the substance and not the substance from the form. We have to organize to accomplish real things as opposed to meeting to meet. In this administration, we like to know we are doing something real that can be accomplished rather than just meeting to talk.

Q: Does the U.S. harbor concerns about further Indian and Pakistani nuclear ambitions, or are they seen as responsible powers?

A: They have these weapons and we have to deal with it, but we still have a series of concerns about nuclear weapons, their delivery capabilities and the risks of proliferation in South Asia.

Q: What will be on your agenda with the Israelis?

A: We'll probably talk about proliferation issues in the region around Israel. There is a lot that is going on.

Q: How would you gauge U.S. concerns about Iranian proliferation activities?

A: They are a threat to our friends in the region and they are a real threat to U.S. armed forces that are located adjacent to the region -- and not just to our military forces, but to those of other NATO countries.

Q: How would you like to see the IAEA's (International Atomic Energy Agency) nuclear inspection system strengthened and how likely is it to occur any time soon?

A: IAEA safeguard responsibilities are a fundamentally important
part of the NPT and of the world's efforts to protect fissile material and to develop civil nuclear power programs in a responsible way. A country's obligations under the NPT, and in some ways the IAEA's responsibilities, can be described therefore as statutory - they are not voluntary. So I guess we worry that IAEA's budget has not enabled it to continue to grow at the same rate as nuclear development.

We think that the IAEA is doing a good job, and we think the situation is still in hand, but the agency is going to have to grow as the nuclear business expands and as more countries adopt additional protocols. IAEA responsibilities are going to grow even more than they have in the last 8 to 10 years. So we want to be sure that the IAEA continues to have rigorous and comprehensive safeguards and continues to reassure the world community that programs are safe and that apparently peaceful programs are not somehow concealing covert moves toward nuclear weapons capabilities.

The lesson of Iraq and North Korea should be sobering to all of us. North Korea was a party to the NPT and it had IAEA safeguards and nonetheless was developing a nuclear weapons capability prior to the 1994 Agreed Framework pact between the United States and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea; ditto for Iraq prior to the Gulf War.

Q: Is there a segment of thought within the administration that formal, international treaties to thwart the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are somewhat passe?

A: No. We are going to be vigorous. We put aside ones that we didn't think could be successful or which put at risk U.S. vital national interests. We are members in good standing of the NPT, BWC and CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) as well as international arms control regimes like the MTCR, the Australia Group, the NSG, and Wassenaar that advance nonproliferation objectives and help ensure a safer world with less risk from weapons of mass destruction and their delivery capabilities.

It would be nice to say we were stopping the trafficking, but it goes on. But we are making a dent and clearly we are going to try and make a much bigger dent through increased bilateral and multilateral efforts.

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